INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOLUME 58

1982

Published quarterly for the

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

by the

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

.1—WINTER 1981/82

No. 2—SPRING 1982

No. 3—SUMMER 1982

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

WINTER 1981-82

Vol. 58, No. 1 £3.50 (UK only)

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

WINTER 1981-82

£3.50 (UK

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOUNDED IN 1922

WINTER 1981-82

PAGE

Published quarterly for the

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

by the

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 58 WINTER 1981/82 NO. 1

EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION: AMERICA SHOULD WELCOME IT

Lord Carrington

IN a speech in London just 30 years ago, General Eisenhower, then Allied Commander in Europe, called for unity among the European nations. 'It would be difficult indeed', he said, 'to overstate the benefits, in these years of stress and tension, that would accrue to NATO if the free nations of Europe were truly a unit.'

This Community of Ten nowadays provides increasingly the context in which Britain frames its domestic and its foreign policies. Since Britain currently occupies the Presidency of the Community, it is particularly appropriate for the British Foreign Secretary to discuss Europe's foreign policy: how it has developed up to now, how it may grow in the future and how I believe it can contribute to the overall strength of the Western world.

I should make it clear at the outset that Britain's membership of the European Community does not conflict with but contributes to a new chapter in our historic friendship and partnership with the United States. Ours is a tried and tested friendship based on a shared history and a common heritage, a friendship which, in General Eisenhower's words, 'was never recorded on legal parchment but in the hearts of our two peoples'. The affection shown by so many Americans for the Prince and Princess of Wales at the time of their wedding shows that these bonds of sentiment and friendship remain strong.

But the most important element in the great Anglo-American friendship is our shared belief in democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. These are precisely the principles on which the European Community rests. Britain's active membership of the Community of ten nations, shortly we hope to be joined by two newly democratic states, Spain and Portugal, will strengthen rather than dilute our ties with the United States.

It took the First World War to put an end to the period when the United States had tried to stand aloof from Europe and, even then, American involvement in European affairs was reluctant and not entirely happy for either side. Some European leaders found President Wilson's high-minded style oppressive. The French leader Clemenceau grumbled: 'Mr Wilson bores me with his fourteen points. The Lord God has only ten.' Then as the peace talks dragged on, Clemenceau asked: 'How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man in two thousand years to know anything about peace on earth?'

* This article is based closely on Lord Carrington's speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on September 23, 1981

But in any case this first American dip into European waters was soon followed by another period of deliberate isolation.

The Second World War and its aftermath changed all that, this time permanently. America's military intervention made it possible to restore the freedom of Western Europe and at the time every European knew that this was so. In the first years of peace, the Marshall Plan was one of the most imaginative and successful expressions of generosity and self-interest that the world has ever known. America realised that isolation was no longer an option. From that day the United States has had to have a global foreign policy.

De Toccueville was talking of Americans as individuals when he said that 'If an American were to confine his activity to his own affairs he would be robbed of half of his existence'. But his remark has become equally true of America's foreign policy, to the great benefit of Europe and the world.

American foreign policy has been based on close identification with the peoples and objectives of the Western democracies. The foreign policies of the Europeans and of America are designed to defend our common way of life. Our aims and theirs are identical in this respect and are symbolised by the North Atlantic Treaty, which established the alliance which has kept the peace in Europe for over three decades.

If the United States waited for nearly two centuries before adopting an active foreign policy, it is small wonder that the European Community took two decades, from its first steps towards economic unity, before embarking on the difficult waters of foreign policy co-ordination. European problems were of course very different from those of the young United States. No-one in Western Europe had ever thought of isolation as a possibility. The individual states of Europe each had a long tradition of active foreign policy. It had expressed itself in a shifting pattern of alliances. It had been reflected in bitter rivalry in every corner of the world—even including, once upon a time, in North America!

These wounds of course have long been healed. To prove it once again, Britain made the magnanimous gesture of sending a Cabinet Minister—the Lord Chancellor—to represent us at the anniversary celebrations last October of the Battle of Yorktown.

The British were defeated in 1781 by an unholy alliance of the Americans and the French. As the British soldiers withdrew from Yorktown with their regimental band playing—so it is said—'The World turned upside down'—they were not to know that two hundred years later those same three nations would be joined not in battle but, with others, in a powerful alliance to preserve peace and freedom. Nor were they to know that the bankruptcy of individual foreign policies in Europe would be demonstrated by the shattering experience of two world wars, which left our continent weak, impoverished and divided by that tragic rift which Winston Churchill christened the Iron Curtain.

Yet it was one thing to see, in the late 1940s, that the old system was

bankrupt. It was another to move forward to a better one, and it is no mean achievement on the part of Europe that, when I spoke in September in the United Nations General Assembly, I was able to do so in the name not only of Britain alone but of the members of the European Community. The speech, in itself, may not have been remarkable, but I think it made good sense and was received as a balanced and coherent approach to the problems of the world today.

The Community is a group of free and democratic states committed to pursuing an even greater degree of unity through common economic rules and policies. We do not pretend that this will be easy. Reconciling strongly held national interests never is; nor is sharing our scarce resources, as the occasional quarrel between federal and state authorities on this side of the Atlantic shows. I therefore fear that you will continue to hear of squabbles about money, fish, sheepmeat, turkeys and the like.

But this does not mean that the Community is falling apart. Far from it: it is a sign that the Community is in business, facing and not ducking the issues. I believe it can and will emerge strengthened as a result of the negotiations now in progress, and that it can and will continue to promote the economic strength of its members. And I am quite clear that it is in Western interests that it should.

As for the co-operation of the Ten in foreign policy, while the Community, as a customs union, had from the beginning to adopt common external policies in many areas of trade and economic relations, there was no treaty obligation to consult on foreign policy as such. It was some years before the interaction of external economic policy and foreign policy proper led the members to establish the system which bears the somewhat colourless title of European political co-operation. Over the years the realisation has grown that economic policy and foreign policy are Siamese twins. In politics, as in economics, the countries that make up Western Europe are too small today to operate successfully on their own. They have to find a unified response to modern problems if they are to control their own destinies.

The political side has in fact moved faster in recent years than the economic, catching up, you might say, with the economic integration registered in the early period. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that the Community's economic problems can be compensated for by means of a more active foreign policy. Progress is needed on both fronts if the Community is to realise its potential.

What, then, has been achieved in our political co-operation? Let me take three examples.

First is that complex process known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE for short). Throughout the years of detailed and exacting negotiations, from the preparatory conference in Helsinki in the early 1970s right through to the review meetings still waiting to be concluded in Madrid, the members of the Community have managed to act closely in

unison. Not everyone is aware how greatly this has strengthened the overall Western position, and how it contributed in particular to the humanitarian sections of the Helsinki final act. At times it has even been the Ten, rather than the fifteen members of NATO, who have given a lead.

A second and more controversial area of European activity is the Middle East. Critics of the European efforts in this field sometimes forget that the Venice Declaration of June 1980 was issued at a time when the Camp David process was for various reasons in the doldrums and likely to remain so for some time. In the consequent political vacuum, frustration was growing. Even the most moderate Arab leaders were demanding to know what the West as a whole was doing to promote the generally accepted goal of a just and lasting settlement. The United States, for understandable reasons, was unable at the time to give a satisfactory answer at Venice. The European Community, whose economic interests are even more directly involved in the region than are those of the United States, suggested some principles for progress. We believe they are balanced and realistic. They included, of course, Israel's security, but they also covered the Palestinian problem with an emphasis different from that of Camp David.

At Venice the Ten drew attention to the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own future and suggested that the Palestine Liberation Organisation must be associated with any peace efforts. We believed, then, and are even more convinced today, that a proper appreciation of the Palestinian aspect is essential if a lasting solution is to be found, and if the historic progress initiated at Camp David on the Egypt-Israel front is to be extended to the West Bank. We did not see then, and we do not see now, that the two balancing principles on which the European approach is based—security for Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians—can be regarded as anything but even-handed and irrefutable.

My third example is a more recent initiative. It will soon be two years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, exposing to the world the hollowness of Soviet claims to champion peace and self-determination. We must not let Afghanistan become, like Ethiopia in the 1930s, the victim of aggression on the part of one government and indifference on the part of the rest. We must continue to work hard for a Soviet withdrawal, not only so that Afghanistan may regain its independence, but so that other countries directly affected by the invasion know that world opinion is behind them as they face the pressure of war.

The UN General Assembly has passed strong resolutions by overwhelming majorities, but such resolutions are unfortunately not self-executing. There is a need for active and imaginative diplomacy, to pin the responsibility for the present situations where it belongs, in Moscow, and to create the framework for a political solution against the day when such a thing may be possible. These were the reasons for the proposals put forward in June by the Ten members of the European Community—proposals which roughly seventy countries have since supported.

In the years ahead, I expect European political co-operation to develop pragmatically. There will be no grand design, no abolition of national foreign policies, no Euro-foreign office, no one Foreign Minister to the power of Ten, but my nine colleagues and I will meet more often, agree more often, act together more often. We shall extend the range of subjects on which we concert. We shall launch more initiatives, and more of them will bring results.

Our co-operation in the Ten will not replace or compete with other groups in which most of the members of the Community are co-operating with other states: in particular the role of NATO will not be impaired. But we in the Ten, soon to be twelve, will become more and more what on our best days we are already: an economic and political grouping of substantial weight and consequence in the great events of the world.

The influence which the Ten or twelve can have, in a world dominated by super-powers and super weapons, will be limited and should not be exaggerated. We cannot hope to set the world to rights or wave a wand over ancient international problems to produce an instant solution. Like other practitioners of the diplomatic art, we shall need patience and perseverance, and a willingness to tolerate second-best solutions when the best is not attainable.

I return to my starting-point. Will this development of European political co-operation be in America's interests?

It should be fruitful, not harmful, for Europe to operate in parallel to the United States. Europe has political and commercial ties with areas of the world with which America is less familiar. In Africa, for example, there are leaders who are used to dealing with the Europeans and who feel at ease with us. The links that are being built up between the Ten and the Association of South-East Nations (ASEAN) may in time produce something similar in another region of the world. For some situations it may be easier for Europe to develop a basis of common interest than it is for America as a superpower. European activity can give the west a greater flexibility and diversity in its international efforts. Not to deploy this flexibility with energy and imagination would be to waste our opportunities.

I see another advantage to America and to NATO. Without the growth of European political co-operation, some Europeans might come to feel that only the superpowers can play a role on the world stage nowadays. This could feed the mood of resignation, even fatalism, which some have detected in the old continent. European political co-operation, by involving all of the Ten in activities directed to the world as a whole, can enhance both a sense of responsibility and a sense of involvement.

General Eisenhower might be a little disappointed if he could read today the articles in the media on both sides of the Atlantic about policy differences between our governments or about divergent trends in public opinion. America and Europe inevitably have a difference of perspectives.

Europeans, living next door to the Warsaw Pact and with memories of a war

fought in their own farms and cities, inevitably have particular apprehensions about the possibility of nuclear war in Europe. It is of course understandable—indeed, I would say admirable—that the United States, bearing the main brunt of Western security, should attach first priority to strengthening their defences in the face of the unremitting Soviet military build-up. I hope Americans will find it no less understandable that Europeans should attach a very high priority to arms control negotiations which will make a real contribution to Western security. These two objectives are entirely complementary. It is essential for NATO to adopt—and be seen by public opinion in member countries to be adopting—a serious and thorough approach to arms control negotiations. Equally, we should not negotiate from a position of weakness. Indeed, there is little prospect of success in negotiations if we do so. I trust that on both sides of the Atlantic it will be widely accepted that a parallel approach on these lines is the sensible way forward.

The only way to deal with such differences is the traditional way of consultation. I am glad that this is being given such high priority in Washington nowadays. We should be careful not to exaggerate our differences, least of all in public. We should not forget the close identity of interests and of ideals which link the United States to Britain and to the European Community as a whole. But we should not look for a total uniformity of view which, thank God, can never exist on this side of the Iron Curtain.

The United States Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, reminded us in Berlin last autumn that Western society is based on democracy and pluralism. There are ways in which this can seem to make us weaker than the monolithic regions. We cannot spend money without it being voted. We cannot pass laws without consulting our parliaments. We cannot take decisions without regard to our public opinion. We cannot even come to power without being elected.

But in reality this pluralism is our strength. It gives us flexibility, creativity, variety, imagination, vigour. An alliance of equals, all contributing to policy, is infinitely stronger than any system on the solar model. The policies of Western governments have greater weight precisely because they must command the support of public opinion.

In the 1980s we must exploit these strengths. The fundamental objectives and beliefs of Europe and America will remain the same. We can afford diversity over methods. There is a role for the European Ten, a role for NATO, a role for the wider family of industrialised democracies. When there are differences within and among these groups, we must consult. When there seem to be no differences, we must consult just the same otherwise differences will develop. There is strength in diversity, and also in unity. What I have been suggesting is diversity without dispute in our methods, unity without uniformity in our policies, and identity in our aims and our ideals.

EUROPE'S NEED FOR SELF-CONFIDENCE

*Christopher Tugendhat**

SHORTLY after the 1978 European Council at Copenhagen at which the idea of a European Monetary System (EMS) really caught hold, I dined with a Commission colleague who had been there and a senior official from the United States Treasury. The American pressed my colleague on what had transpired. 'Nothing really happened', my colleague replied. 'What is important is that the Europeans at last decided to stop simply complaining about the effects of US policy and to attempt something on their own account to safeguard their own interests.' That in a nutshell was the genesis of EMS, a system which has subsequently proved to be an impressive source of stability for European currencies and for the international monetary field generally.

The analogy of the EMS is perhaps not altogether inapt when one considers the present disarray within the North Atlantic Alliance on certain security policy issues. Security is, of course, a quite different affair from monetary matters and different means will be appropriate. The point is that complaining and demonstrating about the Americans is not what is needed. We in Europe must try to take action on our own account.

Europeans must always be the principal providers of their own defence as indeed they are at present. But Europe cannot be successfully defended without the United States. The American strategic umbrella and, equally important, the presence of substantial American conventional forces in Western Europe are vital to our security. The North Atlantic Alliance also provides the indispensable means whereby the particular interests of each of the allied countries can be taken into account and reconciled with each other within the context of an overall security policy.

For many years this thesis has been accepted by the great majority on both sides of the Atlantic and has provided a solid foundation on which European security has rested. Now it is subject to increasing doubts and even attack. If the Alliance is to enjoy the public support which it must have, and if the partnership between the United States and Europe is to be put onto a better footing, new ideas are needed.

The nub of the matter to which I wish to address myself is the wedge of mutual suspicion and misunderstanding which is currently forcing the partners

* Christopher Tugendhat is a Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities. But he writes here in an entirely personal capacity. The views expressed are his own

apart. Most of what I have to say concerns the European side, but I begin with the Americans.

In the United States there is mounting impatience with what is seen as the softness and unreliability of the allies. This mood is accompanied and in part caused by a diminished interest in European politics compared with the past, and an apparently growing reluctance to take them fully into account when reaching decisions. The way in which the decision to proceed with the neutron bomb was handled last August is an example of this. But it is also based on an assessment of what is happening in Europe.

For some time now Europe has been perceived by some Americans as wanting the benefits of the Alliance without being willing to contribute a fair share to its upkeep. In some quarters it has also for quite a while now been felt that some Europeans are so attached to detente that they would be prepared to be over-responsive to Soviet wishes in order to maintain it. Against this already unfavourable background Americans have recently had to read of massive 'peace' marches with strong anti-American overtones, attacks on American military personnel and the subjection of their most senior officials to hostile demonstrations. It is not surprising that they should feel doubt and concern about Europe and we should not be surprised if the American commitment to its defence comes in for increasing questioning in Congress and the press.

In Europe distrust and in some circles even dislike of the United States has reached disturbing levels. These sentiments are not like old fashioned anti-Americanism and pro-Sovietism, as they are felt by many with no admiration or sympathy for the Soviet Union. They derive in part from the recent history of the United States. But two factors give them a particularly dangerous cutting edge. The first is doubt over the American commitment to the reduction of tension and in particular to arms control. The second is the suspicion that the United States would be ready to risk a nuclear war in the belief that it could be confined to Europe. These two factors have done more than anything else to generate opposition to the positioning of new American missiles in Western Europe and to undermine popular support for the Alliance.

The attacks on the United States for wanting to put new missiles on West European soil are, of course, desperately unfair. It was originally Europeans, notably Chancellor Schmidt, who suggested their deployment in order to counter-balance the build-up of SS20 and Backfire bombers already undertaken by the Soviet Union. Far from trying to save the United States from the risk of involvement in a nuclear war it was thought that the deployment of a new generation of American missiles based in Europe and capable of striking Soviet territory would bind America even more closely to Europe's defence. The Americans deserve thanks rather than brickbats for their response.

But the arguments and demonstrations should nevertheless be treated very seriously. When large numbers of people live in areas that they have reason to believe may become a nuclear battlefield it is not surprising that they should

feel deeply uneasy. If for whatever reason—and in this context it does not matter whether it is justified or not—they have doubts about their major ally to whom the missiles actually belong, the depth of their unease will be enormously increased. It can, as I believe it has, at least temporarily blind many reasonable people to the necessity of maintaining a military balance between East and West if peace is to be preserved. It has, I fear, already blinded some to the nature of the danger posed by the Soviet Union.

Moreover, it is not only the nuclear side of Europe's defence that is in difficulties with public opinion. In most countries it is also increasingly difficult to mobilise the political support necessary to maintain even the present level of military effectiveness in the conventional sphere. The more the cost of equipment rises the more public opinion seems to question the desirability, or even the necessity, of undertaking the expenditure concerned, especially if it means that spending on the social services will have to be still further constrained. Thus the modernisation of Western Europe's defence is being held back on both the conventional and nuclear fronts while the Soviet Union, with no public opinion to worry about, continues to devote some 13 per cent of its gross domestic product to the continuous modernisation of its already formidable nuclear and conventional military capability.

In these circumstances those of us who believe that the best and surest way of preventing war in Europe is, in conjunction with our American allies, to maintain a military balance, face a massive task of political persuasion. It is one that has to succeed because in modern European democracies no defence effort, be it national or multilateral, can be sustained without a sufficient base of public support.

The European member of the Alliance in which defence appears to enjoy the greatest public support is France. This applies both to the nuclear and the conventional arms. Support for unilateral disarmament is tiny and all the main political parties, including the Communists, are in favour of the *force de frappe*. In the light of what has recently been happening in Germany, Britain and the smaller northern European countries, French attitudes are surely remarkable. We should see what can be learnt from them.

The most striking characteristic of the French scene is that French public opinion perceives the French defence effort as being directly related to the defence of France and French interests. It is, of course, widely recognised that these are in fact closely bound up with the security of Western Europe as a whole which in turn must involve the Americans. President Mitterrand's remarks since taking office about the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe bear this out. French public opinion also believes that its defence effort strengthens France's ability to bring influence to bear on issues and in places, be they in Europe or beyond, that have a direct bearing on their own country's well-being.

By contrast, in other European countries public opinion finds it harder to see the link between defence policy and the national interest. There is growing

doubt and misunderstanding about the extent to which it is relevant to the needs of ordinary men and women or enables their government to influence events that bear on the national interest. An apparently growing number of people even take the extreme view that because of the interlocking nature of their national defence effort with that of the United States through the Alliance it in fact endangers their own security. This in turn leads to growing sympathy with and even support for pacifism and neutralism, which, though often bracketed together, are of course very different things.

I do not believe that in any country other than France the appeal to purely national feelings that has contributed so much to French support for French defence policy would be effective. Indeed in other countries a purely national appeal would seem vainglorious or irrelevent. In Germany it would pose other problems as well. But I do believe that throughout Europe public opinion would respond if it could be convinced that the main objective of defence and security policy is the prevention of war in Europe and the enhancement of Europe's ability to influence events that affect it rather than the defence of America, which is what so many seem to think at present. The two are in fact two sides of the same coin since peace in Europe and a strong and self-confident Europe are essential to the security of the United States. But the emphasis is important.

In essence this means that Europeans must feel they are in charge of their own affairs in matters relating to security within the Alliance system. They must feel that their alliance with the United States is, as most Americans have always wished it to be, one between equals. If they are to feel that they must be convinced on two points: first, that together they can bring independent influence to bear on issues of concern within the NATO area and beyond. And secondly, that they can command as much attention in Washington and over the direction of American policy as applies in reverse.

By itself no single European country could do those things, and the vast majority of their citizens know it. That is why the problems of Europe's defence and of public attitudes towards it must be tackled on a European scale. Far from weakening the American commitment, or creating strains within the Alliance, such a development could reinforce transatlantic relations if it led to a greater European contribution to the joint defence effort and more public support for it.

Action is needed on two fronts: the defence-industrial and the political.

To take the defence-industrial first: At present there is a 10 to 1 imbalance in transatlantic trade in defence equipment in favour of the United States. Thus European defence programmes yield nothing like the job opportunities for European citizens that they could if Europe produced more of its own needs and did so sufficiently competitively to be able to sell more to the United States. Moreover the division between defence and civil industrial technology is blurred. Much of the defence equipment that is needed today involves technology which pushes at the limits of scientific and engineering

development. In the aero-space, electronics and shipbuilding industries, to name only three, defence provides both a major source of orders—60 per cent of aircraft industry sales within the Community for instance—and thus an essential stimulus to the technological advance that is essential if they are to remain competitive on world civil markets.

There is a budgetary angle to this question as well. All European governments are finding difficulty in funding their defence programmes and the budgetary problems will get worse as the cost of equipment rises. Economies will therefore be necessary. This could mean buying less than had earlier been planned, or less sophisticated equipment than is needed. What it should mean, however, is that more attention will be paid to seeking the most cost-effective methods of procurement.

The total defence procurement markets of Europe and the United States, excluding America's heavy and specialised expenditure on strategic nuclear weapons, are of a roughly comparable order. The difference is that American companies are organised on a systematic and competitive basis to operate in a single market, whereas European companies are left as relatively small individual units geared principally to the requirements of their own national governments. There are exceptions in the form of collaborative projects, such as the Tornado aircraft, that have been successfully carried through in Europe. But they have been ad hoc arrangements put together by governments, and the result, because governments have felt the need to be involved directly at every stage of the project's development, has been that costs have tended to over-run badly.

This is not, however, inevitable. The Airbus consortium shows that it is quite possible for European high technology industries to produce modern aircraft as competitively as the Americans. The reason why the defence industries in Europe have so far held back is not because co-operation in the defence field imposes particular burdens, but because they have not been able to take advantage, on a competitive basis, of an open procurement market of the kind that exists in the United States. For both industrial and budgetary reasons the development of a more effective European defence and security policy requires that such an open procurement market should now be created.

On the political front the effort to develop a distinctive European approach within the Alliance framework should be conducted through the existing institutions. This is the most sensible way to proceed because although the European Community as such is not involved institutionally in defence matters, its members form the core of the European arm of NATO. In fact once the present enlargement negotiations have been successfully completed only Norway, Turkey and Iceland of NATO's European members will not belong to it. Moreover, as Mrs Thatcher pointed out in 1978 in a speech in Brussels in which she called for closer co-ordination between Community and NATO affairs, the headquarters of NATO and the principal site of the Community's institutions are in the same city.

European Political Co-operation and the European Council already provide the means for European governments to work out distinctive European positions on a wide range of issues as we have seen over the Middle East, Afghanistan and Poland. More examples will arise in future as the habits of co-operation grow and the practices evolve. As Europe's role in the world expands so should the self-confidence of Europeans in the ability of their governments to exert an appropriate degree of influence within the Alliance. This in turn should help to reduce suspicion of what is at present seen by some as an over-mighty ally.

Political Co-operation first turned its attention to security some years ago when it achieved one of its earliest successes in preparing a common European approach to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. What could be more natural now than for ministers meeting in Political Co-operation and the European Council to devote an increasing amount of time and attention to such matters as the proper balance between military capability and arms control, the need for the more cost effective use of defence resources and questions concerning the deployment of particular types of weapon. All touch the peoples of Europe very directly and it would be odd indeed if in a grouping as close and intimate as the Community they were not dealt with. It is also important that the general public should see that this is happening.

There is not and should not be anything incompatible with NATO in this. Over the years NATO itself has in fact sought to foster specific co-operation among its European members and has recognised that there are forms of co-operation and integration in the defence field which may be appropriate for the European countries to pursue together, but in which the US and Canadian members of the Alliance will not necessarily be involved. It is the fault of successive European governments that more has not been done, and European peoples now need visible signs of progress along these lines.

There is no easy solution to the present problems of the Alliance in Europe. But if we remember that those who serve a cause voluntarily both because they believe in it and because they believe it serves their own best interests are likely to serve it best, we have a guide to follow. Ministers and politicians must make speeches and engage in debate in order to draw attention to the nature of the Soviet threat and the need to defend our liberties. But actions which give substance to the claim that Europe's own particular interests and preoccupations are given their proper weight in an Alliance between equals are also required. We Europeans must stop complaining and start to do more on our own account.

LIBYA AND THE WEST: HEADLONG INTO CONFRONTATION?

Claudia Wright *

FOLLOWING the inauguration of President Reagan, in 1981, the United States launched a campaign to isolate Libya internationally, and promote the downfall of the regime headed by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The American effort has been formidable.

The Reagan initiative

North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) allies, Italy in particular, were asked not to permit state visits by Qaddafi, which had been under negotiation for more than a year and tentatively scheduled for mid- to late-1981.[1] The Mitterrand administration, which took power in France in May, was asked by Washington to maintain the embargo on arms deliveries and oil exploration instituted in late 1980 by President Giscard D'Estaing,[2] and even after France announced in July that it would fulfil the terms of existing contracts with Libya, Pentagon officials claimed that 'technical problems' would delay the deliveries of arms and military spare parts essential to keep Libya's *Mirage* jets flying.[3]

The Italian government was urged to prevent the Libyans from purchasing military spare parts manufactured or marketed in Italy.[4] Italian Airforce fighters were involved in shadowing and challenging a civil Libyan aircraft in the Mediterranean.[5]

American oil companies were urged to withdraw personnel from Libya, and to stop importing Libyan crude to the United States. Although Mr Reagan and

* **Claudia Wright** is the Washington Correspondent for the *New Statesman*, and a specialist on Arab affairs. She has visited Libya several times.

1. Private communications from West European officials; see Claudia Wright, *The Middle East* (London), August 1981, 18-24 Claude Cheysson, the French External Relations minister, made a guarded reference to this issue in *Le Monde*, May 28, p 6. See also Paul Balta, *L'inquiétude de Tripoli*, *Le Monde*, Oct. 19, 1981, pp 1-3

2. This was one of the points made during meetings between American officials and M. Cheysson in Washington on June 4, 1981, and again during the visit to Paris of Vice-President George Bush on June 24

3 *The Washington Post* reported an American official with the Secretary of Defense, Mr Caspar Weinberger's party on a visit to Paris and Stockholm, as saying: 'Technical problems are something that by their very nature cannot be announced in advance ' Oct 18, 1981, A30

4. *New York Times*, Nov. 1, 1981, p. 34.

5 The Italian press agency and the Libyan press agency both announced that an Italian fighter had intercepted a civilian Libyan aircraft on September 21. The Libyans claimed that the aircraft was in international airspace, the Italians that it was in Italian airspace. In an earlier, unpublicised incident only days before, the Italian airforce had intercepted a Libyan civilian aircraft en route between Belgrade and Tripoli. At the time, Col. Qaddafi was on a visit to Eastern Europe, and Libyan officials claimed that the Italian actions might have been intended to threaten Qaddafi's return home. Italy denied this allegation.

other officials denied the intention to do this, it was reported from Tripoli that by mid-October 1981, the American oil companies had replaced many of their American workers with expatriates of other nationalities, and had stopped oil sales to American purchasers.[6]

On October 21, Senator Hart (Democrat, Colorado) Senator Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) and eight other, mostly Democratic senators introduced an amendment to a foreign assistance bill to ban imports of Libyan oil to the United States, and 'coordinate international measures to establish and maintain a total prohibition of all imports of Libyan oil. . . '. This measure received no advance publicity, or, as is customary in the Congress, public hearings. It was opposed in debate by the Republican chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy, who was convincingly defeated in a vote to table the amendment, and then only narrowly won approval with a proposal, said to be 'greeted by the administration with enthusiasm', for a delay of six months in implementing the import ban. During that interval the government was ordered to prepare a review of its Libyan policy. The voting indicated an overwhelming Senate majority in favour of punitive action against Libya. Then on November 12, Exxon Corporation announced it was withdrawing from its oil and gas operations in Libya, relinquishing its assets there—the first time ever that an American oil company had voluntarily abandoned an interest in Middle East equity.

Publicity stemming from a long *New York Times* investigation of the activities of American companies and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives in Libya—this was followed up by a formal investigation by a House of Representatives committee—aimed at stopping military purchases from American sources for American-made transport aircraft and helicopters in Libya, and ending the recruitment of American and British pilots and mechanics to service Libyan aircraft.[7]

Prior to the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Nairobi in June, American diplomats lobbied several African member states to move motions of censure against Libya, and to shift the venue of the OAU summit meeting, as well as the presidency of the OAU for the year, from Libya to alternative sites in Senegal and Niger.[8] A major effort combining economic and military aid, naval portcalls, the despatch of military advisers, and diplomatic pressure was focused on the Liberian government to persuade it to break relations with Libya, and expel the Libyan mission.[9]

6 Paul Balta, *Le Monde*, Oct. 19, 1981. Officials of American oil companies operating in Libya said that they had been replacing some American personnel with other nationalities for more than 18 months prior to the Reagan administration requests, and that was a routine matter, unrelated to the political situation. They also say that their oil purchases from Libya have been dictated by price considerations alone, and that although sales to the United States had dropped substantially, they had not ceased, and were expected to rise again as world surpluses and US inventories fall.

7 *New York Times Magazine*, June 14, 21 ('The Qaddafi Connection' by Seymour M. Hersh), *New York Times*, Aug. 24, Sept. 5, 13, 18, 24, Oct. 24, Nov. 1 (series by Jeff Gerth and Philip Taubman).

8. Private communications from OAU member state officials.

9 US Special Forces personnel arrived in Liberia on April 10 for a month of training with Liberian troops; approximately 100 Americans were involved. A US destroyer, *USS Thorn*, called at Monrovia on April 12 for

In addition to its attempts to isolate Libya diplomatically, reduce its oil revenues, and disrupt its trading relationships, the Reagan administration sought to intensify direct military pressure on the Libyan forces, and if possible provoke Qaddafi into creating a *casus belli*. On May 23, two radar-surveillance (AWACS) were sent to Egypt to monitor the Egyptian and Sudanese borders with Libya and—in the event of a coup d'état that was planned for that time within Libya—co-ordinate the military support that might have been sent by Egypt across the border to aid the rebels.[10] Three months later, on August 19, American aircraft shot down two Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sirte during an American exercise in the area that was co-ordinated with Egyptian military manoeuvres on the border. That exercise was planned in an area below the 32 degree 30 minute line, which had been drawn by the Carter administration in talks with the Libyans as the southernmost boundary for American naval and air exercises.[11] The downing of the Libyan aircraft occurred on the forty-first interception by Libyan of American aircraft, in circumstances which both Israeli and American reports suggest were planned as a provocation to the Libyans.[12] Immediately after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat—which Washington initially sought to blame on Qaddafi—two AWACS aircraft were again sent to Egypt to operate along the Libyan border, and a large-scale military exercise, planned to include over five thousand American troops with Egyptian and Sudanese contingents, was set for November. Officially inspired press reports claimed that these measures were necessary to prevent a Libyan invasion of Egypt and the Sudan.[13] Along the Sudanese-Chadian border, what had started in September as an attempt by Egyptian and American-supplied guerrillas, led by the former Chadian Defence Minister, Hissein Habré, to take control of several Chadian border towns, turned into a rout, as Libyan-aided Chadian forces pushed Habré's men back across the border to their Sudanese sanctuaries.[14] The fighting was magnified by Sudanese president, Jaafar el-Nimeiry, who argued that an imminent Libyan

three days. The Libyan 'People's Bureau', had been permitted to open on March 7, but on March 12, Mr Lannon Walker, the acting US deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, had talks in Monrovia and recommended cutting ties with Libya He was supported by General Thomas Quiwonkpa, the Liberian armed forces commander, and opposed by the Liberian foreign minister, Gabriel Matthews. On May 12, the Liberian head of state, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, ordered the Libyan bureau closed and cancelled scholarships for Liberians to study in Libya See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (US), *Daily Report Middle East and Africa* (MEA), 81-050, March 16, 1981, T3, and 81-091, May 12, 1981, T2.

10 See Wright, *The Middle East*, Sept 1981, p 16. Initial disclosure of the AWACS mission, which was kept secret at the time, came from President Sadat in a television interview in Washington ('Meet the Press', National Broadcasting Company, Washington, Aug. 9, 1981, transcript, p. 6)

11 Private communications from Carter administration officials and from Libyan officials who participated in talks with US representatives. For details of the Sirte incident, see Claudia Wright, *New Statesman*, Aug 21, 1981, and *Macleans* (Toronto), Aug 31, 1981

12. On the Israeli analysis of the Sirte incident, see Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), MEA 161, Aug. 20, 1981, I1 See also: David A Brown, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, Aug. 31, 1981, pp. 19-21; International Report, *Defense Electronics*, 13: *10* (Oct.), 1981

13. E.g., George C Wilson, 'Pentagon Plans Airborne Show of Strength and Reach in Egypt', *Washington Post*, Oct. 8, 1981

14. For details, from the Sudanese, Chadian and Libyan perspectives, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), MEA, Sept 8, 14, 15, 17, 18

invasion made substantial new arms supplies and financial credits from Washington essential to his security.[15]

American officials spoke of Qaddafi in terms that implied their support for his downfall and death. Asked the day after the Gulf of Sirte incident if he would 'not be sorry to see Qaddafi fall', the President replied: 'Diplomacy would have me not answer that question'.[16] The Secretary of State, General Haig, was reported to have referred to Qaddafi as 'a cancer that has to be removed'.[17] Former President Carter, on his return from Sadat's funeral, spoke of Qaddafi as 'subhuman'.[18] Former President Ford said at the same time that he was a 'bully' and a 'cancer',[19] while Vice-President Bush described him as an 'egomaniac who would trigger World War III to make headlines'.[20] In Paris, after a semi-official mission to Riyadh, Amman, Tunis and Fez, former President Nixon issued a statement through the American Embassy, calling Qaddafi 'more than just a desert rat . . . an international outlaw', and urged 'an international response [to] an international threat . . . Our military options are limited. Another course which might be considered is to impose an international economic quarantine on Libya.'[21]

Of American involvement in clandestine plots to kill Qaddafi, there have been reliable reports of a CIA plan, prepared in the first two months of the administration by the then deputy director for operations, Max Hugel.[22] This included proposals for disinformation and propaganda dissemination about Libya, sabotage of Libyan oil installations, financial and military support for the Habré guerrillas in Chad and for Libyan dissident groups based in Morocco, Egypt, Sudan and the United States, and assassination attempts against Qaddafi himself.[23] A detailed review of American press reports emanating from official sources and encouraging the campaign against Qaddafi runs into dozens of items, and includes the most prominent and influential American media.[24] Tunisian and Saudi officials confirm privately that they were told by officials of the Reagan administration that Qaddafi would be eliminated by the end of 1981.[25]

There can be no doubt of the determination with which the Reagan administration has sought to confront what it has termed the 'Libyan challenge'. To Qaddafi's adversaries in the region, like Sadat, Nimeiry, King Hassan of Morocco, and President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, this was an

15 Wright, *New Statesman*, Oct. 16, 1981, pp 1-2
16 *Presidential Documents*, Aug 20, 1981 889.
17 *New York Daily Post*, May 17, 1981
18 *Washington Post*, Oct 12, 1981; *New York Times*, same date.
19 *Ibid*
20 *Washington Post*, Oct 14, 1981
21. *Washington Post*, Oct. 18, 1981, A-1, p. 23.
22. *Newsweek*, Aug 10, 1981, 24, *Washington Post*, Aug 20, A-1, p. 17; *Washington Post*, July 25, 1981, A 1, p 14
23 For a detailed summary and review, see Jeff McConnell, 'Libya: Propaganda and Covert Operations', *CounterSpy*, 6, *1* (Nov 1981), pp 21-40
24 See McConnell's list, *ibid*
25 Private communications See Wright, *New Statesman*, Oct 30, 1981, pp 10-16

appropriate reaction to the long-held antagonism between them. In their view, Qaddafi was intent on expanding his influence and subverting his neighbours. To Bourguiba, he 'thinks himself too big for such a small country'.[26]

In the early days of the Reagan administration, its primary justification for the campaign against Qaddafi was that he was 'an agent of the international Soviet-backed terrorist conspiracy'.[27] This conspiracy or 'terror network', as it was called in a lurid account of Libyan and Soviet involvement in terrorism published not long after the Reagan administration took office, linked Qaddafi and Libyan funds, weapons, and training camps to Palestinian groups, the Saharan Polisario, and other national liberation groups, as well as to the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, and others acting alone or in groups.[28] The book and the official claims were riddled with inaccuracies and uncorroborated claims, which the CIA initially declined to support.[29] It was pressed to revise early drafts of a regular annual report on the incidence of international terrorism. The final report was delayed until June 1981, when the Libyan government was identified as 'the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism.'[30] That was defined broadly so as to include fourteen attacks by 'Qaddafi's assassination teams in Europe and the United States', and also support for 'leftist insurgents' in El Salvador, the Palestinians, Turkish leftist groups, Armenian, Irish, Basque, and Iranian political dissidents. 'Right-wing terrorism', in which the Libyans were considered to have played no role, was identified as the source of the greatest number of casualties during 1980, but relegated definitionally into 'the category of domestic violence and is not dealt with in this paper . . . [It] is difficult to categorize . . . because it is perpetrated anonymously by groups with few or no articulated goals.'[31]

The argument over terrorism applied to Libya caused considerable controversy in Washington, and was ultimately eliminated by government spokesmen in favour of a much broader political rationale for confronting Qaddafi. In July 1981, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, spoke of Libya's 'diplomacy [*sic*] of subversion in Africa and in the Arab world . . . a diplomacy of unprecedented obstruction to our own interests and objectives.'[32] In October, the chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, Howard

26. 'Pourquoi Khedhafi nous a attaqué', *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), Feb. 11, 1981, p. 18.
27. *Washington Post*, March 22, 1981, A1.
28. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*, New York Reader's Digest Press/Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981). For a critical review, see Tony Clifton, *New Statesman*, Aug. 7, 1981.
29. Leslie Gelb, 'Soviet-Terror Ties Called Outdated', *New York Times*, Oct 18, 1981. See also Wright, *New Statesman*, March 20, 1981, pp. 8-10.
30 National Foreign Assessment Centre (CIA), *Patterns of International Terrorism 1980*, Washington: June 1981, p. 9. See also 'International Terrorism', Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 10, 1981.
31. *Ibid*, p. 10.
32. Statement of Chester A Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 8, 1981.

Wolpe, declared: 'In the aftermath of the Sadat assassination, many Americans are concerned that Soviet-armed Libya will exploit political strains in Northern Africa in order to foster anti-American political change.'[33]

This shift was significant, not only because it was almost[34] unprecedented for the United States to settle its political differences with other countries by openly espousing military confrontation, economic embargo, subversion, sabotage and assassination, but also because the means chosen were so plainly inadequate for the ends. If the new administration sought to demonstrate its power to punish Libya and thereby 'demonstrate that it pays to be an American friend',[35] the 1981 campaign was a disastrous failure.[36]

Libyan oil output was indeed cut by half—although as we shall see the economic consequences of that are not unfavourable for Qaddafi's domestic support—and some obstacles were placed in the way of Qaddafi's visits to Western Europe. However, Qaddafi himself survived—at least one, possibly four assassination attempts[37]—whilst America's most important friend in North Africa, the Egyptian president, was assassinated under the eyes of the American ambassador and the commanding general of the United States Rapid Deployment Force. This in turn put new pressure on General Nimeiry's unsteady grip of the Sudan.

On October 13-14, the army of the Polisario attacked Moroccan forces at Guelta Zemmour, in the western Sahara, and scored one of the most decisive military victories of the Saharan war. Three Moroccan aircraft, a C-130, a *Mirage* and an American F-5 fighter, were shot down, the 4th Moroccan Army Regiment virtually annihilated, and large stocks of weapons, transport, ammunition and supplies were captured.[38]

On October 18, the Greek Socialist Party, led by Andreas Papandreou, won an unprecedented popular mandate on a platform that rejected American use of Greek bases or airspace for operations against Arab countries like Libya, with which Papandreou has good personal relations.

These were not the only changes in the strategic context in which the Reagan campaign against Libya was conducted in 1981, but they served to dramatise the larger stakes involved in American policy and the risks of the

33 Opening Statement by Dr Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Oct 29, 1981

34 The most recent precedent was the Nixon administration's campaign to isolate and quarantine the Chilean government of Salvador Allende and topple him from power For details of this type of activity, see *CIA -The Pike Report* (London. Spokesman Books, 1977)

35 Testimony of Richard Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, before the House Subcommittee on International Security, March 23, 1981: 11

36 The campaign did help stop Libyan assassinations and attacks on political dissidents In 1981, only three deaths or assaults occurred, none known to be directly part of the liquidation campaign of the year before—the murder of a Libyan student in Utah, the 'poison peanuts' case in England, and the death of a Libyan exile in Rome (said to be of natural causes but under suspicion nevertheless)

37 Reported assassination attempts include: an attempt to shoot Qaddafi's aircraft down in April (*Newsweek*, July 20, 1981: 23), a plot by military men of the Magarha tribe, May 1981 (Wright, *New York Times*, June 25, 1981: the Italian interception of aircraft perhaps thought to have Qaddafi on board, Sept. 1981 (see fn 5), and a poisoning attempt, referred to by Qaddafi himself, Sept 1, 1981 (FBIS-MEA-170, Sept 2, Q10)

38 For details see FBIS-MEA-200, 201, 204, Oct pp. 16, 19, 22

anti-Qaddafi campaign backfiring. A growing awareness of these, and of the failures of the administration's year-long effort, stimulated scepticism among American allies in Europe, resistance to further involvement, and advocacy of alternatives to confrontation with Libya. Bitter argument over the American tactics and alternative policies arose in the Italian and French governments.[39]

Against this background, the Americans themselves began to reconsider the policy towards Libya.[40] If confrontation was part of a broader strategy to block 'anti-American political change',[41] what positive goals was the administration seeking? In what ways was Colonel Qaddafi personally responsible for checking them? and how important was Libya to the larger American strategy?

In the next section, we shall suggest that the basis of American antagonism to Qaddafi is conflict over who will dominate the Mediterranean. It will be shown, moreover, that despite America's current emphasis on Qaddafi as an individual, Libya has always been the focus of intense Great Power rivalry in the region. The historical record shows an American resolve to control Libya that long antedates Qaddafi or the discovery of Libyan oil; it goes back, in fact, nearly two hundred years.

If confrontation is to have any chance of success in the broader strategical context, then it should be clear what internal support Qaddafi can draw on during the period of challenge and international isolation. The third section will, therefore, illustrate the dynamics of Libyan development, and suggest that, if it produces any reaction, the American campaign is likely to rally nationalist support behind Qaddafi—particularly in those parts of the population that have been most critical of his policies to date. More ominous from Washington's point of view, it will be argued that a successful assassination attempt against the Libyan leader would not necessarily result in the emergence of a pro-Western or pro-American regime.

Finally, we must ask whether Qaddafi's foreign policies are inherently antagonistic to American or Western interests, and in those cases where they are, whether confrontation and military intervention are the most suitable methods for dealing with them. It would be a bitter irony for the Americans—one that the White House cannot at this point recognise—if in their effort to dislodge Qaddafi as an agent for Soviet influence in the region, they compelled him to engage greater Soviet support, both economic and military, than Qaddafi was willing to permit before 1981.

The buffer state of sand

Thirty years ago, Libya was a country that in most respects did not exist. It had a population of little more than one million, that had been decimated by a half-

39. See Wright, *The Middle East*, Aug. 1981, pp. 18-23
40. See John Cooley, 'The Libyan Menace', *Foreign Policy* 42, Spring 1981, pp. 74-93. Cf. Zartman, *op cit*
41. Wolpe, *op cit.*, p 1.

century of Italian colonisation, counter-insurgency, and concentration camps, and scattered among a few decrepit towns along the Mediterranean coast and water-short oases of the desert. What the Italians built, the Allies destroyed during the Second World War. Politically, the country was divided between Britain and France, and among squabbling networks of town and tribal notables, none of whom had acknowledged a single legitimate political authority of the three *wilayas* (provinces) of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, since the collapse of the Ottoman empire.[42]

The discovery of oil did not alter the basic political weakness Libya has always suffered. It simply multiplied the value of the takings for whoever proved powerful enough to take control of oil-rich Cyrenaica and the urban centres of Tripolitania, at the same time guarding the Fezzan and the Tunisian borders against outsiders intent on dismembering the state. This contest lured several generations of Senoussi leaders,[43] who took over the country after independence, and it attracted the bedouin from Sirte, Colonel Qaddafi, who deposed the Senoussi king, Idris, almost bloodlessly in 1969.

But long before oil and Qaddafi, Libya was considered in Europe, the United States and the Arab world, well-worth scheming and, if necessary, fighting for. H. S. Cowper, an astute nineteenth-century English observer, described the country as 'a barren inheritance at best. Waterless, treeless . . . nearly tradeless, and it may also be said, harbourless . . . rather a desert than a country—a buffer state of sand as it were, between fertile Tunisia and fecund Egypt.'[44]

Still, Cowper believed it essential to ensure that whoever controlled Libya would not be hostile to the aspirations of the Great Powers—then primarily Britain and France—or disturb their spheres of influence to the east, west and south, and also in the Mediterranean to the north. For Britain, Cowper advised: 'It would be our policy, if prudent, to endeavour that, should it cease to be a Turkish nonentity, it must pass at least into the occupation of a power whose interests do not clash so materially with ours as those of France.' Direct British takeover he thought too expensive and unprofitable, and so he recommended Italian colonisation instead as 'a cul-de-sac against French aggrandizement in North Africa'.[45]

By that time, the United States had already attempted to establish its own position between French interests in Algeria and Tunisia, and the British in Egypt and the Sudan.[46] The most ambitious American scheme had been

42 See Salaheddin Hasan, 'The Genesis of the Political Leadership of Libya, 1952-1969: Historical Origin and Development of its Components' (unpub doct diss., Washington. George Washington University, 1973); Majid Khadduri, *Modern Libya, A Study in Political Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), Henri Habib, *Politics and Government of Revolutionary Libya* (Montreal: Le Cercle du Livre de France, 1975)

43. See Marius and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Essays on Social and Political Development* (New York. Praeger 1982), ch. 4

44 H S Cowper, *The Hill of the Graces* (London: Methuen, 1897), p 320

45 *Ibid* , p 304

46 See James Field, Jr , *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).

William Eaton's plan to topple Yusuf Qaramanli, the Bey of Tripoli, and replace him with his brother, Hamet, who was in exile in Egypt. This collapsed with the signing of the treaty between Tripoli and Washington in 1805. That pact was criticised by many in Congress at the time (they wanted victory over the Bey, not a negotiated solution), and during the rest of the nineteenth century, several fresh attempts were made to persuade the administration in Washington to establish 'footholds' along the Libyan coastline.[47] These were finally established after independence, with the signing of the Libyan agreement to American use of Wheelus airfield in 1954.

In 1959 the Central Intelligence Agency prepared a special study of Libya for the Eisenhower administration's Committee to Study the Military Assistance Program, chaired by William Draper. That study, the text of which recently became available,[48] argued for Libya's strategic value to the United States in terms startlingly similar to Cowper's:

> The West, should it lose completely its strategic position in North Africa, would find its control over the Mediterranean seriously threatened. North Africa, moreover, flanks the routes which the Soviets would follow in their efforts to penetrate Africa . . . Libya . . . serves as a buffer between the Middle East and the Maghreb and at least partially shields the latter from the full force of Arab nationalism emanating from Cairo . . . So long as Libya remains friendly to the West, the West can control the southern shore and part of the Eastern Mediterranean.[49]

The strategic picture has certainly changed since the nineteenth century, just as it has changed rapidly in the years since 1959.[50] Algeria broke free of France; Tunisia and Morocco continued to depend on American (and to a lesser extent French) military protection, and Egypt swung from its pro-Soviet stance under Nasser to a pro-Western position, and unsteady 'normalisation' with Israel under Sadat and General Mubarak, his successor. The relative strengths of the Great Power fleets have also changed, as have the values, from the military point of view, of littoral bases in North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece. Changes in the range and type of naval vessels and ship-borne aircraft have created new problems for American and Soviet planners that influence their assessment of the relative value of shore facilities, friendly and hostile harbours.[51]

The fundamental concern with Libya has remained the same—the threat it

47 *Ibid.* Cf. the plan proposed by Michel Vidal of Louisiana for using Tobruk as a foothold 'for military and commercial purposes'. This was in 1874.

48. Blanche Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower* (Garden City. Doubleday, 1981), pp 329-32.

49. Quoted by McConnell, *op. cit* p. 26. The original, unpublished document is in the Eisenhower Library.

50. For a summary, see Jesse W Lewis, Jr., *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976).

51 See Edward N. Luttwak and Robert G. Weinland, *Sea Power in the Mediterranean. Political Utility and Military Constraints* (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University), Sage Publications, 1979; Kenneth A. Myers (ed.), *NATO—The Next Thirty Years* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1980); Clarence A Robinson, Jr., 'Maritime Superiority Goal Keyed to 600-Ship Fleet', *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Aug 31, 1981: 38-46

poses alone, or allied with other North African or Middle Eastern states, in league with the Soviet Union, to American interests in the Mediterranean.

Twenty years after the Draper Committee-CIA study, a report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee reiterated the same threat assessment:

> The United States has a strategic interest, both for itself and its allies, in... ensuring that no one power dominates the area and closes [eastern Mediterranean] to international traffic. A second, but no less important, strategic interest is oil . . . It is crucial for the United States to ensure that no nation or bloc of nations will interdict the oil flow.[52]

Coincidentally, the date of the ending of the Tripolitan War and of the withdrawal of Americans from Wheelus in 1970 is the same, June 10, and they are celebrated together every year in Libya with mass rallies, televised replays of a Hollywood epic on William Eaton's adventures, and an annually up-dated philippic against the United States by Qaddafi. In these speeches, he regularly draws the historical analogy: 'Once more, after over 170 years, the United States fills the Mediterranean with its fleets and practices international terrorism against the people.'[53]

Just as regularly, Qaddafi threatens to cut Libya's oil exports to the United States, to attack aircraft, ships and bases of its Sixth Fleet, to impose economic sanctions on American allies in Europe, to liquidate opponents in exile in Europe and the United States, and to provide active financial and military aid to the enemies of America's friends throughout the world.

It is unsurprising that in the eyes of many Americans, Qaddafi is regarded as personally repugnant, and Libya under his control an infernal nuisance, exercising a degree of international influence out of all proportion to its population, size, and national interests. One important, but unpublicised development has qualitatively changed this influence. During 1981, Libya deployed approximately twelve Soviet-built SS-12 *Scaleboard* missiles on moveable launchers that can be positioned to fire from anywhere along the Libyan coast.[54] These are the most advanced missiles ever despatched by Moscow to foreign territory, and with a range of at least 800 kilometres, high accuracy, and the capacity for being fitted with nuclear warheads, they pose an entirely new threat to American and NATO missile sites (including the proposed Italian sites for the *Pershing*-II and cruise missiles targeted on the Soviet Union), as well as to American aircraft carriers. Qaddafi mentioned these missiles in a speech on September 1, 1981 and added a clear warning of their targets: 'Let Sicily hear, let Crete, Greece and Turkey and Western Europe hear. They are in danger . . .'.[55]

52 *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service (Washington: April 1979), p. 74

53 FBIS, *North Africa*, June 12, 1979: pp. 1-2.

54 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1981-82* (London, 1981), pp 54, 115.

55 FBIS, MEA-81-170, Sept. 2, 1981, Q9.

The weaponry changes, the strategic character of the threat remains the same in American thinking. To many Arabs, however, Qaddafi does not pose the strategic threat that his rhetoric suggests:

> Qaddafi has been serving the interests of the United States more than he has been serving the interests of the Soviet Union in the area. The only reason Qaddafi is disliked in the Western world is because of his relationship with what they call international terrorist groups.[56]

The speaker, a senior Kuwaiti official, was implying that Qaddafi's policies were advantageous to the United States in several ways. American oil companies enjoy distinct advantages in Libya, compared with their Italian or French competitors, and American imports, including aircraft and weaponry when they are available, are clearly preferred over West European, East European or Soviet supplies. American universities are favoured by Libyan students. Compared with Egypt, Algeria, and Somalia in the past—or Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Ethiopia at the moment—Libyan policy has avoided friendship pacts with the Soviet Union, and kept its distance from Moscow on many issues.[57]

We will consider shortly how far this stance altered during 1981. During the Carter administration, however, American policy did appear to distinguish between Qaddafi's rhetorical threats and his actions, between strategic confrontation, that was of deep concern, and encouragement of terrorism which was much less troublesome. During the Carter period, American policy appeared to be motivated by the desire to preserve economic relationships, limit military provocation,[58] and avoid stimulating Qaddafi to move closer towards Moscow.

David Newsom, a former ambassador to Libya and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1978 to 1981, told a Senate committee in August 1980:

> We obviously cannot have satisfactory relations in the face of Libyan-supported terrorism practised against us and our friends. While we don't see eye-to-eye on how Middle East peace can be achieved, in the absence of terrorist actions and subversion directed against other parties involved, it should be possible for our two countries to accept that we have differences and proceed on that basis—as is the case with other Arab countries in the region.[59]

56. Private communication Oct. 1981.

57. For example, Qaddafi has been critical of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Soviet aid for the suppression of the Eritrean insurgency.

58. The Gulf of Sirte is a case in point. American policy has consistently rejected Libyan claims to the Gulf waters as 'internal' waters over which Libya had full sovereignty. Cf. Ali A. el-Hakim, *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979) pp. 9, 215. On the other hand, Carter representatives negotiated in Tripoli for drawing the 32 degrees 30 minutes line—across the mouth of the Gulf—and restrained US Naval enthusiasm for crossing the line on exercises. On the other hand, the Carter administration almost certainly backed such *indirect* challenges to Qaddafi as the Habré guerrillas in Chad.

59. Statement by David Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, before the Senate Special Subcommittee to Investigate Individuals Representing Interests of Foreign Governments (the Billy Carter inquiry), Aug. 4, 1980, p. 5.

Newsom expressed confidence that Libya would agree to halting its liquidation campaign abroad; terrorism in Newsom's view applied to the attacks on Libyan dissidents abroad, not to Libyan backing for the Palestinians or other national liberation organisations. Reflecting the State Department view at the time, Newsom believed that if the United States acted flexibly towards Qaddafi, he would not align himself with Moscow to such a degree as to tip the balance in the Mediterranean. In an article written just after he retired, Newsom suggested that Libya, like other Arab states, 'suspect(s) the worst of the Soviets. The Arabs have no desire to invite the cat into the hen house.'[60]

So far as the Carter administration could see, that hadn't happened in Libya. For this approach President Carter himself, as well as officials of the State Department and CIA, were accused of softness towards Libya, and of possible corruption by Qaddafi. There were claims that in the past Qaddafi had been tipped off about coup attempts by the CIA; that the FBI, CIA and other federal agencies had concealed evidence of lucrative but illegal links between Americans and Libya; and that the Carter administration had been influenced by, and had then covered up, the circumstances of the relationship between the President's brother, Billy Carter, several American oil companies, and the Libyans.[61] These had a damaging effect on the President during his election campaign, but despite their lack of substantiation, they produced an especially hostile climate of opinion about Libya. That made it easy for the Reagan administration to openly espouse confrontation with Qaddafi, as we have already seen.

This was a major shift in American policy, although it was well-founded in the way the Americans had considered threats of the Libyan kind in the past. In 1959, for example, when the Draper Committee-CIA study considered the possibility of the pro-American Senoussi regime in Tripoli being toppled by a Nasserist coup, partition of Libya was proposed:

> Bourguiba (the Tunisian president) might intervene in Tripolitania rather than see it fall under Nasser's control. The United States could strengthen Bourguiba by giving him certain prestige weapons . . . which would make him the strongest single Arab leader in the Maghreb.[62]

Even before Ronald Reagan took office, emissaries from President Bourguiba were sounding him out on a variant of this twenty-year-old scheme. Once in office he quietly committed himself to supply the Tunisian armed forces with nearly $1 billion in 'prestige weapons'—F-5 aircraft, M-60 tanks, etc.—over five years, and even more arms to Egypt. The stage was set for military confrontation on both eastern and western borders and, through the covert aid to the Habré guerrillas, from the south also. What the Eisenhower

60 David Newsom, 'America EnGulfed', *Foreign Policy*, 43, Summer 1981, p. 32.

61. American press coverage of this matter was voluminous See *Report of the President to the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate* (Washington: The White House, Aug. 4, 1980).

62 Quoted by McConnell, *op. cit.*, p 26

administration had contemplated against Gamal Abdel Nasser and any group he sponsored in Libya,[63] the Reagan administration resolved to do to Qaddafi.

We shall now consider how this affected the Libyans themselves, and whether it weakened Qaddafi's domestic standing.

Inside the Libyan Revolution

Qaddafi's 1969 revolution was achieved so easily that neither he nor his colleagues on the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) needed to mobilise popular support until after the event. Oil revenues then made it possible for him to transform the country without imposing material sacrifices on any major segment of the society.

Abdussalam Jalloud, an army captain in 1969 and now a major, one of the five original RCC members still in power,[64] prime minister from 1972 to 1977, and Qaddafi's deputy still, admits that the leadership found itself in an ideological quandary from the beginning:

> It was a vanguard that in 1969 achieved the revolution, and that continues to keep it going. That's our weak point. We were hoping the people would take over, but we ascertained that the elimination of the vanguard would be fatal to the revolution . . . We find ourselves facing a dilemma, because the revolution which wants to elevate moral and spiritual values sees the intention frustrated by everything it has managed to do for the well-being of the people.[65]

The material satisfaction of the vast majority of Libyans is demonstrable. Surveys indicate that most household needs have been met already, or else people are confident they will be by the end of the current five-year plan (1981-85). Even in sectors like housing and transportation where government performance has fallen short of demand, there is a high level of optimism about the future. Only six per cent of Libyans in one recent survey say they expect the future to be less satisfying than the present.[66] More than two-thirds of

63 President Eisenhower wrote in his diary for March 13, 1956

> 'I think we can hold Libya to our side through a reasonable amount of help to that impoverished nation . . If Saudi Arabia and Libya were our staunch friends, Egypt could scarcely continue intimate associations with the Soviets, and certainly Egypt would no longer be regarded as a leader of the Arab world.' Quoted from newly released papers at the Eisenhower Library by Donald Neff, *Warriors At Suez, Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press, 1981) p 198.

The American and British misjudgment of Libya, even under King Idris in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis, is as plain in retrospect as the Reagan administration's calculation of 1981. The parallels between American plans to 'surround' Nasser in 1956 and the plans to 'surround' Qaddafi in 1981 are almost identical. See also: Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand, America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: Norton, 1980) Eveland was a CIA operative during the 1950s and early 1960s involved in covert operations in Syria, Libya and elsewhere in the Middle East

64. In addition to Qaddafi and Jalloud, the three survivors are: Brigadier Abu Bakr Yunis Jaber, now commander-in-chief of the armed forces; Major Mustafa al-Kharrubi, currently listed as a member of the Syria-Libya 'Unity Committee'; and Major Khuwaildi al-Humaydi, head of 'urban militarization' or the people's militias

65. Quoted by Paul Balta, *Le Monde*, Dec 30, 1980.

66. Mustafa O Attir, *Trends of Modernization in an Arab Society: An Exploratory Study* (Tripoli: Arab Development Institute, 1979), pp. 20-23. (Arabic and English.)

Libyans own their own home, and almost every household now has at least one car, television set, and refrigerator.

Economic confidence is indicated by a population growth rate of 6.3 per cent per annum; the average Libyan family has between five and six children, and despite the improvement in income, urbanisation, health care, and career opportunities for women, which everywhere else in the world leads to birth control and small families, Libyans continue to make the traditional choice. A sociologist reports that 'the majority of married people, even among newlyweds, has no desire to resort to family planning techniques.'[67]

Regarding the greatest source of dissatisfaction revealed in surveys—inflation in the cost of food and clothing—there appears to be widespread confidence that Qaddafi will find a solution. By eliminating the *souks* and private commerce, and substituting large supermarkets and department stores, Qaddafi is hoping to release labour from the commercial sector, hold costs down, and guarantee supplies. At present, the new stores are overflowing with people and stocks of goods, but it remains to be seen whether the Libyan bureaucracy can keep it up. If it cannot, it will be easy to hold the Americans responsible for the 'economic quarantine'.

The one problem the regime's economic success has created is not the sharp contrast between affluence and poverty that can be found in other Arab states—in this respect Libya under Qaddafi is democratic—but the mania for conspicuous consumption that Libyans have developed. Everyone wants to join the leisure class; no-one wants to work. This is especially evident in the population aged under twenty, who have no memory of Libya's impoverished past, and who now make up more than two-thirds of the society. In the affluent and increasingly educated population, there is the widespread complaint that there is nothing to do.

Jalloud admits that the regime 'is reinforcing the bourgeois mentality', and Qaddafi rails publicly against it. But despite his exhortations, there has been only marginal popular interest or participation in the experiments in revolutionary ideology and organisation to which Qaddafi has been committed for a decade.[68] The more he tries, the greater the inertia rises against him.

Qaddafi believed that political ideology was necessary to unify the traditionally passive, fissiparous societies of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, but his methods have progressively alienated each of the economic and intellectual elites on which the country's development depends. A string of abrupt changes—from establishing a local capitalist class to abolishing most forms of entrepreneurship and rent[69]—new and then abandoned starts in

67 *Ibid* See also Marius and Mary Jane Deeb, *op. cit* , ch. 3, 'Women in Modern Libya'.

68 For a review of the main experiments in democratisation and political mobilisation, as well as useful surveys of public response to them, see Omar el-Fathaly (*et al.*), *Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya* (Lexington, Mass . Heath, 1977); Omar el-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya* (Lexington, Mass Heath, 1980).

69 Qaddafi has long sought to develop his own theories of revolution, political development, democracy and economics, to supersede those popular among Libyan intellectuals, especially Marxism. See *The Green Book*, 3

economic organisation, political partisanship, administration of schools and universities, and the operation of the state bureaucracy have blundered badly, in the final analysis, because they have left the Libyan economy almost as dependent on foreign expertise and management as it was in 1969.

Qaddafi calculated that so long as he preserved the flow of resources and cash, he could buy legitimacy, co-opt support, insulate the mass of Libyans from the militant critics, and control them with the military. The initial impetus of the revolution did not uproot the well-entrenched bureaucrats, and during the course of time Qaddafi has campaigned hard to mobilise public opinion against them, and institutionalise more rigorous public accountability for their decisions. But the records of the General People's Congress, the principal legislative body that meets annually for budget deliberations and occasionally in special sessions, show that the anti-bureaucracy campaign quickly degenerated into a welter of local community demands for expensive state projects in their areas.[70] Qaddafi has made countrywide tours to inspect projects, intervened to stop the most blatant pork-barrelling, put public officials on trial for corruption, and instituted tough rules to improve bureaucratic performance, but his ultimate priority has been to keep the money flowing and his constituencies quiet. Administratively he has retained continuity where it did not threaten him.[71] In foreign policy, in the information and propaganda agency, and in the military commands, where Qaddafi has been most ideologically and personally threatened, there has been considerable turnover and purging, some of it fatal to the victims. The net impact has been small on most Libyans, whose traditional deference to officialdom continues to manifest itself in surveys.[72]

Qaddafi's most serious administrative blunder was the attack and purge he instigated during 1980 against the Libyan foreign ministry and its missions abroad. For several years, Qaddafi had relied on Ahmed Shahati and his Foreign Liaison Bureau to handle relations between Libya and non-governmental groups, political parties, liberation movements, and guerrilla armies, as well as to foster friendship societies of the kind that first drew Billy Carter to Libya. The foreign ministry was headed by Ali Abdussalam Treiki, a professional bureaucrat in the foreign ministry for many years.

parts, Eng. edn. (Tripoli: Public Establishment for Publishing, 1980). Cf. also Deeb, *op. cit.*, ch. 5, 'The Social Basis of the Revolution'

70. El-Fathaly and Palmer, *op cit*, ch. 9

71 It is worth noting the durability of many of the officials in charge of domestic programmes. Among the current secretaries of the people's committees (as ministers of state are now identified), Muhammad al-Manqush is still in charge of housing as he was in the cabinet of 1971 Abdul Majid Gaoud, who is currently in charge of atomic energy, was responsible for agriculture in the cabinet of 1972. Muhammad Ali al-Jadi, the newly appointed president of the High Court, was minister of justice in the first 1969 cabinet. Muhammad az-Zarruq Rajab, now the equivalent of the speaker of the parliament, was finance minister nine years ago. The original health minister in 1969, Dr Muftah al-Usta Umar, has a new portfolio, 'liaison for internal affairs', that takes care of constituency needs the regular bureaucracy ignores. The current secretary of the General People's Committee (nominally the prime minister), Jadallah Azziz at-Talhi, was minister for industry in 1972, and the key post in charge of the economy is in the hands of Abu Zaid Durdah, who was minister of information in 1970.

72. Attir, *op. cit.*, p. 72, reports that 57 per cent of his sample agreed that: 'Nowadays people wait for some higher-ups to straighten things out instead of helping each other.'

There was considerable bureaucratic competition between Shahati and Treiki, which Qaddafi encouraged. But by the end of 1979, he felt Treiki and several Libyan ambassadors abroad were resisting the efforts Shahati was making to link Libya to opposition movements, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The diplomats became openly hostile when, after Qaddafi announced his decision to 'turn the colleges and schools into barracks' and impose a military training requirement on all students at home and abroad, the threat was made that students who did not return to Libya by mid-1980 would be liquidated.

During 1980 therefore, as Qaddafi's supporters began to implement this threat in Western Europe, he ordered the 'takeover' of the formal Libyan embassies, the recall of most of their diplomats, and their replacement by 'People's Bureaus'—committees of individuals whom Qaddafi considered personally loyal and who reported, not to Treiki, the nominal foreign minister, but to Shahati; then when he fell ill, to his replacement Abdul Ati al-Ubaidi. The latter is a loyal bureaucrat from an important Benghazi tribe, and has held several Cabinet portfolios since 1970. Treiki was moved into Qaddafi's personal entourage as an adviser on foreign affairs.

Underlying the conflict within the foreign ministry and the liquidation campaign of 1980 was Qaddafi's realisation that the student population on whom he had counted for personal and ideological support, were indifferent to him in most cases, and openly hostile when his schemes to 'revolutionise' their curricula, reorganise school and university administration, and interrupt their schooling with military training, appeared to threaten their career ambitions. The ideological failure, which was reflected in embarrassing student riots in 1979 and 1980, drove Qaddafi to a degree of repression he had not considered before. But since many of his critics were abroad, on state scholarships, he was unable to silence them without involving foreign states in his internal affairs and severely straining Libya's foreign relations. The terror campaign in turn provoked the resignation of several Libyan diplomats, some of whom had been packed off to overseas posts because Qaddafi already did not trust them at home.[73] The ranks of Qaddafi's opponents in exile appeared publicly to swell as he flailed murderously but ineffectively to crush them.

By the end of 1980, Qaddafi's preoccupation with the student threat had turned his foreign policy into a shambles. He had failed to suppress his critics, and given his opponents more publicity and legitimacy than they had known before. He had provoked partial or full expulsion of his representatives in Europe, the United States, and several African countries; in the Arab world

73. Several Libyan diplomats have resigned and made statements in support of the opposition in exile. Muhammad al-Magrif Lamgarief (a former auditor-general and ambassador to India); Amnad Hwas (ex-army instructor, chargé d'affaires in Guyana); Ezzedin Ghdamsi (ambassador to Austria); Abdassalam Ali Aylah (chargé d'affaires in New Delhi); Ibrahim Sahr (chargé d'affaires in Argentina) The case of Mansour Rashid al-Kikhia, the Libyan ambassador to the UN (and former foreign minister), resigned his post and did not return to Libya, but he has not gone over to Qaddafi's opposition.

(for other reasons) diplomatic relations were cut with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

But if the Reagan administration calculated that Qaddafi's domestic support was deserting him and he was ripe for a coup, it proved to be mistaken. In 1980 there was little public acceptance in Libya for military conscription, and scepticism, based on the news coming from foreign radio broadcasts, of the foreign threats with which Qaddafi justified his actions. In 1981, however, the Reagan administration made these threats palpable; the Israeli bombing attacks on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June and Beirut in July added to Libyan popular concerns, and the Gulf of Sirte incident seemed to confirm what Qaddafi had said all along. The American campaign boosted Qaddafi's popular support, inside and outside the country.

It also appeared to verify what Qaddafi had consistently said, both about American and Israeli threats to Libyan security, and also about the uses of the AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia—two of which were flown to the Egyptian border in the May episode—the covert Western aid to Hissein Habré in Chad, the partition of southern Lebanon, and the manipulation of Libyans abroad by Washington. When four Libyan students were killed in an Israeli attack in southern Lebanon in May, their loss was a sacrifice the Libyans could accept—it would have been far less acceptable the year before. Sadat's assassination helped demonstrate that Libyan support for the anti-Sadat opposition had *Egyptian* support as well. The assassination helped to justify the sizable expenditures the General People's Congress had committed to aid the Arab opposition in North Africa, and to back the Steadfastness Front (Algeria, Syria, South Yemen, the PLO, and Libya), as well as the new Ethiopian-Yemeni-Libyan pact, against the 'stable David'[74] alliance of the United States, Israel, Egypt and the Sudan.

As events were also to illustrate, the Reagan administration's tough rhetoric was not readily turned into effective support for Qaddafi's internal and external enemies. The 1979-80 student opposition in Tripoli and Benghazi had stopped short of a plan to seize power, and the military men who have attempted coups failed largely because of the narrowness of the connexions and support on which they have relied. The Muhaishi coup attempt of August 1975, for example, drew the majority of its members from Misurata, Muhaishi's home town. The August 1980 attempt was confined to Tobruk. The plot of May 22, 1981 appears to have been limited to members of the Magarha tribe (Fezzan). What may have been a necessary element of the initial security of coup plans became a mortal liability in the execution. Qaddafi has never been threatened at more than one place at one time, and this has allowed him ample opportunity to concentrate loyal forces on surrounding and crushing the rebels. There have been few solid links between the Libyan National Democratic Movement, the Libyan National League and other groups abroad, and critical sections of the society at home. The distinguishing

74 In Libyan parlance, Camp David is referred to deprecatingly as the 'stable David'.

feature of those known to be involved in the exile groups is their tie to the urban middle class from before the revolution. They have no appeal to the new generation of Libyans.

Suppose, however, that an assassination attempt succeeded. It is far from certain that Qaddafi's supporters would evaporate. More likely, the armed forces would divide territorially, and fighting between units in Tripoli, Benghazi, Tobruk and Sebha degenerate into civil war. No-one can tell with certainty how such a conflict would end. It might lead to the establishment of a military or civil-military regime that was indebted to Morocco, Egypt and the United States. But it might also lead to the emergence of a group of officers, whose training and ideological orientation would tie them far more closely to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc than Qaddafi himself is.

Among the civilian elites, there are many who have been alienated by Qaddafi's policies in the past decade. But their criticism of Qaddafi has been that he has been *too* supportive of American and foreign interests in the country. These are the educators, academics, technicians, managers and planners who would, if they could, break Libya free of its dependence, despite the oil wealth, on foreign expertise and management. They have argued that the rate of Libya's development is too fast for the economy and society to cope with. Oil production, they say, should be cut to 500,000 barrels daily, and with the lower level of revenues, the country should reduce the number of investment projects that it executes, the volume of goods imported from abroad, and the number of foreign workers imported to execute projects and keep up the pace of development.

From the perspective of this group, the Reagan campaign has been regrettable because it has heightened tension along Libya's borders, and justified Qaddafi's demands for military conscription—which removes badly needed Libyans from the workforce, increasing still further Libya's dependence on foreign workers—as well as his claim for continuously increasing military expenditures. On the other hand, the economic embargo that the Americans have threatened—and that the international oil surplus has facilitated—has produced one of the results they have long advocated. By late 1981, Libyan output varied between 400,000 barrels a day and 700,000 barrels a day, and oil revenues had dropped accordingly.[75] The result was a slowing down in new investments, and greater selectivity in imports. In the long run, without Qaddafi, Libya will be run by civilian economists, who learned their development economics in the United States and Britain, and who may prove to be far more hostile to the high rates of oil output and massive development imports from which the United States and Western Europe benefit under

75. *The Economist*, Sept. 12, 1981; private communications from officials of US oil companies operating in Libya. See also Paul Balta, *Le Monde*, Oct. 19, 1981, p. 3. Just how badly Libyan revenues might have been affected is difficult to substantiate, for at the same time as oil sales diminished the flow of dollars to Libya, the rise in the relative value of the dollar against the European currencies (up to 50 per cent revaluation against the Italian lira, for example) enabled Libya's Central Bank to sell dollars for European currencies and maintain a fraction of the purchasing power which would otherwise have been lost.

Qaddafi. A combination of these and a Soviet-trained military cadre might have little incentive to produce oil or trade with the West at all.

The prospects of eliminating Qaddafi are not as likely nor as favourable for American interests as they may appear, and Europeans who trade with Tripoli understand this quite well.[76]

Qaddafi's foreign policy

Is Qaddafi capable of threatening the United States as seriously as the Reagan administration claims? Is he as dangerous as Nasser, and for the same strategic reason, that he is in league with Moscow?

There is a widely believed Libyan proverb that goes: 'If I am not a wolf, other wolves will eat me.' This indicates the traditional mistrustfulness of the Libyans, and it is directed just as much within the society as beyond it.[77] But the aggressiveness that is suggested is not recklessness, and does not reflect a penchant for risk-taking. The Libyan hero of modern times, Omar el-Mukhtar, the leader of the resistance to the Italians between 1911 and 1931, was a patient negotiator, good at bluff, and a cautious tactician.[78] Qaddafi would retain no military or public support if he were perceived as straying far from that model. The evidence suggests that his tactics are a continuous series of adjustments between two points—the security of the Libyan state, and the consensus of the Arab states. As contradictory as his moves may appear, and as swiftly as he changes direction, the imperatives of Libyan national security temper his apparent readiness for violence, while the hostility or support he can anticipate from the Arab states constrains his temptation to push his security concerns too far beyond his borders.

The brief engagements between Libyan and Egyptian forces in 1977 proved that an offensive by either side was an unlikely prospect to succeed at the time. Libyan reinforcements since then—matched by the Egyptian build-up around Mersa Matruh and Sidi Barrani—add substantially to tensions, but short of an internal coup that sends one side's forces over to the other, the effectiveness of a policy of confrontation has not been established on either side. Indeed, by November 1981, both President Mubarak and Colonel Qaddafi had signalled that they had no intention of moving against each other, not directly at least.[79]

76. See Wright, *The Middle East*, Aug. 1981, p. 18

77. El-Fathaly *et al*, *op. cit*, p 56.

78 See Romain Rainero, 'La capture, l'exécution d'Omar El-Mukhtar, et la fin de la guérilla libyenne', *Cahiers de Tunisie* (Tunis), 28, nos 111-112, pp 59-73

79. Sadat's initial plan to attack Libya—which followed the serious food riots in Cairo in January 1977—was opposed by senior officers of the armed forces. Mubarak privately opposed Sadat's build-up of tension with Libya during 1980, and immediately before Sadat's death, when Mubarak was in Washington, he indicated that the promised US weapons deliveries—aircraft and tanks—were failing to materialise, spare parts were also unavailable, and for these reasons, he argued at the time, Egypt was in no position to challenge Libya directly, or even indirectly, by supporting the Sudan in the Chadian border conflict. After he succeeded to the presidency, Mubarak did not request the American gesture of sending two AWACS aircraft, and they were withdrawn when it became clear to Mubarak that they might become a *casus belli* with the Libyans. For background and reports of the July 1977 clashes, see *New York Times*, July 22, 24, 25, 26, 27; Dennis Chaplin, Libya—Military Spearhead Against Sadat?', *Military Review*, Nov. 1979, pp. 42-50. Qaddafi made a number of statements to indicate that he would not cross the Egyptian border; see FBIS-MEA-202, Oct. 20, 1981, Q4;

Although President Bourguiba has accused Qaddafi of inspiring the incident of January 1980, when sixty Tunisian exiles tried to spark a rebellion in the southern town of Gafsa, not even Reagan administration officials who justify the rearmament of Tunisia with references to Gafsa, will say clearly that the Libyan leader had been responsible. Qaddafi himself has said: 'Whenever a Tunisian cat is killed, I am blamed for it'.[80] But in American statements on the Tunisian-American military deal, the language was equivocal. Assistant Secretary Crocker would say only: 'Apparently at Qaddafi's direction, a number of armed guerrillas sought to take over the central [*sic*] Tunisian town of Gafsa . . .'.[81] The State Department and Pentagon told the Congress in their presentation on Tunisian military assistance: 'the guerrilla attack against the town of Gafsa . . . Tunisia believes was organised by Libya.'[82] In fact, American officials admit in private what Tunisian and Libyan officials have accepted—Qaddafi did not direct the Gafsa raid, and Algeria was more responsible for what happened than Libya. Not a single Tunisian opposition leader, nor many Tunisian officials,[83] believe that Libya threatens Tunisia militarily, and although none is positively disposed towards Qaddafi, they share the view that the Libyan threat is part of Bourguiba's manipulation of Tunisian politics to preserve his own power and that of his designated successors.[84] The Reagan administration has its own stake in promoting Tunisian hostility towards Libya—not least of which is the interest of the United States in establishing improved military facilities for the Sixth Fleet on the Tunisian coast, as well as potential bases from which to monitor, and in a crisis, attack Libyan military movements in a potential regional conflict.[85] As indicated earlier, this is a resuscitation of the contingency plans of Eisenhower vintage, and they risk much greater internal instability in Tunisia than they protect America's allies in the country.

Whether—from the Libyan viewpoint—internal dissent in sub-Saharan Africa and the *ceinture saharienne* has been suppressed by French intervention (Tunisia, Central African Republic, Niger, Senegal, Gabon),[86] American and Belgian intervention (Liberia, Morocco, Zaire),[87] and British intervention (The

for Mubarak's comments on Libya, see FBIS-MEA-200, Oct. 16, 1981, D3-4 (interview with Middle East News Agency); FBIS-MEA-203, Oct. 21, 1981, D1-9 (interview with *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*, as published by the Middle East News Agency) In the latter interview, he said: 'We will *not* say anything against any Arab state I will tell the press today not to attack any of our Arab friends, even Libya itself. We will not initiate attacks on any of these states ' This did not rule out Egyptian support for Habré in Chad.

80. Private communication

81 Crocker, *op cit* , p. 3

82. Departments of State and Defense, *Congressional Presentation Document* (on US foreign military assistance, Fiscal Year 1982), Washington, n d., 163.

83. These include the Prime Minister, Mohammed Mzali. Personal interview, July 1981 See Wright, *Nation*, Dec. 6, 1981; *The Middle East*, Oct. 1981, pp. 22-24.

84. Wright, 'Tunisia. Twilight for the Bourguiba Regime?', *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston), Nov. 1980; Lassooing Tunisia', *New Statesman*, Oct. 30, 1981.

85 Wright, *New Statesman*, April 10, 1981, based on private communications with US officials.

86. Roger Faligot, 'Les services secrets français en Afrique', in *La France contre L'Afrique, Tricontinental* (Paris), I-1981, pp. 115-30.

87 Crawford Young, 'Zaire. The Unending Crisis', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 169-85; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978).

Gambia),[88] or whether—from the European perspective—Libya's efforts have been no match for the indigenous security forces, a simple practical conclusion can be drawn: the threat of Libyan subversion in Africa is overrated, and relatively easy to deflect. Put another way, confronting Libya directly on its borders is an unnecessarily costly and provocative method for blocking Qaddafi's initiatives further south. Just how far Qaddafi actually threatens these countries—as well as Kenya, Somalia, Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria, which are also mentioned in official American statements—is difficult to substantiate. For each country has substantial internal unrest, some of it with a Muslim cast. This would continue whether Libya was sympathetic or not. American, French and Soviet economic and military aid has been funnelled into Africa for much longer than Libya had oil revenues to spare for the same purposes, and even a reduction in Libya's ability to continue this aid—one of the objectives of the 'economic quarantine' proposed in Washington—will not put an end to the troubles that Washington currently blames on Qaddafi.[89] Arguably, cutting down Libya's ability to operate at the economic level with its neighbours may encourage Qaddafi to optimise his influence by backing military subversion more fully. In Niger, for example, Qaddafi was able in June to offer above-market prices for over 1,200 tons of uranium ore (yellow cake). While American officials worry about that as an indicator of Libyan ambitions to nuclear status, the expenditure of Libyan resources to enrich the impoverished *nigérien* economy is perhaps to be preferred to a smaller investment on training *nigérois* guerrillas. Caught in budget constraints of their own making, the Americans are resentful that Libya can offer more directly useful economic aid to the government in Niamey than it is willing to provide.[90]

If the Reagan administration's case for direct US confrontation with Qaddafi rests on the situation in Chad,[91] a close analysis of the circumstances suggests that Chad is a special case, not the first of the African dominoes Qaddafi will knock down if he isn't overthrown at home, and one on which French and American policy have increasingly diverged since President Mitterrand took office.

Quite untypical of the countries to the south and west, Chad is ethnically much more Arab. Economically and socially it has been linked for centuries to the power centres of Libya. The mid-section of Chad, which contains the main

88 Associated Press report, *Washington Post*, Aug. 7, 1981.

89 Americans who argue that Libya is a threat to its Saharan neighbours usually omit an analysis of internal unrest in the countries affected, and the American press and Congress cannot be expected to inquire into the political intricacies of countries, mostly of the Francophone group, that are virtually unheard of in the US. For a statement of the American case, see T. William Zartman, 'Libya: Problems for US Policy', Hearing of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, Oct. 29, 1981.

90. In the provision of aid to Niger, the Reagan administration budget proposal for 1982 cut food aid and permitted only a marginal increase of $200,000 to a total of $15.1 million. This was much less than the rate of increase in the Carter budgets.

91 Crocker, *op cit* —'Libyan intervention in Chad has been the most disturbing manifestation to date of Qaddafi's intentions in Africa' (6). Cf. René Lamarchand, Testimony presented to the House Subcommittee on Africa, Oct. 29, 1981.

towns and military strong-points, includes at least half a million people of Arab identity and language—about 14 per cent of Chad's total population.[92] Linguistic, tribal or religious ties link them also to the Toubous and non-Arab ethnic groups in the north.

Historically, political power in Chad has shifted under the pressure of military expansion from the north, east and west. During the European colonial period, Chadian territory was contested and nominally partitioned into spheres of influence by the French, Italians (as rulers of Libya after the Turks), and the British. If the policy adopted by the OAU of accepting the borderlines drawn across Africa by the colonial powers is applied to Chad, Libyan claims to the Auzou Strip and other sections of northern Chad and Niger have some basis in legal argument.[93]

In the undisputed 'French' part of Chad, which became nominally independent in 1960, there has been a protracted conflict that is also untypical of the surrounding region. The central authority in N'Djamena, the capital, depended on French financial assistance, trade support, and military forces until the latter were finally withdrawn after intermittent but bloody fighting in April 1980. That left several factional contenders for power, each with its own tribal allies, territorial base, and small army.[94]

The complexity and acrimony of these internal divisions is unique to Chad, and they have facilitated ample scope for influence and subversion, not only by the Libyans, but by all of Chad's neighbours, France, Egypt, the United States, Israel, and the Soviet Union. Qaddafi's contention is that Chad is a part of Libya's 'vital space', that there had been secret agreements with France's former President, Giscard D'Estaing, and Sadat that they would not intervene on the side of Hissein Habré—the loser in the Chadian civil war of 1980—that these commitments were broken, and that Libyan torces were not finally sent into Chad in strength until the civil war intensified, and after the signing of a mutual support pact between Oueddei Goukkouni's transitional government (GUNT) and Libya on June 15, 1980. Legally, Qaddafi thus claims that his intervention in Chad was at the request of the legitimate government; although there are disputes about that, the circumstances closely parallel those which Paris and Washington have used to justify their interventions in the Central

92. Harold D. Nelson, *et al.*, *Area Handbook for Chad* (Washington. US Government Printing Office, 1972).

93. In 1890, for example, Turkey formally notified the French and British of its claim to territory extending as far south as Lake Chad The feebleness of the Sublime Porte and its unwillingness to back its claim with a military presence led the French and British to draw their own spheres of influence in the same area by an agreement of 1899. Italy became a claimant as a member of the winning Allied side over Turkey in the First World War, and in 1935 Mussolini negotiated a pact with France providing for a borderline between French Chad and Italian Libya that assigned the Aozou Strip to the latter On the complex territorial dispute over this boundary, see Victor Prescott, 'Africa's Boundary Problems', *Optima*, 28 (Jan. 12, 1979), p. 2; Abdul Amir Majid, *Libya, A Geopolitical Study*, unpub. doct diss., University of Ohio, 1952 In Crocker's statement, referred to above, there is an admission that 'Libyan interest in its southern neighbor is based on ancient religious and tribal ties which have given rise to longstanding, if disputed, territorial claims.'

94. See Lamarchand, *op. cit* Also *Africa Confidential* (London), Aug. 13, 1980; Oct. 15, 1980; Arnold Hottinger, 'L'expansionisme libyen. Machrek, Maghreb, et Afrique noire', *Politique Etrangère*, 1, 1981, pp. 137–49; Paul Balta, 'Kadhafi: Est-il expansionniste?', *Politique Internationale*, 11, Spring 1981, pp. 231–46.

African Republic and Zaire; which Egypt and the Sudan apply to cover the presence of Egyptian forces in Sudan; and which the Gambian and Senegalese governments have claimed to legitimise the use of Senegalese troops to put down attempted uprisings in The Gambia in November 1980 and August 1981.

According to Paul Balta, who reported on secret talks between the French and the Libyans in the period between the Chadian-Libyan pact and the retreat of Habré to the Sudanese border in December 1980, Qaddafi had reason to believe that his role in Chad had the tacit acquiescence of the Elysée Palace.[95] The French then changed their minds, and were encouraged by the new Reagan administration and by the Saudis to back Habré more strongly.[96] Subsequent reports of a Goukkouni-Qaddafi pact of January 6, 1981 that would permit Libyan annexation of Chad are not borne out by the language of the pact itself,[97] by the statements of Goukkouni and other Chadian leaders, or by the assessments given by members of the OAU committee on Chad (Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, CAR and Sierra Leone) at conferences on the Chad problem during 1981.

Until November 1981, when President Mitterrand stimulated an apparent willingness by Nigeria, Senegal and other OAU member states to contribute to a peacekeeping force to enter Chad, there was grudging acceptance by the African states of Qaddafi's *fait accompli* in ending the Chadian civil war, and in gaining favoured status as the country's only source of cash and technical aid to rebuild the shattered economy. The Nairobi summit in June accepted the territorial *status quo* created for Chad by the Italian-French pact of 1935, and acknowledged Tripoli's interest in having a non-hostile power on its southern border. For most of 1981, however, the Reagan campaign's covert aid to the Habré guerrillas undermined the one test of Libyan intentions that the French, the Libyans, the OAU and Goukkouni's government had agreed on—the establishment of a peacekeeping force.

A secret meeting between the Libyan foreign minister, Abdel-Ati Ubaidi, and the French minister of co-operation, Jean-Pierre Cot, in Paris that autumn, made the Libyan position clear to the French. Neither offers of new arms contracts, nor threats of an arms embargo, that Cot proposed, would persuade

95 Balta, *Le Monde*, Dec. 27, 28, 30, 31, 1981.

96 Wright, *Atlanta Constitution*, Jan. 27, 1981.

97 President Goukkouni visited Tripoli in the first week of January, 1981, from January 20-23, and then after he attended the Islamic summit meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia, from January 29-31. His foreign minister also attended the Taif summit, and both were interviewed there by this author The Goukkouni-Qaddafi communiqué of Jan. 6, which Assistant Secretary Crocker described (*op. cit*, 6) as an announcement of 'the merger of Chad with Libya', speaks of 'the legitimate government in Chad, it being the sole legitimate authority in Chad', 'the freedom and independence of (the) people (of the Republic of Chad)'. It bases Libyan military aid to Chad, including troops, on 'the joint defense treaty signed between the two countries on . . . 15 June 1980', and, finally, it speaks of a resolution 'to work for the realization of complete unity between the two countries—a *jamahiri* unity in which authority, arms and resources are in the hands of the people . . .' This formula, parallel to the one adopted by Syria and Libya, reflects Qaddafi's ideological ambition of creating certain types of political system among his friends. It no more means a merger or annexation than the Syrian-Libyan 'unity' pact of 1980. This point was made by the Libyans and Chadians in subsequent 'clarifications' of the January communiqué For the original text, see FBIS, MEA-81-004, Jan. 7, 1981, I-1, 2, 3.

Libya to withdraw. Ubaidi told Cot that only a public request by Goukkouni, invoking the June 1980 pact, would produce a Libyan withdrawal. At the same time, the French were warned, Goukkouni was in a poor position to preserve the peace in Chad if Libya pulled out and an OAU force were not well-established.

The position of the French government was unclear, and reflected deep divisions between those who favoured the American approach and urged tougher measures with the Libyans, and those who advocated testing Qaddafi's promise of withdrawal first. President Mitterrand opted for the second option. He issued a statement at the Cancun meeting in Mexico, urging the African states to assemble the peacekeeping force quickly. He then urged Goukkouni to demand the Libyan pullout, and promised arms and economic assistance if he did so. Goukkouni accepted the French advice, and Qaddafi ordered his forces to withdraw in Mid-November. Almost immediately, the Habré forces advanced into eastern Chad, and without the deployment of the OAU force that had been promised, Goukkouni's position began to deteriorate. Libya's manouevre, however, eliminated a dangerous source of provocation with its neighbours and the United States, dramatically cut Libya's financial obligations to N'Djamena, and gave Qaddafi a diplomatic victory at the expense of both the French and the United States, who were obliged to underwrite the costs of both the Habré challenge and the survival of Goukkouni.

In the Saharan conflict between Morocco and the Polisario, to take another case that is often said to be an example of Libyan expansionism, the steady deterioration of Morocco's position cannot be blamed on Libya. It can be explained by the effectiveness of the Polisario as a highly-mobile and strongly motivated fighting unit, by the demoralising and heavy cost to Morocco of garrisoning isolated outposts and maintaining supply and communications links in hostile territory, and by the lack of international support for King Hassan's refusal to negotiate with the Polisario.[98] Libya has provided the Polisario with arms, but as with the original *Frolinat* movement against the French in Chad, Qaddafi has been an inconstant and untrusted supporter. Only very reluctantly did he agree to recognise the separatist government set up by the Polisario; and he was prepared to restore relations with King Hassan, behind Polisario's back, to head off a Moroccan-inspired censure motion at the Nairobi OAU summit. Even if SA-6 and SA-8 missiles which were used at the Battle of Guelta Zemmour by the Polisario were supplied from Libya, they hardly match the volume of weapons and aid provided to Rabat by the United States—to little avail in the field. It is arguable that without Libyan arms and money, the steady military gains made by the Polisario, together with their diplomatic victories in the OAU, would have been won regardless. Algeria has been of substantially longer and more durable assistance to the Saharan movement, but Washington has not diagnosed Algerian expansionism as the underlying motive.

98. See 'Western Sahara—The Military Angle', *Africa Confidential*, 22, 14 (July 1, 1981).

Again, as in Chad, American intransigence towards Qaddafi may be the obstacle to an effective negotiated settlement of the territorial issue, for Qaddafi himself—like most Arab leaders—does not favour a separate Saharoui state. His proposal, announced during a visit to Mauritania on April 22, 1981, for a union between Mauritania and the Polisario, 'to materialize when subjective conditions in this area (i.e., the war with Morocco) end', and the creation of 'a front extending from Mauritania to Libya' represented, not a giant Libyan land-grab, but a compromise formula permitting Hassan to negotiate through Mauritania with the Polisario, without having to do so directly, accept a settlement that would create no new state, and put the results of the negotiations under guarantee of all the Arab states immediately involved.[99] Mauritanian officials do not rule this proposal out—and they cannot be described as pro-Libyan. What stands in the way of further movement on negotiations is Hassan's inflexibility, and the belief, backed by Reagan ministrations, that he can have a military victory. Hassan's own covert actions—which include the backing for an abortive *coup d'etat* in Mauritania in March 1981—have been no more effective; they do, however, threaten his immediate neighbours more than Qaddafi's moves.

Outside the Maghreb, in Lebanon, Syria, and the area most immediately affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qaddafi has been far less persuasive and influential than the 'front-line' states and the PLO. He cannot be considered a contender for pan-Arab popularity on Nasser's level—Arab loyalties are far more segmented than those of a generation ago.[100] He has intrigued to develop a 'Libyan faction' within the Palestinian movement, and his open quarrel with Yasir Arafat in late 1979 indicated how impotent he was at the time, especially within Arafat's *Fatah*.

The differences have been patched up cosmetically, as the conditions in southern Lebanon and on the Syrian-Israeli border deteriorated towards war in 1981. But Qaddafi's uncompromising hostility to territorial compromise with Israel and his advocacy of 'practical stances in Lebanon'—reinforcement of PLO forces by Arab-state volunteers, sophisticated Soviet missile deployments to contest Israeli air supremacy, and long-range artillery to attack northern Israel and the pro-Israel Christian Lebanese enclaves—have gradually won grudging acceptance from Syria, the main PLO leaders, and to a lesser extent by Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Qaddafi's feud with Saudi Arabia reflects underlying disagreements on tactics in Lebanon and on the Palestinian issue, on the belief by both sides that each wishes the other dead, and on Qaddafi's attacks on Saudi oil policy and the proposal to buy American AWACS aircraft, both of which he regards as a betrayal of Arab solidarity. On the oil and AWACS issues, Qaddafi's position represents the Arab consensus; disclosures made by White House officials during the October AWACS debate in Washington make abundantly clear

99. Qaddafi's words are translated in FBIS, MEA-81-078, April 23, 1981, Q3.
100. See Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

that, from the American perspective, the AWACS system is indeed part of a military strategy aimed at the Arab states.[101]

One could continue enumerating cases—the Yemen-Oman conflict, the Horn of Africa, Sudan, the Iraqi-Iranian war, the Moro insurgency in the Philippines, American pacts with Turkey and Pakistan—but a few simple points stand out in all. Qaddafi is opposed to American policy wherever he perceives an 'imperialist' threat. It is unwise to exaggerate this—as the Americans and Qaddafi himself have done. His means to influence events are limited to cash, and his support is fickle, inconstant and poorly informed. His role has not proved decisive, except in Chad. Because the Reagan administration has pursued policies that offend the Arab consensus, Qaddafi's views have drawn the other Arab states much closer towards him, narrowing the gap that developed in 1980, and American pressure tactics have helped push those states more uniformly behind him than ever before.

Qaddafi has survived to date, not just because he has a good East German and Soviet intelligence network, but because he has anticipated the Americans more shrewdly than they have anticipated him.

This is one reason for Britain and the West Europeans to make their own assessment of Qaddafi and preserve their independence of the Reagan White House in dealing with him. There are other reasons. Libyan terrorism has been primarily a European problem, and the evidence suggests it can be solved by direct negotiations, accompanied by vigilance. Libyan oil and the Libyan import market are of greater value to Europe than to the United States, and American economic interests there are not identical to Europe's. They are competitive in fact, which underscores the traditional Western rivalries in the region. America's policy of confrontation cuts Italian, French, German, and British receipts from Libya, while boosting the American share of trade (mainly arms) with countries in the traditional French and British zones, like Morocco, Tunisia and the Sudan. But if Libya is a Soviet ally, can the Europeans afford to break ranks with the United States?

The Soviet threat

When Qaddafi visited Moscow, after several postponements, in April 1981, he was seeking fresh Soviet arms, an agreement on transfer of nuclear technology, assistance in the Libyan oilfields, and a public commitment to support Libya in case of a foreign attack.

But instead of negotiating directly on these issues, Qaddafi and the Russians bickered over whether he could pray in the shuttered Grand Mosque of Moscow, whether the prayers would be broadcast from the minaret, and—after the Russians had agreed to both demands—whether Qaddafi would reciprocate by laying a wreath at Lenin's mausoleum. The Libyan press agency celebrated the visit as a triumph of the Faithful over the Non-believers, but from within

101 Scott Armstrong, *The Washington Post*, Nov. 1, 1981, A1; Wright, *New Statesman*, Oct. 9, 1981.

both delegations, there was disgruntlement that none of the key issues had been decided.

Was Qaddafi play-acting? There is always a difficulty in arms talks—Russian officials specialising in Middle East and North African affairs explain—and Qaddafi himself is a 'phenomenon'. He is:

> explicit in personal talks, but he had a handicap when he started years ago of no patience. He cannot be a party to an easy compromise. That explains many problems in Soviet-Libyan relations. In a sense, his approach is all or nothing—say yes or I go. Qaddafi is rational. We know what he means. He has not been inclined to think objectively, however he is courageous. He appears irrational, but idealists often appear like this.[102]

Idealism in the Soviet political vocabulary is not a compliment, and the assessment is indicative that on the Soviet side, there is considerable caution and mistrust. About Major Jalloud, Qaddafi's deputy, who returned to Moscow in June to complete the negotiations, the Russians are even less complimentary: 'a nonentity, an actor, a man who believes in nothing.'[103]

American officials believe that the Reagan pressures of 1981 didn't push Qaddafi towards the Russians; they think he was already a 'surrogate'. West European diplomats in Tripoli unanimously disagree, and blame American tactics for the moves Qaddafi made during the year to move closer to the Soviet Union.

Whichever came first, the outcome was clear not long after the Jalloud visit. At that time, Soviet officials told Western correspondents that the Soviet Union would not stand by if Libya was the target of an outside attack. At about the same time, the first Soviet shipment of enriched uranium fuel for Libya's nuclear programme—11.5 kilogrammes—was reported to have been delivered to Tripoli.[104] Then on July 25, two Soviet naval vessels entered Tripoli harbour for the first ever Soviet portcall.[105] Soviet warnings about foreign attacks were repeated after the Gulf of Sirte incident in August and the Sadat assassination in October. Qaddafi visited Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia in September only days after a visit to Tripoli of the Czech president, Gustav Husak. On September 25, the Soviet Deputy Oil Minister opened technical talks in Tripoli with Libyan officials. During 1980/81 Western intelligence sources reported various sightings of SS-12 *Scaleboard* missiles in transit, though further details are not available. The opening moves of Libya's turn toward the East were now complete, even as Qaddafi continued to insist—on Italian television—that:

> we are prepared to enter into a dialogue with the United States on several issues: the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the bilateral problem, the

102. Private communications to the author.

103. *Ibid.*

104. Information provided by officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) to David Willis, *Christian Science Monitor* (in press).

105. Announcement by the Libyan government, FBIS. MEA-81-143, July 27, 1981, Q1.

> United Nations, the International Court of Justice and the Law of the Sea Conference . . .[and] to maintain economic interests of mutual benefit to both peoples . . .[106]

American analysts argue over whether the substantial stocks of arms Libya has purchased from the Soviet Union represent a realistic arsenal for Libya's own security needs, or are prepositioned for Soviet or Soviet-allied (Syrian, Ethiopian) use in the region.[107]

The conventional argument is that the numerical size of the stocks—2,600 tanks, 740 scout cars, 600 howitzers, etc.[108]—is much too great for the small Libyan army of only 55,000 to use. However, the stocks do match the Egyptian arsenal, and deterring an Egyptian attack across the eastern border has been a reasonable defence preoccupation of Libya, particularly since the 1977 war. There is another explanation too. Lacking proximity to the Palestinian 'front line', or the level of influence with Palestinian groups that Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan all have, Qaddafi has conceived of playing quartermaster to the PLO in the event that it requires sophisticated weaponry and cannot readily acquire it from the front-line states or Moscow itself. Such an arsenal as he has assembled is thus a tool of his influence and, if anything, reflects suspicion of Soviet support for the Palestinian cause, rather than compliance with Soviet regional designs.

But the best test of the American claim that Qaddafi is the Kremlin's agent is to be found in the evidence of his foreign policy performance. The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that his moves have been characteristically, eccentrically, his own. There is an obvious contradiction in this kind of allegation, for if the Reagan administration seriously believed it, and furthermore considered the 'Soviet arsenal' in western Libya to be evidence substantiating the claim, why would Washington imagine it could challenge Qaddafi, even plot to topple him, without sooner or later confronting the Soviet Union itself? Would the Russians be likely to let slip such a military investment with the same resignation and lack of fight demonstrated by the United States when Qaddafi ordered it out of Wheelus, or the British when evicted from Tobruk and El Adem? It seems far more likely that the Reagan administration chose to tackle Qaddafi precisely because it did *not* expect the Soviets to get involved.[109] That aspect of the American strategy has also backfired.

There is one last issue on which several American administrations have

106 FBIS-MEA-81-206, Oct 26, 1981, Q1.

107 Crocker, *op cit.* 'I am referring to the acquisition of highly sophisticated weapons systems far in excess of Libya's legitimate defense requirements' (5); cf. John Cooley, *op cit*, 86; Dennis Chaplin, *op. cit.*

108 *The Military Balance 1981–82*, *op cit*, p. 55.

109. Once before the Russians were involved—the date of Qaddafi's *coup d'etat*, when a joint Soviet-Egyptian-Syrian naval and troop exercise was occurring near the Libyan border, and when Soviet ships were anchored off Tobruk. It has been suggested by some Americans—denied by David Newsom, who was in the North Africa Bureau of the State Department at the time—that 'the Soviet fleet may have been used by Egypt and the officers around Qaddafi as a 'floating trip-wire' for the Libyan *coup d'etat* . . . (to) deter any countermove by the United States and Great Britain' See Jesse Lewis, *op cit.*, p. 75.

challenged Qaddafi—his ambition to build a nuclear weapons capability. The Israeli nuclear weapons capability has made it inevitable that the Arab states would seek the uranium resources, enrichment and separation technology, and other components to match the Israeli weapons. Egypt, and notwithstanding the June reactor raid, Iraq are both considerably closer to the weapons production stage than Libya. It is believed that Qaddafi tried to take a shortcut by financing the Pakistani nuclear programme, during the Bhutto period, and seeking manpower training and perhaps weapons in return, but he failed. Such co-operation as existed between Libya and Pakistan on nuclear technology[110] ended some time between the fall from power of the Pakistani president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in July 1977 and his execution—which Qaddafi strongly opposed—in April 1979.

The proliferation of nuclear weaponry is now an irreversible fact in the Middle East, and no Arab leader can afford to ignore the path Qaddafi tried. The path will not disappear if Qaddafi goes. In the meantime, he is intent on creating a sizeable cadre of foreign-trained nuclear physicists and engineers,[111] a stockpile of yellow cake, and technical facilities associated with the Soviet-supplied reactor programme. For the foreseeable future, however, Qaddafi must rely on the Soviet Union for his nuclear technology, reactor equipment, and enriched uranium, and about that relationship, one conclusion can be offered with assurance: unlike French, American or Canadian nuclear technology and uranium supply agreements to date, no Soviet contract has ever led to proliferation or diversion to weapons manufacture. Soviet involvement in Libya's nuclear programme is a more reliable guarantee of non-proliferation than the United States' past or current involvement with Israel or Egypt.

110. The literature on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme is voluminous and highly speculative, and the Libyan role almost wholly unsubstantiated. Cf Zalmay Khalilzad, 'Pakistan and the Bomb', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Jan. 1980, pp. 11-16; 'Nuclear proliferation in South Asia', *Strategic Survey 1979* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 15-17.

111. David Willis claims that there are approximately 200 Libyans training in the nuclear sciences in the United States, 200 in Europe, and a larger number in the Soviet Union. Private communication. *Christian Science Monitor* (in press).

SECURITY AND THE RESOURCES SCRAMBLE: WILL 1984 BE LIKE 1914?

*Bruce Russett**

WE are about to witness the demise of non-alignment as a viable foreign policy for states with any significant resources. The world market is losing its force as a means of allocating supplies of natural resources. Rather, major powers increasingly will seek assured access to vital raw materials, with that assurance achieved by political means. Access to raw materials will be too important to leave to market forces under conditions of political instability. Unstable or radical Third World governments will seem too unreliable. They may be unwilling, or unable, to maintain the large-scale constant supply of vital resources to the industrialised world. The removal of Iran from the world market of petroleum suppliers may be tolerable for a while, as a single case. But many Irans would either paralyse the entire world economy, or set off a scramble for assured access to the remaining raw material sources and economic disaster for all who lagged behind in the scramble. Hence national leaders may feel irresistible pressure to take preventive steps before a crucial supplier collapses.

The imperative of growth

The period since the Second World War has, in a real sense, marked the triumph of capitalism. The OECD countries of the advanced industrial world have experienced an unprecedented era of sustained economic growth, a high level of material well-being, and substantial equality of economic benefits between and within the OECD nations. Even with some slackening of growth during the recent period of 'stagflation', the achievement is remarkable. This phenomenon of growth and prosperity has been made possible by modern industrial capitalism—an enormous dynamic force for change.

Of course, not all industrial countries are capitalist, nor are all countries industrial. But in crucial ways almost all try to mimic the behaviour of dynamic capitalist states. Beset by fears and historic experience of penetrations, the Soviet leaders see the security of their state as dependent upon the growth of high technology, heavy industry, and expanding production. To accept economic stagnation would be to accept too great a posture of military weakness. Industrial development is essential to survival of the regime in a world where that regime's ideology is seen as a threat to others, and where

* Bruce Russett is Professor of Political Science at Yale University, and has written extensively in the field of international politics. He is grateful to Stephen Krasner and Patrick McGowan who generously shared their thoughts with him when he was first formulating this article, and to William Foltz and H. Bradford Westerfield who offered later comments. Of course they are not responsible in any way for the final product.

military power is dependent far less on a large population than on a base of modern industrial capacity and sophistication. If the perceived external threat to the regime's security is not enough (and I suspect it is, given Russia's history of invasion by its neighbours and Bolshevik memories of Western intervention in 1918), then the regime must also be mindful of the internal threat to security implied by any failure to sustain growth. Domestic peace requires an expanding economic pie. Indeed, the Soviet regime has justified its own existence largely on the grounds of its ability to raise the living standards of its populace. Poland's failure to provide sustained growth has washed away that regime's already tenuous legitimacy, and portends a wider crisis of socialism in Eastern Europe unless growth can be restored.

Thus socialists must behave like capitalists in many essentials. Their states must grow to insure their international security and domestic tranquillity. Given their lagging productivity and narrow non-military scientific base, their growth requires access to advanced technology and capital goods from abroad. Stalinist Russia could tolerate virtual autarky within its alliance bloc for a time, but the contemporary Soviet Union can no longer do so. It must have Western technology to stimulate stagnant productivity and bureaucratic inefficiency, Western wheat to feed its population, and raw materials—notably in the possible entry of the Soviet Union on to the world petroleum market as a buyer—to feed its industrial and military machine. Even China has ended its era of autarky, forced to obtain Western technology and capital goods in order to provide some measure of military security against the Soviet Union.

All industrial powers—and perhaps all major powers at whatever stage of development—must maintain growing economies. Failure implies falling behind in the industrial and technological base necessary to sustain military power. Without evolving technology for advanced weaponry, and an expanding economic surplus to support a large military establishment, a country invites attack or, at best, atrophy of its international sphere of influence. Failure also implies the risk of overthrow from within. Populations of modern states expect, and demand, rising incomes. Prolonged stagnation, especially with widespread unemployment, loosens popular support for the regime. Most Third World governments try to legitimise their rule by fostering economic growth; indeed they often claim the need for growth requires the 'temporary' sacrifice of political liberties. They must produce at least some growth if they are to retain the support of the middle classes for very long. Every Western democratic government lives with the spectre of the 1930s' Depression; bringing Nazism to Germany and the threat of authoritarian government throughout Europe. Few political analysts seriously contend that 'no-growth' economies are easily compatible with stable democratic polities. If continued stagnation or economic decline is politically intolerable, then every threat of denial of access to essential supplies of raw materials becomes a matter of central concern to the state.

The supply of resources

The growth of industry and popular consumption requires tremendous quantities of raw materials—to the point where many of the traditional sources of raw materials within the industrialised countries have become much sparser and, in some cases, exhausted. Western Europe imports all its supplies of ten vital minerals; Japan all of eleven. The United States must look beyond the North American continent for more than half its supplies of bauxite, cobalt, chromium, columbium, manganese, mica, platinum, tantalum, tin, titanium, abaca, natural rubber, and industrial diamonds.

Throughout most of the period since 1945 the international trade regime assured more or less open access to supplies. The United States was the world's dominant economic and political power. It maintained a stable international reserve currency. By example and by cajoling its trading partners it assured a liberal order of relatively free trade, and helped reconstruct the economies of war-torn countries even at the cost of strengthening commercial rivals. It also was ready to intervene politically to ensure the continuance in less developed countries of governments committed to development plans organised around relatively open economies oriented toward the world market (e.g., Guatemala, Iran after Mossadegh).

From the point of view of its industrialised allies this hegemonic American regime was not always benign. The British, for example, resented continued American pressure to open up the trade of the Sterling Area and dismantle their system of Imperial Preference. British oil interests were substantially dislodged from their position of predominance in the Middle East, and forced to share, unequally, with American-based multinational corporations. American political muscle supplemented the economic competitiveness of American firms to ensure this.

Nevertheless, the United States government was always concerned for the economic strength of its political allies, as witnessed by the Marshall Plan. American insistence on a liberal international order was for the benefit of all (non-communist) states, and the United States needed militarily strong allies, with underlying strong economies, to participate in the common defence. Great military exertions were not demanded of all the allies, however. Rather, American military strength provided the main umbrella to ward off Soviet penetration and under which all the capitalist industrial states could pursue their global economic interests. Japanese recovery in the 1950s constitutes the most vivid example.

In the past few years, however, these conditions have ceased to apply. American military hegemony can no longer be depended on to resist Soviet penetration of the Third World, or to sustain such important allies as the Shah of Iran. Third World governments, even if not significantly Soviet-influenced, cannot so readily be assumed to be open to Western investment activities or so wedded to the large-scale production of raw materials for the world market.

Often they wish to pursue some form or degree of self-reliance, and to exert greater control over the extractive activities taking place in their territories. They wish to sell their oil in quantities, at prices, and to customers of their choosing. OPEC, especially AOPEC (the Arab subset), is the most successful grouping of commodity exporters, but other countries and groupings of countries have taken some steps along the same path. United States military force would meet greater obstacles, both indigenous and Soviet-assisted, in any attempt to maintain or reinstitute past marketing conditions.

Under these changed political and military circumstances, the free play of international market forces no longer suffices to guarantee access. The threat of politically inspired boycotts—though ever-present since 1973—is secondary to the threat simply of political chaos in producer countries, making them unable to maintain the flow of supplies.[1] A revolutionary government may intend a modest reduction in commodity extraction, but then, in a period of near-anarchic conditions be unable to keep the degree of domestic peace that would ensure even its new and lower level of intended production. Terrorism, the breakdown of domestic order, periods of civil war, or international war between Third World commodity producers, can readily sever the necessary chain from extraction to international marketing. Industrial importers need assured access; this means Third World governments willing and able to keep the mines operating, electricity flowing to the smelters, the railroads or pipelines running to the ports, and the dockside facilities in action. Stability and control, more than ideological orientation or commitment to free enterprise, become the touchstones by which a Third World state is judged a reliable ally. To achieve this stability Third World states may have to be generously supplied with military and internal security equipment and training for their forces, perhaps given economic assistance in times of balance-of-payment crisis, and occasionally even bolstered by the presence of military forces from the industrialised countries (viz. the American rapid-response force for the Middle East, or regular French military intervention in Africa).

The need for politically assured supplies of raw materials is most dramatically seen with oil, but is hardly limited to that commodity. Chromium (essential not just for car bumpers, but for most steel) comes almost exclusively from three sources: South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the Soviet Union. Platinum, cobalt, natural rubber, and abaca come primarily from vulnerable or potentially unstable states in Africa or South-east Asia. More important than access for the United States is access for its natural-resource-poor industrialised allies of Western Europe and Japan. If the United States cannot keep their access, as well as its own, under the American protective umbrella, one or several unpalatable eventualities will occur: its allies will suffer severe economic

1 Arguments that the necessary conditions for successful large-scale price increases by international cartels are rare include Davis Bobrow and Robert Kudrle, "Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 20: 1 (March 1976), pp. 3-56, and Stephen Krasner, "Oil is the Exception", *Foreign Policy*, 14 (Spring 1974), pp. 68-83.

dislocations; they will seek the protection of some stronger power, if there is one (the Soviet Union?); or they will seek their own military-political associations with Third World producers, resulting in sharpened competition among themselves and with the United States. Thus the decline in American hegemony endangers the United States' economic position directly, and Western long-term economic and political security indirectly. A highly competitive struggle for 'spheres of influence' and areas of economic control among the industrialised states—and here we should clearly include the Soviet Union—would imply great dangers of military confrontation and war.

Impetus to the First World War

This prospect is more than a little reminiscent of the process that led to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. During the nineteenth century the major European powers experienced a period of rapid demographic and economic expansion. Their populations, industrial capacities, and technological bases all grew at historically almost unprecedented rates. So too, as a consequence, did their demands for resources to feed their people and fuel their industrial machinery. For much of the century this expansion placed more-or-less tolerable strains on the structure of world order. The Pax Britannica replaced mercantilism with the principles of relatively free trade, defusing some pressure for colonial acquisition. More important, resources and potential colonial territory were abundant. Many areas of Africa and the Far East were still uncolonised, and the major powers could carve out empires or spheres of influence without coming too seriously into competition with one another.

Towards the end of the period, however, competition over the few remaining areas became more intense. The acquisition of a new colony by one power increasingly meant the denial of another's ambitions in that region. Spheres of influence began to intersect, and establishing the borders between spheres of influence became a matter of intense concern, often resulting in political confrontations and military shows of force (e.g., Agadir, Fashoda) and threats of war. During this later period (roughly 1890–1914) tensions grew, alliances and counteralliances formed, and international crises became more common.

These conflicts of interest and political tensions were driven by a variety of forces. The demand for resources, powered by economic and demographic expansion, was supplemented by other internal as well as international influences. Arms races, both naval (Britain-Germany) and army (e.g., France-Germany) were fed by mutual fears and ambitions, in the now familiar pattern of an upward spiral. Bureaucratic pressures to maintain and incrementally expand military spending were common then, as now. So too were the various economic and societal interests that benefit from increased arms purchases. These entrenched interests provided enormous resistance to any reversal of the

dynamics of military spending. Since they operated within growing economies, it was almost always possible to expand the military without seriously infringing on civilian demands—the economic pie as a whole was growing, and greater military spending, representing the same or even a slightly larger share of the total, could be accommodated without an actual reduction in other kinds of expenditure. Moreover, military capabilities, in the form of occupation troops and naval forces, were required to secure the new colonies and maintain lines of supply and communication over long distances. Once these troops and ships were available, however, they then could be used to acquire new colonies or if necessary to fight wars in quite different places. (A substantial number of the 'European' troops that fought on the Western Front during the First World War were in fact 'colonials' brought from India and Africa.) Colonial acquisitions thus gave momentum to the arms expenditure spiral, and were in turn further encouraged by it. Similarly, as the major powers' spheres of influence increasingly collided, these confrontations both fed and were promoted by the expansion of military forces.

By this interpretation, the crisis events of August 1914 followed naturally from the underlying conflicts inherent in the major-power international system. Conflicts of interest inevitably arose as economies demanded new resources, economic and bureaucratic interests supported programmes for increased military strength, and in their conflicts national leaders sought reliable friends and feared implacable enemies in an atmosphere of mounting suspicion and hostility. Under these circumstances, major international crises were inevitable. Sometimes, as in North Africa or as late as the Bosnian crisis of 1908, matters might be settled at least temporarily. Perhaps even, with greater wisdom, patience, and objectivity, more prudent decision-makers might have managed the 1914 Sarajevo crisis without a general European war. But the underlying conflicts and tensions were so severe that they would have re-emerged again within a few years, and ultimately the required combination of luck and crisis-management skill would have broken down. In this interpretation, if by some means the outbreak of general war could have been averted in August 1914 that would have been not war-prevention, but merely a temporary postponement of the almost inevitable.

The events directly following August 1914 may, at terrible cost, temporarily have provided some 'slack' in the system. Three major powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) were dismembered or left militarily almost impotent. The populations of Europe were left disillusioned with war. The biggest colonial powers, France and Britain, kept their empires intact, and indeed expanded them with League of Nations 'Mandates'. It took almost two decades for the defeated powers to regain their strength and revive their expansionist pressures. Then the Second World War, at even more terrible cost, again ultimately released some of the pressure as most major powers were either defeated or economically exhausted, and except for the United States and the Soviet Union had no immediate need or ability to expand. For two or three

decades American supremacy served to discourage effective challenge to the new status quo. It took even longer after the Second World War than after the First for competitive expansionist pressures to fully resume.[2]

Conflict in the 1980s

Of course the contemporary era is not 1914, but many parallels are apparent. The need for assured access to raw materials, discussed in earlier pages, provides a powerful driving force toward present-day international conflict. When major powers were relatively self-sufficient within their own borders or within their pre-existing colonial empires, the pressure to obtain further external sources of supplies was low. Even as the colonial empires were formally disbanded, various tools of political and economic influence would usually maintain the earlier trading patterns and commercial expectations. Where that was unsure, at least American hegemony could be relied upon to maintain a relatively open world economy where raw materials could still be bought and sold as necessary. But self-sufficiency now has vanished for so many of the industrial countries' commodity needs, a victim of the exhaustion of home territory sources, needs for ever-increasing total amounts to supply larger populations and growing economies, and the snowballing loss of colonial and post-colonial controls over Third World areas. With all this, the United States' ability to preserve a liberal international economic order, for itself and its allies, has also weakened. Assured access to raw materials is now felt as a pressing need for all states, especially advanced industrial ones.

Partly as a direct response to these needs—for instance, as manifested in the creation of the American rapid deployment force—and partly as a response to general East-West tensions, the arms race has entered a new phase of expansion. Soviet military expenditures seem to ascend each year to ever-higher levels and to give the Soviet Union ever-increasing strategic and tactical military capabilities. American military spending, which had declined for several years under the impact of the late Vietnam War years, began to rise again in real (non-inflated) dollars in 1976 and has continued to do so since, with a particularly sharp rise in 1981. Uncertainty about Soviet capabilities and intentions intensifies American fears.

New arms acquisitions are stimulated as much by what the other side does with its military forces as simply by what forces it possesses. Soviet (and Cuban) support for Marxists in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa contributed greatly to the revival of super-power tensions. It is arguable that former President Carter's decision to seek a larger military budget was provoked as much by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—Russia's use of its military

2. In the discussion on the pre-1914 period I have drawn heavily on the theory and findings of Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, *Nations in Conflict* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1974), and in my subsequent remarks on the applicability of these ideas to the contemporary era on Richard K Ashley, *The Political Economy of War and Peace* (London: Frances Pinter, 1980)

forces actually to invade an originally non-communist neighbour—as by the Soviet Union's growing military capability. In this sense the Soviet Union had acquired military and naval forces that could pose a direct threat to Western access to vital raw material supplies in the Third World. Afghanistan or Ethiopia are themselves irrelevant to raw material markets, but their occupation suggested a greater Soviet willingness and ability to move against states that were more important—and of course Soviet control of strategically important places like Afghanistan and Ethiopia would make it easier for them to move militarily into adjacent areas. We no longer see much imperialism or colonisation in the 1914 sense of formal political control, but we certainly see large spheres of influence and many client states.

Finally, once again, as in 1914, the effects of international threat and counter-threat are intensified by domestic bureaucratic and economic interests. (The Soviet Union also has a 'military-industrial complex'.) While the demand for external raw materials' access continues to grow in the West and to emerge in the East because of the decline of domestic reserves, the major powers' economies are not growing as rapidly as they did a few years ago, or as rapidly as in the years preceding the First World War. In a sense this may relieve some of the pressure; for example, the recent decline in industrialised countries' imports of foreign oil is due in part to the lack of growth in the world economy. It also imposes earlier limits on the increase of military spending—the trade-offs with civilian needs will be readily apparent in an economic pie of more-or-less constant size. Yet no one should count on civilian demands to be an effective constraint on military spending for some time to come. Military spending in the United States currently accounts for less than 6 per cent of GNP; it was about 13 per cent during the Korean War, and during the Second World War exceeded 40 per cent—whilst in Britain, during the same period, the comparable figure touched 60 per cent. When people can be persuaded that a clear threat to their security exists they will pay a heavy economic price. Arms races are not readily limited by consumer demands. Rather, both sides are likely to have to pay substantial costs, and make substantial additional sacrifices in the name of military preparedness, before either feels compelled to call an effective halt. Even without wartime urgencies, it would seem that a good deal more could be extracted from the populaces of both Eastern and Western states under the 'right' political circumstances.

Those 'right' political circumstances, however, include a much greater sense of national danger than existed during the decade of the 1970s, and would have to be intensified by sustained, consistent communications from political leaders to the general populace. Recall the advice of United States Senator Arthur Vandenberg, at the beginning of the cold war era: 'Scare the hell out of the country'. Popular fears and hostilities, once fanned, cannot later be so easily restrained or controlled. Political leaders, once having alarmed the populace about the imminence of enemy threats, may not find it easy, for example, to conclude strategic arms limitation treaties that must inevitably

depend in some degree on mutual confidence and trust, or readily to forego apparent (and perhaps illusory) possibilities of achieving strategic superiority.

Protracted economic stagnation is worrisome in another way as well. People have come to expect ever-improving living conditions; the ability to provide those improvements has undergirded the legitimacy of virtually all developed industrialised states, capitalist and communist alike. Rising popular dissatisfactions, with people's anger directed against their governments, add a degree of political instability that must inevitably complicate efforts at prudent crisis-avoidance and crisis-management. Pre-existing stagnation and political unrest make any interference with access to necessary raw material supplies even less tolerable than if there were more 'give' in the system.

Competition and war

This discussion has so far closely followed a 'neo-mercantilist' line of argument, and eschewed other economic explanations of imperialist or other expansionist behaviour. The theories of Hobson, and of Lenin and other Marxists, are of course familiar to readers. Perhaps less familiar are those neo-Marxist writers who see the Soviet Union as epitomising 'state capitalism', beset by stagnation and pursuing a form of international expansionist behaviour not readily distinguishable from that of Western capitalist states.

If one were, however, to credit these other economic theories seriously, the result would only be to strengthen my line of argument that emphasises the pressure of raw material scarcity. For instance, a world of intense political competition, especially a world divided into spheres of influence, would inhibit the now-established patterns of activity by multinational corporations. Both banks and producer corporations need freedom of movement, freedom to shift their investments and to threaten to relocate their activities if host-country restrictions become too binding. Their prosperity, and hence that of their home countries, will suffer if they are shut out of large parts of the world. Indeed, the confluence of Marxist, neo-Marxist, mercantilist, and neo-classical theories suggests even more reason to be alert to the rising dangers of international conflict.

By this analysis the coming years will be more dangerous than any we have experienced in a long time. Conflicts over which Third World areas are to be in whose sphere of influence will become more common. It may seem necessary to insure that the vital raw materials' suppliers are in someone's sphere of influence because only then (if then) can access be insured. Hostilities and suspicions among major powers are likely to be corrosive. ('Are they just trying to stabilise the situation, perhaps to preserve their own access, or are they trying to keep or push us out of the area?') It will be hard to reassure leaders or populace of the other side's relatively benevolent intent, or that any benevolent intent can be relied upon once the other has a new base of power.

The absolute level of military destructive capabilities will be higher than

ever, and still growing. Thus any outbreak of violence carries enormous risks of devastation. Even more seriously, an arms race implies changing kinds and degrees of capability. It would be foolish to expect changes always to favour the defence, for example. Surely there will be times when offensive weapons systems seem to gain some new advantage over defensive systems, and therefore where the pressures to carry out the first strike, to attack rather than risk being attacked, are intensified. The faster the rates of technological change and weapons deployment, the greater the risk that imbalances may occur.

We know from previous experience that periods of arms races carry high risks of war. One scholar identified ninety-nine 'serious disputes' among major powers since 1815. In seventy-one of those instances the powers involved were not engaged in an arms race (defined as a three-year increase in the rate of increase in military spending), and the dispute was settled without war in all but three of those instances. In twenty-eight cases, however, the dispute occurred between states that were already involved in an arms race—and twenty-three of those disputes eventuated in war. Similarly, a variety of recent studies, using different methods and differing in detail but not in their overall conclusions, now point conclusively to periods of change in relative strength between major state rivals of nearly equal power as particularly dangerous to peace. Such periods of 'power transition' (typically accompanied by arms races) produce great uncertainty in the minds of decision-makers, leading to exaggerated estimates of one's own strength or of the rival's hostility and threat. Such uncertainties, fears, and misperceptions frequently lead to large-scale wars.[3]

This is not to say that arms races necessarily, or even usually, cause war. Sometimes they do produce tensions and uncertainties that lead directly to war. At other times an arms race may merely reflect pre-existing international tensions. Both the arms race and the war would therefore be caused by those tensions. But whatever the precise causal mechanism—and one would expect it to be different in different circumstances—we do know that periods of rapid bilateral increase in arms spending very often do end in war. A renewed arms race with the Soviet Union may be unavoidable; perhaps we would even invite aggression and war by refusing to compete. That does not, however, detract from the fact that a renewed arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union marks, by historical standards, a period of great danger, and will demand very wise, prudent statesmanship on both sides.

3. For the comparative study of many arms races see Michael Wallace, ''Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence'', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23: 1 (March 1979), pp. 1-16. Other works providing, in one way or another, evidence supporting periods of ''power transition'' as especially dangerous are A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), ch. 1; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Charles Doran and Wes Parsons, ''War and the Cycle of Relative Power'', *American Political Science Review*, 74; 3 (December, 1980), pp. 947-65.

Avoiding and managing conflict

How then can we hope to deal with these dangers, to prevent the inevitable tensions and political confrontations from escalating into nuclear conflict? Prescription is harder than diagnosis. One component of any treatment is surely, as suggested, prudent crisis-management: becoming as aware as possible of the risks inherent in crisis situations, particularly of the ways unexpected threats to major values, forcing decisions to be made within short time periods, leave decision-makers prone to misperception and miscalculation. John Kennedy is said to have been cautioned, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, by his reading of *The Guns of August*. Future decision-makers can be cautioned by understanding why and how other crises have, or have not, been managed short of war, and by the solid scholarship in cognitive and social psychology that illuminates these problems. Crisis-management alone, however, is a thin reed on which to lean. If crises recur frequently, mistakes will almost inevitably occur. Decision-makers are, after all, human. Prudent strategy would prescribe efforts at crisis-avoidance as well as crisis-management.

Crisis-avoidance involves reducing the number of conflicts of interest that are likely to occur. To avoid conflicts of interest we might, for example, try to work out prior agreements with our major economic and political rivals as to which parts of the world would fall within whose sphere of influence. Parts of the Third World will not, after all, be of great importance to resource-seeking major powers. Some states in Africa and Asia, with large populations and meagre resource endowments, are already sometimes labelled the 'basket cases' of the world. Obtaining political control over such states would in most circumstances add little to the strength of the acquiring major power—on the contrary, by draining resources, it might actually mean a net loss of power. Exceptions would be states whose population or armed forces might be useful in the role of regional surrogates for military capabilities of the great power, or states whose geographical location gave them special strategic significance.

The most difficult cases will be those states whose natural resources are in demand and whose governments are politically insecure. If there are many such states, with a number of different resources at stake, an elaborate balancing act will be required. How is the value of a state controlling large manganese deposits to be balanced against a major producer of rubber? It would depend, for instance, on the relative share of each state in the world market for the relevant commodity, how politically insecure access from that and from other countries seemed, and how dependent each of the major industrialised countries was on access to that raw material. A major power might be relatively self-sufficient in one but dependent in another, with the situation quite reversed for another power. With virtually all the world's chromium coming from Zimbabwe, South Africa, and the Soviet Union, Western countries could obviously not tolerate hostile control over the African

chromium producers to the degree the Soviet Union could. How does one interpret the actions of a rival power in 'locking up' access in a particular country? Are those actions merely those of prudent self-protection, or are they intended as an aggressive threat to sources we need? Calculating equations based on subjective evaluations of so many variables—my need, your need, your intentions, the political stability of this and other suppliers, the size and nature of the resources at stake in a particular case (when world geological knowledge is itself still far from perfect)—sounds extraordinarily difficult. In fact, by comparison the calculations necessary to balance different weapons systems and different geopolitical circumstances in comparisons of strategic 'essential equivalence' may seem trivially easy.

Many industrialised countries' interests are at stake. Some allied countries have begun major stockpiling efforts, but there is little evidence of serious intra-alliance planning. One tactic must certainly be to share the responsibility and access with allies, and not to allow the Western alliance to fragment into *sauve qui peut* competition. In important ways allies can serve each other's interests on a mutual basis. It would be curious if Lenin's prediction of sharp competition for 'colonies' among states at the 'final state of capitalism' should be fulfilled now, driven by forces not fully appreciated by Lenin.

Some sharing with the Soviet Union is also inevitable, as Moscow seeks to secure its own economic and strategic interests. The Soviet leaders have always resisted the vision of all Third World states around their border becoming clients of the capitalist world, and now they have the power to make that resistance effective. It is unimaginable that the Soviet Union could be denied access to the world market. Moreover, as American and Soviet experience with Third World allies has abundantly shown, local rivalries have their own dynamic. A close political relationship with A (Pakistan, Ethiopia, Israel) is acceptable to A only because of A's needs for external support against a regional enemy B. As a consequence, B (India, Somalia, Syria) then inevitably becomes more hostile toward A's great power ally, and seeks its own great power support elsewhere.

Carving up the Third World into spheres of influence and secure access to raw materials is, in plain English, a frankly imperialist policy. There is good if sometimes overstated reason for the repugnance with which the term imperialist is generally regarded. In the contemporary context it means allying with repressive authoritarian regimes, and typically means sustaining regimes which encourage wide inequalities of economic conditions as well as political rights among their citizenry. Jimmy Carter's 'human rights' policies were ineffective in influencing the governments of countries that were regarded as economically or strategically essential to American interests. A realistic policy designed to insure Western security in the coming years probably cannot entirely dispense with such alliances. Nevertheless, in all politics there are matters of degree, and choices available.

Several steps offer promise of significantly reducing the pressures to align

ourselves with authoritarian regimes. In fact it is essential to take these other steps, quite aside from moral or humanitarian qualms. The stability of any government with which we ally simply cannot be assured. The very act of concluding the alliance can sharply diminish the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of its population. It may acquire coercive instruments (weapons, police training) from a big-power protector, but that act too sows illegitimacy and dissent. A Western policy dependent on long-term alliances with such regimes is unreliable as well as repellent.

The effectiveness of military force is, moreover, doubtful as a means of insuring continued access and supply. Remember, for example, the widely acknowledged difficulty of insuring a continuous flow of Middle East oil by means of military occupation, or simply the aphorism about the difficulty of sitting on bayonets. Many Third World regimes now have highly sophisticated weapons from the United States, the Soviet Union, or France. Gunboat diplomacy, against a state armed with MIG-25s or guided missiles, puts the gunboat at risk. The Soviet Union may on occasion be willing to go in with large-scale military forces and enforce a long occupation: neo-colonialism, not 'just' imperialism. Americans are less likely to be willing, or able, to use military force that way. Western countries can, instead, supply a volume of food assistance and financial capital to aid development that far exceeds what the Soviet Union can offer.

Reducing dependence

One timely and substantial step available to diminish the degree of dependence on unreliable sources of commodities—and to reduce pressures for quick military intervention—is stockpiling. The American strategic stockpile of various raw materials, acquired after the Korean War, has since become sharply depleted. The depletion may have been sensible. During the 1960s and early 1970s America's access to most raw materials must have seemed reasonably safe; in any case, a large flow of raw material supplies is irrelevant to the kind of short intense war usually envisaged as the chief military danger. The strategic stockpile has also become something of a political ploy for some domestic producers to maintain high prices, and a source of concern to some friendly overseas producers who feared it would be used to manipulate world market prices to their disadvantage. Under the circumstances projected by this analysis, however, stockpiling is again in order. The Reagan administration has assigned this matter a high priority. The United States is no longer concerned with insuring production in wartime. Rather it needs to maintain productive capacity in peacetime against the possibility of reductions in raw material supply resulting from actions like boycotts and from political instability that might cripple commodity production in key Third World countries.

The cost of rebuilding the strategic stockpile in those materials chiefly obtained from politically vulnerable Third World areas would be substantial

but not exorbitant. After all, it was done before. In 1962, for example, the United States held stocks of tin that amounted to more than two and one-half times that year's total non-communist world production. Even in the mid-1970s America's stockpiles of tungsten equalled eight years of normal domestic peacetime consumption. Current plans to sell excess holdings of these two metals, and especially silver, can largely finance the new acquisitions.

A few metals are of greater importance—perhaps chromium, cobalt, platinum, and, above all, petroleum. The last would be the most expensive. For the one thousand million barrel reserve currently authorised (enough to replace total oil imports into the United States for about five months) the cost would be, at around $35 a barrel, about $40 thousand million for acquisition and storage costs combined. The most severe constraint is likely to be not the absolute cost in dollars, but devising appropriate financing means during the next few years when budget cutting and restraint of inflation are primary goals—especially if the stockpiling programme becomes a 'pork-barrel' to enrich domestic American producers of non-critical materials. Past strategic stockpiling activities were distorted by politically powerful domestic interests (e.g., silver, lead, zinc; also consider American quotas on imports of oil and sugar).[4] Currently, the 'need' for a variety of minerals is also emboldening American mineral companies to demand that national park and other reserved lands be opened up to mining. For some minerals this may be justified; for others fears of a 'resource war' provide only a rationalisation for private greed.

What is really at stake is the *strategic* stockpile, to be treated as a true instrument of national security. The Soviet Union's leaders may have begun taking steps to avert a similar threat to their country. Recently the Soviet Union has been importing substantial quantities of non-fuel minerals which are not currently in short supply domestically. This looks like stockpiling behaviour.[5] Diversifying suppliers and building the capacity for ocean mining also represent appealing ways to multiply sources of minerals and so to reduce dependence on politically vulnerable foreign suppliers.

What will it take to stimulate the necessary actions? At the moment the United States lacks the institutions and the belief system to operate effectively in a mercantilist world. The prevalent ideology remains that of liberal trade; an ideology and a policy that served the country's interests well in the first decades after the Second World War. Nor has the United States established the kind of close government-industry co-operation associated with Japan (MITI) or the French government policies of encouraging consolidation and

4 Previous analyses have approached the topic from a variety of perspectives. Michael Tanzer, *The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles over Minerals and Fuels* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980) stresses the role of private economic interests. Alfred Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), emphasises national strategic interests, and Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) argues that most actions have been taken in light of a national interest as interpreted in the traditional "liberal" perspective of the foreign policy bureaucracy.

5. J A Miller, D. I. Fine, and R. D. McMichael, eds., *The Resource War in 3-D—Dependency Diplomacy Defense* (Pittsburgh: World Affairs Council, 1980).

ourselves with authoritarian regimes. In fact it is essential to take these other steps, quite aside from moral or humanitarian qualms. The stability of any government with which we ally simply cannot be assured. The very act of concluding the alliance can sharply diminish the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of its population. It may acquire coercive instruments (weapons, police training) from a big-power protector, but that act too sows illegitimacy and dissent. A Western policy dependent on long-term alliances with such regimes is unreliable as well as repellent.

The effectiveness of military force is, moreover, doubtful as a means of insuring continued access and supply. Remember, for example, the widely acknowledged difficulty of insuring a continuous flow of Middle East oil by means of military occupation, or simply the aphorism about the difficulty of sitting on bayonets. Many Third World regimes now have highly sophisticated weapons from the United States, the Soviet Union, or France. Gunboat diplomacy, against a state armed with MIG-25s or guided missiles, puts the gunboat at risk. The Soviet Union may on occasion be willing to go in with large-scale military forces and enforce a long occupation: neo-colonialism, not 'just' imperialism. Americans are less likely to be willing, or able, to use military force that way. Western countries can, instead, supply a volume of food assistance and financial capital to aid development that far exceeds what the Soviet Union can offer.

Reducing dependence

One timely and substantial step available to diminish the degree of dependence on unreliable sources of commodities—and to reduce pressures for quick military intervention—is stockpiling. The American strategic stockpile of various raw materials, acquired after the Korean War, has since become sharply depleted. The depletion may have been sensible. During the 1960s and early 1970s America's access to most raw materials must have seemed reasonably safe; in any case, a large flow of raw material supplies is irrelevant to the kind of short intense war usually envisaged as the chief military danger. The strategic stockpile has also become something of a political ploy for some domestic producers to maintain high prices, and a source of concern to some friendly overseas producers who feared it would be used to manipulate world market prices to their disadvantage. Under the circumstances projected by this analysis, however, stockpiling is again in order. The Reagan administration has assigned this matter a high priority. The United States is no longer concerned with insuring production in wartime. Rather it needs to maintain productive capacity in peacetime against the possibility of reductions in raw material supply resulting from actions like boycotts and from political instability that might cripple commodity production in key Third World countries.

The cost of rebuilding the strategic stockpile in those materials chiefly obtained from politically vulnerable Third World areas would be substantial

but not exorbitant. After all, it was done before. In 1962, for example, the United States held stocks of tin that amounted to more than two and one-half times that year's total non-communist world production. Even in the mid-1970s America's stockpiles of tungsten equalled eight years of normal domestic peacetime consumption. Current plans to sell excess holdings of these two metals, and especially silver, can largely finance the new acquisitions.

A few metals are of greater importance—perhaps chromium, cobalt, platinum, and, above all, petroleum. The last would be the most expensive. For the one thousand million barrel reserve currently authorised (enough to replace total oil imports into the United States for about five months) the cost would be, at around $35 a barrel, about $40 thousand million for acquisition and storage costs combined. The most severe constraint is likely to be not the absolute cost in dollars, but devising appropriate financing means during the next few years when budget cutting and restraint of inflation are primary goals—especially if the stockpiling programme becomes a 'pork-barrel' to enrich domestic American producers of non-critical materials. Past strategic stockpiling activities were distorted by politically powerful domestic interests (e.g., silver, lead, zinc; also consider American quotas on imports of oil and sugar).[4] Currently, the 'need' for a variety of minerals is also emboldening American mineral companies to demand that national park and other reserved lands be opened up to mining. For some minerals this may be justified; for others fears of a 'resource war' provide only a rationalisation for private greed.

What is really at stake is the *strategic* stockpile, to be treated as a true instrument of national security. The Soviet Union's leaders may have begun taking steps to avert a similar threat to their country. Recently the Soviet Union has been importing substantial quantities of non-fuel minerals which are not currently in short supply domestically. This looks like stockpiling behaviour.[5] Diversifying suppliers and building the capacity for ocean mining also represent appealing ways to multiply sources of minerals and so to reduce dependence on politically vulnerable foreign suppliers.

What will it take to stimulate the necessary actions? At the moment the United States lacks the institutions and the belief system to operate effectively in a mercantilist world. The prevalent ideology remains that of liberal trade; an ideology and a policy that served the country's interests well in the first decades after the Second World War. Nor has the United States established the kind of close government-industry co-operation associated with Japan (MITI) or the French government policies of encouraging consolidation and

4 Previous analyses have approached the topic from a variety of perspectives. Michael Tanzer, *The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles over Minerals and Fuels* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980) stresses the role of private economic interests. Alfred Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), emphasises national strategic interests, and Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) argues that most actions have been taken in light of a national interest as interpreted in the traditional "liberal" perspective of the foreign policy bureaucracy.

5. J. A. Miller, D. I. Fine, and R. D. McMichael, eds., *The Resource War in 3-D—Dependency Diplomacy Defense* (Pittsburgh: World Affairs Council, 1980).

nationalisation of industry, and actively promoting arms industry sales abroad. These countries are already well along the way toward the kind of 'strong state' that can compete successfully. Efforts to build the institutions of a mercantilist state in America will meet strong resistance.

A change in the belief system may come more readily. At the end of the Second World War, when American leaders perceived a new and long-term danger from the Soviet Union, a change in the belief system, of both the leaders and the general populace, was achieved speedily. The leaders saw the danger, articulated it as a combination of threat to physical security and to basic American cultural values, and conveyed the message widely. Almost immediately the Soviet Union became seen as an enemy rather than an ally. Isolationism had been a respectable intellectual and political tradition before the Second World War. Many of its proponents tried to revive the tradition after the war, but within the space of a few years it was utterly destroyed, overwhelmed by the general commitment to the ideology of containment.

It is possible to imagine a similar change in the contemporary belief system, as leaders redefine a sense of national interest away from a narrow preoccupation with military security towards maintenance of a sound economy more resistant to the whims of foreign producers. A dramatic event, symbolising the industrialised countries' vulnerability, may be necessary for an effective revision of popular beliefs. The 1973 oil shock, and all subsequent oil price increases, only began the process. The economic damage they did was neither sharp nor sudden enough to have sufficient impact on public consciousness, perhaps already receding during the probably temporary 1981 oil glut. Further shortages and induced economic hardships may be required before the effect is substantial enough. When it does become so there may be several kinds of political alliances. One is already forming. There is a significant community of interest among domestic minerals producers, arms manufacturers, traditional anti-communists, and covert friends of the government of South Africa. A 'hard-line' ideology of national security, justifying stockpiling, extensive rearmament, and military interventions, will frequently be heard. Left unchallenged, the result might well be an adventurous foreign policy of substantial risk.

Seen this way, there is also an opportunity for an alliance between environmentalists and those who take a measured view of national security risks. Conservatism and recycling can in this sense become foreign policy instruments, and major components of any strategy to reinforce self-sufficiency in raw materials. This is so in the obvious sense that we benefit to the degree that overall economic growth can be maintained without growth in the use of raw materials, especially those whose supplies are politically vulnerable. Equally important, however, is learning to live with a more modest rate of increase in the GNP. That is *not* to advocate a policy of complete no-growth in the industrialised world (much less in the poverty-stricken Third World, for whom a prescription of no growth would be intolerable). It is only to insist that

attention to equity, to easing the effects of stagnation on particular groups or industries, and in general to cushioning the social and political effects of economic slow growth, is essential. As we know from wartime experience, sacrifices are much more tolerable to the degree thay are felt to be more or less equitably levied. If the brakes to economic growth in the industrialised countries can be applied slowly, the restraints should be more acceptable. Over the course of a generation or two cultural change may significantly reduce expectations of, and demands for, ever-greater material wealth—especially if conditions of equity are given attention.

Another force to defuse the international impact of competition for scarce resources can be found in those resources in which the United States is rich and many other industrialised and less developed states are poor; namely, foodgrains. North America now accounts for 80 per cent of all grain exports. Others, thus, are dependent on the United States, and the world trade in grain can provide a certain cement to hold the entire system together. Indeed, Russia's reliance on American food resources, in particular, may yet serve to moderate its political ambitions in the Third World. We should not expect the Soviet leaders to forego opportunities to secure their own needed supplies of raw materials—for example, oil in the Middle East over the next decade or so. In return for assured supplies of food they may, however, be prepared to be more tolerant of Western needs for industrial raw materials. By this logic the United States should apply political restrictions on food exports to the Soviet Union only for a very limited set of very serious reasons. The Soviet leaders should be assured that they can buy all the food they need subject only to the legitimate needs of the United States and its allies, and subject to Soviet non-interference with Western raw material access. If, however, they attempt to prevent necessary Western access—and only then—they must expect the grain trade to shrink in consequence.

Conclusion

The risks of international great power confrontation stemming from economic causes will be critical in coming years. No government of an industrialised state can tolerate sustained interruption in the supply of vital commodities. Not all commodities are equally at risk; probably the threat is really severe in the case of only a few. But it might require interruption of only a couple—such as petroleum and/or chromium—to create immediate economic and political crisis. To limit the vulnerability a variety of courses of action must be pursued. They include political arrangements with some Third World suppliers, selective stockpiling, learning to live with fewer demands on resources, and strengthening the web of interdependence that already ties all the industrialised states in bonds of common interest. Neither exaggeration of the 'resource war' nor ignoring the likelihood of shortages can be done safely. The gravest threat for the next few decades is not contained in the 'limits to growth' vision of

population explosion, resource exhaustion, and pollution. It is contained in the kind of economic demands that can end in political action—war. Without political vision the world may end in a nuclear bang before it ever has a chance to utter the ecological whimper.

FORGIVING POVERTY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF NEGOTIATIONS

Stephen D. Cohen *

ONE of the principal objectives sought by the less-developed countries in their quest for a new international economic order has been generalised debt relief. This measure has a simple economic purpose: by being absolved of their commitment to continue making repayments on official, bilateral development loans, the less-developed countries (LDCs) could reallocate the use of a portion of their precious foreign exchange earnings from retiring old loans to the purchase of needed imports. The industrialised countries that extended these loans in the first place have not, however, judged such a course of action to be wise or justified.

The result has been a protracted series of multilateral negotiations aimed at reconciling the differences between the rich and the poor, the creditors and the debtors. As the aggregate external debt burden of the LDCs continues on its seemingly inexorable upward spiral, concern about the precarious international financial position of these countries also mounts. Nevertheless, the key to the past and future course of the ongoing debt relief negotiations is a unique political process. Whereas the LDCs' debt problem is an unprecedented global economic phenomenon, the equally unprecedented political dynamics of the larger North-South dialogue on the creation of a new economic order are the ultimate determinants of the terms and extent of debt relief measures.

The limited success of the dialogue is only partly due to the extremes of the LDC demands and to the stinginess and selfishness of the industrialised countries. In the cases of two of the most important items on the negotiating agenda—international commodity agreements and generalised debt relief—there is a significant commonality in the constraints imposed on the negotiating process by: (1) the priority of political unity pursued by the LDCs despite different economic needs; and (2) the equivocal nature of the purely economic arguments that can be advanced to justify the LDCs' demands. The economic plight of more than a hundred LDCs is indisputable. The most effective and immediate economic cures remain controversial and subjective.

* Stephen D. Cohen is Associate Professor in the School of International Service, at the American University, Washington DC. A specialist in international economic relations, he is currently visiting the London School of Economics as a Fulbright Fellow. The second edition of his book, *The Making of U.S. International Economic Policy*, was published in November 1981 by Praeger.

What the LDCs want and why they want it

The exact birthdate of the LDCs' demand for generalised relief from their external debt burden is unclear. As in the case of commodity prices, there was reference to the problem of debt burden in the original 1974 United Nations 'Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order'. The emergence of the debt relief issue can be traced to the late 1960s, and thus it antedates the oil-pricing actions of OPEC and the later concern for widespread defaults by LDCs on their external debt. The genesis of this demand was less related to fears of an inability to handle mounting debt service burdens than to the LDCs' assessment that the ceiling on official development assistance was becoming an increasingly serious constraint on the development process.

The debt relief issue emerged as a major agenda item in the new international economic order debate mainly because of 'flow side pessimism' concerning financial resource transfers to LDCs.[1] From the South's perspective, across-the-board relief from obligations to make repayments on past official loans is an indirect increase in new and untied official development assistance. In economic terms, these repayments can be viewed as 'opportunity costs'—precious foreign exchange earnings are being used to repay old debts to relatively wealthy countries, instead of being used to pay for new imports of needed consumer and capital goods. If the North cannot provide increased aid flows to the South, then a 'second best' solution, it is argued by some, would be for the North to absorb less foreign exchange repayments from the South.

The statistics associated with the LDC external debt burden are equivocal. Except for the fact that debt in the aggregate has increased rapidly in absolute terms, a number of different interpretations on the significance of this trend can be supported by appropriately manipulating the data. For example, different time periods and base years can be used; a differentiation between disbursed and undisbursed debt can be made; current debts can be adjusted for future expectations of inflation and LDC export earnings; private loans not officially guaranteed may or may not be excluded. Relating the debt burden to the LDCs' GNP, or to their annual export earnings, produces small increases of arguable importance.

A second fact that is clear from a close inspection of the data is that LDC external debts are concentrated in relatively few countries. Throughout the 1960s, most debt was accounted for by heavy official lending by OECD countries to a few populous and strategically important LDCs. Reflecting this situation was a statistical calculation by the State Department which found that of the total debt service owed to the United States in 1977 for repayment of past AID and PL 480 loans, a mere three countries—India, Pakistan and Egypt—accounted for 81 per cent of anticipated repayments in that year.[2]

1 Not for attribution interview, UNCTAD official, June 1980.
2 Unpublished, unclassified State Department memorandum on debt service dated August 30, 1976, p 1.

Beginning in the 1970s, the primary source of the increase in external LDC debt was based on the ability of the more economically advanced LDCs to borrow heavily in an expanding international capital market. As demonstrated in the table below, the growth of disbursed debt from private sources has increased much faster than official debt in both absolute and relative terms.

Table I

Disbursed Debt in Billions of Dollars

	1970	*1974*	*1980 (year end)*
Official sources	35	64	154
Private sources	29	78	262

Source: World Bank. *Annual Report, 1981*, p. 24.

During the same nine-year period, debt service (total annual repayment obligations) on borrowing from official sources grew from $2.5 to $12 billion, while debt service on loans from private sources leaped from $5.7 to $57 billion.[3] The assertion that private debt is concentrated in the advanced developing countries can be supported by the fact that during 1980, four countries—Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Korea—accounted for about 60 per cent on all publicly announced bank loans in the Eurocurrency markets made to non-OPEC LDCs. Brazil and Mexico accounted for slightly more than 40 per cent of this total, a percentage fully consistent with the breakdown of earlier years.

The result is a situation in which LDCs have a highly differentiated profile of debt (i.e. its source, size, and repayment schedule). There is no demonstrable correlation between the absolute size of a country's debt and either the need for relief or an inability to continue borrowing. However, the statistics do seem to indicate that while the poorest of the LDCs (in terms of per capita GNP) have not acquired a significantly large foreign debt, there may be a correlation between a large, growing economy and the accumulation of a sizeable foreign debt.

It would thus seem that generalised debt relief could momentarily help the poor countries only in the aggregate. On a 'micro' basis, each country would be affected differently, depending on the exact size of its total debt and on the relative breakdown of that debt as between obligations acquired from official foreign aid sources and those obtained from commercial sources—the latter being exempt from LDC requests for a debt write-off. In other words, some countries have only a limited debt that potentially can be written off. The ultimate benefits of debt forgiveness also would vary in accordance with how each country utilised its foreign exchange 'windfall'—for example, as between

3. *Ibid.*

buying more capital goods or more luxury consumer goods. The 'macro' argument that there is a full justification for increases in the transfer of financial resources from the countries of the North to those in the South is one that appeals to many persons sympathetic to the need to expedite the development process. The 'micro' argument, that debt relief is a function of the needs of an individual country, appeals to economic analysts, mainly in the industrialised countries, who prefer traditional Western financial techniques and the belief that the economic policies of recipient countries are at least as important as aid flows themselves.

So far, the LDCs' demand for generalised debt relief has met with refusal by the industrialised countries to go beyond case-by-case debt reschedulings, as opposed to cancellations, in emergency circumstances. The painstaking negotiations, which culminated in the limited compromise of 1978, did little to modify the underlying clash of values, priorities, and desires on the debt relief issue. The policy prescriptions of the donors and the debtors differed because their perspectives differ; each interpreted the emerging data on the mounting debt burden in the context of a pre-existing set of experiences and beliefs. This is the means by which economic issues become politicised.

The role of the Group of 77

During the 1970s the, by now anachronistically labelled, Group of 77 (G—77) coalition increasingly emerged as the spokesman for the developing world in discussions about the new international economic order. Pressure from representatives of the Group ensured that the issue of generalised debt relief rose to prominence on the negotiating agenda, and gatherings such as the ministerial meeting in Manila in 1976 provided valuable opportunities for public and systematic articulation of the Group's negotiating demands.

Nevertheless, the sheer size and disparate character of the G—77 (now comprising some 120 members) presents formidable decision and policy-making problems. Both the need to delegate responsibility and the reality that only a limited number of countries are actively interested in pursuing debt relief led to the utilisation of the so-called inner 'Group of Fifteen' to manage the LDC position on debt relief (as well as other international monetary issues on the North-South negotiating table). This Group comprises five countries each from the three regional LDC blocs, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Each of the three regions is primarily represented in substantive UNCTAD talks by an elected chairman, and it is no coincidence that these chairmen are from countries whose governments are vitally interested in pursuing the debt-relief issue. While these chairmen are responsible to the full Group of Fifteen, the delegations of their three countries are clearly the forces to be reckoned with when the G—77 is negotiating with the industrialised countries on matters related to debt.

Representatives from Ghana, Jamaica and Pakistan have so far provided the

collective leadership in formulating and managing the policy on debt relief in the G—77. These three countries, operating in tandem, have played the critical role in building a G—77 consensus on the debt issue.

A major delegation of authority to manage the debt relief issue on behalf of the LDCs has thus been granted by the full G—77 to Ghana, Jamaica and Pakistan. Although some countries have major reservations about the demands for debt relief, they have generally remained aloof from the debt negotiations; they seldom try to moderate or silence the demands of their fellow LDCs.

The major procedural handicap facing the LDCs' debt relief position has not been the inability of these three countries to work in harmony, but a lack of full-time technical expertise that could be assigned to this issue. Not even the three leading LDC advocates of debt relief can afford to allocate civil servants to research or argue this effort on a full-time basis.

The backbone of the LDC debt negotiating team consists of officials assigned by Ghana, Jamaica and Pakistan to the small permanent delegations maintained by these countries in Geneva to handle the myriad of international organisation activities in that city. All of the diplomats who have been given the debt relief portfolio by these countries also have to follow a number of other issues handled by the multitude of multilateral meetings that regularly take place in the specialised United Nations agencies and the other organisations headquartered in Geneva. The Pakistani delegate charged with debt relief responsibilities was also charged with representing his country in *all* UNCTAD meetings, plus all meetings of the GATT, the UN Economic and Social Commission, and all conferences dealing with human rights and disarmament issues.[4] Interviews with this delegate, as well as with his colleagues from Ghana and Jamaica, suggested that their presence is required at an endless round of meetings on specialised economic and political subjects, of which debt is but one. With an absence of full-time debt experts in Geneva, a lack of major technical support from their capitals, and an absence of a professional secretariat comparable to that in the OECD, the G—77 has had to rely for technical support on the Geneva-based Secretariat of UNCTAD.

As a United Nations body, UNCTAD and its Secretariat are nominally neutral: i.e., they exist to serve all member countries, not a single interest group or regional bloc. The UNCTAD Secretariat has, nevertheless, played an active role in providing a source of ideas, position papers, and econometric analysis to the LDCs on the whole gamut of issues in the North-South dialogue. Within the Money, Finance and Development Division of UNCTAD, approximately two of a total of fourteen professionals have been assigned full-time duties involving debt. These individuals must respond to requests from the UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade, the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board (which meets semi-annually), the UNCTAD organisation as a whole, and the UN General

4. Not for attribution interview, June 1980.

Assembly.[5] Consultations with individual country delegations are arranged informally upon request.

Since it is called on to perform such a variety of functions, it is impossible to characterise the prime role of the UNCTAD Secretariat in the North-South dialogue. One of the Geneva-based delegates who has played a key role in the deliberations on debt privately argued that the UNCTAD Secretariat should not be passive. Since this forum is designed to help redress the North-South economic imbalance, Secretariat members, whatever their nationality, should be seeking solutions to existing global disparities.[6] Another delegate suggested that the Secretariat's presumed neutrality could not, in operational terms, force it to be 'blind to the LDCs' needs'. During informal consultative sessions on debt and other problems, the delegate said, the UNCTAD Secretariat has not directly advocated either a specific action or a position to be taken by the G—77. Rather, it 'has called attention to certain problems in advance, stating that, given the way current economic trends are going, certain economic hardships will result for LDCs if adjustments are not made'.[7]

The direct role of the Secretariat appears to have been relatively limited in the debt relief negotiations as compared to the international commodity talks. The burdens of external debt were very straightforward for a number of countries, and a moratorium or write-off affecting their repayments was a relatively simple concept. The Integrated Commodity Programme was a relatively abstract idea that involved a number of different commodities, complex judgments about commodity prices, and the need to choose among various mechanisms for providing commodity earnings assistance to the LDCs. Interviews conducted with participants of the debt negotiations in Geneva in connection with this research suggest that the UNCTAD Secretariat was one of the sources originating demands for debt relief. The Secretariat also provided economic data supporting the arguments advanced on behalf of these demands, and occasionally it provided suggestions on negotiating tactics. The UNCTAD Secretariat did not attempt to co-opt or dictate the G—77 negotiating position, but it has been an unofficial ally of the tripartite LDC negotiating team.

The institutional framework of UNCTAD has assumed a symbiotic relationship with the economic interests of the LDCs. The professional Secretariat is a source of partisan ideas and advice. More importantly, however, the 'one-man, one-vote' rule assures a numerical majority for the G—77 position on all votes. The unity factor has, therefore, assumed a transcendent importance for the LDCs. The lack of economic and political power is offset by the outward appearance of unified determination by some 120 countries. In most aspects of the North-South dialogue, the analogy between LDC unity and the labour movement can be made. Sheer numbers are used to affect a balance of power with the narrower, but stronger base of the 'establishment'.

5. Not for attribution interview, UNCTAD official, June 1980.
6. Not for attribution interview, June 1980
7. *Ibid*

But unlike the situation in which workers in an industry share the common goal of increased wages and benefits, the demand for debt relief is somewhat confused by levels of differentiated economic interests among the countries of the South. The G—77 mantle covers a broad spectrum of economic development. At one end are the smallest, poorest countries who have acquired a relatively small external debt burden (Somalia, for example). A second group of countries are moderately poor countries, usually with a large population, who have borrowed heavily from official sources, but who have not had the credit-worthiness to borrow commercially on a large scale (Pakistan and Egypt, for example). The third group of LDCs are moderate-to-upper income (in terms of per capita GNP) who have been disproportionately responsible for the increase in aggregate LDC debt in the 1975-81 period.

Led by Brazil and Mexico—and to a much lesser extent, South Korea—the third group is composed of relatively fast-growing economies with a sophisticated industrial base and a promising outlook for their export sectors. These are countries whose economic futures and financial stability instil confidence among commercial bankers. Whilst other LDCs may be preoccupied with the financial strain and opportunity cost associated with repayments of past foreign borrowings, members of this third group are more concerned with preserving their good credit ratings so that continued access to the international capital markets is in no way impeded.

The internal development and international financial strategies of most of the successful, advanced LDCs are the antithesis of the ultimate justification for providing debt relief to a debtor: that heavy past borrowing has caused balance-of-payments strains and limited the ability of the national economy to set the bases for growth and prosperity in the future. Countries such as Mexico and Brazil do not want themselves included in the category of countries that are pleading for debt relief. They view as anathema any indication that their commercial bankers might ever be confronted with debt relief demands. Their national interest lies in assuring the continued full confidence of the private capital markets, not in pleading international financial plight. They are the quiet, de facto drop-outs from the G—77 chorus demanding generalised debt relief. They would have no problem with a genuinely unilateral decision by the industrialised countries that forgives repayment obligations on past official development loans, no matter what the economic status of the debtor country. Nor do they argue against interested countries trying to win a reprieve from their own debt burden. What countries like Brazil and Mexico do *not* want is an 'intermediary' such as G—77, pleading for a generalised rescheduling of all LDC debts.

The 'successful' borrowers decline to seek forgiveness for any of their international debts, be they from official or private sources. The Brazilians, Mexicans and a few others have adopted a very subtle diplomatic posture in the debt relief negotiations. During the 1977-78 period, they played no active role either in the internal G—77 deliberations or in the talks with the North. No

firm evidence is available that they actively opposed the positions adopted i the Group of Fifteen. However, they did keep themselves fully informed on tl course of the negotiations and obliquely made known their true feelin; concerning generalised debt relief. The 'count me out' attitude was clear to a of the officials interviewed in the course of this study. In the view of or interviewee, the Brazilians and Mexicans were comfortable with the negotiating abstinence because they perceived virtually no chance that tl industrialised countries would ever agree to generalised debt relief for offici loans and absolutely no chance that generalised relief from commercial del would ever be seriously discussed.[8]

The compromise on debt relief and its uncertain status

A new level of anxiety crept into the debt relief negotiations at the beginning (1978. A special ministerial-level meeting of the Trade and Developmer Board (TDB) was scheduled to be convened in March and devote itse exclusively to the debt issue. The previous two sessions of the Debt Exper Group, meeting at the technicians' level, had utterly failed to bridge tl negotiating gap; the two sides seemed further apart than ever, at the conclusio of their meeting in Autumn 1977. One reason for this situation was suggeste by an American participant: the meeting involved an unprecedented degree (specificity and economic analysis rather than the G—77 emphasis on a 'let' not analyse—let's bargain' approach.[9]

In a search for a compromise arrangement that both sides could accept at th impending ministerial meeting, a natural progression began towards th concept of providing special financial relief to the poorest of the LDCs. B 1978, a number of European countries (the United Kingdom, th Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands) had decided that a write-off (their old bilateral aid loans to a limited number of LDCs was appropriat Separately, the Secretary General of UNCTAD (Gamani Corea) and his senic Secretariat official dealing with international financial issues began a successfi effort to reach de facto agreement with key governments for eliminatin repayment obligations on old development loans to the poorer LDCs as compromise debt relief measure. This effort was the major exception to th rule that UNCTAD officials assumed a subordinate role in the negotiatin process.

Ministerial-level meetings have a special significance in the North-Sout dialogues—i.e. they can be viewed as action-forcing instruments. In the view (economic officials in the industrialised countries, the LDCs believe that higl level meetings promote concessions because of political pressures on Group ' (the industrial countries) ministers to 'come up with something' in the way

8 Not for attribution interview, US Treasury Department official, January 1980.
9. *Ibid*

concessions for LDCs at such a meeting.[10] Failure to produce results at political-level meetings attracts media attention to the apparent inability of the technocracy to negotiate technical issues successfully. Preferring to avoid the negative effects of such failure, most Group B countries believe that they will have to 'pay something' in the course of a ministerial meeting.[11]

The mission of the TDB ministerial meeting was to translate this concept into language mutually acceptable to both North and South. After several sensitivities were assuaged, a precisely worded communique was approved by the TDB ministers on March 6, 1978. A number of specific accommodations were necessary to obtain acceptance by the industrial countries: first, the agreement never mentioned the concept of debt relief. Technically, the donor countries did not write off their loans. Rather, they agreed to enhance the terms of their past bilateral official development-assistance loans to the least-developed countries. This was to be done by 'retroactive terms adjustment': loans would be converted into grants. This transformation in the terms of relatively old loans coincided with the emphasis, started in the mid-1970s, on providing grant aid rather than loans to the poorer LDCs. Secondly, the Group B countries promised only to 'seek to adopt' loan conversions or 'other equivalent measures', in lieu of any binding commitment to act. In theory, a literal interpretation of this provision suggests that an honest effort would be tantamount to compliance with the agreement, even if physical implementation of 'retroactive terms adjustment' was delayed. Thirdly, each donor country was left free to make two crucial decisions 'within the context of its own aid policy': (1) *how* to provide the enhanced resource flows through retroactive terms adjustment or 'equivalent measures'; and (2) *which* countries it would certify as being eligible to receive retroactive terms adjustment. In other words, no standardised operational procedure was adopted and no standardised country eligibility list was created. In both cases, donor countries created their own operational guidelines.[12]

Another important facet of the agreement on retroactive terms adjustment was the degree of specificity achieved in defining exactly what kind of debt was being considered for adjustment. No precise definition of the contents of the 'debt relief' package being sought had previously been offered by the LDCs. Delegations representing the G—77 had never responded to the question, advanced on several occasions by American negotiators, as to 'what type of debt are you seeking relief from?' One delegate from the G—77 did however respond at one time by saying 'when you tell us that you will in principle agree to debt relief, we will tell you exactly what types of debt we want included.'[13] Even the term 'official' debt is imprecise. The question existed in the early stages of the talks as to whether loans negotiated from regional development

10. Not for attribution interview, French government official, May 1980.
11. *Ibid*
12. Not for attribution interview, US Treasury Department official, October 1980.
13. *Ibid.*, January 1980.

banks would be included among those eligible for relief. Also relevant to the debate was the issue of whether governmental export credits (such as those made by the US Export-Import Bank) would be eligible for any debt relief package subsequently negotiated.

A second part of the agreement reached at the TDB meeting dealt with a long-standing effort to agree on 'certain basic concepts' to provide 'guidance' to the international community on future negotiations concerned with alleviating a specific debt problem. Among the mutually agreed upon concepts were the notions that the consideration of the debt problem of a country would begin only after a specific request of that debtor country, and secondly, that any future debt reorganisations (a concept distinct from forgiveness) agreed upon would protect 'equitably' the interests of both debtors and creditors. The reservations of the more advanced LDCs were handled by the insertion in the agreed-upon text of the adjective 'interested' before the phrase 'developing countries'. This phraseology allowed countries such as Brazil and Mexico to divorce themselves from the agreement by formally noting that they were not interested in securing debt relief.

If a good compromise is measured by the mutual dissatisfaction of both parties, then the retroactive terms adjustment (RTA) agreement can be viewed as a good compromise. Dissatisfaction with the RTA agreement was felt by both the G—77 and Group B countries. For the more conservative countries of the North, the basic negotiating principle of refusing to extend 'generalised' debt relief measures had been broken, and a demand for further concessions by the LDCs was deemed inevitable.[14] (As suggested below, this was a well-founded concern.)

The dissatisfaction on the other side was concentrated in those countries desiring debt relief who later found themselves excluded from the donor countries' eligibility lists. Once again, the exacting language of the RTA agreement was critical: special emphasis was placed on adjusting past bilateral official development loans to the poorer and least developed countries. Although each donor country was free to construct its own country eligibility list, the net result of the agreement was to induce most of the large donor countries, such as the United States, to use the United Nations General Assembly's list of twenty-nine least developed countries as the basis for selecting recipient countries. In addition to poverty and a relatively small GNP, these countries[15] also shared the characteristic of relatively small external debts, a reflection of the fact that the very poorest countries generally have relatively small economies and have done relatively little external borrowing. In no case was any of the countries on the least developed list an active negotiating proponent of debt relief within the UNCTAD framework.

14 Not for attribution interview, French government official, May 1980.

15 The complete list of these 29 least-developed countries as of 1979 was as follows: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde Islands, Central African Empire, Chad, Comoros Islands, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldive Islands, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, The Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Western Samoa, Yemen AR, Yemen, P.A.R.

The internationally recognised list that would have been preferred by the activist debtor countries is referred to as the Most Seriously Affected Countries. These are the medium and lower-income LDCs whose balances of payments were judged to have received the biggest external economic shock from the OPEC price surge of 1973–74. (If a country imported a relatively insignificant amount of petroleum, it would not be on this list, its extreme internal poverty notwithstanding.) The forty-five countries on this list include two of the three key proponents of generalised debt relief: Ghana and Pakistan. This list also included India and Egypt, two debt relief advocates that had played a secondary role in the negotiations to this date. Given the RTA focus on the least developed, the March 1978 debt compromise helped none of the three LDCs who for years had actively pressed demands on the North for debt relief within the UNCTAD Forum.

In the peculiar negotiating dynamics of the North-South dialogue, a compromise usually does not conclusively settle anything on a long-term basis. The retroactive terms adjustment compromise proved to be more of a cease-fire than the end of contentious bargaining on the debt relief issue. By the fourth quarter of 1978, the RTA agreement was under formal assault by Pakistan. The problem did not stop there. When even one G—77 country voices strong feelings about a North-South issue, the others support it.[16] Pakistan, having been excluded from most of the eligibility lists for receiving retroactive terms adjustment, and having fervently pursued a policy of securing relief from its external official debt, assumed the lead in challenging the legitimacy of the Group B interpretation of the retroactive terms adjustments provision. In essence Pakistan lobbied successfully for a G—77 position which attacked the Group B debt relief actions as being too narrowly based, a violation of the spirit and the letter of the agreement.

A formal disagreement by the G—77 on the status of the debt relief compromise was promulgated in two official statements, one being the Arusha Declaration of February 1979, the other being a G—77 statement issued at the conclusion of the TDB's Autumn 1980 session. As articulated in these statements, the countries of the South argue that the March 1978 resolution approving retroactive terms adjustment had *not* been implemented and would not be considered implemented until the donor countries extended RTA coverage to 'all the poorer developing countries described in the resolution without discrimination of any kind'. The objectives of the LDCs had not been achieved, the G—77 countries argued, because they later discovered that they had erred in assuming that the RTA provision would be:

> comprehensive in coverage, equitable, and non-discriminatory in scope and timely in application, so as to provide swift relief to developing countries affected by the resolution. In the light of subsequent developments, the developing countries had learned with dismay that the

16. Not for attribituion interview, UNCTAD official, June 1980.

implementation of the resolution in respect to retroactive adjustment of terms had tended to vary as regards both beneficiary countries and the degree of adjustment accorded by individual creditors. Thus, whilst some had taken action in favour of the most seriously affected countries, others had restricted their coverage to the least developed countries only, while yet others had taken no action whatsoever. In the light of this varying performance, the Group of 77 concluded that developed donor countries which had granted relief measures to only a limited group of countries could not be considered as having implemented [the RTA] resolution.[17]

Debt relief and the political economy of the North-South dialogue

The debt relief negotiating process is part of a larger political-economic process: the North-South debate on the creation of a new international economic order. The latter is an extraordinary exercise in international relations. The majority of the world's sovereign countries, possessing relatively limited political and military power, are using economic and moral arguments—not force—to induce a voluntary international redistribution of both financial resources and decision-making influence in international economic organisations.

Although the reality of the North-South income gap is clearly demonstrable, the appropriate policy responses are not obvious or unequivocally quantifiable. Subjective values and the limits of economic knowledge preclude any universally acceptable, scientifically defensible programme of action. At the heart of the problem are such normative issues as what is the relative responsibility between North and South in sponsoring efforts (resource transfers versus self-help) towards the goal of economic 'development' (whatever that term precisely means), and whether the real issue is the South's poverty in absolute terms or the relative problem of an uneven global distribution of income: i.e., is the ultimate goal international income equality or an increasingly prosperous South *and* North?

As the North-South dialogue moves into a 'mature phase' and the probability increases of its permanence in international relations, a critical evaluation of its achievements and relevance is in order. There is a general consensus that after six full years of effort, the achievements of the various negotiations were relatively modest in terms of what economic policy measures the G—77 countries wish to implement as part of the new international economic order. One possible reason for this outcome is the resistance to change and the economic selfishness of the industrialised countries of Group B. A second possible reason for this lack of change is the controversial ideological (i.e. non-market) flavour of the economic reform demands being pressed by the South.

The procedural limitations of UNCTAD—the LDCs' chosen negotiation

17 Unclassified US State Department cable dated October 14, 1980

forum—is a third possibility. The extent to which the political economy of the debt relief negotiations parallels the dominant effort in the North-South dialogue—i.e. international commodity agreements—suggests this factor is a significant (but not exclusive) factor in determining the substantive course of the full gamut of North-South negotiations: debt relief, commodity prices, technology transfer, tariff preferences, etc.

Decision-making in the debt relief exercise followed a similar pattern to the other issues discussed in the UNCTAD framework. For both sides, the large number of countries involved suggests a disparate set of perceived self-interests, economic success, and ideological commitments. The negotiating attitudes of the relatively small membership (about 20) in the Group B countries—the responders, not issue initiators—took the form of a broad continuum. Countries, like the United States and West Germany, with deep commitments to the market mechanism and potentially large financial obligations to new resource transfer programmes in general, were relatively negative and unresponsive. Countries with a more egalitarian outlook—such as the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands—generally are much more amenable to institutionalising official interventions in global economic relations to induce a greater flow of financial resources to the LDCs.

By contrast, the G—77 is a polyglot alliance united in a shared belief that effective negotiation leverage on the North pre-supposes G—77 unity on the economic demands made. Consequently, the demands are broad in nature and extensive in number. There are literally dozens of subordinate demands under the broad headings of trade, finance, investment, development assistance and energy. The latest compendium of the G—77's objectives, the Arusha Declaration of 1979, was described as being of 'telephone book proportions'.

When negotiating on debt relief or on the establishment of a comprehensive series of international commodity agreements, the LDCs must take a sufficiently broad and aggregated approach that there is something on a net basis to be gained by virtually all countries. Any effort at a narrowly defined negotiating stance is made difficult by the different and often conflicting economic interests of the South. Some LDCs perceived their creditworthiness (i.e. ability to continue borrowing in the international capital markets) would be damaged by their participating in a demand for generalised debt relief. In statistical terms, many LDCs have a rather modest external debt burden and limited exports of commodities. Their attitude in UNCTAD is one of relative indifference. In terms of commodities, some barren LDCs are net importers of raw materials; they would be penalised financially if their import costs increased.

It is the countries with the larger debt problems and the greater endowment of exportable commodities, along with the professionals comprising the UNCTAD Secretariat, who have strongly sponsored the proposals of debt relief and commodity arrangements. However, these countries must act within the larger mandate of unity. The results on the negotiating process are

important. In his incisive, first-hand study of the commodities negotiating process in the 1976-78 period, Robert Rothstein wrote:

> the imperatives of intragroup unity dominated the imperatives of intergroup agreement. Group unity, particularly for the Group of 77, seemed necessary for major gains, and maintaining it seemed more important than the minor gains to be expected from a normal pattern of conflict and compromise. Concern for shared principles and the avoidance of ideological conflict with the developed countries was inevitably minimal. Massive initial demands—'blue sky' proposals—were necessary to maintain unity, and 'fractionalising' problems and settling what could be settled seemed likely to split the coalition and to facilitate the typical 'divide and conquer' tactics of the rich.[18]

The dominant role within the Group of 15 and within the overall Group of 77 that was assumed by three countries on the debt relief issue, together with the omnipresent support role of the UNCTAD Secretariat, parallels yet another aspect of G—77 unity on the commodity issue described by Rothstein:

> Many developing countries lacked the technical capacity to deal with the issues or were simply indifferent to whatever transpired in Geneva. For those countries, it was always the course of least resistance to support whatever the Group [of 77] supported.[19]

A United States Treasury Department official argued in an interview that 'the vast majority of developing countries are not emotionally or intellectually committed to generalised debt relief'. Most LDCs, he felt, were content to let a few G—77 spokesmen, backed by the UNCTAD Secretariat, push for economic concessions for all they are worth and to endorse the right of these countries to speak for the entire Group.[20]

Until the March 1978 TDB meeting, the precise definition of debt relief had not been formally discussed, let alone agreed upon. The G—77 felt no need (or perhaps had no ability) to specify the exact nature of the debts that they wanted forgiven. The argument advanced by the LDCs and contested by the industrialised countries never went beyond the general issues of need and justification. There was no assessment of the benefits to be accrued and no advanced thinking about what might be termed the 'follow through' of debt relief. Elimination of a past external debt burden is only part of the equation:

> There is no way to guarantee that countries relieved of the debts will not immediately borrow again so heavily and on such terms that they will soon confront debt-service obligations as large as those they bear today. Once relief is granted, after all, the creditors' leverage is greatly diminished. It should not be impossible, however, to devise rules for new

18. Robert L. Rothstein, *Global Bargaining* (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 150.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
20. Not for attribution interview, January 1980.

> borrowing that would keep debt-service flows from growing more rapidly than current-account receipts . . .[21]

As of late 1981, the debt relief negotiations have never studied technical guidelines to discourage repetitions in the future of debt burden problems that have previously been 'relieved'.

Another broad similarity between the debt and commodity issues negotiations is their staying power despite fundamental disagreements between the two factions. Commodity talks began in 1976 and have continued on a regular basis. A minimal number of new commodity agreements have been concluded, and it was not until June 1980 that agreement on a vastly scaled-down Common Fund was reached. Similarly, the lack of any move towards mutual accommodation on the debt issue during the 1976–78 period never threatened to cause a cessation of negotiations. If there was one continuing point of agreement, it was that both sides wanted to avert the negative stigma that a rupture in negotiations would cause. Mutual acceptance of the need for continued deliberations inevitably emanated from inconclusive meetings. Technicians and political-level officials on both sides were always amenable to further debate. In the long debt relief and commodity struggles, the 'tactics of nonsettlement' assumed an unusually important role as the means of transcending stalemates and allowing the negotiating process to continue, despite minimal prospects for agreement.

The course of the debt relief and commodity negotiations both appear to have been affected by the perceptions held by most industrialised countries that the outward display of G—77 unity disguises internal disagreements over economic demands. The Brazilians and Mexicans, among others, made no effort to disguise their disdain for generalised debt relief. Although no public record exists to document this notion, off the record interviews with United States Treasury Department officials elicited the following points: that those two countries felt no need to silence their G—77 colleagues because they had every confidence that the Group B countries would do their work for them (by rejecting the concept of generalised debt relief); and that in meetings with finance ministry officials, held prior to 1978, in Brasilia and Mexico City, American officials privately had received expressions of sympathy with America's resistance to generalised debt relief.

Discussing the commodity negotiations, Robert Rothstein has written:

> some very sophisticated countries continued to support the Integrated Program for Commodities, despite strong reasons for opposition, because they felt that the developed countries would never accept it. Why, then, lose face by breaking ranks for something never destined to be implemented?

21. Peter Kenen, 'Debt Relief as Development Assistance', in *The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1977), p. 59.

> The symbol of group unity was also used very effectively by the majority, for defectors would have to violate one of the Third World's most powerful norms. The developed countries persistently misunderstood the force behind the idea of unity. For example, American officials were frequently bitter about the fact that developing country diplomats sometimes said one thing in private and another in public . . .
>
> many of the developed countries saw only the potential for defections and listened only to the private expressions of disagreement; as a result, they felt little need (never having the inclination) to offer more than cosmetic concessions. What one side saw as essential prevented it from compromising; what the other side saw as counterfeit prevented it from compromising.[22]

There is also an apparent consistency in the impact of temperament and ideology on the basic negotiating differences assumed by North and South in the debt relief and commodity talks. In view of the North's stance based on the use of case-by-case debt relief operations to handle situations of imminent default, its emphasis on more aid, given the long-term nature of the LDCs' problem, and the North's commitment to using the Paris Club forum to conduct ad hoc debt relief operations, the following passage from *Global Bargaining* concerning the North-South dialogue in general, and the commodity issue dialogue in particular, provides additional support for the contention that common principles of political economy prevail. The result of a fixed Group B ideological orientation, he writes:

> has tended to be a policy that conflicts with Group of 77 demands in rather consistent ways across issues: the case-by-case emphasis versus an emphasis on first principles, an emphasis on efficiency and stability versus an emphasis on equity and redistribution, and emphasis on improving the market versus an emphasis on radically restructuring it, and an emphasis on reforming old institutions versus an emphasis on creating new ones.[23]

Conclusions

The March 1978 agreement to provide a modified form of debt relief to the very poorest of the LDCs marks a milestone—not the conclusion—in the debt relief debate. The first reason for making this assertion is that the upward spiral in oil prices since 1979 has produced record high current-account deficits to be financed by the non-oil LDCs. The projected medium-term permanence of non-oil LDC current-account deficits suggests that the recourse to foreign borrowing by the oil-importing developing countries may become more, not less, intense.

22. Rothstein, *op cit.*, pp. 119, 121
23 *Ibid.*, p. 165.

It is widely assumed that bilateral official development assistance will not increase proportionately. Increased commercial bank-lending[24] and financial innovations, such as an expanded lending role for the International Monetary Fund, will account for the bulk of the continuing LDC external borrowing that will be necessary. The debt relief negotiations, concentrating as they do on forgiveness of official bilateral loans, are being bypassed by the force of economic change. Bilateral official loans will account for a major source of the debt service burden during the 1980s in only a handful of countries, for example, Pakistan.

The second reason for a continuation of the pursuit of debt relief is the failure of several LDCs to be included in most of the eligibility lists for retroactive terms adjustment (RTA) adopted by donor countries. Pakistan can be expected to continue leading the challenge to the implementation status of the RTA agreement of 1978. An important, but still unanswerable question is whether the current effort to expand the list of countries receiving RTA is based on a genuine misunderstanding as to the coverage of the original March 1978 agreement or whether there was a calculated G—77 position to accept 'half a loaf' and move immediately to demand the other half. On the other hand, a degree of ambiguity characterised the RTA agreement; the phrase 'poorer', not 'least developed' was used. Pakistan, Ghana and Jamaica may naturally have assumed that their economic conditions matched this definition.[25]

On the other hand, the delegate from one of these countries to the debt negotiations stated privately that when the Group B countries agreed to alleviate the debt of the least developed countries, 'it destroyed their refusal to talk about country classifications'. The donor countries now are 'caught in a trap'. Once they committed themselves to helping the least developed group, then 'it was logical and probable that debt relief to other categories of countries would follow, for example, to island, landlocked, and the Most Seriously Affected Countries.'[26] It is very difficult, stated a US Treasury official, to know whether the LDC accusation of bad faith 'is a sincere belief . . . based on the belief that somebody was being two-faced, or whether an LDC negotiator is just saying this because he has a negotiating objective that goes beyond what has been agreed to . . .'[27]

Unlike Jamaica, with its relatively heavy commercial bank debt, and Ghana, which has not taken an especially hard-line stand on relieving its own debt burden, the government of Pakistan for many years has given a very high priority to achieving such relief for itself.[28] Pakistan may therefore be expected

24 Publically announced Eurocurrency bank lending to non-oil LDCs nearly tripled from $13 5 billion in 1977 to a $40 billion annualised rate during the first half of 1981, according to Morgan Guaranty Trust Company data. Estimates for the commercial banks' share of financing the current account deficits of the non-oil LDCs in the 1975-79 period are in the 50 to 70 per cent range.

25. Not for attribution interview, US Treasury Department official, October 1980.

26 Not for attribution interview, June 1980.

27. Not for attribution interview, US Treasury Department official, October 1980

28. *Ibid*

to continue pressing to be included in the RTA provisions, thereby potentially extending the negotiations indefinitely.

The economic adequacy of providing debt relief only to those countries on the United Nations list of least developed countries is a subjective issue. Dissatisfaction with the list has, to date, not been met with any indications of flexibility by the North. The likelihood that the donor countries will widen the list of LDCs to whom they extend retroactive terms adjustment is uncertain. An on-going negotiating effort is probable. If the hypothesis of this study is accurate, then the broader negotiating dynamics of the North-South dialogue suggest a snail-like, but enduring effort to inch towards mutual accommodation. In addition to seeking to broaden RTA eligibility, the LDCs can also be expected to press for a progression of separate concessions that would affect the Paris Club's procedures for approving debt rescheduling. It would be in the LDCs' interest to make these procedures more automatic and more responsive to debtors' needs.

Again, if the hypothesis is accurate, and the negotiating dynamics of debt relief are coterminous with those of commodities, then the LDCs will not be content with the pending implementation of the scaled-down version of the Common Fund to finance the Integrated Programme for Commodities. It can be expected that the Fund's inauguration would soon be followed by G—77 demands for a better financed Common Fund that encompasses both a larger number of individual commodity agreements and increased facilities for marketing promotion functions in the so-called Second Account.

A major cause of the substantive failure of the North-South dialogue is the modality of negotiations. Overwhelming the virtues of the one-country, one-vote rule of UNCTAD are the vices of an inherent negotiating handicap. By trying to represent everyone in a bloc of 120 countries, the G—77 cannot pinpoint its 'shopping list'. Everyone's economic grievances at present must be included in a comprehensive and broadly worded text of demands. To achieve greater results in the future, the LDCs may find it necessary to stop playing politics G—77 style. UNCTAD should start focusing on a few well-documented priority issues, regardless of the fact that benefits will be concentrated in a few countries and regardless of the fact that the pet projects of many LDCs may have to be excluded. Another critical necessity is the assurance of increased consistency between what is being pressed in UNCTAD committee meetings in Geneva and what are the greatest economic concerns in the capital cities of the LDCs.

The long-running Geneva negotiations scene has tended to create and perpetuate priority issues peculiar to intermittent UNCTAD meetings. If national sentiments are not more widely and precisely reflected in Geneva, it is possible that the UNCTAD machinery will move towards a state of atrophy. Given the prolonged state of debt relief and commodity negotiations, many LDC countries have tended to lose their interest and enthusiasm in pressing these concepts ad infinitum. If both sides do not respect the central role of

UNCTAD, then there may be a drift into the use of 'pluri-lateral' (as opposed to universal) economic talks among countries in certain geographic regions or among countries interested in a single, narrowly defined issue. Such an approach might well prove to be more politically efficient and economically rewarding in securing some of the international economic changes most eagerly sought by the South.

The global system needs an improved negotiating process that better addresses itself to the unique political-economy of the North-South dialogue. Such a process could enhance the acceptance of the principle that, given international economic interdependence, concentrated global efforts to rectify a limited number of LDC economic grievances can be accomplished within the context of a positive sum game. In such a case, most—if not all—of the countries in both the North and South could receive the benefits of a partially restructured international economic order.

THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE AND THE DEEP SEA MINING ISSUE: THE NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT

*D. C. Watt**

THE action of the United States government in unilaterally imposing a delay on the progress of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)[1] has brought to a head an accumulation of resentments, antagonisms, *ennui* and *longueurs* among the leading industrial states that has been taken by many commentators to threaten even the successful conclusion of the Conference itself. At the time of writing, the other delegations to the Conference are waiting for the results of the review of the Conference's work then announced by the Reagan administration and promised for the end of November 1981. At the last meeting of the Conference in summer 1981 the Americans were left in no doubt, even by their normal allies, of the generally hostile reaction to their behaviour. The decision of the new Reagan government to postpone UNCLOS III was preceded by a barrage of leaks to the press in Washington which—when taken with the successful passage through the United States Congress and the West German Bundestag of legislation governing the mining for minerals on the floor of the oceans outside the 200 mile limit,[2] and the introduction of similar legislation into the British parliament[3]—was taken by many to indicate an organised and co-ordinated rebellion by the leading industrial states of the world against the pressures exerted through UNCLOS III by the Group of 77 (G—77). This impression was reinforced by the decree of the French government of May 12, 1981[4] requiring French companies planning to engage in deep-sea mining to file details of their plans, financial composition and proposals to protect the environment with the French Ministry of Industry.

Mr Mitterrand's incoming Socialist government subsequently announced its intention of introducing legislation patterned on that of America, Germany and Britain; the Japanese are reported to be considering similar legislation. The

* D. C. Watt is Professor of International History in the University of London. He is Chairman of the University of London M Sc Sea Use Law, Economics and Policy-Making Steering Committee, and Chairman of the Greenwich Forum

1 Department of State Press Conference, March 2, 1981

2 US Public Law 96 283; Federal Republic of Germany Action for the Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining

3 Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Bill.

4 *Decret No 81 555 relatif au dossier de demandes interessant les activites d'exploitation des resources minerales des grand fonds marins* France, *Journal officiel*, No. 115, May 16, 1981, pp 1,490-91.

abrupt dismissal of the Chairman of the American delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference, Mr George H. Aldrich, together with all but one of the members of the delegation (a purge of Stalinist proportions), and the rise to second position in the delegation of Mr Leigh Ratner—who had left the delegation in 1976, after President Carter's election, to work for Kennecott, one of the leading American companies involved in deep-sea mining proposals—led commentators to conclude that pressure from America's mining corporations lay behind the decision of the Reagan administration; as pressure from these sources was equally supposed to have lain behind the inclusion in 1980 of an element in the Republican party's election programme, alleging that the Law of the Sea negotiations had 'served to inhibit US exploration of the seabed'.

These allegations have produced predictably strong reactions from those diplomats representing the G—77 countries which had been most active in preparing the draft proposals under consideration by UNCLOS III for the regulation of deep-sea mining. The subsequent uproar was fanned by the Soviet Union and its spokesmen and complicated by the eager appearance on the field of battle of a range of American and British 'flat-earthers' for whom the whole 'dialogue' between the industrial states and the G—77 was something outlandish and inimical.[5] In the smoke of this battle the real issues and genuine disagreements and divergencies which existed between those industrial states which had introduced legislation into their national legislature, and the view taken by the G—77, has tended to be ignored or obscured. It was, after all, the Carter administration, advised by Mr James Richardson, then leader of the US Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference, which passed the United States seabed legislation. Yet West Germany, which passed similar government legislation at the same time, is in terms of UNCLOS III a 'geographically disadvantaged state', and divided from the United States, Britain, France and Japan on a great many issues connected with UNCLOS. There were, equally, very wide differences of opinion among the G—77 on the seabed mining issue, differences which have led some observers to argue (wrongly in my opinion) that their sensible exploitation by the developed industrial nations could have avoided the proposals to set up an international seabed authority *in toto*.[6] Now that the British legislation has become law, it is worth examining the issues on both sides to clear away the chaff and to attempt to arrive at some defensible assessment of what is really at stake.

UNCLOS III: What is really at stake?

The draft terms of the texts now before UNCLOS are the outcome of a marathon attempt to adjust the international law of the sea to the changes in

5. See, for example, Mr William Safire, 'Sea-Law: A Great Ripoff?' in *New York Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1981 *The Financial Times*, March 17, 1981, described UNCLOS III's proposed deep-sea mining regime as 'a lawyer's delight and an industrialist's nightmare'.

6 See, for example, P. N. Kirthisingha, 'The Enterprise: an Expendable Triumph' in *Marine Policy*, July 1981, pp. 252-56.

marine and maritime technology which have taken place since its original formulation in the seventeenth century. This enterprise was given its initial impetus by the unilateral declarations issued by the United States government in September 1945, and has already occupied two United Nations Conferences in 1958 and 1960. This third UNCLOS differed from its two predecessors in attempting a once-and-for-all updating of all outstanding legal problems, and in involving every member of the United Nations, including those with no sea coast whatever, in its deliberations. The draft terms represent more than six years of continuous negotiation since the Conference first met in 1974 in Caracas; they involve therefore an enormous number of complicated bargains and 'trades-off' of interests over an enormous range of issues. A good deal of the material included has already become part of conventional international practice and thus assumed the status of 'customary law' by the enactment of national legislation, especially where the extension of national jurisdiction from the edge of the territorial sea to 200 miles from the coastline in matters such as fishery regulations, protection of the environment or exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf are concerned.[7] Any prospect that all this work might have been in vain is therefore dismaying in the extreme.

It becomes the more dismaying when the nature of the 'trade-off' is examined more fully. The principal element of the new developments in the law of the seas has been the wholesale extension of territorial limits from three to twelve miles. This has brought something like 116 former major high-sea straits within the territorial waters of riparian states and extended, in many important respects, the national jurisdiction of more than eighty coastal states to 200 miles from the coastline. These developments have meant the virtual disappearance of vital sectors of the world's normal high-sea routes into the jurisdiction of single states. The continuance of the principle of freedom of navigation (and overflight) is essential to the major sea-using powers both for military and commercial shipping purposes. It is essential for the deployment of their naval forces, and for the free transport of oil and goods. And it is nowhere more important than to the NATO powers for whom the Atlantic and the Mediterranean represent their internal lines of communication, and who draw most of their energy supplies in tanker-carried crude oil from the Gulf.

It is this, more than anything else, which led the governments of the United States and the other powers of the advanced industrial world to understand the need for an internationally agreed new regime. But this need is equally understood by the great transnational and multinational industrial and transport enterprises which are engaged in the use and exploitation of the resources of the sea. A single agreed international regime is essential, whether for fisheries, the mining of offshore minerals and aggregates, the exploitation of offshore energy resources, long-distance transportation by sea, or the protection of the marine environment. The sea is continuous and

7 This is, strictly speaking, governed by the earlier UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. But the concept of the 200 mile Economic Zone originates with UNCLOS III

interconnected. Fragment it into numbers of differing national regimes and operation on any scale becomes at best absurdly expensive and complicated, if not actually impossible.

For the world as a whole, threatened as it is with the Malthusian nightmare of a population increasing as fast as the projections for the next thirty years suggest, the exploitation and use of the resources of the sea represents its last hope. The proper development of the seas and oceans, as sources of energy, proteins, minerals, for cheap means of transport of goods and so on offers the world a vital breathing space in which the problems of indiscriminate human breeding can be tackled and population growth stabilised; in which the food and protein supplies can be matched to population size, in which the less developed parts of the world can industrialise and diversify without destroying the general environment irreparably; in which an international regime can be evolved which will match the increasing economic interdependence of the various parts of the world (something we have not really had since the breakdown of the private European capitalist system in 1914, and the failure, largely as a result of American sabotage, of the only two serious attempts to develop a genuine international substitute in 1931-33 and in 1945-47—all attempts at a system since then having been at best palliative, irritating to the donors and inducing remarkably little respect in the recipients).

The exploitation of the resources of the sea, however, is far more costly in money and resources and far more hazardous than the exploitation of land-based resources. The matter has been bedevilled here as elsewhere by two entirely irrelevant and largely unreal debates; the first being that between public and private ownership, the second that over the respective merits of national versus international action. These conflicts have been pursued by elements on both sides of each of the controversies to the inhibition of any progress and the destruction, or at the very least the postponement, of any real action. Whether ideologues like it or not the world is divided, and will continue to be divided, between private enterprises trading transnationally, drawing their capital and repatriating part of their profits equally across the boundaries of nationally based financial revenue and taxation systems; and as many state-owned and state trading enterprises, some of which will turn naturally to protectivism, some of which are deeply suspicious of all foreign elements. Ideologists of both sides may regret it but we live in a mixed economy world. They must not be allowed to wreck it. The problems this mixed economy world faces are complicated by the fact that private capital economies, mixed economies and planned economies each appear to have different cyclical phases of economic development which mutual interdependence may very well accentuate (as would appear to be the problem with Poland today).

The need for international organisation and consensus

The world thus faces the need to create a system whereby the expertise and capital of the developed world (which where deep-sea mining is concerned is

concentrated largely, though by no means entirely, in the hands of large private industrial organisations) can be directed towards the recovery of those minerals which are known to be on the ocean bed. Experience has shown that the capital demands of such an undertaking are enormous, and that it will require a research and development effort on a major scale. Organisations which have the capacity to undertake such an enterprise (whatever their ownership) will require a good profit and a steady return to compensate them for the risks run and to repay the capital invested. They will need a regime which deals fairly and equably with their requirements.

The establishment of such a regime cannot be achieved in a hurry. It will require as far reaching a degree of international consensus as possible. UNCLOS III may strike Western diplomats as enormously time-consuming; but it has developed a remarkably successful set of mechanisms for achieving its ends. Its collapse now would be a psychological disaster of a major order. By the end of 1980 the Informal Composite Negotiating Text so-called had made remarkable progress. The continental shelf provisions had been agreed. The clauses dealing with marine scientific research were in their final form. Where the deep-sea mining issues were concerned, agreement had been reached on the establishment of an International Seabed Authority (ISBE) to regulate mining. Its structure and the complicated form of decision-making which was to guide its Council had been agreed; the deep seabed mining regime as a whole had been refined and improved enormously since its first conception. Only four sets of issues remained unsettled. One was the much vexed question of who was to sign the treaty, the Arab States proposing that the Palestine Liberation Organisation should sign it, the Soviet bloc objecting to the demand by the members of the European Community that the Community should sign for them. The determination of economic zones and continental shelf segments between opposite or adjacent states still remained unsettled. Two other issues more germane to the exploitation of the ocean bed remained to be agreed. The first was the establishment of a Preparatory Commission to follow signature of the first UNCLOS III Convention, to prepare the way for its entry into force, especially in the seabed mining field. The second was the agreement of a regime for Preparatory Investment Protection to maintain the development of deep sea mining in the period before the Convention achieves a sufficient number of ratifications to enter into force.

This degree of achievement should not hide the fact that there were at least four sets of issues which, given half a chance, various states could be expected to reopen. One of great concern to United States defence authorities (and others) is that of notification of innocent passage of warships through the continental sea. Another is the issue of revenue sharing from the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond the 200 mile limit. Germane to the issue of deep-seabed mining are two issues of great complexity. The first is the demand by land-based producers of the minerals found on the ocean floor that deep-sea mining of these minerals be severely limited. The second is the demand that

industrial organisations, granted concessions to mine the ocean floor, should in return enlighten the United Nations organisation, set up in the interests of the rest of the world to complement them, as to the details of the technology employed (transfer of technology).

It was in this context that the British government chose to introduce its legislation. Speaking in the House of Commons on April 29, 1981 the Under Secretary of State for Industry, Mr John MacGregor gave four main justifications for their action and timing.[8] The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, he said, had made great progress towards an international regime. Nevertheless it would be years before it was ratified and in force. Until that date it was necessary for there to be some legal system to cover the position of the industrial enterprises which wished to mine the ocean floor. National assurances, he admitted, were only partial and clearly were no substitute for a properly agreed international regime. The industrial enterprises, he said, had already expended considerable amounts of capital on prospecting for potential sources of minerals on the ocean floor.[9] They wished, he said, to secure their claim to these potential mineral bearing areas. The United States and Germany, he said, had already passed their legislation and would soon be accepting applications for licences to explore.[10] British mining companies could not be left behind. Competition between companies operating under licences issued by the United States or West Germany or other reciprocating countries would be avoided by each country recognising the authority of the other 'reciprocating country'. Mechanisms for resolving overlapping licence operators would be agreed, so he said, between the 'reciprocating countries'. The British legislation also included a clause empowering the government to take countervailing measures against countries which discriminated against British ships. Fears that the Group of 77 might proceed to take action against British interests as part of their general reaction against the manner in which the developed countries were seeking to anticipate the conclusion of UNCLOS III he dismissed. In the British view, since no licences for exploitations would be issued before 1988 when the convention was confidently expected to be in force he saw no reason for them to act.

Safeguarding national and private interests

Before proceeding any further with our exposition, there are a number of points which need making about the manner and matter of British, American and West German legislation. The first is that the concept of 'national companies' being disadvantaged by the lack of national legislation is largely

8 H.C. Debates, 29, IV. 1981, cc. 841-49.

9 Speaking in the House of Lords on January 19, 1981, Lord Errol of Consolidated Goldfields said that the international consortium of which his firm was a member had already spent $50 million on exploration and would need to spend a further $150 million to develop a commercial operation involving a throughput of 3 million tons of raw materials annually.

10. According to Mr T H. Skeet speaking in the same debate, the United States is to start issuing licences on January 1, 1982.

absurd. The degree of financial involvement, delay and risk involved in the mining of the sea bottom is so great that of the industrial organisations which have so far shown their hands—four out of six, and they the most advanced—are all consortia involving at least six companies of three different nationalities,[11] with the exception of the Lockheed Group, where the only non-American company is a subsidiary of the bi-national oil giant, Royal Dutch Shell. If these consortia follow the same practice as the consortia in the offshore oil business they will each designate or establish one single company to operate any concessions they may gain. Licence applications will probably be guided by geographical propinquity, which, since by far the largest number of mineable areas so far located are in the Pacific, will be to the United States, Canada or Japan.[12] It is of course possible that there may develop a kind of covert competition between the various licensing countries (by which the concept of reciprocation will be thoroughly undermined). But at present the dominating role played by American companies in three out of the four leading consortia suggests that they will look to Washington as the licensing authority. The French and Japanese groups will presumably look to Paris and Tokyo. The remaining consortium, Ocean Management Inc., has no British participation, being divided equally between Canadian, German, Japanese and American companies. The British legislation includes licences to exploit as well as explore but, while saying that no permission to exploit before 1988 would be given, leaves open the issue as to whether licences to exploit in 1988 could not be issued several years in advance. Indeed in its discussions of on-site development it is quite clear that the aim of the British, as of the West German and American legislatures, is to pre-empt the decision-making power of the projected international Seabed Authority by facing it on its establishment with a *fait accompli*.

It is worth pointing out at this stage that reports that Kennecott was behind the American campaign against UNCLOS III appear to be based on a confusion between the views of Mr Leigh Ratner (now a member of President Reagan's entourage) with the view of one of his erstwhile employers. Like all large

11 The major consortia involved are the following
(i) *Kennecott Copper*
[40% Kennecott (USA), 12% Rio Tinto Zinc (UK), 12% Consolidated Goldfields (UK), 12% BP Minerals (UK), 12% Norenda (Jap), 12% Mitsubishi (Jap).]
This is the most advanced of the consortia.
(ii) *Ocean Mining Associates*
[33% US Steel (US), 33% Union Minière (Belg), 33% Sun Oil (US)]
(iii) *Ocean Management Inc*
[25% International Nickel (Canada), 25% A M.R. (3 West German Cos), 25% Sedco (US), 25% Deep Ocean Mining (23 Japanese Cos)]
(iv) *Ocean Minerals Co*
[40% Lockheed Group (US), 25% Billiton (Royal Dutch Shell), 25% Standard Oil of Indiana (US), 10% Bos Kalis Investments (Netherlands)]
(v) *French Group*
(vi) *Deep Ocean Mineral Associates*
(Japanese)

12. The Kennecott Group have already earmarked sites for the development of processing plant on the Pacific Coast of the United States

transnational operating companies Kennecott are extremely sensitive to the need for an internationally agreed regime and to the vulnerability of a commercial undertaking to state actions. Even if this were not so, BP[13] and RTZ would be at hand to warn them. Retaliation could involve action against any local affiliates within the national jurisdiction of the Group of 77 by any member of the group who felt moved to this, as BP learnt to its cost with Libya and Nigeria. It could involve deliberate obstruction to their future operation once ISBA was established, thus bringing about precisely the break in continuity (and its threat beforehand) which would most imperil the capital already ventured and inhibit any further flow. It could well involve pressure on the most vulnerable member of a particular consortium (or its flag government) to withdraw from the consortium. All in all, it is difficult to accept Mr MacGregor's optimism at face value. It is clear that like many other Western politicians, diplomatists and commentators, he has dismissed as mere rhetoric the consistent suspicion of and hostility towards the industrialised countries frequently expressed by leading figures within the G—77.[14]

The approach of the G—77 is, it is true, both moralistic and legalistic, much given to appealing to sacred texts and legal precedent. The establishment of international control over the mining of the ocean bed is a major element in the New International Economic Order which members of the group intend will replace the economic and financial structure erected in the days of European empire and taken over by the United States and the 'multinational' companies under the guise of internationalism as the tide of empire receded. Their approach coincides with the determination displayed by the United Nations Conferences on Trade, Aid and Development (UNCTAD) to eliminate the freight-fixing roles of the liner companies and to break the industrial world's dominance of the bulk shipping business. It is also in harmony with UNESCO's attempts to break the 'monopoly position', so-called, of the international news agencies; and with efforts to copy OPEC in setting up other intergovernmental cartels of raw material and primary-producing countries. In the case of the seabed G—77 countries rest their case on UN Resolution 2749 of 1970, by which the General Assembly of the United Nations declared the resources of the ocean floor to be the 'common heritage' of mankind.[15]

Despite their many varied and disparate interests, members of the G—77 regard the protection of deep ocean resources from despoilation by the strongest and most industrialised as the first chance they have had of preventing colonialist ambition from being realised *before* the event. This

13. It is worth noting that through their control of Sohio Oil Company, BP can now play the dominant role in Kennecott Copper itself.

14. Which is odd because it is an historical phenomenon common to all primary producers including those within major industrialising countries. Cf. the suspicion of the industrial East and the international finance displayed by the farmers of the American mid-West in the latter half of the nineteenth century and manifested in the Granger movement and the role of the Populist party in the 1890s.

15. A phrase which, it should be remembered, was anticipated by President Johnson of the United States in 1966 when he said: 'The deep seas and the ocean bottom are and must remain the legacy of all human beings.'

belief is deeply rooted amongst G—77 leaders and goes still deeper into the psychological make-up of those who wait to replace them as Qaddafi replaced King Idris of Libya, the Derg replaced the Westernised Amharic nobility around Haile Selassie, or the Liberian sergeants replaced the Tubman dynasty. The ISBA and the International Seabed Enterprise envisaged in the ICNT are the G—77's creation; and its abortion (as opposed to its modification) could well be interpreted by its members as a major reassertion of colonialism, equivalent in their view to Suez. The doctrine of the 'common heritage' seems to them one of the few tangible gains that have emerged from the whole North-South dialogue. Its role is to regulate ocean floor production and marketing and, via the Enterprise, to embark on production itself, aided and financed by the industrial nations and instructed by the transfer of the necessary technology from the advanced industrial nations.

In the search for this aim they have produced in the structure of the Authority and the Enterprise what the *Financial Times* has rightly called 'a lawyer's delight and an industrialist's nightmare'.[16] The Authority would comprise an Assembly, in which all members of the United Nations would have a place, a Council of thirty states composed of five different categories, a General Secretary and Secretariat, an Economic and Planning Commission of fifteen members elected politically, a legal and technical Commission also of fifteen members elected politically, and a financial organ; the Enterprise would be headed by a Director-General and fifteen elected international public servants, 'internationalists'—elected to act in a personal capacity and not as representatives of governments—to comprise its Governing Board. The Enterprise would have powers to explore, exploit and market. Like a British nationalised industry it would be autonomous in its day-to-day operations, responsible to the Council of the Authority and charged to operate on 'sound commercial principles'. It would be obliged to pay compensation to land-based producers of the minerals mined from the ocean floor, whose economies suffer as a result of its competition.

The Authority would expect to derive its income from five different sources: initial contributions from the developed industrial countries; fees ($500,000 a time) for processing applications for licences; either a royalties charge plus fees and a production charge, or a production charge plus an agreed share of the net profits of each licensed undertaking; commercial loans; and voluntary contributions. Out of this income it would have to meet the costs of its own administration, fund the Enterprise, pay the compensation mentioned above, and arrange an equitable distribution of the profits among the member states. It could also commission and fund marine scientific research and publish the results. The proposed structure, in diagrammatic form, looks something like this:

16. March 17, 1981.

Decision-making procedures in the Council (with its members elected under five separate headings) is complicated in the extreme—varying from simple majority voting on questions of procedure through two-thirds and three-quarters majorities on questions of substance, procedures designed to preserve vetoes for the most important interest groups. There can be no denying criticisms that the proposed Authority is 'over-politicised' throughout, especially in the composition of the Council and the two main Commissions. Given their composition it is inevitable that the major decisions, especially those on production ceilings, will be arrived at politically with scant regard for technical, economic or mining considerations. Cynics have noted that wherever the Authority is bidden to act 'without discrimination', these words are always qualified by the rider, 'special consideration must be given to the interests of developing countries'. As more than one commentator has pointed out, the provisions of the draft negotiating text are rooted in mistrust.[17]

The principal metals at issue are nickel, cobalt, manganese and copper bound together in the ferrous nodules. Any organisation which chooses to mine these nodules and refine them into their components is thus stuck with at least a fourfold marketing problem compounded by the fact that the world demand for their products in no way corresponds with the amount of each which may be expected to be produced from a given weight of nodules. Manganese is by far the commonest but, to quote a recent study, 'the majority of the consortia have a professed disinclination to market this metal in any form'.[18] The relative make-up of the nodules varies somewhat from one ocean floor site to another, but a typical nodule—according to United Nations documentation—consists of at best 1.35 per cent nickel, 1.3 per cent copper, 0.24 per cent cobalt,[19] 26.9 per cent manganese, and traces of up to twenty

17 See A V Lowe, 'The International Sea Bed. a Legacy of Mistrust'. *Marine Policy*, July 1981, pp. 205-16.

18. Hugh Cameron and Luke Gheorgiu, 'Production Limits. Who Benefits?' *Marine Policy*, July 1981, pp. 267-70

19. Despite early findings this figure was as much as 1%. See E. J Lengevad, 'Production Policy for the Deep Sea Mineral Resources, *Marine Policy*, July 1981, pp. 264-67

various other minerals, of which iron and phosphorous are the most common. Each of these metals has a land-based production of concern to a different group of countries, a differing demand structure, different markets, and production of sea-based minerals will therefore affect the interests of land-based producer countries differently. Metal production from the nodules will be roughly in the proportion: 10 per cent nickel, 8.7 per cent copper, 1.6 per cent cobalt, 176 per cent manganese; by comparison with present world consumption of these metals which is roughly of the order of 10 per cent nickel, 130 per cent copper, 0.4 per cent cobalt, 180 per cent manganese—though what it will be as and when ocean-floor based production comes on stream, at least ten years from now, is anybody's guess. The consortia seem to feel that the most valuable products of the nodules in the foreseeable future are nickel, copper and cobalt in that order, and even where nickel is concerned, the more pessimistic maintain that it may be up to twenty years before the production of ocean-floor mined nickel would be economic.[20] This is the more important in that, as we shall see below, the terms of the draft convention impose limits on nickel production rather than on that of any of the other metals. The resulting output of these other metals will represent quite different proportions of their markets. There could, for example, be serious over-production of cobalt. The market for most of the products of the nodules is bound up with the production of high-grade steel. The production of high-grade steel is itself one of the most reliable indicators of the general state of the world's economy, which, it need hardly be said, is not at the moment in the healthiest of states, nor do industrialists, contemplating investment of the order required to go into full-scale production of minerals mined from ocean-floor sites,[21] anticipate the kind of economic recovery which would quickly justify such investment. The optimistic prophecies of a bonanza in ocean-floor mineral production which spurred so much of the initial impetus and which still linger on in the not surprisingly suspicious minds of the negotiators for the G—77 have yielded to a very much soberer picture.

The land-based production of these minerals is concentrated in about 15-25 of the United Nations' member states. In only eight cases does production play an important part (more than 5 per cent) of the export earnings of the countries concerned. Four of these eight are copper producers, Chile (48 per cent), Papua-New Guinea (42 per cent), Peru (19 per cent) and the Philippines (12 per cent). One, the Dominican Republic, is vulnerable where nickel is concerned (15 per cent).[22] Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe (the three 'Zs'), are vulnerable in cobalt production. The Gabon is vulnerable in relation to manganese. Together with the major nickel producers these countries have succeeded in writing into the draft convention provisions for the limitation of

20. Lord Erroll, *H L Deb*, January 19, 1981, cc 255-58.
21 Lord Erroll, *op cit*, spoke of some $1,000 million further investment.
22 The world's largest nickel producers are Canada, the Soviet Union, French New Caledonia and Australia

production which will make actual forward planning very difficult, but will on any of the calculations so far made severely limit the profitability of any serious operations.[23]

It is hardly surprising that under these circumstances the Reagan administration—whose Secretary of the Interior's policy on access to domestic raw materials is earning him so remarkable a reputation as a believer in the absence or removal of any but purely commercial restrictions on the operation of commercial organisations—should have demanded time to reconsider the terms of the draft convention as a whole, in terms which appeared to make it clear that it was the nature and tendency of those clauses which dealt with deep-sea mining with which it was most concerned. Nor is it surprising that the countries which are most concerned with deep-sea mining, in the sense that companies of their nationality are involved in the various consortia, have begun to introduce their own 'interim' legislation to protect the position and investments of the consortia in the period before the draft convention becomes part of international law. For it is on this period that the terms of the draft convention have aroused most criticism among the members of the consortia.[24]

Their interests are supposed to be protected by the clauses dealing with 'Preparatory Investment Protection'. The vital clause, however, limits the development costs which can be offset against profits from production under license from the Authority to those costs which are directly related to the development of the particular area licensed. Since the consortia will have incurred very substantial general, as opposed to specific, research and development costs, long before they enter into contract on a specific area—whether they are recognised by the Authority or not—this clause is particularly objectionable to them. They would already have been required to surrender to the Enterprise whichever half of the site it deemed the more profitable; admitted it into their own ranks; accepted that its operations—unlike their own—would be immune from both direct and indirect taxation; and undertaken to instruct, without charge, the Enterprise or its nominees in the techniques and technology which they have at their own very considerable cost developed to exploit the ocean floor sites. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the present terms of the draft convention relating to the International Seabed Authority have been criticised by the consortia as over-politicised, cumbrous and offering them no incentive whatever to proceed.

Thus far the process of the negotiations is easy to understand. There can be no doubt that from a mixture of ideology, suspicion, the self-interest of individual metal-producing states, and lack of industrial understanding, the majority at UNCLOS III have produced a draft convention which may very

23. A figure of 6,500 tons of nickel per annum has been mentioned as the limit for production by organisations other than the Enterprise.

24. Kennecott, it should be noted, have recently reduced their share in the relevant consortium from an original 50% to 40%.

well end up by postponing the development of ocean-floor mining until the world really does begin to run out of land-based minerals. By that time the knowledge, research teams and managerial capacity that the consortia have been putting together so laboriously and at such expense over the last decade will probably have been dissipated, directed into other channels, or have become obsolete. The world will then have to learn the whole process all over again, at much greater speed and at much greater expense. This kind of ideological folly the nations and peoples of the world as a whole, under the Malthusian threats which now exist, cannot afford.

An even greater disaster would be the re-emergence on the political stage of those intellectual dinosaurs of Western politics who still cling to nineteenth-century economic ideals. But while individual American and other Western industrialists may dream of the kind of world envisaged during the last century by economic liberals of the Manchester School—with the role of governments confined to protecting their commercial operations from foreign political interference—any industrialist who has to operate a genuinely transnational operation knows that he needs an international regime which represents a genuine international consensus. The idea that the few transnational consortia, which can command both the capital resources and the high technology necessary to exploit the minerals of the sea floor, are prepared to envisage operations where Western navies will be required to stand by to protect their operations, like Victorian gunboats with naval landing parties, belongs only to fantasy. The sheer physical, natural and economic risks involved in ocean survey are large enough without adding any political nonsense of this kind.[25]

But, it is argued in some of the more primitive sectors of Western political thinking, the regimes proposed under the various national bits of legislation now being produced will provide a perfectly satisfactory substitute for the economically unworkable international consensus which UNCLOS III has evolved. The elites of the G—77 may rant and roar: some of them may discuss or even try to operate economic sanctions, boycotts and so on against the Western industrial nations. If they do they will only damage their own interests; to whom else can they sell their products? The short answer to such Curtis le May-like acceptance of escalating economic conflict between OECD countries and the G—77 is that they can sell to the more vulnerable and less committed of the existing industrialised countries; to the newly emerging industrial countries among their own ranks, whose economies have 'taken off'; to the Soviet bloc which may itself be running short by then (with the Soviet Union hogging the lot—as it is already hogging the bloc's energy sources); and to China. At the same time Western mining interests in Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in Malaysia and Indonesia, in Latin America and Africa will be

25 To give one obvious example. The nodules have to be raised from the ocean floor by some kind of machinery which connects ship and ocean floor, at a distance of 15,000 feet from each other. To secure its safety in the event of a storm, present estimates of the nature of the operation require at least 24 hours' warning The Pacific is not always that accommodating.

open to reprisals. This is not a view of the future that any serious or balanced statesman in the West will contemplate with sanguine feelings, still less the financial houses and banks whose investments would be at risk.

There is however more at stake than this. The proposed International Seabed Authority is far from meeting all the criteria which divide effective international organisations from the ineffective. As planned, it does have, it is true, the kind of specialised technical role which limits the number of politicians who are likely to be genuinely aware of what it is up to. It has a clear, justified and agreed-on mission. It is planned to have a relatively small secretariat, and is likely in general to command very little public interest. On the other hand its membership is not restricted in number nor limited to those states with a direct interest in its operations. Nor does its proposed organisation and structure reflect the interest, relative power and specialist knowledge of the member governments in the field it proposes to cover. And while its subject matter can be said to be of only moderate political and economic interest, it could just as well lend itself to the kind of rhetorically dramatisable confrontation ideal for a particular government which was looking for an issue on which to make the headlines, whether for reasons of domestic or external politics. In London and Washington, therefore, longing eyes have been cast at organisations such as INTELSAT, which, while having an assembly of more then seventy member nations, is effectively run by a board of twenty-one members with voting weighted in accordance with the use that each member state makes of the international satellite communication facilities it was set up (in 1964) to run. Representation at the governmental level on this essentially commercial operation, it is noted, has not impeded functional performance. The cost to the users per unit continues to decline as does the United States' share in the operation of the body—which dropped from 61 per cent in 1964 to 21 per cent in 1980—although it still enjoys a commanding lead in terms of technology and expertise. Given the re-establishment of goodwill and mutual confidence between the industrialised countries which have introduced their own legislation and the members of the G—77, no doubt some modification in the terms of the draft convention dealing with the International Seabed Authority can be brought about. But it will not be easy after the tactless manner in which the Reagan administration has interrupted UNCLOS proceedings or the ultra-nationalist rhetoric in which it has been justified for American audiences.

It is possible to argue that the British government, through its Commonwealth connections, could, if it chose, play a vital role here. Outside observers, however, are not optimistic. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office under its present leadership is not always as sympathetic to Commonwealth sensitivities as it would need to be in this case. Its task of winning over the Cabinet has been made much more difficult by the disbandment of the old Lord Privy Seal's Cabinet committee on marine policy matters by the Thatcher government and its replacement by a system

which gives the lead (and therefore the dominating voice) to individual departments which are deemed to be most directly concerned—some of which (e.g. Energy and Fisheries) have become centres of economic nationalism of which even President Reagan's Secretary of the Interior might not entirely disapprove. Where ocean floor mining is concerned the matter is complicated by the division of responsibility between the Departments of Trade (some of whose staff are used to dealing with the existence of a world in which foreigners have not only a place but a voice) and Industry. It is devoutly to be hoped that Lord Carrington, one of the Prime Minister's few ministers with a proven capability of converting his colleagues to the course of political realism, can be induced to take strong hold of the issue. Britain's general record at UNCLOS III so far has resembled that of its test cricketers under Ian Botham's captaincy. A possible model could be found not in INTELSAT, but in its marine equivalent, INMARSAT, set up on the initiative of the UN Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation in 1976.[26]

A second field also open to action by Britain, if the opportunity is seized, is that of training the Authority's manpower requirements. It was in fact the British delegate who suggested that an international fund be set up to provide training awards for qualified students in the disciplines identified as being relevant to the needs of the Seabed Authority and the Enterprise. To quote Dr Kurt Waldheim, 'scarcity of manpower resources is the chief limiting factor to the development of national effort and international cooperation as regards the study of the oceans and the rational use of their resources'.[27] The Authority itself may well come to incorporate a training institute, and is charged with aiding developing countries to promote and conduct marine research and to facilitate information exchange.

Discussion has focussed on the need to remedy the lack of marine engineers, marine scientists, geologists, oceanographers, marine mining experts etc. There has been little discussion so far of policy-training for administrators. Yet the more flexible the Authority is expected to be the more it will need highly skilled and trained personnel, and the more it will need to acquire an independent data base, run by highly trained operators, to undertake the proper evaluation of the data provided by the mining consortia.[28] Business management, knowledge of the relevant physical sciences and engineering, resource economics, systems design and management, ocean law, and international politics are all required to produce the scientifically knowledgeable administrators which the Authority will require. Britain itself is not that well provided with this kind of animal, nor is there any institution which as yet specialises in it. But the wherewithal for such an institution exists in Britain, in the universities of London, Edinburgh, Wales, and the North-

26 G J F van Hagelsom, 'The Argument for an Interim Arrangement'. *Marine Policy*, July 1981, pp 260-64

27 UNCLOS III, A/Conf 62/82 of August 17, 1979, 'Manpower Requirements of the Authority and Related Training Needs Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General', p. 3.

28. *Ibid*, p. 3.

West. With a little official good-will (and a little money, be it whispered) here is a field in which Britain could make a contribution, and win back some of the good-will recently lost in the field of overseas education, in a manner which should pay obvious benefits.

Conclusion

The recent developments at UNCLOS III are beginning seriously to endanger the consensus which has painfully been developed over the last six years of negotiations on the nature and shape of the new international regime of the oceans. As a major trade-dependent, maritime nation, Britain is vitally interested in the establishment of a new regime. All that part of a new regime that can be established by the individual actions of individual states has already been established while UNCLOS III has been in session. We cannot expect a return to the Grotian view of the matter which once obtained. In every field Britain is one of the most vulnerable of countries to the absence of a generally accepted regime—as three lost 'Cod Wars' have shown. Britain needs a new regime provided only that it is universally accepted and that it does not interfere with Britain's own very considerable marine interests.

The coming into existence of this new regime has been thrown into doubt by the breaking out of a conflict which is real in ideological terms but is otherwise as bogus as it is unnecessary. To develop the resources of the ocean requires a marriage of high technology and high finance—which both happen to be concentrated mainly in large-scale Western organisations which operate transnationally in a manner suspect to nationally based governments conscious of their past subjection and anxious about their future vulnerability to skills and capital resources they cannot themselves command (and jealous of those who can). Development of the oceans' resources also requires a generally accepted international regime which cannot be achieved without the agreement of all, nor if that agreement is only forthcoming on terms which make such development too hazardous and too unrewarding for the organisations which have so far shown themselves willing to pioneer such development. Whatever draft convention UNCLOS III produces it has to be ratified by a substantial number of the G—77. It must also be ratified by the Congress of the United States (by a majority of two-thirds). The British government has every reason and every interest in preaching realism on these issues to all parties.

There is however more to the Convention and the Seabed Authority even than the guarding of the world from the Malthusian disasters which threaten. UNCLOS III will enormously limit the areas of the world's oceans available for warlike movements and activities. Not only has the introduction of the 200-mile zone enclosed about one third of the existing oceans. The ISBA's operation is likely to lead to a further scattering of areas which are, in part at least, removed from the free-for-all grab-as-grab-can which used to be known as

'the command of the seas'. Navies will see their roles change from contemplation of an oceanic Armageddon to the police style activities which largely occupied European navies between Trafalgar and Tsushima, that is to surveillance and enforcement.

And how may the Seabed Authority itself be expected to develop? It will certainly be more than merely regulatory, more like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank than the International Labour Organisation or the IPU. Much will depend on whoever is chosen as its first Secretary-General and as the first Director General of the Enterprise. There is no absence of tough, able and strong-minded international figures acceptable to the Third World countries, as the careers of Al-Jadir of UNCTAD's shipping side, Sheikh Yamani of Saudi Arabia or 'Sunny' Ramphal of the Commonwealth Secretariat have shown. Hopes, entertained and audible in some quarters, that its first head will be sufficiently weak that its powers will be emasculated in practice, are at best short-sighted, at worst unreal. With the declining strength of Britain and the vulnerability of British enterprises in the last two decades of the twentieth century, Britain needs strong hands at the various international tillers, providing only that they are the hands of those who understand that they have to operate in a mixed economy world which can afford ideological disagreement but not ideological conflict.

THE RESPONSE OF THE LONDON AND BELFAST GOVERNMENTS TO THE DECLARATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, 1948-49

Ronan Fanning[*]

THE Irish government's repeal of the External Relations Act of 1936 and the description of the state as the Republic of Ireland, thus breaking the last link with the British Commonwealth, came as no surprise to His Majesty's Government. As early as January 1948, the month before Eamon de Valera's Fianna Fail party lost office for the first time in sixteen years, Lord Rugby (formerly Sir John Maffey), the shrewd and perceptive United Kingdom Representative in Dublin since the outbreak of war in 1939, told Whitehall that it was:

> quite plain that the annulment of the External Relations Act will not be long delayed. No party has left the door open for any other course. All we can do is to give consideration to our line of action.
>
> Personally I should not be sorry to see this strange device removed. The Irish have handled it in such a way as to discredit it. Furthermore, it is now clear that it will not provide the bridge to closer association, as was once hoped. Indeed, it may well be that its removal will make closer association easier. The relationship between the United Kingdom and Eire is now based on facts, not on sentiments, and we must adapt our policies to this principle.[1]

In the event, Rugby's laconic realism was not mirrored by the reaction of his government. The purpose of this article is to explain why, and to ask how, if at all, British reaction was influenced by pressure from the government of Northern Ireland.

Initial British and Commonwealth reactions

Although Rugby's first reaction to the election results of February 1948 was to assume that de Valera would form yet another government, he was increasingly persuaded that he would 'do away' with the External Relations

* **Ronan Fanning** is a lecturer at University College, Dublin where he teaches Modern Irish History and Anglo-Irish Relations. His major publication is *The Irish Department of Finance 1922-1958* (Dublin Institute of Public Administration, 1978) He is now writing a book on the Irish Policy of the British Government 1910-1950 (to be published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson)

1 Rugby to Sir Eric Machtig, Jan. 27, 1948 CAB 134/118/annex II All references are taken from the Public Record Office in London unless otherwise indicated.

Act on the grounds that it would be 'good tactics to rob the left of the programme and to steal their thunder'. That he had learnt confidentially that Freddie Boland, then Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, had 'recently remarked that "the External Relations Act must go" ', confirmed him in this opinion.[2] Although, ironically, on the very day that the first inter-party government was formed under John A. Costello as Taoiseach, Rugby cited a speech by Sean MacBride (the new Minister for External Affairs) as suggesting that the matter would not become urgent before the next election, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) were sufficiently persuaded by his earlier reports to circulate a memorandum among the members of the Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Relations.[3] This argued against, 'any device which permitted Eire to remain within the Commonwealth if she decided to abolish all recognition of the king's position', and, like Rugby, suggested that 'the practical degree of co-operation with Eire which can be achieved is not likely to be diminished but may even be improved if she is treated as a foreign country in close and friendly association with other Western European countries'. The conclusion was 'that if Eire of her own accord decides to repeal the External Relations Act, we should treat her, as in the case of Burma,[4] as having brought to an end her membership of the Commonwealth'.

There matters rested until early August 1948 when a series of recent Dail speeches by Costello, MacBride and the Tanaiste, William Norton—asserting that Ireland was effectively no longer a member of the Commonwealth and seeming to point towards the repeal of the External Relations Act—caused Lord Rugby again to draw the matter to the attention of the CRO whose secretary of state, Philip Noel-Baker, brought it before the Cabinet, pointing out that it raised questions in connection with the invitation already extended to Costello to attend the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in October—an invitation to which Costello had not yet replied.[5] Rugby, meanwhile, was reporting a conversation with Dublin's Catholic Archbishop John Charles McQuaid. McQuaid vainly tried to convince Rugby that Costello's government would not 'commit the folly' of repealing the Act which, he argued, would be 'out of step with the anti-partition agitation' and likened to 'dragging a red rag under the very nose of the bull'.[6] One CRO official was sufficiently impressed by Rugby's apprehensions to wonder 'whether a word of warning should not be given to Eire Ministers, before they commit themselves too deeply, in regard to the direction in which such a step might take them'.[7] But the time for warnings soon ran out when, on

2 Ibid., annex III; Rugby to Machtig, Jan 28, 1948

3 n d, but circulated on March 10, 1948, CAB 134/118/annex VI

4. Burma seceded from the Commonwealth in 1947—see Nicholas Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change 1939-52* (London, 1958) pp. 240-46

5 Aug 17, 1948, CAB 129/29/9798

6. Rugby to Machtig, Aug 17, 1948, DO 130/93

7. *Ibid.*, Maurice James to Norman Pritchard (United Kingdom Representative's Office in Dublin), Aug 26, 1948

September 7, 1948, Costello publicly announced his government's intention of repealing the Act at his celebrated and controversial press conference in Ottawa;[8] an intention confirmed by MacBride in a conversation with Rugby the same day. Although both MacBride and, indeed, Rugby then anticipated an Irish government presence at the Commonwealth conference in October—when MacBride expressed anxiety about the drinking of the king's health at the official receptions Rugby retorted 'that we were not going to alter our normal habits because Irishmen happened to be present'[9]—the British Cabinet thought otherwise, as we can see from their decision of September 10 that Rugby should inform MacBride orally that they 'considered that it would be embarrassing for Eire Ministers to be invited to attend the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers'.[10]

British ministers, too, seem to have been embarrassed by the prospect of another Irish imbroglio and a month elapsed before their next move. So dilatory, indeed, was Whitehall's response to what was now the public intention of the Irish government, that Noel-Baker's eventual 'top secret and personal' telegram to Rugby was scarred by exclamation marks of disbelief where it spoke of London's 'urgent consideration' of the matter. What had become urgent was the necessity for consulting with the leading Commonwealth prime ministers on how the Irish government's proposed action would affect its relations with the members of the Commonwealth 'particularly in the field of preferences and nationality' and the British now proposed immediate discussions 'before the Eire government take a step which may bring these results'.[11]

The outcome was the Chequers meeting of October 17, hosted by the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, and at which the other British representatives were Noel-Baker and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt. The Commonwealth representatives were the New Zealand prime minister, Peter Fraser; the Canadian prime minister designate, L. S. St Laurent; and the Australian deputy prime minister, Dr Herbert Evatt. Curiously, neither the Taoiseach nor the Tanaiste attended and the Irish delegation consisted of MacBride and the Minister for Finance, Paddy McGilligan. Attlee opened the meeting by saying that, following informal talks at the Commonwealth conference then being held in London, it had been thought 'it would be advantageous if the representatives of those four Commonwealth countries, whose populations included a substantial number of people of Irish descent', could discuss with Irish ministers the 'practical consequences' which would follow on the repeal of the External Relations Act. Although Attlee stressed that the meeting was not designed to put pressure on the Irish to remain in the Commonwealth, he spoke of the serious consequences of repeal and said:

8. See University College Dublin, Archives Dept, McGilligan papers, P35a/C/5c, for a copy of a memorandum later prepared by Costello giving his account of the events leading to the Ottawa statement

9. Rugby to Machtig, Sept. 7, 1948, DO 130/93.

10 CAB 128/13/82.

11. Noel-Baker to Rugby, telegram, Oct. 6, 1948, DO 130/93.

> he was advised that, once the External Relations Act was repealed, Eire would become a foreign state in relation to the United Kingdom and the other countries of the Commonwealth; and those countries might find it impossible to refrain from treating Eire as a foreign country and her citizens as aliens. He did not wish to imply that this action, if it had to be taken, would be taken out of hostility towards Eire: it might well be forced upon the other Commonwealth countries by the treaty obligations which they had undertaken in 'most-favoured nation' clauses in commercial treaties.

MacBride, equally, denied that his government's intentions were motivated by hostility towards the Commonwealth but put them in the context of long-standing Irish enmity towards the Crown. Repeal, he argued, 'was a necessary preliminary to the restoration of friendly relations between Eire and the United Kingdom'. His government wanted friendlier relations with Britain and the Commonwealth which, in his opinion, Ireland had effectively left with the enactment of the 1937 constitution; and, if Britain and the Commonwealth countries felt similarly, he believed that the difficulties to which Attlee had referred could be readily overcome:

> At the present time Eire citizens had the same rights as British subjects in the United Kingdom; and British subjects were exempted in Eire from the restrictions applicable to aliens. His government was quite ready to see this position, and the existing trade preferences, continued after the repeal of the External Relations Act; and he believed that a special kind of association could be established between Eire and the other countries of the Commonwealth, based on the reciprocal exchange of trade preferences and citizenship rights. With goodwill between the governments, and by the exercise of ingenuity, this special association could surely be expressed in such a way as to enable commonwealth governments to resist successfully any claim by third parties based on 'most-favoured-nation' clauses.

Peter Fraser, the New Zealand prime minister, took the lead in endorsing the desirability of preserving an Irish connection with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and deprecated the possibility of Ireland's becoming 'a foreign state in relation to the Commonwealth countries', and he was backed up by the Australian and Canadian ministers. Lord Jowitt, on the other hand, amplified Attlee's opening statement and argued that the decision as to whether Commonwealth countries should treat Ireland as a foreign state might not rest with them in that 'their hand might well be forced by the action of third parties with rights under "most-favoured-nation" clauses'. Lord Jowitt suggested that the Irish legislation might mean Ireland's being challenged in an international court and went so far as to say that 'the responsible departments of the United Kingdom government believed that there was a

grave risk, indeed almost a certainty, of such a challenge being made and a strong probability that it would succeed'. But the British got no support from their Commonwealth colleagues and the talks petered out inconclusively without any effort to arrive at firm decisions.[12]

The nature of British anxieties was more apparent in Attlee's report to his Cabinet which recognised that the Irish government were clearly 'determined to repeal the External Relations Act and unwilling to put in its place any other constitutional link involving any recognition of the Crown'. The best that might be hoped for was that, 'after an interval', Ireland might 'be willing to re-enter the Commonwealth on some new basis not involving any relation to the Crown' but, in 1948 as ever afterwards, such hopes would seem to have been pious indeed. Attlee did take comfort from the fact, however, that the External Relations Act was the 'last constitutional link' binding Ireland to the Commonwealth and, given that Irish ministers had publicly stated that Ireland had 'ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth, once it was repealed '*it will no longer be practicable for other Commonwealth countries to maintain that she is a member of the Commonwealth*'. (author's italics).

Another point of potential British embarrassment in relation to the Commonwealth was the constitutional change then under way in India and, as Attlee admitted to his colleagues, it was 'now known that the new Indian constitution will provide for the establishment of India as a "sovereign independent republic" and it seems likely that India will not be willing to accept the king's jurisdiction even for the purpose of her external relations', notwithstanding the anxiety of Indian ministers that India should remain within the Commonwealth—following talks with Nehru, Attlee had still not despaired (as he had in the case of Ireland) of 'the possibility of devising some satisfactory constitutional link, preferably through the Crown, which would be acceptable to public opinion in India'.[13]

The British were also becoming apprehensive of how Ireland's final break with the Commonwealth might affect the question of partition—MacBride had touched on this at the very end of the Chequers talks, saying that, although he realised Attlee would think the moment inappropriate for a discussion of partition, 'United Kingdom governments had never found any occasion appropriate for discussing partition', and some occasion for discussing how it might best be ended would have to be found 'in the not too distant future'.[14] British anxieties surfaced at a Cabinet meeting on October 28 which took the view that:

> behind the immediate issue lay the Eire Government's determination to end partition, and there was little doubt that they recognised that they would be in a better position to put pressure on the United Kingdom

12. 'Eire's relations with the Commonwealth—account of the meeting with Eire ministers at Chequers on Sunday, Oct. 17, 1948', CAB 129/30/147–49 See also CAB 129/30/195–99

13. Attlee's memorandum to the Cabinet, Oct 26, 1948, CAB 129/30/68.

14 As note 12.

> government once Eire had become a foreign country. For it could be assumed that no further obstacles would be placed in the way of Eire's admission to the United Nations; and it would then be open to her to raise the question of partition in the General Assembly with the assurance of substantial support. The United Kingdom government had hitherto maintained the attitude that partition was an issue for settlement by the Irish themselves. But Eire's secession from the Commonwealth *would raise acutely the issue whether, for defence reasons, it was possible any longer to maintain that attitude*; [author's italics] and it would certainly be embarrassing for the United Kingdom government to be put in the position of gaving to support the continuance of partition. The government and people of Northern Ireland would undoubtedly regard Eire's secession from the Commonwealth as a serious threat to them; and, whatever mitigation of the practical consequences of secession might be acceptable to the United Kingdom government, it was likely that the government of Northern Ireland would feel bound to adopt rigorous measures in protection of their interests.[15]

For these reasons, and also because of the prospect (admittedly faint) of devising a constitutional status for India which might be acceptable to Ireland, British ministers felt that further efforts should be made to persuade the Irish government to postpone the introduction of legislation repealing the External Relations Act. But the Chequers talks led the British to believe such efforts would be vain and they took refuge in the device of bringing the consequences of repeal to the attention of the Irish government in a formal written communication which Noel-Baker was asked to draft, bearing in mind that 'it would be most inadvisable to give the Eire government the impression that they were being threatened with measures which the United Kingdom government were not in fact intending to enforce'.[16]

These arguments were again rehearsed in Cabinet on November 12 when Noel-Baker's draft together with other memoranda, including a note from Rugby predicting that the bill repealing the External Relations Act would be introduced in the Dail as soon as it reassembled on November 17, were considered. The conclusion 'that a formal communication should be sent without delay to the Eire government and that full publicity should be given to its contents' was confirmed, although it was thought politic that the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand governments 'should at least be aware of the contents' before it was despatched. Some ministers also stressed:

> the disadvantages of Eire's becoming a foreign state. The Home Office would be confronted with the most formidable administrative difficulties if all Eire citizens had to be treated in this country as aliens. If Eire became a member of the United Nations and raised the partition issue there, the

15 CAB 128/13/113-14
16 *Ibid*

> United Kingdom government would find it highly embarrassing to be forced to give positive support for the continuance of partition—as they would probably find themselves compelled to do for strategic reasons alone, apart from any consideration for the feelings of the people of Northern Ireland. Account must also be taken of the unfavourable reactions on public opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in other Commonwealth countries, of Eire's secession from the Commonwealth.[17]

Indian analogies, in particular, still loomed large and Attlee incorporated an appendix on Ireland in a note on the constitutional proposals he had discussed with Nehru during the latter's recent London visit. Any concession for Irish citizens over other aliens, whether in law or merely in practice, argued Attlee, would 'make it proportionately more difficult to contend that Commonwealth citizenship (on which we must largely rely in support of the view that India is not "a foreign country") has any real content'. Attlee also pointed to the relevance of the External Relations Act in that the Indians were asserting that repudiation of allegiance to the King 'does not alter in essence the nature of the Commonwealth tie'. Attlee's response to what he saw as a singularly unfortunate precedent whereby under the External Relations Act Ireland had been 'granted Commonwealth treatment without challenge' was to argue that this was more a product of what he described as a:

> lack of understanding on the part of foreign countries of the exact effect of the Eire External Relations Act and of her citizenship legislation than as a conscious acceptance by them of the proposition that Eire is really entitled to Commonwealth treatment notwithstanding the most-favoured nation clause. Moreover the war supervened shortly after Mr de Valera's legislation and thereafter there was little desire or opportunity for foreign countries to raise the point.[18]

But Attlee's Commonwealth colleagues again proved antipathetic to his government's Irish proposals as the Cabinet were made aware at a special meeting on Ireland on Saturday, November 13. Both Evatt, for Australia, and Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 'expressed concern' at the contents of the proposed British note to the Irish government; and Peter Fraser, although not objecting to despatch of the note, 'emphasised that the New Zealand government could not be associated in any way with it'. Although Attlee and his colleagues felt time was running out—they were reconciled to the fact that there was nothing they could do to dissuade the Irish government from introducing legislation during the following week and fell back on the position of trying to persuade Irish ministers 'to allow a reasonable time for discussion' before the [Republic of Ireland] Act was brought into operation—they decided they could not formally communicate with Dublin

17. CAB 128/13/129-31.
18. Nov 10, 1948, CAB 129/30/132.

without further consultations with the other participants in the Chequers talks; and it was agreed that Noel-Baker and Jowitt should go to Paris where Fraser, Evatt and Pearson were attending a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations.[19]

The consultations took place next morning, Sunday, at a meeting in the British Embassy in Paris when Jowitt opened the discussion by again emphasising the legal difficulties. Evatt proposed further talks with Irish ministers, preferably before legislation was introduced in the Dail, although he conceded that the Irish could not be deflected from that course. He considered that the Irish government's action 'was not directed at the realities of Commonwealth co-operation', but was rather due to domestic political factors, ' "to take the gunman out of Irish politics" '—a point against which Rugby minuted 'rubbish' on his copy of the record of the talks. Fraser, too, saw it as 'primarily a political question', and, 'thought it would be a great disaster for the Commonwealth if Eire's association were terminated . . . He must, therefore, be in a position to tell the New Zealand people that, on the one hand, every effort had been made to avert the contingency, and, on the other, that it was absolutely clear that the consequences were inevitable'. And Lester Pearson 'doubted whether the grant of a special position to Eire would, in fact, be challenged by foreign countries'. All in all, cold comfort for the British and the outcome was that Noel-Baker sent a message to Rugby instructing him to contact Costello or MacBride inviting them to join in immediate 'discussions with representatives of the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom either in Paris, London or Dublin'.[20]

The meeting duly took place in Evatt's offices in Paris on Tuesday, November 16, and MacBride, McGilligan, Cecil Lavery (the Attorney-General) and Freddie Boland made up the Irish delegation. Things began badly for the British when Peter Fraser immediately launched into a vigorous attack on the British government's manipulation of the press following the Chequers conference. He was strongly supported by Evatt and MacBride, and it was agreed that there would be no press conferences after the Paris meeting. The meeting, although it was adjourned and resumed in the afternoon, did little more than go over the same ground covered at Chequers. The British arguments made no impression and even the official British record reveals something of the Commonwealth ministers' sympathy for the Irish position: Evatt, for instance, was recorded as criticising 'the use of the term Eire . . . In the English language the term Ireland should be used'.[21]

19 CAB 128/13/133 34

20 DO 130/93, see also CAB 128/13/137–38 See *The Irish Times*, Jan 1 & 2, 1979, for MacBride's account of the circumstances of the invitation: 'Evatt phoned me in Dublin to say the British wanted another conference and would suggest a meeting in Dublin He warned me not to agree, since he and Fraser could not leave Paris. I had hardly put the phone down when Rugby came trotting in He said the Prime Minister was worried--we must reach some conclusion I could have fallen for the Dublin proposal quite easily if I hadn't been forewarned by Evatt I said I had better find out if the Commonwealth prime ministers were free to come to Dublin I phoned Evatt and Fraser and the British very reluctantly agreed to meet in Paris.'

21 Notes of meetings of Nov. 16, 1948, DO 130/93. This official record, when compared with MacBride's recollections (*The Irish Times, loc cit*), affords a striking example of how misleadingly bald official records can

The outcome of the Paris meetings was merely an agreement that Irish ministers, in speeches in the Dail on the Republic of Ireland Bill, would 'be careful to avoid saying anything which would increase the legal and political difficulties which Commonwealth governments will have in explaining the position which will result from this legislation', while the Commonwealth governments agreed to 'refrain from public statements which will make it more difficult for them to maintain that despite the repeal of the External Relations Act Eire is not a foreign country'. The Irish government also agreed to ensure that the United Kingdom and colonial citizens would enjoy comparable rights in Ireland with those granted Irish citizens in Britain'.[22]

Noel-Baker admitted the extent of the British reverse to his Cabinet colleagues on November 18 when he acknowledged that the British representatives in Paris 'could not have presented the practical consequences of the repeal as measures of retaliation for Eire's secession from the Commonwealth: even if they had wished to take this line, the other Commonwealth governments would have dissociated themselves from it'. Ministers, the Cabinet minutes tell us, agreed to the Paris policy:

> with reluctance, as they felt that Eire would thereby succeed in retaining many of the practical advantages of Commonwealth membership while renouncing its obligations. They recognised, however, that, if they insisted on treating Eire as a foreign state . . . the practical difficulties would be greater for the United Kingdom than for Eire; and, furthermore, that they would thereby forfeit the sympathy and support of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.[23]

That, so far as the Irish government was concerned, was the good news. The bad news was yet to come, but its seeds lay in another decision taken at the Cabinet of November 18: that Attlee would at once inform the prime minister of Northern Ireland, then Sir Basil Brooke, of the course of the discussions with Irish ministers and of his government's Irish policy.[24]

Belfast's response

Brooke stayed with Attlee at Chequers on the night of November 20 and told

be The British record reads: 'Mr Fraser, with the support of others present, criticised the arrangements made by the United Kingdom authorities for supplying information to the press about the meeting at Chequers on 17th October He requested that no press conference should be organised in connection with the present series of meetings with Eire representatives. It was agreed not to hold press conferences for this series of meetings.' MacBride's account reads: 'The British delegation was led by Jowitt, who presided and began to read a long prepared statement. There was a noise in the room. I realised it was Fraser, who was mumbling—he always mumbled—"Before we proceed any further I want an explanation as to who fouled the waters after our last meeting and I want an assurance that the waters won't be muddied again after we leave this room." Jowitt gave lengthy explanations—"free press" and so on. Noel-Baker said the same thing When the row was well on I said I had a copy of the Commonwealth Office handout I threw it on the table. Jowitt said he was shocked. Noel-Baker was silent. Then a most dramatic incident occurred Fraser put his hand in his pocket, pulled out a handful of coins and threw them on the table He called an official and told him to go out and buy all the papers and see if there were any leaks in them.'

22. Noel-Baker to Rugby, telegram, Nov 19, 1948, DO 130/93.

23 CAB 128/13/143–44.

24 *Ibid.*

him 'that his immediate anxieties would be allayed if he could be given an assurance that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland would not be prejudiced by Eire's ceasing to be a member of the Commonwealth. 'I gave him, on behalf of the United Kingdom government', recorded Attlee in his note for the Cabinet of their conversation, 'an assurance that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland would be fully safeguarded; and I added, in reply to a further question, that he was at liberty to say publicly that he had received that assurance'. Brooke also raised what he described as 'the ultimate objectives of the Eire government as regards partition' and the need for his government to guard 'against any large influx of Eire citizens who, having acquired some colourable pretext for exercising the franchise, might help to out-vote the loyalists in Northern Ireland on the partition issue'. He thought it might be necessary 'to tighten up still further the qualifications for the local franchise in Northern Ireland'. Attlee replied that that was their business and said the British government would make no objection, although he did reserve his position when Brooke then said that he and his colleagues might want to suggest changes in the qualifications for voting in Northern Ireland elections to the Westminster parliament. Brooke also listed a number of other points which his government would probably wish to raise formally:

> If Eire was now to take the title "Republic of Ireland" the North could not conveniently continue to be known as "Northern Ireland" ' and his government 'would probably ask that their title should be formally changed to "Ulster" '.
>
> That the King might revive, in respect of Ulster, the Order of St Patrick.
>
> That Irish representative peers from the Republic might be disqualified from sitting in the House of Lords and their election revived and confined to Ulster.
>
> That the lights around the coast of Northern Ireland should no longer be controlled from Dublin.
>
> That 'the "Imperial" functions of the Belfast branch of the Bank of Ireland' should be reviewed.
>
> That disputes over the Foyle fisheries be resolved with the Irish government lest they use it as an excuse to make difficulties about the use of the deep-water channel in Lough Foyle by British naval ships.[25]

Brooke showed no signs of apprehension when he reported back to the Northern Ireland Cabinet and they agreed to establish a working party of the civil service heads of departments which would, 'as a matter of urgency . . . consider and make recommendations on any matters—constitutional,

25 Attlee's note, 'Republic of Ireland Bill effect on Northern Ireland', 7 Dec 1948, CAB 129/31/124
25 Attlee reported verbally to the Cabinet on 22 Nov. 1948—see CAB 128/13/148-49

economic or administrative—affecting Northern Ireland in consequence of the repeal of the External Relations Act'.[26] The recommendations approved by the Northern Ireland Cabinet were much as proposed by Brooke in his talk with Attlee. The constitutional declaration sought in legislative form was that 'any alteration in the law touching the status of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom or the relation of the Crown to the parliament of Northern Ireland shall require the assent of that parliament as well as of the parliament of the United Kingdom'[27]—a more impregnable guarantee than the formulation ultimately achieved in the wording of the Ireland Act of 1949.

The Stormont government cannot but have been reassured by the knowledge that Whitehall was contemplating still more sweeping changes and the Northern Ireland liaison officer at the Home Office intimated that instructions had already been given for the urgent preparation of a bill dealing with the changes required as a result of the repeal of the External Relations Act which would be introduced immediately after the Christmas recess. Matters listed as minimum provisions for the clauses of such a bill included the 'substitution of "Republic of Ireland" for "Eire", and of "Ulster" for "Northern Ireland" in the King's title and the designation of parliament'—it was noted that it was 'desirable to know whether there is a Latin rendering of the world "Ulster" '. There was: *Ultoniae.* Other points 'under consideration with a view to inclusion in the Bill', and in addition to those already raised by Brooke, included the question of recruitment into the civil service and armed forces; the use of the word 'Royal' in the nomenclature of 'Eire' organisations; whether children born in the Republic to British parents would be eligible for registration as British citizens; passports; fugitive offenders; and that the Republic's diplomatic representative in London should *not* be accorded the title of ambassador.[28]

Given such gusts in the winds of change from London it was hardly surprising that Roland Nugent, the Northern Ireland Minister of Commerce, should conclude that this government was 'in an exceptionally favourable position to get anything within reason for which we ask, but . . . it is of the greatest importance that we should ask *now*, in time for our wishes to be included in the legislation now in preparation in England'. He went so far as to argue that Northern Ireland should look for control of its own taxation:

> Ulster has few natural resources, fuel (sic) or minerals. Like all countries which depend on human brains and effort rather than natural riches she is very vulnerable to high taxation which not only prevents capital accumulation but reduces the incentive to work and enterprise. Taxation which might merely check British progress would ruin Ulster probably long before Great Britain was sufficiently alarmed to consider a reduction of taxes . . . It is dangerous for a poor country to follow step by step the

26 PRONI CAB 4/769/11; Northern Ireland Cabinet meeting of 25 Nov. 1948

27. PRONI CAB 4/771/9; Northern Ireland Cabinet meetings of Dec. 8/9, 1948.

28 Note by assistant secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet, Dec. 8, 1948, PRONI CAB 4/771/2.

> social expenditure of a much richer country, especially when that policy is being pushed to the edge of recklessness. Yet as long as taxation is reserved there is no incentive to undertake the difficult task of economy, the money is going to be taken from us in any case. British expenditure now covers a wide range of objects which do not interest or benefit Ulster, and as socialist measures increase the proportion of such expenditure to the expenditure on matters which do benefit Ulster, such as defence, will probably increase.[29]

But Nugent's extravagant proposals were not incorporated in the formal memorandum approved by the Northern Ireland Cabinet on December 13 and delivered by hand to the Home Office by a team of four senior Northern Ireland civil servants led by W. D. Scott, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. Scott reported that, although their 'representations were sympathetically received', the British government had by then established their own working-party of senior civil servants under the chairmanship of Sir Norman Brook, the Secretary to the Cabinet. Scott soon realised, following discussions at the Treasury and Home Office, that this working-party were 'adhering strictly to their terms of reference under which they are required to recommend the minimum legislation necessary to implement the Imperial Government's policy towards the new "Republic of Ireland", i.e. to preserve the status quo as far as possible'. As matters stood, the only request from Stormont which Scott thought would fall within the scope of the British bill was the proposed change of name from 'Northern Ireland' to 'Ulster'. But he did obtain assurances that 'no final decisions' would be taken before Brooke had the opportunity of discussing them with Attlee.[30]

But Stormont's demands fell on some sympathetic ears in Whitehall and one member of the working-party, Sir Frank Newsam of the Home Office, put up a memorandum vigorously supporting the approach embodied in their formal memorandum. Although Newsam admitted that 'few, if any,' of the Northern Ireland proposals were really consequential on the repeal of the External Relations Act, he took the line that:

> the Northern Ireland government contend that Eire's secession from the Commonwealth has killed any lingering hope of a united Ireland and . . . there is therefore no ground for the continuance of arrangements which are based on the assumption that partition might some day be ended. At the same time the Northern Ireland government fear that Eire's latest move is a prelude to a violent campaign for the ending of partition and are naturally anxious to strengthen their hands against any such campaign. In my view we cannot brush aside these considerations and treat the Northern Ireland proposals as though all we were concerned to do was to

29. PRONI CAB 4/772/5.
30. W. D. Scott to Sir Basil Brooke, Dec 20, 1948, PRONI CAB 4/773/5.

> recommend such changes as are consequential in the strictest sense of the word.

In the same vein, Newsam argued that the request to use the name 'Ulster' could hardly be refused and he went so far as to suggest that consideration be given to 'recommending legislation to provide that no law, the effect of which would be to make Northern Ireland cease to be part of the United Kingdom, should be enacted in the Westminster parliament otherwise than at the request and with the consent of the Northern Ireland parliament'[31]—a proposal which, if enacted, would have afforded Ulster Unionists a cast-iron defence against the fate which they most feared. This mood of sympathy for the North was similarly reflected at a meeting of the British working-party next day when Sir Norman Brook observed from the chair that political pressures within the United Kingdom meant that 'something must be done for the North' and that 'the present indications were that it might not be so easy as had been hoped to get the Bill through the House as a mere piece of technical and terminological adjustment'.[32]

When the Northern Ireland Cabinet discussed these developments, Sir Basil Brooke told his colleagues he had had a letter from Attlee proposing a meeting between British and Northern Ireland ministers on January 6, 1949 and he argued that they should give priority to 'strengthening Northern Ireland's position so as to eliminate the possibility of interference by a government in Whitehall now or in the future and on anticipating any pressure which might be exercised by the government of Eire to force Northern Ireland to make concessions on the partition issue'.[33]

Brooke was accompanied to the London meeting by the Ministers of Finance and Home Affairs (J. M. Sinclair and J. E. Warnock) and the Attorney-General (L. E. Curran), and the British team consisted of Attlee, Jowitt, Noel-Baker, Patrick Gordon-Walker (Noel-Baker's understudy at the CRO), the Home Secretary (Chuter Ede) and the Attorney-General (Hartley Shawcross). Attlee opened the meeting by saying that the 'specific proposals' proposed by the Northern Ireland government to safeguard their constitutional position 'were considered to be too wide in scope', but that alternative methods had been considered of which the most preferable:

> would be to include in the body of the bill, which was likely to be introduced at Westminster to recognise the new status of Eire, an affirmation by parliament that in no event would Northern Ireland cease to be part of the United Kingdom except with the consent of the parliament of Northern Ireland.

Although 'it was recognised that a subsequent parliament could revoke such a declaration', it would have greater force than a joint pledge by the leaders of all

31. 21 Dec. 1948; CAB 130/44/262/8.
32 CAB 130/44/262.
33. PRONI CAB 4/773/6; Cabinet minutes of Dec. 23, 1948.

the parties at Westminster 'that no change would be made in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without Northern Ireland's free agreement'. Brooke welcomed Attlee's proposal, 'but asked that it should include specific references to the existing boundaries of Northern Ireland', and this was agreed.[34]

In regard to the question of the titles of the North and South, Attlee followed the line adopted by the British working-party at their first meeting, namely:

> that it was impossible to maintain the use of 'Eire'. In the international field any country had the right to call itself what it liked, and it would therefore be merely pin-pricking . . . to maintain the use of 'Eire'. We should, however, endeavour to use 'The Republic of Ireland' rather than 'Ireland'. We had been given this opportunity by the very title of 'The Republic of Ireland Act' and we should cling to this point.[35]

Brooke bowed before the weight of this argument for abandoning the use of 'Eire' while continuing to express his own preference for its retention, but he continued to resist 'Republic of Ireland', saying:

> that people in Northern Ireland had resented the assumption by the South of the title . . . with its implied claim to jurisdiction over the whole island; and if the South was to be known by this title and the North continued to be known as 'Northern Ireland', this might be taken as accepting the implication that the North in some way formed part of 'the Republic of Ireland' . . . In assuming their title, the South were laying a claim not only to Northern Ireland territory but also to United Kingdom territory . . . He suggested that the terms 'Republic of Southern Ireland' or 'the Irish Republic' would be preferable to 'the Republic of Ireland'.

Brooke's complaints were met by the formula that, while statutory provision must be made for the use of 'Republic of Ireland' in British legislation, 'as far as possible, in less formal contexts, the phrase "the Irish Republic" should be used'.

There was less disagreement in regard to the title of the North. Attlee pointed out that the use of 'Ulster' 'would undoubtedly give offence in the South, since Northern Ireland did not include three counties which had formerly made part of the province of Ulster' but he placed much greater emphasis on:

> the argument that the use of the title 'Ulster' would arouse controversy among Irishmen in other Commonwealth countries. And the governments of those countries must be asked to concur in any change in the king's title. There would, therefore, be advantage in making the

34. Minutes of the meeting of Jan 6, 1949, CAB 130/44/262/(M). What follows is based on this source unless otherwise indicated

35 Minutes of meeting of British working-party, Dec. 16, 1948, CAB 130/44/262.

> minimum change in the king's title, i.e. simply substituting 'Northern Ireland' for 'Ireland'

—a proposal that was 'warmly welcomed' by Basil Brooke.

In relation to the questions of the boundary of Northern Ireland, the Irish Lights and fishing rights in Lough Foyle, 'it was generally felt that it would be inexpedient to raise at this stage either the boundary question itself or any other question which might have the effect of stirring up the boundary question indirectly'. Franchise questions proved more contentious. The British ministers had agreed among themselves to take the line of telling Brooke and his colleagues that, although 'sympathetic consideration would be given to the imposition of a three months' residence qualification for the Westminster franchise', they should be warned that this would provoke criticism in the House of Commons and it would therefore be 'helpful if the Northern Ireland government could undertake to reduce the residence qualification for their local franchise'. British ministers also agreed that, 'in view of the responsibility of the Westminster parliament as trustee for minorities in Northern Ireland, no general power could be given to the Northern Ireland government to prescribe the qualifications for members of the Northern Ireland parliament'.[36] These positions formed the basis for what was agreed at that afternoon's meeting with the Northern Ireland ministers: in each case the matter was effectively deferred by the device of inviting the Northern Ireland government to put forward specific proposals, framed in the light of the discussion, for the consideration of the British government.

The only point raised by the Northern Ireland delegation which the British do not appear to have anticipated related to the defence of Northern Ireland which Brooke brought up in the context of what he described as:

> the renewed activities of the IRA in the South and to the state of anxiety which existed in Northern Ireland. He said that, as a counter-move to the IRA, there had been talk of reforming the Ulster Volunteers. He was very anxious to avoid this and he hoped that he might be able to keep any such movement in check; but he would be greatly helped if he could have an assurance from Mr Attlee that Northern Ireland would be defended from any possible attack, just as any other part of the United Kingdom. Sir Basil Brooke added that some embarrassment had been caused by certain activities of the GOC Northern Ireland Command. The GOC had visited Dublin and had talks of a quasi-political nature with leading personalities there. Furthermore, a number of Eire army officers had been received for training courses with the Northern Ireland Command. In the present state of affairs that was most undesirable; and, though he did not wish to raise any objection to the training of Eire officers with the British army, he suggested that this could more suitably take place elsewhere than in the Northern Ireland Command.

36. CAB 130/44/262/(M).

Attlee was conciliatory but cautious, and merely undertook to look into the matters raised.[37] It seems worth recording in passing that, some two years later, the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Northern Ireland, General Sir Reginald Denning, did not seem any better disposed towards Stormont. He told the British ambassador in Dublin that he felt 'the North was primarily and exclusively concerned with its own future and its own interests and . . . disappointingly indifferent to Commonwealth and still more to international considerations'.[38]

The Ireland Act

The meeting between British and Northern Ireland ministers of January 6, 1949 determined the British legislative response to the Republic of Ireland Bill enacted in Dublin on December 21, 1948 and Attlee recommended to the Cabinet that the recommendations of the official working-party be modified in the light of what had been agreed at that meeting. And it is here we find Attlee's formulation:

> that Northern Ireland remains part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom and . . . that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the parliament of Northern Ireland—

which was to form the core of the crucial guarantee to the Ulster Unionists contained in the United Kingdom Ireland Act of 1949, although it should be noted in passing that Attlee specifically drew to the attention of his Cabinet colleagues that 'this parliament cannot of course bind its successors; and a statutory provision on these lines could be repealed or modified by a subsequent parliament'.[39] The major point of difference between Attlee and his working-party was the use of the title 'Ulster' which a majority of the working-party had favoured.[40] The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, felt it represented 'a useful positive declaration in support of Ulster's independence of the South and it would also be convenient at international gatherings, where Eire would certainly be known in practice simply as Ireland'.[41]
Frank Pakenham, the Minister for Civil Aviation, seems to have been alone in Cabinet in speaking against Atlee's recommendations:

> he thought it would be a mistake to give any guarantee of the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland. In two Northern counties there was a

37 As note 34

38 British ambassador (Gilbert Laithwaite) to Sir Percivale Liesching (CRO), Dec. 4, 1950, DO 130/110 Denning also expressed concern 'about recruiting Regular recruiting seemed normally to be as to some (sic) 50 per cent from across the Republican border. There had been a falling off in that figure in the spring of this year when the partition issue was very much to the fore in Southern Ireland But it had now more or less come back to normal In other words the South was making a substantial contribution to our regular recruiting '

39 'Ireland—memorandum by the Prime Minister', Jan 10, 1949, CAB 129/32 pt. I/37.

40. See CAB 129/32 pt. I/28

41 Minutes of working-party, Dec 23, 1948, CAB 130/44/262

> majority in favour of an ending of partition and, if the issue of partition ever came before an international court, the view might be expressed that these counties should be transferred to Eire. He believed that the right solution lay in the political unity of Ireland and the strategical unity of Ireland and the United Kingdom.

But Pakenham had little weight in the Cabinet of which he was a member only between June 1948 and February 1950, and the Cabinet took the line that:

> it was by no means certain that an international tribunal . . . would consider that . . . Tyrone and Fermanagh should be transferred to Eire: recent discussions on the partition of India and Palestine provided examples of the arguments which might be used in favour of treating these counties as essential to the viability of Northern Ireland. Unless the people of Northern Ireland felt reasonably assured of the support of the people of this country, there might be a revival of the Ulster Volunteers and of other bodies intending to meet any threat of force by force; and this would bring nearer the danger of an outbreak of violence in Ireland. From the point of view of Great Britain, experience in the last war had amply proved that Northern Ireland's continued adhesion to the United Kingdom was essential for her defence. There was nothing in past experience to give any reasonable assurance to Great Britain that Eire would not be neutral in a future war. In 1940 Eire had jeopardised her chances of ending partition by remaining neutral,[42] and her recent legislation had shown that she laid more store on formal independence than on the union of Ireland.[43]

Nomenclature remained a bone of contention between London and Belfast and the Northern Ireland government fought a rearguard action against the use of the term 'Republic of Ireland'. The case argued by Sir Basil Brooke at another meeting with Attlee and the Home Secretary in London on January 18 rested not so much on legalities as on what he described as 'the political and psychological effects in Northern Ireland of giving any statutory recognition to the title "Republic of Ireland", in view of the significance which the politicians and people of Eire were attaching to that title'. He therefore urged that, even if it were 'necessary for the (British) legislation to begin by referring to the title ("Republic of Ireland") used in the Eire legislation . . . all subsequent references should be to "the Irish Republic" '.

> If he was not satisfied on what he regarded as a question of principle, he could not conceal this from his political supporters. He might then be pressed to put forward the demand that Northern Ireland should be given

42 This refers to the offer made by the British war cabinet in the summer of 1940 that, in return for Ireland's abandoning neutrality, the United Kingdom government would accept the principle of a United Ireland—see Joseph T Carroll, *Ireland in the War Years* (Newton Abbot, New York, 1975), pp. 44-59

43 Cabinet minutes of Jan 12, 1949, CAB 128/15/2A-3A

> Dominion status, so that the Northern Ireland parliament might have full power to do all that it thought necessary for the protection of the North. This, he thought, would be an unsound solution of Ulster's difficulties and he did not wish to be put in a position in which he would have to advocate it.

The Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, was unimpressed and pointed out that:

> at present Northern Ireland was, for defence purposes, as much a part of the United Kingdom as Kent or Sussex: but, if she acquired Dominion status, she would be only one of a number of equal partners each of whom had an independent right to decide whether or not they should assist the others in any war in which they might be engaged.

Attlee was more conciliatory and gave an assurance that 'in their official documents the United Kingdom would normally describe the South as "the Irish Republic" ', but he saw no way around using the term 'Republic of Ireland' in the British legislation, although he did undertake to consider whether the alternative title 'Irish Republic' might not be included somewhere in that legislation. In the event it was not so included.

Brooke met with more success on the franchise issue when Attlee agreed to recommend the imposition of a three-months' residence qualification for the Westminster franchise in Northern Ireland, notwithstanding the Northern Ireland government's refusal to reduce the residence qualification (seven years) for their local franchise. But he rejected the proposal that the Northern Ireland parliament 'be empowered to legislate on matters affecting the disqualification of their Members'.[44]

But the atmosphere of frantic urgency which had characterised the British Cabinet's deliberations on Ireland now evaporated when it became clear that the Republic of Ireland Act would not be brought into operation on January 21 as had been anticipated. A meeting of the British ministers most involved—Attlee, Noel-Baker and Chuter Ede—shrank from doing 'anything which might be represented as taking the initiative in thrusting Eire out of the Commonwealth or provoking the Eire government into bringing the Republic of Ireland Act into operation', although, as the Cabinet Secretary sourly minuted, their new choice of date, April 18 (Easter Monday, the anniversary of the 1916 rising), was 'hardly in accord with their professed desire for friendlier relations with the United Kingdom'.[45] Irish affairs did not, therefore, next come before the Cabinet until nearly two months had elapsed.

Attlee explained the reasoning behind postponement and recommended to the Cabinet that the Ireland Bill should not be introduced until after the Easter recess in addition to the recommendations agreed at his meeting with Brooke on January 18—the formula agreed by the Cabinet in the matter of title was

44. CAB 130/44/262/(M)
45. *Ibid.*, minutes of meeting of ministers, Jan. 27, 1949

'that the Bill should formally recognise the title "Republic of Ireland" as the description of that part of Ireland hitherto known as Eire, although in official usage the description "Irish Republic" would also be employed'. A suggestion made by Sir Basil Brooke that Attlee's government should lodge a protest in Dublin against the Irish government's anti-partition campaign and 'should make a public declaration condemning Eire's interference in the affairs of Northern Ireland' was resisted, although it was agreed that,

> in the debates on the Ireland Bill, the government should take a clear and firm line . . . there was a serious danger that an effort would be made to embroil political parties in Great Britain in the partition issue. The conduct of the Eire government was far from satisfactory, and it was right that the justifiable anxieties of the people of Northern Ireland should be allayed.[46]

The meticulously detailed preparations of the draft of the Ireland Bill together with the degree of co-ordination between London and Belfast meant that the Irish government were effectively presented with a *fait accompli* when the bill was published on May 3. Protests against the affirmation of Northern Ireland's constitutional position and territorial integrity, made verbally by Sean MacBride in an interview in London on May 5 with the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and Noel-Baker, and formally in an Irish *aide-memoire* of May 7 were equally in vain. Bevin, whose only previous involvement in the whole affair had been to express concern lest the declaration of the republic might create an Irish vote in Britain which would be embarrasing in the conduct of foreign policy and who won his point when it was accepted by the Cabinet 'that the Foreign Office should not undertake any responsibility for Irish business'[47] which was left with the CRO, was especially forceful in his response. Many people in Britain and many in the British government, declared Bevin:

> were in broad sympathy with the ideal of a united Ireland. But we could not ignore the history of the last forty years. Northern Ireland had stood in with us against Hitler when the South was neutral. Without the help of the North Hitler would unquestionably have won the submarine war and the United Kingdom would have been defeated. That would have brought Hitler at once to Dublin and they would have made the Irish become as slaves. Until the majority of the Northerners were persuaded, therefore, that it was in their interests to join the South, the British people would oblige us to give them guarantees that they would not be coerced.
>
> Moreover, the present government of the Irish Republic had made it much more difficult to make any move about partition.

46. Cabinet minutes of March 8, 1949, CAB 128/15/66-67. The Cabinet also agreed that there should not be any provision in their bill for a change in the king's title, because of objections raised by Canada and Pakistan who were not prepared to promote the necessary enabling legislation.
47. Cabinet minutes of Dec. 15, 1948, CAB 128/13/176.

> Firstly, they had gone out of the Commonwealth, and it was virtually impossible for us to give the impression that we were encouraging or desiring Northern Ireland to go out too.
>
> Secondly, they had refused to join the Atlantic Pact. This meant that we had no assurance of the help of the Irish Republic in time of trouble, and after our last experience, people would not be willing to take a chance.[48]

Bevin's *cri de coeur* does much to illuminate the context into which we must place the greyer civil service prose in which much of the British reaction to the declaration of the republic here described has been couched. But one sentence, perhaps, from all that has been quoted from Cabinet minutes bears repetition: that the Irish government's 'legislation had shown that she laid more store on formal independence than on the union of Ireland', a conclusion which this writer, at least, finds it difficult to dispute.

48 Telegram from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to UK Representative to Republic of Ireland, May 9, 1949, CAB 21/1848. See Ronan Fanning, 'The United States and Irish Participation in NATO: the Debate of 1950', in *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 39–48, for something of the Anglo American reaction to the Irish government's rejection of the invitation to join NATO

BOOK REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

Economic Divergence in the European Community. By Michael Hodges and William Wallace. *London: Allen and Unwin for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1981. 227 pp. £15·00.*

THIS timely book provides a thoughtful appraisal of the prospects for possible further European integration. The days are over when the Community was 'condemned to succeed' through the abolition of trade barriers and when such 'negative integration' was expected to lead to 'positive integration' in undefined ways. Since then, the effects of negative integration have proved economically beneficial but there has never been agreement on precisely what positive action the Community should take beyond the establishment of the Common External Tariff, ECSC, and the more controversial CAP. In the endeavour to find new guidelines, 'convergence' has become fashionable, but it remains arguable whether this should be in policies or performance.

Since the EC is primarily an industrial area, attention should be paid, first and foremost, to industrial performance. In terms of 'positive' integration, there should be convergence in performance. The original six joined together in times of rising prosperity. Their industrial performance converged and this continues despite the rougher economic climate of the 1970s and 1980s. The newcomers of 1973 had no time to adjust themselves to their new opportunities, before deepening recession overshadowed all else. In their case, long-standing divergences in performance persisted. The Community has little or no direct power to intervene effectively. The budgetary imbalance had to be resolved at inter-governmental level. Community institutions such as the European Investment Bank and regional policies were not allowed enough funds to be very effective. Perhaps the most effective 'positive' action was to limit divergence in national aids to industries. Despite EMS, the Community is powerless when a national government wants to depreciate in order to protect its labour-intensive activities which, in turn, inhibits adjustment and convergence.

The book was written to consider next steps and not as an historic survey. So perhaps it is not surprising that there is no discussion of why and how it came about that the main achievement of 'negative' intra-European free trade was the growth of intra-industry trade. The result was certainly positive at the businessmen's level whose activities have become more integrated. As far as economic integration is concerned, that is the level where the results should show rather than at the institutional or political one. Moreover, this omission gives the prospects for Britain's integration into the EC an unduly pessimistic slant.

Amongst the possible policies to secure convergence, exchange rate policy takes up much time in Brussels and much space in this book. The tortuous history of the various moves towards monetary integration, is clearly outlined in Chapter 6, and one possible way towards success elaborated in Chapter 10. The proposal is to concentrate on the option of a parallel currency system. The Community is shown at its best where it has extra-national instruments of its own, such as the Common External Tariff in relation to external trade or Community anti-trust law in relation to intra-European

cross frontier trade. In these areas it is neither superior nor subordinate to national governments and does not interfere with purely domestic issues. On this reading, the way forward is through a parallel currency system and generally parallel integration wherever this is appropriate.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Foreign Policy Behavior: *The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model.* By Jonathan Wilkenfeld *et al. Beverley Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1980. 288 pp. £15·00.*

The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior. Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Pat McGowan. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage, 1981. 295 pp. (Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 6). £14·00. Pb: £6·25.*

THE book on *Foreign Policy Behavior* by Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *et al.*, presents an Interstate Behavior Analysis Model for the comparative analysis of foreign policy behaviour. The enterprise is designed to identify, through statistical techniques, the causes (or sources) of variations in the patterns of international actions of nation states. The Model attempts to relate sets of source variables to the actions of states. Features of states—economic, governmental and capability characteristics—mediate the influence of the source variables and allow the establishment of 5 'classes' of states—'Western', 'Closed', 'Large Developing', 'Unstable', and 'Poor'.

Analysis within the Model is undertaken in various stages. The first evaluates the respective influence of 'inter-state' variables (behaviour that impinges upon the given nation-state) and 'societal' (domestic) variables. Subsequent analysis excludes the impact of behaviour experienced by states but now includes other, basically economic, 'inter-state' variables and 'global' variables (relating to international organisation and to conflict occurring within the international system). A final analysis introduces 'elite views' and attempts to evaluate their influence upon foreign policy actions.

Overall, the analyses indicate the overwhelming influence of behaviour-experienced upon the behaviour subsequently initiated by states. This finding may, however, be largely conditioned by the basic methodology of the Model: a methodology that embraces a number of rather serious shortcomings.

The time-span covered by the data employed in the study—1966 to 1970—is far too short to permit the identification, or coverage, of significant developments in states' foreign policies: quantitative 'variations', often of qualitative triviality, are all that can thus be captured. Short time-span also encourages the view that the characteristics of states are static and may, therefore, be treated merely as mediating variables. It also largely conditions the 'discovery' that 'inter-state' variables (action-reaction type) exert the greatest influence on most 'variations' in foreign policy behaviour.

Some important data also look suspiciously artificial and unduly subjective. Adjudging South Africa to be a 'Western' state (with inevitable connotations of democracy, etc.), rather than 'Closed', reflects just such doubtful approaches to data generation.

The study of international relations and foreign policy is in clear need of greater precision and rigour. The methodological shortcomings and trivialising effects of *Foreign Policy Behavior* will, however, hardly mark it as a landmark contribution to such progress.

Rather more interesting, if uneven in quality, are the contributions to Kegley and McGowan's edited volume *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior.*

The papers, here, address matters of real substance and interest. Manus I. Mildarsky argues that revolution in agrarian societies reflects inequalities in land-holdings, and between socio-economic sectors, and, thence leads to switches of allegiance between the super-powers. James Lee Ray indicates that while the United States' dependents in Latin America show more politico-diplomatic autonomy than do the Soviet Union's East European satellites, the latter have enjoyed far greater economic development than the former. Tom Travis goes on to demonstrate the considerable variation amongst the 'imperialisms' of the capitalist metropoles, with France maintaining her satellites in a far more intense condition of dependence than the other metropoles, including the United States.

OPEC's oil demarché of 1973, and the subsequent emergence of a collective 'Southern' call for a New International Economic Order are the subject matter of a number of interesting contributions. Heraldo Munoz demonstrates that the United States, West Germany and Japan substantially increased investments in overseas sources of basic resources, and aid to those Less Developed Countries that possessed such resources, in the aftermath of 1973. Jeffrey Hart considers the split over the NIEO that developed between Holland, Sweden and Norway (favourable); and Great Britain, West Germany and the United States (critical and obstructionist). Kuniko Inoguchi expresses a concern that the successful negotiation of a NIEO (effective 'voice') may retard the South's progress towards a desirable degree of partial economic disengagement from the world capitalist system ('interactive exit').

Maurice East outlines the manner in which the Norwegian foreign ministry has coped, thus far, with the demands of the new 'economic diplomacy'. Neil Richardson is most salutory and instructive on the conceptual and methodological difficulties of measuring dependence between states.

The volume is not, however, of even quality. Seabold and Onuf review some important notions regarding 'uneven development' and 'late capitalism' but within a poorly sustained argument. George Modelski offers a most unconvincing application of the economic idea 'Kondratieff long cycles' to international politics, in the process of which he protects his thesis by 'forgetting' about the major phase of decolonisation, and consequent state creation, after 1946. Finally, Herb Addo renders commonplaces of the Marxist/radical perspective upon world economics wholly indigestible.

Overall, then, *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior* constitutes a worthwhile read despite a few serious failings.

University of Reading R. J. BARRY JONES

Change in the International System. Edited by Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George. *Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1980. 316 pp. $28.75. Pb: $12.50.*

The Study of Political Adaptation. By James N. Rosenau. *London: Frances Pinter. 1981. 235 pp. £15·00. Pb: £6·00.*

FOR a long time, the academic study of international relations tended to assume that processes of change, whilst they are clearly important if not all-pervading, were not a fit subject for explicit and systematic study. Partly, this feeling may have stemmed from a belief that change was simply too complex and wide-ranging to be subjected to theories or generalisations; partly, too, it may have stemmed from a confidence among academics and policy-makers in the Western world that however radical certain changes seemed to be, the fundamentals of international life remained unaltered. In the last ten years, these easy assumptions have been challenged, and one result has been an attempt to describe, define and analyse the nature and impact of international change. This attempt faces formidable problems, for the complexity which may have

daunted previous generations of scholars was not a figment of their imaginations. Simply to describe change in the global arena is a task of almost unimaginable extent; to assess the relative significance and salience of changes in different issue areas or dimensions, and to relate an academic estimate of significance to the problems confronted by practitioners demands the utmost rigour and clarity.

The two books under review here approach these problems in two rather different ways, and with varying degrees of success. One approach to international change, the one emphasised by Holsti and his collaborators in *Change in the International System*, is to take a systemic level of analysis, drawing attention thereby to broad processes, the transformation of overall structures and the constraints exercised by system-wide forces. The editors openly address themselves to the 'dynamics of system change', averring that existing approaches deal rather better with static and comparative analysis than with the continuous processes of transformation and evolution which they discuss. They have assembled a group of contributors which contains several well-known and even distinguished scholars. Unfortunately, it appears that this group only came together on paper—that the contributors had little shared interest in or common understanding of what they were supposed to be examining. The result is a rather patchy collection, divided into three parts: the nature of change, the sources of change and the restraints on change in the international system. In the first of these, Dina Zinnes calls for a study of 'thresholds' between different phases of international system development, focussing largely upon rather traditional notions of the system. More interestingly, K. J. Holsti challenges the idea that the growth of 'interdependence' necessarily leads to change in the direction of transnational or collaborative processes, and stresses forces of fragmentation and 'nationalism'. Stephen Genco, in a study of international integration and its relationship to changes in the structure of relations between societies, rather misses the chance to connect with Holsti's arguments, thereby emphasising the fragmentary nature of the book.

This tendency to fragmentation is carried through into the second section, which focuses on sources of system change. Volker Rittberger's study of the New International Economic Order hardly deals with change as an explicit problem, and misses the chance to attack the idea of change as an aim of policy. Nazli Choucri's chapter on international political economy consists largely of a list of possibilities which have little substantial argument attached to them. Robert Keohane, on the other hand, does a good job of analysing the possible links between change in the international power structure and international regime change in the 1950s and 1960s. Thereafter, this section retreats again to what are often little more than speculative contributions from Terence Hoppmann and Timothy King (on the role of the Cuban missile crisis and Test Ban Treaty in furthering detente), from Charles Hermann and Robert Mason on 'triggering events' in international crises, and from Randolph Siverson on the role of war.

The last section of the Holsti collection is in fact the best integrated, with Alexander George and James Rosenau (in company with Ole Holsti) providing some interesting insights into the uncertainties facing American policy-makers during the postwar era. George's idea of policy legitimacy, especially when policy-makers have espoused change as an objective, is stimulating; whilst Rosenau and Holsti document some of the uncertainties within American elites after Vietnam. This theme becomes a major motif of the second book under review, Rosenau's 'collected works' on the subject of political adaptation, which for a variety of reasons, is a far more satisfying and substantial contribution to the study of change. Rosenau's focus on the way in which political actors adapt to the demands of their environments may be open to question, especially in terms of its testability through detailed case studies, but it is on the whole cumulative, coherent and rigorous.

The book starts with a series of essays which define Rosenau's approach, and which

elaborate on the idea that societies manifest typical modes of adaptation to their global settings. A major element in these settings is constituted by change, which may threaten to undermine the 'essential structures' of societies; adaptation has the effect of containing the threat and enabling national societies to persist. There are strong links here to the arguments about 'nationalism' and interdependence advanced by K. J. Holsti in *Change in the International System*—links which are emphasised again by Rosenau's treatments of small states and intervention in chapters 6 and 7. From these, we move to a familiar theme, and one which may explain some of the new stress on change and uncertainty in the study of international relations—for Rosenau's concluding chapters focus again on the fracturing of consensus in the United States, and on the loss of confidence among elites and policy-makers. Whether this amounts—as Rosenau suggests—to an 'adaptive transformation' of American society in its relations with the global system, is open to question. Few, however, would contest his view, expressed in his concluding essay, that a world of 'ugly asymmetries' is likely to confront academics and practitioners alike for the foreseeable (and changing) future.

Coventry (Lanchester) Polytechnic MICHAEL SMITH

The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization. By Karl P. Sauvant. *New York: Oceana. 1981. 232 pp. $22.50.*

The Third World Without Superpowers. 2nd series. The Group of 77: Collected Documents. Vol. 1. Edited by Karl P. Sauvant. *New York: Oceana. 1981. 592 pp. $50.00 (per volume).*

FROM his helpful vantage point at the Centre on Transnational Corporations in New York, Dr Karl P. Sauvant has recently and rapidly laid claims to be the most assiduous and best informed of those documentors and historians of the Third World's general conference activities. Having recently co-edited, with Dr Odette Jankowitsch, four sizeable volumes of documents on the non-aligned movement from 1961 to 1976, he has now published this introductory handbook for those wishing to learn about the Group of Seventy-Seven (G—77). He has also embarked on the compilation of a companion set of documents, within his general rubric of 'The Third World Without Superpowers', on the G—77. When completed this is to be a five volume set. Meanwhile volume I has appeared with the rest to follow *seriatim*, though intending purchasers are told by the publishers that they have to buy the whole set and cannot buy single volumes.

Dr Sauvant has now also produced a brief introductory monograph (of just under 90 pages of text, the rest being accompanying documents, notes and appendices), crisply tracing the evolution, structure and organisation of the G—77. While this little book should be a useful introductory survey for all scholars and students of the subject, buttressed as it is by full references to available documentation and other relevant writings, it is likely to be particularly useful to practising diplomats who need a quick handbook-guide to the G—77.

To say that this short volume will serve admirably as a reliable handbook for diplomats and others looking for a serviceable guide to the background and complexities of the G—77 is not to say that it is entirely bland and lacking in personal judgement and some exhortation. It purveys a perspective from the United Nations Plaza which is informed and combines a keen sense of current realities with a seeming imperturbable optimism—qualities which the G—77 may well need in the 1980s.

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London PETER LYON

The Non-Aligned in Havana: Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of Their Significance for the Global Political System. Edited by Peter Willetts. *London: Frances Pinter. 1981. 283 pp. £16·95.*

THE Non-Aligned Movement has already elicited from Peter Willetts a scholarly and illuminating study. Now its sixth 'summit', in Havana in 1979, has given rise to a carefully edited book of documents, prefaced by a long introductory essay, which combines informed commentary with stimulating, and often convincing, theoretical argument.

Somehow, without voting, though with a number of reservations, which Willetts meticulously lists, the eighty-nine countries, plus three liberation movements, which participated as full members, managed to agree on a formidable corpus of resolutions: a sixty-page Political Declaration, a thirty-page Economic Declaration, a sixteen-page Action Programme for Economic Co-operation, ten Political Resolutions, eleven Economic Resolutions, and a paper modifying the Movement's constitution. Among the eighty-nine were India, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, and most oil-exporters (Saudi Arabia, though remaining a member, boycotted Havana). Twenty other states, and fifteen international bodies, were there as observers or guests. Whatever may be thought of its collective impact, it was hardly a gathering of the powerless or the insignificant.

For some, the very fact that a movement professing non-alignment met in Cuba is a demonstration of its hypocrisy or gullibility. Willetts shows that this is a superficial judgment, partly because other issues, notably decolonisation in Africa, have always been as prominent among the Movement's concerns as detachment from, and mediation in, the cold war, and partly because many of its members, led by Yugoslavia, worked hard and effectively to limit the political gains falling to Cuba as host (and chairman until the next summit, at Baghdad, in 1982). Thus Dr Castro, predictably, got virtually nowhere with his thesis that the socialist states were the movement's 'natural allies', and the Declarations eventually adopted differed extensively from Cuba's original draft. In fact, the decision to meet in Havana reflected Cuba's standing in the Movement in the middle 1970s, which was then at its peak and has since perceptibly declined.

Willetts claims that ideology, in 'the neutral meaning of a coherent set of ideas' as 'the produce of contemporary political organisations' (p. 42) is an important and neglected element in contemporary world politics. It is difficult, however, to discern the ideology running through the decisions taken at Havana: some lamentably prejudiced, such as that putting Egypt on probation, as guilty by association because of Camp David; some seemingly arbitrary, such as the endorsement of Bolivia's claim to an outlet to the Pacific; and some eminently reasonable, such as the criticism, in the name of the principle of self-determination, of Morocco over Western Sahara, Indonesia over East Timor, and Guatemala over Belize, and the refusal to seat *any* representative of Kampuchea—an improvement, this, on the United Nations' handling of the issue. The inclusion of a timely, if inconclusive, section on human rights can also be placed in this last category. But these assorted positions do not spring from any clear intellectual analysis corresponding to, say, the Prebisch thesis in UNCTAD.

Willetts, nevertheless, believes that the Movement is more dynamic than the Group of 77, and that Havana has already had significant consequences. In support of the former, he shows that the summit attracted more countries than the Group's Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Arusha the previous February, and that the Non-Aligned have, in the recent past, taken important initiatives on economic issues such as that leading to the call for a New International Economic Order in 1974. He makes the latter point only in his Preface, and the consequences cited are not self-evidently

momentous; but it can be imagined that gatherings of such high-level delegations subtly affect their participants' images of the world, and even that, in some cases, their policies may be consciously modified to avoid censure. Yet the Movement still lacks a Secretariat (which may account for the frequent trivial errors of fact which Willetts found in the documents), and there was no disposition to create one at a time when Cuba might well have been able to dominate it.

In threading his way through the documents' errors and variations, Peter Willetts has largely avoided falling into error himself, though there is a quite incoherent sentence on p. 13, and a breathtaking understatement, in n. 7 on p. 50 explaining why China 'might be better placed in a category of its own' (rather than as a member of the Eastern bloc). Such lapses apart, this is another intelligent and helpful contribution to our knowledge of a phenomenon still too easily dismissed in the West.

University of Sussex RODERICK OGLEY

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation. 3 Vols. 1959–1979. *By Mohamed I. Shaker. New York: Oceana. 1980. 1,526 pp. $120.00 (per set).*

THIS is a comprehensive analysis of the negotiations, content and implementation of the NPT. It was originally completed as a doctoral dissertation in 1974 and published in 1976 under the title: 'The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' (Graduate Institute of Higher International Studies, Geneva). The present version extends the analysis to cover the period up to the end of 1979, closing before the second NPT review conference of 1980. The author is an Egyptian diplomatist who served on the ENDC delegation from 1965 to 1968 and so participated in the Treaty negotiations and who attended the first NPT review conference in 1975. It is an enormous work, in six parts divided between two volumes, with a third volume to hold the 27 appendices, the bibliography and the index. Your reviewer can only hope that the index is adequate, because the publishers neglected to provide it for review; the study is unfortunately quite unuseable as a reference work without it, and it is as a reference work that it will make its strongest appeal to purchasers.

Dr Shaker's method of work is to describe the formulation and origins of the five principles of non-proliferation set out in General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) (1965) and to examine the text of the Treaty and the effectiveness of its implementation in the light of those principles. One consequence of this methodology is to make the study an apologia and justification for the policy adopted by Egypt in the NPT negotiations and in subsequent dealings on the Treaty and the work can accordingly be read as a solidly reasoned non-aligned perspective on the history and present state of the arms control business. The methodology also provides a focal point for the study which renders a complicated tale manageable and gives it a moral coherence. If the Egyptian government's own dealings in the murky world of weapons of mass destruction have not always shown the same moral coherence in the years since 1959, that is not the responsibility of Dr Shaker as author.

At the end of 900 pages, there are some brief and not surprising conclusions: the Treaty as implemented has done some good, particularly by the establishment of the IAEA in the role of supervisor of the transfer of nuclear technology, a role which would otherwise have been monopolised by the nuclear-weapons states and their industrialised allies; but the goals set out in the five principles have not been achieved. There continue to be loopholes in the system of non-proliferation; there is not an

acceptable balance between the responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers; little, if any, progress has been made towards nuclear disarmament, let alone GCD; improvements have been made in the safeguards system, but it is not yet adequate; and only Latin America has taken up the implicit invitation in the fifth principle to conclude a regional agreement on non-proliferation. Dr Shaker's final point is a sound one, even though it casts a question against much of his preceding analysis: not much can be expected of nuclear weapons control and disarmament unless there is at least a first step towards de-emphasising the role and importance of nuclear weapons as instruments of policy. Although the Third Principle in 1965 spoke of disarmament, United Nations members stopped short of pressing for an unequivocal assurance on that point. They knew they would not get it, but they hoped that it would creep in later.

This is an old-fashioned book in many ways. It takes the diplomatic process at face-value, recounting in detail the speeches of all who spoke, regardless of their standing in the power structure. But this is also its strength. With renewed interest in what Keohane and Nye have termed 'the international organisation process', we need comprehensive accounts of what happens in international organisations. By providing such an account spanning two decades, Dr Shaker has performed a valuable service.

University of Glasgow C. M. MASON

How Little is Enough? Salt and Security in the Long Run. By Francis P. Hoeber. *New York: Crane, Russak for National Strategy Information Center. 1981. 53 pp. Pb: $5.95.*

The Soviet Union and SALT. By Samuel B. Payne. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT. 1981. 155 pp. £12·40.*

ADMIRAL ZUMWALT introduces his foreword to Hoeber's book with a salvo:

> Senate consideration of advice and consent to ratification of the grossly-inequitable and unverifiable SALT II Treaty has been indefinitely postponed, on the announced grounds of the Soviet invation of Afghanistan. Even before the invasion, however, there was increasing doubt that approval of ratification could pass by the required two-thirds majority . . . .

Hoeber himself eschews the gunboat style in his search for some guidelines for negotiations towards lower bilateral strategic arms levels. But his study is not an easy read despite its brevity; indeed, the attempt to refer to the often disparate factors which need to be taken into consideration make for a particularly gritty presentation. What emerges is an elaborate affirmation that when supping with the Soviet Union the United States needs a very long spoon; whatever the pace of negotiated strategic force limitations Hoeber insists that the United States should consciously maintain a credible deterrent and provide the capability effectively to protect its world-wide interests, and he does not attempt to answer his question 'how little is enough', rather emphasising the need for great caution in pursuing deep cuts should the Soviet Union agree to pursue such a goal.

Hoeber focuses on the United States; Samuel B. Payne on the Soviet Union in his beautifully produced book. Emphasising the authority of the leadership, he identifies 'militarists' and 'arms controllers' and combs Soviet literature for examples of their thinking, shrewdly observing on the way that sometimes both groups ascribe to American 'hawks and doves' views which they wish to be taken into account by Brezhnev. His attempt to present the views of both sides in an even and extremely well-documented manner results in a certain blandness, but he succeeds admirably in

identifying explicitly the pressures on Soviet and implicitly on American negotiators. In his cool way he endorses Hoeber's conclusions:

> the driving force behind Soviet foreign policy is, in Thomas Hobbe's words, 'a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death' [or conceivably world conquest] . . . Soviet militarists and arms controllers disagree, not about the objective of increasing Soviet power, but about the means of doing so and the relative usefulness of various forms of power' (p. 106).

Where he advances beyond Hoeber is in his dispassionate and lucid description of SALT I and II and his assessment of the prospects of a SALT III; and that which makes his study valuable is its timely scepticism towards theories of linkage which seem to have been accepted as axiomatic by the Reagan administration. 'Arms control should not be linked to the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. We should not make an arms control agreement contingent on the resolution of our conflicts with the Soviets in other areas, nor should we expect an arms control agreement to make Soviet policy in general less hostile and aggressive' (p. 108). This is the sort of argument which the more robust of the European allies in NATO have been making for some time; in the same way as Payne describes the possible influence of Soviet academic commentators on Russian leaders, so it is to be hoped that his views and those of others of his kind come to influence the present American administration.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force. 2nd rev. edn. By James Cable. *London: Macmillan. 1981 (First publ. 1971.) 288 pp. (Studies in International Security: 16.) £20·00.*

WHEN *Gunboat Diplomacy* was first published in 1971, this reviewer had the welcome opportunity to review it in *International Affairs.* The opportunity to review the second and revised edition is no less welcome, not merely to see whether my earlier observations have been vindicated, but more especially to examine James Cable's own reappraisal of his arguments concerning the political applications of limited naval force in the last, new, and additional chapter to his book based on the experience of the decade 1969–79.

On the former point, it is apposite perhaps, to cite from the original review: 'of the two [J. Howe's *Muticrisis* and *Gunboat Diplomacy*] only *Gunboat Diplomacy* will have any lasting value among the more cerebral books on maritime strategy and sea power in general'. This has indeed been the case, and not just because it has warranted being published in a revised, second edition: it has stimulated a number of well-argued studies in maritime and naval strategy during the past decade, and heightened awareness of the political purposes to which the deployment, and employment, of naval force can be, and has been, put.

The strength of Cable's book, in both editions, lies in his careful—and exemplary—clarification of basic principles, assumptions and terminology before developing his thesis. It is a thesis well supported by illustration and example, and has been given added pertinence by the illustrative materials of naval action during the decade 1969–79. Its case to be considered a classic, which it might well become in time, rests on the axiom that politics and military force cannot properly be separated. In this sense Cable is purely Clauswitzian, linking the flexibility of option that the use, especially, of naval force affords with the multiplicity of political objectives pursued by modern states. That it is a valuable, and effective option, is not to be doubted.

On the second point, whether or not the use of naval force by states—both large and small—in the past decade continues to support his central thesis that it is a valuable

and flexible asset, Cable can rest assured. What he, perhaps too cautiously, claimed as 'tentative' in the first edition—particularly in respect of the nascent Soviet naval power in the 1960s—has been vindicated in the 1970s not only by the expanding size and presence of the Soviet fleet but also in the publication of Admiral Gorshkov's study of *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* in 1979. But then the Soviet Union has never divorced the instruments of military force from political ends, and its use of naval power must be expected to expand in the 1980s.

The additional material to the revised edition, contained in ten pages of chronology in Appendix one, a short eight-page Appendix two, and an introduction of fourteen pages, is all that differentiates the new edition from the original. But this should not be grounds for passing the book over. Although the price is high, the relevance of the book remains, and will continue to remain, for a long time to come; and if the original was not purchased, the cost of the revised edition is worth paying. If the original, however, is accessible, then the marginal cost of the second edition must be considerable, though Cable's analysis of the role of British and Icelandic naval power during the Cod War is well worth having.

This review cannot allow the pertinence of James Cable's thesis to pass without reference to the problems the advanced industrial relations are facing with regard to resource allocation to defence and between their armed services. Without delving into the opportunity cost of different decisions as it applies to the interests of the three services, there is a strong case that the opportunity cost of the flexibility of the naval force for political and diplomatic purposes, as cogently argued and supported by James Cable, is one that should seriously be challenged as one that these states, with global political and economic interests, can ill afford to pay.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

First Line of Defence: The U.S. Navy Since 1945. By Paul B. Ryan. *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1981. 224 pp. $14.95.*

CAPTAIN RYAN'S is a simple world with clear categories of villains and heroes and a simple remedy for the decline of the United States' world power. The villains are the civilian office holders, including Presidents, who have been responsible for the Navy's decline, have deludedly pursued detente with the Soviet Union, and sought popularity by excessive social service expenditure. A particularly objectionable sub-class of villains are those Pentagon officials and academics, who in the McNamara mode have presumed to lay down guide-lines for the size and shape of the Navy, according to abstract concepts of cost-effectiveness and systems analysis, disregarding the expertise and experience of the naval professionals. The heroes are these naval professionals and a handful of right-thinking politicians who have recognised the continuing threat of Soviet dominance—made the more serious by the acquisition of naval power, in contrast with the United States' naval decline. The remedy is simplicity itself; more money for the Navy, enabling it to have more of everything and of the most advanced and complex types.

Presumably, similar increases in land and air power would also be welcome but this is not mentioned except for a warning against over-concentration on the European central front and the folly of basing overall strategy on the dogma of a short European war. Ryan is obviously puzzled by the fact that what to him are self-evident truths have been rejected by political leaders who have served in the Navy, President Carter among them, and yet have accelerated its decline. It does not seem to have occurred to him that their personal experience of naval dogmatism and factionalism may have made them wary of such massive over-simplifications. He is particularly critical of the detailed political control of combat operations in both the Korean and Vietnam wars

and can see no dangers in giving complete freedom of action to the commanders on the spot.

There is, of course, considerable truth in his contention that the rise of the Soviet Navy has produced new challenges for the United States and its allies. It is folly to assume that the European Central Front should dominate the West's strategic thinking and equipment procurement. America and its allies are dependent on the use of the seas and it is essential that the Soviet Union should not come to believe that it could challenge this with impunity and that political leaders should realise that this demands a continuous updating of naval equipment. It is true that theoretical evaluations of complex weapons systems may well be belied by the strains of combat and that there are qualities of military leadership which can be impeded by over stringent political control. Captain Ryan is presumably delighted by the massive increases in naval strength planned by President Reagan—announced after his book was written—but it is to be hoped that this increase in *matériel* is matched by more concern with political and economic reality—including the manning problems—than is displayed here.

King's College, London BRYAN RANFT

Towards a New Strategy for Global Freedom. Edited by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith. *London: Foreign Affairs Research Institute. 1981. 130 pp. £5·00.*

THE theme of this book, as indeed of all the products of this publishing house, is clear from the outset: the Soviet Union has a master plan for global domination; against Soviet strength and clarity of purpose stands Western weakness, confusion and self-deception; the answer is a global anti-Soviet alliance initiated and led by a resurgent United States.

One might point to some problems here. It would be useful if the authors of the essays in this book could agree on whether China is irreducibly an adversary or potentially an ally. It might also be useful if, when the list of potential members of the potential anti-Soviet grand alliance is drawn up, relations between the members were thought about: can Israel and Saudi Arabia really belong to the same political and military alliance just because they are both anti-Soviet?

Such issues are, no doubt, nit-picking details. But they do reveal the basic problem about this book and others which hammer on at the same theme. Underlying the diagnosis and prognosis presented in this book is a worldview which is essentially self-sealing against any criticism. To criticise the basic assertion that Moscow has a master plan for global domination—to point to its inability to explain much of Soviet policy since the Second World War, to indicate alternative explanations more soundly grounded in understanding the whole of Soviet policy—is to be cast into the category of those who promote confusion and self-deception.

To those who espouse this worldview, it is probably at best irrelevant and at worst pernicious to argue that most of the Western world's most pressing problems have little or nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Such arguments are irrelevant or pernicious because what is presented in this book is a modern Manicheanism: an irreconcilable struggle between virtue and evil, in which all evils are traceable to one source.

Those who deny the tenets of this fundamentalist approach must be seen by its exponents as among the forces of evil. Yet to follow this demonology is to chase phantoms. Acting as if every ailment of Western societies from domestic upheaval to the 'energy problem' were a product of the presumed Soviet master plan is to avoid confronting the roots of the problems, which leads to a resounding failure even to begin to identify solutions. Despite the apparently growing appeal of the

fundamentalism of which this book is yet another text, it is as unhelpful for understanding the world's problems as it is possible to imagine.

DAN SMITH

Political Roles and Military Rulers. By Amos Perlmutter. *London: Cass. 1981. 313 pp. £13·50.*

THE incentive, apparently, for this collection of essays, articles and book chapters written by the author over the period 1963–78, was, on the suggestion of the publisher (for whom Professor Perlmutter is also editor of the *Journal of Strategic Studies*) to offer an overall view and some generalisations to account for the number of, and exporential increase in, occasions for military intervention in politics and government. It is debatable whether a reprint of past articles, prefaced by seven somewhat summary pages half of which are devoted to a self-indulgent account of his visit to Egypt, is the most appropriate vehicle to employ for such a challenging task. And although the author claims to have added new material and three new essays, there is little evidence of it; indeed nothing is new of substance, and Perlmutter's oft repeated arguments on military corporatism and praetorianism—already elaborated at length in his *Politics and the Military in Modern Times* (Yale University Press, 1968)—hardly warrant repeating in this form.

Perlmutter has in the past made an important contribution to the analysis of civil-military relations and military intervention in politics; reprints of his old arguments with dated material do not do him justice, or elevate his contribution further. Indeed, over-exposure serves to reveal further the limitations in his thesis, some of which were clinically laid bare by Professor S. E. Finer in his review of *Politics and the Military in Modern Times*

As far as this collection is concerned, it does not suffice to make generalisations about military corporatism and interventionism in new states based predominantly on his work on Israel and the Middle East. One all-pervasive conclusion that was drawn from the plethora of studies during the 1960s and early 1970s on the role of the military in the political development of new states was that emergent societies throughout the world were so different, that each, in fairness, should be studied *sui generis*. Perlmutter may be more or less accurate about the Middle East; but his generalisations when applied to the Far East, or Latin America, are far from the mark.

The chapter on 'Perspectives on Praetorianism' is the only contribution which has not been widely circulated before. It is a useful summary of Perlmutter's interpretation of praetorianism and an explanation of why he considers it a better construct than the more traditional civil-military relations theories of military intervention. Perhaps it is a matter of emphasis, but his stress on the desire of the corporate military for political influence and his dismissal of cultural and professional imperatives goes beyond the bounds of prudence when seen in the context of his declared objectives.

There is no obvious reason to want to buy this book even for the addition of one new chapter. The arguments have all been articulated elsewhere in Perlmutter's books, and the articles can be read separately. The book adds nothing either to his well-established arguments or to the subject; and the proof-reading (p. 165) could have been improved, also. The publication smacks more of commercialism than scholarly contribution; little has been gained and a good title has been lost.

University of Lancaster

MARTIN EDMONDS

Marxism and the Science of War. Edited by Bernard Semmel. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 302 pp. £15·95.*

THIS is a pretty useless book. It consists of a number of extracts from Marxist writers on the subject of war, prefaced by a lengthy introduction by Professor Semmel. Some sections are acceptable, such as that on street fighting and guerrilla warfare ('The Tactics of Revolution') and that on 'Soviet Marxism and a Nuclear Strategy'; yet there is nothing at all on Soviet Marxism and non-nuclear strategy. Does the professor believe that the Russians have not got a non-nuclear strategy? The uninitiated, reading his book, are liable to be led to think so; yet Soviet non-nuclear strategy is, in many ways, the most interesting and most important of the Marxist contributions to the 'science of war'. Instead, we get a muddled section on 'Capitalism, Socialism and Militarism', which starts with a sub-section on the inevitability of war under capitalism. It says nothing whatever, however, about Lenin's development of it with regard to war between capitalism and communism nor about Khrushchev's comments on Lenin; yet these, I should have thought, were of the utmost relevance today. The third sub-section suffers from the lack of a reading from Frunze's *'O edinoi voennoi doktrine'*, the key document on the matter under discussion.

One gets the feeling that Professor Semmel knows no Russian, and hence has relied for his anthology on those pieces by Soviet writers which happen to have been translated into English. This is a bad criterion for compiling a reader for students. For instance, in addition to the Frunze omission, Marshal Ogarkov's piece on strategy is ignored completely, yet he is, after all, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff; and although Semmel mentions Lenin's crucial reading of Clausewitz, he does not appear to have read the *'Vypiski i Zamechaniya na Knigu Klauzevitsa "O Voine i Vedenii Voin"'*; yet this is fundamental for the proper understanding of the Soviet attitude to war. Further in respect of Clausewitz, Semmel at times translates the former's famous aphorism as 'war is the continuation of policy by other means' (p. 33 and elsewhere); at other times he renders it as 'war is the continuation of politics' (p. 67 and elsewhere). There is no excuse for carelessness of this kind.

Semmel misunderstands the Soviet teaching on war's ability to attain 'the most decisive political goals' (p. 36). It is not the new technology which has conferred this ability on war: it has always had it. What the new technology has done, as Sokolovsky has said, has been to make it possible for war to attain such aims in a very short space of time. Finally, the unitiated are not going to learn very easily from Professor Semmel that, at least in the Leninist view, war is a function of economics, and needs an efficient supply system and productive manufacturing base for its prosecution and that, by extension, major wars nowadays cannot be conducted successfully without the hearty support of the mass of the population.

P. H. VIGOR

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Dialogue for a New Order. Edited by Khadija Haq. *New York, Oxford, Pergamon. 1980. 312 pp. $32.50.*

THIS book is a collection of twenty contributions (some of which have already appeared in print) by seventeen experts most of whom are to be found in various kinds of international organisations and academic institutions around the world. Many of the contributors come from countries in the Third World and all of them are well-known for their views and writings on Third World and international development issues.

The book examines in the light of the events and trends of the 1970s in what way international economic problems (particularly in the trade and monetary sectors) might be tackled and the stalemate in the North-South Dialogue be overcome so that changes of potential benefit to all countries in the North as well as in the South could be introduced into international economic relations. An aim of the book is to increase understanding of the issues that divide not just the North and the South but the South itself. According to the editor's preface, the book is intended as a modest contribution to the evolution in thinking about North-South issues.

In two relatively short parts of the six that make up the book, some proposals aimed at helping to reform the international trade and monetary systems are suggested and analysed. In the section entitled 'Trade Union of the Third World', there is a discussion of what it is that Third World countries have in common which enables them to collaborate together in political groupings. Ways in which Third World countries might consolidate their political co-operation within the Group of 77 (G—77) and hence their ability to negotiate as a group are examined. In another section, the prospects for South-South co-operation and the use of such co-operation by the South as a means of 'countervailing power' in North-South negotiations are discussed and evaluated. The two final parts of the book consider the main problems in the international economy and especially in the Third World requiring priority attention, how the North-South Dialogue might be revived in such a way as to help to begin to tackle some of these urgent issues, and the kinds of policy options available to the international community which would reflect the interests and concerns of all countries.

The sheer range of topics and the scale and complexity of many of the problems embraced by the North-South Dialogue often make edited compilations of contributions a particularly appropriate and effective way in which to survey and discuss the issues involved. This book contains a well-balanced and fairly wide-ranging selection of pieces and is a successful example of this kind of approach. The contributions dealing with the Third World as a political entity, the issues that divide countries in the South and Third World co-operation are particularly worth a mention. Two rhetorical pieces—one a speech by President Nyerere to the 4th Ministerial Meeting of the G—77 in 1979, the other (also a speech) by Shridath Ramphal dating from December 1978—along with an abridged and reprinted contribution by Kenneth O. Hall on the need for some kind of technical support unit to strengthen the negotiating capacity of the G—77, when taken together give a general picture of and insights into the more recent preoccupations of Third World leaders, diplomats and observers concerning the practical mechanics of North-South negotiations and developing countries' co-operation within the G—77. Ismail Sabri-Abdalla in a piece first published in 1978, provides a useful examination of the heterogeneity and differentiation existing among developing countries and the relevance of the term 'Third World'. In the section on South-South co-operation, there is a piece by Samir Amin and one by Mahbub ul Haq which candidly analyses the difficulties and lack of progress in developing even modest levels of economic co-operation among countries of the South.

Two further contributions, dealing with wider issues of the North-South Dialogue and the demand for a NIEO, are also of special interest. The first, by Mahbub ul Haq, analyses the North-South Dialogue, the state of North-South relations and the current validity of assumptions on which the postwar international economic order was based. The second is a short contribution by Raul Prebisch whose ideas have had and continue to have a strong influence within both the G—77 and the UNCTAD Secretariat. Adapted from a speech to UNCTAD V, it argues the need for North and South to join together to develop a strategy for the economic and social development of Third World countries. The assumption behind many of the contributions, as the title

of the book suggests, is that the international economic system can be transformed through a dialogue similar to that which has been taking place between North and South. Those who are pessimistic about the likelihood of orderly change taking place in this way may find some parts of this book of limited value.

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London CAROL GELDART

The New International Economic Order: A U.S. Response. Edited by David B. H. Denoon. *London: Macmillan. 1980. (First publ. New York, 1979). 346 pp. £15·00.*

THE editor of this book is an Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics who was on leave from New York University during 1978–79 serving in the US Federal Government as Vice-President for Policy Analysis of the Export-Import Bank of the United States. He provides the introductory chapter to this American compilation. He explains why and how the United Nations-based campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was launched, why it faltered between 1974 and 1978 (and continues to falter, though he seems to have completed his work for this book by late 1977) and asks: what is appropriate American strategy now? The rest of the book is divided into three parts, with three chapters each on Trade and on 'Commodity Policy', and two on Capital Flows. Each of the chapters has much meat in it. I found the three on commodities the most interesting, with their frankly American-centric discussions of Grains, Tin, and Aluminium/Bauxite respectively.

The tone, setting and style of the book are characteristically revealed in these words from the last paragraph of the editor's introductory chapter:

> a remarkable set of circumstances precipitated the New International Economic Order. Though the United States should be reasonably pleased with the results of its tactical response during the Ford and Carter administrations, steps need to be taken to avoid a recurrence. Several substantive agreements were negotiated and the most objectionable NIEO proposals were deflected. Yet some longer-term structural issues about the evolution of the international economic system have not been adequately handled. The system does need to be more resilient, and the LDCs need to see that there is a workable construct that will be able to cope with their particular concerns' (p. 27).

Since the Reagan administration came to power American policy has hardened further; thus the book is a record of the recent past rather than a guide to the immediate future.

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London PETER LYON

Recession, the Western Economies and the Changing World Order. By Lars Anell. *London: Frances Pinter. 1981. 181 pp. £12·50.*

IT is difficult to say precisely what this book is about or what the author is trying to say. The blurb states that it examines the way in which the international economy functions and what constitutes its coherent forces. At the end of it though it is not at all clear what these coherent forces are, or the unique preconditions which the author claims were responsible for maintaining international order during the long period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1970s.

Were they, for example, the strength of the dollar, America's role as the world's policeman, Japan's 'free-riding' of the world economy with the acquiesence of the United States, as the author claims, or what? Maybe they all had something to do with

it. Presumably also, they contributed to the world recession which subsequently followed. One needs a lot more analysis than is presented in this volume to come down on one side or the other.

It becomes even more unclear as to what the author proposes should be done about it. He is clearly in favour of a new order in which the developing countries play a greater part. So, too, are a lot of other people. But no amount of conscience-baiting or irreverent sniping at the way the developed countries pursue their international economic and foreign policy objectives is likely to bring it any nearer. One has got to come up with constructive proposals which will stand up to serious and systematic analysis and convince skeptics and critics that one's proposals are reasonable and feasible.

This to a large extent explains why the author's analysis and prescription of the role of the OECD countries falls flat. It is not enough to say that the government of these countries should spend more of their human and financial resources on new and unconventional ways of organising production, public services, housing and community services. One has got to go further and show how this can be done without jeopardising or denying any of the myriad of other claims on their resources. The author does not explore any of these avenues. What he does instead is to cut a very broad and descriptive swathe through postwar developments. In the process he dismisses a number of major and still unresolved controversies in a rather cavalier fashion, and ends up with his own interpretation of events which reflects his ideological sympathies more than anything else.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change. By Lester C. Thurow. *New York: Basic Books. 1981. 230 pp. £7·95.*

THE author deploys skills from two crafts; journalism as well as economics. Here then is a book written in English as simple as is consistent with its complex subject and it is clear that the target population for this work is a wider one than just economists. Professor Thurow deals with the political economy of the United States, concerning himself hardly at all with the international dimension of America's troubles and even less with its effect on the international system. Whether or not such unconcern is to be considered a defect, this preoccupation with domestic issues and the determinants of America's economic performance which lie inside rather than outside the national frontiers is a highly significant comment on the mood of our times.

We are presented with the thesis that the Americans have 'An Economy That No Longer Performs' (see Chapter 1) and that energy, inflation, slow economic growth, and environmental issues all constitute problems because there has been a failure to confront the issue of 'Distribution'. Poor economic performance persists because the American system allows of the most dogged defence of existing economic interests. Adversarial contests in both political and legal arenas lead only to battles of attrition which favour the defence of the status quo and prevent developments which could lead to productivity growth. While the United States engages in trench warfare, other nations have broken through and have that degree of freedom of movement in economic affairs sufficient to achieve strategic advances. The following quotation gives some idea of the line of argument:

> Solving our energy and growth problems demand that government gets more heavily involved in the economy's major investment decisions. Massive investments in alternative energy sources will not occur without government involvement, and investment funds need to be more rapidly channeled from our

> sunset to sunrise industries. To compete we need the national equivalent of a corporate investment committee. Major investment decisions have become too important to be left to the private market alone, but a way must be found to incorporate private corporate planning into this process in a non-adversary way. Japan Inc. needs to be met with U.S.A. Inc. A united energy front cannot be created, however, by simply trying to bulldoze energy, growth, and anti-inflation policies down the throats of all those who would be hurt. The losers in this process may not be a majority of the population, but they are certainly large enough to prevent any such policy from being adopted (pp. 191–92).

The author argues convincingly that high morale in the labour force and good teamwork are essential if there is to be rapid movement down the learning curve. If this is indeed true, then distribution and redistribution do become the keys to unlock the gains latent in modern technical change. Any hope for economic progress must rest on achieving a capacity to compensate the losers and tax the winners so that Pareto Efficiency (fn. 1, p. 218) can be pursued. Indeed the whole book is about the political difficulties concealed behind the economist's comfortable concept of Pareto Efficiency and it is in this sense that the title of the book is misleading, since in a true Zero Sum society there would be no gains of any kind from 'nature', and every improvement for one person would involve a corresponding loss for another person.

This is a lucid, short book. It advances radical prescriptions and employs a polemical style. Some readers might detect in it yet another sign of the neo-mercantilist times.

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

The World Energy Triangle: A Strategy for Cooperation. By Thomas Hoffmann and Brian Johnson. Cambridge, Mass.: *Ballinger for the International Institute for Environment and Development. 1981. 219 pp. £14·75.*

IF books had all the merit of their authors' intentions, this would be outstanding. The points of the Hoffmann-Johnson triangle are the OECD, OPEC and the poorer oil-importing LDCs. The thesis is that the minimum welfare of the third depends on larger access to affordable energy, and that political and economic self-interest should induce the first two to co-operate in providing it. Only the misguided will fail to sympathise with the premise or to applaud the objective. Only the prejudiced will not admire the common sense illuminating many of the authors' assessments of what is desirable or feasible, as well as their uncommon willingness to distinguish one from the other.

Too many books about energy aid to the Third World are either naïve nostrums or strident sermons, just as too many official statements on the subject are mere compendia of obstacles to action. This essay is none of those things. Much that it says about Third World energy problems is wise and timely. Many of its criticisms of what has hitherto been attempted are cogent. All the more sadly, therefore, its strengths are not quite sufficient to stay its chosen course.

One difficulty Hoffmann and Johnson face is that the credibility of their thesis can only derive from a large and diverse body of evidence: about energy circumstances, needs, possibilities and programmes in the poorer LDCs; but also about the relationship between energy and development. Unfortunately, although they have gathered some useful information about aid programmes into appendices, a brief essay precludes any systematic presentation of that evidence. What we have is assertion, argument and anecdote, rather than analysis.

We also have a measure of confusion. As the essay proceeds, it becomes harder to identify the authors' view of the purpose to be served by greater international energy

co-operation. Because they have little to say about the links between energy and economic processes, and are sometimes uncertain whether to be concerned with all Third World countries or only the poorest, doubt grows as to whether their recommendations are meant to further human development or only to sustain human subsistence. More seriously, while they purport to value energy as such and to compare all sources of it even-handedly, there is heavy emphasis throughout on 'renewable', and especially solar, energy. A new study of solar energy for the Third World might be useful, as might an investigation of international support for Third World energy development at large. Interlacing the two themes proves uncomfortable. At one moment, powerful reasons are advanced for promoting oil, gas and coal production in poorer LDCs. At another, attitudes to 'renewable' energy sources tend to become the touchstone for bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, and dependence on fossil fuels is described as 'dangerous'. One effect is to weaken both cases.

The last and greatest weakness is that the book almost completely fails to demonstrate that OPEC members can and should co-operate with industrial countries in resolving the appalling energy predicament of their poorest customers. We learn why and how OECD governments should do more to mitigate that problem, but we are given no evidence that oil exporters would be wise, or are likely, to share their interest. In the main, therefore, this is a book about how the rich and developed world, by promoting energy planning and production, can help to save the poorest countries from undue suffering. Even if uncertain in aim, it is often shrewd and refreshingly judicious, and always readable. But the triangle remains obstinately one-sided.

IAN SMART

The Poverty of Nations: The Political Economy of Hunger and Population. By William W. Murdoch. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981. 382 pp. Pb: £4·50. $9.40.*

THIS is one of the best books on the problems of world hunger, population and poverty. Written in non-technical language it brings together much contemporary thinking on this central issue. The argument is that hunger stems not from too fast a growth of population nor from the inadequacy of agriculture's productive potential but from poverty. This fundamental cause can be remedied by structural changes in the ownership of wealth in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) but is impeded by the trade, investment and political behaviour of developed countries. Professor Murdoch is a convinced radical, believing that gradual, reformist strategies have little chance of success.

The early chapters of the book which deal with population growth, the performance and potential of agriculture, and the role of agriculture in development are profoundly hopeful. The evidence suggests that it is within the world's capacity to feed its probable population adequately for as far ahead as can be seen. The final chapters, which analyse the historical reasons for poor performance and the prospects for improvement, were to this reviewer at least very pessimistic. Reform is rejected as ineffective. Radical change assessed to be improbable.

Such an approach represents a virtual consensus among many 'development economists'. It does, however, leave some questions unresolved. First, it seems to impose a set of values on other societies in the concept of development. These are well motivated and command widespread acceptance. They are not, however, the only possible values and could be thought of as a more subtle and destructive form of colonialism than that their exponents often attack. Second, the arguments seem to demand enormous and rapid technological change but take little account of the social

costs this implies. Rightly they reject transplanting developed country technology to LDCs, but the call for an 'appropriate technology' will still require changes in the management of resources, the working disciplines and social hierarchies within the developing country. Such changes impose costs, not only on the rich, in such communities. Third, the argument seems to set aside the entire possibility that goodwill within Developed Countries has been or can be important. This is exemplified in the conventional analysis of colonialism and multinational corporations. Those who live in rich countries may be excused if they find themselves confused, on the one hand they are told that imports from LDCs exploit the underpaid labour force in their regions; on the other that they must open their markets to LDC exports in order to allow development to occur more quickly.

Such questionings although applicable to Professor Murdoch's work are by no means peculiar to it. They would apply to most current studies in this field. By explaining his arguments so well, by the scholarly use of the literature well-documented in the references, and by a helpful index this author has made a distinguished contribution to the debate. His book should be on many undergraduate and postgraduate reading lists but it will also be read with great interest by the wider public which shares a concern about hunger and poverty and wishes better to understand the issues. It is a book for which many readers will be grateful and which, if its message is heard, may help to improve the lives of many millions of people who will not know of its existence.

University of Aberdeen JOHN MARSH

International Money: A Collection of Essays. By Charles P. Kindleberger. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 341 pp. £18·00. Pb: £7·95.*

AS the publishers inform us on the backcover the centrepiece of this collection of twenty-two papers written during 1966–76 is *The Economist* article 'The Dollar and World Liquidity: A Minority View' written by Professor Kindleberger with Emile Despres and Walter S. Salant in 1966. When the article appeared fifteen years ago it made an original contribution to the then current debate and its argument is worth summarising not only for its place in an intellectual history of international money but also because the thesis of 'A Minority View' reverberates through other essays in the book.

The Economist article was addressed to the 'unbelievers' in the Bretton Woods system both in the United States and particularly in Europe. The 'unbelievers' led by Robert Triffin and Jacques Rueff who, although in often bitter disagreement among themselves, watched the simultaneous rise in foreign holdings of U.S. dollars and decline in America's gold reserves and agreed that this increasing mismatch of liabilities to assets would inevitably lead to recurring crises in the system. In response to this analysis Kindleberger *et al* argued that the United States balance of payments deficit was caused primarily by America's lending of capital to Europe and consequently America's external accounts should be exempt from the criteria by which other nations were judged. As the Bretton Woods system developed, the United States became banker to the world. A role deeply resented by the French and regarded with suspicion by the inflation-conscious Germans, and possibly a reason why the system has not been formally reconstructed.

When Professor Kindleberger examines the functioning of the Eurodollar market and calls for an 'Atlantic Open Market Committee' to design world monetary policy, the themes of 'A Minority View' are expanded and this focus highlights the weaknesses of the book. America's abandonment of the dollar/gold parity and the failure of the Committee of 20 to reconstruct an international monetary system—the

most significant event and non-event of the decade which the collection covers—are not addressed by a single essay and remain mentioned only in passing. Because of Professor Kindleberger's unsurpassed ability to present the complex and often unnecessarily mystified issues surrounding international finance and economics clearly and concisely these omissions should be regretted, but they are perhaps not surprising. In reading the essays a belief that the Bretton Woods system was not only working but also working well emerges. It may be too much to expect from a 'believer' that he analyse the system's demise.

The essays which concern themselves with the more general aspects of the international monetary system are the most valuable. A researcher owes a special debt to the two chapters which explain and analyse the numerous definitions of equilibrium in the balance of payments and their individual significance. The technical problems surrounding a change in the price of gold under a system of fixed exchange rates is illuminating and would be understandable to a layman. Finally the book closes with a solid but abstract discussion of the political criteria necessary for the establishment of an international monetary and economic system. Nevertheless these strengths sadly serve to underline the omissions.

Chatham House T. C. THOMPSON

Multinationals Beyond the Market: Intra-Firm Trade and the Control of Transfer Pricing. Edited by Robin Murray. *Brighton: Harvester for the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex. 1981. 335 pp. £22·50*

THE replacement of trade between independent parties, at 'arm's length' prices by intra-firm trade at administered transfer prices is an important corollary of the growth and dominance of multinational firms in the world economy. This book contains papers from two conferences run by the United Nations and the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, which attempt to survey the evidence on intra-firm trade and to analyse possible mechanisms of control.

Transfer prices can only be evaluated as excessive or undervalued by reference to some objective alternative price. The standard technique has been to compare them with arm's-length market prices. However, in many cases, no market or 'world' price can be said to exist. The definition of transfer prices can be unduly widened, as it is in the definition used by Green, 'whenever for reasons related to inadequate national knowledge or bargaining skill a country or nationally controlled enterprise pays too much or receives too little for goods and services bought or sold' (p. 222). This takes us well beyond arm's-length pricing into the concept of the just price. In implementing controls on these lines, national authorities may be attempting to run before they can walk.

The stage is set in a thoughtful introduction by the editor, which nevertheless seriously undervalues the extant literature on transfer pricing and on the economics of internal markets. In the first section of the book, papers by Chudson and Helleiner examine the growth of intra-firm trade. Chudson forcefully puts the case for the arm's-length standard despite its difficulties. Helleiner introduces the goal of 'unintrusiveness' of external relations for less-developed countries and raises the issue of widening the definition of transfer prices to long-term contracts and longstanding customer relationships between unrelated parties—which would include most of world trade. The second section is a most interesting examination of transfer pricing in practice and is rich in the complexity of real world pricing issues. The export of bananas, unwrought copper and aluminium, the insurance and banking sectors, technology transactions and machinery markets are all well-documented and

interesting case studies, which for many readers will be the central interest of this collection.

The third and final section examines the control of transfer pricing. Robin Murray analyses general strategies, concentrating on the development of the market rather than the firm. Frances Stewart looks at the efficacy of taxation as a control, but perhaps a more technical paper is required on this issue. The following chapter on the Restrictive Practices approach to control is all too brief. A challenging paper by Fitzpatrick examines the need for a 'public' as opposed to a 'private' model of law in the control of transfer pricing, although the implications for property rights are not made obvious. Helleiner examines the informational disadvantages of peripheral nations. The chapter by Green equates the just price with elimination of transfer pricing and opens up a wide range of welfare issues. A valuable paper from the US Internal Revenue Service follows, on tax avoidance and/or evasion. Finally, Roumeliotis puts forward a blueprint for a transfer pricing 'commando unit'. Transfer pricing in practice is then examined in chapters on Greece, Colombia and cases under Section 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code (by the US Treasury Department).

Overall, the book represents a good mixture of theory, practice and case material. Perhaps more attention could have been focused on the 'unitary tax' approach on Californian lines. A concluding section is sadly missing and the final impression is the danger that control of transfer pricing, in many instances, is an attempt to deal with too many policy goals at once. This collection can be thoroughly recommended (despite its price) for all interested in this difficult and challenging issue.

University of Bradford Management Centre PETER J. BUCKLEY

HISTORY

The League of Nations Union 1918–1945. By Donald S. Birn. *Oxford: Clarendon Press· Oxford University Press. 1981. 269 pp. £18·50.*

THE League of Nations Union (LNU), which was the predecessor of the UNA, is arguably the most successful foreign policy pressure group that has existed in Britain. It was the manifestation of one of the principles upon which the League of Nations was based: that public opinion could have an effective and beneficial influence upon foreign policy. By 1933 it had over a million members (although only 400,000 of these were paid up [p. 130]) and its Executive Committee included an impressive array of leading public figures. But it is this emphasis on attracting members of which Birn is most critical. He believes that it led to an over-simplification of the idea of the League among the British public which was thereby given 'an unrealistic view of collective security as a kind of abstract principle' (p. 151. See also p. 229).

Every British government between the wars declared its devotion to the League and the LNU's size and quality of leadership made it a force to be reckoned with. Birn believes that League opinion influenced policy in a significant way on the British arms embargo during the Far Eastern crisis in 1933 and on sanctions against Italy in 1935. But this was the exception rather than the rule. More often than not the government went its own way, disregarding the LNU.

On account of the information it provides, Birn's book will be welcomed by all who are interested in the role of public opinion on foreign policy, in British policy towards the League of Nations, and in the British peace movement (and those interested or involved in the contemporary British peace movement will find that a good many of its activities were pre-empted by the LNU). His best chapters are those dealing with specific issues: Manchuria, Abyssinia, the Peace Ballot and the LNU's propaganda

methods. Recurring themes are the difficulties for the LNU of maintaining a non-partisan stance, of deciding how to influence foreign policy, and of knowing how far to go in disagreeing with the government of the day.

The weaknesses of the book largely stem from Birn's attempt to tell the whole history of the LNU in a little under 230 pages. His general chapters on the 'early 1920s', the 'mid-1920s' etc. are too kaleidoscopic. Brevity dictates that some questions are dealt with superficially and conventional wisdom is uncritically accepted. Too many topics are covered in an unstructured way, for example, the Disarmament and Arbitration campaign of the mid-to-late-1920s.

More serious is the absence of sufficient biographical information about the many people who troop through Birn's pages so that a reader who is unversed in British interwar politics would be unable to assess their relative weight and the relationships between them. The organisational structure of the LNU is not clearly described and emerges only in a discussion of criticisms made in the late 1920s (pp. 73-79). It is also difficult to know why Birn does not provide us with the LNU's formal objectives and constitution. But although Birn's book is not without its faults he has undoubtedly provided us with a useful study of an important aspect of British interwar politics.

University of Keele LORNA LLOYD

The Depression and the Developing World, 1914-1939. By A. J. H. Latham. *London: Croom Helm; Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble. 1981. 230 pp. £12·95.*

THIS book is a continuation of the author's book *The International Economy and the Underdeveloped World 1865-1914*. It is a factual, descriptive account of the economic happenings in the developing countries grouped in five chapters—Communications, Money and Capital, International Trade, Population and Migration, Development and Depression. There is no major thesis argued in the book but it should prove useful as a textbook or as a reference book for courses in economic history or on development. The author has brought together the relevant statistics on population, trade, income for a number of major countries which is now called the Third World.

London School of Economics MEGHNAD DESAI

Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-23. By Michael L. Dockrill and Douglas J. Goold. *London: Batsford. 1981. 287 pp. £14·95.*

THE peacemakers at the close of the First World War were not bereft of advice and information. Handbooks and memoranda flooded into them from official and unofficial quarters. What they lacked, however, was time and energy to assimilate, in manageable form, the rich detail with which they were supplied. Students and general readers have been in a somewhat similar position. Detailed monographs have appeared over the last twenty years discussing Yugoslavia, Armenia, Czechoslovakia and Austria (to name only a few) but, despite the attention which has been given to British wartime diplomacy, no one has offered a book on Britain and the peace settlements. So, Dockrill and Goold are to be congratulated on filling a gap.

They deserve praise, too, for not limiting themselves to a consideration of Versailles. Too often in the past the German settlement has been so central that the other issues have been pushed to the side-lines. The authors do indeed begin with the German settlement, after a preliminary consideration of the way in which Britain prepared for peace. It is treated in 55 pages, while the succeeding chapters on East Europe, the Middle East 1919-20, and Turkey 1919-23 are allocated 42, 48 and 71 pages respectively. Thus no reader can fail to realise the way in which the various

issues were related to each other. This is particularly true of British policy towards the dissolving Ottoman empire. Dockrill and Goold do not attempt to disguise the confusions, not to mention the contradictions, into which the British government fell, but point out how greatly the need to mollify the French complicated the picture. Both men have previously published detailed studies of specific aspects of peacemaking and the present work is firmly based upon monographs and official papers together with some reference to private manuscript material. Nevertheless, as will have been realised, this volume does not purport to trace every boundary back to its source (though the maps are helpful in this respect). What it does is provide a clear and concise account of the problems confronting the peacemakers and the way in which they were resolved. A few small slips apart, it is a volume that can be confidently recommended to students who need a succinct summary of complex issues.

That said, the authors might have been more ambitious both in their scattered judgments throughout the text and in their conclusion. They tell us several times that we are still living with the consequences of the peace settlement in Palestine: that Arab–Israeli wars have 'threatened global peace': that the 'betrayal' of the Arabs 'fuelled the fires' of anti-Western and anti-imperialist sentiment. Revelations of this kind could have been restrained and more space devoted to just why the settlement was 'a peace without promise'—a phrase only used as the book's last line.

University of Glasgow KEITH ROBBINS

The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941. By James Neidpath. *Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1981. 296 pp. £22·50.*

THE succession of catastrophes which struck Britain in the Far East at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 seems to hold a perennial attraction for those who find themselves entangled in the tentacles of what William James called 'the PhD octopus'. But James Neidpath's study merits more attention than many of its predecessors because he begins it at the end of the First World War, and traces the story of the construction of the Singapore base from its inception. He also examines the influences which delayed its completion so seriously and explains the reasons why the 'Main Fleet' for whose support it was designed never materialised. His object, he tells us, is to provide answers to questions such as 'could this catastrophe have been averted by swift and wise action on the part of British Governments?' (p. vi)—which is an ambitious undertaking and obviously demands a measure of crystal gazing, which the author does not shirk.

The likelihood of war against Japan and its implications were first raised by Admiral Wemyss as First Sea Lord in a perspicacious paper of March 1919, and thereafter the subject was rarely off the agendas of the CID, Cabinet, Joint Planners, and Overseas Defence Committees. The first and fundamental issue to be resolved was whether the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 should be renewed—which produced a strong clash of views, ending in the substitution of the amorphous Four Power Pact at Washington in 1921; but the decision to develop the new base was actually taken before the pact was signed. The story of the cancellations and delays which ensued is well known, as is the steady increase of the time which would elapse before reinforcements could arrive—which stood at forty-two days until 1937 and then rapidly increased as 'the overriding importance of European complications' became increasingly apparent (p. 101). Another crucial influence was the inter-service quarrel whether the defence should consist mainly of heavy guns or aircraft; and Churchill's relentless opposition as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924–29 certainly contributed to the delays. Beatty as First Sea Lord from 1919 had handled these issues very skilfully, but his retirement in

1927 produced a succession of serious setbacks for the Admiralty. After nine years only £4 millions had been spent on the project—much of it provided by the Empire. To describe this measure of progress as 'a solid achievement' (p. 121) seems exaggerated. Then early in the 1930s Japanese aggression on the mainland of China made it plain that British power to check Japan's territorial ambitions had in fact already been surrendered. Dr Neidpath handles the anxieties of that decade with skill and fairness—even with regard to the much criticised Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935.

As to the defence of the base, attack from rear was recognised from the very beginning as 'the potential Achilles heel of the fortress' (p. 154); but the author argues convincingly that far more could and should have been done by way of preparing defensive positions on the Malayan mainland. With the outbreak of war in Europe the likelihood of reinforcement on anything like the scale sought by the local commanders became a pipe-dream; but Churchill's 'consistently complacent view of the Japanese menace' (p. 179) is only partially, and somewhat contradictorily, offset by the author's conclusion that his decision to give priority to support for Russia (which received 676 aircraft and 446 tanks in 1941) and supply of the Middle East theatre was the correct strategic option. No mention is made of the use made by the Soviet Union of those supplies, which could of course have been vital to Singapore; but the available evidence suggests that it was slight.

This carefully researched and heavily referenced work is not easy reading, and its price will place it out of the reach of the layman; but it should be of use to experts on the subject. I am glad that the author has included an Appendix which should dispel the oft-repeated myth that the big guns of Singapore were in 1942 'pointing in the wrong direction'. In fact all but one of the 15-inch and *all* the smaller defences had all round traverse and, subject to technical limitations which are not here explained entirely correctly, could and did use the freedom thereby given them during the last days of the siege.

STEPHEN ROSKILL

Britannia At Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan 1931–1941. By Paul Haggie. *Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1981. 264 pp. £16·00.*

MR HAGGIE'S book survives a very severe test. Since it appeared we have also been presented, posthumously, with a major work on the same theme by the master-historian of the Royal Navy in the twentieth century, Professor Arthur Marder's, *Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic Illusions 1936–1941* (also from OUP). It is fair to say that Mahan's great successor would have found himself in harmony with Mr Haggie on most essential points—except, perhaps, that the latter is implicitly critical of Admiral Pound's surrender over the sending of *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* to Singapore whereas Marder—distancing himself once again from Captain Roskill—submits a robust defence.

The most significant word in Mr Haggie's title is 'Empire', for the British failure in this regard was comprehensive. The Far Eastern estate vanished in a flash, but so also did any hope of defending Australasia: had it not been for the American victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway, Australia and New Zealand would have been naked. Yet of all the sad and sometimes shameful aspects of British policy in the decade under review, nothing is more deplorable than the way—as Mr Haggie remorselessly reveals—that the mother country kept the Antipodes in the dark about the Royal Navy's inability to provide a powerful deterrent in eastern waters. Churchill's

'terminological inexactitude' is a charitable description for some of H.M. Government's intentionally Delphic utterances, while the concept of a 'Main Fleet to Singapore', stubbornly sustained for so long, is shown up here as a delusion which should have been identified as such by the Admiralty long before the fall of France, and the introduction of Russian convoys, made even the blind see.

Churchill himself, always at his most obtuse over East-of-Suez matters, emerges once again from these pages as a man caught in traps set by himself. The move of his mind from his blocking policy as Chancellor in the 1920s to his final fantasy that Singapore was 'a fortress' shows him swaying from one pole of unreality to another. His pardonable concentration on the German menace kept him in blinkers as regards Japan, whose military capability he consistently under-rated. Though he had twice been the Admiralty's Supremo and the *soi-disant* master of naval strategy, his insistence on sending two capital ships to Singapore in 1941 without adequate air cover was lamentable. The argument that this was fundamentally a political decision simply means, as Mr Haggie demonstrates, that all those half-truths and empty promises communicated to Australia and New Zealand had at last come home to roost.

Perhaps the most bitter irony distilled from Mr Haggie's impressive research is the fact that in the end the Americans had to pull the fat out of the fire: yet he shows how for too many years—indeed until it was too late—people in Whitehall and Westminster were reluctant and even petulantly cynical about concerting policies with the United States. The main thrust of his book may be summarised in a note written by Hankey for Baldwin: 'The real fact to be faced is that over a period of years all the Defence services have been starved . . . They can stage Navy Weeks, Tattoos and Air Displays, but cannot sustain a major war. We have but a façade of Imperial Defence.'

RONALD LEWIN

The German Problem Reconsidered. Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present. Pb. edn. By David Calleo. *Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1981. 239 pp. Pb: £4·95. (First publ. 1978.)*

IT is hardly surprising that experience and knowledge of the Nazi years have resulted in ambivalence being the predominant feeling of most non-Germans towards Germany, the Germans, and modern German history. This is true whether one sees the Nazi years as an 'episode' of aberration or irrelevance to the mainstream of German history since the mid-nineteenth century, or whether they are seen as part and parcel of the 'continuity' of modern German history. David Calleo's interpretative survey (now issued in paperback) of the 'German problem' as he puts it, is mainly concerned with getting to grips with the causes, justifications, and even the misconceptions involved in these attitudes of ambivalence.

While there is a great deal that is interesting in this survey of German history from Bismarck to Brandt, the reader should be aware that it obviously belongs to some kind of 'revisionist' school which seeks, among other things, to de-particularise the 'German problem' in history. Calleo feels it is wrong to see Germany 'as an isolated case, a country with broad characteristics presumed not to exist elsewhere' so that the 'habit of seeing German culture as unique has a parallel in the tendency to view German unification as a malevolent accident that befell an otherwise harmonious European system' (pp. 2-3). Up to a point—and one needs to stress the qualification—one can hardly dispute this; nor his standpoint (which he shares with Professor Norman Rich) that 'perhaps the proper conclusion is not so much that civilisation was uniquely weak in Germany, but that it is fragile everywhere' (p. 6).

Nevertheless, the overwhelming revisionist purpose and tendencies of this book are

revealed by the argument that Germany's constant involvement in wars since the 1860s must be explained by the fact that a unified and dynamic Germany came 'late' upon a European scene which, by its very nature and unlike the overseas empires of Britain and Russia, could permit no 'adjustment' of power to accommodate the 'upstart': 'Hence, while Britain came to preside over half the globe, and both Russia and the United States relentlessly filled out their continental hinterlands, Germany was expected to remain locked within the tight frame of Europe's traditional balance of power. From a German view, preserving the European balance, while extra-European giants formed all around, meant condemning Germany to mediocrity and, ultimately, all of Europe to external domination' (p. 5). But more than this faint echo of simplistic pre-1914 German propaganda follows. Calleo attacks what he regards as the tendency 'of victors to write history in their favour' and suggests instead that 'as the Second World War grows further away in time, and as we grow less confident of our own virtue, wisdom, and power, or of the system that our victory imposed upon the world, perhaps we are ready to consider the German Problem in a new light' (pp. 5–6).

Perhaps, but not entirely after reading this book. Calleo, like all authors attempting to throw fresh light on old subjects, does have interesting things to say on subjects like Bismarck himself, the role of the Junkers in Wilhelmine Germany and their actual influence on domestic and foreign policy, the economic factors influential in shaping the foreign policies of Wilhelmine and Hitler's Germany (the Weimar Republic is totally ignored in this book), and on Germany's post-1945 position and role in a world dominated by the super-powers of America and Russia. However, one's initial misgivings aroused by the Introduction are never entirely dispersed. By their very nature such books, whose chief purpose seems to be the idea that all powers are as 'wicked' as each other and that is is almost historical 'accident' that any particular individual or nation is singled out for special blame, tend to blur the edge of accurate and individual responsibility for such crises as 1914 (p. 49), and 1939 where the author clearly and proudly follows in the steps of A. J. P. Taylor (pp. 96–97). It comes as no surprise then to see the author neatly sidestep any real examination of the Nazi *Endlösung* of the Jewish question, discussion of anti-Semitism conveniently being shifted to nineteenth century Germany (pp. 194ff).

While the book may, in parts, be stimulating it is one that students without a broad and deep knowledge of the subject should use with some care and caution.

JOHN P. FOX

German Socialism and Weimar Democracy. By Richard Breitman. *Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 1981. 283 pp. $20.00.*

THIS book has an interest extending far beyond the demise of the Weimar Republic, which has been related so often in elegaic prose; it must also interest all who have recently observed Mitterrand's negotiations with the French Communist Party, or indeed the current struggle within the British Labour Party. For the Weimar story is the classic case of disastrous Marxist in-fighting, with the SDP—at least nominally a Marxist party until 1959—believing that socialism and salvation could only be found within a democratic framework, and the KPD taking up the Leninist posture of a revolutionary elite and insisting on the immediate 'dictatorship of the proletariat', regardless of the state of the economy, or of the wishes of the proletariat itself. In Weimar until 1922 there was even the Independant SPD (USPD), vainly trying to straddle the ever-widening gap between the other two Marxist parties. Because the USPD so well illustrates the predicament, it is surprising that Richard Breitman does not give it more space. He gives only one mention apiece to the important role of the

Comintern and to the Halle Congress, at which the USPD split; neither, incidentally figures in the Index.

The aim of the book is to examine developments from the SPD's point of view. The fact remains that the main pressure on the SPD—at least until the Nazi surge of 1930—came from the KPD, which was successfully competing for the working-class vote, unencumbered by the onus of collaboration with the bourgeois parties. It is therefore disappointing that Breitman does not attempt even a cursory analysis of the KPD's differing interpretations of Marxist dogma. Thus the important theoretical role of Rosa Luxemburg, who also differed from Lenin, is only once briefly mentioned in a later chapter, dealing with the career of Rudolf Hilferding (ch. 7). In relation to the November Revolution, Breitman belittles the part played by the Spartacists, who, he writes (p. 31), 'were without significant influence'. He seems not to have grasped the fateful significance of their control of the Berlin streets in precipitating Ebert's decision to seek the aid of General Groener.

Within the Left as a whole the other principal agent of pressure on the SPD was the General Federation of Trade Unions (ADGB), which is examined in greater depth, especially in relation to two crucial episodes: Chancellor Mueller's resignation in 1930, and the decision to offer no active resistance to Papen's take-over in Prussia in 1932. The importance of the ADGB is also stressed in a useful Appendix on The Social Democratic Organisation; but one looks in vain for a statement of the divided nature of trade unionism, as a whole, which prevented the workers from speaking with a single, powerful voice.

If the foregoing comments sound mainly critical, this should not be allowed to obscure the book's undoubted merits. Breitman's narrative is readable, well-balanced and scrupulously researched. One is grateful, too, for the full treatment given to developments in Prussia, where the SPD clung to a share of power, thus providing the chief element of stability in the short life of the Republic. An appendix listing Prussian *Landtag* elections might well have been added to that listing elections to the *Reichstag*.

R. CECIL

The Road to Nuremberg. By Bradley F. Smith. *London: Deutsch. 1981. 303 pp. £7·95.*

IN this work Professor Smith returns to some of the issues discussed by his earlier book *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* (Deutsch 1977). There the most valuable part of his treatment was an extensive review of the process by which the eight members of the International Military Tribunal arrived at their verdicts and sentences upon Göering and his fellow-defendants. The preliminary section, which provided a brief account of the political and diplomatic haggling prior to the actual establishment of the court, has now been greatly enlarged to form the present volume.

The central theme is the evolution of war crimes policy in Washington—where most of the preparatory running was made—from the autumn of 1944 until early June 1945. Thus, somewhat oddly, the account stops two months short of the signing of the inter-Allied London Agreement and five months short of the start of the main proceedings. However, in regard to the span that he has chosen to cover, Professor Smith supplies a finely detailed and well-annotated guide to the extremely tortuous route by which the Americans arrived at their proposals not only to mount some brand of full-scale trial but also one with the particular innovatory features which ultimately characterised the Nuremberg hearings. He is surely right to observe that 'few important decisions made by a major power in recent years have enjoyed such a lavish expenditure of time, thought, and reconsideration as did the conspiracy/criminal-organisation plan of 1944–45'. The author is highly adept in illuminating the manner

in which many of the most cogent objections to proceedings of the Nuremberg type, especially in the outstandingly vulnerable area of 'the crime of aggressive war', were debated extensively within Washington itself at a very early stage. Other features that come through strongly are the bureaucratic rivalries between the War Department and other organs of government, as well as the contrast between the wooliness of Roosevelt's approach to relevant issues and the far more decisive stance adopted by Truman right from the opening days of his Presidency. Overall Professor Smith gives us little reason to doubt the American government's broad wisdom in eventually steering away not only from the crude revanchism advocated by Morgenthau and his Treasury aides (seemingly triumphant on the war crimes front during Roosevelt and Churchill's Quebec meeting of September 1944) but also from the more timorous legal conservatism which threatened to yield only minimal action against the leading Nazis on the judicial plane at least.

Regarding Whitehall's role in the preparatory negotiations, the book produces little that is new by way of direct evidence; even so, its comprehensive analysis of the conflicts and ambiguities within the American camp makes its possible for us to assess less harshly some of the reciprocal oscillations in policy discernable on the part of figures like Eden and Simon as they were driven away from their initial insistence on summary execution. At the point where Professor Smith's volume finishes the major British contribution lay still ahead. Nowhere was it more valuable than inside the offices and courtroom at Nuremberg itself. As we learn progressively more about the preceding muddle and uncertainty, the eventual achievements of Fyfe and Shawcross as advocates and of Lawrence and Birkett as judges stand out all the more sharply. The task which they, and their American counterparts, had to fulfil was—especially within the context of the embarrassing Soviet presence—neither very enviable in prospect nor altogether untarnished in outcome. But Professor Smith's recent studies have certainly indicated just how easy it would have been for the whole operation to have turned out very much worse, both as an exercise in practical politics and as an exercise in the application of justice.

University of Reading MICHAEL D. BIDDISS

The United States, Britain and Appeasement 1936–1939. By C. A. MacDonald. *London: Macmillan for St Antony's College, Oxford. 1981. 220 pp. £15·00.*

IN this austere study, based on an Oxford PhD thesis, the author poses various questions about American perceptions of European and Far Eastern events and its diplomatic relations with Britain, France and Germany. On the British side Dr MacDonald demonstrates that Neville Chamberlain had become mistrustful of Roosevelt's ability to support rhetoric with action several months before the showdown with Eden over the President's overture in February 1938. In view of the German and Italian threats Chamberlain was not willing to risk a quarrel with Japan 'and I very much fear that after a lot of ballyhoo the Americans will somehow fade out and leave us to carry all the blame and the odium' (p. 42).

On the American side, Dr MacDonald stresses the continuing rivalry between pro and anti-appeasement groups in the administration and shows how little scope Roosevelt had for doing anything positive. This became depressingly evident to the British during the Munich period when tough American gestures were followed by precipitate retreat in face of Hitler's determination. Prominent members of the American administration (notably Sumner Welles) continued to place a naïve trust in the moderating influence of the German generals and of Göring. American policy changed—in theory anyway—from appeasement to containment and the arming of the democracies soon after Munich, and Roosevelt became increasingly irritated by

Chamberlain's continuing quest for an Anglo-German agreement. American suspicion that Chamberlain was seeking a sinister economic deal with Hitler at their expense was deep-rooted and persisted right up to the outbreak of war. The efforts of Roosevelt and the anti-appeasement group to arm and encourage the democracies had some limited successes (as in pressing Britain into adopting conscription in April 1939), but signally failed to deter Hitler who rightly discounted a power with weak armaments and a neutrality law. Despite the President's diplomatic manoeuvres and warlike rhetoric, America did not enter the war until it was directly attacked.

This study, perhaps reflecting the overriding concern of several of the major participants such as Cordell Hull, attaches great importance throughout to economic considerations, but is less impressive in its coverage of strategic factors. Dr MacDonald, for example, correctly mentions that in February 1939 Chamberlain appeared optimistic that appeasement was working, but it was worth pointing out that in the same month he accepted, albeit reluctantly, that Britain must abandon 'limited liability' and pledge military support to France on the Continent. He also states erroneously (p. 178) that it was the German invasion of France, rather than the Norwegian fiasco, that led to Chamberlain's fall. There are too many printing errors for such an expensive monograph, most of them merely irritating, but the statement on page 166 that 'The State Department was *now* wholly convinced' (that Britain was not negotiating secretly with Germany) is misleading because 'not' is surely required in context. These blemishes apart, and a regret that the presentation is so clinically detached, this book makes a generally convincing contribution to a surprisingly neglected aspect of the diplomacy of appeasement.

King's College, London BRIAN BOND

The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950. By Frank A. Ninkovich. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 253 pp. £15·00.*

THIS book is about the development of cultural policy as an instrument of American diplomacy between 1938 and 1950. It is an elusive topic, and at first sight one that seems to have only marginal relevance to the main issues of American foreign relations. It is a tribute to Dr Ninkovich that he has not only pinned it down, but shown convincingly how the debate over the use of culture illustrates key assumptions in America's world-view during this period.

Until the late 1930s the cultural aspects of Washington's international dealings were left in the hands of the great private foundations, and it was not until 1938 that the State Department entered the picture with the establishment of the Division of Cultural Relations, in response to Axis penetration of Latin America. From that point on, however, government involvement deepened, and the Second World War produced some messianic blue-prints, notably that of Professor Ralph Turner, which envisaged a world made safe for democracy by 'both the exercise of power and the use of cultural relations programs'. Though this grandiose design was not to be put through, government activity in the cultural sphere became intense with the onset of the cold war, and Dr Ninkovich closes with the emergence of the fervidly anti-Communist Congress for Cultural Freedom in the summer of 1950.

His conclusion is that the American concept of a world striving towards a universal culture has been a gross distortion of reality, in that it has failed to recognise that the interests of the world at large do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the United States or that there is an inherent cultural diversity at work which cannot be brought into conformity with any one model. These are familiar arguments, but Dr Ninkovich brings a wealth of new archival evidence to bear in support of them.

Readers of his book will gain a better understanding of the cultural illusions which contributed to the disasters of Vietnam and Iran and which are still all too evident *vis-à-vis* El Salvador today. It is the sad story of a country which thought it had nothing to learn and which in spite of everything persists in thinking so.

University of Hull JOHN MAJOR

Power and Culture: The Japanese–American War, 1941–1945. By Akira Iriye. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1981. 304 pp. £13·20.*

THIS book operates at various levels. At the level of history it is a sophisticated narrative of American-Japanese relations from the 1930s to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam declaration in 1945. In a series of chronological chapters, Professor Iriye analyses in parallel the attitudes of the United States and Japan to the global war—especially to the changing roles of China and Russia in it. Since his study is based on the widest use of Japanese and American sources, both printed and archival, he gives us the most up-to-date and authoritative account on many hotly debated points.

One of the most impressive sections is his treatment of Japan's peace initiatives. From the time of Yalta onwards, some of the national leaders outside the government wanted to sue for peace direct to the United States and Britain, where they thought that Japan could be successful in securing peace, even if on harsh terms. Instead the government through Foreign Minister Togo preferred to begin talks with the Soviet Union in order to prevent its entry into the war but also to enlist its co-operation as a mediator to bring the war to an end. Even when Tokyo was warned that this would only subject Japan to the fate of east European countries, Togo persisted in negotiating rather than accept unconditional surrender. In Iriye's view, this dangerously delayed the return of peace with the agonising consequences that entailed for Japan.

The second level of the book is, as the title suggests, that of international relations theory. Iriye explains his approach thus: 'the actors in world affairs can be viewed as powers and cultures . . . international relations are interpower *and* intercultural relations. . . The study of international relations must therefore entail three categories of inquiry· power-level interactions, cultural interchanges, and the relationship between these two sets of relations' (p. vii) During the war both nations were concerned with 'defining what they were struggling to preserve'. They sought to articulate their war and peace aims for rhetorical and practical reasons. Interestingly and surprisingly enough, it is Iriye's conclusion that, as the war was nearing its end, Japan's statesmen began to plan for 'a cooperative world structure that was remarkably similar to the ideas of American policy-makers.' The book demonstrates that the Japanese and Americans based their strategic thinking on a number of similar, and at times parallel, assumptions. Professor Iriye gives the reader the detailed evidence on which these conclusions are based and enables him to form a judgment of his own. The evidence Iriye adduces is itself rich in new insights, especially on Japanese thinking.

London School of Economics I. H. NISH

The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947. By Terry H. Anderson. *Columbia, London: University of Missouri Press. 1981. 256 pp. £10·80*

Eisenhower and the Cold War. By Robert A. Divine. *New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 182 pp. £7·50.*

NATIONAL ambitions are not eliminated by alliances and wartime coalitions. It comes as no surprise, then, to learn that the Atlantic partnership in the Second World War

exposed vital differences as well as points of common interest. Franklin Roosevelt reflected his country's general suspicion of British colonialism, the British class system and British diplomacy. He could not approve of Churchill's attempt to carve up Europe with Stalin and he objected to British interference in the domestic affairs of Greece and Italy. The Americans believed that the Allies should only intervene when political conditions in the liberated areas actually jeopardised military operations. So diplomatic comradeship did not come naturally to Britain and the United States. Like the most compatible marriage partners they still had to work to keep their alliance together. There were high points and low points; and these vicissitudes were shaped by day-to-day events.

Truman's accession to the presidency witnessed a continuation of these fluctuations. The new president began his term by trying to patch up the disenchantment that Roosevelt had experienced in the last few weeks of his life. But with growing difficulties in Germany and Eastern Europe Truman was soon forced into co-operating more closely with London. However, his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, was convinced that he could still save the world from the cold war and so he deliberately distanced himself from his own department and from the Foreign Office. But Americans no longer wished to play the role of intermediary and so by the autumn of 1946 'cooperation became a habit'. Universalism seemed unworkable and the United Nations seemed only to reflect problems, not resolve them. So when Truman proclaimed his Doctrine in March 1947, he not only confirmed the extension of American power overseas but he also acknowledged the existence of a Western interest.

The vicissitudes of the Atlantic partnership are documented in careful detail in Anderson's study. He has looked at a wide range of archival material and has thoughtfully condensed the available information. At times he is too immersed in the sources. Foreign Office minutes naturally contain comments that were critical of American policy; but expressions of discontent at the desk are not always translated into national rift. Anglo-American relations undoubtedly had their ups and downs, but it is questionable whether these fluctuations did much to change the character of the early cold war. Byrnes's belief in his personal ability to work out a rapprochement with the Soviet Union was moulded by his estimation of British policy, but it was influenced even more by his misplaced confidence in Stalin's malleability.

In many respects, Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, shared Byrnes's optimism about the future of American-Soviet relations. In his short study of Eisenhower's foreign policy, Robert Divine echoes the beliefs shared by so many historians who believe they have drawn the appropriate lessons from the Vietnam war. According to Divine, Eisenhower combined good sense and a guarded scepticism to provide the United States with eight years of peace and a healthy awareness of the dangers of nuclear escalation. His bequest was not without irony: Eisenhower was personally responsible for the 'New Look' in defense policy, a policy that substituted nuclear deterrence for containment. Yet Ike was skillful enough to employ the threat of nuclear bombardment without ever getting close to the brink of implementing such a threat. Thus in the Indochina war, he desisted from intervening while making it quite clear that he would use the nuclear arsenal to deter Chinese intervention. Similarly, he introduced a deliberate note of ambiguity in his veiled threat to employ tactical weapons in the crisis over Quemoy and Matsu. He neglected the advice of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to threaten an automatic attack; he liked to keep his adversaries guessing. Divine argues that Ike kept careful control over foreign policy. His Secretary of State was not an irresistible intellectual force, but a yeast who activated Eisenhower into assuming full responsibility for diplomacy. Eisenhower made it quite clear that he did not share Dulles's implicit approval of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956. Ike may well have had such overall command, but

Divine ignores the fact the President could not convince the public that this was the case; Dulles still left more hallmarks than Eisenhower. The President, for example, was aware of the force of Arab nationalism, but he deliberately masked that force—deflecting attention onto the fairly negligible threat of communism in the Middle East. Eisenhower's greatest ambition was to secure arms control and the reduction of international tension. His sincerity was credible and genuine. But he had played a considerable role himself in the initiation of a nuclear arms build-up at the beginning of his administration. The 'New Look' probably doomed the disarmament talks as much as Gary Powers, high above Russian skies in his U-2.

University of Keele R. A. GARSON

Materialen zur Zeitgeschichte. Vol. 2: **Oesterreich und die Grossmachte.** Edited by Alfons Schilcher. Vienna: Geyer. 1980. 359 pp.

A PRODUCT of the 'jubilee' celebrations of the Treaty, this collection of Austrian official documents covers the period of the four-power occupation, illustrating the evolution of Allied and Austrian relations from the end of the Second World War until the conclusion of the *Staatsvertrag.* As such they may be read in conjunction with Prof. Gerald Stourzh's *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945-55*, a revised edition of which was likewise published last year. The earlier part of the book will perhaps be of interest mainly in Austria itself. But from about 1953 onwards the documentation offers a wider appeal, both because of the way it leads up to the final settlement and, for British readers at least, from the fact that the archives relating to these developments are still subject to the thirty-year rule, so that exchanges between the British and Austrian governments, and the constribution of British negotiators to that settlement, are made available for the first time. A good deal of space is naturally also given to the Soviet Union, including the views of the egregious Austrian Ambassador in Moscow, Bischoff, whose reputation for credulity is not belied here. (Thus, as late as April 1955, one finds him ascribing to the British Foreign Office the desire to 'leave open the door to an *Anschluss* with Germany'!)

On the whole, the documents confirm that Austria's salvation lay in not having been of prime importance, as an end in itself, for postwar Soviet policy, but rather a bargaining counter to be used in a broader context as occasion warranted. And eventually, after Stalin's death, when the first inklings of detente appeared on the European scene—and when their control of the Eastern zone, limited as it was, must have come to be seen by the Russians as a declining asset—a general withdrawal from Austria evidently struck them as a price worth paying to that end. At the same time, however, the book lends no credence to the popular version that neutrality was the key that unlocked the Treaty—though certainly there would have been no treaty without it. On the contrary, these pages show that the country's ultimate status was never seen by the West as other than alliance-free; and that the Russians could always have had any assurances in this sense that they wanted. True, the technical problems of any actual neutrality declaration (and its timing), like those too of a possible four-power guarantee to Austria, raised issues that helped to account for the somewhat exaggerated Western misgivings over the Austrian mission to Moscow in the final stage: not that the West were alone in their doubts of Soviet intentions, for it looks indeed as though only the Chancellor Julius Raab—not even his governmental colleagues—in fact knew, from his secret and personal talks with the Russians, that the outcome of that visit would be a satisfactory one.

MICHAEL CULLIS

WESTERN EUROPE

Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe. By Jaroslav Krejčí and Vítězslav Velímský. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 279 pp. £14·95.*

THIS comparative study, by two authors apparently of Czechoslovak origin, may be warmly recommended to persons who genuinely wish to understand the problems of nationalism in European politics, and are prepared to do some fairly hard thinking. The writing is clear and to the point, even if there is perhaps a little too much sociological jargon for some tastes. The facts and the ideas are stated in brief and compact form. This is not a book for those who believe that no idea should be expressed in less than twenty pages, and that each should be wrapped up in closely bandaged layers of gobbledygook. But members of the vanishing species who aspire to learn and to think, will find it most valuable.

The first part discusses definitions and currently fashionable interpretations. It is well done and fair. The present writer disagrees with some of the authors' views, but has no space here to argue them out. The authors have succumbed, to a greater extent than they need, to the modish preference for diagrams and symbols, but in fairness one must note that their arguments are also fully expounded in normal language Many of their tables, with numbers and categories of national groups, are excellent.

The second part takes a number of situations, spread over Europe, each with somewhat different relationships between dominant and minority nations within states or between fractions of one arguably single nation divided between several states. The sections on minor language groups and minor nations in North and West European states are especially interesting.

In the third part the authors discuss in general terms the connection between religion and national identity, and the economic aspects of national problems. The last chapters consider future prospects. These are frankly disappointing sections. The argument is disconnected, often very naïve, the occasional flippancies sometimes entertaining and sometimes silly, and the flow of thought in the end simply trickles into the sand. But then that is perhaps of the very essence of the subject.

Two comments in inevitably oversimplified form. In the course of frequently using such phrases as 'ethnic', 'political nation' and 'cultural nation', the distinction between groups which effectively feel themselves to be nations and so act, and groups which are merely distinguished from others by certain identifiable features, is lost; and the problem of the varying ratio between the nationally conscious minority of a community and its mass for whom the minority claims to speak, is not tackled. Scots and Catalans on the one hand, and Friulians and Frisians on the other, are not the same sort of community. Secondly, in discussing the uses of the words 'nation' and 'nationality', and the theoretical distinctions argued by various intellectuals and politicians based on them, the authors do not take sufficient account of the ignorance of history (for example, among American or English theoreticians) or the prejudices ('my group is a nation, yours a nationality, or a tribe, or a clan, or whatever', a way of thinking very widespread among dominant, or even only briefly dominant, nations in Central Europe, but by no means only there). The authors seem to hold the simple conventional wisdom that 'Nationalism' is a 'Bad Thing'. There is more to it than that. To sum up, the book is a job well done, it has brought light to bear on a difficult theme, and has added very little to the confusion which surrounds it.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London HUGH SETON-WATSON

European Cooperation Today. Edited by Kenneth J. Twitchett. *London: Europa. 1980. 285 pp. £12·95.*

THIS is a curate's egg of a book. It is not, as the blurb suggests, a comprehensive survey of 'the most significant European organisations', even though all the many intergovernmental organisations appear in its pages. One of the four categories of European regional organisations which Kenneth Twitchett outlined in his introductory chapter, those covering pan-European co-operation, scarcely appear at all. There are virtually no references to that little studied organisation, the UNECE, and few more to the semi-institutionalised framework for confrontation and co-operation which is the CSCE. A historical essay on Britain's ambivalent relationship with successive experiments in European co-operation might usefully have been complemented by a similar essay on France or Germany. There is an excellent chapter (by Geoffrey Dennis) on European monetary co-operation since the end of the Second World War which stands on its own as a functional chapter, without parallels in the industrial or agricultural fields. There is a rather discursive chapter on cultural co-operation, noting the number of different organisations involved, which provides the reader with little opportunity to assess the effectiveness of what has been achieved. There is no concluding chapter.

There are, however, some very useful and workmanlike chapters on particular areas of European co-operation, clearly aimed at the interested but inexpert reader: providing potted histories, brief analyses of problems, and some thoughts about future direction. I was particularly impressed with the chapter on Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, by Ieuan John. Ian Fletcher's chapter on the Council of Europe focuses, justifiably, on its work in the field of human rights. I regretted that the chapter on NATO and the Euro Group, by Phil Williams, did not take further the hints in the opening chapter about the tensions between European and Atlantic perspectives in co-operation, at a time when inchoate ideas are being floated on extending European co-operation into the security field. Carol Twitchett provides two chapters on the European Community's internal and external relations, and Clive Archer provides a basic and helpful introduction to Nordic co-operation.

This is not a book which the reader will pursue from start to finish. Indeed, many of the underlying issues raised in the first chapter—the distinction between a common market and an economic community, the tensions between European and Atlantic co-operation, the importance of collective defence arrangements for effective regional co-operation—are largely neglected later in the book. But it is the sort of volume which many readers of international affairs will want to keep on their bookshelves, as a useful point of reference on aspects of European co-operation which rarely hit the headlines of the press.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

The European Parliament: What is It—What it Does—How it Works. By Michael Palmer. *Oxford: Pergamon. 1981. 235 pp.*

MICHAEL PALMER, Deputy Director General at the European Parliament, has written a book of interest to academics and the general reader. The style is clear and devoid of jargon. The history, organisation and functions of the European Parliament within the European Community (EC) are illuminated. Almost half the book consists of an appendix listing all Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), their EC and national party affiliations, the country and constituency they represent, date and place of birth and contact addresses. A second appendix refers to books and works on the European Parliament the author found useful, and a third deals with 'recent

developments' outlining the importance of the isoglucose case to the European Parliament's powers, action over the draft 1981 EC budget, and the effect on the European Parliament's functioning of the addition of twenty-four Greek MEPs.

The book opens with a chapter summarising briefly the direct elections results and pointing out anomalies arising from the different electoral systems employed by the Nine in 1979. While this is done well, and while the author points out that the 410-strong European Parliament in 1979 saw a higher proportion of women parliamentarians (66/410) elected than in any other Western parliament except the Danish (p. 16), he refers to all MEPs and voters as 'he' (for example, 'What can the Member do for his voters?', p. 17). Not only is this irritating, it inadvertently overlooks half the electorate, and is the costly trap several political parties and those responsible for election posters and material fell into during the Euro-election campaign when they recognised belatedly the problem of assuming all candidates, MEPs and voters to be male. If authors wish to avoid repeating he/she, then they should resort to the plural 'they'.

The chapter on the European Parliament's institutional role and powers is straightforward and unprovocative. The section on the European Parliament and the budget is not only clear but deals with innovations like the Ortoli facility (p. 39) and the elected MEPs' rejection of the 1980 budget concisely. It raises also contentious points about MEPs' ability to control EC expenditure. Michael Palmer highlights also the drawbacks in MEPs' powers to supervise the Commission and Council of Ministers, noting in particular the virtual unaccountability of the Council of Ministers and COREPER's total unaccountability. Interesting points are raised but the severe weaknesses of Question Time are diplomatically glossed-over.

Before turning to the European Parliament's internal organisation and its political groups, Michael Palmer usefully outlines the European Parliament's role in External Relations.

For anyone wanting to know just what MEPs do, Chapter 5 provides insights into their typically busy schedules, their salaries (ranging from £24,376 in France to £9,389 in Ireland) and the horrendous problems of the European Parliament lacking a permanent seat.

In Chapter 6 dealing with the future, the author discusses some interesting aspects of how the European Paliament's effectiveness could be increased, including (if necessary) amendment to articles of the Rome Treaty (p. 124). Finally, the author enthusiastically explains how the European Parliament's role in the EC could be dynamically developed, but realistically cautions against it failing to develop its political teeth and, thereby, making the future of democracy in the EC 'a mere charade' (p. 138).

The book is an admirably concise and clear guide to the European Parliament written by an insider for outsiders. While numerous controversial political points are not explored and some interpretations are open to dispute, the book will be useful to general readers and to new students of the EC.

University of Hull JULIET LODGE

West Germany: A European and Global Power. Edited by Wilfrid L. Kohl and Georgio Basevi. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington for the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. 1981. (Distrib. by Gower, Farnborough.) 224 pp. £10·00.*

THE chapters in this book represent papers given at a conference in Johns Hopkins University at Bologna in 1978. It is therefore somewhat out of date, particularly as some of the authors are mainly concerned with West Germany's payments surpluses. The intention of the conference was to establish how far West Germany had in fact

become a great power economically and politically. The general conclusions seem to have been that, economically, the Federal Republic was to be blamed for not accepting a greater role in managing the international monetary system and that its foreign policy had not significantly changed from the 1950s.

The essays on foreign affairs are so bland and generalised, however, that it is difficult to draw any worthwhile conclusions from them. More interesting aspects of the book are the attempts by Hager and Hankel to explain the prolonged success of German exports in terms of domestic economic policy. Both assume that this has now come to an end but their alternative policy recommendations are not very convincing, particularly Hankel's plea to restore the importance of medium-sized firms, the 'guardian angels' of the economy. Steinherr presents some useful data and argues convincingly that the European Community has had virtually no effect on German industrial development. Priebe launches, in shorter form, another denunciation of the Community's agricultural policy and, unlike most contributors, makes some useful suggestions; particularly that regional agricultural expenditure within a properly financed regional policy would better achieve the original aims of the CAP.

The translations from the German are at times so bad as to make the essays incomprehensible and some of the contributions apparently made in English are little better. It is a shocking reflection on a publishing house with such resources that it should publish a work which is not in a sensible and correct form of the English language and is frequently in gibberish.

UMIST, University of Manchester ALAN MILWARD

The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. By Grant Amyot. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 252 pp. £12·95.*

The Nature of the Italian Party System: A Regional Case Study. By Geoffrey Pridham. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 283 pp. £12·95.*

GRANT AMYOT'S contribution to the wealth of literature appearing on the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in recent years is an illustration that 'Eurocommunism'—the logical extension of the Popular Front strategy of class alliances pursued in various guises since 1935—need not necessarily have developed in Italy in the 1970s into a cautious and circuitous route to socialism through an 'Historic Compromise' with the Christian Democrats (DC). On the contrary, he argues that the *via italiana* could have become a radical strategy for the rapid achievement of socialism, without in any way de-emphasising the PCI's independence from Moscow, or its progress towards internal party democracy. The chief proponent of this radical alternative was Pietro Ingrao, who in the early 1960s, when the precise route of the *via italiana* was still to be mapped out, argued in favour of a more central role for the working class and a greater emphasis on socialism as an immediate objective of the class struggle, than others in the party. It was only with Ingrao's defeat that the road was finally open to the conservative interpretation of the Eurocommunist strategy, with its heavy emphasis on alliances with the 'middle-strata' and even part of the bourgeoisie, in pursuit of an intermediate (non-socialist) phase of 'progressive democracy'. The book is thus an Italian case study of that ambiguous twentieth-century theme, the deradicalisation of the working-class party. Amyot accounts for the defeat of the Ingrao left by looking at its bases of support at provincial leadership level in five very different Communist federations. He concludes that the conditions favourable to Ingrao (inter alia, rapid economic change and the presence in the party of a 'critical' number of intellectuals—not too many and not too few!) were uneven and thinly spread, thus preventing a solid basis of support among provincial cadres and rank-and-file activists. Moreover, the issues dividing the party were more complex than a clear left-right

division, and this tended to cut Ingrao off from his natural allies. Despite the defeat of the left, however, Amyot clearly retains considerable sympathy for its ideas, and the final three chapters of the book provide an interesting critique of PCI strategy from the vital Congress, in 1966, to the end of the 1970s.

One does not have to share his ideas to find them well worth reading. Overall, this is an exceptionally valuable work. It is not without its faults; the empirical research at times seems rather unsuited to the type of conclusions Amyot draws, and the argument is often difficult to follow as a result of unstated assumptions. But, steeped as he is in PCI ideological debate, Amyot displays none of the naïvety of many Anglo-Saxons in this field. He has produced one of the most stimulating contributions on the PCI for some time and deserves the widest possible audience.

Geoffrey Pridham's book on the Italian party system is, despite the cover's ambitious title, a study of party politics in Tuscany in the 1970s. Its great strength is the prodigious amount of research it contains—nearly a hundred interviews with local party leaders and a vast and eclectic documentation from local sources. As a cameo of the life of the two main parties in a particular region, and as a guide for those intent on getting a feel for Italian politics at the grass roots, it is extremely useful. However, the book lays claim to be more than this, indeed to provide a 're-interpretation' of the nature of the Italian party system. Its success on this score is questionable. There is much tilting at long-obsolete windmills—polarised pluralism; imperfect bi-partism—but all we are really told is that Italy has now become a 'multi-party system with dominant elements': in other words, the PCI is a bit stronger and the DC a bit weaker—some change and much continuity! Readers may in any case doubt whether a case study is appropriate, as is claimed, to measure the 'precise importance' of these changes, or 'to evaluate the intensity and depth of their impact'. Despite the author's best endeavours to show how representative Tuscany really is, Italian society is too diverse for general conclusions to be drawn from local cases, and the concluding chapter therefore inevitably has a rather tired and forced ring to it. All this should not deter, however, for the three core chapters (on the PCI, the DC and inter-party relations) are, despite a ponderous style, sound and interesting. They contain a wealth of material and make the book a valuable and up-to-date contribution to the literature.

University of Newcastle DAVID HINE

Politics in Denmark. By John Fitzmaurice. *London: C. Hurst. 1981. 173 pp. £8·50.*
Political Parties and Elections in Austria: The Search for Stability. By Melanie A. Sully. *London: C. Hurst. 1981. 194 pp. £9·50.*

THE publishers continue their praiseworthy series of country monographs, which began by specialising in the Nordic field but has extended to the French and West German political systems. These latest books contain, in comparatively short compass (also, it may be said, at comparatively high price), plenty of factual material of value to the student, and are clearly the product of conscientious research. Even if not aiming at very much in the way of original treatment or insight, they could indeed prove convenient sources of reference for a wider public.

Mr Fitzmaurice's is the better of the two. Possibly his half-Danish origin, and his vantage-point in the Brussels Commission, may have helped to add breadth to his theme, but his general approach also seems an advantage. Whereas Mrs Sully's leads straight into the *medias res* of party political organisation, he gives us the benefit of a historical introduction—even if he is no more successful than many others in making the Slesvig-Holstein problem intelligible—as well as of chapters setting the economic and social pattern.

A lack of similar context tends to impair Mrs Sully's work. In particular, she may

be thought to give insufficient weight to the postwar decade, when Austria's very existence remained in the balance: a formative period for the development of the country's political life, which can be fully appraised only against this background, with the conduct of its Western and Soviet occupiers being crucial alike to the outcome and to one's understanding of it. (Even a minor episode like the question of licensing the Independent Party in 1949 [p. 100] cannot adequately be considered without reference to such factors.) Mrs Sully's sketchy handling of those years leaves in fact a good deal to be desired, not least from the *Staatsvertrag* aspect: and a useful body of statistical and other detail does not make up for this shortcoming where the wider picture is concerned. However stable things may have become today, Austria's political experience in the present century has been vastly more traumatic than Denmark's, yet this feeling hardly comes across in Mrs Sully's account. Perhaps, admittedly, Mr Fitzmaurice is lucky in that the scope of interest in his book is enhanced by certain peculiarities of his subject: such as Denmark's points of difference from its Scandinavian neighbours; its outlying territories; and the proliferation, sometimes amounting to eccentricity, of its political parties (albeit the author's recourse to a welter of initials here does rather detract from readability).

Anyhow, it is a not inapt coincidence that this pair of books should deal with a couple of erstwhile European empires that have come so satisfactorily to terms with their reduced status, not only domestically but also externally, where exposure to the East has (? *à contre-coeur* in each case) obliged the one to embrace neutrality, and the other to abandon it.

MICHAEL CULLIS

Politica Commercial Exterior en Espana (1931–1975). 2 Vols. By A. Viñas *et al.* *Madrid: Banco Exterior de Espana. 1979. 1,564 pp.*

THIS two volume work by Professor Viñas and his team was written to celebrate the fiftieth anniversay of the Banco Exterior de España. The object of the study is to trace the evolution of Spanish commercial policy from the setting-up of the Second Republic, through the years of the Civil War, through what can be described as the period of strict autarchy up to the end of the 1950s and then, finally, the loosening of autarchy in the latter Franco years.

In the early 1930s Spanish external commercial policy was directed towards opening up Spain's highly protected economy to greater competition in international trade. This policy was brought to an abrupt halt, however, by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. As is well known, in the aftermath of the Civil War Spain entered a prolonged phase of isolation in both political and economic terms. In the 1940s and 1950s Spain's external commercial policy was largely shaped by ideological factors geared towards a high degree of self-sufficiency. This resulted in an intensification of protective mechanisms, import substitution and the development of an extensive network of government controls which spanned domestic production as well as external commercial policies.

By the end of the 1950s recurrent economic crises had made it clear that the maintenance of such a rigid and protectionist framework was no longer tenable. In 1959 the series of measures collectively known as the Stabilisation Plan was introduced. These included two important changes; the abolition of multiple exchange rates and the gradual liberalisation of imports, which were to have a significant impact on commercial policy and indeed on the economic development of Spain in the 1960s and 1970s. Once again Spanish commercial policy was directed towards the integration of Spain's economy with the international one.

The authors of this study have had ample access to government material for the

entire period 1931-75. As they rightly point out the role of Spain's commercial policy in the 1960s and 1970s has been far more closely studied than in the period prior to the Stabilisation Plan. The period 1931-59 has received scant attention in part because of the paucity and poor quality of the statistics available and in part because of the inaccessibility until recently of much of the relevant government material.

This being so it is perhaps surprising that little more than one half of the 1,450 pages of text is allotted to the period leading up to the crisis of 1957-1959 since developments in the post-1959 period are already far more fully documented. Within this earlier section considerable emphasis is laid on the strategic and defence elements which were an integral part of the economic assistance forthcoming from the United States in the early 1950s. While the terms of the treaties are of historical interest and indeed topical at present as the United States-Spain defence treaty is currently subject to renegotiation, the space devoted to this topic seems excessive in a work of this nature. Since the publication of this study Professor Viñas has of course published his own book on this theme.

Given the space allocated to the post-1959 era it is disappointing not to find a greater number of new insights into the inter-relationship between external commercial policy and the development of the Spanish economy in this period of change and rapid economic growth. The distorting effects of nominal and effective tariff protection on the development of specific sectors and on the structure of exports, the fact that commercial policies in the 1960s and 1970s continued to reflect although in lesser degree and through the use of different mechanisms the earlier bias towards import substitution are already common knowledge. Nor is the suggestion that the structure of tariff protection in force in the 1960s and 1970s favoured the development of capital rather than labour intensive industries a novel one. These two volumes make use of a good deal of material previously unavailable but the result is an unhappy compromise. On the one hand the diffuse style makes the study difficult to use as a work of reference while at the same time the length and ponderous tone does not facilitate easy reading. Both volumes could have benefitted considerably from vigorous editing and a more discriminating use of material.

ALISON WRIGHT

Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years. By Malyn Newitt. *London: C. Hurst. 1981. 278 pp. £11·50. Pb: £4·50.*

AS a survey of the existing state of knowledge about the Portuguese in Africa, this book points up many areas of ignorance as well as suggesting some new interpretations of various aspects of Portuguese colonial activity; it also devotes much space to the Africans in the colonies. It relies heavily on printed and archival sources—though no Portuguese archives are mentioned in the bibliography. This in itself reflects the fact that the collection of oral history is still in its infancy, so that the motives and actions of the Portuguese are far better explained than those of the Africans. Throughout the book African states, peoples and groups are mentioned, but it is not always clear how and why African identities changed, or indeed what were the significant divisions within African societies. The author, for example, does not deal with the problem of how far a 'national' identity emerged in the various colonies, although he implicitly suggests that it was not very far.

After setting the scene up to 1870, the book deals with the establishment of Portuguese rule, the Concession Companies, African reactions and initiatives, the White community, the New State system, and the wars of independence, discussing along the way the international ramifications, Portugal's colonial ideology, colonial economics and 'native' policy and administration. The author rightly stresses that

Africans were not mere objects of history during the colonial period, but were active initiators, making and shaping change in the period; but his treatment here reveals how little we do know of that side of the story.

In reassessing the New State's policies, the author discusses the social and economic changes introduced under Salazar and argues that the New State was largely successful in reaching its objectives, while at the same time noting how total was the failure to have any political programme (in this at least the colonies and Portugal were on a footing of equality). He attacks the view that the wars of independence sapped Portugal, emphasising that the war brought boom conditions, and argues that the outbreak of war in Angola may indeed be seen as having saved the Salazar regime from the threatening crisis of the late 1950s—although he downplays excessively the role of the wars in undermining the regime in the long run. On the nationalist movements, he emphasises not their strengths but their weaknesses—their inability to win ground from the Portuguese, the gap between leaders and followers, and their limited bases in each colony—all with post-independence consequences.

The author is misleading about the Pan-African links of the Portuguese Africans (p. 145). Their participation in the Congresses was greater than he allows, and it is reasonable to assume that the presence of many West Coasters working in Angola led to a greater diffusion of ideas than has yet been established—but that awaits its own historian.

A. M. BERRETT

The Cyprus Conflict: A Lawyer's View. By Zaim M. Nedjatigil. *Nicosia: Kema Press. 1981 194 pp. Pb: £4·00.*

THE author of this book is described on the title-page as 'Attorney-General of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris (North Cyprus)'. In it he deploys the historical and legal arguments upon which the present leaders of the Cypriot Turkish community base their claim that the only possible future for the island is as a 'non-unitary federation', in which the two sections of the population, now conveniently separated as a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the 'creation of facts' that followed, would enjoy separate and equal autonomy. 'For the Turkish Cypriots the basic issue is security. They cannot tolerate a "strong" federal government until prolonged and happy experience with cohabitation under a weaker one has changed the climate in the island' (p. 134). The case is set out clearly, despite a good deal of intricate discussion of legal points, and for the most part in temperate language. This gives some documentary value to what is inevitably an uncompromisingly *ex parte* statement, however much one may disagree with the one-sided elucidation of the reasons why the 1960 constitution broke down in violence. Considerable space is allotted to the varieties and technicalities of federation and to rebutting accusations laid against the Turkish forces of violating the United Nations Convention on Human Rights.

J. S. F. PARKER

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR: Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro. Edited by T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway. *London: Macmillan, 1981. 207 pp. £15·00.*

IT would be difficult to overestimate the contribution of Professor Schapiro to Russian

and Soviet studies in this country, and indeed more widely. In this *Festschrift*, eight of his former colleagues and students—representing a wide range both in age and approach—have chosen to elaborate some of the themes to which Schapiro himself devoted much of his working life and which gave rise to some of his best-known and most monumental works, like *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy* (1955) and *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (1960). Chief among Schapiro's preoccupations was the nature, scope and operation of power in the Soviet Union, involving an interaction between personalities, ideology, and political, legal, cultural, and economic institutions.

Harry Rigby thus launches the volume with an attempt to define the nature of power, bringing to bear, predictably perhaps, a modified Weberian approach to the problem. Thereafter the contributors consider more specific features of the Soviet system and their historical evolution, with a rough chronology underlying the sequence of essays. Neil Harding examines the role of Bukharin in putting an ideological gloss on prevailing Bolshevik practice in the early days after the Revolution, with Leninist centralism and 'one-man management' supplanting the radical, direct democracy professed hitherto. Richard Taylor considers agitation, propaganda and films, all vital cogs and screws in the Soviet political machine. Alec Nove, in a characteristically effervescent and wide-ranging piece, discusses the origins and problems of an economic system dominated by political control. Graeme Gill's contribution deals with the ways in which Stalin recast the myths and mystique of the Revolution in furtherance of his own rise to power; Archie Brown's looks at the power Stalin finally achieved and compares his position both with that of Khrushchev, who, like Stalin, believed in leading 'from the front', and with Brezhnev, who leads 'from the middle'. Two chapters are devoted to an examination of the implications for the intelligentsia of Soviet power: A. Kemp-Welch gives an illuminating account of the fate of scholarship and literature in the dark days of the Stalin period, while Peter Reddaway attempts to 'map out the main territory' of the subject of dissent he has made so much his own, in an effort to provide pointers for further research. In his concluding remarks Harry Rigby scans the political horizon, more in hope than in expectation, for signs of change in the nature and scope of political power in the Soviet Union.

The editors of this volume have succeeded in creating a book as well as a collection of essays. Rigby's introductory essay does much to forge links between the case studies, though they all possess much intrinsic interest. This book will undoubtedly serve the dual purpose of honouring a distinguished scholar and at the same time of providing interest, information and insights for many younger ones.

University of Hull M. C. CHAPMAN

Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. By Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon, 1981. 319 pp. $35.00. Pb: $10.00.*

Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. *Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop. 1981. 295 pp. £9·75. Pb: £6·45.*

A FIRST glance at the titles of these books led me to feel sorry for the authors. In the last couple of years students have been begging for a chronology of events as well as an explanation of issues, so that there is a clearly felt need for a concise overview of Soviet foreign policy, a slimmer, more up-to-date textbook than Adam Ulam's *Expansion and Coexistence*, which appeared in a second edition as long ago as 1974. But two accounts of the same period seemed to be one too many. One would detract from the other and the reviewer and the reader would have to choose between them. In fact

there is no choice to be made. Both should become indispensable preliminary reading for courses on Soviet foreign policy and postwar international politics.

Both Rubinstein and Nogee and Donaldson approach the subject from within the balance-of-power tradition, but their personal interests lead to a slightly different selection of events and different emphases. Weaknesses of one are a strength of the other, so that the two books are complementary without confusing the novice by contradicting one another. The bibliographies of both lead the student forward to a more advanced stage where they have to reconcile contradictory authoritative interpretations.

Rubinstein defines his approach as 'eclectic, historical, policy-oriented and analytical' (p. vii). He aims to provide a comprehensive account of Soviet foreign policy which will provide a foundation for deeper study. While eschewing theory or models, he maintains that 'what motivates Moscow is a restless search for strategic advantages' (p. 287). The implication is that the only possible model is power-political and that Rubinstein's power-political assumptions are implicit rather than explicit. In his account the Soviet Union, though often cautious, is essentially active, pursuing 'peaceful engagement in Europe and competitive rivalry in the Third World' (p. 288). Nogee and Donaldson explain that Soviet foreign policy operates in two distinct but interrelated political frameworks—the international system and the communist subsystem. These authors 'examine the impact of internal as well as external events upon Soviet foreign policy' (p. 4). They describe a balance-of-power international system, bipolar in the aftermath of the Second World War and becoming multipolar in the late 1960s and 1970s, in which the Soviet Union is 'an astute, though hardly infallible, player' (p. 12). In their account the Soviet Union is often reactive, alternating between periods of conflict and accommodation and responding to changes like multipolarity, polycentrism, nuclear weapons, nuclear parity and domestic changes. The reactivity of Soviet foreign policy is tempered by communism, 'a creed that continues to infuse Soviet policy with dynamism' (p. 292).

Nogee and Donaldson see the relationship between ideology and policy as circular—though there is a continual modification of doctrine, ideology provides a framework or analytical prism, so that the way the Soviet Union operates within the balance-of-power system is to some extent dictated by doctrine. They give considerable space to a masterly exegesis of Soviet international doctrine both in a separate chapter and within chapters devoted to other topics. In every case their explanation of the doctrine illuminates their account of events. Rubinstein pays less explicit attention to ideology, which he calls 'the least reliable unifying cohesive' (p. 91) within the Soviet bloc. Although he does not set the doctrine out as clearly as Nogee and Donaldson do, he refers to it often in the context of his analyses of particular events. Both Nogee and Donaldson and Rubinstein see the function of ideology primarily as a legitimising device for policies undertaken because of other considerations.

Both books cover all the major postwar international events beginning with the cold war. Nogee and Donaldson start their chronological account with the period of wartime diplomatic collaboration, while Rubinstein devotes a chapter to prewar Soviet policy. Nogee and Donaldson divide their attention evenly between pre-1964 and post-Khrushchev periods, while Rubinstein tends to concentrate on the post-Stalin era. He also deals in more detail with the military dimension of Soviet foreign policy, includes a valuable chapter on Soviet policy in the United Nations, and chronicles less well-known facts about Soviet-Japanese relations and Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf.

Both books conclude that future Soviet policy will depend upon the domestic economic situation (for which the outlook is bleak) and upon Brezhnev's successor. Neither Nogee and Donaldson nor Rubinstein envisage great changes. Nogee and Donaldson believe that this calls for prudence from the United States, so as to 'restore a measure of peace and stability in superpower relations' (p. 291), and Rubinstein

prescribes firmness since, in its search for strategic advantages, 'Moscow will be influenced not by what Washington wants but by what it can do' (p. 287).

There are excellent chapter-by-chapter bibliographies in both books. Nogee and Donaldson list an official Soviet source for most topics and they have annotated their bibliography. Rubinstein includes a few maps. Both books are interesting, well-written and useful. They are excellent complementary textbooks which already have pride of place in this reviewer's list of required reading for new students of Soviet foreign policy.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

The Soviet Union in World Politics. Edited by Kurt London. *Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1980. 380 pp. £14·95.*

Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s: Superpower Politics and East-West Trade. By Lawrence Caldwell and William Diebold. *New York: McGraw-Hill for the 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations. 1980. 314 pp. £4·75*

SOVIET studies have always been bedevilled by the How-To-Fight-The-Russians-More-Effectively' brigade, and this collection of articles in *The Soviet Union in World Politics* is no exception. The old cold war horses have been lured out from the comfort of the stables by the sound of chinking (Russian) armour. They are obsessed with what Professor Ulam calls the 'disarray and weakness of the West' (p. 50) and what Professor Seton-Watson sees as its 'weak-willed, guilt-ridden, and gullible' approach to the Soviet Union, and in his particular case also to 'the new states of the Third World' (p. 81). Even the usually so sensible voice of Professor Gutteridge, himself a stranger amongst this reunion of ex-combatants, rises close to the hysterical pitch of the others in referring to the Soviet Union as 'the leading imperialist power in a new scramble for Africa' (p. 127): a gross exaggeration which is not borne out by the moderate analysis which follows. But the articles are not without interest. Professor Schapiro has produced a masterly and ingenious but totally irrelevant manufacture called 'Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy'. Professor Marshall has a way with words, labyrinthine in fact. Referring to a term—'impact'—which I hitherto understood, the Professor informs us that: 'Here the term is figurative for effects on an organized society's awareness and conduct attributable to the circumstance of a particular other organized society's contemporaneous existence on the same planet' (p. 263). There are, however, contributions which actually come down to earth, notably Professor Pfaltzgraff's level-headed 'Soviet Military Strategy and Force Levels' and Galia Golan's 'The Middle East'.

Overall, though, this book cannot be recommended. The reasoning is often overloaded with prejudice and the knowledge displayed is at times abysmal. How can Professor London talk of the 'Comintern journal' in the context of post-1945 Europe (p. 324) and believe that it was Soviet, not West German policy which altered in 1969 to produce an era of detente (p. 327)? But, then, why bother with accuracy when you are so sure of the answers?

The other volume under review—*Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s*—could easily have stumbled down the same path into Cassandra-like warnings about Finlandisation and other dread monsters emerging from the Steppes. Instead Lawrence Caldwell (with some additional writing by William Diebold on Eastern Europe) has managed to juggle successfully with an impressive range of disparate factors—Soviet and American, domestic and foreign, political and economic—to produce a sober and cautious assessment of the current state of affairs (including some shrewd observations on Solzhenitsyn and the limited utility of trade as a weapon) as well as some indicators to watch for future trends. In fact the book will serve well as a text on contemporary

Soviet foreign policy, concentrating as it does on the essentials and refreshingly free as it is from the alarms and excursions of our knights in tarnished armour.

University of Birmingham JONATHAN HASLAM

Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations. By Philip Hanson. *London: Macmillan for the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Birmingham. 1981. 271 pp. £20·00.*

IT would be hard to imagine a better time for this book to be published, coming as it does at a time of intense debate on the wisdom and scope of trade and technology transfer between East and West. Hanson has distinguished himself from the majority of writers who tend to be dogmatic about the importance of Western trade and technology transfer for the Soviet economy on the flimsiest of evidence. This book shows time and again that assessing the effects and benefits of technology transfer is an immensely complex process which cannot be couched in simplistic terms. The author is frank about the limitations of the data and the subjectivity of conclusions in his assessment that,

> imports of Western machinery and know-how over the past two decades or so have been neither a major nor . . . a negligibly small source of Soviet economic growth. Nobody has yet arrived at a precise and reliable quantification of their total impact; but, so far as their impact on the Soviet industrial sector is concerned, it would be hard to make a case for a total net contribution of much more than half a percentage point of annual growth of net industrial output in the 1970's (p. 211).

It is interesting to find that, despite the massive publicity accorded to Soviet imports of Western equipment, even at their height (in 1975) these accounted for only 6·1 per cent of total Soviet domestic equipment investment (Table 8.1, p. 129). However, there is no doubt that this figure is enhanced because the Russians have been very skillful at selecting critical gaps in domestic capabilities where imports have the greatest effect. The chapter on the mineral fertiliser industry provides one of the most important examples; another would be the importation of large diameter steel pipe for the gas industry. Nevertheless, in the surveys conducted by Hanson and others in respect of chemical companies which have exported their plant and equipment processes to the Soviet Union,

> the picture is not very impressive: assimilation takes longer than in Western Europe . . . where evidence of a learning process could be assessed, there was no sign of a systematic reduction in lead times with experience; subsequent manning tends to be on the high side and output levels on the low side . . . successful domestic diffusion and modification appear to be limited (p. 201).

In addition, for those who have convinced themselves that embargos of plant and equipment might yield near-term results, 'The best guess at average lead times (for chemical plant) between peak deliveries and start of impact on production would be just over three years' (p. 204).

The final three chapters of the book are devoted to the implications for Western policy and it is only a pity that the book was written before the effect of the grain and technology embargo, which followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, became apparent. The near total failure of the grain embargo, which most observers were agreed was the biggest weapon in the Western arsenal of possible trade sanctions, highlights the first of Hanson's two elements for an optimal strategy: namely, 'to increase their [Western policy makers'] capability to impose coordinated restrictions

on commercial technology flows to the USSR . . .' (p. 257), the accent here being on co-ordination of measures so that they cannot be circumvented, although I am not persuaded that it would be possible to focus these restrictions on the Soviet Union without including the other Comecon countries. More important, given long lead times for projects, if measures are to be effective, they have to remain in place for a protracted period, probably not less than a year, in order to have the desired effect.

I am less convinced by Hanson's other recommendation to 'promote the growth of East-West trade and technology transfer as long as Soviet policies (e.g. in the Third World) were deemed to be compatible with the long run improvement of East-West relations.' The problem is that, as the author points out, the threat of trade restrictions, 'should not be overrated . . . but it is likely to be worth something, if only at the margin of Soviet foreign policy choices' (p. 259). But Afghanistan and Poland are not at the margin of Soviet foreign policy and it is unlikely that choices about Soviet policy towards these countries are influenced by possible Western commercial actions and reactions, although (even in the wake of the grain embargo) the Reagan administration evidently thinks otherwise.

For anybody concerned with the economics and politics of East-West trade and technology transfer, this is easily the most comprehensive, straightforward and pragmatic work on the subject. It should be very widely read in companies and governments, as well as the academic world, on both sides of the Atlantic.

JONATHAN P. STERN

The Stalinist Command Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy 1945-53. By Timothy Dunmore. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 176 pp. £20·00.*

THE publishers have ridiculously priced a short book, but it would be unfortunate if Dr Dunmore's informative and well-organised study should, therefore, suffer from inattention. This fruit of extensive research into Soviet sources casts new light on the last years of Stalin's rule and must be the most comprehensive study of the Fourth Five Year Plan of 1946-50. The author's central thesis reinforces the theme of other works, which have suggested that the freedom of action of Stalin and the Politburo in this period was circumscribed by the objectives sought by other sections of Soviet society.

Dunmore demonstrates persuasively through two case studies, how—although enshrined in the Plan—the regional and sectoral targets of the Soviet leadership were altered in execution by production ministries. The 'bureaucracy' was able to do this, because other Soviet organs with responsibility for checking the implementation of economic policy—the Party, secret police, Gosplan, Ministry of Finance, local and republic authorities, trade unions—all lacked either the power and/or the will to adequately counter their aims. The ministries diverted labour, material, investment and transport inputs to assist the 'western' region and the heavy industry sector, both of which they favoured.

The 'bureaucracy' not only dominated policy-execution, but it played an important, if not crucial, role—together with the leadership and other bodies—in what was by Soviet standards a remarkably open debate upon the formulation of Plan policy in these two spheres. The regional and sectoral debates taken together revolved around the following themes: short-term as opposed to long-term returns upon capital investment; reduction of administrative and transport costs; considerations of 'nationalities' policy; strengthening of Soviet defensive capability; consumer satisfaction.

Dr Dunmore dextrously leads the reader through the intricacies of these debates

and their outcomes. In addition to useful statistical information in the text, he provides some twenty tables to illustrate the issues and to array evidence for his case—though some may quibble with a few of his figures. There is a helpful map of the economic regions of the Soviet Union in 1953, blemished only by a premature rechristening of Stalingrad as Volgograd. Understandably, what can not be presented—although this is hardly unique to the study of Soviet government—is any sustained atributable admissions by officials, that they adroitly sidestepped their masters' wishes after complying with an equivocal 'Yes, Comrade Minister'. That they did distort or even ignore their leadership's plans is, from the inferential evidence presented, convincing—with one caveat.

I remain unconvinced by the author's opinion that defence was of low priority as an influence upon postwar regional and sectoral policy, because of the Soviet Union's strengthened military position after 1945. This takes the role of defence in the economic debate too much at face value. Rather, the Soviet leadership saw its blood-sacrifice to win Great Power status and military security virtually swept away by Hiroshima and Nagasaki and committed itself immediately to its own atomic programme. As a holding action at the first postwar Foreign Ministers' Conferences, Molotov sought to downgrade the atomic weapon which Jimmy Byrnes, initially flaunted upon his hip, by ignoring its existence; what one scholar has termed 'Reverse Atomic Diplomacy'. Thus, it is improbable that defence could have been a centre-piece of the domestic debate. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Soviet atomic programme could have avoided making demands upon the heavy-industry sector. Nor is it reasonable to believe that the whims of the 'bureaucracy' would have had any leeway here, since Beria's executive responsibility made the programme an unambiguous leadership concern.

Alternatively, there may have been leadership dispute upon resource allocation, a suggested reason for the fall of Voznesenskii, the chairman of Gosplan, in the 'Leningrad Affair'. It is also averred that the real reason for his removal was that Voznesenskii was a consumer-goods advocate; and Dunmore offers an interesting speculation against this. On the other hand, he writes incorrectly of another victim of the affair, that 'G. M. Popov was in 1950 a Central Committee Secretary (and) a secretary of the Moscow city and provincial party organisation'; in December 1949, he had lost these posts to one N S. Khruschev.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

The Logic of 'Normalization': The Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia of 21 August 1968 and the Czechoslovak Response. By Fred H. Eidlin. *New York Columbia University Press for East European Monographs, Boulder, 1980. 278 pp. $26.00 (East European Monographs, No. LXXIV.) $26.00.*

Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia. By H. Gordon Skilling. *London: Allen and Unwin 1981. 363 pp £20·00.*

THERE are many mysteries to be unravelled about the shaping of Soviet policies and the making of particular decisions. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is a case in point. Professor Eidlin's considered view is that troops were sent in, not to destroy or replace, but to increase the pressure on the existing Czechoslovak government which, reasonably in Soviet eyes, was expected to co-operate. The widespread, if restrained hostility that quickly and spontaneously appeared, spurred by the resistance of the party presidium in Prague and a series of accidental events, forced the Soviet Union to change tack and work gradually towards the replacement of Dubček and the reformers by Husák and a more compliant government. Eidlin is right to point out that what Moscow did in the end was not necessarily what it intended from the start, and to

demonstrate the impact of events in Czechoslovakia on the course of Soviet foreign policy. To do so he sifts Czechoslovak evidence and makes intricate deductions. Yet he examines little of the Soviet material that others have adduced; and while properly denigrating simplistic approaches in general, he himself adopts a restricted view by considering over a brief period a single aspect of one Soviet action and the Czechoslovak (and mainly Czech) reaction to it. His frequent repetition and heavy footnoting could well have been replaced by a wider discussion of the tactical and strategic considerations involved in Soviet policy-making in the difficult domestic and international circumstances of 1968 to make his entire book more worthwhile.

Professor Gordon Skilling's book deals with the somewhat later period when the new regime in Prague had had time to dispose of the reformers' last resistance. The Charter 77 movement, emerging consciously in the Year of Political Prisoners, drew part of its inspiration from the ideals of 1968, and it has had among its prominent members and supporters some of the leading figures of the reform era. But it was also a reaction against the failings of 1968 and an attempt to do something new and hopefully more effective. Its signatories have included socialists, the politically uncommitted, and practising Christians, of all ages and from many walks of life. And it has encouraged other forms of protest, particularly underground writings. It is still making history; and writing about it accordingly demands great perception. Fortunately, as one of the best foreign specialists on Czechoslovakia, Skilling has the understanding, knowledge and sense of perspective required.

Charter 77 aimed neither to be a mass movement nor to become an opposition in the formal sense. With its emphasis on moral issues in politics and its pursuit of fine legal points, it would not have attracted a large and active following even in a society free of official repression. In the monolithic atmosphere of Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and in face of the hostility with which the Husák government greeted the publication of the Charter, joining the movement required a singular act of courage. Its signatories have barely exceeded a thousand, and there are important areas, especially Slovakia, where it has won little even tacit support. Although basing itself on United Nations' covenants and becoming intertwined with the Helsinki agreements, it has had no more than transient and ineffective assistance from abroad It has suffered a little from internal disagreement and greatly from official harassment. It has also been frustrated by the problem of appealing to a population bribed into acquiescence by a reasonable supply of consumer goods and persuaded into inaction by the risks and likely futility of open disagreement (though, besides widespread cynicism after thirty years of communist rule, there is rather more constructive, if discreet criticism within Czechoslovakia than Skilling admits). That the movement survives at all is due to the Chartists' attitude—*drobná práce*, or small-scale work. A similar approach was adopted by Tomáš Masaryk who, in 1918, helped to topple the Habsburg Empire.

Circumstances change of course, and the second last decade of the twentieth century differs markedly from the second. Yet in a comparative sense what is interesting (though humanly distressing) is the effort the present regime devotes to trying to discredit a small community of individuals and their ideas. Marxism in power is unable to tolerate its falsehoods being exposed—and the half of the book devoted to documents must be read. This is where Skilling seems to suggest both the strength and the weakness of the movement lies. However, he does not discuss at length the aspirations of the rising generation in Czechoslovakia who, like their counterparts elsewhere in Eastern Europe (and in the Soviet Union), may not tolerate existing official attitudes once the old guard in Prague and Moscow have departed.

University of Glasgow WILLIAM V. WALLACE

Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East. By Amnon Sella. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 211 pp. £15·00.*

The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance. By Galia Golan. *New York: Praeger. 1980. (Distrib. by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 289 pp. £15·25.*

THE study of 'conduct' constitutes a more suitable approach to Soviet activities in the Middle East than does the study of 'policy'. Conduct, we may observe: policy must be sought by induction, deduction, by guess or by God. In fact, despite the modest claims of his title, Amnon Sella opts mainly for policy. The first part of his little book contains a brief and selective discussion of some factors influencing Soviet policy towards the region. Certain features, such as naval strategy, receive considerable attention (although more application to detail might have persuaded the map on p. 50 to agree with the text on p. 54); some, such as oil, encounter but a cursory glance before the author leaps to an unestablished conclusion; and others, like the Straits question, are passed over in silence. Sella, it seems, cannot wait to reach the feature of Soviet policy which interests him most, namely Soviet involvement with Egypt in particular and the Arab-Israeli question in general since 1970, with especial attention to the 1973 war. And in this circumstance lies a serious weakness in his analysis.

'The Middle East', he observes, 'is of major concern to the Kremlin because of its proximity to the southern borders of the USSR' (p. 58). He also notes the Soviet distinction between Middle Eastern countries bordering the Soviet Union and the rest. These signposts might have induced him to distinguish between Soviet interests in different parts of the region and to concentrate on the Northern Tier, but the customary obsession with the Arab-Israeli question leads him to what is a distortion of Soviet priorities. Even his discussion of the possibilities of Soviet military intervention is geared to the Arab region.

The central part of the book concerns the 1973 war where Sella chooses the uncertainty theory to explain United States' policy. Conceding there is no good evidence of any Soviet intention to interfere he believes that the famous red alert was inspired by uncertainty about Soviet intentions and a determination to put a stop at once to any possible hanky-panky. Of the alternative explanations he rejects the view that Nixon acted as he did to divert attention from his domestic (Watergate) difficulties. 'The idea cannot be easily dismissed', he writes in a mysterious footnote (p. 185 n. 24) 'but we must deal with decision makers as they are and not as they could have been if it were not for the constraints within which they must operate'. On the whole this sentence appears to mean the opposite of what he wants it to mean. Like almost everyone else he does not notice the argument of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse to the effect that the red alert was a smoke screen to conceal America's intention reluctantly to restrain Israel in deference to a strong Soviet hint that the United States should live up to its unwritten understanding about the matter. Right or wrong this explanation fits the facts better than any other on display and it is time it received more attention.

In total contrast to Sella's over-ambitious, poorly presented and incomplete analysis is Galia Golan's painstaking, detailed and beautifully presented examination of shifting Soviet attitudes towards the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Until 1968 the Soviet Union took little note of the Palestinians, treating them largely as a refugee problem, and concentrating on relations with Arab states. After 1968, and more especially after 1973, Moscow gave progressively more attention to the PLO, culminating in the recognition of that organisation as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people. The author describes both the broad lines of this change and the various twists and qualifications of it. She rightly rejects ideological explanations and plumps for a *realpolitik* interpretation. Soviet policy, she argues, was governed by regional factors

and super-power relationships. In fact, towards the end, she concludes that the Soviet Union had little choice in the matter:

> There were in fact few options open to the Soviets with regard to supporting the PLO or not, given the increased importance of the organisation in the eyes of Arab states and the success of its operations at least in thrusting the Palestinians' cause into the center of world attention (p. 248).

Indeed most of the world has come to the same conclusion during the same period and although it is nice to have the ordinariness of Soviet policy documented in such detail one wonders whether it would not have been much more interesting to have had a book on why the United States has lagged so far behind everyone else. What does stand out in this book is the consistency of Soviet policy in the Palestine question with the consequence that important differences still exist between the Soviet Union and the PLO. The author concludes that Soviet support for the PLO is not complete and that if the Arab states threw the Organisation over, the USSR would probably follow suit. Wouldn't we all?

School of Oriental and African Studies, London M. E. YAPP

MIDDLE EAST

Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and Leaders in the Middle East. By Paul Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1981. 197pp. $18.00. Pb: $8.95.*

CONTRARY to what is suggested by its title, this book is not exclusively concerned with the implications of the Camp David Agreements. It consists of a series of short, sharp observations on current Middle Eastern politics and some of their international ramifications. Despite the brevity of their treatment (the actual text covers slightly more than half of the book, with the rest devoted to appendices) the authors have succeeded in presenting a stimulating, and at times provocative, overview of a host of daunting political problems faced by the major countries of the area—ethnic malaise, social strains, regional conflicts, super-power rivalries. But their ultimate intention is 'an attempt to consider and forecast emerging alignment and leadership patterns' (p. viii).

One merit of such an approach is to throw some light on some of the intricacies in the relationship between domestic and international politics. This is done first by succinctly describing the political importance and role of the 'key countries'—namely, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, plus Jordan—and the principal factors governing their decision-making. The main conclusions of this section are that: (1) Egypt, despite its enormous internal problems and the 'stalemated' Camp David process still displays great resilience, since 'operating in an environment and political culture that do not favor subversion, President Sadat has a degree of flexibility unusual for a Middle East leader' (p. 4); (2) Iran's internal turmoil is bound to worsen during the next five years; (3) to the extent that the Alawi regime of Hafez Assad continues to prevail as a narrowly based confessional clique, Syria's 'regional power must inevitably decline' (p. 14); (4) Iraqi national integration is still an objective rather than a reality (p. 17); (5) Saudi Arabia is now a factor in the domestic and foreign affairs of not only the countries of the area, but also of OPEC and OAPEC; but such 'broader definitions of interest', have also meant, 'a larger number of vulnerabilities' (p. 19).

All these points have been elaborated, and sometimes repeated, in the second part of the book, which deals with the regional, multilateral and regional pressures. Here the

link between the internal and external politics has been shown in greater detail—but not always persuasively. The authors' main assumption is that '[d]isintegrative forces resulting from social change have rendered domestic considerations paramount for states such as Iran and Syria. In other countries, particularly those where the peoples are more homogeneous, social change has not proved so potent a force of disunity', such as in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, where 'foreign policy is more clearly a function of the leadership's perception of external issues . . . (p. 27). This is open to question: Egypt's present stance on Arab-Israeli conflict may be partly the result of Sadat's idiosyncracies, but as can be inferred even from the author's own discussion it is also equally a function of Egypt's strategic realities. There are a number of predictions in the book: the Iran of Khomeini will not last (p. 33); the Alawi-Sunni conflict in Syria will in the end unseat Hafez Assad (p. 60) a 'Christian . . . state in Lebanon is probable, and an Alawi state along the Mediterranean littoral of what is now Syria may also eventuate' (p. 91). These are supported by some arguments; if they come true, the authors ought to be doubly praised for combining a prophetic insight with analytical skills.

St Antony's College, Oxford HAMID ENAYAT

The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey. Edited by Alvin J. Cottrell. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1980. 695 pp $37.50.*

THE editors and publisher deserve to be commended for assembling and presenting this informative volume. It brings together a number of distinguished scholars who explain generally the ancient and modern history of the Gulf and highlight its military, economic, social, artistic, and literary facets. There is a wealth of data here, providing a valuable source book for the casual and more serious scholars of this vitally important region. The latter will find a great deal that is familiar but they will invariably agree that the summaries of vast bodies of material are fair and useful; as a bonus, they are bound to find instructions in subjects outside their disciplinary expertise.

Roger Savory nearly presents a gravity-defying act by explaining so cogently the Gulf's pre nineteenth century history in under forty pages. He sets the stage well for Malcolm Yapp's intelligent survey of the more recent period, for both agree that British entrenchment in the region was far from an act of grand strategy or the consequence of imperialist greed; it was, rather, the culmination of a series of reactions to local circumstances by agents on the spot. Whether history reveals a uniformity of British intention or not, it is probably the case, as Dr Yapp suggests, that the early modernisation of these countries owes much to the British protection they received. But his assessment of the Shah's intention—and power—will strike many as too generous when he writes that the White Revolution effected 'a fundamental transformation of Iran's social, economic, and political system' in the 1960s (p. 63).

Brian Clark's guide to Gulf tribes nicely complements R. Michael Burrell's and Keith McLachlan's more general discussion of the problems of territorial demarcations, and for those who seek even harder stuff, the chapters on military affairs and on oil will not disappoint them. In addition, Michael Bonine makes great sense when, reviewing the Gulf states' urban policies (or lack of them) he argues that the capacity to develop modern economies needs to be balanced with the will to solve the dilemmas of excessive urbanisation and to be matched with a sensitivity to traditional housing patterns. Ralph Magnus's piece on social change does well also to remind us of the dynamics of cultural borrowing that has long been at work: 'the traditional social institutions and cultural patterns have proven to be highly flexible, so much so that they have been denying to themselves that any change had in fact taken place' (p.

386). It is a point the chapters on language, literature, and art especially illustrate. Robert Hillenbrand's discussion of the many strands of artistic development in the Gulf is admirably comprehensive, though for those of us who can't tell a rhyton from a griffin, the definition of technical terms like 'anepigraphic' and 'apotropeic' would have been gratefully welcomed.

There is the occasional slip or distortion, however. For example, the Buraimi Oasis dispute was settled (apparently) in 1974, not 1973 (p. 67); it is incorrect to refer, even if it is relatively understandable to do so, to 'Wahhabism' as the official Saudi 'religion' (p. 295). Additionally, Professor Magnus is so convinced of the inevitability of social transformations that perhaps he takes inadequate account of how specific programmes do not have a life of their own and can be reversed or altered when revolutionary changes themselves occur (p. 411). James Dougherty emphasises that 'all projections into the future should take into account the differences between Sunni and Shi'i in their basic approaches to religio-political matters' (p. 313). Yet these projections need also to take into account the broad appeal to *all* Muslims today of Khumayni's assertively 'Islamic' example.

Most disappointingly, the book is marked by an inconsistency of chronological focus. While some chapters, such as those on literature and art, stay well wide of the contemporary period, others, such as those on oil and international organisations, are relatively up to date. Despite the editors' disclaimer of interest in events beyond the mid-twentieth century (p. xv), their readers inevitably will want to be currently informed. Many will be especially disturbed to find that the editors have failed to commission a chapter concentrating on the present international relations of the Gulf 'subsystem' or even of American and Soviet rivalry there. It would have been helpful to all of us to have had these matters addressed with the illuminating kind of synthesis and interpretation this survey generally offers.

Chatham House JAMES P. PISCATORI

The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity. By Christine Moss Helms. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 313 pp. £14·95.*

THERE has been a lamentable dearth of scholarship on Saudi Arabia. The lion's share of blame for this lies with the Saudis themselves who have been anxious, even paranoid, about outsiders bearing research proposals and asking thoughtful questions. Happily there is a wealth of data outside the Kingdom easily accessible to historians like Christine Helms. Much of the British archival wealth she mines has already seen the light of day, notably in Gary Troeller's *The Birth of Saudi Arabia.* Like him Dr Helms has done an exhausting job of sifting through reams of documents and secondary sources in several languages.

From this labour she has given us a detailed explanation of how Abd al-Aziz gradually asserted his authority over reluctant, and later recalcitrant, tribes. There are nuances not always found in discussions of Saudi history, as when she argues that the replacement of the Islamic *zakat* for the tribal *khuwa* tax was another way the Sauds were making claim to governance. She also emphasises, instructively, that the settlement of the Ikhwan did not fundamentally break down tribal organisation and that the Sauds' accent on Islamic equality was largely a means to overcome old patron-client and badu-settled distinctions and thus to top a new political and social hierarchy of their own. She also does justice to Abd al-Aziz by presenting him as a clever negotiator, not only eager to understand the subtleties of international diplomacy but also able somewhat to bend the great powers, like the British and Ottomans, to his purposes.

More contentious is her assertion that the Saudi adoption of 'the concepts of

''boundary'' and ''nation-state'' created, at least temporarily, major alterations in political behaviour among the Arabs themselves' (p. 272). It is a chicken-and-egg type argument, and one could propose, rather, that it was not until the establishment of regular relations of dependence between the Sauds and their new clients and the eventual suppression of the Ikhwan among them that the idea of a Saudi nation-state began to acquire meaning. Even more troublesome is her criticism of historians of Saudi Arabia for romanticising and concentrating on the figure of Abd al-Aziz while ignoring 'social and environmental factors' (p. 29). It is unfair to suggest that George Rentz and others associated with ARAMCO failed to grasp that 'the activities and attitudes of the inhabitants . . . also influence the course of events and subsequent decisions by governments' (p. 17). It would be odd of competent businessmen on the spot if they lacked this kind of savvy, and certainly the researches of the oil men's Arabian Affairs Division on tribal and economic as well as legal matters testify to their awareness that the Saudi situation, just as one would expect, is complex. There are other straw-man arguments as well, as when she tells us that 'contrary to accepted belief in the matter, the badu did not wander aimlessly in the desert' (p. 49). Readers with interest in this book's topic will doubtlessly be surprised that such had been the conventional wisdom.

In seeking to differ from the others in depicting 'the broader context' (p. 18) and avoiding the 'Great Man' approach to history, Dr Helms paints like an impressionist, giving us a number of individual dots that are to become whole when we step back a bit. Unfortunately, some measure of aesthetic disappointment sets in, for while all the facts are present, the overall impression they give is sometimes blurred and largely familiar.

Chatham House JAMES P. PISCATORI

Libya: the Experience of Oil. By J. A. Allan. *London: Croom Helm; Boulder, Col. Westview. 1981 328 pp. £14·95.*

THE assessment of Libya's contemporary economic, social and political performance has in recent years been rendered difficult by the contentious allegations which have characterised comment on the country—whether on the part of Libyan political leaders purveying the achievements, or opposition elements and foreign observers eager to denigrate. Dr Allan's cool assessment of the country's pattern of development is, therefore, most welcome.

The study covers the whole period since oil began to flow in 1961. Emphasis is placed on separating out the continuities from the discontinuities over these years—i.e. identifying which elements in the pattern of development were changed fundamentally by the coming to power of a new regime in 1969, and which were not. Beginning with a brief survey of Libyan economy and society before oil, Dr Allan proceeds to examine the patterns of economic planning, agricultural and industrial development, redistribution of oil revenues, infrastructural development, and political organisation which have emerged since 1961. Roughly the first half of the book covers the years up to 1969, and the latter half the period since then.

Two themes appear central to the book's conception. First, prospects for development are bound to be inhibited by the relative poverty of Libya's resource-endowment, hydrocarbons excepted. The poor quality of the cultivable soil and the inadequate water resources ensure that ambitious schemes of agricultural development may both prove uneconomic and lead to a long-term impoverishment of the environment. Second, the change of regimes in 1969 altered the manner in which economic production is organised, but it did not alter the rate of economic and social development. While the years since 1969, therefore, have seen the private sector

diminished to a position of marginal significance in all non-agricultural production, distribution and marketing, the expansion of the economy and of social infrastructure has not been affected (whether positively or negatively). A steady rate of growth has been maintained.

Where the book falls short is in providing a clear picture of the political and economic dynamics which led to, and were involved in, the introduction of 'popular democracy' and an increasingly egalitarian economic policy in the late 1970s. Dr Allan is no doubt justified in his incisive criticism of Qadhafi's somewhat garbled writings (the Green Books). One important facet of these writings, however, is obscured: if only by making available a convenient set of slogans, a framework was created through which popular support for egalitarian social measures could be effectively mobilised. A detailed analysis of the dynamics in Libyan society which led the leadership to change direction, and of the manner in which recent economic policy has in fact reflected the aspirations of specific social groupings, would have been useful.

Despite this shortcoming, the book constitutes a timely and informative contribution to the difficult task of comprehending Libya.

Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter T. C. NIBLOCK

The United States and the Palestinians. By Mohammed K. Shadid. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 252 pp. £12·95.*

PLO Strategy and Tactics. By Aryeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Arnon-Ohanna. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 225 pp. £11·50.*

THE Palestinians feature in the first of the above works as the object of American policy, in the second as autonomous agents.

The United States and the Palestinians, based mainly on Congressional and executive branch records, examines the evolution of American policy towards the Palestinians from the period before 1948 until the end of the Carter administration. The central chapters survey American policy in what are identified as five policy phases, while the first and last discuss, respectively, the Palestinian people as such and the sources of American policy towards the Palestine conflict.

The principal argument of the book is that the Palestinians have always been central to the Middle East policy of the United States. This centrality, whether or not officially acknowledged, has derived from the threat the Palestinians present to maintenance of the (American-dominated) order in the region, which remains the constant of American policy. Ostensible shifts in Washington's policy are thus interpreted as tactical accommodations within a continuing strategy of Palestinian containment. Other themes include the disproportionate scale of concessions demanded of the Arab world relative to those sought from Israel, and the minor role of American oil and business interests in United States policy-making.

The main value of the book is that it groups material previously scattered or of more limited historical scope, and fills a gap in the literature by offering a systematic historical survey of American policy towards the Palestinians. Mr Shadid provides some revealing and detailed coverage of the positions of particular policy-makers and of specific workings of the Zionist lobby in the United States. He also contributes an informative account of America's anti-terrorist programme of the late 1960s, prefaced with a six-page list of selected commando operations.

Some issues, perhaps surprisingly, are omitted: for instance, Washington's official position on the findings of the King-Crane Commission, on the role of Zionist terror in the Palestinian exodus, and on the conditionality of Israeli admission to membership of the United Nations on implementation of General Assembly resolution 194(III); the

relative scale and forms of American support to Israel and to the Palestinians over the years; and Ambassador Young's contacts with the PLO in 1979.

The principal shortcoming of the book, however, is conceptual. The force of the author's material is diminished by the failure either to analyse directly or else to analyse in sufficient depth such concepts as Zionism, Jewish nationhood, Palestinian nationhood, terrorism and de-Zionisation; the rival territorial claims of internationally recognised nationhood on the one hand and of uninterrupted occupancy on the other; and the 'humanitarian' versus the 'political' definitions of the status of Palestinian refugees.

But while more sustained analysis of such underlying concepts would have reinforced Mr Shadid's arguments, it might conceivably have undermined those of Mr Yodfat and Mr Arnon-Ohanna.

The main themes to emerge from *PLO Strategy and Tactics* are: PLO intransigence (witness the failure to revise official ideology and the continuing formal commitment to the 'destruction of Israel'); PLO bad faith (conciliatory statements and talk of a 'secular democratic state' to be interpreted as tactics within a strategy of stages); terror as the basis of Palestinian support for the PLO; the PLO Covenant as the major liability in the Middle East peace process; naïvety of those seeking incorporation of the PLO in that process (i.e. most states, and growing numbers of American policy-makers); and the generally 'reactive' nature of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.

These essentially orthodox Israeli arguments are presented in a style which tends to narrative and assertion. In accounting for PLO policy, the focus is on factors internal to Palestinian society; although PLO relations with the world at large are reviewed, silence surrounds the Zionist/Israeli determinants of PLO policy. If, for instance, anything in current Israeli behaviour (e.g. policies relating to occupation, settlements and Jerusalem, not to mention Israeli military activities in Lebanon) operates independently to obstruct revision of official PLO doctrine, attention is nowhere alerted to that possibility. (One passing reference is made to settlements in the 137-page text, on p. 116.)

Together with the absence of any discussion of Zionism, its relationship to Judaism and the State of Israel, and its implications for the Arab world, this analytically created vacuum leads by omission to a view of the PLO as the Palestinians' worst enemy, its policy as the embodiment of unreason, and any reform of Zionist institutions as genocidal.

The rather breathless epilogue contains an excessive number of typographical errors, and the titles on the spine and fly-leaf differ. In all, the book would seem to contribute little by way of fact or analysis to the existing literature on the Palestinians, the claimed absence of which served to justify its writing. Its main value lies in the 58-page collection of documents, many of which admit of wider interpretation than that available in the text.

CLARE WELLS

Arabs and Africans: Co-operation for Development. By Anthony Sylvester. *London: Bodley Head. 1981. 252 pp. £7·50.*

MR SYLVESTER has written a book which is interesting, informative and useful in several respects. However, it possesses no particular rigour in analysis and is often rather facile. *Arabs and Africans* fairly effectively demolishes the crude 'orientalist' and Kissinger cases against OPEC as the prime cause of the post-1971 economic crisis. One may have less confidence that the author's pure monetarist proposals for overcoming it—an approach which by and large the Arab states with export surpluses share—are as much the heart of the answer as part of the continuing problem.

The summary of Arab aid and the description of aid institutions serving Africa is useful. It shows—albeit the author does not seem to have noticed it—that Arab aid agencies are very like those of OECD countries both in procedures and motivation. The political motives and responses centring on Israel and the quest for allies in the United Nations look much like 'cold war' aid politics and America's quest for secure UN General Assembly majorities twenty years ago. There is the same mixture of genuine concern for poor people—especially if they have recognisable common characteristics, in this case a common Islamic faith—and the same range of aid donor styles and stances with, say, Algeria the OPEC parallel to Sweden, and Saudi Arabia to the United States.

The discussion of Africa's problems and constraints is interesting and at times thought-provoking. But the pieces on would-be practical proposals and country experience suffer from too mellifluous an approach—rather more criticism would provide a clearer picture. Indeed the author is not inclined to criticise either Arabs or Africans (except Africans for insisting that Egypt is still an African state in good standing whatever its relations with other Arab states). This somewhat obscures the real stresses in Arab-African interstate relations, and the reasons why there has been little progress at institutionalising economic and political economic relations beyond a significant, but secondary (whether to OECD flows or to post-1972 increases in oil bills) aid. Nor does examination go very deep into subjects—like 'trilateralism' with Arab funds, European technology and African site and labour—which do not divide Africans and Arabs but have posed very serious problems in putting into mutually satisfactory practice.

The oil exporters rather flat statement that dual pricing to poor countries is not feasible because of intermediation is, for example, repeated several times. Given the number of government to government oil supply agreements between Arab and African states this is hardly convincing. Even if it were valid at that level, the Venezuelan/Mexican provision of medium term soft loans parallel to a portion of the price of oil sold to their regional neighbours would appear perfectly appropriate to Africa.

When Amir Jamal of Tanzania is cited (pp. 170–72) as supporting OPEC's attempts to begin to change international economic relations in their corner of world trade and welcoming greater Arab monetary and economic power one does have a valid representation of African views. But it is incomplete, Minister Jamal's comments on the need for common fronts and complementarity between Arab and African 'Otherwise we shall have problems that will benefit neither . . .' are an equally valid representation and one representing a much deeper criticism than the author seems to realise.

In the end, the volume is interesting but rather superficial; informative but inadequately analytical.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN

AFRICA

Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955–1975: The Political Economy of African Diplomacy. By G. Aforka Nweke. *Boston Mass.: African Studies Center, Boston University. 1980. 285 pp. (African Research Studies, No. 14.) Pb: £10·00.*

The Nigerian Military and Foreign Policy 1975–1979: Processes, Principles, Performance and Contradictions. By Alaba Ogunsanwo. *Princeton: Center of International Studies, University of Princeton. 1980. 86 pp. (Research Monograph, No. 45.) Pb: $5.00.*

THE broad principles of foreign policy to which all African governments are committed—economic development, the liberation of the continent from colonial rule and racial domination and solidarity amongst themselves—were first given institutional expression in the OAU Charter. They were originally conceived as interlocking, mutually dependent parts of a single package: without an end to minority rule independent Africa would not be secure either physically or psychologically; without economic independence African governments would be unable to resist external intervention or adequately to support the efforts of the liberation movements; and without solidarity to compensate for their economic and military weakness they would remain vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by the great powers. To agree on principles, however, is notoriously easier than to implement them particularly in a continent where, even now, communications are fairly rudimentary, deep historical and ethnic conflicts are often more compelling than the need for solidarity against the outside world and where the state itself is often regarded as a prize to be captured rather than as a set of institutions, laws and practices through which interests can be both defined and protected at home and abroad. How then have African states coped with the problems which face them all but which constantly threaten to undermine their collective purposes? In different ways these two monographs, both by members of the Political Science Department of the University of Lagos provide a most timely and useful account of the problems and achievements of the first twenty years of independence. As his title indicates, Dr Nweke's focus is on the diplomacy of harmonisation. If his final conclusions are fairly predictable—he finds, for example, that the problems of harmonisation grow in direct relation to the degree of external intervention in African conflicts—students of African politics and diplomacy will be much in his debt for the detailed and careful analysis he provides of collective African diplomacy on decolonisation, international economic relations (from the Nigerian attempt in 1961 to have GATT declare Association with the EEC to be illegal to the negotiation of the first Lomé Convention in 1975) and conflict resolution in the intra-African and Afro-Arab relations. Moreover, apart from Michael Wolfers's more restricted study of the politics of the OAU (1976) this is the first general study of collective African diplomacy to appear for some years. It therefore both fills a gap in the literature and meets a need.

In their efforts to achieve their common goals African governments have been hampered by their own military and economic weakness—which has often left them with little to do but pass resolutions—and by a reluctance of those governments which were, theoretically, in a position to provide leadership—to do so. Until the mid-1970s the latter charge was often levelled at Nigeria whose governments commanded greater resources than others and yet which often seemed excessively constrained by the egalitarianism of the African diplomatic milieu. Whether or not this charge was ever justified it is clear that after the departure of General Gowon the Nigerian government became less inhibited in its foreign policy. Part of the interest of Dr Ogunsanwo's short study is that it gives us an inside view of this period of reappraisal and

transformation: he was a member of a committee set up by, the then, Brigadier Murtala Muhammed to review Nigeria's foreign policy; an exercise which, we are told, led to 'a relative democratisation in the foreign policy making process' and arguably to a more determined effort, for example in Angola, to influence the shape of Africa's diplomatic system.

How successful was the new look Nigerian foreign policy? There is no easy answer to this question and one of the merits of Dr Ogunsanwo's essay is the even-handed way in which he handles the failures and contradictions along with the achievements. Take for example Southern Africa. If today Western governments are more concerned to secure change in Southern Africa than during the earlier period surveyed by Dr Nweke it is certainly partly because they must now deal not merely with African resentment in general but with a government which is, in principle, willing to use its economic power in support of its foreign policy objectives. They may not yet have to choose between Nigeria and South Africa but the idea of such a choice can no longer be dismissed as absurd. But the pressures for accommodation with the West are also strong. Dr Ogunsanwo is probably therefore right to conclude that 'the wide nexus of mutually beneficial relationships existing between the numbers of Nigerias's multi-dimentional élite and Western countries would not permit any meaningful anti-imperialist campaign to be sustained without internal sabotage.'

London School of Economics JAMES MAYALL

Uganda: A Modern History. By Jan Jelmert Jørgensen. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 381 pp. £13·95.*

THE author declares the aim of this book is to test 'the "fit" of the structural dependence paradigm to a single case' (p. 22) of a Third World country in the periphery of the world capitalist system. Those who are put off by the heavy use of jargon and the sweeping, unsubstantiated assertions which tend to characterise modern neo-Marxist writing should not ignore this book, as it does avoid both drawbacks. Apart from a short, sophisticated, critical essay on dependency theory in the preface and the use of the word 'salariat' to describe salaried employees of the government, Marxist jargon is not used very frequently. The author is too good a historian, amassing empirical material, so that explanations of events are not forced into line with untenable theory. There are three chapters on the colonial period, one on the formation of political parties before independence and one each on the Obote and the Amin regimes. A brief 'Epilogue' covers events in 1979 and 1980, since the fall of Amin. The period since independence, of concern to most readers, occupies about 40 per cent of the book.

Given the author's aim, most attention is focussed on the development of the Ugandan economy and, given the nature of Ugandan politics, a major subsidiary theme is the rivalry between the Baganda and the other peoples of Uganda. The result is an interesting work of political economy: not a comprehensive 'Modern History' but a significant contribution to the study of Ugandan history. Dependency theory does not stand up well against this test case. The theory appears to be consistent with a description of the Ugandan economy at any particular point of time in the twentieth century, but it does very little to help us explain political or economic change. For example, Jørgensen takes a conventional view of what are the important events of the Obote period: 'the UPC-KY alliance foundered on the issue of the "lost counties"' (p. 219) and 'the 1966 Crisis' is discussed as a separate section within the chapter. Yet these events centred on tribal loyalties which cannot satisfactorily be fitted into a Marxist framework. To say that the exceptional cases of Binaisa and Ocheng 'should warn us that class interests could and did override ethnic identity' and that 'the

African bourgeoisie and traditional rulers in each area used ethnic or status group identity to mobilise support and to obscure class antagonisms' (p. 227) just is inadequate without substantial supporting evidence. Similarly, it was not domestic or international opposition to Obote's 'Move to the Left' which brought about his downfall in 1971. 'The coup was executed . . . by Amin and his supporters to forestall Amin's imminent arrest' (p. 268): a most idiosyncratic and personal reason, rather than a feature of structural dependence, which then had a major impact on Ugandan society—including the economy—as Jørgensen demonstrates well.

The book is extensively researched with copious footnotes and a sixteen-page bibliography, but it is worrying that the sources have not always been used properly. On p. 229 the Ugandan Hansard is referenced for Daudi Ocheng's motion which launched the 1966 crisis. Following other prominent academics, Jørgensen gives the impression that the motion called for investigation of allegations against Obote, Onama and Nekyon and says that Kakonge was the only MP not to vote in favour of the motion. In fact Hansard reports the motion was agreed without a vote and the three politicians were not mentioned in its text. It also is not accurate to say the commission of enquiry, which resulted from the motion, cleared Amin of 'any wrong-doing' (p. 229).

It is a great pity, and surprising in view of the author's approach, that the impact of regional and international relations is not covered systematically. The EEC and the World Bank, as well as the formation and impact of the East African Community, are not mentioned.

City University, London PETER WILLETTS

The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath. By Anthony Clayton. *London: C. Hurst. 1981. 166 pp. £9·50.*

IT is difficult for a British scholar to write the recent history of Zanzibar. Fieldwork is not allowed (particularly if, like Anthony Clayton, one teaches at Sandhurst) and official records are still closed. Clayton has however done his best, using what published sources are available, supplemented by oral testimonies from former British officials and some necessarily anonymous Zanzibaris. The result is a useful, informative, lucidly written interim survey.

He begins with a brief account of the colonial period and ends with the assassination of Abeid Karume in 1972. British administration in Zanzibar was makeshift, without long-term aims. The deep-seated antagonisms of race and class were overlooked; constitutional changes favoured the dominant Arab minority. Even the general strike of 1948—a politically motivated protest which united the African urban population—was not taken as a serious warning. When decolonisation came it was a simple handover to the Sultan and his Arab government.

Clayton's account of the revolution which broke out a few weeks later in January 1964 is largely written round the elusive John Okello. Okello is indeed a strange figure. He surfaced suddenly, an unknown leader, overthrew the government within three hours, established a reign of terror (to the terrifying tune of his own threatening broadcasts), and then within a few weeks had left Zanzibar forever, edged out by Karume, who inherited his revolution. And a revolution it genuinely was: the existing political, economic and social structures were irrevocably overthrown.

Most of the British officials however remained at their posts and kept the essential public services going. What turned Karume against them was the British government's delay in recognising his government (which Clayton explains plausibly in terms of the then international situation). This he could not tolerate, so after a few

months they and all the other British and American residents were expelled. East Germans, Russians, and eventually Chinese replaced them.

The first twelve years of Zanzibar independence were dominated by Karume. He outmanoeuvred his radical intellectual rivals (they were either killed or driven out), and ruled himself in the name of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. Clayton finds his methods unsympathetic—authoritarian, mindless and inefficient. But he gives him credit for his economic policy, which aimed, with some success, at making the islands economically self-sufficient, and his land policy. Here official Marxist models were ignored. The big plantations were not collectivised but split up into smallholdings which have been successfully farmed by peasant producers.

The union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika, as Tanzania, was equally pragmatic. Karume insisted on retaining his freedom of action in economic policy and foreign affairs, as well as complete administrative autonomy. Yet the union held together, and still holds—a rare example of African Unity in action. In practice, as Clayton points out, foreign policy differences were less than they seemed. Zanzibar did not become the 'African Cuba' of American alarmists. No Soviet or Chinese military units (let alone rockets) were installed. Throughout Karume stuck to his own aims—non-alignment, self-sufficiency and the establishment of a distinctively Zanzibari society—and in his capricious, heavy-handed way, came closer to achieving his aims that most leaders of the African independence period.

University of Edinburgh CHRISTOPHER FYFE

Capital and Labour in South Africa: Class Struggle in the 1970s. By D. du Toit. *London: Kegan Paul International for the African Studies Centre, Leiden. 1981. 495 pp. £18·00.*

READERS of this book might be advised to start with the Conclusions, for the author there lays out in broad strokes the major themes and preoccupations which are explored in greater detail in the previous chapters. This will enable them to have a better sense of the purpose and direction of the argument which tends now and again to get submerged or lost in much detail which is not always *shown* to be relevant, though it clearly is.

The central thesis of the book is that the history of South Africa, and especially the period from the mineral revolution in the nineteenth century, is best understood as a continuing clash between the interests of capital and unfree labour. This is not a new thesis, but is one which is worked over here at great length. The historical background to the events of the 1970s are examined in the light of this central proposition, as are the policies, theories and actions of major oppositional groups from the South African Labour Party through the 'bureaucratic' organisations of the Homelands, the Black Consciousness movement, and the ANC—as well as trade union movements and organisations. After laboriously setting the scene, Dr du Toit then gives attention to the events of the 1970s, starting with the Durban strikes and ending with the events of and after Soweto. He explains the objective causes and conditions of these actions by Black workers and students and analyses the reactions of the liberal parties and organisations (such as the Progressives), the state, and movements like Buthulezi's Inkatha.

His central conclusion is that the major political and industrial organisations which have sought to represent Black interests have rarely had a clear analysis of capitalism in South Africa and hence have failed to anchor themselves directly in the proletarian experience and reality of Black workers. For apartheid is the local South African variant of capitalism and all the discriminatory and oppressive legislation and practices are directly geared to sustain capitalism through the oppression of unfree workers.

Organisations (like those of the liberals, Black consciousness, Inkatha and others) which attempt to ameliorate the cutting edge of racism seek to salvage what he regards as probably a doomed capitalism, not to transform it. He has sharp words too for the South African Communist Party and the ANC, and especially the former for effectively 'postponing the socialist transformation of society' in its two-stage programme.

It is a long book, and I think too long. The central thesis is a good one and a strong one, but its impact and effect gets diluted in the length of the study. Perhaps this is because too little editing and slimming down has been done on the original version of the book, which started life as a doctoral thesis. There may be a good case for a '10-year' rule, which obliges writers to let their theses mature and boil down before being published. For this book would have benefitted greatly from economy, from a closer fit between argument and evidence, and from a more selective use of appropriate evidence. That being said, the author has taken on an ambitious task, has stuck with it and has relentlessly organised a lot of material into this study. Those who find rigid theoretical frameworks for the organisation of evidence to be simplistic will not have an easy time with this book. Those who can go along with the approach as, at least, a heuristic device and, at best, as coherent analysis will find that there are some sharp insights and useful observations on South African politics which emerge.

University of York ADRIAN LEFTWICH

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

The Emergence of Modern India. By Arthur Lall. *New York, Guildford: Columbia University Press. 1981. 260 pp. $22.00.*

IMAGINE the sort of book we would have if a senior British diplomat who had spent most of his career in, say, Singapore and Tokyo, decided to write a concise account of modern British history for Asian readers. Stylistically, it would be lucid and occasionally elegant, but it might also lack the depth and accuracy which can only emerge from serious study and a familiarity with day-to-day details. This is roughly what we get from Arthur Lall, a long-time member of Indian delegations to the United Nations in Geneva and New York.

He begins by offering us a view of Indian civilisation which has been drastically tailored to suit his liberal, secularised outlook. Something vaguely described as 'synthesis' is apparently the central element of this civilisation. It might have served as the pivotal concept of the book, but it vanishes after the opening pages. Most scholars would prefer 'hierarchy' to 'synthesis', but that inconvenient concept is never mentioned. Caste receives only a few fleeting, ill-informed comments and then disappears under the rug too.

Lall has an odd sense of priorities. It is understandable that a diplomat should want to emphasise foreign relations. But it is bizarre to find the index (and the text) of a survey of modern India giving more space to the 'United States' or to 'Lall, Arthur' than to 'Gandhi, M. K.'.

In his unrestrained ardour to defend Nehru's record in foreign affairs, he makes an easy task difficult and does his former chief a disservice by seriously overstating the case. He goes to ridiculous extremes over the Sino-Indian conflict, trying and failing to sustain myths long ago discredited by scholars.

His comments on domestic affairs are even less helpful. He is apparently unaware of the central feature of India's politics up to the late 1960s: the working of the Congress Party's formidable political machine, based on transactional ties to powerful

landowning groups. He therefore cannot see the historic importance of the breakdown of the machine and the growing assertiveness of the poorer majority from the early 1970s onward. These two events have created problems which no subsequent Indian government has solved and opportunities which no government has grasped.

Lall's description of Mrs Gandhi's post-1980 government is outrageous in its naïveté, if naïveté is the right word. He sees her followers attacking lawlessness; never practising it. He depicts Sanjay Gandhi as an inspired altruist whose supporters brought youthful vigour and renewal into government. We are told that it is fortunate for India that they believe in action and not talk. None of this can withstand serious examination.

It is a great pity that a university press with many notable achievements in the field of Asian studies should publish this book. To claim that it is the 'first close-up view of India's modern history' is farcical.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

Studies in India's Foreign Policy. Edited by Surendra Chopra. *Amritsar, India: Guru Nanak Dev University. 1981. 586 pp. £5·00.*

THIRTY-ONE papers, given at two seminars held in 1979 and 1980, are collected here. They are of unequal length and weight, but their sum total of interest is considerable. Most of the contributors are academic figures, some of high status, belonging to universities in Delhi and the Panjab, and their papers are well documented. It is heartening to find that seven of them are women. Their general thinking may be described as, in terms of world politics, distinctly radical. Various of the papers were composed in the context of the brief eclipse of Mrs Gandhi's Congress by the more conservative Janata Party, when there was much speculation about changes in Indian foreign policy which on the whole did not come about. Whatever their own preferences, it is pointed out that the Janata leaders did not deem it prudent to tamper with the good understanding with the Soviet Union which has for years been India's sheet-anchor (pp. 216, 423). In one of his own two contributions, on the Kashmir, issue, the editor emphasises that only Soviet support enabled India to hold out against the combined pressure of Pakistan, America, and China at the time of the Bangladesh war. Relations with America, N. P. Singh observes in a thoughtful study of them, 'have remained without warmth' all along. He protests against Washington's determination 'to perpetuate its role of world policeman', and regards its links with China as 'highly dangerous to India'. Discussing affairs of the Indian Ocean, K. P. Misra dwells on the dislike of most Afro-Asian countries bordering on it for the American thesis of a 'power vacuum', with the implied assertion of a need for American intervention.

Five papers go into questions about China; all are deeply suspicious of China's external policies. These have grown still more unscrupulous since Mao's death, the C.P.I. spokesman Mohit Singh argues in one of the very few essays by a non-academic; Mao and Chou were at least far more deeply rooted in old revolutionary tradition than their successors. K. P. Karunakaran thinks India well ahead of China in many fields of technology; S. Swarup is less sanguine, crediting China with a steel production of 32 million tons to India's 10 million (pp. 21, 107). The longest article, again by the editor, deals with relations with Pakistan, tracing them from the time of Bhutto's coming to power. Two are concerned with the Afghan situation, and disquiet is expressed at the United States undertaking to rearm Pakistan, as if, Leela Yadava writes, 'deliberately trying to promote an arms race in the third world' (p. 313). Other topics taken up are international law on territorial waters, the world economy and the

multinationals, and India's nuclear programme. Other neighbouring countries scrutinised are Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

The collection conveys a strong sense of the extreme complexity of India's place in Asia and the world, as a focal point of a great many of their tensions and their aspirations. A very helpful addition is a study by Satish Kumar of the structure and working since independence of India's foreign office, and of its diplomatic service which he finds much less satisfactory. Another is the concluding section, a detailed bibliographical survey compiled by a group of six scholars.

V. G. KIERNAN

Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy. By Milton Osborne. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 197 pp. £5·95.*

Souvenirs Doux et Amers. By Nordom Sihanouk. *Paris: Hachette/Stock. 1981. 413 pp.*

IT seems a fair, though sad and ironic, surmise that Dr Osborne's excellent memoir of Phnom Penh in 1966 would not have seen the light of day without the horrific fate which overtook Cambodia after its involvement in the Second Indochina War. The origins of 'Democratic Kampuchea' are a matter of natural, lively curiosity for any observer of international affairs. Consequently this whole 'disaster area' has attracted some superficial analysis from those who, having come to know—or at least know of—Cambodia only after Sihanouk's overthrow, have taken 1969-70, and the American intervention, as the starting-point and prime cause respectively of the Cambodian tragedy. Thanks to a historical research trip Osborne, by contrast, was uniquely placed to observe in a random and as yet unknowing way the mainly domestic antecedents of right-wing coup and left-wing revolution. These antecedents have now 'fallen into place', with the help of an entirely unsententious kind of hindsight. At the same time, the book contains much valuable and evocative observation of a vanished society.

Yet there is not much that is not in some way germane to politics. For instance, Sihanouk's obsession with film-making was no purely private matter for it helped convince the political Right that this man could never save Cambodia from ruin or revolution; simultaneously it constituted Sihanouk's refuge from his own secret fear that events had indeed slipped from his control. The dominance of French journalists in Sihanouk's private secretariat and official press is not just a comment on his personal Francomania: the unstinting sycophancy of men like Charles Meyer and Jean Barré sustained Sihanouk's flagging ego and his will to cling to power even after he had lost the ability to exercise it effectively. Sihanouk's fawning admiration for de Gaulle blinded him to the fact that France in the late 1960s had no more leverage on the developing Indochina situation than he himself did.

Readers may notice the poignant irony that Sihanouk could recover no credit with the conspiring Right by his eleventh-hour agreement to American strategic bombing of the Vietnamese sanctuaries because both the bombing and the agreement were secret! One will welcome Osborne's unambiguous assertions about such matters, including the observation that the astronomical level of corruption was not the result of American aid but of Sihanouk's renunciation of it; while that same corruption, combined with Sihanouk's shameful behaviour and the rising power of the Right, confirmed Marxist-Leninist preconceptions of the necessity of armed struggle and also pushed many would-be liberals into the revolutionary camp.

But it is desirable that the memoir should have confined itself to the urban scene that Osborne knew instead of venturing judgments on the rural scene which he did not know (nor its language: 'my Southeast Asian language was Vietnamese'). He is

anxious to explain peasant motivation towards, and in, the Khmer Rouge. He finds little evidence that Cambodia was a special case in South-east Asia as regards peasant indebtedness, etc., but cannot shake off a vaguely Marxian conviction that revolutions have economic causes. No place here for the idea that the Cambodian revolution might represent the world's most ingenious exercise in Leninism . . . yet the Khmer Rouge conspicuously manipulated the 'feudal' loyalty of the adult peasantry (towards Sihanouk) in order to alienate them from the bourgeoisie, and invented an entirely new 'contradiction', the generation gap, in order to alienate rural youths from their parents and mobilise them as guerrillas. The youth strategy of the Khmer Rouge was described by the defector Ith Sarin as early as 1973. Is Osborne then sticking by his bland judgment of 1974 (J. J. Zasloff, M. Brown, eds., *Communism in Indochina*: p. 245) that such information 'needs to be treated with reserve'?

Sihanouk's latest opus gives no sign of exposure to Osborne's, or anybody else's, considered analysis of his regime. *Souvenirs Doux et Amers* is appropriately named, for it is a fifty-six course *pot-pourri* of sickly sweet nostalgia about family and friends, and intensely bitter self-justification in response to the mockery and incomprehension of the Western press in the 1960s. One might have expected the author of *Chroniques de Guerre . . . et d'Espoir* not only to view the foreign press comment of two decades ago with a certain emotional detachment, but to grasp the opportunities of perspective to write a new and reasoned apologia. Instead, Sihanouk quotes *in extenso* from government pamphlets of the period or refers us to *My War with the CIA*.

But it is not the lack of contemporary pamphlets that makes him pass over the secret strategic bombing in silence. In fact, he stages a subtle charade of discussing it and denying that he gave *carte blanche*. But the January 1968 talks to which Sihanouk refers were concerned with a much lower level of attack anyway (Nixon was still a year away from the White House). The ultimate proof of Sihanouk's complicity lies in his public silence at the time of the B.52 raids. That silence is maintained here amidst an effective diversionary barrage, for to admit complicity would destroy the illusion that Sihanouk's actions were always at least consistent with his doctrine that communist advance is accelerated by American involvement (an involvement which is now Sihanouk's major alibi).

Is it due to ingenuousness only that he refutes all the unrealistic allegations of 'treachery', 'tyranny' and personal corruption but ignores entirely the major issue of the late 1960s (apart from the Vietnamese occupation): the corruption of Mme Monique's family? He may deserve only envy for his succession of beautiful women but he reveals great self-deception on the belief that his charm was more important than rank in achieving these 'conquests' (he makes the same mistake about his political appeal). Self-deception is evident too in the claim that nineteen women make a very modest tally after his father's 'century up by the age of 30', for who accepts the standards of the late-colonial court and harem anyway as a relevant yardstick for a modernising leader? Sihanouk judges all his sexual (and, again, political) activity by the values of his parents' generation and thus finds himself strikingly progressive and modern.

Sadly, times move a lot faster than Sihanouk will ever realise. How attractive will this book be to the modern French public to whom, curiously, it appears to be mainly addressed—with its strange *mélange* of anti-Americanism, testimonials for old French friends and old-fashioned sexual titillation? It can only confirm the contempt of Cambodia's middle-class survivors wondering whether to rally to Sihanouk's banner against Vietnamese colonialism—even if so much space were not devoted to abusing 'the Cambodian intellectuals'. I personally am grateful for some detailed reminiscence of court life and French Indochina, and the contest with Son Ngoc Thanh so formative for Sihanouk's self-perception. Jean Barré has written a superbly obsequious Preface in the style of *Realités Cambodgiennes* (which he once edited), a veritable gem of its

genre. The cover depicts Sihanouk by the side of de Gaulle—a man whose stature he long aspired to but rarely managed to emulate. At least an autobiography which so intimately merges the private with the political sphere may stimulate some understanding of the reasons why.

University of Kent ROGER KERSHAW

Australia in the Korean War 1950–53. Vol. I: Strategy and Diplomacy. By Robert O'Neill. *Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 1981. 548 pp.*

Australia in World Affairs 1971–75. Edited by W. J. Hudson. *Sydney, London: Allen and Unwin for the Australian Institute of International Affairs 1980. 440 pp. £18·50.*

THE two volumes under review describe Australia's entrance into the cold war in Asia and the halting attempts made in the early 1970s to adapt Australia's position to new international conditions growing out of detente reaching East and South-east Asia. Both books are broader studies than their titles imply. O'Neill's *Australia in the Korean War 1950–1953* is in large part a detailed study of Australia's security policies from 1945 to 1954. *Australia in World Affairs 1971–1975* also covers a more extensive period of time and range of subjects than its title suggests. They are, however, in all other respects very different kinds of books. *Australia in the Korean War* will be the definitive work on its subject for many years to come. Indeed, it is a volume that no serious scholar of Asian and Pacific international politics in the early 1950s can ignore. *Australia in World Affairs* will be of much less lasting value.

A second volume of *Australia in the Korean War* covers the combat history of the RAN, Australian Army and RAAF in Korea. Volume 1, 'Strategy and Diplomacy', begins with three chapters outlining the background and circumstances of Korea, and Australian post-Second World War defence and foreign policy. The heart of the book (Chapters 4 to 24) provides a month-by-month account of how the Australian government, its foreign affairs and military officers, and the opposition and press, analysed and attempted to use the Korean War to achieve their various aims. Chapter 25 covers the 1954 Geneva Conference and the removal of Australian forces from Korea in 1957. The concluding chapter brings together in a succinct analysis the various threads that are developed in the narrative. The book also contains useful photographs, maps and cartoons from the period, as well as appendices on the composition of government ministries from 1946 to 1956, forty-one pages of biographical notes, the text of the armistice agreement, a chronology of events, and other useful information.

Dr O'Neill's account is based upon a wide variety of sources including files of the Australian government, extensive interviews and a broad range of previously published sources. The analysis is sound and does not wander into irrelevant areas, even though the book is as much a study of the formulation of Australia's post-1950 security policy as it is of the more limited subject of Australia in the Korean War. If the book has a fault, it is one that many 'official' histories have—that is, the tendency to celebrate the events and personalities it describes rather than to judge their actions in a framework other than the conventional wisdom of the period. Nevertheless, O'Neill is not oblivious of the political consequences of the events and actions he so fully describes. The success of the External Affairs Minister, Percy Spender, in shifting the focus of Australian Liberal Party thinking from Britain to the United States and getting the Truman administration to negotiate the ANZUS Alliance is a centrepiece of the history. As O'Neill writes, while the Korean War was not the sole cause of the formation of the United States–Australian Alliance, it 'was an essential ingredient in

the drama which set Australian federal politics, and foreign and defence policies, onto a new course for the next twenty years' (p. 200).

The essays in *Australia in World Affairs 1971–1975* attempt to assess how Australian policy and politics adjusted not only to the election of the Whitlam-Labor government, but also the restructuring of international attitudes in Asia after the Nixon doctrine and the reality of the American defeat in Vietnam had become apparent. As in earlier volumes in this series, the editor, W. J. Hudson, has brought together a diverse collection of papers by experienced authors in different fields to record and synthesize events during a five-year period. Several essays fall out of this rubric however. F. A. Mediansky contributes a piece on defence reorganisation between 1957 and 1975 and Sir Keith Waller tells about the life of an ambassador in Washington during the Johnson years. To this reviewer, the best of the essays focus on Australian relations with specific countries or regions. With the admirable exception of Robert O'Neill's cogent but understated first essay on contradictions in defence policy, the discussions of investment, imigration, international law and the United Nations might better have been included in collections dealing with similar issues in other countries. Without more comparative analysis, a non-specialist is often at a loss as to how to judge the importance or reasonableness of Australia's behaviour. Most of these essays, like the country and regional essays on Australian relations with the United Kingdom, Japan, China, South-east Asia, the Indian Ocean, the South-west Pacific and Papua New Guinea, tend to be too tied to a chronological discussion of newspaper opinion and politicians' speeches. For good analysis the best are those of John Ingleson on South-east Asia and Ian Clark on the Indian Ocean. But of them all, Neville Meaney's critique of Australian relations with the United States in the first half of the 1970s is outstanding. This was an exciting period in Australia when there was an atmosphere of experimentation and adventure. Meaney's essay captures that mood and reminds us of lost opportunities.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ROBERT H. TAYLOR

NORTH AMERICA

Presidents and Prime Ministers. Edited by Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1980. (Distrib. in UK by Transaction Books.) 347 pp. Pb: £4·75.*

THIS is a collection of studies of prime ministerial authority and power deliberately aimed at the American market. Its underlying theme is that the presidential system in the United States suffers from the absence of collegiality at the top, resulting from the lonely eminence of the President among a cabinet without independent political standing, and the inadequacies of a staff without administrative experience or a wide network of contacts throughout the governmental machine.

It has, however, some useful, at times fascinating, insight for the European reader. Richard Rose's chapter on the British Prime Minister, and Ezra Suleiman's on presidential government in France, bring out the enormous difference between the explicitly political role of the French civil service, thus allowing political advice to be given by men with secure careers and a sound grasp of the bureaucracy, and the allegedly non-political position of the senior officials on whom—apart from a few insecure and temporary political advisers—a British prime minister relies. The contribution on the German Chancellorship, by Renate Mayntz, draws out of the failure of Ehmke's reorganisation of the Chancellor's office a sober assessment of how far it is possible to plan and co-ordinate from the centre within a collegial system

of government. Other chapters look at the head of government in Canada, Italy, Norway and Spain, picking out parallel themes: the head of government's role as a policy co-ordinator, as party manager, the problem of staffing, the problem of managing the government, the advantages and disadvantages of prime ministers who emerge through long years of training within the party, as opposed to those who are 'self-employed' and burst upon the scene from outside. Hardly surprisingly, in view of the American political experience in recent years, the editors come down heavily in favour of heads of government who are team trained, as against the self-employed.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

Global Food Interdependence: Challenge to American Foreign Policy. By Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1980. 214 pp. $25.00 Pb: $9.40*

THE character of this book can best be described as a briefing paper for busy policy-makers and for non-specialists who want to obtain an understanding of this most important of all international problems. This purpose is admirably achieved. The book is short, action-oriented, middle-of-the-road and objective in giving different views. Those concerned in the United States are fortunate to have this book available to them. It cries for a European counterpart. This is not to say that the book is not also important and useful to the non-American reader, partly because America's policy is so crucial in this field but also because a good deal of light is thrown on the international food system and the current discussions regarding world food security.

The seven chapters deal, respectively, with the overall problem; the commercial system (food trade); the concessional system (food aid); governmental organisation in the United States for international food policy; America's role in international organisations; recommendations for future United States policy; and general conclusions and summary.

The two authors are well-known authorities, both as individual scholars and as a collaborating team, and the book throughout can be described as dependable and authoritative. The book makes it very clear that, in spite of some superficial similarities, America's food power has its clearly defined limits and can in no way be compared to OPEC oil power.

A reader may have some doubts or objections on points of detail. For example, there is an unexplained cryptic reference to a '200 per cent decline' in America's wheat export prices between 1974 and 1977 (pp. 43-44). One could also wish to learn a little more from the book about American grain trading companies—Cargill and all that. Sometimes one feels the book is too condensed. For example, Chapter 3 on food aid will mean more to the reader who already knows something on the subject, and there is not always sufficient space given to making clear what effects apply to aid in general and what effects are specific to food aid.

However, these are minor grumbles and this reviewer finished the book with a feeling of gratitude to the authors.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex H. W. SINGER

Food for War—Food for Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context. By Mitchel B. Wallerstein. *Cambridge Mass., London: MIT Press. 1980. 312 pp. £18·60.*

THIS book gives both more and less than the title indicates. It gives *less* because the author concentrates so strongly on the donor side of the food aid relationship; the

recipient side is hardly touched upon. But it also gives *more* because not only America's food aid (PL480), but also other bilateral food aid programmes are discussed, as well as various multilateral programmes, such as the EEC and the UN/FAO food aid programmes. In fact the treatment of the global food aid context is, in some ways, the most interesting and novel part of this book. To an economist, a particularly important aspect of this book is the emphasis properly placed on the politics of food aid, based on widespread and solid research in the United States' national archives and presidential libraries. Within its limits, largely self-imposed, this is an excellent book which no one interested in food aid can afford to disregard. The reader may, however, regret the absence of a text of the actual laws and regulations governing PL480, and also of a list of tables for reference.

The author brings out particularly well the constant and complex interplay between the different purposes of food aid: surplus disposal, market development, foreign policy, humanitarian purposes, economic and social development.

On the negative side, one would have liked more discussion of how far the various problems discussed are specific to food aid, or to what extent they apply to aid in general, including financial aid. One would also have liked more information about America's domestic food aid programmes and their interplay with international food aid. Among points which come out very clearly from the book are the harmful effects of budgeting in terms of dollars, rather than tonnage; this means that food aid will fade out just when it is most needed, i.e. when world food prices rise as a result of shortages and harvest failures.

Another point which will be new to non-American readers is the way in which President Nixon used food aid to obtain resources for the Vietnam war and the backwash effect this has had on the use and control of food aid. In spite of ritualistic emphasis on the 'temporary' or 'transitional' character of food aid, it is likely to expand in the future, as also suggested and recommended by the Brandt Report. The subject is therefore certain to be a focus of future discussion, and this book is an important contribution to that discussion.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex H. W. SINGER

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea. By Ann L. Hollick. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1981. 496 pp. £18·80. Pb: £8·70.*

IT has been argued that President Reagan's reluctance to give the United States' imprimatur to the UNCLOS Convention has put the whole package in danger, always assuming that it is more than a temporary attitude. Legislation to authorise deep sea-bed mining is already afoot in the United States, West Germany and the United Kingdom—albeit with many provisos. Voices have warned that these moves could negate more than a decade of negotiations, threaten the prospects of other multinational treaties (e.g. outer space), and antagonise the Third World. Critics of the critics complain that the Third World's claims were exigent, the negotiations too prolonged and nit-picking, and international conferences undesirable anyway. An ironic twist is that it was the United States which pushed maritime affairs into the United Nations arena in the first place.

Ann Hollick's substantial and masterly book is thus particularly valuable in that it takes a long historical view of America's maritime policy, drawing on unpublished material and her own personal knowledge of the State Department. She deals with domestic conflicts, state versus federal claims, disputes among federal agencies, and—more recently—the growing interest of Congress in executive policy in this field. Externally the United States had to move from a position in which as a coastal state she was concerned with local issues such as fisheries and her specific relations with Canada

and the Latin American countries, into the full realisation of her claims and responsibilities as a super-power. The basically expansionist Truman Proclamation marked the turning-point.

The oceans have been regarded as a source of food and fuel (oil and natural gas), a medium of transport, a protective barrier, an arena of armed conflict, a laboratory for scientific investigation, and a receptacle for waste disposal. With such a divergence of uses as well as users, accelerated by pressure of population and advances in technology, conflict was bound to sharpen. All these matters are fully analysed and discussed.

The aim of United States policy has been to uphold the doctrine of freedom of the seas and the principle of equal access to resources, consonant with its pro-Free Trade position, while protecting its own interests. The author is critical of America's policy at the early stage of 1945 in that, as the chief architect of the United Nations the United States missed an opportunity of promoting an international settlement at a time when national maritime claims were not so stridently expressed.

When she writes of the UNCLOS negotiations she shows that the early sessions were influenced by the East-West conflict and that Russia was able to win the support of the Third World by its stand on sovereign immunity, the rights of the land-locked countries (some of them being in the Soviet bloc) and resistance to arbitrary settlement of disputes. But by UNCLOS III the developing countries had come into their own and it is these nations which despite many internal differences still contrived to present a united front. By contrast America and Russia's positions were beginning to converge.

Some of the ground of the book has been well-traversed, not least by the author herself. But the dexterity with which she slots each piece into the pattern, her deployment of original sources particularly with regard to the American negotiators themselves and her identification of the essential themes, their genesis and development, make this book an impressive achievement.

AUDREY PARRY

Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950. Edited by Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1980. 332 pp. $21.90.*

The Road to Confrontation: American Policy towards China and Korea 1947-1950. By William W. Stueck. *Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 1981. 326 pp. $20.00. Pb: $10.00.*

BOTH these books reflect recent developments in the study of American foreign policy in the late 1940s: the availability of a great deal of new source material, both published and unpublished; and the emergence of a 'post-revisionist' interpretation of events which, while recognising that the United States must bear its share of the responsibility for the origins of the cold war, does not seek to lay the entire blame at its door.

The Borg and Heinrichs volume is the record of a conference sponsored by the East Asian Institute of Columbia University in 1978. Eight papers deal with various aspects of Sino-American relations during the period in question, and there is a summary record of part of the discussion. All the papers are of a high standard, and the book is essential reading for anyone interested in the subject.

One of the most interesting features of the collection is the way in which the reader is given different, and sometimes opposing, perspectives on the same issue. Compare, for example, Warren Cohen's view of the China White Paper of August 1949 as an attempt by Dean Acheson to disassociate the administration once and for all from Chiang Kai-shek's regime in order to pave the way for an accommodation with the Communists (p. 25) with that of Steven Goldstein, who maintains that 'from the

Chinese Communists' point of view it would be difficult to imagine a more inflammatory document than the White Paper' (p. 264). In the case of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950, Michael Hunt claims that the economic aid which Russia gave to China 'was meager compared to Chinese needs or (to judge from the frequent references in the press in the fall of 1949) CCP expectations' (p. 221). While conceding that the aid extended 'was . . . a drop in the bucket of Chinese need', Steven Levine nevertheless points out that in 1950 the Soviet Union was still suffering from the effects of the Second World War and that, in comparison with 'the simultaneous Soviet exploitation of the East European communist states, one can see how generous Stalin was towards Mao, in his own terms to be sure' (pp. 300-301). It is not always helpful to interpret Sino-Soviet relations in 1950 in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute, no matter how much both Chinese and Russians, together with many Western historians, now encourage us to do so.

In one instance whole papers take opposite views. That of Michael Hunt argues 'that Mao and his associates seem at least down to June 1949 to have in a measure suspended their ideological assumptions, carefully sized up China's position and rationally sought some way out of a difficult international situation' (p. 232). The significance of June 1949 is that this was the month when Mao delivered his famous 'lean-to-one-side speech', in which he proclaimed that there was no possibility of neutrality between the socialist and imperialist camps. Steven Goldstein's paper, on the other hand, denies that Mao's speech 'was a benchmark in the CCP's foreign policy. Statements issued by the Party from 1946 on anticipated almost every major theme in the foreign policy section of Mao's address . . . As Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart reported to Washington, Mao was "simply dotting i's and crossing t's" ' (p. 253). The difference, of course, is yet another example of the perennial debate over whether a communist state's foreign policy should be interpreted primarily in terms of national interest, or of ideology.

William Stueck has already published some valuable articles on the origins of the Korean war. In this equally valuable book he has widened his horizons to present a detailed study of American policy towards both Korea and China from 1947 to November 1950. He is at his most interesting on Korea, not only because comparatively little has been written about it, but also because of his arresting point of departure, viz. that whereas, during the first forty-five years of the twentieth century, the United States displayed great interest in China and virtually none in Korea, in the five years that followed it disengaged from China and ended up fighting a war in Korea (pp. 9-10).

Indeed, Professor Stueck argues with some force that American intervention in the Korean war flowed more or less irresistibly from past policy. He has even unearthed an army study of June 1949 which predicted it (p. 156). But this is not to say, as some of the more conspiratorially minded revisionists have done, that the Korean war was in some way provoked by the United States, in order, for example, to facilitate the implementation of NSC68. Professor Stueck discusses the intelligence failure which preceded the North Korean invasion and provides some convincing reasons why the evidence which, in retrospect, seems so clear an indication of aggressive intentions was not seen as such at the time.

The author is, however, by no means uncritical of American policy. In particular, he attacks the administration's decision to cross the 38th parallel and to permit General MacArthur to employ non-Korean troops near the sensitive border between North Korea and Manchuria, which between them precipitated the massive Chinese intervention in the war. His examination of the second decision draws attention to at least two factors which have not received sufficient attention from other historians. Firstly, he points out that the order sent to MacArthur on September 27, 1950, which has often been interpreted as forbidding the general to use non-Korean troops

along the border, was in fact phrased in such a way as to grant him a certain amount of latitude in the matter (pp. 235-36). Secondly, he believes that if Louis Johnson had remained Secretary of Defense and not been replaced by the prestigious figure of General Marshall, the State Department—and Dean Acheson in particular—might have sought successfully to amend the order and restrain the impetuous United Nations commander (pp. 236, 250).

There are doubtless many more books to come on American policy in the Far East during this period. While wishing their authors well, however, your reviewer feels bound to conclude by observing that their contribution to our knowledge is unlikely to be as great as that which would come from studies of the policies of the other powers involved.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

U.S. Business Involvement in Eastern Europe: Case Studies of Hungary, Poland, and Romania. By Martin Schnitzer. *New York: Praeger. 1980. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 155 pp. £12·25.*

IN his preface, the author writes that 'the potential for U.S. and Western business involvement varies from country to country and also depends upon priorities established in the economic plans of the respective Eastern European countries' (p. v). Such truisms and the inevitable generalities derived therefrom are a major weakness of the book under review. The main criticism, common to all general surveys, is that it tries to cover too much ground and leaves the reader with little more than a bird's eye view of East-West economic relations.

East-West industrial co-operation is an inherently heterogeneous phenomenon which does not lend itself to a precise definition; in spite of the complexity of the interaction of historical, social and political variables which affect East-West economic relations, the author has not allowed himself to be drawn into a discussion of the major non-economic characteristics of the East European domestic systems. His analysis of business co-operation between American and East European firms would have benefited from a broader historical perspective, which would have allowed the complexities of his new type of international economic development to emerge.

The volume is also highly United States-centred: there are too few references to West European multinationals, which pioneered business involvement in Eastern Europe and would have added robustness to the data.

Three chapters in this book are devoted to industrial co-operation in Poland, Hungary and Romania respectively. The lack of data and the totally haphazard distribution of tables (three on Poland, none on Romania and Hungary, out of the book's total of five) does not help the reader in his evaluation of the issues discussed. The chapter on Romania is a case in point: here the author suggests that that country's failure to attract foreign investors in large numbers—in spite of amendments to the legal framework designed to encourage Joint Ventures—is partly due to the lack of trading support from other Comecon member states, which are reluctant to buy from Western-Romanian Ventures on the assumption that 'a Western product is automatically better than anything made in Romania' (p. 121). This otherwise interesting proposition cannot, however, be verified because of the absence of supporting factual evidence.

The responses to a postal questionnaire sent to forty American multinationals—which form the basis of the final chapter on the future of East-West industrial co-operation—provide a somewhat clearer, albeit belated, picture of the incentives and drawbacks experienced by the first-time foreign investor in Eastern Europe.

Although this study adds little new to the existing body of research, it will serve as a useful introduction for the newcomer to the field of East-West industrial co-operation.

University of Bradford PATRICK F. R. ARTISIEN

Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience with Iran. By Barry Rubin. *New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 426 pp. £8·95.*

THE good intentions to which Barry Rubin's title refers were crystallised in Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision of making Iran 'an example of what we could do by an unselfish American policy'; the paving, of course, is a reference to the road to hell. So this book is about the frustration of benevolent intentions.

Such a concern is mixed—perhaps a little uneasily—with interests in the American media presentation of Iran and in changes of public opinion within Iran: the book asks from the outset 'How did it happen that the Iranians, who once looked to the United States as their staunchest ally, now charge us with rank imperialism?'

In addressing such questions, the author has extensively interviewed American officials and searched recently declassified archival sources. This method has a number of limitations for his purposes. First, the insights he gets are inside views of Washington rather than Tehran and do not bear out the dustcover photograph taken through a keyhole. Second, he supposes that prevailing opinion is general opinion and is inclined to mistake a transfer of power for a shift of opinion. Third, when he is short of data from Iranian sources, he magnifies irresistible anecdote as compelling parable, very much in the style of the BBC's foreign correspondents: so one twenty-one year old language teacher at an American missionary school in Tabriz in 1909 is used to 'symbolise'—it is not clear how—the hope of further American aid. And fourth, when absorbed in documentary sources of which he is the first public reader, the author finds himself settling matters of truth and fairness: for example, the question of whether the belief current in Tehran that the Americans wanted to reinstate the Shah is 'misinformed' is really rather trivial in view of the powerful social and psychological functions of myth in revolutionary situations. Indeed, the important point that Rubin misses in his vagrant thesis is the necessity for the Islamic Revolution of maintaining a bogey figure, a role in which the United States was to some extent to be succeeded by Iraq.

We are informed here of what Carter did and did not say about the Shah, of human rights in Iran as perceived internationally, of debates within Congress, of the competence of intelligence agencies. The evidence from Iran is lighter and still less pertinent: we have only public statements and news of changes in political and religious hierarchies. The drift of the evidence submitted in this book shows a withdrawal of American support for the Shah; an abandonment confirmed by Khomeini's first prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan (p. 221). Superficially, at least, this would account for an enhancement rather than a deterioration of the image of the United States in Iran. In terms of solving a jig-saw puzzle, Rubin has sorted out the straight edges: but the inside picture remains confused.

University of Kent ROGER HOMAN

LATIN AMERICA

Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru. By Cynthia McClintock. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1981. 418 pp. £15·30. Pb: £3·85.*

IN 1977 one bibliography on the Peruvian revolution listed over one thousand items. This number has probably now doubled with the florescence of Peruvian research in the social sciences and a flood of literature from foreign scholars. Dr McClintock's book, a detailed study of change in three rural co-operatives, results from the interest shown in Peru by a group of American scholars in the early 1970s. Although essential reading for future analysts of the agrarian reform, it will also interest those studying the comparative effects of self-management schemes on workers' and peasants' attitudes and behaviour.

The 1969 Cornell-IEP research project permits a rare comparison of peasant attitudes before and after the reform. In 1974 McClintock re-surveyed three production co-operatives, two near Virú on the coast and one in the central sierra, with follow-up visits in 1975 and 1977. Less extensive analyses of other sierra sites and two 'control' villages unaffected by the reform complement these surveys, which are fully discussed in the appendices. The first part of the book discusses theories of self-management, presents a general outline of the Velasco government's reform programme, and compares political culture before and after 1969. It concludes that co-operative members developed attitudes best described as 'group egoism', demonstrating a growing willingness to participate and collaborate within the enterprise, but neither a sense of solidarity with other peasants outside nor support for the government. The four chapters in Part II—on political participation, leadership, society, and work and economic performance—each begin with a discussion of the behaviour implied by clientelist, corporatist, and 'fully participatory social democracy' models, test these against the survey data, and conclude with detailed illustrations from each site. Political participation and leadership opportunities increased remarkably. Co-operative members managed to control the activities and salaries of technical experts, and even to block some government initiatives, contrary to the expectations both of officials and left-wing critics. The reform, however, encountered problems. There were greater incentives to raise wages than work for profits. If private enterprise gave better rewards hard work on the co-operatives became unattractive. Co-operatives competed for markets and tried to dominate others. Vacillating government policies on peasant federations and co-operative marketing engendered distrust. Conflicts, between *comuneros* and ex-hacienda employees in the highlands, and between co-operative members and *eventuales* on the coast, were difficult to resolve.

This is not a book for Sunday afternoon reading, though it will be an essential work of reference on the Peruvian agrarian reform. Doubts remain, however, about the validity of generalisations based on a small and geographically confined number of sites; about the rather black-and-white picture of politics and rural society before 1969; and about the viability of improvements in the reform programme suggested in the conclusion. One also wonders whether, in a book intended for specialists, it is really necessary to hide under pseudonyms research sites which the expert can probably identify with ease.

University of Liverpool RORY MILLER

Political Power in Ecuador. By Osvaldo Hurtado. Trans. by Nick D. Mills. *Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1980. 398 pp.*

OSVALDO HURTADO published the original Spanish version of this work in 1977, as a

political sociologist at the Catholic University who was also prominent in the Christian democratic party of his country: but he insisted that this was an academic work, and disclaimed at several points any intention to produce party propaganda or a manifesto. Two years later, when Ecuadorean politics had taken the sort of unexpected turn readers of his treatise had learned to expect, elections propelled him into power as vice-president: last year President Roldós was tragically killed in an air accident and was succeeded by vice-president Hurtado.

President Hurtado has written a fascinating account of Ecuador's progress from Spanish colonial backwater to its present status as an oil-rich democracy with a considerable potential both for internal development and for regional political influence. He deals with the colonial period, the republican period, and, at greater length, with what he calls the 'crisis of power in contemporary Ecuador.' This latter section is full of interesting material about modern Ecuadorean politics, including populism and personalism—very much a feature of the recent past—and the struggles of the university Left. But possibly the most fascinating part is President Hurtado's discussion of the theocratic period of Ecuador's history, a subject which the President, a modern Christian democrat, obviously finds of great interest. (He quotes a circular of the Archbishop of Quito of 1883 condemning the 'so-called *Rights of Man* . . . We remind our most beloved faithful of the obligation which they have to abstain from reading these types of publications and we command that they be not held in their possession, rather that they should be destroyed so that their reading might not cause damage to the soul.')

What he has produced, therefore—and the English version is clear and fluent, with a foreword by the translator, Professor Nick Mills—is not only what would in any case be a wise and reflective account of his country's political history and contemporary political sociology, but an insight into the approach and outlook of the country's president at a time when Ecuador is acquiring both political and geopolitical importance in the continent.

Chatham House DAVID STEPHEN

The Dominican Republic. By Ian Bell. *Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Benn. 1981. 392 pp. £12·95.*

THE Dominican Republic has been neglected by academics and journalists alike. In the last decade only one major work on the republic appeared in English: *The Dominican Intervention* by Abraham Lowenthal (Harvard University Press, 1972). Like so many countries in the Caribbean and Central America the Dominican Republic usually receives international attention only when it is confronted by severe crisis; and that attention is often superficial and reflected in books that are ill-considered and overhastily published.

This book by a retired diplomat, Ian Bell, has none of these failings. The author spent four years in the republic in the late 1960s and has returned since. The book contains an excellent description in the tradition of the best diplomatic reportage. It opens with a succinct narrative that in one hundred pages summarises the most recent historiography from the pre-Columbian period to the resignation of Joaquín Balaguer in 1978. The author then provides a series of brief summaries of social conditions, the state of the economy and the political structure. Each of these accounts is characterised by a judicious judgment and care in the assembling and presentation of evidence.

Academics may complain that the author is more concerned to describe than to debate. He refrains from discussing the merits and disadvantages of the intimate relationship of the republic with the United States. He describes—rather than

analyses—the character of authoritarian rule and the 'social democratic' and 'liberal' experiments in the country. He only hints at debate about desirable and viable paths of economic development. But such complaints are unfair. The book sets out to provide a readable and informed introduction to the island for the general, intelligent reader. As such it succeeds admirably. At the same time it fulfils another function. The book challenges academics to pursue their own particular interests in the study of an island which they have sorely neglected.

University College, London CHRISTOPHER ABEL

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

International Who's Who 1981–82. 45th edn. *London: Europa. 1981. 1,426 pp. £35·00.*

THE 45th edition of this standard reference work follows the pattern established in previous editions. A brief introductory roll of the reigning monarchs and the most important members of the reigning royal families is followed by an obituary listing of notables whose deaths have occurred since May 1980. The alphabetical section of over fifteen thousand biographical entries make up the majority of this work. Entries are concise and contain the essential facts: date of birth, nationality, education, career, present positions, honours, awards, works published, current address. The majority of eminent men and women of our time in most sections of society are included. Existing biographies have been brought up to date and revised to include the latest information.

This sizeable reference work is clearly set out and handles well despite the large format.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Lambert's Worldwide Government Directory with Inter-Governmental Organizations, 1981. Edited by Diane E. Hrabak. *Washington: Lambert. 1981. 779 pp. $125.00.*

THIS new directory is likely to prove of great value. It lists heads of state, government ministers, senior civil servants, and heads of the armed forces, judiciary and economic bodies, with addresses, telephone and telex numbers. Information on forms of address is provided for each country. The last forty pages are devoted to international organisations.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

European Yearbook, Vol. XXVI. *The Hague, London: Nijhoff for the Council of Europe. 1980. 696 pp. Fl. 210.00.*

THIS annual's chief function is to survey developments in the various economic and political organisations which link the countries of Western Europe; the year covered here is 1978. There are, in addition, five signed articles, including one by ex-President Senghor on Euro-African relations. An extensive bibliography rounds off the volume.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

A Guide to the Official Publications of the European Communities. Edited by John Jeffries. *London: Mansell. 1981. 318 pp. £21·00.*

THE author is a librarian at the University of Kent where he has supervised the European Documentation Centre since 1974. This second, revised edition of the guide first published in 1978 has been expanded to include the recent publishing output of the Communities up to the end of 1979. A short exposé of the history of the European Communities is followed by a description of the machinery of the institutions. The official publications of each institution are comprehensively listed and clearly described by categories. Where applicable, other publishers' sources of information are indicated. The chapter dealing with bibliographic aids has been expanded to include an outline of mechanised information retrieval systems. The appendices list sources of free EEC documentation, worldwide sales offices and European Documentation centres and libraries. It is to be noted at Appendix III that among the journals listed *New Europe* ceased publication with the Winter 1979 issue.

Chatham House Library N.G.

A Collection of Treaties and Other Documents Affecting the States of Malaysia, 1961–1963. 2 Vols. Edited by J. de V. Allen *et al London: Oceana, 1981. $85.00 (per set)*

THIS comprehensive collection is based on, and largely supersedes, Maxwell and Gibson's *Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States* (1924). Intended primarily for historians, it includes a good deal of explanatory material. The Foreword is by Professor C. D. Cowan, for the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

HAWRLYSHYN, Bohdan: *Road Maps to the Future:* Towards More Effective Societies. Oxford, New York: Pergamon. 1980. 193 pp. £12·75. Pb: £4·50.

KUBALKOVA, V. and CRUICKSHANK, A. A.: *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations.* London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1980. 411 pp. £14·75.

MCNAMARA, Robert S.: *The McNamara Years at the World Bank:* Major Policy Issues 1968–81. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981. 675 pp. £18·00. $37.50.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

BINKIN, Martin and KYRIAKOPOLOUS, Irene: *Paying the Modern Military* Washington: Brookings Institution. 1981. 83 pp. Pb.

GODSON, Roy, ed.: *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Vol. 3: Counterintelligence.* New York: National Strategy Information Center. 1980. (Distrib. by Transaction Books, New Brunswick, London.) 339 pp. Pb: $7.95.

GOEBEL, Hans: *The Wrong Force for the Right Mission:* Defending Nato's Central Front. Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. 1981. 97 pp. (National Security Series, No. 4/81.) Pb.

GREENWICH FORUM V: *The North Sea*: A New International Regime? (Records of a Conference at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, May 2–4, 1979.) Edited by D. Cameron Watt. Guildford: Westbury House. 1981. 284 pp. £28·00.

GREENWICH FORUM V: *The North Sea:* A New International Regime? (Records of a Conference Naval College, Greenwich 23-25 April 1980.) Edited by M. B. F. Ranken. Guildford: Westbury House. 1981. 234 pp. £25·00.

LASZLO, Ervin and KEYS, Donald, eds: *Disarmament:* The Human Factor. (Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Societal Context for Disarmament, UN New York.) Oxford, New York: Pergamon. 1981. 164 pp Pb.

ØRVIK, Nils, ed.: *Nato Priorities.* Kingston, Ont.: International Relations Centre, Queen's University. 1981. 51 pp. (National Security Series, No. 3/81.) Pb.

RASIULIS, Andrew P.: *On the Utility of War in the Nuclear Age.* Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs and Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. 1981. 95 pp. (Wellesley Papers 8/1981.) Pb: C$4.75.

THOMPSON, Robert, ed.: *War in Peace* An Analysis of Warfare since 1945. London: Orbis. 1981 312 pp.

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL: *Nuclear Weapons.* London: Frances Pinter. 1981. 223 pp. £9·50

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

AGARWAL, Anil *et al: Water, Sanitation, Health—For All?* Prospects for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, 1981-90. London: Earthscan for the International Institute for Environment and Development. 1981. 146 pp. Pb: £3·00. $7.00.

BUPP, Irvin C. and DERIAN, Jean-Claude: *The Failed Promise of Nuclear Power* The Story of Light Water. Pb edn. New York: Basic Books. 1981. 241 pp Pb. (Originally published as *Light Water. How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved.*)

DEUTSCH, Karl W., DOMINGUEZ, Jorge I. and HECLO, Hugh: *Comparative Government.* Politics of Industrialized and Developing Nations. Boston, London: Houghton Mifflin. 1981. 495 pp. 1981.

DOERINGER, Peter B. ed.: *Industrial Relations in International Perspective* Essays on Research and Policy. London: Macmillan. 1981. 425 pp. £25·00.

ECKERT, Theodore J.: *The Transfer of US. Technology to Other Countries.* An Analysis of Export Control Policy and Some Recommendations. Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1981 60 pp. (Research Monograph No. 47.) Pb: $6 00

JENKINS, Clive and SHERMAN, Barrie: *The Leisure Shock.* London: Eyre Methuen. 1981. 185 pp. Pb: £4·50.

LOVENDUSKI, Joni and HILLS, Jill, eds: *The Politics of the Second Electorate:* Women and Public Participation. (Britain, USA, Canada, Australia, France, Spain, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, E. Europe, USSR, Japan) London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981. 332 pp. Pb: £6·95.

MACBEAN, A I. and SNOWDON, P. N.: *International Institutions in Trade and Finance* London: Allen and Unwin 1981. 255 pp. £13·95 Pb: £4·95.

MCWHINNEY, Edward: *Constitution-Making: Principles, Process, Practice.* Toronto, London: University of Toronto Press. 1981. 231 pp. £12·00.

ODAGIRI, Hiroyuki: *The Theory of Growth in a Corporate Economy.* Management Preference Research and Development and Economic Growth Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 220 pp. £20·00.

PINDER, John, ed.: *Fifty Years of Political Economic Planning:* Looking Forward 1931-1981. London: Heinemann for Policy Studies Institute. 1981. 228 pp £9·50.

SZAJKOWSKI, Bogdan: *Documents in Communist Affairs 1980.* London: Macmillan. 1981. 387 pp. £20·00.

TISDELL, C. A.: *Science and Technology Policy* Priorities of Governments. London: Chapman and Hall. 1981. 222 pp. £12·00.

HISTORY

BERGER, Jason: *A New Deal for the World:* Eleanor Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press for Brooklyn College Press. 1981. 177 pp. $26.00.

DARWIN, John: *Britain, Egypt and the Middle East:* Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918-1922. London: Macmillan. 1981. 333 pp. £20·00.

DEIST, Wilhelm: *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament.* London: Macmillan for St Antony's, Oxford. 1981. 151 pp. £20·00.

FINCER, John H.: *Chinese Democracy:* The Self-Government Movement in Local, Provincial and National Politics 1905-1914. London: Canberra: Australian National University Press. (Distrib. in UK by Croom Helm.) 1981. 276 pp. £17·95.

HIRSCHFELD, Gerhard and KETTENACKER, Lothar, eds: *Der Führerstaat:* Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. 1981. 465 pp

JACOBS, Dan N.: *Borodin:* Stalin's Man in China Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1981. 369 pp. £15·00.

PEARSON, Frederic S.: *The Weak State in International Crisis:* The Case of the Netherlands in the German Invasion Crisis 1939-40 Washington: University Press of America. 1981 174 pp $17.75. Pb: $8.75.

ZAMOYSKI, Adam: *The Battle for the Marchlands* Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs. 1981. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press, NY.) 218 pp. (East European Monographs No. 88.)

WESTERN EUROPE

CARLTON, David: *Anthony Eden.* A Biography. London: Allen Lane. 1981. 528 pp. £20·00

CARR, Raymond: *Modern Spain 1875-1980.* Oxford: Oxford University Press 1981. 201 pp. £7·50. Pb: £3·95.

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION: *Britain in the European Community.* London: HMSO. 1981. 68 pp. Pb: £3·60

DOSI, Giovanni: *Industrial Adjustment and Policy:* II Technical Change and Survival: Europe's Semiconductor Industry Brighton: Sussex European Research Centre. 1981. 103 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 9.) Pb: £4·00.

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG: *Die Türkische Krise.* (Beiträge eines Expertengesprächs der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 24-26 Sept. 1980.) Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 1981 207 pp. Pb: DM10.00.

JONES, Daniel T.: *Industrial Adjustment and Policy:* I. Maturity and Crisis in the European Car Industry: Structural Change and Public Policy. Brighton: Sussex European Research Centre. 1981. 121 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 8.) Pb: £4·00.

LAFFERTY, William M.: *Participation and Democracy in Norway* The Distant Democracy Revisited. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1981. 193 pp. $16 00

SCHÖNENBERGER, Toni: *Der Britische Ruckzug aus Singapore 1945-1976.* Zurich: Atlantis. 1981. 230 pp. DM38.00.

TULLIO, Giuseppe: *The Monetary Approach to External Adjustment:* A Case Study of Italy. London: Macmillan. 1981. 127 pp. £15·00.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

STARRELS, John M.: *East Germany:* Marxist Mission in Africa. Washington: Heritage Foundation. 1981. 54 pp.

VALENTA, Jiri: *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968:* Anatomy of a Decision. Pb edn. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981. (First publ 1979.) (Distrib. in UK by CCJ, London.) 208 pp. Pb: $7.45. £3·75.

MIDDLE EAST

CATTAN, Henry: *Jerusalem.* London: Croom Helm. 1981. 229 pp. £12·50.

ISRAELI, Raphael: 'I Egypt': Aspects of President Anwar Al-Sadat's Political Thought. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. 1981. 173 pp. (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, 34.) Pb.

PRITTIE, Terence: *Whose Jerusalem?* London: Muller. 1981. 246 pp. £9·95.

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

BALLARD, J. A., ed.: *Policy-Making in a New State:* Papua New Guinea 1972-77. St Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press. 1981. 331 pp. A$25.00.

POULTON, Robin and POULTON, Michelle: *L'Afghanistan: Que Sais-je?* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1981. 127 pp.

TOYE, John: *Public Expenditure and Indian Development Policy 1960-1970.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 270 pp. (Cambridge South Asian Studies, No 25.) £20·00.

NORTH AMERICA

BUCKNELL, Howard: *Energy and the National Defense.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1981. 235 pp. $19.50.

Energy for Development: An International Challenge. New York: Praeger for the North-South Roundtable, Society for International Development, Washington. 1981. 257 pp.

SCHWARTZ, Gail Garfield and CHOATE, Pat: *Being No. 1. Rebuilding the U.S. Economy* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1981. 132 pp. £10·00.

TRILATERAL COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORTS 15-19. New York: New York University Press 1981. 459 pp. $38.50. Pb: $19.50.

WALZER, Michael: *Radical Principles:* Reflections of an Unreconstructed Democrat. New York: Basic Books. 1981 310 pp. $15.00.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

DORR, Steven R.: *Scholars' Guide to Washington DC for Middle Eastern Studies.* Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, Turkey, Iran. Washington: Smithsonian Institution. 1981 540 pp. (Scholars' Guide to Washington No 7.)

GARDINIER, David E.: *Historical Dictionary of Gabon.* Metuchen, NJ, London: Scarecrow. 1981. 254 pp. (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 30.) $15.00.

GERTEINY, Alfred G.: *Historical Dictionary of Mauritania.* Metuchen, NJ, London: Scarecrow. 1981. 98 pp. (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 31.) $10.00.

HAHN, Lorna: *Historical Dictionary of Libya.* Metuchen, NJ, London: Scarecrow. 1981. 116 pp (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 33.) $10.00.

BOOKS REVIEWED, WINTER 1981-82

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

CONVENTIONAL AND THEORISING DIPLOMATS

Dear Sir,

In your issue for Autumn 1981 there appeared an article by Professor Frankel entitled 'Conventional and Theorising Diplomats'. This purported to comment on an article of mine entitled 'The Useful Art of International Relations' in your issue for Spring 1981.

Professor Frankel writes:

> Sir James's argument is couched in terms of such abstract generality that it can be summed up by the simple statement that the performance of the FCO has been, to use theoretical jargon, 'suboptimal' owing to the employment of unclear and outworn concepts (p. 542).

This statement is not only simple: it also has the merit of being easily falsifiable.

My article contained approximately 300 sentences. Ten of these—3 per cent—mentioned the Foreign Office or the Diplomatic Service. None of them attempted any assessment of the performance of either. As for 'suboptimal', I can not charge my conscience with ever having employed the word.

I am sorry Professor Frankel dislikes abstract generality, just as I am sorry I did not refer to his previous works (though I can assure him I have read some of them). He had every right to remedy my omission at some length, but not to foist on me his specific interpretation of a generality he admits.

My article was not about the Foreign Office or the Diplomatic Service or British foreign policy, but about utility as the criterion for the study of international relations. I can understand why Professor Frankel may have viewed with distaste this profane intrusion upon academic preserves, but I regret that he should have reacted by misrepresenting what I wrote.

I am, sir, yours faithfully,
JAMES CABLE

As from British Embassy, Rome

1. I was very interested to see Professor Frankel's comments in *International Affairs* on Peter Unwin's pieces and James Cable's article. Having worked quite closely, in the early 1970s, with a number of academic students of international relations on the subject of interaction between diplomatic practitioners and academics, perhaps I may offer some personal observations. They are, I must make clear, my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of my FCO colleagues, let alone the British government.

2. I found Professor Frankel's piece not only interesting but also provocative. If he has found Peter Unwin's and James Cable's pieces disappointing I hope he will not conclude that he would fare no better with analyses by other practising diplomats (to paraphrase James Cable), whether of the theoretical or traditional persuasion. For my own part, I have read contributions by academics in both categories that have failed to

satisfy. Even so, I agree with Professor Frankel in discounting James Cable's proposed cure, through a reform of the FCO's recruiting pattern and the universities' curricula, for the problem he may have identified. On the other hand, I do share what I believe to be James Cable's belief that 'the renewal of conceptual armoury' is necessary and more useful than Professor Frankel seems to credit. A recent exchange of correspondence in *The Times* led by Robert Jackson MEP on European Community problems provided an illustration. Drawing helpfully in general terms on the terminology of games theory, it would have been quite outside the normal modes of thought in the FCO in 1970; not so, I believe, today.

3. May I make some specific comments on Professor Frankel's critique?

(i) On page 540 he suggests that theoreticians of international relations find the traditional conduct of foreign policy increasingly irrelevant. Professor Frankel has never, I think, had much sympathy for some of the more arcane American approaches; but surely a theoretician who finds for example the course of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States—or even, on a more modest scale, the Zimbabwe settlement—'irrelevant' would be purblind. I would say the same of any diplomatic colleague who thought for example that theoretical work on federalist lines in the 1950s and 1960s had been without influence or value. No doubt there are both academics and diplomats to whom such a term could be reasonably applied.

(ii) On page 541 he writes modestly of the influence of his book on international theory and the behaviour of states. He suggests that it may have been commissioned solely as an act of window-dressing. I was myself involved at the first stage of that particular period when, after the Duncan Report, the FCO was looking to see whether it should pay closer attention to academic work in the field. From this experience I would conclude that the commissioning was in fact serious: that the effort to bring academics (of whatever persuasion) and diplomats closer was only partially successful, probably because of weaknesses on both sides, but bore some useful fruit; and that, for various reasons, the book, and the effort to make practising diplomats more aware of international relations theory, had less effect than would otherwise have been the case.

(iii) Where Professor Frankel starts, on page 542, to examine Peter Unwin's diagnosis in substance, it seems to me that, oddly enough, he may underestimate the extent to which foreign policy choices are determined by the domestic environment. I realise that his own analysis is based on the contention that the FCO may mistakenly believe that foreign policy considerations should be a principal determinant on many occasions when in fact foreign policy follows from domestic choices (p. 545). But I am not sure that he does not occasionally fall into the same trap himself. For example, on page 547 he suggests that no constructive thought has been given to the English language and the British educational system as assets for exercising influence abroad But members of the diplomatic service have in my own experience on innumerable occasions advanced in internal argument precisely this proposition. We are met with the steady conviction of our domestic interlocutors and, apparently, of the country that the virtues of the British educational system spring from its variety, from the autonomy of local education authorities, from the absence of regimentation and the ability of the universities to determine for themselves whom they should admit, what their standards should be and what qualifications they may or may not recognise elsewhere. For example, the problem of securing the siting of an international organisation in the UK can be greatly complicated by the government's inability to guarantee appropriate schooling for the children of those who will come from abroad to work there. Everything depends on the local education authority. Other states have no such difficulty. Most of my colleagues would like to be able to use language and education as the overseas assets that they could be. But in advocating this Professor

Frankel is surely recommending that foreign policy considerations should take precedence over what are seen as more important domestic values. Is not this, in his own terms, 'to assume the primacy of foreign policy' (p. 545)?

(iv) In his passage on national interests (p. 544) he seems to suggest that there has been no sustained argument about the national interest in the context of examination of our prosperity outside or within the European Community. This is surely quite wrong. Not only was the issue debated at length at the time of our entry, but from personal experience I recall how at the time of renegotiation in 1975 it was hammered out at inordinate length through Committees, in public debate and in political discussion. Professor Frankel may not consider the end product to have been satisfactory; the categories in which the national interest was canvassed may have been imperfect; but, whatever else the argument was not, it was certainly sustained and remains so.

(v) Still on the question of membership of the European Community, Professor Frankel argues that (p. 547) the failure to inform and win over public opinion to British membership of the European Community has been positively pathetic. He seems to suggest that it is the role of the FCO to perform this function. The FCO did in fact do a great deal under ministerial direction, with whatever success, in 1975 during the referendum campaign. Some of my colleagues may share my own doubts whether it is the proper function of the FCO to take the lead in persuading the British public of the validity of policies which are controversial between the political parties. This consideration may be all the more important in a case such as that of debate on the merits of membership of the European Community in which I should have expected Professor Frankel to argue that it should be a broad economic and political choice springing from assessments of domestic interest rather than 'foreign policy' considerations. Would Professor Frankel argue that the Department of Industry should have been engaged in convincing the British public of the merits of membership of the Community? If so, should this have been on the initiative of the civil servants concerned or as spokesmen for their Secretary of State?

(vi) On Professor Frankel's contention (p. 544) that the domestic environment does not come traditionally within the purview of diplomats and his comments (p. 548) that we have not learned to play the Community game, I would only say that a high proportion of the Diplomatic Service's manpower in London—itself, I believe, an increased proportion of the total strength—is engaged in close collaboration with the Home Civil Service on economic and technical issues which are plainly the primary concern of the domestic Department, and on which home Departments are largely responsible not only for the formulation of policy but also, subject to FCO monitoring and support, for eventual negotiation. Here again, I fear he exaggerates the FCO's ability to modify specific domestic policies in pursuit of what its members and FCO Ministers may see as a general national interest.

(vii) Finally, may I suggest that when Professor Frankel takes Peter Unwin to task for too optimistic a view of Britain's social, economic and political condition, and therefore of the opportunities open to us, he should allow for the fact that a serving diplomat can hardly concentrate on the more negative aspects of reality. Having chosen the subject of Britain's foreign policy opportunities, Peter Unwin could hardly write that there were none. And given that there is merit in rejecting the temptation to concentrate solely on small technical problems when on sabbatical, there is surely something to be said for an attempt to identify what opportunities we should have if we can put our economic house in order: and indeed the extent to which the exploitation of those opportunities can contribute to that process.

W. R. TOMKYS

Editor's Note

We have received a number of letters about the series of articles which began witł Peter Unwin's two articles on 'Britain's Foreign Policy Opportunities', w appeared in the Spring and Summer 1981 issues of the journal. We hope to re to the subject of Britain's foreign policy machine in a forthcoming issue of the jour

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK: THE BRITISH APPROACH

Geoffrey Howe *

THE British Chancellor of the Exchequer represents a country which was among the founder members of the international monetary institutions; he takes part in the meetings of Finance Ministers of the Commonwealth countries and appreciates their concern with the problems of development; and he comes as a member—in the second half of 1981, as representative of the presidency—of the European Community which itself embodies the continuing European aspiration for greater common achievement, combined with an outward-looking concern for the problems of the world economy.

My position is thus in a sense a privileged one. It does not, of course, enable me to offer an insight that is in any sense unique. But I can certainly identify the issue which has now come to dominate every occasion at which any group—Community, Commonwealth or still wider—of finance ministers are called together. It is the instability of the economic conditions in which we all have to do our work. This environment is hostile to our desire to improve the welfare of our peoples. So more and more powerfully there is emerging a common desire to promote greater order in the economic and monetary framework.

This greater stability which we seek is not something which can be imposed. It will not, in any circumstances, come easily. For today's uncertainties have many causes. They have their origins in the long period of gathering inflation which finally destroyed the Bretton Woods exchange-rate system; then two enormous increases in energy prices; and finally the effects of the fight against this inflation itself. The return to stability will require hard and sustained effort from us all, backed up by the Fund and the Bank, which we must also sustain.

But stability by itself is not, of course, enough. We need at the same time to foster the dynamic of the marketplace and to cherish those principles of economic liberalism which are essential to the fruitfulness of our interdependence. So there is a crucial balance that has to be struck.

*The Rt Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC MP, is Chancellor of the Exchequer and Governor of the International Monetary Fund for the United Kingdom. This article is based on Sir Geoffrey's statement to the Joint Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of the IMF and IBRD, held in Washington in September 1981.

The role of the private sector

The best of governments, and the best of institutions, are not able to take upon themselves the whole responsibility for achieving this balance. Domestically, governments have a prime duty to make room for, and to encourage, all the dynamic and productive elements in their own societies. At the same time, they must take account of the needs of the poorer and weaker among their people. Both requirements hold true internationally as well. Government aid programmes and the international institutions have their part to play in promoting help for those in need. It should, however, be a mark of success when countries, like individuals, find themselves able to dispense with direct support from others (whether this support takes the form of overseas development assistance to a middle-income developing country or of balance-of-payments support to an industrial country from the Fund). Internationally, as well as in our national economies, we need to allow the wealth-creating private sector all the room it needs to fulfil its role.

I make no apology for this emphasis on the importance of individual enterprise. A major characteristic of the remarkable recovery and vigorous growth of European economies after the Second World War was the encouragement of the market sector. The so-called economic 'miracles', which occurred in so many of the world's liberal democracies in the 1950s and 1960s, reflected the efforts of millions of individuals to produce and sell more goods and services and to do so more efficiently. In the process, they achieved a truly remarkable rise in their standard of living.

It is this same dynamic that is helping today to secure rising living standards around the world—particularly, perhaps, in the countries of East Asia and the Pacific basin. Many of these newly industrialising countries have few material natural resources, but they make up for that by the resourcefulness of their peoples. In the past five years, the most successful have been increasing their industrial production by 10 per cent a year or more—and this in spite of the external difficulties caused by successive oil price rises and the slow growth of world trade.

Flows of private capital for investment should have a key role in facilitating this kind of growth. Yet it must be acknowledged that inward private investment is not always welcome; not always, for example, even in some countries in Europe. But it is my firm conviction that it brings great benefits in transferring technology, developing markets, and bringing in new expertise.

The flow of private capital needs to be encouraged. Industrialised countries must provide access to their capital markets. The United Kingdom has played its part here by lifting exchange controls two years ago. It is vital, too, for recipient countries to establish and maintain a climate conducive to investment. The need for enterprises to be profitable means that they must have the prospect of freedom to adopt reasonable pricing policies. Fears of expropriation need to be allayed. In some cases, joint ventures have provided a

good solution. I do urge the value and importance of seeking out ways of making private investment capital work to the best advantage.

The private markets have also served us well in the continued success of the recycling process. The international capital market has continued to function in a practical and pragmatic way, in spite of the uncertainties,of recent years. Increasing numbers of middle-income countries are now beginning to tap the market. The success of both newly industrialising and middle-income countries in attracting private capital, particularly bank lending, reflects their ability to offer opportunities for profitable and productive investment. This has enabled them both to finance their external payments and to raise their living standards, and is surely the best form of recycling.

We can continue to rely on the banks to fulfil a major role here. They have, however, found that their efforts need to be supplemented by full use of all the Fund's facilities, including the policies of enlarged access. Most, though by no means all, private capital flows go to the middle-income countries. This is another reason why official aid is rightly concentrated on the poorest. But, that said—and it is important—it is the free market system that has recycled the surpluses, and continued to deliver some growth worldwide; a better achievement than in 1975, when world output fell.

But we still face low growth, high unemployment, high inflation, and high and volatile interest rates coupled with great volatility in exchange rates. And high interest rates are adding to the debt burdens of developing countries. This brings me back to the wider outlook for the world economy—the importance of stability, and the discipline which can help us to achieve this.

The role of government

The greatest discipline, which we all now recognise, is the need to fight inflation. Success in this fight is essential, and not only for the developed countries. Success is particularly important in the United States. It is crucial to the stability of the world monetary system, on which hinges the prosperity of us all, that the value of the world's leading currency should be maintained. The present United States administration is right, for all our sakes, to give priority to beating inflation.

But, as I know our American friends recognise, such policies cannot succeed simply through high interest rates. These are an index of the extent to which the battle is still being fought. We acknowledge and welcome further efforts just announced by the President of the United States to reduce present and future budget deficits, and thus the government's demands on the capital markets. My own experience teaches me how painful and difficult these efforts are. But it is essential for the rest of the world that the United States should succeed in its efforts to reduce its budget deficit, with consequent benefit to the level of interest rates.

There are similar requirements on all of us. As the Managing Director has

said, budget deficits in the industrial countries in terms of GNP have doubled since 1973. We face the demands of increasing social security programmes and of rising defence expenditure caused by international tension. These have come at a time when the increases in the oil price have imposed on the world a great new demand for capital. If interest rates are to come down it is essential to reduce public deficits and the demands they make on capital markets. In the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, we are seeking to achieve this by the containment of public expenditure, but in my last budget I also accepted the disagreeable necessity to raise taxes—rather than allow a higher deficit.

The defeat of inflation is not only an end in itself. It is also the essential foundation for sustained growth. The disciplines have to apply to all of us. There is no real distinction in this respect between industrialised and developing countries, though I well understand that treatment which is difficult for the rich can be painful for the poor. But a cure for the inflationary disease is equally necessary for both. Certainly, the treatment should be applied with as much sensitivity as possible. But our commitment to it must be clear, credible, determined, and persistent.

The Role of the IMF

This brings me to the role of the Fund. The IMF has its own part to play, by providing the bridging resources with which to finance well-judged plans of adjustment. We must preserve our balanced approach to the Fund, which recognises the realities of the present state of the world economy, but does not distort this role. Our support for the international financial institutions should be unquestioned. But we must not transform the Fund into a source for an endlessly expanding transfer of resources. It is first and foremost an instrument for providing balance-of-payments support in a framework of adjustment. We must preserve this essential character.

It is perhaps worth recalling an address given by Dr Arthur Burns almost five years ago.[1] Fund lending, he said, must not become a substitute for an adequate adjustment policy by borrowers. I particularly commend his key insight, that the adjustment process will remain unsatisfactory:

> Unless broadly shared agreement develops that international financial affairs require a 'Rule of Law' to guide us through the troubled circumstances that now exist. Such a Rule cannot be codified in detail, but it is essential that there should be broad agreement that parochial concerns will be subordinated to the vital objective of working our way back to more stable conditions in international finance. Governments also—indeed Governments especially—must be prepared to forego their own quite frequent inclination to do things inconsistent with the effective pursuit of Fund objectives. If the Rule of Law in international monetary

1. Columbia University Graduate School of Business, New York, April 12, 1977.

> affairs is ultimately to prevail, all countries—there can be no exceptions—must fully respect the IMF's integrity.

This exactly reflects my own approach. The Fund is not some detached entity with an independent existence. Its objectives are—or should be—a manifestation of the collective will of its member states. Its management and staff can, and do, contribute greatly to its effectiveness and success. But in the last resort, the Fund can and will achieve the required objectives only if we allow it, and indeed encourage it, to do so. We must give it our full support.

In these annual discussions, I have been impressed by a general wish that the Fund should deepen its activity in carrying out surveillance of our national policies. This could help towards a more orderly evolution of the floating exchange-rate system. It certainly provides an expert forum in which the problems I have been discussing can be examined and perhaps moved toward solutions.

The co-operative nature of the Fund, and the shared expertise on which it draws, enables it to speak with genuine authority. The Fund can draw the attention of members to the international repercussions of their domestic policies. The Fund is uniquely well placed to point to the need for more prudence and greater compatibility between national policies if excessive volatility in exchange rates is to be avoided. In this way the Fund can carry out a crucial role in encouraging and overseeing an improvement in the underlying stability of the world monetary system. Certainly, it is right to encourage us all to wind down the inflation which has so savagely attacked the system and threatened the value of some of its principal currencies.

So the significance of the Fund's potential role is hard to exaggerate. As I have said, this does not, however, entitle any of us to take a detached view, leaving any of these areas to the Fund alone. We must all be ready to accept fresh mutual obligations for the system in a world in which economic strength and responsibility are more widely diffused than in the 1950s and 1960s. We all have a common interest in preventing further oil price shocks. In whatever forum—and why not this one—this is a proper subject for discussion between producing and consuming nations. We all need to pursue medium-term policies which will improve the stability of our economies. Above all, perhaps, we all have to moderate excessive expectations.

I ought to add a word about the Eighth General Review of Quotas, which is now beginning. Some lessons from recent experience should help us in determining what should be the total size of the Fund, in the light of its prospective responsibilities for the rest of this decade. We may find that we have troublesome and sensitive issues to resolve, when we come to consider members' quota size and voting power. For the present, I wish only to reaffirm my belief that the founders of the Fund were right in their view that, in an institution which underpins the international monetary system and so indeed

the global economy, quota size and voting power must broadly relate to the stake of member countries in that world economy.

Special Drawing Rights

We have all subscribed to the long-run objective of making the SDR the principal reserve asset of the system. But we did so at a time when the discipline of fixed exchange rates was still in place and when it was natural to recall the possibility of a shortage of reserves over a large part of the world. The situation today is quite different. We have floating exchange rates and there is no global shortage of liquidity; rather the reverse. The SDR has remained an adjunct of the system, not its centre.

The SDR cannot be transformed into the principal reserve asset of the system simply by creating more SDRs and distributing them as unconditional liquidity. If the SDR is to make progress as a reserve asset then it has to be made as attractive as possible to hold in national reserves. Holding the SDR must be seen as a prudent alternative to switching between the main currencies. The five-currency basket for the SDR, and the improvement in the interest rate, are steps in that direction. There may be others we should explore or reconsider. We should perhaps make it possible to purchase an SDR asset with national currencies, and encourage the transferability or even marketability of such an asset. These are complex questions, but the thrust of our studies should be designed to increase the attractiveness of the SDR as an asset and a unit of value.

But the future of the SDR, like so much else, crucially depends upon the network of all our joint responsibilities, toward each other and toward the world monetary system. The SDR cannot be a strong unit and a worthwhile asset unless those responsible for its component currencies ensure that those currencies retain their value. If, however, they indeed do that to the best of their ability, then there should be a developing obligation on central monetary institutions to consider holding SDRs, or SDR-denominated assets, and to avoid, as far as they can, destabilising movements between major currencies. This is an important area for study and possible development in the IMF. We should be ready to support any efforts they are able to make in this direction.

The Fund is, of course, playing an important role in recycling, particularly through the policies we approved a year ago relating to enlarged access to its resources. In many cases the adoption of an adjustment programme supported by the Fund has led to more substantial inflows of capital from the private markets than would otherwise have been forthcoming. This is a good example of how an orderly institutional framework can help promote the operation of a liberal capital market. It also shows how the Fund can help in providing just such a framework.

The Managing Director is rightly seeking to match the calls on the Fund's facilities with the proceeds of the borrowings which are financing them. He

will make proposals for further borrowing when the need arises. For my part I would not object to some market borrowing, if there is an unavoidable gap to be bridged. Such borrowing must, however, be seen as essentially a temporary expedient.

The role of the World Bank

Capital flows. The World Bank also plays an important role in mobilising capital flows for countries which would otherwise have difficulty in borrowing from market sources. In the past decade, the Bank's annual loan commitments have increased more than fourfold, to nearly $9 billion in 1981. The general capital increase should allow further steady growth in lending. Last year, we supported the introduction of programmes of structural adjustment lending for countries with balance-of-payments difficulties. We look forward to hearing more of Mr Clausen's views on how the Bank can improve its existing techniques for co-operating with the private sector. Co-financing is the obvious example.

There is particularly good reason to support the Bank's plans for an increase in lending for energy development. We are certainly willing to play our full part in discussion of mechanisms of that kind, but they must be designed to mobilise additional funds, and not to multiply bureaucracies. They could well include an energy affiliate provided—and this should be emphasised—that it can attract the support of the oil producers.

Trade. The Bank and the Fund both share our common concern over the need to prevent any deepening of protectionism. Each year, we refresh our commitment to the further liberalisation of trade, through the multilateral trade negotiations. And if that by now sounds trite, indeed optimistic, we must be ready to struggle to prevent moves in the opposite direction. Pressures for protection are understandable during a recession that coincides with a period of drastic structural change. But it is the first lesson of economic history that these pressures must be kept at bay.

Trade remains the most effective means of strengthening the partnership that is necessary between developed and developing countries. When world growth is slow, there must be risks of increased strife among countries over their share of it—all the more reason to approach the GATT ministerial meeting in 1982 in a positive spirit. Above all, we must not lose our nerve.

All this underlines how important it is for developing countries themselves to open up the channels of trade. The *World Development Report* has drawn attention to the success achieved by those developing countries which have followed a policy of 'outward orientation'. On the one hand, this has involved structuring their economies toward export production. And, on the other, it has involved avoiding excessive concentration on import substitution. Their export producers have thus been able to buy intermediate inputs at the best

world prices. The Report notes that countries with outward orientation policies have typically been the most successful, because of the increased flexibility of their economies in adjusting to external shocks. I am sure that there are lessons here for us all.

Aid. In the perspective which I have sought to describe, the role of aid certainly remains important. But comparatively, it is far from being the central instrument of development. There is still a tendency to exaggerate what official aid can do—and still more to exaggerate its likely availability. This makes it all too easy to see the road to development primarily in terms of increased international transfers, carried out by governments on concessional terms. This view is based on a misunderstanding of how the world economy actually works.

Aid is a scarce resource. We must ensure that it is deployed efficiently and toward those who most need it. The *World Development Report* usefully illustrates how aid from overseas, though it may finance only a small proportion of a nation's investment, can, if properly deployed, make a significant difference. A good example, as Mr Clausen has pointed out, is how India, where famine was once endemic, has now become very largely self-sufficient in food grains. This is primarily the result of India's own skill and effort. But it owes more than a little to specialised assistance from the World Bank, other multilateral agencies, and bilateral donors. India has for many years been the biggest recipient of British aid. We are modestly proud of our contribution to its progress, both in agriculture and in industry.

The countries which most need official aid are the low-income countries, especially those with only limited access to private capital. Britain's aid programme has long been heavily weighted towards the poorest. Roughly two thirds of our aid goes to these countries. This compares with an average of about one third for all OECD and OPEC countries. So I welcome the stress, in the *World Development Report*, on the need to look carefully at the direction and distribution of aid.

We were all glad to hear that the United States government has now obtained authorisation to participate in the Sixth Replenishment of IDA, which is of special importance to the poorest countries. While we appreciate the difficulties which the Reagan administration faces in the field of public spending, we hope that it will succeed in its efforts to obtain the necessary appropriations from Congress as soon as possible. A resumption of IDA lending is an important step for the Bank, which we must all welcome.

United Kingdom aid

The United Kingdom's aid programme is a very large one. This is despite the fact that our economy, like many others, has been going through a particularly difficult period of adjustment, which has been taking place alongside our

crucial fight against inflation. As a consequence, and alone among the major industrial countries, we have suffered reductions in national income both last year and this. Our own people are having to make real sacrifices in the cause of restoring the strength of our own economy. In these circumstances, some reduction in the volume of our total aid was inevitable.

Even so, the United Kingdom's aid programme this year exceeds £1,000 million. It is the fifth largest aid programme in the world, and each of the four countries with larger programmes is substantially richer than the United Kingdom. Relative to the average income of our people, which is about the fairest measure of how well off one country is compared with another, the British aid programme ranks very high indeed.

Practically all of our bilateral aid is in the form of straight grants, rather than loans. This is clearly right, for British aid is heavily concentrated on those most in need. We have pledged outselves to the target of giving 0·15 per cent of our GNP to the least developed; this only puts into the form of a new international target an aim which we have already virtually achieved. In 1980 our proportion was 0·14 per cent.

Furthermore, despite our difficulties we have maintained an open economy—indeed the most open of the major industrial economies—with imports amounting to about one third of our GDP. This figure is higher than most of our European partners of similar size, and more then twice as high as those of Japan or the United States. We are also highly dependent on the state of world trade, since we export over one third of our GNP. London also continues to be one of the most important sources of finance for investment. The British contribution to the development of the Third World, taken in its widest sense—as well as in the rather narrow context of official aid—is substantial and will remain so.

It will not, I hope, be thought immodest if I mention one further United Kingdom contribution to the work of development. Our membership in the Commonwealth links us with many developing countries, and perhaps gives us a particular sympathy for, and understanding of, the problems such countries face. We are well placed to make, and I hope we do make, a constructive contribution to the dialogue.

For us indeed it is not easy to recognise the alleged difficulties of communications between so-called North and South. As I said in my speech on the occasion of the Annual Meetings last year, I find the North/South division itself both false and misleading. I see no sharp division, but rather a spectrum of countries at different stages of development. Moreover, it is a spectrum blurred by oil, for sharp changes in the price of oil have created new categories of the very rich, and increased the poverty of some of the very poor.

The concept of a sharp division serves only to obscure the most important questions. How we should transfer resources is a matter of great concern to the poorer among us, and rightly so; since we are all in a real sense interdependent, it must concern us all. But the central question, and this too must be shared, is

and must be this: how best to restore growth to the global economy. Growth is what will secure long-term prosperity which can be diffused among us all, to the benefit of those most in need, within our own national societies and in the international community as a whole. But the check has been severe, and is proving hard to overcome. Are there lessons that can be learned from the past? What is the path ahead?

Lessons from earlier decades

Looking back again on the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, which can now be seen as something of a '*belle epoque*', one is struck by the strength of the economic relationships established after the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. The world was then able to enjoy a stable international monetary system. Progressive liberalisation of tariffs and payments systems produced a rapid expansion of growth. Increased technological innovation accelerated the engines of growth. The freeing of international investment flows supported a sustained rise in living standards which could be shared with others.

Our two institutions, together with GATT, played an important part in these achievements. They have continued to develop flexibly to meet changing needs. I am sure that they can, and should, continue to evolve to the mutual benefit of all their members. We should build on them, not supersede them or change their basic nature. New institutions are not the key to a better future.

But stresses were developing even during those years which, with hindsight, now seem so successful. It seemed then that we had found the key to running the world economy effectively—and could relax. That sense of relaxation subsequently proved to have been seriously misjudged. Governments became over-ambitious about their role and their ability to shape their economies. Their people were led to expect too much. There was increased government spending, financed by deficits and monetary expansion. Inflationary tendencies were already very strong even before oil prices made their first sharp and dramatic jump. This jump was in part the consequence of past inflation, in part the cause of more. It helped to generate the payments surpluses and deficits and the capital flows which have made exchange rates so volatile, and it further complicated economic management. The second, no less dramatic, jump made things cumulatively even worse.

But at least these developments and their consequences have helped to show that we must try to recapture the more disciplined approach which contributed to the successes of the '*belle epoque*'. It is now widely understood that there are no quick and easy solutions, no painless formulas, no instant victories. The battle we are all fighting, in our own and the common interest, is bound to be a long one.

These are reasons for persistence and determination, not despair. It is encouraging that we are all now more aware of the need to change attitudes. In the industrialised countries, we must strive to achieve growth within a

framework of stricter financial policies. The fight against inflation must be sustained. We have to pay particular attention to the control of monetary growth, of budget deficits and public spending. The right monetary and fiscal policies must be matched by sustained moderation in the growth of incomes. By every means we must restore the flexibility of our economies. And in the developing countries too, there can be no escape from the patient search for policies that will secure the necessary adjustment, hard and painful though the prescriptions may be. All these lessons from the past are becoming more widely understood.

There are still some critics in all our countries who seek to question this analysis. I can understand, of course, why they might like to find a more comfortable approach. But it is part of our task, as finance ministers, to explain that there is no such option. That is the clear message which has emerged with increasingly widespread support, from developed and developing countries alike, from every gathering of this kind that I have attended in the last three years. The government which I have the honour to represent accepts this analysis, which identifies the only way in which we should be able to achieve national or world growth, to overcome the appalling poverty of the least-advantaged countries, or to restore hope and dignity to the millions now without work.

We ignore the lessons of history at our peril. History proves that sustained success requires sustained effort. Learning from the history of the institutions we here represent, we need to continue the movement toward greater economic liberalisation, at the same time as we restore and strengthen the framework of stability and order. Within our own countries, we are directly and obviously responsible for that good order. Internationally, that responsibility is less direct—but no less real. The institutions we here represent have in the past shown their ability to maintain the international framework. We are responsible for ensuring that they remain able to do so. Let us be sure that we do not fail in that task.

THE IDEAL AND THE REAL: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 1815-1982*

*James Joll***

IN 1807 Hegel wrote: 'It is not difficult to see that our epoch is a time of birth and an era of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things and the old way of thinking . . .'. It is very much the sensation we have today, especially when we try to find ways of analysing the contemporary state of international relations. But both the policy-makers and the political scientists and historians in their attempts to make sense of and bring some kind of order into the complex international system, have inherited a number of ways at looking at international relations, a variety of conceptual models and several conflicting ideas about the goal which the international system is intended to achieve. My intention here is to look at some of these perceptions of the international system as they have developed since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and speculate whether any of them are applicable to the system now.

Hegel wrote at a moment when political changes of the French Revolution and the economic, social and technological changes which we call the Industrial Revolution had left few aspects of life in Europe unaffected. As far as the international system is concerned we have ever since been trying to solve the problems left behind by these two revolutions. We have tried rather unsuccessfully to evolve an international economic system which would enable the vast new resources released by the industrial revolution to be made available to everyone. And we have made repeated attempts to produce a stable and peaceful international order in the face of what have been perceived as revolutionary threats to it. We have also had to face the fact that technological change and economic complexity have made wars increasingly 'total', increasingly demanding, and increasingly destructive so that the concept of war is in many ways very different now from what it was in the nineteenth century and we have felt that each of our twentieth century world wars must be regarded as a war to end war if we were to be able to face the future at all; and the threat of a third world war has for many of us come to seem a threat of total annihilation.

* The edited text of the 30th Stevenson Memorial Lecture given at Chatham House on January 26, 1982.
** James Joll is Emeritus Professor of International History in the University of London, and was Stevenson Professor of International History 1967-81. His many publications include *The Anarchists* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1964) and *Europe Since 1870* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973)

There is a sense, indeed, in which the history of international relations since 1815 is the history of a series of disappointed hopes as, one after the other, the conservative belief that the European great powers—the Concert of Europe, as it was beginning to be called by the 1830s—and the maintenance of a balance of power would bring stability; the liberal belief that free trade and national self-determination would lead to liberty, peace and prosperity for all; the socialist belief that the common interests of the working class would transcend national boundaries and the class struggle replace struggles between states—all these have been shown not to work. The two world wars and their aftermath have put an end to the easy optimism of the age of enlightenment, and to the belief that all problems have solutions and that reason and justice might form the basis of new relations between men and between states.

In the nineteenth century it seemed otherwise; and it is perhaps worth examining some of the ideas which were put forward in an attempt to produce a stable international order, an international system in which war might be avoided or at least limited and in which peaceful co-operation between states might be possible, because I think many of our underlying beliefs about international relations today still have their roots in the different world of the nineteenth century. To the statesmen of Europe who met at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 to pick up the pieces of the international system after the upheavals of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the essential thing seemed to be to restore some sort of legitimacy both internationally and within each state. 'We had to rebuild what twenty years of disorder had destroyed, to reconstruct the political edifice out of the vast rubble with which a terrible upheaval had covered the soil of Europe' was how the conservative propagandist, Friedrich von Gentz, who was secretary of the Congress, put it. Metternich himself put the claims even higher:

> Since no state is any longer isolated . . . we must never lose sight of the *Society* of states which is an essential condition of the modern world . . . One characteristic of the present world which distinguishes it fundamentally from the old one is the tendency of nations to draw closer and to set up a kind of corporate body resting on the same basis as the great human society which grew up at the heart of Christianity.[1]

In practice, of course, the Restoration of 1815, both internally and internationally, was never as complete as the conservative politicians had hoped it might be. Within a few years it became clear that the wish of Metternich and Tsar Alexander I of Russia that the international system might be used to preserve the internal stability of the conservative regimes in Europe was vain—largely because the British government was sceptical about the possibility of recurrent intervention in the affairs of other countries—although as Dr Bullen has recently reminded us,[2] this did not stop the British

1. Cited in M. S. Anderson, *The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914* (London: Longman, 1972), p. 4.
2. F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System* (London: Longman, 1980), p. 3.

intervening in Portugal on three occasions between 1826 and 1847. So the hopes that there might be a Holy Alliance to achieve a permanent conservative order came to nothing. The upholders of the 1815 settlement, whether they liked it or not, were left with a more modest hope. As the British government put it in October 1815:

> The problem of a universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world has been one of speculation and of hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can; but you may in practice approach towards it.[3]

What this approach meant in effect was that in moments of international crisis the European great powers—Austria, England, France, Prussia, and Russia—tended to concert together to find a settlement. This worked on some occasions—over the establishment of an independent Belgian state in the 1830s or over the limitation of the effects of the perennial Eastern Question in 1840-41 or in 1878; but it did not always work when some of the great powers were themselves directly involved—in the Crimean War, for example. Still, it did appear to provide some sort of diplomatic machinery, if not for maintaining the status quo established by the Vienna treaties, at least for controlling the effects of changes in that status quo and for forcing the smaller states to accept solutions decided by the great powers; and on occasions larger states were themselves faced with a diplomatic alignment which made it prudent for them to reach a compromise—as was the case with Russia in 1878.

The functioning of the Concert of Europe depended—and it was one of the points on which, as we shall see, liberal criticism of the system concentrated—on the maintenance of the balance of power. What the balance of power meant in practice was expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office in his famous memorandum of 1907: 'The only check on the abuse of political predominance has always consisted in the opposition of an equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power.'[4] It was in fact a commonsense arrangement which does not need any elaborate theoretical analysis, and the phrase, the balance of power, itself can be interpreted both as an objective assessment of the actual military and economic strength of the powers and as a subjective evaluation by contemporary statesmen of where their own national interest lay. As Bismarck put it succinctly and with his usual brutal realism: 'Always try to be one of three in a world of five great powers'.[5] But when the balance of power broke

3 Memorandum submitted by the British plenipotentiaries at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 1818 Charles Webster, *The Congress of Vienna* (London 1919), Appendix VIII. See also Rene Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe 1815-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 41.

4 See G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds, *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1914-1918*, Vol 3 (London: HMSO, 1928), pp. 402-3.

5 Bismarck to Saburov, 1878. *The Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1917. See also G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy 1904-1914*, 2nd edn (London 1937), p 76

down in 1914, its failure came as a great shock to many politicians, notably Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, whose diplomacy during the final crisis was based on the assumption that Germany could not be so misguided as to upset the balance of power by going to war with Russia and France, and that the Concert of Europe could still be made to work and be used, as on previous occasions, to limit the effects of a crisis which seemed to be, at least in its initial stages, a crisis in the Balkans.

In fact, what had undermined the nineteenth century international order, such as it was, was a change in fundamental attitudes to international relations, the result of imperialist rivalries overseas and new problems for the international economy, combined with the belief that Darwinian, or pseudo-Darwinian, ideas about the survival of species could be applied to human communities as to the animal kingdom. This in turn encouraged a new kind of nationalism in which the nation, now regarded as a living organism, was justified in taking any measures whatsoever which were thought necessary for its survival or expansion. These new beliefs and the new language in which they were expressed undermined the conservative notion of the Concert of Europe and the balance of power and provided new material for the critics of that system, both liberal and socialist. Liberals had long maintained that diplomacy based on the balance of power would lead to war and that secret diplomacy conducted by aristocratic functionaries would end in an international conflict for the sake of pointless goals—national prestige or the vainglory of a ruling elite. Socialists, on the other hand, were by the end of the nineteenth century maintaining that wars were inherent in the nature of capitalism and would only cease when capitalism was abolished, while by the beginning of the twentieth century some socialist theorists were demonstrating that capitalism necessarily led to imperialism and imperialism necessarily led to war.

Let us then look a little more closely at the liberal and socialist criticisms of the international system as it existed before 1914—a system largely based on the conservative doctrines of the Concert of Europe and the balance of power. The philosophy of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, on which liberal ideology and practice in the nineteenth century were largely based, assumed that there existed in the world an ultimate harmony of interests, the achievement of which depended on the exercise of reason. Just as the legal and constitutional systems of individual states could be organised to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, so an international system could be devised based on the belief that, in Jeremy Bentham's words, 'Between the interests of nations there is nowhere any real conflict. If they appear repugnant anywhere it is only in proportion as they are misunderstood'.[6] It was on this optimistic belief, traces of which still survive today, that liberal thinking about international relations was based. The three main points in this liberal model

6. Jeremy Bentham, *Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*, cited in F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, Pb. edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 302.

for the international system were Free Trade, Open Diplomacy, and the National Self-Determination of Peoples.

The belief that the free flow of international trade would provide the basis for a new prosperity is of course one which had been held by the founders of classical economic theory from Adam Smith to Ricardo and Jean-Baptiste Say, but it was above all Richard Cobden who not only convinced British governments that free trade was a practical political goal but also converted people all over Europe to a belief in Free Trade as a moral principle which could transform international society. The essence of Cobden's view, as put forward in a series of pamphlets and speeches from the 1830s through to his death in 1865, was that the removal of restraints on international trade would increase prosperity for all and that this would make wars unnecessary. Wars, he believed, would vanish once the conduct of international relations was taken out of the hands of aristocrats and military men and entrusted to sensible middle-class businessmen concerned to increase their own profits. This would reduce the cost of government by putting an end to large expenditure on armaments and rid international relations of foolish romantic ideals which led nations, and especially in Cobden's view England, though it applied equally to France under the Second Empire, to interfere abroad in pursuit of undesirable or unattainable political goals.

Such a system of international relations would also be one conducted in public: there would be no more secret treaties, no more sinister confidential diplomacy and above all no more pursuit of the balance of power: 'the old and ghastly phantom of the Balance of Power'[7] as Cobden called it, or 'this foul idol' as his colleague John Bright expressed it.[8] International politics would be in the hands of the people—or at least of the middle classes with whom Cobden often seems to identify them—and states would be free from the strains of militarism and cynical diplomacy and able to concentrate on improving the lot of their citizens.

In the mid-nineteenth century, down to the 1870s and the onset of what we can conveniently call the Great Depression, it looked as though some of these liberal ideals might be realised: tariff barriers were being reduced, governments in several countries were increasingly obliged to take account of public opinion. But the hopes of the liberals that an era of universal peace was about to dawn were disappointed, partly for economic reasons, as free trade no longer seemed an automatic recipe for prosperity, but also because it became increasingly clear that one of the other axioms of liberalism, the principle of national self-determination was by no means necessarily compatible with the peaceful economic internationalism which was the basis of the ideology of Free Trade. Far from being a factor making for international stability, the development of nationalist aspirations among subject peoples and the transmutation of

7 Cited in J A Hobson, *Richard Cobden, the International Man*, rev. edn, edited by Neville Masterman (London: Barnes and Noble, 1968), p. 302.

8 G M. Trevelyan, *The Life of John Bright* (London 1913), p 334

nationalist sentiments among the great powers have remained in fact the most unsettling factor in the international system down to our own day.

The thinker who did more than anyone to foster the illusion that national self-determination would lead to a new and happier international order and that independent states would have liberal governments was Giuseppe Mazzini. Mazzini was not only the main ideologist of the Italian Risorgimento, but also the apostle of nationalism in a much wider context. Many years after his death in 1872 his work continued to inspire nationalist movements both in Europe and elsewhere. Sun Yat-sen, the maker of the Chinese revolution of 1911, and the early leaders of the Congress Party in India were among his readers. He maintained that every nation could only realise its full potential if it inhabited its own national state, free of foreign domination. Just as the individual had the right to develop himself to the full and to pursue his happiness without interference from others, so in the international society, each nation had the right to its full freedom. However, in Mazzini's view, the attainment of national independence by every oppressed people—and his writings of the 1830s inspired Poles, Irishmen and Czechs as well as Italians—would only serve to enhance the international community: 'In labouring for our country on the right principle', Mazzini wrote, 'we labour for humanity . . . Humanity is a vast army advancing to the conquests of lands unknown . . . The peoples are the different corps, the divisions of the army.'[9] The harmony of interests would prevail among nations as among individuals, and the achievement of national independence would, Mazzini hoped, be accompanied by the establishment of republican constitutions. He was therefore bitterly disappointed when his beloved Italy achieved unity and independence as a monarchy rather than as a republic; and the years since his death have shown again and again that there is indeed no logical link between national independence and liberal institutions. The development of national movements has often been as great a threat to internal liberty as to international stability, as the history of the twentieth century has shown all too clearly.

The liberals, therefore, throughout the nineteenth century, both by their advocacy of open diplomacy and democratic control of foreign policy and their attacks on the balance of power, as well as by their agitation for national self-determination, envisaged an alternative system of international relations to that accepted by most of the governments of Europe. They believed that economic co-operation could replace traditional diplomacy and that economic growth and technological development could lead to a new international order. In this connection, although he is usually labelled a socialist rather than a liberal, Henri de Saint-Simon was, for all the eccentricity of much of his writing, a true prophet of a new international economic order. He believed that the future lay with the technocrats. Improved methods of transport (and his followers were among the pioneers of railway building in France and included

9 Cited in J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1960), p. 265.

Ferdinand de Lesseps, the engineer responsible for the Suez Canal), the development of international finance (and other disciples became some of the great merchant bankers of the nineteenth century) would be combined with the planning on an international scale of the vast new technical possibilities of mass production and mass consumption. 'The Golden Age of the human race is not behind us but before us',[10] he wrote in 1814. This golden age would be achieved by the creation of a European parliament and by the rational ordering of society under the benevolent control of industrialists and scientists. Saint-Simon's view of the new technocratic international order seemed far from realisation at the time of his death in 1825, but a century-and-a-half later in an age when there is, for better or for worse, a European Parliament and when a technocratic European community is perhaps developing—though whether the bureaucrats of Brussels are quite what Saint-Simon had in mind is another matter—when much of our educational and cultural life depends on the charity of great international foundations and the economic development of the world is in the hands of large multinational corporations, we are perhaps justified in wondering whether in fact Saint-Simon has not turned out to be a better prophet than Karl Marx.

But it was of course Marx, Engels and their socialist followers who were from the middle of the nineteenth century developing the most radical criticism of all aspects of contemporary European society, including the international system. For them the class war would take precedence over national wars, and the final abolition of the capitalist system would mean the end of wars and the creation of a peaceful international socialist community. While waiting for the revolution, however, Marx himself judged the international situation with as realistic an eye for power politics as any diplomat of the conservative school. Unlike some of the liberal advocates of a new international order, Marx and Engels had no objection to war as such; and Marx despised the English liberal pacifists of his day whom he dismissed as 'hypocritical phrase-mongers, a squint-eyed set of Manchester humbugs'.[11] Some wars should be supported because they helped to speed up inevitable currents of history or remove obstacles in their way. The Crimean War was justified because it might weaken Tsarist Russia, in Marx's eyes the biggest obstacle to the revolution in Europe; and in the Crimean War even Turkey had its historical role to play in opposition to Russia, since, as Engels put it a few years later: 'A subjectively reactionary force can in foreign policy fulfil an objectively revolutionary mission.'[12] Other wars might have the effect of creating a strong centralised state ready for a socialist take-over, so that in 1870 Engels could declare 'Bismarck is . . . at present doing a bit of our work

10 *De la Réorganisation de la Société Européenne*, in H. Comte de Saint Simon *Selected Works*, edited and trans. by F. M. H. Markham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 68.
11 Karl Marx, 'The War', *New York Daily Tribune*, Nov. 15, 1853, cited in *The Eastern Question*, edited by Eleanor Marx (London 1899), p. 151.
12 Cited in E. Molnàr, *La Politique d'Alliances du Marxisme* (Budapest 1967), p. 152.

for us, in his own way and without meaning to, but all the same he is doing it.'[13]

By the end of the century, after Marx's death and in the last years of Engels's life, the situation was changing. What now seemed in prospect for Europe were no longer wars for national unification or even national independence but, rather, imperialist wars arising from the struggle of the capitalist powers to control what was left of the pre-capitalist world outside Europe. The new imperialism, socialist theorists were beginning to argue, was the last stage of a capitalist system desperately trying to find new fields for profitable investment, new sources of raw materials, new markets, new reserves of cheap labour, so as to overcome its own internal contradictions; and this, many socialists believed, would inevitably lead to major wars.

People were also coming to realise that a future war might be more disastrous, more destructive and more 'total' than any previous one. Although most of the general staffs of Europe believed that a war might still be won in a quick campaign, other commentators like the Polish banker Ivan Bloch and some socialists, notably Engels and Jean Jaurès, predicted long brutal wars of attrition, while a few writers believed that the actual advance of military technology would itself make wars impossible because the new methods of warfare were too horrifying ever to be actually used; and if war did start economic exhaustion would soon force an early peace. The sufferings which war was bound to bring posed particular problems for the socialists. The revolutionary Left, and especially Lenin, were prepared to welcome a war as an experience which would fatally weaken the structure of capitalist society and prepare the way for revolution. Others, such as Karl Kautsky, believed that war was, as he put it, the most irrational way of making the revolution, and realised that it would be the conscript soldiers—the majority of whom were workers and peasants—who would be the first to suffer, just as it was the working classes who were already bearing the burden of the indirect taxation needed to pay for the vast armaments required by a modern war. Accordingly, in the decade before the First World War, there was among socialists increasing emphasis on the idea of socialist internationalism and on the belief that the working classes could assert their solidarity across national boundaries—demonstrating that the workers had more in common with their comrades abroad than the bosses at home—and thus make it impossible for their governments to declare war.

The international solidarity of the working class was only one of many illusions which were shattered in a few days in July 1914, but it is interesting to see how liberals in the Cobdenite tradition and the leaders of the international socialist movement had felt before 1914 that there were enough international links at many different levels which would make war impossible. 'There are at present too many pacifist forces', the Belgian socialist leader Emile Vandervelde said in 1911, 'starting with the Jewish capitalists who give

13. Cited in Gustav Mayer, *Friedrich Engels* (The Hague 1934), p. 187.

support to many governments, through to the socialists who are firmly resolved to prevent mobilisation of the nations and in the event of defeat to spring at the throats of their rulers.'[14]

When the crisis of 1914 came, the outbreak of the war was a bitter blow to the adherents of the different views of the international system which we have been considering—conservative, liberal and socialist. The crisis showed that this time the Concert of Europe could no longer contain the rivalries between the great powers or control the national aspirations of the small states, and that the balance of power was not a built-in regulator keeping the international system on a steady course. It was equally a blow to the liberals who had hoped that international trade and a democratic foreign policy might usher in a new era of peace. And the socialists too found that in a few days their confidently proclaimed international working-class solidarity had proved meaningless. Thus the First World War not only profoundly affected the facts of the power relationships within the international system, it had also radically upset the perceptions and analyses of those who after 1914 tried to recast the system after more than four years of war.

So far I have suggested that there were, down to the First World War, three ways of looking at a possible international system. The first, was the traditional diplomatic approach—the use of the Concert of Europe to maintain the balance of power. The second, was the liberal vision of a peaceful world based on free trade, disarmament and the democratic control of foreign policy in which independent self-governing nations would each contribute to the general good of humanity. And the third, was the socialist picture in which war was inherent in capitalism and would vanish once the revolution had abolished the capitalist system. This latter was a picture with some ambiguity about what would happen in the meantime, since the socialists were rather uneasily poised between the belief that war would hasten the revolution and the hope that the international solidarity of the working class would succeed in preventing war and its attendant horrors. These were not firm divisions: some governments accepted much in the liberal outlook; and the liberals and socialists shaded off into each other, with many socialists sharing the liberal faith in disarmament, international arbitration and free trade, while most socialists would have agreed with Cobden when he wrote, 'The truth is that hitherto the Governments of Europe have maintained their armies in time of peace almost as much for the purpose of defending themselves against their people as against their neighbours.'[15]

But whichever way you looked at international relations before 1914, the First World War and its consequences forced a radical change of view and made it increasingly hard to apply the old categories, both practically and theoretically, however much people went on trying to adapt their old ideas to

14 Emile Vandervelde, 'La Guerre Italo-Turque et l'Internationale', *Revue Socialiste*, 54, 1911, cited in Georges Haupt, *Der Kongress fand nicht Statt* (Vienna 1968), p. 59

15 Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 336

new experiences. The old balance of power was gone. Germany in 1919 was defeated and humiliated, and Allied leaders, especially in France, believed that it might now be possible to manipulate the system so that the Germans could be prevented indefinitely from challenging French hegemony in Europe, a hope which was of course soon proved vain. Even more important was the fact that it was no longer possible to think in terms of a *European* balance of power. The process, already begun with the Spanish-American war of 1898 and the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904-5, by which new great powers were emerging outside Europe, had been carried a decisive stage further with American and Japanese participation in what had started as a European war. Cobden's prophecy had now become true. 'The Equilibrium of Europe', he had written at the time of the American Civil War, 'was a phrase of some significance when the whole civilised world was in Europe. It has lost its meaning now'.[16]

The war had made impossible a return to an international system based on the balance of power in Europe alone. On the other hand there were many people who hoped that now at last a new international order based on liberal principles would finally be established. There was a widespread belief that the causes of the Great War were to be sought in the alliance system, in the balance of power, in what was now called the 'old diplomacy'. The hope that liberal ideas would now triumph seemed a real one when in 1918 President Wilson, whose own thinking about international relations owed much to the writings of British radicals, announced his Fourteen Points as a basis for peace; points which, of course, included 'open covenants openly arrived at', the removal of economic barriers, disarmament and, by implication, national self-determination. All these ideals were to be embodied in the League of Nations which it was fervently hoped would make possible a totally new way of conducting the relations between states. Even though these hopes were disappointed—with the withdrawal of the United States into isolation, with the determination of the French to use the new system solely for the purpose of containing Germany, to use the League of Nations that is to maintain the new balance of power, and the ambivalent attitude of the British government and the Dominions towards the new international order—nevertheless the belief was still deeply held that the war had really been the war to end war, and that new international institutions would keep it that way.

But the most dramatic change resulting from the war was that the hopes of a new socialist world order now seemed to have a potential power base with the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia. The creation of the Communist International early in 1919 had as its immediate effect the splitting of the socialist movement and the creation of an insurmountable gap between the Social Democrats and the Communists—a gap which has lasted ever since. But in spite of these divisions there was now a revolutionary international

16. Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

organisation in being—the Comintern—to spread, or to protect as circumstances demanded, the successful revolutionary regime in Russia. The possibility of a Communist international order seemed to many on both sides in 1919 and 1920 not far away. Originally, therefore, the Communists believed that international relations in the old sense would not be necessary any more: 'I shall publish a few revolutionary proclamations and then shut up shop'[17] Trotsky declared on becoming the first Foreign Minister of the Bolshevik government. The Comintern would be the general staff of the forthcoming revolution which would do away for ever with the old conventional international system. But here again the hopes of revolution were not realised and the Comintern, far from being the general staff of the revolution, became increasingly the organ by which foreign communist parties could be used in the national interest of the Soviet government.

Increasingly, too, that government—for all its Marxist rhetoric—found itself regulating its foreign relations according to something very like the old principle of the balance of power. The object of Soviet foreign policy became the prevention of the capitalist states from uniting against Russia. In the 1920s this desire to keep the capitalist world divided led to the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany to stop it becoming reconciled with France and Britain. In the 1930s when Hitler posed a direct threat to the Soviet Union, Stalin worked for an anti-Fascist front with Britain and France but, when the effectiveness of the British and French will to resist Germany seemed doubtful, Stalin signed his pact with Hitler in the hope at least of buying time and, by the partition of Poland, space for the defence of Russia. Finally, with the German invasion of Russia in 1941 Stalin was forced into alliance with the western powers; and as a gesture—which cost very little—to his new allies, in 1943 he abolished the Comintern altogether.

The outbreak of the Second World War seemed to show that for all the liberal hopes of a new international order represented by the League of Nations and for all the hopes of the Communists and their allies that a new revolutionary world order was at hand, the old principles in the relations between states still prevailed. International relations were still regulated by the balance of power. However reluctantly, Britain and France were in 1939 forced to recognise a renewed German threat to the balance of power, and found themselves, with much hesitancy and many misgivings, facing a new German bid for hegemony in Europe. The fact that they faced it at all meant also that they had in practice to close their eyes and hope for the best when confronted by a Japanese threat to the balance of power in the Far East.

Yet much of the language and some of the trends during the Second World War continued to repeat older ideas. It was certainly thought to be a war for liberal ideas, a genuine war for democracy and human rights, no matter how hollow this sometimes sounds today. It was hoped that this time it really would be a war to end wars and that out of it would come a new and more effective

[17] Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed Trotsky 1879-1921* (London 1954), p. 327.

League of Nations in the shape of the United Nations Organisation, which would, it was hoped, combine features of the League with echoes of the old pre-1914 Concert—in the Security Council and the veto right of permanent members. Yet for all this, the Second World War was, nevertheless, a war fought to maintain a balance of power, to check Hitler's ambitions for world hegemony and the Japanese threat to American and British interests in the Far East. However, the essence of the principle of the balance of power is that as soon as one threat to it is removed, another threat presents itself. Once Germany and Japan were defeated, many people became convinced that it was now the Soviet Union's turn to seek world domination, while others were equally convinced that the threat now came from the United States: and once both sides had nuclear weapons, and others didn't, either threat seemed both plausible and alarming.

The immediate result was a period of unusual bipolarity in international relations. The United States and the Soviet Union were the only countries that really mattered: the balance of power, necessarily lay between these two. This did not mean that the realities of international life fitted exactly into the framework of the cold war. The more doctrinaire exponents of cold war diplomacy like Mr John Foster Dulles—and, no doubt, some members of the present American administration—were repeatedly irritated by the failure of some countries, notably those of the Middle East, or India and Pakistan, to fit into their pattern. The situation was complicated by the fact also that both of the super-powers adopted the language of earlier, more idealistic systems of international relations. The United States justified its policies, such as the war in Vietnam in terms of classical liberal doctrines of liberty, self-determination and making the world safe for democracy. The Soviet Union justified its control of Eastern Europe and its intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the language of socialist internationalism and claimed to be making these countries safe for true democracy. The result was undoubtedly a devaluation of the language of international relations; and such devaluation inevitably encourages a certain cynicism and a reluctance to take any statement by any government at its face value.

It is possible perhaps that none of the historical models for the international system which we have been discussing are appropriate to the international scene today. Some people have talked as if we were returning to a Bismarckian world of five great powers—America, Russia, China, Japan, and the European Community—in which Bismarck's advice to be one of three in a world of five great powers becomes practicable again after the decades of the cold war. There were those, including perhaps Dr Kissinger in certain moods remembering his early work on Metternichian diplomacy, who have welcomed the new flexibility that this is supposed to give. But even if the events of the last year or so had not caused a trend back towards a bi-polar system, this five-sided great power system in any case only exists potentially and not actually: it certainly seems too soon to talk of the European Community adopting the role of a great

power given that its structural unity is scarcely even that of the German Confederation before Bismarck. The Japanese have studiedly and successfully pursued a foreign policy of having no foreign policy. There are still innumerable questions unanswered about China's potential world role; and perhaps Henry Kissinger is right when he says that the Chinese 'establish a claim to be a great power on the basis of universal principles and a demonstration of self-confidence that attempts to make the issue of power irrelevant.'[18]

However, even if Europe or Japan or China are not yet performing the role of independent great powers, at a moment when the strategic balance of power between America and the Soviet Union is more evenly poised than at the time of the first cold war, the views and susceptibilities of America's allies have, however reluctantly, to be taken into consideration by the United States government (though there seems little sign that the Soviet Union takes much notice of the opinions of its allies). This produces elements of a multi-polar international system—elements which make the maintenance of a balance of power in America's favour a complex and subtle operation into which many factors not directly related to the conflict between the West and the Soviet Union have to be fitted: questions of oil supply, of Middle Eastern policy and so on.

If the earlier models of a liberal or socialist international order have largely become obsolete as we think more and more in terms of a system based on the balance of power, some aspects of the more idealistic views still remain, both in language and substance. The work of the Brandt commission, the question of the relations between rich and poor states, between producers and consumers draw our attention to the need for Saint-Simonian global planning, and there are echoes of Cobden in the suggestion that the only real international problems are or should be economic or environmental ones. Mr George Kennan has recently made an eloquent plea for such an approach when writing: 'Can we not at long last cast off our preoccupation with sheer destruction—a preoccupation that is costing us our prosperity and preempting the resources that should go to the solving of our great social problems, to the progress of our respective societies?'[19] This is still a voice in the Cobdenite tradition. And even if Soviet policy has given a sinister ring to the phrase 'socialist internationalism', there is still the possibility that, as we saw all too clearly in Iran, too deep a Western commitment to a tyrannical regime which fails to satisfy the economic aspirations of a majority of its subjects can give rise to a blind and furious reaction that unites the underprivileged of more than one country, so that anti-Americanism becomes as strong an international bond as the class solidarity proclaimed by the Marxists.

The upheavals caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars forced the nations of Europe to look for a new international system both in

18 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p 1,979.
19. George Kennan, 'On Nuclear War', *The New York Review of Books*, Jan. 21, 1982, pp. 10–12.

terms of practical arrangements and of the goals which such a system was intended to achieve. I have tried to look at some of the models—conservative, liberal, socialist—that were put forward as a result. It can be argued that today after changes even more far-reaching and fundamental than those of the revolutionary era of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, we are now looking for a new international system which would give some sort of stability in practice. But we are, I think, also looking for a conceptual model which will approximately fit the facts of contemporary international life. I can only suggest very tentatively some of the questions which we would have to take into account in constructing such a model. Is the debate about nuclear strategy, for example, different in kind from earlier strategic debates and earlier arms races? Does the destructive power of these weapons mean that we have to think of questions of peace and war in terms which are qualititatively different from ever before? On a more practical level, how can the Western powers maintain a liberal concern for human rights in our foreign policy without destabilising the balance of power on which many people would argue that our survival depends? As Laurence Martin recently pointed out in his Reith lectures, the balance of Europe is based on there being little change in political alignment: but does this mean that we want a stable regime in Poland at whatever cost to the Poles themselves and that we must echo that minister of Louis Philippe at the time of the suppression of the Polish revolt in 1831, who outraged liberal opinion by declaring complacently '*L'ordre règne à Varsovie*'? How are we to relate the demand of the industrial powers for secure access to sources of raw materials to the needs and ambitions of the Third World itself? Can governments gain such access without sacrificing other goals of their foreign policy? The problem for the analyst of foreign policy is not only to find out what is happening, but also to decide on the values which any international system must embody and to bring the contradictory forces which he observes in the world into relationship with one another, to find some conceptual framework which will include the Russo-American confrontation, the hopes for arms control and mutual trade, the relations between rich and poor countries, to say nothing of such new and surprising phenomena as the appearance of a Cuban army in the middle of Africa.

As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835: 'A new science of politics is indispensable to a new world. This however', he goes on 'is what we think of least; launched in the middle of a rapid stream, we obstinately fix our eyes on the ruins which may still be descried upon the shore we have left, while the current sweeps us along and drives us backward towards the gulf.'[20] Perhaps the data for such a new science of international politics, for descrying the pattern of a new international system are still too unstable for us to make the attempt. No sooner, for example, had political analysts found it helpful to invent the concept of the Third World than they found it necessary to add a fourth to include the very poorest states. Or again, in the mid-1970s

20. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, edited by H. S. Commager (Edinburgh 1946), p. 7.

intelligent and well-informed observers of international politics were talking about the not far distant point when Iran would join the ranks of the great powers and become the Japan of the Middle East. In an unstable and unpredictable situation in which few governments are really clear where they are going and what the long-term goals of their policies are, the task of the student of international relations is especially hard. And it is perhaps even harder to say, given the facts of contemporary international life, what kind of international system we should like to see and what values it should embody. We are confronted by a world full of contradictions and paradoxes which seem incapable of resolution: a world in which the super-powers constantly improve their means for mutual destruction and yet need to develop economic links with each other, so that there is a risk that sanctions may always hurt the country which imposes them more than they hurt the victim; a world in which the desire for larger economic and administrative units—the EEC for example—exists side by side with a fanatical insistence on the maintenance of local culture and institutions; a world in which the most extreme nationalist feeling exists side by side with an ever increasing cultural homogeneity; a world in which historic forces which a generation ago seemed to be almost spent—I am thinking particularly of Islam—are becoming once more a powerful influence on the destiny of nations.

One could go on with the list of paradoxes for a long time. They pose a challenge not only to the politician but also to the political scientist and historian. But here fortunately the historian is at an advantage. His task is not to esbablish laws which will enable him to predict the future, but rather to enlarge his own and other's experience in such a way that they will not be surprised by the unexpected, by what has been called 'the pleasing irony of History'. In dealing with the international system, the historian can point out some ways of looking at past systems and look for similar features in the present, but he is, or should be, also aware of changes in the present which make it qualitatively unlike the past. To take an example from what we have been discussing, we may fall into deep errors if we think that the European balance in Bismarck's day has many parallels with the world balance of 1982 or if we press too hard the suggestion made in Miles Kahler's influential article in *Foreign Affairs* some two years ago that our situation differs little from that of 1914.

The relation between the historian and the political or social scientist is a complicated one: both sides are constantly complaining about the other yet each is indispensable to the other. The historian can open perspectives on the present and help us to see the events which rush in on us in some broader context. But the historian needs his experience of the present for his understanding of the past. Goethe once said, '*Über Geschichte kann niemand urteilen, als wer an sich selbst Geschichte erlebt hat*'. Only someone who has himself experienced history can make judgments about it. And to this extent I suppose there are still advantages for a historian in times like these when history seems to be moving too fast for our comfort.

POLITICIANS, PRACTITIONERS AND PROFESSORS

*Cyril Pickard**

THE vast change there has been in the power, resources and commitment of Britain since the First World War appears to be the accepted starting-point for a review of British foreign policy. The downward path can be plotted by selective quotations. In 1952 Anthony Eden could still say:

> For Britain's story and her interests lie far beyond the Continent of Europe. Our thoughts move across the seas to many communities in which our people play their part in every corner of the world . . . That is our life; without it we should be no more than some millions of people living on an island off the coast of Europe, in which nobody wants to take any particular interest.

By 1969 however, the Duncan Report saw Britain as 'a major power of the second order'.[1] In 1977 the Berrill Report argued that:

> what has changed in the last quarter century is the U.K.'s ability to promote and protect is interests and ideals . . . The extent to which this process can be delayed, and its consequences mitigated, by diplomacy or international public relations is in practice limited.[2]

In 1981, Professor Frankel went further: 'Britain's decline from the Big Three status . . . to a "leading power of the second rank" has been followed by further decline.'[3] It is, therefore, encouraging that Mr Unwin, during his sabbatical year at Harvard, reached the conclusion that:

> In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the British . . . went too far. They began to underestimate their international power and influence. This error . . . was understandable; but it was also damaging to the country's confidence and moral seriousness . . . A concatenation of circumstances . . . gives Britain a better chance . . . to exercise influence in the 1980s.[4]

*Sir Cyril Pickard was British High Commissioner in Pakistan, 1966–71, and in Nigeria 1971–74. He is a member of the Central Council, and a vice-president, of the Royal Commonwealth Society. Sir Cyril's article brings to a conclusion the series of articles on British foreign policy which have appeared during the past year

1. *Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation* (1969), Cmnd 4107.
2 *Review of Overseas Representation*, Central Policy Review Staff, 1977.
3. *International Affairs*, Autumn 1981, p. 539.
4. *International Affairs*, Spring 1981, p. 225.

A serious attempt to assess, on this basis, Britain's foreign policy opportunities is indeed very welcome.

Treasury influence on foreign policy

For a decade or more, Britain's overseas policies and representation have not been decided on any balanced assessment of our long-term interests. Rather the imperative demands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer have led to cuts all round, and in the name of equal sacrifice, reduction in the subsidy on school meals has been matched by a withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. We avoided the difficulties of analysis and deciding where our interests lie by accepting the imperative demands for short-term economy whatever the long-term cost. Those of us who have argued during the last two decades that we were abdicating from positions of influence and dissipating a vast accumulation of knowledge and goodwill welcomed the evidence in the Berrill Report. However much one might question the basic assumptions of that report, and the qualifications and fixed preconceptions of some of the Think Tank team, the report, nevertheless, provided the basic material on which a more balanced assessment might be made. Professor Frankel refers to the 'worst traditions of the Civil Service—escaping responsibility by relegating an intractable problem to an outside body'. In the case of the Berrill Report, however, a great deal of discussion was generated. The government was stimulated into issuing a White Paper[5] setting out its conclusions on the need for overseas representation and how it proposed to meet it in the coming years.

Objectives of British foreign policy

The White Paper was issued in August 1978, and it might well have become the basis of an interesting debate on how 'to enable our overseas representation effectively to meet the challenges of the last quarter of this century'. The objectives of our foreign policy were listed as:

(a) to safeguard the security of our country
(b) to promote its prosperity
(c) to uphold and extend the basic values and freedoms of our democracy
(d) to honour our commitments and obligations
(e) to work for a peaceful and just world
(f) to contribute to the achievement of the above objectives by providing assistance to developing countries.

This list covers the objectives set out in the Berrill Report and adds two additional ones: to uphold the freedoms of our democracy, and to provide assistance to developing countries. Mr Unwin covers much the same general ground in listing 'the conventional foreign policy goals of a democracy: peace, freedom, prosperity and justice'. Successive British governments have also

5. *The United Kingdom's Overseas Representation* (1978) Cmnd 7308.

committed themselves at Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles,[6] first agreed in Singapore in 1971, and to fostering and extending these Commonwealth relationships:

> for we believe that our multinational association can expand human understanding and understanding among nations, assist in the elimination of discrimination based on differences of race, colour or creed, maintain and strengthen personal liberty, contribute to the enrichment of life for all, and provide a powerful influence for peace among nations.

However, Mr Unwin refers to the Commonwealth only once, and then dismissively.

The Labour government fell in 1979, and the White Paper of August 1978 was not much debated. Lord Carrington, when in opposition, had criticised the Berrill Report and was sceptical of the validity of many of its recommendations. The White Paper had argued that the balance of payments was little affected by the costs of our diplomacy—not least because the cost of Britain's overseas expenditure was only half of the £260 million pounds spent (in 1976) by foreign countries on their diplomatic representation in London. Mr Unwin, for his part, writes that, 'The development of North Sea Oil and gas has added to Britain's freedom of manoeuvre . . . It has removed for a time the balance of payments constraint which for nearly forty years forced the country's economic managers to put a premature stop to every period of expansion.'[7] But there are new constraints. The balance of payments is no longer of towering importance. Nevertheless the Conservative government is fully committed to a reduction of government expenditure, and the pressures for economy are even more stringent. Further reductions in the Foreign Office vote inevitably meant cuts in Overseas Staff. Other economies enforced included cuts in the BBC Overseas Service and, on the Education vote, increases in the fees at universities for Commonwealth students. Professor Frankel argues 'it is surprising that no constructive thought seems to have been given to two real assets for exercising influence abroad—the English language and the British educational system which attracts foreign students.'[8]

In fact Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers have given a good deal of thought to the malign effects of our increases in university fees on Commonwealth relations, but they have been unable to persuade their Cabinet colleagues that in the longer term we cannot afford these economies, which strike at the heart of the Commonwealth relationship. Lord Carrington—who perhaps more than any other Foreign Secretary since the war, is aware of the importance of this relationship—finds himself presiding over more draconian cuts than were proposed following the Berrill Report.

6 *The Commonwealth Today*, Commonwealth Secretariat.
7. *International Affairs*, Spring 1981, p 226
8. *International Affairs*, Autumn 1981, p. 547.

Long-term objectives and short-term economies

Mr Unwin argues that a concatenation of circumstances gives Britain a better chance to exercise influence in the 1980s. Certainly the development of our oil resources has transformed our balance-of-payments position, but the pressure for economy still remains. Professor Frankel raises some cogent doubts about the assets Britain brings to the 1980s.[9] I doubt, too, whether we are now in any better position than we have been in the last ten years to exercise influence. Our failure to recognise and use the opportunities open to us in the field of foreign policy was not the result of unfortunate circumstances and economic necessity, but of the deliberate decision of British ministers to concentrate on the short-term objectives of domestic policy, brushing aside the arguments of those who claimed that irreversible damage would be done to our long-term interests. In its evidence to the Central Policy Review Staff in 1976 the Royal Commonwealth Society argued that:

> Britain, as much as any and more than most other countries, is vulnerable in war; and as a trading nation is more dependent than any other on its external trade. It is concerned with the peaceful development of other countries which are potential trade partners. We can however only contribute to these objectives to the extent that we have the power and the influence to do so . . . We recognise the great change in the military balance in the world, and the fact that we as a nation now have little power to enforce world peace. We must not, however, underestimate our international influence. The process of decolonisation has gone on for nearly 30 years. There is little sign of bitterness towards ourselves as former colonial masters, and indeed there is much evidence of the especially close contacts and friendly understanding between the British and both the older and the newer independent countries in the Commonwealth. These contacts and this understanding are facilitated by the inheritance of a common language, and have been nourished by the devoted work of generations of teachers, doctors, nurses and other British people as well as Government Representatives who have continued to work overseas . . . Despite the fundamental change in the world power structure, Britain can still deploy an effective influence on every continent and ocean . . . because of its partnership with other Commonwealth nations. The maintenance of that influence depends in part, however, on the understanding and sympathy which we can show for the problems and aspirations of our fellow members of the Commonwealth. That understanding and sympathy can only be based on adequate knowledge and experience; and this in turn depends on sufficient staffing of our diplomatic missions in the Commonwealth.[10]

9 *International Affairs*, Autumn 1981

10 *Memorandum for Central Policy Review Staff*, Royal Commonwealth Society, Feb 1976, p. 4.

Changing pattern of diplomacy

Mr Unwin, not surprisingly, directs his attention almost exclusively to the European Community and to the Atlantic Alliance. As a good European since the 1930s I am delighted that he shows some degree of optimism about our ability to play an active role in those areas. I agree, too, with Mr Hurd[11] that since 1952 the biggest change in diplomatic method stems from European Political Co-operation. But we should not overlook the other changes in the pattern of our diplomacy which have flowed from the vast increase in the number of states which have come to independence since the war.

Lord Strang has pointed out that in 1910 His Majesty's ambassadors were eight in number. Two had been raised to the peerage while still in service. All eight were Privy Counsellors. All had the GCB and all but one the GCMG as well. In 1955, when our ambassadors represented us in over a hundred countries, no ambassador then serving had been raised to the peerage or made a Privy Counsellor or given the GCB 'The decline in the status of Ambassadors', wrote Lord Strang, 'is part of the levelling spirit of our age.'[12] The nature of diplomacy has changed in other ways. Britain's ambassadors were dealing in 1910 with countries with which most of them had been familiar all their lives. Moreover there was a certain homogeneity among our politicians, senior civil servants, and our diplomats. Many of them shared the same social and educational background, used the same clubs and met the same influential groups. They could be assumed to have the same general ideas about Britain's place in the world and Britain's national interest. The Empire has been described as a system of outdoor relief for the British aristocracy. Certain it is that many politicians were connected by family ties to India and our possessions overseas. This interest in the emerging Commonwealth was not confined to the Conservative and Liberal Parties. Labour politicians had close personal relations with the leaders of opposition movements in India and the colonies. Indeed after the war many Labour politicians had a detailed knowledge of the problems of India and Africa. That stage has passed however, and it would not be too harsh a judgment to say that the present generation of politicians is both more narrow-minded and more ignorant than its predecessors.

Commonwealth diplomatic posts in the period of decolonisation were adequately staffed, sometimes with the extra advantage of men who had previously served in the Indian and Colonial Services. The governments were fortunate enough to have the services of several outstanding High Commissioners. Nye in India, and MacDonald in Canada, Singapore and Africa[13] put a new emphasis on the importance of knowledge about, and

11. *International Affairs*, Summer 1981.
12. Lord Strang, *Home and Abroad* (London: Deutsch, 1956), p. 369.
13. See, Lord (Joe) Garner, *The Commonwealth Office, 1925-1968* (London: Heinemann Educational, 1978); see also, Anthony Harrison, 'Archie Nye: A Memoir', Royal Commonwealth Society Library (unpublished memoir, Feb. 1980)

understanding of, the country in which a diplomat serves; on informal contacts with officials and non-officials alike; on touring and upon team work in interpreting the local scene. It might be argued that traditionally the diplomat had been regarded as an expert who had acquired certain diplomatic skills, which he applied with virtuosity in whatever country he was serving. In the newly independent countries these skills did not seem quite so important, and the emphasis tended to be on getting to know the countries and the problems that faced their new rulers. It could not be assumed that those concerned with policy in Whitehall were thoroughly familiar with the countries in which we were represented, as in the past they had been familiar with Europe. The judgment of diplomatic representatives on the spot, therefore, became of greater importance; and it followed in turn that they and their staffs needed to know the countries in which they were serving, if the advice given to London was to be soundly based. This, I think, was fully recognised in the 1950s; but for the last two decades there has been continual pressure for economies and staff reductions, and political reporting has become increasingly unfashionable. This is at a time when our legacy of knowledge inherited from the past is nearly exhausted. In the past we have been able to call on the advice of those who had spent their lives in administering, trading, healing and teaching in newly independent countries with whom we now have important economic and political relations. Many of these sources of knowledge are no longer available to us.

Formulation of foreign policy

The Plowden Report listed the main tasks on which the Overseas Services are engaged. It begins, '(a) Advice—This is the function of advising Her Majesty's Government on every aspect of foreign policy'.[14] The White Paper of August 1978, surprisingly, scarcely refers to this aspect of diplomacy; instead it bluntly says that 'foreign policy is about what has to be done; diplomacy about how to do it'. No doubt the author's pleasure in his aphorism was greater than his appreciation of the need for somewhat closer analysis of the nature of diplomacy and the way that foreign policy evolves. In my view the giving of advice, which presupposes a detailed study of the country concerned, is still the primary function of an ambassador or High Commissioner. Of course trade is vital to us as a nation; but the emphasis of recent years on the trade promotion activities of an embassy must not be at the cost of knowledge of the country and its rulers. No doubt events in Iran in 1979 have led to a reappraisal of the importance of the political work in certain key countries. Mistakes in our political analysis cost us very dear; and it would be a real economy if the small sums involved in maintaining an adequate political staff had the effect of enabling us to assess better the risks to our trade and investment.

It has been argued that political reporting by ambassadors is no longer

14 *Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas* (1964), Cmnd 2276, para. 27

needed, because of the speed of disseminating information worldwide through the international press and through television. In fact the mirror held up by the press and television is a distorting one. There are very few resident British newspaper or television correspondents; and for the most part they stay only for short periods. Moreover, their task is not to produce a balanced analysis but to provide news and arresting stories. Ministers are newspaper readers and look at television. The view they get will be a distorted one. Moreover the staff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will not necessarily, from their own knowledge, be able to provide a more balanced picture—especially of events in Asia and Africa. The reports and views of the ambassador concerned are a major ingredient in assessing the situation and formulating a policy. Of course ministers direct their attention to more urgent, although not necessarily important, trouble spots of interest to Parliament—some of which, such as Anguilla and Gan to take extreme examples, absorbed a great deal of ministerial time in the 1960s.

There are many groups which have an influence on the formulation of foreign policy. In the Middle Ages the wool merchants or the fishermen were quite capable of insisting that their special interests should be taken into account in the formulation of policies. Trade associations have always exercised a special influence, from the days of the Muscovy Company in the sixteenth century to the association of foreign bond holders in the nineteenth century or the Chambers of Commerce today. Social groups, however, are no longer as strong as they once were; there is not the same cohesive social grouping exercising the continued influence on external policy which it once did. Officers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office no longer live in London; they are likely to have little social contact with politicians. They catch their commuter trains, and undertake their domestic tasks, and have little time left for entertainment, except perhaps an occasional meal with their opposite numbers in embassies or lunches in the City. They are, therefore, not exposed to much lobbying, or pressure from groups with special interests. Some commentators however still ascribe considerable influence to various academic and specialist bodies.

Public opinion and foreign policy

A further component is the influence of public opinion. It is a commonplace of academic writing about external policy that it is an area both distinct and separate from the processes of domestic policy. This has never been entirely true, but in most branches of external policy the executive is still uninhibited by many of the limitations on its freedom of action which affect the policy-making processes in the domestic field. It is, however, not always easy to deal with questions of foreign policy in isolation from domestic issues. I suspect that the then Foreign Secretary had a freer hand in determining our policy on the Turkish invasion of Cyprus than he did in handling the Cod War with Iceland.

The Treasury still maintains, as I have argued above, a crucial influence on British foreign and defence policy. There is a keen scrutiny of any policies in the foreign field which might call for expenditure of scarce resources. Also the demand for continual economies has its effect on the whole apparatus of our diplomacy and on our machinery for formulating foreign policy. This is not a new phenomenon. In the 1920s grave concern was expressed in the Foreign Office about the effect of the 1919 Treasury Minute which made Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, also Head of the Civil Service.[15] The Dominions Office, also, was concerned about the effects on their policies of the Treasury refusal to agree to appointments which the Dominions Secretary wished to make.[16] The difficulty of resisting economies arises from the organisation of our Cabinet government. Perhaps Crossman was right in arguing that we have a Prime Ministerial rather than a Cabinet system of government. But in order to ensure the Prime Minister's authority in those political areas which are vital, in many other areas, rather than give a lead, the Prime Minister is prepared to see compromises in order to minimise contention and reduce confrontation. This has meant over the last two decades a policy of equal sacrifices all round rather than any genuine attempt to establish national priorities.

The White Paper of 1978[17] stated that it is essential that the basic aims of British foreign policy should be supported and understood by the people of Britain. It proposed, 'in support of their overall objective of providing a more open and accessible administration' to make a special effort 'to explain publicly the objectives of our foreign policy'. It is not clear how far the previous government began to move along this path; nor whether the present Foreign Secretary is committed to such a policy. Any observer of the contemporary British scene would find it difficult to convince himself that the people of Britain were aware of the basic aims of British foreign policy. More than any other country, Britain has a vital interest in world trade and a deep concern for world peace. The British electorate, however, has shown comparatively little interest in issues of foreign policy. There have of course been exceptions. But it is a long time since Mr Gladstone stirred the nation during the Midlothian campaign of 1879 with the atrocities committed against the Bulgarians. Certainly both before the Second World War and immediately after, and again during the Suez campaign, public opinion was gravely concerned with the effect of events in the outside world on our fortunes. Again, some sections of public opinion have shown a deep involvement in such issues as decolonisation, aid (sales of the Brandt Report were unexpectedly large), nuclear disarmament, Ireland, the Common Market, and most recently Poland. But by and large it is true that foreign affairs affect very few votes. In Britain, during the last decade, there has been an increasing preoccupation with our domestic

15 Sir Walford Selby, *Diplomatic Twilight* (London. Murray, 1953), p. 4
16 Lord Garner, *op cit*
17 Cmnd 7308, *op cit*

affairs; in part because British society and British institutions have been exposed to an accelerating speed of change, which is almost revolutionary in its impact. The structure of our domestic politics has changed to a significant extent during the past two decades. All parties have emphasised the importance they attach to the democratic process, both in appointing leaders and deciding policy. Moreover the confrontational element in our political life has led to ludicrous ups and downs in our domestic policies and an increase of partisan attitudes in foreign policy.

Nowhere does the laying down of a policy in advance by an Opposition make less sense than in the realm of foreign affairs. No party out of power can have access to the information necessary to come to a balanced conclusion. Inevitably, in Opposition it is the party activist, with his own special axe to grind, who can most readily persuade the party to adhere to rigid, and even perverse, foreign policies. If in turn Members of Parliament, and indeed ministers, are denied the freedom to modify these policies in the light of experience and of the facts available to the minister only when he takes up office, we would be faced with a serious situation in which it would be impossible to pursue most of Mr Unwin's opportunities.

Nobody concerned with our foreign and Commonwealth relations can accept such a situation with equanimity. They have, therefore, an imperative duty to do their best to avert it. Some, who are still members of the Diplomatic Service, might have no opportunity to do so except through the ballot box. Others may be able to take a more active role in the political arena. Perhaps the most extreme case would be, if a government came to power committed immutably to unilateral disarmament, which in the opinion of the officials concerned would bring with it an increased danger of the destruction of our planet. My generation might feel that we have been here before. When I was a student in the 1930s, much concerned with student movements in Europe, we asked ourselves, after discussion with our German friends, how far a German could go in trying to frustrate Hitler's policies from within the state apparatus, or whether it was better to resign and make a public stand. We recognised that the choice would be an agonising one; and I doubt whether many of those who made such a choice survived the war. Those, however, who followed the line—which would no doubt commend itself to those who believe in rigid predetermined policies—of subordinating their views to the demands of the party and the government, might well have found themselves in danger at the Nuremburg trials. In our present case the choices are less agonising. The worst follies of the party activists in the field are still a distant nightmare—and a resignation is not so dangerous as it was in Germany in the 1930s.

I have argued that many different groups influence the formulation of British foreign and Commonwealth policy. But it could also be argued that our policy is never formulated at all. Neither the Cabinet in 1914 nor Chamberlain's Cabinet in the 1930s had a very clear idea of what our foreign policy was. Since 1945 our policy has been to deal with crises as they turn up.

David Vital concludes his survey by arguing, 'All in all British policy making machinery is geared to the handling of problems as they arise rather than to the definition of goals and objectives in terms of which such problems as arise are to be dealt with.'[18] In fact our policies tend to be spatchcocked together by a series of hurried decisions based on inadequate evidence. Whatever the merits of this sort of ad hoc approach, one thing is clear: if policy is determined in response to situations as they arise, if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is primarily a department for dealing with crises rather than for formulating principles and policies, the man in the field, the practitioner, the diplomat, has a key role to play.

The main qualities which Britain has been able to contribute in the past to its relations with the United States and Europe have been experience, knowledge and understanding. At times since the war we have developed very close relationships with Washington, for instance in concerting policies towards Asia. Britain's views were respected, because they were based on experience and knowledge. On joining the European Community, Britain talked of the importance of Europe being outward looking, and we took to the counsels of Europe a dowry of knowledge and expertise about the Third World and enhanced our reputation by the Zimbabwean settlement. Our membership of the Commonwealth provides an opportunity to learn and understand. Over the years there has been resentment about the pressures which some of the newer Commonwealth countries put on Britain to modify its policies. If we can accept that we have something to learn about the Third World as well as something to teach, we might appreciate more the value of the Commonwealth relationship—as Mr Heath came to do.

I would also suggest that the capacity to learn and understand is one of the most important attributes of a diplomat in this difficult world. This capacity will be tested to the full if he is to give useful advice. Anything which develops it is of great value—and at this point Sir James Cable and Professor Frankel both make their contribution. I certainly believe in the 'constant renewal of their (the practitioners') conceptual armoury', although I would have used different words from those of Sir James to express the thought. I also entirely agree with Professor Frankel about getting away from the limitation of a practice governed by the exigencies of routine and of the recurrent incidence of crisis management to broader commonsensical thinking. Few will object to any attempt 'to systemise analysis, to question assumptions, to alter the framework of decision-making by taking into account a longer time-scale and a broader context'. But the difficulty about making progress is noted by Professor Frankel earlier in his analysis. He says that the practical difficulty about the use of his book was the great shortage of personnel at the First Secretary stage.

The Plowden Report recorded that 'one of the great needs is for a sufficient margin of manpower to cover the time which officers necessarily

18 David Vital, *The Making of British Foreign Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 110.

spend away from their desks'.[19] It went on to recommend a staff margin of 10 per cent. This, however, has never been implemented.

The pressures on the Diplomatic Service are still very great—the more so because so much time has been spent since the 'Butler measures' of the early 1950s in reviewing and re-reviewing staffing measures to achieve economies. It is one of the ironies of a declining economy that economy reviews are so wasteful of time and resources. I do not think, therefore, that even the modest programme that Professor Frankel suggests is required, is likely to be implemented until there is an adequate staff margin which permits time to be spent in study—whether the theme is 'international theory' or 'the lessons of history'. The whole system of Inspection and Review tends to play down the importance of the acquisition of knowledge, its analysis and interpretation. Inevitably the emphasis is on cost effectiveness, and the Treasury tends not to count what it cannot add up. What importance might the Inspectors have ascribed in the mid-1970s to the work of an officer in Teheran interested in and capable of reporting on, the strength of religious movements and the power of the Mullahs? How important was a post in Peshawar (closed in 1967) or in Lahore (closed a few years later)? At the time they were closed, nobody could have foreseen the developments in Afghanistan. Indeed, if Berrill's criteria for deciding on the need for a post had been applied, the embassy in Kabul itself might have been closed. Nobody expected Mr Bhutto to be replaced by a military government; but where better to learn of the Pakistan Army's attitudes than in Lahore?

Anyone concerned with the Indian sub-continent in the 1960s was aware of the large pool of academics on which the State Department could draw either for advice or to undertake specific tasks. We could match their input, because there was still available to us the advice of men who had known India throughout their lifetime. There were also academics and still some journalists who could make a contribution to our understanding. However it was always difficult to organise and systematise these exchanges. From 1975 to 1978—as a Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of Public Administration—I listened to lectures, given to senior Nigerian civil servants, on the problems of an oil-based economy. The lecturer took his main illustrative material from Iran. He prophesied three times a year over several years that in due course the Shah's economic policies would have revolutionary consequences. I hope his voice was being listened to in the Foreign Office. If not much importance, however, is attached to the advisory function of ambassadors, if ministers are not conscious of the need to collect and to take into account all the advice available to them, if the staff at the desk level in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office continually changes as a result of tight staffing, we are unlikely to have the organisation and the staff to make the best of the academic output. However, anything which would enable us to play a fuller part in working for the survival

19 Cmnd 2276, *op. cit.*, p. 25

of our planet must not be rejected. It seems irrelevant whether time is spent on the 'lessons of history' or on 'international theory'. What is vital is that everybody concerned, from Foreign Secretary to the most junior Third Secretary, should continually test and question their assumptions against all the information and advice they can amass, knowing that the value of Britain's contribution to Europe, to the Alliance, to the Commonwealth, indeed to its own survival, depends on the credibility and sensitivity of its informed judgment. To neglect this in order to save staff is an economy we cannot afford.

The opportunities which now present themselves call for imaginative leadership, both political and professional. Britain has the possibility of making a contribution to peace and security quite disproportionate to its power. As the Plowden Report urged—no action must be neglected which makes a contribution to peace. But we delude ourselves if we think we are free to pursue short-term domestic policies, which prevent future Commonwealth leaders coming to British universities, which radically reduce our development aid, which make us less well informed and less understanding of the world's problems, without putting our opportunities at risk.

In the last resort, our view of the role Britain should play depends on our estimate of the dangers we face. It requires a degree of optimism—which is beyond my capacity to muster—to believe that we can safely concentrate on domestic problems and neglect our opportunities to exercise our influence for peace. I fear that in this dangerous world, if we fail to find ways of living together, we enhance the likelihood of our dying together.

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS A DECADE AGO: A NEW ASSESSMENT (1)

*Alan Campbell**

This is the first of two articles on Anglo-French relations during the period 1968-72 written largely from the point of view of the British embassy in Paris.[1] This first article includes a reassessment of the 'Soames affair' of February 1969 which marked the low point in relations during those four years of Christopher Soames's Embassy to France. The second article will have as its central episode the Anglo-French discussions leading up to the Heath-Pompidou meeting of May 1971.

CHRISTOPHER SOAMES was forty-seven years old in February 1968 when he was offered the Paris embassy. He had been Member of Parliament for Bedford from 1950 to 1966 and had lost his seat in the General Election of that year. His political career during those sixteen years had been astonishingly successful. After acting as Parliamentary Private Secretary to his father-in-law, Sir Winston Churchill, he had been made a junior minister, first at the Air Ministry and then at the Admiralty, and was appointed Secretary of State for War in 1958. He did two years at the War Office and then joined the Cabinet as Minister of Agriculture in 1960: in that capacity he collaborated closely with Mr Edward Heath, then Lord Privy Seal, in the first EEC negotiations in 1961 and 1962. He was generally thought in political circles to have been a good minister—even if unpopular with many of the farmers—and after initial accusations that he had been unduly favoured by his father-in-law his outstanding ability had come to be widely acknowledged. Indeed, Cabinet minister when still under forty, he must be reckoned one of those rare men in politics who take time to find their feet and then run on so strongly as to outdistance nearly all their contemporaries. Not that he was everybody's favourite. Even some of those who admitted his success criticised him for being overbearing, something of a bully, not too patient with the more boring aspects of constituency life, inclined to throw his not inconsiderable weight about. After losing Bedford he had not succeeded by early 1968 in getting adopted as a parliamentary candidate for any seat that suited him. Still, he was confident that sooner or later he would get back into the House of

* Sir Alan Campbell is a retired member of HM Diplomatic Service, having ended his career as British ambassador to Italy. He was Counsellor in Paris 1967-69.

1 They are derived from a longer study of the period which is based on published material, supplemented by information obtained by the author from British and French ministers and officials.

Commons and the offer of the Paris embassy faced him with a difficult decisi
Some of his close political friends advised him to refuse it, but in the enc
accepted, conscious that in doing so he was leaving for a time—and it tur
out to be a long time—the main highway of political life.

He had been a member of the embassy before, albeit in a very jui
capacity. Immediately after the end of the war in Europe, as a Captain in
Coldstream Guards, he had served in Paris as an Assistant Military Atta
under Duff Cooper. This had not been a particularly brilliant phase of
career since, like many young officers at that time, he was mainly intent
enjoying the good things of life after the deprivations of the war years. Still
made some useful friends and acquaintances in Paris. Furthermore
presence in Paris then was perhaps the luckiest of all the many lucky thi
that happened to him in his life since it was there that he met Mary Churc
They were married in 1947. Twenty years later, when Soames returne
Paris as ambassador, the family consisted of Christopher and Mary, and tl
children Nicholas, Emma, Jeremy, Charlotte and Rupert.

The choice of Soames as ambassador to France was intended to help bı
about a change in a situation in which Britain's relations with Europe
general, and with France in particular, seemed to have got stuck after
second French veto of December 1967, and the British government w
casting around for some new move. The announcement of the appointm
was on the whole well received by informed public opinion in the Un
Kingdom and had a generally favourable press. But there were some dissen
voices. Neither Mr Wilson as Prime Minister nor Mr George Browr
Foreign Secretary was widely admired at the time and Mr Brown's judgm
of people was considered somewhat erratic. In the Labour Party there
surprise at the choice of a Tory politician not at all sympathetic to Lab
policies. There was some criticism too in the Conservative Party where Soa
had enemies as well as friends. On the other hand in some British off
quarters the idea was not unwelcome. Sir Patrick Reilly[2] recalls that he
thought for some time before his own retirement that if his successor was t
a political appointment Soames would be the best choice.

The reaction in France was wary. Most commentators regarded
appointment of such a prominent politician as a compliment to France and t
gave due weight to Soames's known pro-European and pro-French views
to the fact that Mary Soames was Winston Churchill's daughter. But t
wondered what lay behind such an unusual appointment, and why the Bri
government, over six months before the retirement of the much liked
respected Sir Patrick Reilly, should have asked with such urgency for t
agrément for Soames Did the British plan to use Soames as a battering ram
their entry into the EEC? Soames did not allow himself to be discourage
these criticisms or doubts. But there soon arose a change in the situation wl
gave him some uneasiness. This was the resignation of George Brown

2 Sir Patrick Reilly, GCMG British ambassador to France 1965–68

March 15. Soames and Brown had views on Europe very close to one another and they had looked forward to working together. Soames had had in mind to come over from Paris several times a month to see Brown and thus to ensure that he kept in close touch with British ministers. On the very day that Brown resigned—late in the evening—they had discussed the prospects over lunch. Now Brown was no longer Foreign Secretary and his successor, Michael Stewart, had had no part in proposing that Soames should go to Paris and was thought indeed to be unenthusiastic about the appointment. Thus the firm political backing that Soames had confidently expected to enjoy had been weakened several months before he even took up his new job.

Anglo-French relations on the eve of Soames's appointment

The state of Anglo-French relations on the eve of Soames's arrival was poor. When General de Gaulle received Soames's predecessor in farewell audience in early September he asserted that the state of relations was good, mentioning examples of Anglo-French collaboration in various fields. But he did not attempt to rebut Sir Patrick Reilly's objection that France continued to oppose the main purpose of British European policy, that is to say its desire to enter the European Community. It was in fact, as the General must have been well aware, this opposition which was the virus poisoning the Anglo-French relationship.

There were three low points in Britain's relations with France in the decade 1962-72. The first was occasioned by the French veto of British entry to the EEC in 1963; the second followed the French second veto of 1967; and the third, arising out of the 'Soames affair', was still to come. Much has been written of the circumstances surrounding the vetoes of 1963 and 1967. Here it is only necessary to say that on both occasions General de Gaulle judged it to be contrary to the interests of France to allow Britain to come in and he was strong enough to resist the pressures and arguments designed to persuade him of the merits of the British candidature. On the first occasion he claimed to be mainly influenced by defence and political considerations. Until the latter part of 1962 he seems to have believed that there was a prospect of Anglo-French collaboration on the design and manufacture of a rocket with an atomic warhead and that the British might prefer this rather than to continue Anglo-American collaboration in this field. When he found that Mr Macmillan was not prepared to take the decisive step of breaking away from the Americans he saw this—or at least represented it—as a British failure to 'choose Europe'. 'Macmillan has let me down' he told one of his closest collaborators at the time. On the second occasion economic and financial considerations figured more prominently. In particular it was the prospect of the weakening effect on the European Community of admitting Britain in the then state of its economy and British liabilities in respect of the sterling balances which were mainly held to justify the French refusal to agree to the opening of negotiations. At the

General's press conference held in advance of this second veto the recent devaluation of sterling provided a useful talking-point to reinforce the generalised political arguments.

British reaction to the first of these two setbacks had been restrained, considering what a blow it was to Mr Macmillan's hopes. It took place when a General Election was already in prospect and at a time when political support for British entry to the EEC was far from solid. But after the veto of December 1967 the British reaction was more vigorous. By that time there was all-party agreement in Parliament on the objective of British entry and the Five (i.e. the members of the European Community other than France) were even more irritated than in 1963 with the French veto. So Mr Wilson declared that he would not take no for an answer and the British pursued tenaciously their attempts to collaborate with the Six within the framework of Western European Union on matters outside the scope of the Treaty of Rome such as foreign policy, defence and technology. This pressure and activity by Britain and the Five annoyed the French who did what they could to frustrate them.

The French attitude caused both of Soames's two predecessors at the embassy in Paris great difficulty. They knew that Britain could not get into the Community against the will of a strong France and it seemed very probable that as long as the General was there we should continue to be blocked. It was no comfort to them that the General, while opposing British entry to the EEC, professed sentiments of friendship and admiration for the British government and people. The only thing to do seemed to be to persevere. Sir Patrick Reilly's view was that his successor would have to try to outlast General de Gaulle. Only then, with all the friendships, knowledge, experience and authority that he would have acquired could he really hope to influence events in France.

By the time of Soames's arrival there was no evidence that the General had changed his mind about British membership of the European Community but there had been important developments in France since the 1967 veto. In May 1968 France had been on the brink of disaster following the student revolt and subsequent industrial disorder. These events were to have significant consequences for the French internal political and economic scene. Two months later, in August, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in order to reestablish there a more pro-Soviet government. Thus on the external front too things were changing. Some adjustments in French attitudes were therefore not to be ruled out, even if their scope and direction could not yet be discerned.

Soames's early months in Paris

Christopher and Mary Soames arrived at the Gare du Nord on September 18, 1968. From the outset Soames was always clear about the principal objective of his mission. It was to help get Britain into the European Community so that it could resume its rightful place at the centre of

European affairs which it had lost in the late 1950s. All other considerations, though some of them were obviously important, were subordinate to this overriding objective. This was why he had accepted the Paris embassy. This was the explicit basis on which Wilson and Brown had offered him the embassy and he knew from long discussion with Wilson that entry into the EEC was his government's objective. Although he regretted George Brown's departure he did not think that his political backing had been thereby fatally impaired. On another aspect of his mission he was less clear. What would be the best tactics for bringing about that change in the French attitude which alone would allow Britain to join the Community with the goodwill of all its original members? Soames wanted to take time before making up his mind on this point. His first task in any case was to establish himself, to get the house running well, to become known, to meet French ministers and other key people, especially those close to the General such as André Malraux. As to his relations with the General, he had hopes that his own experience of dealing with his father-in-law might help him to find the right touch.

Soames lost no time in getting to work. He presented his Letters of Credence on September 21 at the formal ceremony at the Elysée Palace which in those days was prescribed by French protocol. For the next few weeks he threw himself with zest into a round of official calls on French ministers and prominent personalities and on diplomatic colleagues, attended a number of large and small parties given in his honour, cultivated the more important press correspondents and tried to get to know the senior members of his embassy who would be his closest advisers.

In the middle of all this activity Soames had a minor heart attack. But the first reaction of alarm was quickly replaced by relief when it was established that the attack was not serious. It hardly affected Soames's conduct of the embassy while mercifully requiring him to moderate his social activity and at least temporarily to abjure smoking cigars.

By the end of January 1969 Soames was fully recovered and back at work, though continuing to moderate his social life to some extent. Having asked early in the New Year to be received by General de Gaulle he was given an appointment on February 4. There followed the curious incident known as the 'Soames affair' which brought Anglo-French relations to a point far lower than they had been even in the bitter aftermath of the first French veto of British entry in the EEC in 1963 or of the second one in 1967.

The 'Soames affair' has been described and analysed in detail and with great perspicacity by several well informed writers.[3] It is now generally agreed that as things turned out, following General de Gaulle's departure from the political scene, the affair had little effect one way or the other on the outcome of negotiations for British entry to the Community. However, it remains a fascinating episode in the vexed history of Anglo-French relations, throwing interesting sidelights on the attitude of the General two months before his

3. See especially, Uwe Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973).

departure from the scene, on the state of edgy suspicion and misunderstanding on both sides of the Channel at that time, and of the evolution of Soames's conduct of his embassy.

The conversation between the General and Soames of February 4 was a sequel to the brief talks they had had at the Elysée Palace when Soames had presented his Letters in the autumn and again at the New Year party at the Elysée. The General had promised on both these occasions a further and more leisurely discussion about what he called 'Britain's movement towards continental Europe'. On February 4, in a conversation *à deux* of more than an hour before and after lunch at the Elysée he said several things which appeared to constitute a new approach. He started by speaking somewhat disparagingly about the present Community of the Six and of the NATO organisation, deploring the tendency of European countries other than France to be unduly dependent on the United States. As regards the EEC, he said that if Britain were to join this would become something entirely different. It would be more in the nature of a Free Trade area with provisions for the exchange of agricultural products. This might be no bad thing. However in such an organisation the biggest countries would have to exercise greater influence if it were to work properly. He then suggested confidential bilateral talks between Britain and France to discuss the way in which a truly independent Europe might be organised. These talks would cover economic, monetary, defence and political problems with a view to reconciling any differences of concept. Finally he said that if the British government thought this a good idea they might care to propose it and the French would be willing to respond positively. In reply to a question he said that the matter should remain secret until talks had started.

On returning to the embassy Soames made a careful summary of what the General had said to him and telegraphed it to London. He recommended that the British government should authorise him to make a friendly and constructive reply even if they were doubtful about the usefulness of the General's suggestion. Having in mind previous occasions when British and French records of important conversations had differed, and especially since he had not been accompanied by a secretary or note-taker, Soames decided to adopt a procedure for checking the record which though based on long-established precedent is nowadays most unusual in diplomatic intercourse.[4] On February 6, accompanied by his Counsellor, he walked up the Faubourg St Honoré to the Elysée Palace to call on Monsieur Bernard Tricot, the Secretary General, who received him in the room on the first floor which Soames was subsequently to know well when it was occupied by Monsieur Michel Jobert. Soames explained to Tricot that when the General had seen him two days

4. This procedure was suggested to Soames by Mr Bernard Ledwidge, then minister at the embassy Guizot's precept quoted in *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice* reads: 'The report of a conversation made by a foreign agent can only be regarded as authentic and irrefragable when it had previously been submitted to the person whose language is being reported.'

before they had been alone and he therefore wanted to make sure that he had accurately recorded the gist of the General's remarks. He then gave him a copy of his report to the Foreign Office and requested him to verify with the General that it was accurate. Tricot, who had with him the General's diplomatic adviser, said that he was not informed about the contents of the conversation, that he would show Soames's report to the General and that he would give him any comments through the Foreign Minister, Monsieur Debré. A few days later on February 8 Monsieur Debré told Soames that the General had seen this record and had no comments to make on it. In reply to Soames's question whether his record had been inaccurate in any way Debré replied that on the contrary it had been completely accurate.

Meanwhile the Foreign Office reaction to Soames's report had been hostile and suspicious. They had for a long time viewed the General's European policy with deep dislike since they regarded it as tending to undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. They saw his suggestion of bilateral talks as a diversionary tactic likely—and probably designed—to confuse the situation rather than to lead to progress. It also cut clean across the present British policy, supported by the members of EEC other than France, of joining the Community without seeking any fundamental modifications. They feared that if a positive response to the French were made this might be used to cast doubt on the genuineness of British aspirations to join the Community as a full member in a straightforward way. Furthermore they were embarrassed by an immediate practical problem. The Prime Minister was to see the German Federal Chancellor on February 12 in order to discuss among other things the question of Britain's entry to the Community. What should he say to him about the General's remarks? If he said nothing but nevertheless followed up the General's suggestion for secret bilateral talks he would put himself in a false position. But if he were to tell Dr Kiesinger what the General had said this would be difficult to reconcile with the positive and friendly response to the French which Soames had advocated. Besides, there was a fear in the Foreign Office that the French might convey to their five partners a tendentious account of the conversation leading them to believe that Britain and France were cooking up an arrangement behind their backs. In the end it was proposed that a polite but cautious reply should be made to the French while Kiesinger, and subsequently the other governments of the Community, would be told of the purport of the General's remarks and of the British reply. At the same time arrangements would be made so that if, as the Foreign Office expected, the French started to leak the story in a way which damaged the British with the EEC governments, a full account of the episode would be made available immediately to the press. The Foreign Office proposals were endorsed by Mr Michael Stewart and a senior official was sent over to Paris to explain the government's view to the ambassador. Soames's view was that before anything was said to Kiesinger he must be authorised to give some official reaction to de Gaulle. He suggested that he should visit London for consultations but he was

told bluntly that Mr Stewart would not agree to this and he did not pursue the idea.

The Foreign Secretary's decisions did not, in the event, turn out at all well when put into operation. In the first place there was delay in obtaining Mr Wilson's agreement to the Foreign Office recommendations regarding what he should say to the Federal Chancellor. For various largely domestic reasons he and the Foreign Secretary had no more than a very brief discussion on the subject before he went to Bonn. In consequence of this delay it was only after Wilson had spoken to Kiesinger about the General's remarks on February 12 that Soames was authorised to tell the French that he was doing so. This was a diplomatic discourtesy which the French were quick to resent and subsequently exploit. Secondly, the Foreign Office press guidance, for use if the story were to be leaked, included the emotive word 'directorate' or '*directoire*' when referring to the General's suggestion that the bigger countries should exercise greater influence in a future European association. This may very well have been what the General meant but it was not exactly what he said or what Soames had recorded him as saying. It was a choice of words which, when the press guidance was eventually used, the French were justified in criticising as slanting the sense of what had been said.

After Wilson had given Kiesinger an account of the General's approach events moved rapidly. The French at once suspected British skulduggery and took energetic diplomatic action with the other governments of the EEC to throw doubt on the British version of the General's remarks which by then had been communicated to them by British ambassadors in the capitals. Within a few more days the story became widely known in diplomatic circles and later to the press. After a French press report on February 21 the Foreign Office press guidance was used, thus intensifying French resentment. On February 22 the French made an official statement protesting at the action of the Foreign Office in 'deforming' the General's remarks. This was followed up by a *Note Verbale* delivered to Soames at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Monsieur Alphand, Secretary General at the Quai d'Orsay, on February 24 at a most uncomfortable interview.[5] By then the respective views of the two governments were being strongly canvassed in public by spokesmen on both sides. Mr Stewart stoutly defended British actions in a statement to the House of Commons and in answer to parliamentary questions. There was an emergency debate in the House on February 25 from which Stewart emerged triumphantly.[6] Monsieur Debré for his part reproached Soames for the unfriendly manner in which the British government had handled this affair while accepting Soames's personal good faith. The press on either side of the channel gave full rein to their nationalist feelings.

5 M Alphand, whose inclination was not particularly anglophile, gives an account of this interview in his memoirs, *L'Etonnement d'Etre* (Paris: Fayard, 1977). The emotion shown by Soames on this occasion was not caused, as Alphand supposed, by chagrin but by indignation at any implication that he had falsified the General's remarks.

6. Michael Stewart, *Life and Labour* (London. Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980).

Both British and French governments were sore. The British considered that they had comported themselves properly in the face of an unrealistic proposal made by the French for obscure and probably malevolent purposes. The French, on the other hand, considered that the General's confidential suggestions—which had been intended to be constructive—had been deliberately distorted in an effort to discredit them with their EEC partners. This is the line taken by both French Ministers chiefly concerned, Monsieur Couve de Murville (then Prime Minister) and Monsieur Debré, when writing their respective accounts of the incident some years later. Debré's account[7] reveals that the General's remarks to Soames followed his own suggestion that it would be useful to involve the British in a bilateral negotiation in advance of the negotiations within the EEC on the financing of the agricultural policy towards the end of the year when the other members of the EEC could be expected to press France to agree to British entry. (Soames himself always accepted Debré's line of thought on this point and this was indeed his main reason for thinking that Anglo-French high level talks would have been very well timed had they taken place). Debré thought that on a number of issues, especially those regarding 'supranationality', British views were closer to the French than to the other Five and this might eventually permit modifications in the EEC which would suit France. Debré says, however, that neither he nor Couve knew in advance what was to be said to Soames. The first they knew of the General's approach was when the General telephoned both of them immediately after the talk in order to tell them of it. Neither minister mentions the General's own reaction to the British handling of the affair though at the time it was believed in Paris that he was outraged by British behaviour. There is no certain knowledge of his attitude towards Soames personally or of whether, as was freely speculated, he contemplated asking for his withdrawal. As things turned out, they never saw each other again.

It is clear that unlucky timing, brusque handling by the British, and mutual suspicion all contributed to the sorry upshot of the affair. On the British side the Prime Minister was due to visit Germany within a week and immediately on his return was to receive President Nixon on his first visit to Europe since his inauguration. The Foreign Secretary was on a visit to Luxembourg for one of the quarterly meetings of the Western European Union when he first saw Soames's report, while at the Foreign Office in London Denis Greenhill had just taken over his new job as Permanent Under Secretary. Thus the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, and Permanent Under Secretary were all of them badly placed to deal with any new French initiative. On the French side the Foreign Minister was on the point of leaving for an official visit to Spain from which he returned to Paris only on February 8. When he saw Soames on that day his instructions from de Gaulle were to await a British reaction before following up the talk of February 4 and he made scarcely any reference to the subject except to confirm that the record made by Soames was accurate. This

7. Michel Debré. *Français! Choisissons l'Espoir* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979).

absence of any further explanation or elaboration on the French side struck the British government as strange and, combined with their deep-rooted dislike of de Gaulle's European policies, nourished their suspicion that de Gaulle's move was an attempt to divert them from their own European policy and might even be a deliberate trap. The French evidently had no notion that their behaviour might seem odd. For them it was perfectly normal for the General to make a diplomatic move and having done so to judge, without further advice from his Ministers, how best to follow it up. Nor did they think it unusual for the General to have suggested that the British should take the initiative in seeking bilateral talks since they knew his consistent refusal ever to put himself in the position of '*demandeur*'. French suspicions were aroused only—and then in acute form—when they learned that the British had given not only the Germans but also the other EEC governments a slanted account of the General's proposals even before giving any reaction to the French government. Then their indignation knew no bounds. The British had by that time put themselves in the wrong by failing to send instructions to Soames to give a reply to the French before Wilson spoke to Kiesinger. This discourtesy was judged by the French as malevolence and nothing could then avert a major row. The French believed that the British were deliberately making mischief with their EEC partners, and at one point almost went so far as to disavow the authenticity of the record of the General's proposals which he himself had allowed to be endorsed.

Soames was mortified over the whole incident. Since his arrival in Paris he had been working to bring about a high-level dialogue. Indeed that was what he thought he had been sent to Paris to do. Now, when at last the General had made a move forward, the British government had sharply rebuffed it. He was angry with himself for not insisting on going home at once to talk to Wilson and Stewart and get them into a less anti-French frame of mind. He was angry with the Foreign Office for the way he thought it had bungled the affair. And he was angry about the effect of the affair on the ultimate success of his own mission and especially on the prospect of persuading the French to acquiesce in British entry to the Community. He reflected bitterly that if George Brown had still been Foreign Secretary he would have handled the matter in an entirely different way. He realised that he had overestimated the political backing available to him from the Prime Minister and also that he had failed to see how dangerous it was for him and the present Foreign Secretary to be on such entirely different wavelengths. It was undoubtedly a setback. But his naturally optimistic temperament did not allow him to take the affair too tragically or to believe that it could have serious consequences in the long run. He concluded that there was nothing to be done except to ride out the storm and to accept that for the time being Anglo-French relations would be frigid, far worse than on his arrival in France six months before.

There has been much speculation over the years about what exactly was in the General's mind when he spoke to Soames as he did on February 4. It has

been suggested that he may not have expected his remarks to be taken as a serious new initiative and that what he said was intended mainly as a polite response to the ambassador's expressed desire to make progress by discussion with the French. This is contradicted by what Debré says in his account. In his view the General genuinely wanted to suggest a renewed discussion with the British at a high level. The General's derogatory remarks about the existing Community of the Six were consistent with his known views; so was his contention that British membership of the Community would fundamentally alter its character so that it would be necessary to create in effect an entirely new organisation. In fact, there seems no reason to doubt that the General said to Soames exactly what he meant to say. That his motives were straightforward seems to be confirmed by the readiness with which he authorised Debré to authenticate the accuracy of Soames's record of the conversation, though it is strange that Debré's account does not mention this except by implication. But did the General seriously think that this overture could have led to agreement between the French and the British about the future of Europe? This is impossible to say, especially as he made it a rule never to divulge his full mind even to his most intimate collaborators. Whatever he may have intended, it is difficult to believe—given the respective national attitudes and deeply entrenched mutual suspicions—that Anglo-French talks could have paved the way at that time for British entry to the Community. A controversy was going on over the scope of discussions to be held at Western European Union meetings at which the French representative was playing an extremely uncooperative part and in general Anglo-French relations were distinctly cool; so it is not surprising that at that time the British found the General's proposals so unattractive. Had there been Anglo-French confidential discussions following the General's proposal, mutually reinforcing suspicions and irritations on both sides—not to speak of fundamental differences of policy over NATO—would probably have made for an arid dialogue leading to stalemate. However, whatever might or might not have happened if the General's move had been followed up, there was one consequence of the affair which undoubtedly assisted the eventual success of the British candidature. This was the establishment in France of the idea that the General at the end of his career actually favoured British membership of the Community on certain conditions. This idea was of great value to Pompidou in the next year or two.

For Soames himself the affair turned out to be helpful in the longer run, however black it looked in the immediate aftermath. The French, in spite of what Alphand had implied, never regarded him as having personally played a hostile part and his action in getting his record checked by the General protected him against any charge of either misunderstanding or misinterpreting the General's remarks. In fact Soames always believed that this action turned out to have been a very fortunate precaution since it saved him from being made to look either incompetent or naïve. As a political realist he fully understood how well it might have suited both the British and the French

in the uproar immediately after the affair to make him the scapegoat and terminate his mission prematurely.

Improvements in Anglo-French relations

The Soames affair was very soon eclipsed by more dramatic and far-reaching events. On April 27 the General lost his referendum and on the following day resigned. In the subsequent Presidential election Pompidou won on the second round by over 57 per cent of the votes. A process was beginning which by the end of the year would give much more encouraging indications for the likely success of the British application to join the European Community.

Even before this favourable tendency had begun, the damage was being repaired in various ways. In London Wilson and Stewart and many senior officials were decidedly unhappy at the upshot of the affair and disposed to make conciliatory gestures. Soames had gone over to see Wilson at Chequers on February 22 and had represented strongly that fences must be mended. A smooth reply was sent on March 1 to the French *Note Verbale* of February 24. In March Stewart took the initiative in seeking a meeting with Debré at the forthcoming NATO Foreign Ministers' Spring meeting in Washington. On the French side there remained a certain sense of outrage at British action as well as bewilderment about their motives, but after some weeks in which French ministers and officials found it embarrassing to have too close relations with the British, the atmosphere lightened and from the purely social point of view became quite friendly. This was to some extent due to the ambassador's heavy investment in the creation of an embassy household in which French and English—and indeed anybody lucky enough to be invited—could be sure of being admirably entertained. There was always good talk and interesting company and by the spring of 1969 the household was well established and the beauty of the house had been enhanced by redecoration and some refurnishing and rearrangement.

It was not only on the social front that Soames was beginning to make his mark. By the time that Pompidou had become President he had begun to establish himself also in the more official or professional part of his job. It was to Michael Palliser[8] who joined the embassy in June and to his Economic Minister, John Galsworthy, that Soames came mainly to look for advice. Palliser in effect ran the embassy machine, Soames reserving to himself all aspects of the question of British entry into the Community and also doing the things that only the ambassador can do such as political speeches, calls on French Ministers, political contacts in Britain, and official visits outside Paris. Galsworthy was the expert on the detail of the European Community and this was the one subject which with all its ramifications Soames wished to handle himself. Though not pretending to any great intellectual stature Soames

8 Palliser succeeded Bernard Ledwidge as minister when the latter was appointed ambassador to Finland. He had previously been a private secretary at 10 Downing Street

proved to be admirable at mastering a brief given to him either by word of mouth or in writing provided that it was served up to him in a digestible form. Once they got used to his method of work Palliser and Galsworthy found him easy and indeed rewarding to work for. He sometimes had his black moods but was usually buoyant and friendly. Furthermore his personality was irresistibly attractive whether exerted upon his friend or opponent. This was his strongest card.

By July 1969 a change began to be obvious in the government of France. Pompidou had appointed Chaban Delmas as his Prime Minister, Maurice Schumann as his Foreign Minister. Both men had the reputation for being extremely friendly to the British with whom they had been closely associated during the War. Not that Pompidou made any abrupt changes either of policy or of organisation. He did not in appearance deviate from the principles and policies laid down by de Gaulle. But there was a great difference of approach between de Gaulle and the cautious, astute banker of country origin and formidable intellectual powers who had now succeeded to the Presidency. It was clear that his first priority would be to master the economic situation and that foreign affairs, even those so closely involved with France's internal situation as the affairs of the European Community, must take second place. The franc was devalued on August 8. A plan for austerity was approved by the French Cabinet in early September. In preparing for the EEC Summit meeting to be held in The Hague in early December Pompidou had taken measures designed to restore the health of the French economy.

The summit meeting at The Hague, on December 1-2, reached agreement that negotiations with the candidates should begin 'as soon as possible', which in practice meant by about the middle of 1970. What had paved the way for this agreement was that France had obtained more or less what it wanted on the financing of the agricultural policy on condition that it agreed in principle to the enlargement of the Community by the admission of the applicant members. It was Pompidou's Foreign Minister, Monsieur Maurice Schumann, who had invented the formula which was to encapsulate French policy in the EEC for the next two years. This was the formula: '*achèvement*', '*approfondissement*', '*élargissement*'. '*Achèvement*' meant, among other things, adoption of a financial regulation in a definitive and irreversible manner in order to complete this part of the structure of the EEC. '*Approfondissement*' meant reaching agreement on the various ways in which the Community might be extended in scope. '*Élargissement*' meant letting in the candidates for membership once the other two aims had been achieved. Schumann had obtained Pompidou's agreement to this formula and in the autumn of 1969 had visited the other five Foreign Ministers of the EEC in order to win their acceptance of it. Their reaction was favourable and Pompidou could therefore be confident that at the Hague summit meeting of the Six in December the French attitude would be generally endorsed. And so it had been. When on this basis the Hague Summit reached agreement to begin

negotiations with the candidates the British government found confirmation of their belief that things were at last moving.

Thus at the very end of 1969 Anglo-French relations had taken a turn for the better and the prospects for a successful negotiation of British membership of the EEC had become brighter. How was it that relations had so rapidly improved since the nadir of February 1969?

First there was the General's departure from the political scene. This was important—perhaps even indispensable—but would not have been by itself decisive since his successors were in no position to reverse his policies even if they had wished to do so. His departure did indeed enable new or modified attitudes to be adopted without some of the incubus of the past. This however was only one element in the situation. In 1969 and 1970 a series of influences brought about something of a sea-change.

No doubt the most powerful agent of change was the pressure by the other EEC governments in favour of negotiations for enlargement. France's five partners were in effect making it clear that France could not expect any developments in the Community favourable to its interests—and specifically progress on a system of agricultural prices—unless it agreed to negotiate the entry of the Candidate members. Hence the bargain made at The Hague in December 1969.

The international situation in 1969 contained other factors favouring British adherence to the EEC. Under President Nixon after January 1969, with Dr Kissinger as National Security Adviser at the White House, American policy towards Europe had developed in a generally helpful way. First, while de Gaulle was still in power, and then later with Pompidou, the United States and French governments restored some degree of warmth and confidence to their relations. This served to lessen the force of any French argument that the British were too pro-American to be regarded as truly European. Even more important was the impact on the international scene of the 'Ostpolitik' adopted by the German government in the autumn of 1969 under Chancellor Willy Brandt. This policy was intended to lead—and eventually did lead—to a reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours to the East including Poland and what had become the separate Communist state of East Germany. Brandt had explained this new policy to his Allies in December 1969 and received their general approbation. But he was well aware of the misgivings of some of them including especially France. He accompanied the policy with a much more positive attitude than the former German Chancellor to the question of British entry to the European Community—which indeed he had in any case favoured for a long time—thus intending to demonstrate that Germany remained anchored firmly to the West and had no desire to indulge in adventures of appeasement towards the East. Pompidou for his part regarded the new German Ostpolitik with uneasy approval but he became thereby more disposed to the view that Britain should be brought into Europe in order to restore the balance of relationships among the larger powers. As Kissinger was

to put it when writing his account of the early months of 1970, 'Of the three most important European leaders two distrusted the tendencies unleashed by the third and the third needed a gesture by which to assuage these suspicions. British entry into the Common Market provided the mechanism.'[9]

British preparations for EEC negotiations

In the early months of 1970 George Thomson[10] embarked on a series of visits to the capitals of the Six accompanied by O'Neill[11] and one or two other officials. In between these visits he oversaw the preparation of the position papers being worked out under the aegis of the Cabinet Office committee by the officials of the government departments concerned covering the many aspects of British relations with the Community which would come up in the negotiations. It soon became clear to him, even more than it had before, that in almost all these questions it was the French who held the key.

However, at the stage when the Labour government was planning its approach to the negotiations in early 1970 it was too early to reach decisions on points of tactics. At this stage Wilson did not make it clear even to his closest political or official advisers how he intended to play the hand—perhaps he had not yet finally decided. But it was supposed by many people who thought they were in his confidence that his intention was to hold—and of course to win—a General Election in the early summer, and then to appoint Jenkins as Foreign Secretary and Thomson as the second Foreign Office minister in the Cabinet.

The main preparatory action taken by the British government on the internal front in early 1970 was the completion of a White Paper in February containing an assessment of the economic consequences of British membership of the Community. This was a paper of some fifty pages examining the effects of membership on British agriculture and food, on trade and industry, on capital movements and on invisible trade, these being sectors of the economy in which the effects of joining the Community were likely to be most significant. The conclusions reached were nicely balanced since there were too many unknown factors and too wide a possible range of the costs of entry for any detailed balance sheet to be drawn up. But the tendency of the White Paper was to convey to Parliament the message that joining the European Community might well be an extremely expensive undertaking even if it might be politically desirable.

In the late 1960s Wilson had in fact become convinced that it was in the long-term interest of the United Kingdom to join the European Community. It seems that it was his 'probe' of 1967, when he and George Brown visited the

9 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979)

10 Rt Hon. George Thomson (created Lord Thomson of Monifieth 1977) Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster 1969-70.

11. Hon. Sir Con O'Neill, GCMG Leader at official level of British delegation to negotiate entry to EEC 1969-72.

six capitals that had brought about this conviction. It was not based on any profound knowledge of the Community or of the countries which it comprised, still less of any long-term view of Europe such as that of Heath. It was nevertheless a strong conviction, tempered only by the consideration that in working towards British membership of the EEC Wilson was determined not to bring about disunity within the Labour Party. This preoccupation was no doubt the primary cause of his tactical shifts. However, if he had won the 1970 election he would have been well placed to carry a united party with him in support of Jenkins and Thomson, and this is what both of them believed that he had in mind in spite of the probably economic cost of membership. George Thomson, preparing himself for the opening of negotiations in Luxembourg at the end of June, took advantage of lulls in his election campaign at Dundee to work on the draft of the opening statement which he expected to make on this occasion.

But all the hopes and intentions of British Labour ministers for a new and successful negotiation were foiled by the verdict of the electors. It was not Wilson but Heath who became British Prime Minister and it was Anthony Barber who made the British opening statement at the meeting in Luxembourg on June 30.

The new British Prime Minister, Mr Edward Heath, had little knowledge of the French language[12] but he had very strong views about the importance of France in Europe and he understood better than any other senior British politician of that time the reasons for the hesitations of many Frenchmen, from de Gaulle downwards, regarding British entry to the Community. He had a deep and detailed knowledge of EEC affairs derived from his years as Lord Privy Seal at the Foreign Office in the early 1960s when he had led the British delegation negotiating in Brussels before the French veto of January 1963. His commitment to Europe was unquestionable. A sympathetic French observer has described him in 1970 as having an attachment to Europe of almost mystical inspiration 'as if this perfectly English man had been born between Burgundy and the Black Forest'.[13] Not that he was blind to French faults, still less was he ready to give away important points in any future negotiation. But he was more aware than any other British politician of the habits of mind in the English 'establishment' which militated against their acceptability by the Europeans and especially by the French. He had been much out of sympathy with the strand of self-righteous anti-French feeling manifested recently in certain political circles in England and had been sharply critical of the way the Foreign Office had handled the Soames affair in February 1969.

It was therefore natural that in France Heath's victory in the 1970 election

12 The tiny minority of French and British senior politicians of that time who spoke each other's language really well included Giscard d'Estaing, Couve de Murville, and Maurice Schumann on the French side and on the British side the late Rab Butler, the late John Davies, Duncan Sandys and, of course, Christopher Soames. The balance, otherwise tilted somewhat in favour of French knowledge of English, is redressed, if we take account of one special category on the British side, that is members of the Royal Family. The Queen and members of her family all speak excellent French.

13 Michel Jobert, *Mémoires d'Avenir* (Paris: Grasset, 1974)

was regarded as a favourable sign. When Barber made his opening speech at Luxembourg on June 30 the substance of what he said was much the same as what George Thomson would have said. But the reception in Europe, or at any rate in France, was a good deal more sympathetic.

There was another advantage for British prospects of entry which derived from the Conservative victory in the election. This arose from the improvement in confidence and contact between the British government and the British ambassador at Paris. Soames had, it is true, been sent to France by the Labour government, and the Labour Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had not come to regret the appointment in any way. Yet there were reservations on both sides. Soames was in no position to be treated by the Labour government in any special way and nor was he. For them he was a senior and respected ambassador filling an important post but he did not enjoy that political intimacy or personal 'entrée' which would have brought him fully into the inner counsels of the government. But Heath's government was a horse of an entirely different colour. Heath and Soames were not close personal friends but they were intimate political acquaintances who had known each other well as Cabinet ministers in the Macmillan government and had worked together in the Brussels negotiations of 1962. As a 'political' ambassador Soames rightly expected to be used by the new government to a much greater degree than he had been by the previous one.

By this time Soames had built up an outstanding position in Paris. Making full use of his political and social stature he had developed a style generally acknowledged by those who had to do with the embassy in those years to be extremely effective. His personality and manner were well suited to television and, as a result of frequent appearances on the television screen, he became widely known both in Paris and the provinces—and was often greeted by strangers in the street. On the social side the Soameses had by mid-1970 established their house as a place in which important Englishmen and Frenchmen from all sectors of society could meet in a delightful and informal atmosphere conducive to the good conduct of Anglo-French business. On the official side too the machine was in good order. Soames had made good his original determination to understand the European 'dossier' and had acquired a very detailed grasp of all the questions likely to figure in the forthcoming negotiations. For the rest he looked to Michael Palliser whose mastery of numerous complicated questions, combined with his attractive personality, enabled Soames to be assured that the embassy was performing efficiently in all other departments as well as on the European front. By this time too Palliser, assisted by his wife (née Marie Spaak), was fully established socially in Paris and was able effectively to supplement the ambassador's representational and political contacts. He and his wife spoke perfect French, as indeed did nearly all the key members of the embassy at this time.

This was the embassy to which Mr Heath looked to advise and help him in the negotiations for British entry.

THE SOVIET UNION IN IRISH FOREIGN POLICY

*Micheál Ó Corcora and Ronald J. Hill**

IN this article we explore the range of issues that concern the Irish Republic in formulating policy towards the Soviet Union. This question has acquired enhanced significance since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1973, accompanied by increased trade between the two countries and the setting up of embassies and trade missions in Dublin and Moscow, and followed by similar exchanges with other countries in the socialist camp. This development has not been without public controversy in Ireland, and has been a relatively sudden occurrence, following over half a century during which the two states had existed, but when the perennial absence of official ties was accompanied by slight cultural links and a low level of economic exchange.

To some extent this state of affairs was the result of Soviet policy. In the years 1917-22 the new Bolshevik government certainly showed an interest in the activities of the Sinn Féin revolutionary movement, and there were substantial contacts between the two internationally shunned governments. By the time the Irish Free State was becoming firmly established in the early 1920s, however, Soviet attitudes towards international politics and the capitalist West had fundamentally changed. Anxious to win acceptance by the capitalist states—notably Britain—the Soviet government had little further interest in Ireland, and political contacts effectively ceased. Trade, too, remained virtually non-existent, a condition reinforced by the policy of autarky pursued by both the Soviet Union and Ireland in the 1930s, and also by the enforced economic isolation of the war years. By the late 1950s, following Khrushchev's espousal of 'peaceful coexistence', Soviet policy towards Western Europe began to change; by the early 1970s the Soviet Union was ready to reappraise its policy towards Ireland.[1]

However, relations between the two countries were equally—perhaps more—affected by events in Ireland, by Irish relations with other countries, and by changes in Irish attitudes towards the Soviet Union. These features of change in Ireland are our concern here. We begin by assessing the disposition

*Micheál Ó Corcora is a civil servant in Dublin. Ronald J. Hill is Associate Professor of Political Science in Trinity College, Dublin. He is the author of *Soviet Political Elites. The Case of Tiraspol* (London: Martin Robertson, 1977) and *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); he is also co-author, with Peter Frank, of *The Soviet Communist Party* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), and has written articles and reviews for scholarly journals and symposia.

1 Soviet policy towards Ireland is discussed in Marcus Wheeler, 'Soviet Interest in Ireland', *Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1975), pp. 81-93; and in Micheál G. Ó Corcora, 'Irish-Soviet Trade Relations and Policy', unpublished M Litt thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 1980, ch. 2

of public opinion as it relates to the Soviet Union, and the stance of various political groups and other institutional actors; and proceed to analyse Irish policy towards the Soviet Union in terms of three issue-areas that seem to be especially significant in analysing Irish-Soviet relations.

Irish public opinion and policy towards the Soviet Union

Irish attitudes towards Russia and the Soviet Union have long been characterised by antipathy and suspicion, if not downright hostility, based mainly on political and religious, rather than ethnic, factors.[2] The reasons for this are numerous and some of them may be identified by examining Irish political culture.

In the first place, the democratic objectives of the Irish independence struggle, and the stress on the importance of parliamentary politics since the foundation of Dáil Éireann, have meant that democratic values and processes have become enshrined in Irish political life; departures from this form of liberal democracy are seen as abnormal and undesirable—hence 'communism', in the form created in the Soviet Union, is viewed with hostility. Also stemming from the nationalist struggle is a diminution in the importance of those social cleavages—particularly between workers and employers—that normally form the basis of political opposition between Left and Right in West European countries.[3] The dominant political cleavage in Irish society is loosely based on the Civil War divisions. Given this failure to polarise in Left-Right terms, the extreme Left has always been a small and unimportant political force in the country: thus, the Communist Party of Ireland has always had a tiny membership and performed badly at the polls.[4] This antipathy towards domestic communism is extended to the Soviet Union. As Mac Grêil notes, Russia, as the first Communist state, has been closely identified with communism, which in turn is very negatively viewed in Ireland because of its atheistic and revolutionary political connotations.[5]

In view of the central position occupied by the Roman Catholic Church in Irish society, religious values undoubtedly contribute towards the negative view of communism, on account of its avowed 'godlessness', and also as a result of Soviet policy in relation to, say, Poland and Lithuania. There, the Irish tend to accept the perception of the Soviet Union as a militantly atheistic,

2 Michaël Mac Grêil, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ireland* (Dublin: College of Industrial Relations, 1977), pp. 241, 255, 239, Table 60

3 See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross National Perspectives* (New York. Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64. For Ireland, see Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), ch 1, and Richard Sinnott, 'The Electorate', in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Ireland at the Polls* (Washington. American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp 35-67.

4 See Neil McInnes, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 4, 21-2

5 Mac Grêil, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

oppressive, expansionist colonial power, imposing an unwelcome ideology on sovereign peoples.

This view of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy is also the result of remnants of the 'British influence',[6] which has allowed Irish political culture to assimilate the prejudices of British society. This enhances an anti-communist, anti-Soviet attitude in a number of ways and especially through the adoption of British political models and principles at the time of independence. This is confirmed by Ireland's alignment with the Western camp, led by the United States, and most recently by its membership of the EEC. Further reinforcement comes through the sources of information available to the Irish public: quite apart from the wide circulation of British news media in Ireland, the 'foreign' news in domestic Irish communications comes almost exclusively from press agencies in the NATO countries. These factors all help to ensure that Irish public opinion on the Soviet Union does not differ greatly from that of other Western countries.

Certain values in Irish political culture that are conducive to anti-communist attitudes result from economic factors. The land reform of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by allowing the peasant holders to purchase land easily, gave rise to the establishment of private enterprise as an essential principle of Irish life.[7] Conservative values and economic principles have been carried over into modern Irish society. Communism (indeed, socialism, since the two are often perceived as synonymous) is considered a threat to the existing economic order, and has been vehemently opposed by all sections of business life. This fear of communism as a disruptive force led for many years to an avoidance of closer contact with the Soviet Union. This was further reflected in an unwillingness to trade with the socialist countries, presumably for fear of contamination or of opening up channels for subversive influence, or perhaps out of unwillingness to support an oppressive regime. This attitude was bolstered by Ireland's traditional trading patterns, and its ideological, political and religious sensitivities. Such indifference to trade with the socialist countries continued in Ireland long after the post-Stalin 'thaw' had taken place in East-West relations, and long after other Western countries had begun to develop economic relations with Eastern Europe. In the public mind, such trade as did exist was potentially or actually disruptive.[8]

In contrast to the dominant themes in the Irish political culture, some elements have at times tended to modify the generally negative attitude towards the Soviet Union. Anti-British feeling and the willingness to court the friendship of any potential ally in the struggle for independence permitted Irish opinion to countenance relations with Soviet Russia during the nationalist

6 The influences on Irish political culture, including the British influence, are discussed in Chubb, *op. cit.*, pp 44-57

7 David Thornley, 'Historical Introduction', in Chubb, *op. cit.*, p 23

8 However, as will be elaborated below, when the possibility of trade with the communist countries became apparent, in the early 1970s, the pressure of anti-communist opinion was overcome with relative ease: economic interests had by then become almost immune to political and ideological constraints

revolution. The Russian revolutions of 1917 were generally welcomed in Ireland,[9] and the Irish labour movement genuinely admired and congratulated the achievements of the Bolshevik revolution. In addition, the declared Soviet commitment to the rights of self-determination, anti-colonialism, disarmament and Third World development are consonant with certain values and symbols in the Irish political culture. However, their influence is minor when compared with the strong negative forces already discussed. Furthermore, the absence of any encouragement of tourist traffic or cultural exchange between the two countries, and the (related) lack of full Russian language and Soviet studies courses in Irish establishments of learning until the 1970s, have resulted in a broad lack of interest in Soviet affairs among many Irish people. Whether the scant coverage given to Soviet affairs in the communications media is a result or a cause of the lack of public interest is not a question that can be answered here.[10] Nevertheless, the view taken in the mass media has clearly corresponded with that espoused by public opinion: it is slowly moving from hostile indifference to tolerant indifference.

The values of Irish political culture are reflected in and reinforced by the various interest groups in society: we turn now to assess these.

Interest groups and policy towards the Soviet Union

There are few specifically foreign-policy-oriented interest groups in existence in Ireland, but influence comes from groups with general aims which perceive in certain foreign policy questions matters that affect them. Important examples are business organisations, agricultural groups, the trade unions and, especially, the Roman Catholic Church.

The Church's influence as an interest group is not always wielded in the way associated with groups without parliamentary representation. The Church rarely needs to intervene overtly as an interest group, since its influence is present and felt at every level of Irish life. There has been no shortage of spokesmen for the Church's views in the Dáil, and even the Labour Party is very much rooted in the country's Catholic traditions.[11]

In foreign policy matters, the effectiveness of specific intervention by the Church is difficult to measure: on two important occasions—the Irish vote in favour of debating Chinese entry to the United Nations[12] and the support for sanctions against Italy following the 1935 Ethiopian crisis[13]—the Church's

9 Michael O'Riordan, *Pages from History on Irish-Soviet Relations* (Dublin: New Books, 1978), pp. 52-53; the author is General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland.

10. 'Where journalists decide that there is insufficient public interest to warrant even low coverage of a foreign policy question . the public response to the "nonevent" can hardly help but be low, confirming the newsmen in the wisdom of their judgement': Bernard C. Cohen, 'Mass Communication and Foreign Policy', in James N. Rosenau, ed., *The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 206.

11 See, for example, the speech by Brendan Corish, quoted in Chubb, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

12 See Brian J. O'Connor, *Ireland and the United Nations*, Tuairim Pamphlet no. 7 (Dublin: Tuairim, 1961), pp. 6-7

13. See Patrick Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1973), p. 283.

views were strongly in opposition to government policy; so too with the controversy over the Spanish Civil War and recognition of the Franco government.[14]

The Church has never lost its militant anti-communism, and as an interest group attempting to affect policy towards the Soviet Union, it has had more influence on public opinion than on the national government. As one National Labour deputy put it in 1946, 'ninety-nine per cent of the Irish workers stand against recognition of Russia or of Communism'.[15] Hence, the Church's attitude has severely limited the options available to the policy-makers, by influencing the views of almost every member of parliament, and indeed the population. Yet public opinion has evolved in recent years, and official relations between Ireland and the Soviet Union are at least tolerated.

In this new situation, other interest groups have tried to mould public opinion and government policy. Attempts to influence the national government have been largely attempts to induce it to make representations to the Soviet authorities. The Special Action Groups of Amnesty International, the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry, various Church-related bodies and others have pleaded the cause of dissidents and prisoners in the Soviet Union, thereby trying to persuade the Irish government to put pressure on Moscow. Since the establishment of a Soviet mission in Dublin, protest marches to the embassy and anti-Soviet demonstrations have been particularly associated with the plight of Jews and Catholics in the Soviet Union.

On the pro-Soviet side, since the foundation of the Soviet state and earlier, various groups have promoted the Soviet Union and the principle of closer contacts with it. For instance, in 1906 and 1917 large demonstrations of sympathy with the Russian workers were held. Groups such as the Friends of Soviet Russia and its successors made little impact on public opinion, however, and had no effect whatever on foreign policy in the climate of antipathy of the 1920s and 1930s. They were rightly identified with the domestic communist movement, and their activities were supervised by the Irish authorities. More recently the Ireland–USSR Society was given impetus by the setting up of a Soviet embassy in Dublin, since when its main interest has been in the cultural field, notably in urging a cultural exchange agreement between the two countries. While it does not have much impact on Irish policy, it maintains close contacts with Soviet diplomats and may have some indirect influence on the application, if not the framing, of Soviet policy towards Ireland. Its most

14. In the 1930s anti communism was rife in Ireland and the Church played a prominent role in articulating this aspect of public opinion, mainly through Lenten pastorals and Bishops' sermons at Confirmation ceremonies: see John Whyte, *Church and State in Modern Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), pp. 89–93. In addition, the Church had many articulate spokesmen outside the clergy, and its warnings were repeated by the leaders of the Blueshirts, by members of the Fine Gael parliamentary party, and later by leaders of the pro-Franco organisation, the Christian Front. The anti-communism of the Blueshirt movement is recounted in Maurice Manning, *The Blueshirts* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), especially pp. 36–37, 61–62, 74. The weak electoral strength of the communist movement at that time was referred to by De Valera in the Dáil in March 1934: see *Dail Debates* 50: 2496–2522 (March 1–2, 1934).

15. James Everett: see *Dail Debates* 103: 1355 (Nov. 21, 1946).

important role has been an informational one, and in this way claims to have helped to change public attitudes.[16]

Somewhat more formally, Irish Trades Union Congress delegations regularly attended May Day and October Revolution celebrations in Moscow until the end of the 1920s, and their reports back to Congress were invariably favourable towards the Soviet government's achievements. Even so, it was difficult to create real sympathy for the Soviet Union in a country where most trade unionists did not even support leftist parties.[17] Even in the 1970s and 1980s the presence of fraternal Soviet delegates at the annual congress is played down. In any case, although the Irish Congress of Trade Unions enjoys substantial influence in domestic economic matters, its impact on foreign policy remains slight.

As a highly significant economic interest group, the trade union organisation may have some indirect impact, alongside such other groups as the Irish Farmers' Association, the Federated Union of Employers, and the Confederation of Irish Industry—groups which exert 'the most consistent and possibly the most successful type of influence'.[18] It is their general interest in promoting trade that makes them of interest to our study, for, although their main focus of attention has been policy towards Britain and the EEC, the realisation of the possibilities of trade with the Soviet Union has broadened their potential scope. Industrial and agricultural interests—manifest in the search for new markets for the products of both expanding agriculture and developing industry—were important factors contributing towards the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union. The interests of this lobby are assimilated by the national export body, Córas Tráchtála, although the number of firms showing a positive interest in Irish-Soviet trade has declined, and now embraces principally a small but significant group of multinational subsidiaries.

The trade union movement has from time to time attempted to influence specific aspects of policy towards the Soviet Union, notably on the question of maritime jurisdiction, markets for Irish fish products in the Soviet Union,[19] and the possibility of a Soviet zinc smelter being built in Ireland.[20] The agricultural lobby has also been significant in influencing trade policy towards the Soviet Union, and also in determining the Irish government's attitude towards EEC policies on agricultural trade with Eastern Europe.[21]

In recent years it has become clear that all these economic interest groups need to exert pressure on institutions other than those of the national

16. The attitude of public opinion has changed enough to allow the society to become 'almost a respectable organisation', according to its long-serving secretary: see Frank Edwards, in Uinseann Mac Eoin, ed., *Survivors* (Dublin: Argenta, 1980), p. 14

17. According to Rumpf, 'the majority of Irish trade unionists had never in their lives voted Labour': see E. Rumpf and A. C. Hepburn, *Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1977), p. 83

18. Keatinge, *op cit.*, p. 273.

19. See *The Irish Times*, Dec 13, 1976.

20. See *Irish Independent*, April 5, 1978.

21 See, for example, *The Irish Times*, Nov. 22 and 28, 1978.

government. Decisions relating to the export of 'intervention' beef and surplus butter, the access of East European agricultural produce to the EEC market, fishing quotas to be applied to the Soviet fleet in Irish waters, and the level of protection from East European industrial competition to Irish industry—all these matters are resolved at European Community level. Hence, economic interest groups seeking to influence the level of trade between Ireland and the Soviet Union must no longer exert pressure within the confines of the national political system.

Political parties and policy towards the Soviet Union

Generally speaking, the development of modern Irish political parties' policies towards the Soviet Union can be associated with the changing generations of Irish political leaders in the period since the foundation of the state. Up to the end of the 1960s, all Ireland's foreign ministers, except for Liam Cosgrave (1954-57), were members of the 'revolutionary elite', who became the political leaders of the new state through involvement in the rebellion that led to its foundation. The succeeding generation, by contrast, 'are economically oriented with a view to the establishment of what is considered sound economic policy for steady economic growth'.[22] Sean Lemáss, although a member of the revolutionary elite, was the leader of the 'new men', and led the 'pragmatic and deliberate fragmentation of the foreign policy field',[23] which this new orientation demanded. This involved elevating the economic dimension in Irish foreign policy and demoting the principles of nationalism, self-identity, the right to self-determination, anti-imperialism, and religious liberty that had guided De Valera, Frank Aiken and other members of the revolutionary elite in their conduct of Irish foreign policy. It was achieved by divorcing trade policy from other aspects of foreign policy, and the new approach seems to have been approved by all the major parties.

Fine Gael

Fine Gael's role in formulating a policy towards the Soviet Union is, however, much older than this comparatively recent departure. The Cumann na nGaedhal government, in office in the Irish Free State until 1932, pursued essentially conservative and prudent policies in both the domestic and the external arenas, aimed at modifying the Free State's constitutional position with regard to Great Britain.

During the 1930s, through association with the Blueshirt movement and the articulation of Catholic views in the Dáil, Fine Gael spoke for the anti-communist and anti-Russian feeling in the country. The party's anti-communism during this period must however be seen as a method of gaining

22 A S Cohan, *The Irish Political Elite* (Dublin Gill and Macmillan, 1972), p. 71.
23 Patrick Keatinge, *A Place Among the Nations Issues in Irish Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1978), p. 210.

political support in an environment of often hysterical anti-communist feeling in the country—and indeed in Europe and the world at large. Through various policies, including attempts to associate Fianna Fáil with communism,[24] Fine Gael became identified as the 'defender of the Faith' and the party was accused of trying to 'cash in electorally on Christianity'.[25]

After the Spanish Civil War and the demise of the Blueshirt movement, Fine Gael in opposition 'no longer seriously attempted to contribute to the shaping of Ireland's policies in international affairs',[26] although anti-communism was still articulated by some of the party's members. The party was critical of the government's policy on Chinese representation at the United Nations and expressed reservations about the possibility of official relations with the Soviet Union. In 1972, the foreign affairs spokesman criticised government plans in this sphere and opposed 'the suggestion . . . that mother Ireland should suckle the Russian Bear in the cause of world detente'.[27]

In government, the party shared in making a number of foreign policy decisions of importance to Irish-Soviet relations. The First Coalition government (1948-51), in which Fine Gael was the dominant partner, decided against joining NATO.[28] Liam Cosgrave, Foreign Minister in the Second Coalition government (1954-57), set important precedents in Irish policy at the United Nations in 1956 by making clear that Ireland's military non-alignment did not mean that it was neutral in the conflict between the free world and the Godless East.[29] In the Third Coalition (1973-77), the Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1973, his visit to the Soviet Union in 1976, and his generally friendly disposition towards that country met no obvious antipathy within the party, little comment from the Opposition, and the general indifference of a much-changed public opinion. The decision demonstrated above all else the economic orientation of the present political elite and the predominance of economic and welfare factors over ideological and political considerations in recent foreign policy, a position that Fianna Fáil shares with Fine Gael.

Fianna Fáil

Not long after its entry into the Dáil in 1927, Fianna Fáil proposed diplomatic

24. *Dáil Debates* 48: 2133-39 (July 11, 1933); *Dáil Debates* 53: 219-33 (June 13, 1934).

25 Frank McDermott, a former leading member of Fine Gael, quoted in Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs', in Owen Dudley Edwards, ed., *Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland* (London: Deutsch, 1969), p. 117

26. *Ibid*

27. *Dáil Debates* 260: 413 (April 18, 1972), quoted in Keatinge, *A Place Among the Nations*, p. 180; the speaker was Richie Ryan, TD.

28 O'Brien ('Ireland in International Affairs', *loc. cit.*, pp. 124-25) has little doubt that Fine Gael in government alone would have opted for NATO membership.

28 While there is insufficient evidence to support Wheeler's assertion ('Soviet Interest in Ireland', *loc. cit.*, p 90) that the presence of Clann na Poblachta and the Labour Party in the First Coalition brought about a change in Soviet attitudes towards Ireland, the Clann's presence did have an important effect on Irish-Soviet relations through its contribution towards keeping Ireland out of NATO

29. *Dáil Debates* 159: 142-44 (July 3, 1956).

and trade relations with the Soviet Union.[30] However, this interest in the Soviet Union while in opposition waned considerably after the party reached office in 1932, in veiw of its broadened electoral support, the party's increasing respectability and conservatism, and the type of economic and foreign policies pursued. Although not as close to Catholic and anti-communist views as Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil was nevertheless sensitive to public opinion, and not even De Valera's government could 'afford to hold out the prospect of establishing a link with the atheistic Soviets'.[31] When voting in favour of Russia's entry into the League of Nations in 1934, De Valera tried to diminish the domestic political significance of the vote by simultaneously calling for religious freedom in the Soviet Union.[32] On that occasion he was probably correct in asserting that he represented a country which, 'if you consider its political and religious ideas, is as far apart as the poles from Soviet Russia'.[33] Even this somewhat hesitant association with atheistic Russia was condemned as immoral.[34]

The isolation of the war years and after, together with the cold war environment of the 1950s, prevented Ireland under De Valera and his successor as Foreign Minister, Frank Aiken, from having even an interest in contact with Eastern Europe, perceived as the Soviet empire. After De Valera's retirement from direct involvement in government, Fianna Fáil under Lemass began the process of subordinating ideological factors and elevating the economic objectives of foreign policy. This new economic orientation allowed the party to seek out new markets, even among the socialist countries, without much ideological or political reservation. As Minister for External Affairs, Patrick Hillery had by 1973 done much of the groundwork for the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union, although the final decision to do so was taken by the Fine Gael-Labour Coalition.

Generally, while Fianna Fáil's attitude to communism and the Soviet Union may not have been traditionally as hostile as that of Fine Gael, the two parties' policies coincided, and still do so, on major issues pertaining to foreign policy, including relations with the Soviet Union.[35] Under Lemass and Jack Lynch (leader from 1966 to 1979) Fianna Fáil became associated with conservative social and economic policies and an often disinterested commitment to 'economic growth' which involves the expansion of trade on a large scale. This allowed the party to seek markets in socialist countries, and also to make use of them as a source of some fundamental materials, notably oil: traditional reservations were not allowed to inhibit this hard-nosed orientation.

30 *Dáil Debates* 27· 13-14, 410-11, 473-7 (Nov. 14 and 21, 1928).

31. Marcus Wheeler, 'The Moscow-Dublin Accord', *The World Today*, Vol 29, No. 11 (Nov 1973), p 459.

32 See Eamon de Valera, *Peace and War Speeches on International Affairs* (Dublin: Gill, 1944), pp 21-22, 32-34.

33. *Ibid*, p. 25.

34. Keatinge, *Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*, pp 24-25

35. The unity of policy has shown some signs of strain under Charles J. Haughey's leadership of Fianna Fáil, the policy differences seem, however, to be confined to Anglo-Irish relations and policy on Northern Ireland

The Labour Party

The Labour Party, the third major political party in modern Ireland, despite early indications of support for links with the Soviet Union,[36] has never been a radical body, and the need to win the votes of the Irish electorate has effectively ruled out international co-operation with communism. It has constantly felt obliged to demonstrate its Irishness and its lack of extremism.

On major issues, the Labour Party's foreign policy posture has not differed substantially from that of the other main parties. Its public (and probably private) attitude to the Soviet Union has coincided with policies adopted by successive governments in reaction to Soviet foreign policy and internal Soviet upheavals.[37] In the First Coalition, the party did not press for relations with socialist countries, even though the Soviet Union had earlier vetoed Ireland's application to join the United Nations ostensibly on the grounds that there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the term of office of the Third Coalition, in the 1970s, there were no apparent policy differences on this question between Labour and Fine Gael: Keatinge notes that Fine Gael's 'prim distaste for dealing with the enemies of the free world' was shared by the Labour Party and that any policy differences that did exist were 'so much water under the bridge'.[38]

In summing up the developing attitudes of Irish political parties towards the Soviet Union, it is noteworthy that none of the three main parties displayed serious opposition to the moves in the 1970s to expand contacts. Less than thirty years earlier, as a National Labour member warned,[39] a decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union could have brought down even De Valera. Traditional opposition had been overcome within all parties by the force of arguments about the trade possibilities that official inter-state relations promised. One further significant external factor was the common acceptance of Ireland's enhanced international role. The rotating presidency of the European Communities would devolve on Ireland in the first six months of 1975; combined with the developing practice of consultation in foreign policy matters, this would make Ireland the 'diplomatic spokesman' for the Nine during that period. It was therefore imperative that Ireland should fairly hastily update its diplomatic network to include the Soviet Union (and later other East European states and China).[40] It is indicative of the coincidence of party attitudes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia was the

36. The party conferences of 1919 and 1921 passed resolutions supporting the Bolshevik revolution (see Whyte, *op cit.*, p. 82), and in 1922 the party proposed famine relief payments and official trade relations with the infant Soviet Union (Rumpf and Hepburn, *op. cit.*, p. 64).

37 On issues such as the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the imprisonment of dissidents and perceived religious persecution, both the Labour Party and the trade union movement have competed with the two major parties for the role of leading critic of the Soviet government.

38 Patrick Keatinge, 'The Foreign Policy of the Irish Coalition Government', *The World Today*, Vol 29, No 8 (Aug. 1973), p. 344

39. See footnote 15.

40. We are grateful to Professor Patrick Keatinge for this point.

result of a policy initiated by a Fianna Fáil government and implemented by a coalition consisting of Fine Gael and Labour.

Issue-areas in Irish-Soviet relations

In our discussion of the developing public and political opinion, and the interest groups that have attempted to influence that opinion, we have noted in passing a number of specific areas that have engaged the attention of the public and the policy-makers in framing policy towards the Soviet Union. We conclude by examining three specific issue-areas:[41] independence and national identity; security, world order and justice; and national economic welfare.

Independence and national identity

Contact between the Irish independence movement and Russia predates the existence of both the Irish and the Soviet states. Many Irish revolutionary groups sought aid from Tsarist Russia whenever that country found itself in opposition to Britain. During the Crimean War, talks were held between John Mitchel, of the Young Ireland movement, and the Russian ambassador to the United States.[42] Similar contacts with the Tsar's representatives in the United States were made by Fenian and Irish-American groups during the Russo-Turkish, Boer and Russo-Japanese wars.[43] Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Brotherhood had closer contacts with the Bolsheviks, but these proved to be of little benefit to either side.[44] After the foundation of the Irish Free State, a number of republican delegations visited Moscow to seek arms from the Soviet government, but they returned empty-handed. More recently, in the 1970s, there has been some Soviet support for the Official Sinn Féin line on the Northern Irish question.[45]

These examples illustrate an important element in Russo-Irish and Soviet-Irish relations: contacts have been mediated by each side's interest in relations with Great Britain. The Russian and Soviet side has seen Irish subversive activity directed against Britain as of potential benefit in conflicts between Russian and British imperialism, or between socialist Russia and capitalist Britain. When Soviet policy turned in 1923-24 towards the pursuit of formal recognition and trade agreements with Britain, this finally put paid to any possible hope of an Irish-Soviet alliance.

41 The issue-area approach has been adapted from the approach of Keatinge: see his *A Place Among the Nations*, *op cit*

42 Alan J. Ward, *Ireland and Anglo-American Relations, 1899-1921* (London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 51

43 *Ibid* , pp 51-54, John Devoy, *Recollections* (Shannon. Irish University Press, 1969), pp. 399-400; see also the letters reproduced in William O'Brien and Desmond Ryan, eds, *Devoy's Post Bag, 1871-1928*, Vol 1 1871-80 (Dublin Fallon, 1948), pp. 209-12

44. See Patrick McCartan, *With De Valera in America* (Dublin. FitzPatrick, 1932), chs 1, 13, 23; Patrick McCartan, 'Recognition of the Irish Republic by the Russian Republic a Possibility in 1919', *The Kerryman*, Christmas number, 1938, reprinted in Sean Cronin, ed , *The McGarrity Papers* (Tralee. Anvil, 1972), pp 203-8.

45 See Wheeler, 'Soviet Interest in Ireland', *loc cit* , p 89.

On the Irish side, hopes have rested on the prospect of turning Russian and Soviet antipathy towards Britain into help for anti-British activities in Ireland;[46] it has never extended as far as espousal of the Bolsheviks' cause. The attitude of Irish revolutionaries to links with the Soviet Union is well summarised by Rumpf:

> The enthusiasm displayed for Soviet Russia was motivated less by real admiration of Communism than by the hope of finding a political and spiritual counterweight to use against the British connection.[47]

British-Soviet relations have also concerned Ireland in so far as they have reflected on Ireland's independence and separate identity since the foundation of the Irish Free State. In 1924, British recognition of the Soviet government provoked opposition from the Free State government because Dublin—like the other British dominions—was not consulted beforehand.[48] The Free State similarly objected to the provision in the Anglo-Soviet *modus vivendi* of 1929 for the extension of the terms of the agreement to any of the British dominions.[49] The Soviet application for membership of the League of Nations was an issue on which the Irish government's position received a good deal of publicity and De Valera's speeches in favour of Russian entry were partly an attempt to show that Ireland had a separate voice in international affairs.

Often, when Ireland's attitude went against the grain of the Western powers—as in its support of a debate on the representation of China at the United Nations—the Soviet Union supported the Irish position, and more widely Ireland's attempts to demonstrate its independence of the Western bloc were encouraged by Soviet representatives at the United Nations. And yet, the Soviet Union used its veto to block Irish membership in 1946, thereby preventing Ireland from manifesting its independence and separate identity in the most effective symbolic way available. Ireland's protestations of non-alignment and independence of the American camp were not regarded by the Soviet authorities as being sincere.[50]

In general, then, the Soviet Union has played only a minor direct part in Irish policies connected with the issues of independence and national identity. Indirectly, however, this issue-area has led to Irish military neutrality and thereby permitted Irish policy-makers on occasion to develop policies independent of those of Britain and the West. This has been well received by the Soviet Union, not because of any real interest in Ireland or even necessarily

46 See Ward, *op. cit.*, p 52.

47 Rumpf and Hepburn, *op cit.*, p 96.

48. David Harkness, *The Restless Dominion* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 68-69, 80.

49. The Free State government would have preferred the establishment of a Most-Favoured Nation arrangement, followed by a full commercial treaty with the Soviet Union, rather than being appended to a British agreement: see Harkness, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

50. Witness the 'horse-trading' that preceded Ireland's entry: see P. Lyon, *Neutralism* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 48; also Khrushchev's attitude to the candidature of Ireland's F. H Boland for the presidency of the General Assembly, as expressed in Strobe Talbott ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (London: André Deutsch, 1974), p. 470.

in the content of the policies themselves, but because Ireland appeared to be a dissenter in the Western camp, and hence worthy of encouragement. From the Irish viewpoint, however, the Soviet Union has not been of particular help in demonstrating Dublin's independence. And even if it were, the Irish government was not inclined to exploit the assistance of what it saw as the arch-enemy of the free world and of religious freedom.

Security, world order and justice

Issues of world order, security and justice have been important matters in Irish foreign policy. Despite its military neutrality, Ireland strongly identifies itself with the Western world, led by the United States, and desires that this group of nations should be strong and that the values which they uphold should prevail. This view is extended to the desire for a reduction in Soviet power and 'resistance to the spread of Communist power and influence'.[51] Such views are broadly supported by domestic opinion.

Nevertheless, Ireland wishes to maintain a stable world order and even perpetuate the status quo, especially the existing international economic order. International trade and foreign investment play such an important part in Irish economic activity that the country's international interests are served less by change than by continuity. In their time, both De Valera and FitzGerald demonstrated the subordination of ideals to realism in relation to the Soviet Union. Faced with the Soviet application to join the League of Nations in 1934, De Valera objected to Soviet treatment of religious believers, but supported Soviet entry since this would enhance European security.[52] Forty years later trade motivated Ireland in maintaining links with Russia; yet the Soviet Union's position as a world power, and the fact that 'Lesser powers must pay attention to their relations with Great Powers as the very condition of their survival',[53] are important factors. Indeed, in 1973 Garret FitzGerald proposed relations with the Soviet Union 'as one of the two world super-powers with whom Ireland, almost alone amongst the countries of the world, has no diplomatic contact'.[54] Hence, even if trade were to decline or disappear, the Irish government would most likely wish to continue diplomatic relations.

The issue of world order is, of course, linked with the issue of security. Ireland's non-participation in NATO implies no ambivalence in its perception of the world: on the contrary, it is firmly committed to the 'free world'. It has repeatedly been made clear that its neutrality is based on specific Anglo-Irish problems; there is no commitment to non-alignment in East-West relations. In an age of nuclear weapons, Ireland's security is bound up with that of the West, and specifically that of the British Isles. Ireland is no more amicably

51 Liam Cosgrave, quoted in Keatinge, *Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
52 De Valera, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-26.
53 Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 88.
54. Garret FitzGerald, *Irish Foreign Policy Text of Statement to Dáil Éireann, 9 May 1973* (Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1973), p. 6.

disposed towards the Warsaw Pact than are the members of NATO. Indeed, Ireland's traditional antipathy towards communism and any form of colonialism makes it even less favourable towards the Soviet Union than a number of NATO countries, and it opposes any weakening of American strength in relation to Russia's.

Ireland's relations with the Soviet Union are also affected by those of its foreign policy goals concerned with justice in the world. Irish foreign policy reflects a consciousness of the country's position as a small, weak state in a world dominated by large and powerful nations. A factor in its foreign policy is the tradition of anti-colonialism, itself a legacy of the nationalist rebellion that led to the creation of the independent Irish state. This gives the country's foreign policy a concern for the rights of other small nations and an interest in defending the principle of self-determination.

Hence, the expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and elsewhere—often by military or subversive means—has led to Russia's becoming identified as a colonial power, suppressing the rights of smaller and weaker states. Any increased Soviet influence or presence anywhere in the world is normally seen as aggression. In the cases of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ireland's foreign affairs spokesmen condemned Soviet activities, and, in the case of the Hungarian revolt, sought censure of the Soviet Union at the United Nations.[55] This attitude has also been present in Irish policy towards Soviet involvement in Africa and Asia, and in 1959 Ireland's position on the Chinese invasion of Tibet provoked a strong response at the United Nations from the Soviet delegation, then representing the interests of the Chinese People's Republic.[56] The concern in Irish foreign policy for religious and personal freedom abroad has led on a number of occasions to criticism of Soviet treatment of 'dissidents', and at the preparatory stages of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 'the Irish delegates were active in the discussion of the principle of religious freedom'.[57] Nevertheless, as the only neutral member of the EEC, Ireland may see for itself a special role in reducing East-West tension in Europe; however, in this area, 'the tradition of a simple, uncompromisingly hostile attitude towards communism could still prove an obstacle'.[58]

In general—especially since the country's entry into the EEC and the growth in the openness of the economy—there has been a certain conflict in Irish foreign policy between the interests of maintaining a stable world order and of change for the sake of universal justice. This has been reflected in a conflict between the sympathy felt for the smaller East European states (especially those with large Roman Catholic populations) and the need for trade

55 T. A. Mulkeen, 'Ireland at the UN', *Eire/Ireland*, Vol. 8, No 1 (Spring 1973), p 4.

56. The Soviet delegation said that Ireland was being 'used by the self-same imperialists against whom it had fought so gallantly': see O'Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

57. Keatinge, 'The Foreign Policy of the Irish Coalition Government', *loc. cit.*, p. 349.

58. Patrick Keatinge, 'Odd Man Out?: Irish Neutrality and European Security', *International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 1972), p. 448.

and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on a normal state-to-state basis.[59] In this, as in most other areas, a pragmatic realism has prevailed, with a major part played by economic considerations.

National economic welfare

Following the isolationist, autarkic policies of the 1930s and the enforced austerity of the Second World War years, Ireland has aimed at industrialising the country through an open trade policy and attracting foreign investment in industry; a fundamental aim has been to reduce the heavy dependence on the United Kingdom as a market for Irish products and as a source of Irish imports. This has involved the goals of product diversification, away from near-total reliance on agricultural and primary product exports towards including more industrial goods, and market diversification, facilitated by EEC membership, but pursued independently with regard to other areas of the world, including the Soviet bloc. A market completely unexploited by Irish exporters, the Soviet Union was also seen as a country whose penetration would also facilitate access to other socialist countries.

In consequence, since the early 1970s Irish governments have supported attempts to develop trade with the Soviet Union: in 1973, Garret FitzGerald made it clear that Ireland would 'pursue a policy of openness to non-members of the [European] Community, whether they be the neutral States of Europe, the U.S. or the Third World, or, indeed, the countries of Eastern Europe'.[60] Official diplomatic relations were a prerequisite for this and were established in 1973; in 1974 a trade agreement was signed. Although a trade imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union has ensued, the Irish government continues to take an interest in relations with Soviet trade organisations, and it negotiated a co-operation agreement when the original trade agreement was revoked under the terms of the EEC Common Commercial Policy, adopted in 1975. The Irish government has sought to make use of the Moscow embassy in developing the level of trade, and a representative of Córas Tráchtála (CTT) has acted as Commercial Counsellor since 1975. CTT has played an important part in executing government policy towards the Soviet Union, stressing commercial and trade links rather than cultural exchange or political co-ordination.

As far as expanding Irish exports to the Soviet Union is concerned, there has been only limited success.[61] Agricultural products—EEC intervention beef and butter in particular—have occupied a major position, while the industrial exports are produced mainly by foreign-owned companies with manufacturing plants in Ireland. Many of these companies are American-based, adding a further dimension to Irish-Soviet relations, in view of Washington's policies on trade in 'strategic' goods: the expansion of Irish-Soviet trade might be

59 This conflict was noted by FitzGerald immediately before the establishment of relations in 1973: see FitzGerald, *Irish Foreign Policy*, pp. 5-7.

60 *Ibid.*, p. 5

61 In 1980, for the first time, there was a trade balance in Ireland's favour.

vulnerable to any tightening of American restrictions—say, in the field of computers and microprocessors, into which Ireland has moved rapidly in the past five years or so.

Turning to imports, we find that fuel has become increasingly important, in terms both of its value as a proportion of all Irish imports, and also its relative scarcity as a resource coupled with the need for secure and adequate supplies. While oil imports from the Soviet Union were worth only about 1 per cent of all Irish imports in the late 1970s, that figure covered over 5 per cent of the country's imports of mineral fuels, at a time of general difficulty in maintaining a steady and reliable flow of fuel into the country. In this field, the 'risk' of dependence on supplies from an ideological and political opponent is outweighed in practice by the need to develop Ireland's economy, using energy from practically any source. However, there is doubt about the Soviet Union's capacity to fulfil any further demand on the Irish side in the future: already fuel production has reached a limit that can be surpassed only by technological innovation, while Soviet domestic demand rises rapidly, as does that of Russia's Eastern European allies—surely higher than Ireland on the list of priorities for any spare Soviet oil.[62] For the moment, however, the needs of Ireland's economic welfare are partially satisfied through trade with the Soviet Union, with whom normal state-to-state relations rather than ideology form the backdrop to mutually beneficial commercial contacts.

Conclusion

Irish-Soviet relations have undergone significant changes since the two states were created. The initial common interest of two revolutionary, anti-imperialist regimes quickly gave way to indifference as each pursued its own interest in securing international recognition and consolidating its authority at home. Other factors also reinforced the lack of contact, particularly (in Ireland) strong religious sentiments against atheistic communism represented by the Soviet Union; Ireland's military neutrality in the Second World War confirmed the lack of contact.

From the mid-1950s, having in 1949 severed its last constitutional links with Great Britain, the newly declared Republic of Ireland embarked on a process of industrial modernisation that has brought profound social and attitudinal changes in its wake. Rapid industrial expansion has created a need for fresh markets for the products of the economy and a demand for increasing supplies of energy and raw materials. This has further necessitated a more active role in international trade and international affairs generally, leading to an increasing measure of national self-confidence and a greater awareness of the outside world—including those parts of it traditionally remote from the Irish consciousness. A growing concern for economic welfare has implied also a

62 A recent examination of the Soviet oil supply industry is Marshall I. Goldman, *The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum. Half-Empty or Half-Full?* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980)

measure of secularisation, reflected in particular in a willingness to set aside moral and religious scruples that hitherto prevented any links with the socialist countries.

The Irish government today, reflecting popular aspirations, is committed to maximising national welfare. Because overseas trade is so important to the Irish economy, the further pursuit of this national goal has become the most important consideration in Irish foreign policy. The Soviet Union serves that policy as a market for expanding Irish exports, and also as a source of oil to help fuel the country's continued economic growth. The search for new markets has thus been the primary visible motivation in the Irish government's policies towards the Soviet Union.

OPEC'S DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE THIRD WORLD

Paul Hallwood and Stuart Sinclair *

THE publication, in 1980, of the report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into Development Issues—better known as the Brandt Report—firmly identifies the members of OPEC, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, as part of the 'Southern' or 'developing' world. In so doing, the report implicitly accepts the judgment on this question of OPEC itself. For no theme emerges so consistently from the public pronouncements of OPEC (the secretariat and the various aid agencies) as that which stresses the consistency of interest and unity of purpose between OPEC and the non-oil exporting developing countries. References to OPEC being 'full members of the Third World'[1] and 'a pioneering group of developing countries'[2] pepper OPEC press statements. But what justification is there for this? To what extent are there in practice conflicts of interest between OPEC members and non-oil less developed countries (LDCs)? And over what issues? Furthermore, what weight would the considerations of the non-oil LDCs' problems assume in OPEC's policy deliberations?

In clarifying and going some way towards answering these questions, this article attempts to outline the evolution of OPEC's relations with the rest of the Third World. It begins with a brief review of the state of relations between OPEC members and non-oil LDCs immediately prior to the announcement of the oil price increases of 1973. It then traces the strains which developed in that relationship as the non-oil LDCs began to experience certain types of economic dislocation in the mid-1970s, and then goes on to analyse the responses which these problems prompted from OPEC. This leads finally to an appraisal of the extent of the consistency of interests between the two groups of countries and a discussion of the likely course of developments between the two in the 1980s.

Early illusions of OPEC–Third World solidarity

The announcement of the Shah of Iran, on December 23, 1973, that

* Paul Hallwood is a lecturer in Political Economy at the University of Aberdeen. Stuart Sinclair, previously with the University of Reading, is now with a multinational company in London. Together they have published *Oil, Debt and Development OPEC in the Third World* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981). They have also published several papers dealing with aspects of the international oil industry.

1. A. A. Al-Anbari, President of the Iraqi Fund for External Development, at OPEC Headquarters, Aug. 1980. Quoted in *OPEC Bulletin*, Sept. 1980, p. 14.

2 Address of Rene Ortiz to UNCTAD V, May 1979, *OPEC Press Release*, 1979.

henceforth a barrel of light crude oil would sell for $11.65 rather than $5.04—the price which had prevailed since October—came as a considerable and unpleasant shock to oil consumers. Immediate reaction was intemperate, with references to an 'explosion in north-south economic relations'[3] and the assertion that 'a critical turning-point in history'[4] had been reached with the prospects for the Third World irremediably worsened. Rather than have such reaction stand unchallenged, however, certain OPEC member states swiftly took up the diplomatic initiative and attempted to turn the perceived disaster into an opportunity. In particular, the Algerian government, which had lately instituted a new and busy foreign policy, was keen to have OPEC's action seen as part of the effort to establish some form of 'new international economic order'. At the sixth special session of the United Nations, hastily convened at the behest of such nations as Algeria, no opportunity was lost to pose the issue in this light. With United Nations secretary general Kurt Waldheim calling the session 'a timely and opportune initiative' by President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, it appeared that any problems anticipated to arise from the oil price rise could be submerged in talk of a new world order. Similarly, at the first Conference of Sovereigns and Heads of State of OPEC member countries, held in Algiers in March 1975, the Algerian memorandum spoke of the oil price rises as advantageous to the entire Third World, and as 'a practical illustration of what the developing world can do'.

Although most observers appeared unimpressed by these claims, there was already some substance behind the rhetoric. The Venezuelan government, with the enhanced scope allowed it by domestic stability after years of upheaval, felt a shared interest with those countries which had as yet not succeeded in wresting control over their own mineral wealth. The Caribbean Development Bank received extra Venezuelan financing very shortly after the oil price rises, while elsewhere among OPEC members, Nigeria was the first to implement—albeit diffidently—an oil-price discount scheme to neighbouring oil-importing countries. Up to 3 per cent of Nigeria's crude oil exports were soon being received by other West African States; the formation of the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS) was hastened by this gesture of goodwill.

While, as will shortly be seen, to some extent these measures could be seen as early and hasty efforts at marshalling some defence against the industrial countries' criticisms of OPEC, they also reflected the prolonged effort to foster a greater degree of unity among Third World countries. One of the oldest of such efforts was the Afro-Arab impulse. For several years prior to 1974, the Middle Eastern OPEC states had been attempting to consolidate the alliance they had forged with a number of black African states, having induced them away from earlier commitments to Israeli aid and technical assistance. This

3. R. N. Gardner *et al.*, 'A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations', in *Trilateral Commission, Task Force Report* (New York: New York University Press, 1977).

4. Trilateral Commission, *ibid.*

manoeuvre went some way to fulfilling the long-standing aspirations of the pan-Africanists and pan-Arabists such as Gamal Nasser, Julius Nyerere and Sekou Touré. Having had little success in achieving their rather vaguely formulated desires for closer ties between African and Arab states at the Accra Conference of 1958 or the Addis Ababa conference five years later, these statesmen found everything coming together rapidly. As Ali Mazrui observed, 'never in modern history did there seem to be as much solidarity between Arab Africans and black Africans as there emerged . . . in the course of 1972 and 1973'.[5]

These, then, were the political relationships put in question in late 1973 when the oil price was raised in a sequence of three steps in June, October and December.

Growing disillusion among non-oil LDCs

Strains were not long delayed. This 'political shrinking of the Sahara' as Mazrui so judiciously put it,[6] first encountered difficulty at the Organisation of African Unity meeting of late 1973 at which ministers from Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania requested concessional oil prices. This request, the first of several as it was to turn out, was rejected, but notwithstanding that rejection the OPEC aid effort began, with a $200 million funding, immediately afterwards. At the Arab summit in Algeria two aid agencies, the Arab Fund and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, were instituted to begin disbursing this aid. Similar tensions were visible at an African Conference in September 1975, with the Tanzanian Minister of Commerce accusing OPEC of having 'turned their backs on the developing countries, particularly the least developed'.[7] Elsewhere on the continent, President Mobutu of Zaire was reportedly even ready to restore relations with Israel. An effort was made to put the OPEC-African relationship on a new footing at the Afro-Arab summit of March 1977. Held in Cairo and attended by twenty-one Arab representatives and thirty-nine Africans, this meeting heard many appeals to unity. But still, the intentions of goodwill and intended munificence so frequently voiced failed to find a suitable vehicle.

By 1979 tensions had become still more marked and more coherent in form. At the fifth session of UNCTAD in Manila in May, Costa Rica was instrumental in organising a lobby calling itself OPIC, the Organization of Petroleum Importing Countries. At the same meeting a Colombian delegate called for oil to be put on to the agenda after it had been excluded by OPEC members. OPIC members argued that Venezuela, as the OPEC state closest to its members, should sell crude oil at concessional prices to its poorer Central American and Caribbean neighbours. Venezuelan ministers had in fact long

5 A. A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations* (London: Heinemann, 1977), p. 145.
6. Mazrui, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
7. *New African Development*, Feb. 1977, p. 117.

been calling for more OPEC aid, suggesting that its scope be extended so that others than Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti in that part of the world would be recipients. Indeed, the Venezuelan Energy Minister had made a two-week tour of North Africa and the Middle East seeking support, or at least attention, for his ideas earlier in 1979.

In the event, the Iraqi deputy trade minister proposed a new fund to compensate the poorest oil importing nations, but the idea was felt to lack conviction. A characteristically robust retort came some five weeks later from the OPEC meeting in Geneva on June 26–28 when it was recommended that its member governments supplement the OPEC Special Fund by $800 million. Apart from this they proposed that a permanent OPEC and OECD fund to compensate LDCs for the rising prices of both oil and manufactured goods to be instigated. A communiqué then reiterated the fundamental OPEC position—by now familiar—that no dialogue on energy issues could be entertained unless it also embraced a more comprehensive discussion of all North-South development matters. Nor did the Special Fund's announcement of a few days earlier—that a selection of non-Arab African countries (including Cameroon, Lesotho, Mali, and Zambia) were to share in a further $38.5 million of project assistance—assuage disappointment in Third World capitals.

By the end of the 1970s then, many Third World governments were increasingly asking whether the burgeoning—if arbitrary—aid they had begun receiving was sufficient compensation for the oil price rises they supported—implicitly or explicitly—at so many international conferences.

The obvious question which arises here is: to what extent was this disillusion justified? The 1970s had opened to witness growing alignment between Arab countries hitherto on the periphery of Third World institutions and councils; they were, seemingly, finishing with widespread ill-feeling, suspicion and not a little jealousy. How far, indeed, had the talk of new economic orders, of Third World solidarity, and of OPEC having blazed a trail for others to follow, been vacuous? Were there still reasons for believing that something could be accomplished in the next decade? The following section begins to analyse these questions.

Oil prices, debt and economic performance

In order to understand the legitimacy or otherwise of the objections from Third World governments to OPEC policy it is necessary to review briefly the nature and extent of the economic impact of OPEC oil price decisions upon the non-oil LDCs. This is itself no small question: determining the criteria by which this should be judged is difficult, as is judging the relative impact of the industrialised countries' policy actions as against OPEC's. However, the main economic consequences of OPEC price policy can be considered with reference to five subjects: the terms of trade between oil prices and the non-oil LDCs' export prices; the non-oil LDCs' growing foreign payments deficits and debt

growth; the growth of OPEC trade with the rest of the Third World; the evolution of the OPEC foreign aid effort; and, finally, through an examination of the rates of economic growth experienced in the Third World after 1973.

The terms of trade (any one of several possible ratios between export and import prices) has for long featured as a central issue in the North-South debate because it largely determines the distribution of benefits between trading partners. Such writers as Prebisch and Singer[8] have pointed to the dependency of Southern economies upon Northern industrial countries and particularly to the alleged long-run deterioration of the South's terms of trade. The latter, essentially an empirical question, has been subjected to close scrutiny and found to be wanting. To the extent that there is a systematic relationship in the South's terms of trade with the North, the evidence suggests it is cyclical rather than secular in its rhythm.[9] In any case, comparing international price relationships between just two trading blocs is far too aggregative to allow useful conclusions to be drawn as it obscures important details. As far as OPEC is concerned, when the organisation took control of oil prices from the oil companies in the early 1970s (the 1971 Tehran agreement between OPEC and the companies marking the watershed), it not only changed the nature of the members' economic relationships with the North, but clearly with the non-oil LDCs also.

The statistical facts can be stated quite simply. In the third quarter of 1973 the price of primary commodities (as measured by *The Economist's* dollar index) relative to crude oil (Arabian 34° light) stood at the decade's peak of 136 (1970 = 100). By the following quarter this terms of trade index had fallen to 83, and in 1974 (I), it had tumbled much further—to 37. In all, it was down 73 per cent in just three months. This remarkable shift in the relative prices of the two groups of traded commodities has persisted, and has even deepened with the second oil 'shock' of 1979 serving to compress the price of primary commodities relative to oil even further.

Clearly, OPEC members now have a degree of control over their export prices that is denied to the non-oil exporting LDCs. Furthermore, the success of OPEC in controlling oil prices and production was not only a shock for industrial countries, it also created new relationships within the developing world. Indeed, a new 'centre-periphery' relationship (to use Prebisch's terminology) has, to some extent, now arisen. The OPEC members manage and try to optimise oil prices within the confines of existing economic and, especially, political constraints, while the non-oil LDCs are left with little countervailing power as far as their export prices are concerned. Moreover, to the extent that OPEC's price policies have weakened the economic performance of the industrial countries (a matter upon which opinion is still

8. R. Prebisch, 'Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries', *American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceedings, 1967.

9 For example, Paul Hallwood, *Stabilization of International Commodity Markets* (Greenwich, CT.: JAI Press, 1979), pp. 19–28.

divided) the non-oil LDCs have indirectly suffered from the loss of dynamism in their Northern markets.

Fortunately, however, some non-oil LDCs have been able rapidly to increase their exports of goods and services to OPEC members and so partly mitigate the effects of higher oil prices. Traditional primary commodities as well as manufactures have been exported in greater volume as have exports of services such as those provided by civil engineering contractors, consultants and migrant workers. Six years after the 1973 oil shock the LDCs as a group were exporting close to $10 billion worth more goods to the OPEC countries than they were in 1973. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the two OPEC members which increased their imports from non-oil LDCs the most rapidly—at over 50 per cent, per annum, during the 1973-79 period—while all the other OPEC members had high import growth rates of over 20 per cent, per annum. However, it is apparent that only a few non-oil LDCs have succeeded in penetrating to any significant extent the rapidly expanding OPEC members' markets. Thus only thirteen non-oil LDCs (most prominent being South Korea, India, Taiwan, Brazil, Hong Kong and Singapore) accounted for about 90 per cent of OPEC's growing imports from the Third World during this period. Indeed, such was their exporting success that nine or ten of OPEC's biggest LDC trade partners had by 1978 actually improved their export/import ratio with the OPEC members. But then again, few of even the dynamic non-oil LDC trade partners have ever had surpluses on their trade accounts with OPEC countries, and the situation is much worse for the mass of non-oil LDCs.

There is a degree of concentration similar to that in exports amongst LDC suppliers of labour to OPEC members (mainly those labour-scarce members in the Middle East). In fact, other Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, South and North Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, have sent the largest numbers of workers and have benefited most substantially from workers' remittances of wages. Outside the Arab world other large labour-sending countries are Pakistan, India and the Philippines. It remains an open question, however, whether remittances are always sufficiently large to offset those costs associated with the loss of the labourers' services in their home countries—especially when skilled labour is involved. Thus not too much should be read in to recorded international remittance flows without fuller examination of the off-setting costs involved in some cases.

While some non-oil LDCs were in these ways eventually able to derive some benefits from OPEC's growing wealth and so partially mitigate the effects of higher oil prices, for the non-oil LDCs as a whole, higher oil prices immediately worsened their foreign accounts. For in 1974 their aggregate current account deficit was multiplied by a factor of four, compared with the previous year, to $24 billion. It was never again to fall below $20 billion and reached $97 billion in 1981. The importance of high oil prices to the non-oil LDCs' payments deficits can be more easily judged from the fact that of an aggregate

merchandise account deficit with the world of $280 billion over the 1974-80 period, about two-thirds was with the thirteen members of OPEC. Indeed, in three of the last four years of the 1970s, three-quarters of the non-oil LDCs' deficits were with OPEC members. Alternatively, looked at another way, in 1972 only Brazil amongst non-oil LDCs allotted more than 10 per cent of its total import bill to oil. Just two years later, twenty-one did so—a figure which was to rise further over the next seven years.

Thus, most of the deterioration in the non-oil LDCs' foreign payments balances after 1973 can be explained by developments in their foreign trade with the oil exporting countries. Further examination of the matter by the authors rules out other possible systematic influences.[10] Since 1973 there has been no permanent deterioration in the price of primary commodities relative to manufactures; export performance in the non-oil LDCs taken as a group held up well in the late 1970s as the real value of exports (nominal export values deflated by the IMF's industrial countries' export price index) recovered after 1975 returning to the 1961-78 trend levels; and nor can explosive real import growth be considered as a general contributory factor, for, following the 1973 oil shock, the real value of the non-oil LDCs' imports were at or below the long-term trend levels.

Foreign aid has been given by OPEC states on a large scale in recent years and it might be thought to have gone a long way in helping to finance the non-oil LDCs' payments deficits. However, this is not the case. A fuller analysis of the political dimensions of OPEC aid and its importance to OPEC's relations with the non-oil LDCs appears in the fifth section of this analysis. However, since the dimension of this aid is relevant in the context of the financing of the non-oil LDCs' payments deficits, some observations on the matter ought to be made here. A comparison of the non-oil LDCs' trade deficits with receipts of foreign aid from OPEC shows that compensation is far from complete—with, in the 1974-77 period, only about 28 per cent of the aggregate deficit being financed by OPEC aid. Since then, the level of OPEC aid has not increased significantly. Useful insights into the relationship between OPEC aid and the non-oil LDCs' oil imports costs can also be made if oil prices are 'index linked' to OPEC import price inflation so as to take account of OPEC's claim that oil prices were adjusted in 1973 only to account for inflation over the previous ten years or so. A reasonably objective assessment can be made by constructing a series of notional oil prices. These are prices which would have been obtained during 1973-79 had the crude oil price (Arabian 34° light) been linked to primary product prices (*The Economist*'s dollar index) ever since 1960. On this basis, during 1973-79 Arabian 34° light cost some $7 to $8 per barrel more than its 'index linked' level. (This is also true if crude oil prices had been linked to industrial countries' export or consumer goods prices.) At an extra $8 per barrel in the four years after the 1973 oil shock, then, the non-oil LDCs

10. Paul Hallwood and Stuart Sinclair, *Oil, Debt and Development: OPEC in the Third World* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 82-83.

spent some $38 billion on imported crude oil more than if prices had kept to the indexed value. At a notional $6 per barrel extra cost, they spent $28 billion more. OPEC aid disbursements during this period amounted to a little over $20 billion. However, this aid was very heavily concentrated upon just a few recipients so that only a few countries could use it to offset their higher oil import bills. In fact, just six countries (Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Jordan, India, and North Yemen) received 70 per cent of aid disbursements from the OPEC members during the 1973-77 period; ten received 80 per cent of the total; and of the largest twenty recipients of OPEC aid disbursements (87 per cent of the total) nineteen were Muslim countries.

Accordingly, the foreign debts of most non-oil LDCs (of which ten account for about two-thirds of the total) have had to be largely financed from other aid sources and, more particularly, by the international banking system. For between 1974 and 1980 the outstanding foreign debts of the non-oil LDCs owed to private creditors increased from 29 per cent to over 40 per cent of the total. According to World Bank statistics the non-oil LDCs' foreign debts are now increasing at a rate of over 20 per cent per annum and, by the end of 1981 had reached some $400 billion. Even by 1978 the external debt outstanding of the largest twenty non-oil LDCs[11] amounted to 25 per cent of their combined GDPs when it has been only 19 per cent in 1973.[12] These debts are proving to be worrisome not only to the borrowers themselves but also to their creditors, and it has been questioned whether financing on such a scale can continue through the existing institutional framework.

The worsening foreign exchange constraint and growing burden of foreign debts upon the non-oil LDCs has contributed to an apparent break in their aggregate average rate of economic growth. Thus, in the six years prior to 1973 the aggregate growth rate of real GDP averaged 6 per cent, per annum. Subsequently, it has fallen to average some one-and-a-half percentage points less than this (even this is a performance somewhat better than that achieved by the industrial countries). There is also some evidence to show that the jolt of the first oil shock increased the degree of economic instability in the non-oil LDCs. 'Economic instability' can be measured as the average proportionate deviation of GNP from a long-term constant growth rate trend. Using this measure, then for a sample of twenty-four non-OPEC LDCs, the average annual coefficient of variation increased from 0·91 during 1967-72 to 1·01 during 1974-78.[13]

However, while the foregoing account of the economic impact of oil price rises upon the non-oil LDCs shows that deleterious trends were indeed instituted and old problems exacerbated, it is inappropriate to talk of an 'unmitigated disaster for many of the LDCs' as was predicted in 1974 in

11. Ranked by the size of their GNPs.
12. Morgan Guaranty Trust, *World Financial Markets* (May 1979), p 8
13. Hallwood and Sinclair, *op cit*, Table 9 4. The post-1974 sample is less than twenty-four countries owing to lack of data availability

certain quarters.[14] Oil imports and economic growth were to a large extent financed by an increase in foreign debt.

OPEC initiatives in the 1970s

It is instructive to note that immediately after 1973, the OPEC members' responses to complaints from oil-importing LDCs were to a large extent *ad hoc*. Few coherent arguments had been developed: the sophisticated public affairs and information systems which would later characterise the secretariat's operations in Vienna had yet to be organised. A common theme in debate was nonetheless beginning to emerge, and this was the argument that OPEC's actions would shortly serve as a prototype for other groups of primary commodity exporting countries. There was much discussion along these lines at the CIEC, or, North-South dialogue, in Paris. Indeed, this idea has still not completely disappeared, and as late as 1980 OAPEC ex-assistant secretary-general, Fadhill al-Chalabi, wrote that, in addition to OPEC's price action having 'effectively strengthened inter-third world solidarity' it had created 'a model for correcting the prices of other raw materials'.[15] Similarly, speaking in 1980 at OPEC in Vienna, H. E. Abdul Amir al-Anbari of Iraq argued that OPEC remains 'a model and . . . pioneering group of developing countries', whose success 'is not necessarily because of the nature of the commodity'.[16]

The lack of substance in these propositions has, however, become evident during the 1970s. For in no other raw material has a comparable cartel been established. Many primary commodities are still priced on free international markets which are, from time to time, subjected to severe fluctuations in demand from both speculative and final user sources. Sometimes primary commodity export prices are agreed on long-term contracts between host countries and multinational corporations and very often it is the latter who have the upper hand in the negotiations over prices. No group of primary producers has been as successful as the OPEC members in acquiring control of their primary product exports from the foreign corporations, yet this is a necessary step in the creation of a successful cartel. As is clear by now, economic fundamentals are also unfavourable for producer country cartelisation, in that industrial country importers have open to them many substitution possibilities which amount to a form of countervailing power against producer country cartels should they be established.

It is significant, however, that no OPEC member has been involved with any scheme to invest surplus funds in other Third World commodity cartels. A minor exception to this was Venezuela's participation in the Bogota Fund group of Latin and Central American coffee producers, who for a time tried to influence prices by intervening in the coffee futures markets. However, even

14. R. M. Dunn, 'The Less Developed Countries', in Z. A. Yager and E. B. Steinberger (eds), *Energy and US Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass : Ballinger, 1974), p 193.

15. F.al-Chalabi, *OPEC and the International Oil Industry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

16 *OPEC Bulletin*, Sept. 1980, pp 14, 17.

this was more a defensive scheme to support a weak market than anything else. The closest OPEC members have come to assisting other raw material producers' aspirations has been their support for the various commodity buffer stocks that are planned in the UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodities. But this is now becalmed for lack of finance, although the OPEC Special Fund did offer $100 million—which was somewhat greater than the members' pro rata share.[17]

There are two main reasons why OPEC members have not wished to further other Third World commodity cartels by providing financial support, although sometimes moral support has been forthcoming. The first reason is the wish to avoid further heightening tensions between OPEC and industrial countries—a factor which remains of importance even in the determination of oil prices, especially on the part of the Western-leaning Gulf states. Secondly, as is argued later, the OPEC members have alternative means of progressing in the major political, economic and military spheres of importance to them other than through the rather blunt instrument of 'Third World solidarity' purchased through this channel. Besides, since successful Third World commodity cartels are likely to be possible in relatively few markets, even with considerable OPEC financial support, the uneven geographical distribution of the benefits consequent upon that support is likely to be, at most, of only minor diplomatic advantage to OPEC members.

Support of the nature actually given illustrates how the grounds of the debate into which OPEC has felt itself being drawn have altered since 1973. For, rather than arguing, as was initially the case, that OPEC's actions could be replicated for other primary commodities, and could thus be seen as to the benefit of the un-industrialised countries generally, OPEC tends now to argue that its own wealth, while created in a manner not replicable among other groups of raw material exporters, can nonetheless still be to the benefit of the LDCs. This benefit could be realised both through the aid effort and by using the threat of oil supply interruptions to widen and deepen the set of negotiable issues between the industrialised world and the rest. This second proposition is both more and less ambitious than the first. It is less ambitious in so far as it replaces fairly clear and measurable objectives—helping foster successful and operational cartels in other raw material markets—with more ethereal objectives whose degree of success is intrinsically hard to measure. This is clear. But the new proposal, to use whatever power OPEC can muster to assist the rest of the world, is, by dint of its less parochial sweep, also more ambitious. Thus, writing of the problems caused by the stockpiling policies of industrialised countries in upsetting oil prices during 1979 and 1980, Fadhill al-Chalabi forewarned that 'OPEC is prepared to use its ability to counter such moves'.[18] Similarly, on a different plane, René Ortiz, OPEC Secretary General, has proposed that 'OPEC can act as a moderating political force and as a

17 OPEC, *Annual Report 1979*, Vienna, p. 14

18 Editorial, *OPEC Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1980, p. iv.

catalyst in achieving an 'equitable interdependence' between developing countries, including OPEC countries, and the industrialised nations'.[19]

This idea of a new OPEC initiative on aid, rather than commodity market intervention, is an attractive one. From initially modest beginnings OPEC aid blossomed in the mid-1970s only to stagnate for lack of clear political direction later in the decade. The proposals of the Committee on Long Term Strategy (the Yamani Report) have tried to remedy this but it has itself been shelved for various reasons. OPEC's aid has been mainly channelled bilaterally, but with a trend towards multilateralism as a plethora of OPEC and Arab aid agencies have sprung up. Despite the heavy geographic concentration of Arab aid pointed to above, it has been largely given on an equitable basis, mainly because many Muslim country recipients are among the poorest in the world. Poor Muslim countries, especially in North Africa, have received more OPEC aid as a proportion of either per capita income or increased oil import bills than have the better off LDCs such as the so-called newly industrialising countries. Even so only eight countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria) have received more OPEC aid than they have paid out for higher priced oil.[20]

The marked geographic concentration of OPEC aid, together with policy statements, suggests that political motivation has been a major factor behind most of the Arab countries' aid programmes. All the Arab foreign aid donors, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Iraq, and Libya, have used their financial resources to aid the so-called 'front line' states against Israel. Other Arab states have benefitted from acts of Arab solidarity. Regional security has been another important motivating factor behind Arab aid. For example, Saudi Arabia has given aid to Somalia, North Yemen, and Oman in an attempt to counter Soviet influence. And, of course, Saudi Arabia in particular and other Arab aid donors have used aid in support of ideological and religious causes, especially the strengthening of Islam, both in Arab and in 'fringe' Muslim countries.

Despite the new thrust of the OPEC effort being partly dependent upon improved aid flows, however, OPEC—or, more precisely, the OPEC Special Fund for International Development—has marshalled two arguments which point to certain constraints on the capacity and willingness of OPEC to provide further aid. The first is that OPEC aid does not come from 'renewable annual income', as Director-General Ibrahim Shihata put it recently[21] and that, given this, OPEC's ability to offer aid is necessarily less than that of industrialised countries.

The second argument used now to defend OPEC against charges of an inadequate aid record (such as was suggested by Chancellor Schmidt at the opening of the eleventh world energy conference in Munich in September

19 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
20. Hallwood and Sinclair, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–28.
21. *Financial Times*, July 17, 1980.

1980) is that, irrespective of the weight of the first argument, OPEC need feel in no respect duty bound to offer aid to crude oil consumers. This is since no other raw material producers do: as Shihata put it 'the principle of compensation [has not] been invoked in respect of any other commodity'.[22]

In essence, the position of OPEC spokesmen is that the present imperfect world economic system is one largely fashioned by the agencies of the industrialised north. All OPEC members can hope to do is to try, probably at the margin, to redress the balance of advantage. This echoes arguments put forward about the fundamental inequity of the system at the Islamic Council of Europe conference of 1978. There, 'the oil weapon was not forged by the Arabs: it was forged by Gulf, Shell and B.P.'[21] was a leitmotif in the speeches.

This sentiment well illustrates the thinking of the major OPEC donors throughout the 1970s. On the one hand they were anxious to be seen mitigating the worst consequences of the oil price rises for certain LDCs—with their priorities between those LDCs depending on their strategic value and a shared religion as much as anything else. On the other hand the aid donors resisted having this aid seen, by recipient country governments or by industrial country governments, as 'conscience money'. Instead it was persistently described by the donors as payment *ex gratia*, and, moreover, the type of payment long overdue from the industrial countries as well.

The next few years: barriers to unity

The preceding sections have sketched out the ways in which relations between the thirteen OPEC member states and the non-oil LDCs unfolded in the 1970s. Above all it has been apparent that while certain interests were shared by both sets of countries, strong elements of antagonism also persisted in their relationship. It remains to pull together these observations to generate some insights into the likely development of these relations in the 1980s.

Two sets of issues which arise from the foregoing discussion will predominantly determine the future course of these relations. The first is the degree to which the non-oil LDCs' interests will come to assume more significant weight in decisions arrived at by OPEC members and thus affect oil and aid policy in the future. The second is the question of what sort of OPEC it is which claims to have a serious interest in the evolution of some form of new international economic order.

Given the efforts expended by OPEC member states, both individually and acting together through their various new agencies, at enhancing relations with non-oil LDCs, might one expect the 1980s to be characterised by greater harmony between the two groups? There are three answers to the question.

First, one must consider what interests OPEC truly has in securing approval or ratification elsewhere in the Third World. In the mid-1970s most observers

22. *Financial Times, loc. cit*

23. Islamic Council of Europe, *The Muslim World and Future Economic Order* (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1979).

believed these interests were considerable, chiefly for reasons of the Gulf rulers' internal insecurity. Thus, it was commonly argued that in order to protect their own position as privileged elites in a sea of resentful poverty, Gulf rulers in OPEC would have to be seen providing largesse for the poor in other countries. Only in this way could the anachronistic rulers hope to retain power. Since then this view has lost adherents—not least because the demise of the Peacock Throne in Iran occurred despite a large programme of foreign aid and treaty links with some non-oil Muslim countries.

A variant of the argument that 'Third World solidarity' would flourish other than at the level of mere rhetoric was that OPEC states, again particularly those in the Middle East, could not afford to jeopardise their new-found allies among the rest of the Third World because as large an anti-Israel vote as possible was needed in the United Nations. Moreover, support for OPEC actions in the conferences of the United Nations specialised agencies such as UNCTAD was valuable in so far as it tended to force the industrial countries into taking the initiative in offering enhanced development proposals. Thus, it could appear that it was up to the industrial countries' representatives to propose new forms of relief for the Third World generally rather than being up to OPEC states to offer recompense for their Third World compatriots.

The evidence against this hypothesis of evolving OPEC-Third World relations is, however, mounting. Above all, it is increasingly likely that it is not votes in the United Nations which will eventually yield some form of Palestinian homeland so much as the momentum of ideas and heightened fears of interruptions in oil supplies arising from the tensions set up by shifting allegiances around the 'front line' states. The evident interest of the EEC foreign ministers—as well as the Israeli Labour Party—in the principle of a Palestinian state has become vastly more important to Arab OPEC members than the fractured and uncertain commitment to that objective they could hope to obtain from elsewhere in the Third World.

A second factor which tends to confirm the erosion of the non-oil LDCs' governments' influence over OPEC members is the changing nature of international trade in crude oil. After the nationalisation of the multinational oil majors by certain oil-exporting countries, and the reduction of the companies' autonomy in others (processes intrinsic to the development of OPEC, of course) it was inevitable that crude oil trade would be to an increasing degree politicised. That politicisation is apparent in such decisions as that of Saudi Arabia to suspend crude shipments to Italy in late 1980 pending the clarification of government scandals. Similarly, the Nigerian authorities have threatened more than once to curtail crude supplies to companies whose affiliates are suspected of on-trading to South Africa. Another reflection of the intensified use of oil as a lever is the increasing frequency with which 'incentive crude' is made available to companies (or, more typically, state trading companies closely tied to their governments) investing in oil-related infrastructure. Japanese and British firms and consortia

from the Far East are now guaranteed a certain volume of crude oil per day commensurate with the size of their commitment to a new refinery, petrochemicals plant or similar projects.

An impression of the extent of oil-producer country governments' stake in crude oil sales can be obtained from estimates made by the International Energy Agency. In 1970 it is estimated that OPEC producer entitlement was 2 per cent of total OPEC output. By 1973 that share had grown to 20 per cent and by 1979 to 80 per cent. As for importing countries, it is estimated that for non-oil LDCs in aggregate, 32 per cent and 45 per cent of crude imports in 1978 and 1979 respectively arrived through government bilateral agreements. (In Europe, by comparison, the percentages were 12 per cent and 18 per cent in the same two years.)[24]

To the extent that bilateral state trading grows, OPEC members' oil agencies involve themselves more deeply in the distribution of crude (and refined products) and incentive crude contracts spread, then OPEC members will clearly be expanding the policy instruments at their disposal. M. Ait-Laossine, previously of Sonatrach, put it thus at the 1980 Oxford energy seminar:

> The price of oil will less and less be expressed in terms of cash and more and more in terms of resource transfers, of technology as well as hardware. This non-commercial aspect of oil trade will inevitably lead to a further restructuring of the traditional supply channels than we have seen so far.[25]

What these trends point to for developing country statesmen, then, is an increasingly ambitious and imaginative use of crude oil in international affairs—an extension of the diplomat's armoury not foreseen twenty years ago. This enlarged authority of OPEC member governments over oil-importing governments' actions (in some areas at least) points again to a greater degree of tension in OPEC relations with the Third World.

Although security of crude oil supply is coming to acquire a position of some importance—almost a primary objective of foreign policy in certain countries—there are, however, also instances of closer co-operation between OPEC members and non-oil LDCs being brought about. A recent example is the decision of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India to construct in the UAE a 12 million tonnes oil refinery, half of whose output of refined products will be assigned to the Indian government.[26] This plan, whose implementation has been enhanced by the UAE offer of 1·5 million tonnes of crude in 1981 to help India over the shortages caused late in 1980 by the Iran–Iraq war, is the first large-scale Arab investment project in India. It is also an example of

24 J M Mohnfeld, 'Changing Patterns of Trade', *Petroleum Economist*, Aug 1980, pp 329–32.
25. Speech at Second Oxford Energy Seminar, Sept 1980. Reported in the *Financial Times*, Nov 3, 1980
26 *Financial Times*, Dec. 22, 1980

countries jointly planning to process more intensively their own primary products while at the same time trying to avoid the excess capacity that frequently accompanies such efforts at industrialisation. Many Third World countries have suffered from refinery excess capacity. Indeed, there are presently around three times more oil refineries in the non-oil LDCs than in the OPEC member states.

There is a further reason for OPEC as an entity to resist the creation of an enlarged oil-aid facility, and still more, a concerted and thorough diplomatic effort to secure Third World support for its position. This reason stems from the fact that each OPEC member has regional as well as global interests, and those regional interests will generally take precedence over global interests whenever the returns appear to be higher from a given outlay of effort. Venezuela, for instance, has for decades harboured a desire to speak with authority in its region. Now that Brazil and Mexico are so frequently seen as being in the vanguard of the Third World, as newly industrialising countries, there is greater incentive for Venezuela to try to recapture some of the diplomatic initiative. The regional oil concession scheme announced in conjunction with non-OPEC member Mexico in July 1980 reflects this regional imperative. Under this scheme, announced in August 1980, the two countries will between them sell some 160,000 barrels per day of crude, available through a five-year 4 per cent credit, to nine nearby countries (Barbados, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic). This scheme should, however, be understood as a concession on credit terms rather than on oil prices. More widespread concessions by OPEC members on prices charged to Third World countries are unlikely, partly because automatic price-concessions would jeopardise whatever political leverage OPEC members obtain by negotiations over foreign aid, and partly because of difficulties in arranging and policing such schemes with private oil companies who still control tanker fleets. Similarly with Nigeria, whose various governments since independence have felt that the most populous black African nation should play more part in continental affairs. With the eclipse of Ghana and the arrival of multi-party parliamentary democracy in Lagos, the Nigerians can also be expected to take a more prominent part in regional affairs.

As well as different regional priorities between OPEC members, different ideological priorities will also persist as barriers to any greater interest in the idea of Third World solidarity. In contrast to the heady brew of socialism espoused by Algerian spokesmen in referring to future developments in the Third World, the Nigerians (fairly clearly committed to capitalist development) and the Venezuelans (in possession of a relatively sophisticated industrial economy) would prefer not to enter the debate at that level of aggregation.

Internal dissent over collective OPEC policies *vis à vis* both oil prices and the non-oil LDCs illustrates these differences in objective. Of importance here is the paralysis of Iraqi–Iranian relations which has in turn adversely affected

the unity of OPEC. Thus, instead of a comprehensive OPEC approach on oil prices and foreign aid, as proposed by the Committee on Long Term Strategy, the members have, for the time being at least, been thrown back upon their own devices. Oil price unity has partly collapsed and the function of OPEC as a price-setting organ has been brought into question. But more important in the context of this article, each OPEC member, or a sub-group like the Gulf States, will continue to arrange its relations with individual non-oil LDCs with its own national interests the main priority. Wider OPEC interests, to the extent that they exist, will meanwhile be given lesser weight, although the trend towards channelling the members' foreign aid through OPEC's multilateral institutions is likely to continue.

Conclusions

In conclusion it is clear that much about OPEC states' interests and priorities remains only hazily comprehended. As was pointed out in *Foreign Affairs* not long ago, 'the forces involved are far from completely understood'.[28] Not least among the barriers to understanding, of course, is the heterogeneity of the Third World itself. Embracing countries so diverse in economic circumstances, in political priorities and in integration in the world economy as Mali, Nicaragua and Singapore, for example, it is little surprise that assessment of OPEC's impact upon this group of states should give rise to confusion and uncertainty. But a few principles can probably be outlined.

In instances where Third World support is forthcoming, and can be acquired at relatively little cost, OPEC as an agency will in all probability continue to seek it.[27] Furthermore, even in instances where substantial aid outlays are involved, OPEC is likely to continue assisting countries as cases of clear need arise. But the OPEC aid agencies will certainly continue to resist the institutionalisation of that aid in the form of a placebo for LDCs' having to put up with rising oil prices. Indeed, neither set of countries is happy to have the OPEC aid effort viewed in that light. For their part leaders of the oil-importing LDCs rarely feel that they receive 'sufficient' aid to mitigate their higher oil outlays. And for their part OPEC members will continue to deny the proposition, implicit in a formal oil-aid scheme, that their oil price policy necessarily harms the rest of the Third World.

27 See R D Hansen, 'The Political Economy of North–South Relations How Much Change?' *International Organization*, Winter 1975, Vol 29, No 1, pp 921–47, where southern solidarity is referred to as 'a free good'.

28 A Q Corradi, 'Energy and the Exercise of Power', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 57, No. 5, Summer 1979, pp 1.144-66

INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACY: THE MYTH AND REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE

*Thomas G. Weiss**

REACTIONS in developed countries to the United Nations system and the officials who staff it are indifferent at best and outright hostile at worst. Ironically, these same institutions and personnel are increasingly involved in the discussion on numerous issues of importance for the citizens of these countries—hostages in Iran, international economic relations, and the status of refugees in South East Asia are recent examples. This article examines the theory of the international civil service and the reality of the supra-national staff who are charged with the day-to-day responsibility for international co-operation.

Although international organisations have traditionally been of marginal interest to scholars and national decision-makers not directly connected with the study or operation of international institutions, the situation has significantly changed during the last two decades. Decolonisation led to the rapid expansion of United Nations membership in the 1960s; and raw materials prices and shortages during the 1970s helped developing countries to assert their positions as active members of the international system in which they emphasised the work of the United Nations more than did established, economically developed states. The recognition of new problems and the rush to erect new rhetorical or institutional responses have so far monopolised analytical attention whilst the administrative aspects of these international bureaucracies have tended to be overlooked.[1]

* This article updates earlier views of the same author in the light of his experience as an international civil servant since 1975. It should be noted that the opinions set forth are his sole responsibility and not those of the international secretariat for which he works

Thomas G. Weiss is an economic affairs officer in UNCTAD's Special Programme for Least Developed Countries, and has a broad academic and professional interest in the operation of international organisations. Dr Weiss's main publications include: *International Bureaucracy* (1975), *The World Food Conference and Global Problem-Solving* (1976 with Robert S Jordan), *The Challenge of Development in the Eighties* (1982 edited with Anthony Jennings), and *More for the Least? Prospects for Poorest Countries in the Eighties* (forthcoming with Anthony Jennings).

1 There have, of course, been historical investigations and internal studies that have criticised the performance of international administration. Well known examples of historical scholarship are: Robert S. Jordan, ed., *International Administration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Georges Langrod, *The International Civil Service* (New York: Oceana, 1963); Alexander Loveday, *Reflection on International Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956); Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945); and Jean Siotis, *Essai sur le Secrétariat International* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963). The most publicised example of an internal self-criticism is Robert G. A. Jackson, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System*, 2 Vols, DP/5 (Geneva: United Nations, 1969). Other examples are the numerous reports of the Joint Inspection

The working hypothesis here is that the unwieldy administrative structures of functional secretariats are counterproductive to the idealistic goals that they have been created to pursue. International institutions fail to be effective not only because of a shortage of resources or insurmountable political problems, but also because of the processes by which resources are allocated. The reasons for this failure become clearer, however, when we examine the nature of the international civil service, and its impact on the day-to-day operations of international organisations. The investigation which follows will therefore illustrate the theory and practice underlying international administration; provide some indications of its ability to serve humanity; suggest reasons for its historically poor performance; and offer some proposals for improvement.

The subject matter is particularly pertinent in that the new Secretary-General has specified that the restoration of staff integrity and morale is to be a priority during his tenure.

The conventional paradigm[2] of the international civil service

The principles underlying the international civil service are multinational composition and responsibility. These principles evolved in the practice and declarations of the League of Nations and have been reaffirmed in those of the United Nations. Each international official is expected to approach decision-making objectively, taking into account the opinions of all nations and the impact of any decision upon the globe as a whole. Such persons cannot be content with particularistic points of view, nor can they favour more narrowly defined national interests. Further, officials are subordinate only to administrative superiors. Most commentators see no unusual political or bureaucratic behavioural problems arising in the international administration. Ignorance of structural conflicts—even of the most basic problems arising from differences among individual personalities—is the norm.[3]

Unit, the most illustrative being Maurice Bertrand, *Personnel Questions Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations*, A/8454 Part I and II, Oct 5, 1971, and *Report on Medium-Term Planning in the United Nations System, document JIU/REP/74/1* See also Martin F Hill, *Towards Greater Order, Coherence and Co ordination in the United Nations System*, (New York UNITAR Research Report No 20, 1974), originally E/5491.

There have been far too few critical case studies of the behaviour of international secretariats and inadequate theoretical efforts to determine the relevance of the present structures of international bureaucracy. The author hopes to have helped to fill this gap Thomas George Weiss, *International Bureaucracy An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats* (Lexington, Mass. Lexington, 1975). See also Theodor Meron, *The United Nations Secretariat* (Lexington, Mass · Lexington, 1977), Seymour Maxwell Finger and John F Mugno, 'The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat', *Orbis*, Vol 19, No 1, Spring 1975, pp 117-45; and Robert Rhodes James, *Staffing the United Nations Secretariat* (Brighton: Institute for the Study of International Organization, 1970) For an application of this type of analysis to one Secretariat, see Robert L Rothstein, *Global Bargaining UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 169-216

2. Although the precision of this term in the natural sciences is not directly applicable to the social sciences, the concept of the international civil service is so prevalent within the theory and practice of international organisation that one is justified in attaching to it the status of 'paradigm' The classic formulation of the theory of paradigmatic processes in the natural sciences was stated by Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)

3 See a definitive statement by Dag Hammarskjöld: 'The International Civil Service in Law and in Fact', lecture of May 30, 1961 at University of Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961)

The concept of an objective and detached international administration is of recent vintage. The earliest examples date from the administrative experience of the nineteenth century when the Industrial Revolution opened the way for many forms of interstate co-operation. Changes in technology and communications linked European economies to overseas markets and resources. As economies expanded and trade developed, public international unions began to emerge.[4] These international entities exemplified a structural innovation in the international system that has become more generalised in the twentieth century. Permanent staffs were sometimes created to carry out research and update the correspondence necessary for effective co-ordination. Tasks were increasingly performed by non-diplomats—persons knowledgeable in a given area, or who represented identifiable interests or who were technicians. New institutional mechanisms for co-operation were created that represented experiments with new forms of bureaucracy.[5]

These nineteenth century developments occurred in international organisations that did not seek universal participation; what is known today as the international civil service originated with the League of Nations. The origins of the concept of an international civil service can be traced to the foresight of the first Secretary-General of the League, Sir Eric Drummond. His conception differed from that of the other British citizen first offered his post, and of most other members of the Paris Peace Conference who were intent on institutionalising national interests along the lines of the recently successful interallied war effort—organised administratively on the basis of national loyalties (a system not dissimilar from that of the European Economic Commission).[6] The League's Covenant is silent on the issue of the loyalty of officials for its signatories envisioned a continuation of co-operative efforts by officials who would be taken directly from national diplomatic ranks to fill League vacancies. Drummond recognised, however, the political dangers of a nationalistic organisational framework for an organisation devoted to international welfare and tried to prevent the establishment of permanent delegations to the League in order to avoid governmental pressures on Geneva's officialdom.[7]

4 See the introductory sections of Josef L. Kunz, 'Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 41, No. 4 Oct. 1947, pp. 828-62.

5. The existence of some private voluntary associations whose purposes included aiding war victims, promoting scientific and religious tolerance, upgrading worker conditions, and developing a universal language should not be overlooked See. Georges P Speeckaert, 'International Non-Governmental Cooperation in the Future', *Main Currents in Modern Thought* Vol. 21, No. 5, May-June 1965, especially pp 115-16 A more detailed account of this development can be found in Paul Reinsch, *Public International Unions. Their Work and Organisations A Study in International Administrative Law* (Boston: Ginn, 1911). Some authors look upon the period of 1865 to 1914 (33 intergovernmental and 182 nongovernmental organisations were created during this period) as the great period of the development of international co-operation that was arrested by the holocaust of 1914. See: F. S. L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe 1815-1914* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1963).

6. For a longer discussion, see: Robert S. Jordan, 'The Influence of the British Secretariat Tradition on the Formation of the League of Nations', pp 27-50; and Robert Rhodes James, 'The Evolving Concept of the International Civil Service', in Jordan, ed., *International Administration, op. cit*, pp 51-73. For an early study of the British, Canadian, French, and German services, see L. D. White, C. H. Bland, W. R. Sharp, and F. M. Marx, *Civil Service Abroad* (New York: McGraw, 1935).

7 See, Francis P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952),

Drummond's principles of international responsibility were subsequently codified and reaffirmed by three League committees and published in the Balfour, Nobelmaire, and Committee of Thirteen Reports.[8] These reports basically echoed Drummond's concept of international loyalty and introduced the practice of distributing League posts to various nations as a possible means to secure internationalism in organisational practice. They also formulated salary and promotional guidelines to ensure the recruitment of high calibre officials. Two principles eventually predominated: a diverse staff selected from a wide geographical distribution, and job security through a system of permanent contracts. Although the value of the theory of the international civil service remained intact, the League's failure was, in part at least, due to the pursuit of narrowly defined national interests by certain staff members (especially Italian and German) despite the increasingly international character of its expanding staff. Towards the end of the Second World War, speculation arose as the eventual shape of a proper international apparatus to replace the League after cessation of conflict. In the United States the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored conferences on the experience of Geneva-based international officials.[9] Interest in the experiment in international administration also revived elsewhere; the most important work was performed in London under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Public Administration.[10]

The combined evaluations of experiences by former officials of the League of Nations and the International Labour Office indicated that international administration was practicable and would be indispensable for the success of future international institutions. On the eve of the Preparatory Conference of what was to become the United Nations, a general sentiment prevailed among

Vol I, pp. 15-39 and 75-80. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat, op cit*, pp 35-52; and Siotis, *Essai, op cit*, pp 82-84

8 Staff of the Secretariat, Report presented by the British Representative, Mr. A. J. Balfour, *Office Journal*, June 1920, pp 136-39 (hereafter 'Balfour Report'); 'Organisation of the Secretariat and of the International Labor Office' Report submitted by Committee No. 4 on the Conclusions and the Proposals of the Committee of Experts Appointed in Accordance with the Resolutions adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its meeting on Dec 17, 1920, *Actes de la Deuxième Assemblée Seances Plénières* (1921), pp 595-626, and also C 424 M.305 1921 X and A 140(a).1921 (hereafter 'Nobelmaire Report' after its rapporteur); 'Committee of Enquiry on the Organization of the Secretariat, the International Labor Office and the Registry of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Report of the Committee', Geneva, 1930, A 16.1930 (hereafter 'Committee of 13')

9 See especially the *Proceedings of Conference on Experience in International Administration*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, Jan. 30, 1943, and *Proceedings of Exploratory Conference on the League of Nations Secretariat*, New York, Aug 21-22, 1943 (hereafter *Proceedings January 1943* and *Proceedings August 1943*, respectively) Also, the Carnegie Endowment sponsored the research and publication of Ranshofen Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*

10. The most important publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs are: 'The International Secretariat of the Future Lessons from Experience by a Group of Former Officials of the League of Nations' (London: RIIA, 1944, hereafter 'London Report'), Chester Purves, 'The International Administration of an International Secretariat' (London. RIIA, 1945); and J. V Wilson, 'Problems of an International Secretariat' *International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Oct. 1944, pp 542-54. The Institute of Public Administration was responsible for an important document concerning the internal mechanics of international administration in a series of articles edited by Arthur Salter, *International Administration* (London. Research Studies of the Institute of Public Administration, 1945).

former officials: the success or failure of a new attempt at world government would depend in part upon the competence of the newly assembled staff.

The end of the second global conflict in thirty years brought about the construction of a system of international organisation staffed by international officials on a scale historically unprecedented. Evaluations of the performance of the international civil service have continued to be generally laudatory. At San Francisco the concept of an independent international administration was considered sufficiently important to be specified in article 100 of the Charter—which recognised explicitly that supranational loyalty, impartiality, and independence for administrative officials was critical for the success of the new international organisation. Moreover, article 104 guaranteed the extraterritorial freedom necessary for an international administration; and in 1947 the General Assembly recommended that all member states adopt national legislation that would permit international officials complete autonomy in a host country.[11] The United Nations has also codified all of the principles of the international civil service in the Staff Regulations.[12] Article 1.9—the oath of office by which international officials commit themselves to uphold the trust placed in them by the world community—is of particular note:

> I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Organization.

Perhaps no other legal decision is more important to the study of international administration than that of the International Court of Justice in 1949 concerning the reparations to the United Nations for the assassination of one of its staff members.[13] Count Bernadotte was on a United Nations mission of mediation when he was killed in Palestine. In awarding direct damages, the Court unanimously recognised that international institutions have some

11 'Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations', Document A/64, July 1, 1946, and 'Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; ST/LEG/3 of 1953 For a discussion of the general subject, see John Kerry King, *The Privileges and Immunities of the Personnel of International Organizations* (Denmark: Strandberg, Odense, 1949); and *International Administrative Jurisdiction* (Brussels International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1952).

12. See: ST/SGB/Staff Regulations/Rev.12, 1979. Reference is made to clauses of the United Nations regulations, but the conclusions are equally valid for the other United Nations organisations.

13. Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949 on 'Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations', *International Court of Justice Reports, 1949*, p. 179. For a further discussion of the general issue, see, Carol McCormic Crosswell, *Protection of International Personnel Abroad* (New York: Oceana, 1952). Precedents establishing the validity of a partial legal personality for international organisations necessary to preserve the autonomy of these institutions have been reaffirmed in two other cases to come before the Court; but in neither case is the language as clear as it is in the 'Reparations' case. The interested reader is referred to two advisory opinions: July 13, 1954, 'Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal', *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1954, pp. 47-97; and Oct. 23, 1956, 'Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization Upon Complaints Made Against UNESCO', *International Court of Justice Reports, 1956*, pp. 76-168.

measure of legal personality, based principally upon the existence of the universally accepted ideal of the international civil service. The international legal principle of 'diplomatic protection'—according to which the claims of an individual are normally presented only by his or her native state in an international tribunal—was applied to an international organisation in order to represent the claims of its staff members.

The reality of international administration

Studies of international administration tend to lump together national and international bureaucratic analyses, thereby missing what are the truly distinctive problems that hinder more effective action by international organisations. It is to five important and distinctive features that this article now turns.

Geographical distribution and international loyalty. Article 101.3 of the United Nations Charter makes the geographical quota an elementary principle of the organisation. Although political and demographic weighting systems were also proposed, the geographical formula was adopted with the ratio of member states' financial contributions a 'rule of thumb' in determining an approximate number of posts.[14] The geographical quota in the Charter demonstrates the gradual acceptance of an organising principle for an international bureaucracy demanding the inclusion of a required number of national perspectives.

The Covenant did not mention the geographical balance of the League's Secretariat. The original British proposal of 1919 recommended that the Chancellor (later called the Secretary-General), after consultation with governments, should appoint ten permanent assistant secretaries on the basis of fixed geographical ratio.[15] After the rejection of this proposal, the subject of geographical representation received little attention. The assumption at Versailles seemed to be that whatever variety resulted would arise from the division of posts among the great powers; and of these the mixture was to be primarily British and French. Smaller nations did propose an amendment to article 6.3 of the Covenant, which read: 'So far as possible, the Secretaries and

14. The mathematical precision of the geographical quota is not always admitted, but is important. Each post for which the formula applies is assigned a certain number of points An official at the P.1 level = 1 point and P.2 = 2 points, while a principal director = 12 points. If one multiplies the number of posts by their value, a total results that is in turn multiplied by the percentage of the budgetary contributions of a state to get the quota of assigned posts The exception to this rule are that the number of posts can vary ± 25 per cent from the norm; no state is too small to have at least 3 officials; and the United States is not allowed to fulfil all of the posts that its relatively large contribution would otherwise merit. Such calculations are not publicised, but made in personnel offices; and public statements tend to emphasise the objectivity of the system. See especially: International Civil Service Advisory Board, 'Report on Recruitment Methods and Standards of 1950', COORD/Civil Service/2, p. iv.

15. David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris: With Documents* (New York, printed for the author by Appeal Printing, 1924), Vol. IV, doct 226, p 41. This proposal suggested the selection of one secretary from each state of the Council, two from European states not in the Council, one from Latin America, two from all other states.

the personnel shall belong to different nationalities'.[16] Although this amendment received little attention because of more pressing issues, the desire to have all national interests represented within the international administration was clearly a concern of small and large powers alike. Furthermore, the three key personnel documents of the League all proposed variations of the geographical quota.[17] Eventually article 10 of the League's Staff Regulations was formulated: 'Recruitment in the First Division shall be effected with special regard to the importance of securing the collaboration on its staff of nationals of various Members of the League.'

The preparatory commission of the United Nations found the principle of integrity and geographical quotas not only reconcilable but also desirable.[18] The policy of the Organisation has become increasingly rigid with posts being distributed niggardly among member states in the extended United Nations family. Newly independent states whose demands for recognition and equality necessarily require representation in the international civil service actually led as early as the 23rd Session of the General Assembly to outline the desired percentage representation for various regions.[19]

The justification of geographical quotas has been based on two arguments. First, quotas are thought to be politically necessary. The staffs of international institutions must reflect universal membership, one of the United Nations goals. Because developing countries have traditionally been under-represented in quotas and now comprise about two-thirds of the organisational membership, it is politically impossible to avoid the issue of staff distribution.

Second, an international administration and its decision-making should profit from the advantages of a heterogeneous staff. The 'contacts' from former careers in government certainly provide channels for communication that would not exist otherwise. While caucusing and drafting by secretariats is facilitated and negotiations perhaps accelerated,[20] the historical development of the international civil service could more usefully be interpreted as having provided a rationalisation for institutionalising national interests in the guise of a political dialogue within the administrative staffs of international institutions.

A person who is recruited, hired, and promoted according to his or her national origins would normally hesitate to ignore them. The geographical quota tends to ensure that national interests continue to be acceptable rationale for policies, both inside and outside international organisations. According to the quota system, positions are not always filled on the basis of qualifications but rather on nominations or pressure from governments; a certain number of officials must represent the different nations involved in bureaucratic

16 *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, doct 576, p. 89.

17 'Balfour Report', p 137; 'Nobelmaire Report' 1921, pp. 600-603, and 'Report of the Committee of 13', 1930, pp. 10-11

18. Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, 'Report to the General Assembly', 1945, PC/20, p. 85.

19 Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly A/7334, Order No. 81.

20. This approach has been analysed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Oct 1974, pp. 39-62.

functions. This policy may have initially been suggested—and subsequently defended by the developing nations—to prevent international organisations from becoming the monopoly of nationals from large, developed countries. Ironically, the solidification of national loyalties within international bureaucracies has proved a major obstacle to the expressed redistributive goals of international organisation. Supranational co-operation is now inhibited not only by governmental controls over budgets and security policies, but also by the representational composition of the international administrative apparatus.[21]

National governmental control: Soviet and United States techniques. During the early days of the League of Nations its policies with regard to personnel were not rigorously enforced. The predominance of French and British in the staff was an obvious violation of the theoretical commitment to heterogeneity.[22] Further, while staff regulations had explicitly forbidden public political pronouncements or the holding of political offices by international officials, Albert Thomas continued as a member of the French Chamber of Deputies during part of his tenure as Director-General of the International Labour Office.

During the 1930s political crises and public criticism forced changes. Representation on the staff was widened and the official Staff Regulations were amended to prohibit overtly political activity, mainly as an antidote to the blatant manipulation of international officials with Italian and German nationalities. This experience foreshadowed the more general problems of the United Nations in reconciling international loyalty and international efficiency with the desire of member states to control their nationals in international service. An Italian law of June 16, 1927, required that all Italian nationals desiring to enter the service of another nation or a public international agency had to obtain the permission of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[23] The Italian development reached a climax when Marquis Paulucci di Calboni Barone became the Italian Under Secretary-General, moving directly from his position as Mussolini's *chef de cabinet.* He promptly organised all Italian officials into a cell, set himself up as chief, and wore a fascist lapel pin at headquarters.[24]

The present situation of many international officials is also similar to that of German nationals who were international officials during the late 1920s.

21 The pressure applied on international secretariats to place their own nationals in international staff positions was formerly only a concern of diplomatic missions for very senior posts, which were the positions where it was assumed that national interests could best be defended. However, governments increasingly exert significant pressures for all professional posts no matter how junior. In fact, thirteen states are now sponsors of the 'associate expert programme' in which posts at the lowest professional level are financed with the stipulation that they be filled by a national of the country financing the post

22. For the statistics on the exact numerical distribution, see. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op cit* , pp. 354–64.

23 For the text of this law and a discussion of its significance see: Manley O. Hudson, *The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 331

24. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op cit.*, pp. 245, 249–51, and 408.

The League, which Germany joined in 1926, was looked upon as the institutionalisation of the German defeat through the Treaty of Versailles. As all aspects of this settlement were increasingly under attack, German nationals appointed to the secretariat began to view organisational policy questions more nationalistically than many fellow officials. German international officials were an integral part of the German national civil service, and did not share the internationalist perspective that grew out of the Paris negotiations. Dissension within administrative ranks elicited an oath of office, itself a recognition that the paradigm of the international civil service was in part a product of wishful thinking.[25]

The potential extent of governmental control and influence on administrative loyalty, and hence the effectiveness of international organisations, can be seen in the contemporary approaches of the two major contributors to the United Nations budgets. The policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, which have the most nationals employed in international secretariats, tend to legitimise similar behaviour by other nations.[26]

It is widely recognised that Soviet international civil servants are dependent upon their government not only for initial appointments but also for subsequent promotions. Many are expected to convey information to their government, and such activities have led to numerous expulsions from the United Nations' administrative cities. They frequently caucus with other Russians in official government settings. One indication of the extent of control is that the Soviet Union has never allowed one of its citizens to receive a permanent appointment; all Soviet officials return to national posts immediately after their fixed-term sojourns in international administration. Contracts (duration, level, etc.) are not negotiated with the individual, but with his or her government.

The Soviet Union has never supported the ideal of an international civil service which many states have supported, at least rhetorically. The Soviet Union regards international secretariats as vehicles that provide services to nation states when they meet for discussions; and thus the use of pressure in questions of personnel is a perfectly legitimate undertaking. For the individual Russians involved, career advancement at home depends on the evaluation of their performance as international officials, which explains why they must keep an eye constantly on the reactions of their own government.

25 For a discussion, see Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, *op cit*, Vol 1, pp. 316–27, and Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op cit.*, pp. 251–255.

26. The studies of the politics of influence within administrations have gradually been recognised as contributing to the mediocre impact of the United Nations system; see, S. M. Finger and John Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat*, (New York: Ralph Bunch Institute, 1974), republished also in *Orbis*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 117–45. For the lack of competence in international officials, see, Maurice Bertrand, *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit of Personnel Problems in the United Nations*, Oct 5, 1971, A/8454; Richard Gardner, ed., *The Future of the United Nations Secretariat* (Rensselaerville: NY: Institute on Man and Science, 1972); Robert Rhodes James, *Staffing the United Nations Secretariat*, *op cit.*, and *Report of the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System* (New York: United Nations, 1972), A/8728.

Whilst the Soviet Union's control over its nationals who are international officials clearly inhibits independent action by an international administration, the policies of the United States government toward its nationals in service to the world community are usually assumed to have quite a different impact. While subtler, American policies have much the same overall effect and have provided a model of interference that other states have found more appropriate than the Soviet variety.[27]

It should be recalled that the United States position toward the international civil service has always been ambivalent. Possible membership of the United States in the League had originally raised domestic concerns about the potential incompatibility between the pledge of international loyalty by an international official and the allegiance to the Constitution demanded of United States citizens. In the aftermath of Italian and German nationalism, an oath of office for all officials was instituted in 1932. The Hearst newspapers reacted with a series of syndicated articles that questioned whether an oath pledging international loyalty and fidelity was indeed compatible with citizenship. A complete study was undertaken by the State Department which eventually decided that this oath was not a pledge of allegiance, but simply a declaration of loyalty and therefore compatible with the dictates of citizenship. Washington had given thought to the manner of recruiting officials as to the other details for the preliminary sessions at Dumbarton Oaks.[28] In October 1944, however, American participants decided not to complicate the already complex agenda with a proposed overhaul of the international civil service and supported instead a straightforward continuation of the League's practices.

That discussions of bureaucratic organisation and the management of the new organisation were not begun immediately in the first sessions of the United Nations should not be construed to mean that articles 100–101 of the Charter reflect the position of the United States government. The efforts to manipulate Trygve Lie's administration should be seen in light of the furor over the League's oath of office and as a natural continuation of America's concern to control the content of the international administration. During the McCarthy period, the attack on the United Nations itself by the forces of the Wisconsin senator effectively demonstrated Washington's belief that international civil servants with United States passports should react as foreign service officers would in a similar situation. They should be counted on to defend the national interests of the United States with unquestioning loyalty.

27. In fact, the United States example may be even more relevant. International staffs are generally composed of 50 per cent nationals of Western nations and only 8–15 per cent from Socialist bloc. As two observers have written: 'Whether we consider the national origins of individuals or participating states, the rich Western countries with competitive politics are the predominant influence in all organizations Their influence has remained remarkably stable, declining only marginally with the accession to membership of many new nations.' Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, 'The Anatomy of Influence', in Cox and Jacobson, eds, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1973), p. 243.

28 In many ways, the United States government study, supervised by Cordell Hull, was the most elaborate and detailed one of international organisation ever undertaken by a government. For details, see: *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, Dept. of State Publication 3580 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949).

The most significant indication of organisational weakness was the willingness of the United Nations to accept and implement Executive Order of the President 10422, of January 9, 1953, 'Prescribing procedures for making available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations certain information concerning United States citizens employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations.'[29] An investigation is required of a prospective international civil servant by the United States Civil Service Commission with reference to the records of the FBI, the military, or 'any other appropriate source'. If information of activities unacceptable to the American government is found, it must be transmitted to the Secretary-General who is expected to use it responsibly—that is, not to hire, or alternatively to dismiss the official in question. The results of this process are not always what the American government might wish, as the work and motivations of men such as Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier indicate. However, the aberrant process of security clearances for American applicants is designed to provide internal bureaucratic support in the person of United States international officials who argue for American interests within the decision-making process.

This argument is even stronger for American civil servants who are seconded to international agencies. Executive Order 11552 of August 24, 1970 authorises the Secretary of State to lend State Department officials to international organisations, and recommends that upon return to national service the experience as an international civil servant be considered in determining subsequent grades and positions. Further, if any loss in salary is entailed by taking an international post, a compensatory formula ensures reimbursement upon return to the national civil service. How such officials differ in attitude or motivation from their Soviet counterparts is difficult to understand. Other nations inevitably attempt to copy the United States and the Soviet Union—through widespread use of clearances by member governments; and personnel policies which reinforce the primacy of national interest in international decision-making. The acceptability of such practices is almost unquestioned and certainly has a negative impact on organisational integrity. The Soviet and American examples sanction the legitimacy of national

29 Reprinted as Annex V of *Report*, A/2364, pp 35-36. The United States government should abolish this 'loyalty check' on the grounds of cost-cutting and inefficiency alone. It is not clear what the benefits are, because few individuals are rejected for failure to receive the clearance. However, there are enormous administrative and financial costs, and the clearance may actually hurt the United States' overall goal in securing employment for Americans United Nations recruitment officials oftentimes prefer a candidate of another nationality because the clearance process can add months to the time necessary for recruitment. Further, the clearance provides an obvious example of interference for other nations seeking to justify their own interference in the United Nations personal policies. As two observers have noted: 'Philosophically, in using its influence to effect individual appointments, the U.S. has both contributed to the legitimisation of such tactics and comprised its own belief in an objective international civil service, consequently lending legitimacy to the Soviet conception of the Secretariat as an intergovernmental organ staffed by partisans'. Finger and Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing, op cit*, p. 41. For a discussion of the limited role played by the Secretary-General in standing up to such pressures, see, Shirley Hazzard, *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), especially chapters 2 and 3

interests and the acceptability of influencing organisational decision-making through national representatives in an international administration.

The external political climate and national budgetary control. The allocation of public funds for administrative programming in international organisations is one of the basic determinants in their behaviour. All too frequently observers speak of international administrative action as if it occurred in a political vacuum: 'It is in the budget and finance areas, more than anywhere else, that the concept of state sovereignty has clashed head on with the principle of collective responsibility for an effective organization.'[30] The general political climate in conjunction with national power-of-the-purse in budgetary allocations has a dramatic effect upon the nature of bureaucratic activities. The financial leverage of individual states threatens organisational autonomy and undermines the theoretical conception of the international civil service.

The ability of a particular member state to manipulate international decision-making was illustrated both by the United States Congress' disregard for a ratified international treaty when it refused to contribute its obligatory share to the International Labour Office, and by its threats to UNESCO following political disagreements over Israel. The 1980 problems surrounding Arab contributions to the World Bank and IMF, resulting from the failure to seat the PLO, provide recent examples of a similar phenomenon.

The crisis over funding peacekeeping operations in the Congo resulted in the principle of the voluntary contributions that continues to provoke financial disorder. The reinforcement of the trend toward voluntary rather than assessed contributions has politicised an area of administrative activity previously less vulnerable to ideological confrontation. Voluntary contributions have reduced the role of the majority of member states in those decisions that affect the quality and volume of co-operative projects. An element of uncertainty as well as a veto over various types of programming have been introduced with voluntary contributions. This trend (65 per cent of United Nations system budgets at the present time) is favoured not only by the United States, but by other important contributing member states as well. The Socialist bloc has always demanded limitations on the budgetary autonomy of international institutions. The conventional wisdom is thus becoming that only basic administrative expenses should be included in regular budgets and that expenditures on programmes should not be the subject of binding decisions. Nations are not obliged to pay for operations not in their interest.

Thus, even if there were an international civil service committed to global perspectives, the present budgetary structure would seriously hinder internationalism. Without an international civil service that conforms to the conventional paradigm, however, the formulation of organisational policies that seek to reflect consensus on global interests is close to impossible.

30 Francis O. Wilcox, 'International Confederation—The United Nations and State Sovereignty', in Elmer Plischke, ed., *Systems of Integrating the International Community* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 52.

The relatively weak position of organisational leadership. One would expect heads of international organisations to give direction to the pursuit of global interests, but many observers have exaggerated the role of leadership in international organisation.[31] In emphasising the need for dynamic leadership in the face of political crises, analysts fail to give proper consideration to the built-in constraints of international administrative structures.

A proper scrutiny of permanent contracts, which have become unquestioned administrative practice in international organisations, is illustrative in this regard. They create a general immobilism that thwarts dynamic leadership. Executive heads have very little latitude to dismiss recalcitrant or incompetent officials for fear of irritating paticular member states or interest groups. When the impact of permanent appointments is added to judicially determined administrative regulations, the ideal of organisational leadership is inhibited, if not paralysed. The most common solution to many administrative problems is usually called upon: the demotion, or assignment to a non-responsible post, of officials whose presence becomes a problem. Inevitably poor discipline, morale and inefficiency result from the presence of administrative 'dead wood'.

Top staff should not be seen in isolation but rather at the apex of a complex bureaucratic pyramid organised not primarily to seek consensus on global interests but rather to compromise on national views. Organisational reform conceived in terms of personality and leadership is not useful without making explicit the relevant assumptions about the composition and constraints of the international bureaucracy.

Increasing size and heterogeneity of international administration. The effect of an increasingly large and heterogeneous staff is central to the analysis of international bureaucracy. The commitment to universalism in membership and administrative staffing has necessitated that the administrative structures of international institutions reflect more and more the abundance of national, ideological, cultural, religious, and racial perspectives to be balanced in the process of policy-making. In addition, the proliferation of international secretariats and their tasks has been accompanied by a necessary increase in the total number of international officials. The extent and pace of the expansion of

31 For the impact of the two most widely recognised international officials, see the following biographical and analytic discussions: E. J. Phelan, *Yes and Albert Thomas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949); and Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of the Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). In addition, the reader might also wish to consult: David Coombes, *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Robert W. Cox, 'An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations', *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1969, pp. 205–30; Amatai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1965); G. Fischer, *La Compétence du Secrétaire Général* (Paris: AFDI, 1965); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Robert S. Jordan, *The NATO International Staff Secretariat*, 1952–57 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); S. M. Schwebel, *The Secrétary-General of the United Nations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952); and F. Van Langenhave, *Le Rôle Prééminent du Secrétaire Général dans l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964).

membership and bureaucratic structures are not analogous to the League's experience, although comparisons have often been made.[32]

An increase in numbers of officials representing national interests inhibits administrative ability to act on supranational interests. Leon Lindberg's analysis of the EEC's administration is even more appropriate to the larger and more variegated ones of international institutions:

> The French were not the only ones in the Six who had serious reservations about the effects of widening the community . . . An increase in the numbers of participants would both overload the already complex decision-making system and decrease the willingness of Member States to make concessions and to adhere to the Community's code.

Judging by the experiences of the League and of the EEC, the United Nations will find that the increasing size of the bureaucracy results in a growing number of purely administrative problems. Increasing the number of perspectives increases the difficulty of compromise. Furthermore, officials have represented increasingly heterogeneous views since the end of the Second World War. A fundamental structural disequilibrium has been introduced into staffing the United Nations system.[34]

At the founding of the United Nations, it was recognised that considerable effort and care would be required to achieve an internal administrative consensus. However, the magnitude of the change resulting from the inundation of new staff representing nations that either had not participated in the League or which were to become independent, could not have been anticipated. Further, an unforeseen and crucial complication arose because of the gradual acceptance and justification of nationalism among international officials as standard operating procedures.

32. The build-up of the League's Secretariat occurred slowly from 182 officials in 1920 to 451 in 1925. In 1956 alone, 2,900 appointments were made for the United Nations See: Robert Rhodes James, 'The Evolving Concept of the International Civil Service in Jordan,' ed., *International Administration, op. cit*, p 62. Another consideration is that as the League's staff grew numerically, the proportion of participating member states represented in the international civil service increased from 40 to 80 per cent by 1938. For a more detailed analysis of all the personnel figures in the 1920–38 period, see. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 356–57.

33 Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 294.

34. Additions to the staff and concomitant disruptions of the League of Nations provide an analogy, on a smaller scale, for the United Nations Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer attributed the early successes of the League to the international loyalty of the staff. One contributing factor was the homogeneity in the cultural and administrative backgrounds of most of the early League's officials. The majority of officials, liberal in their political orientation, came from that part of the middle-class which had supplied European governments for about 100 years with the upper rung of public officials. Among other things, the British and French also maintained control over most of the top leadership posts. Even the entrance of the Soviet Union in the League from 1934 to 1939 did little to disrupt the unity of the ideological vision within the administrative staff, since the Soviets claimed only one position in the Secretariat at any time Also, the United States never became a member, although a few officials were United States citizens. See: Ranshofen-Wertheimer *International Secretariat*, *op. cit*, pp 406–8.

Updating the paradigm of the international civil service

The preceding analysis has seriously questioned the conventional conception of the international civil service, although the paradigm remains relatively unchallenged within international administrative circles and is virtually ignored by scholars. Critical internal examinations by international administrations rarely transcend superficial problems such as supervision, recruitment, and language training. Still lacking are structural analyses of a crucial problem: the incompatibility between the present administrative structure of international organisation and the United Nations' stated redistributive goals.

Decisions are not the results of a common struggle by officials to formulate policy based on a conception of world interests, but rather of bureaucratic struggles to implement programmes designed to avoid irritating member states whose views are stratified in the presence of officials. The quota system, the control exerted by member states over recruitment and promotion, the external political climate and budgetary strings, the relatively weak position of organisational leaders, and the increasing size and heterogeneity of the staff more than suffice to show that the idealised international civil servant is more myth than reality.

The deterioration of the concept of an autonomous international civil service is particularly distressing because the international staff has acquiesced in the process. Although the political pressures exerted on United Nations officials are not imaginary, such pressures are much less formidable than is usually thought to be the case, and could be more easily counteracted than most officials realise. As one United Nations personnel officer has stated: 'It is not so much that the political pressure is intense, but that our resistance is so low.'[35] One explanation for this lack of a strong stance by international officials is the role that national governments play in lobbying for higher level promotions. Most officials believe that resistance to political pressures would achieve little—except to make life difficult for their own superiors and to irritate officials in national missions—while co-operation in permitting political pressures might enhance the possibilities for promotion.

That the original strategy of international organisations was predicated upon internationalism in administration suggests a potential lever for change. It is not only the impotence of international administrations in the face of political problems that thwarts more dynamic initiatives. Even technical assistance becomes a field for unnecessary ideological confrontation within a politicised bureaucracy that is not pledged to overcoming parochialism. To deny the value of reforms in international administration underestimates the important future prospects of present reforms. By making international civil servants more effective agents for decision-making about global interests, the international administration would gradually become more universally recognised as a voice

35. Finger and Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

for the interests of the world community. If international administrations were to become more widely accepted as advocates for global interests, then governmental elites threatened by crises would have established structures to which to submit conflicts or to provide additional funds. In much the same way that eminent Swiss citizens are considered neutral agents and called upon through the international Red Cross in emergencies, a reformed global civil service would prepare itself to assume the role of well-recognised decision-maker for the global village in welfare matters.

The previous analysis suggests three types of reform that are both necessary and feasible in order to convert the international administration, as presently constituted, into a more appropriate vehicle for the improvement of human welfare. Although change in this area is inherently slow, it is not impossible.

The first general recommendation is to make international institutions more flexible by reducing their size and jurisdiction and by simultaneously decentralising their operations.[36] This recommendation contradicts the dominant trend in recent analyses towards consolidation of budgetary and decision-making control as the panacea for all shortcomings of the UN system. The much discussed *Capacity Study*, for example, lamented the fact that specialised agencies had become 'the equivalent of principalities, free from any centralised control'.[37] There is no technical reason why large departments or functional divisions of specialised agencies could not be made more autonomous, while receiving subsidies from parent organisations. Pertinent decisions could potentially be made more rapidly and with less disagreement by the parties ultimately responsible for their implementation. Decentralisation could also counterbalance the increasing bureaucratic depersonalisation so characteristic of large societies and institutions.[38] International secretariats could encourage grass-roots participation and initiate small-scale projects in many parts of the world, in which the final decision-making authority would be vested in global civil servants in the field and local communities rather than in staff at headquarters. A freedom, flexibility, and intensity in welfare programmes, virtually unknown in existing international bureaucracies, could result.

The second general recommendation is that various measures should be taken to increase the commitment to planetary interests by international officials. Geographical quotas and national pressures legitimise and

36. In making this argument, one cannot ignore the obvious problems that decentralisation might involve (log-rolling, higher administrative costs); but there are also major advantages that do not often receive much attention. For an extensive study of the United Nations field system and some of its decentralisation dilemmas, see. Walter R. Sharp, *Field Administration in the United Nations System* (London: Stevens, 1961), in particular pp 181–292. In a similar context, a recommendation has been proposed to decrease the size and longevity of United States foundations in order to increase their creativity and stimulative effect on society See: Waldemar Nielsen, *The Big Foundations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

37. Jackson, *Capacity Study*, *op. cit* , Vol. 1, p. v.

38. Decentralisation corresponds to Alvin Toffler's proposals to cope with rapid change through 'ad-hocracy'. Toffler attempts to avoid the pitfalls of centralisation and bureaucratisation by assembling groups to work on concrete problems and by specifying that they are to be dismantled on a particular date. See: Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), especially 'Organization: The Coming Ad-Hocracy', pp. 112–35.

institutionalise national interests, thereby postponing the moment when non-nation state interests become the legitimate and feasible standard for decision-making in global secretariats. Governments have already agreed in theory to relinquish control over their nationals. In fact, a straightforward publicity campaign against practices such as clearances or seconding by nation-states could diminish national influence over the selection and performance of international personnel.

Observers generally agree that, in contrast with the United Nations, the staff of the League of Nations (particularly in the early years) was far more neutral and sought to counterbalance pressures from their national governments.[39] Officials of the United Nations are far more likely to confuse their own national interests with supranational ones. They identify loyalty for the most part with their own national, cultural, or ideological background, and not with a concept that goes beyond, and in some sense above, such parochial concerns. As long as the world community is not considered to have interests separate from the narrowly conceived visions of nations or blocs, the redistributive goals of international organisations are unattainable. Until the necessity to have international administrators for the international community is recognised, international secretariats—as a grouping of conflicting loyalties—must continue to avoid, or deal ineffectively with, sensitive supranational policy issues central to human survival with dignity.[40] Member states should be forced to re-examine the costs and benefits of political pressures in light of the needs of interdependence. That some members engage in pressure tactics is no pretext for other members to be permitted to abandon principles of non-interference without a public protest from organisational leaders.

The overriding basis for action by an international civil service should be loyalty to the world community and to supranational perspectives. Ironically, the geographical quota system reinforces the acceptability and validity of national loyalties in the heart of international organisation, promoting precisely what international administration was theoretically erected to overcome.

Geographical quotas should be eliminated as the most crucial component in selecting candidates, certainly at the junior and middle-level professional levels. As a minimum, governments must be required to submit more than one candidate for any given senior position when a post 'belongs' to a particular

39. See: Siotis, *Essai*, *op. cit.*, p. 161; and Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *International Secretariat*, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

40. Observers of regional co-operation reject the necessity for such changes or the feasibility of institutionalising objective supranational interests; and they define valid interests as those that arise from compromises among national viewpoints and objectives. They argue accordingly that the success of the European Commission stems from confrontation among officials in Brussels. Compromises thereby represent a European rather than a particular national interest. The pooling of interests may be valid for institutions whose scope is limited, but is unacceptable for global secretariats. Confrontation among officials representing national perspectives is unsuitable for administering development projects whose benefits are not equally distributed. In fact, the financial burden of international welfare falls upon those national governments that profit least, directly or in the short run, from technical assistance to improve human welfare.

country. While quota systems are not without value in guaranteeing variety and freshness of perspectives, there are several alternatives that are not bounded by national frontiers. Quotas could be based on age, sex, race, language-grouping, length of service, or some combination thereof. A balanced criss-cross among these categories could reduce the internal impediments to dynamic programming on welfare matters within international secretariats.

During all recent sessions of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has been requested to take a series of measures to alter the composition of the secretariat.[41] Although excessive emphasis continues to be given to geographical quotas, prominence is also given to selection of candidates who are young or female—*i.e.*, new types of quotas that could potentially provide candidates who are less committed to nationalistic perspectives than their predecessors and less linked to national civil services. Further, stateless individuals should not be shunned automatically by the international civil service; in fact, a quota for them would be more likely to result in committed international officials than reliance upon national government secondments. Also, staff members from over-represented states who have been serving loyally for ten years could be considered in yet another type of quota.

The third recommendation is to reconsider the commitment to competitive salaries and permanent contracts in international organisations. These measures, originally intended to ensure a qualified and secure staff, have too frequently resulted in organisational paralysis and bureaucratic 'dead wood'. In fact, much could be said for discouraging or excluding individuals attracted primarily by comfortable settings, high salaries, and privileges. Several non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam and the American Friends Service Committee have demonstrated that an effective and idealistic service agency can develop without salaries commensurate with those in related professions. Salaries could be more closely geared to local standards; and headquarters staff could have less attractive salary scales than those of field staff (instead of equivalent and even higher ones) to stimulate the exodus of qualified personnel from the Organisation's headquarters in developed countries to field assignments. The United Nations system should modernise its recruiting procedures to eliminate favouritism. Additional measures to find and attract the most competent candidates—examination systems, computerised roster, contacts with professional associations, and wider publicity for vacancies—are already used by corporations, private research institutions, and universities. They could and should be used far more widely to improve the calibre of international officials.[42]

41. The interested reader is referred to the most recent annual publication from the Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Services, 'Action taken by the General Assembly on Personnel Questions during the Thirty-Fifth Session', Doct. ST/IC/81/1, Feb. 19, 1981.

42. The level of competence and professionalism, even in the highest grades, is scandalous. The Joint Inspection Unit found that in 1970 only one candidate was considered and interviewed for a position in 63 per cent of the cases. Only 20 per cent of the D-1 and 28 per cent of the D-2 posts filled by persons without a basic

A continual infusion of new ideas through a more rapid turnover in personnel is also desirable. To accept without question the advisability of permanent contracts overlooks their negative influences. For the same reasons that permanent academic tenure is being reassessed, the concept of permanent contracts for international administration needs to be reevaluated. Permanent contracts have served as much to foster complacency in senior positions and to discourage younger officials as to protect the integrity of international secretariats. Consideration should be given to non-renewable, five-year contracts rather than permanent ones as a means to renew secretariats on a continuous basis. In addition to the increased use of independently recruited, short-term consultants, another alternative source of fresh perspectives might result from the wider utilisation of the United Nations volunteer programme, in particular to attract retired persons with the possibility of applying their skills to development. Consideration should also be given to an international competition to establish a prestigious visiting fellows programme by which highly motivated young persons could be involved in the work of United Nations organisations for a specifically fixed period of time. Accomplishments should be duly recognised, particularly by allowing staff members to attach their own names to documents and projects for which they are responsible and to publish books or articles in professional journals under their own names without prior clearance.

This article has analysed the bureaucratic structure of international institutions in an attempt to discern internal structures susceptible to change—an approach common to observers of the level of national decision-making but rare among students of international organisations. A decidedly negative evaluation of international administration, as presently constituted, results. However, there is no reason to accept the continual decline of the ideal of global civil service. The reforms here proposed demand no reversal of international legal precedents, and their feasibility is demonstrated by early experiences of the League of Nations. Further, the suggested reforms demand no additional finances; in fact, they would free existing finances for more programming.

If international organisations were considered effective service organisations, and if recruitment and promotion reflected commitment to internationalism, a qualified and devoted staff could be assembled. Reform would free monies for additional programming and provide a working example of the equity and justice (in the more consistent life-styles among professionals, support staff, and the local community) toward which the administrative effort is ultimately directed.

university degree. Even more striking, 31 per cent of P-4 and 18 per cent of P-5 posts are filled by persons who had never completed a single university course. Although a university degree or experience may not guarantee competence and wisdom, this kind of lack of education raises serious questions about the ability of supervisors to understand and to guide an increasingly complex world and technical assistance geared to it and it suggests the extent to which non-technical considerations dominate senior appointments and promotions to it; See: Bertrand, *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit*, A/8454, pp. 51–52 and 117.

The United Nations is a fragile organism at an early stage of development, and every effort must be made to nurture it. It is vital to reverse the movement away from the conventional paradigm and to create a global civil service. The potential utility of international institutions in the future will reflect the administrative realities of managing an interdependent world. As two observers have noted:

> If the UN is to help design and administer programmes to meet these global needs, then not only must there be a political consensus among a certain minimum of member states; the member states must also have confidence in the ability of the UN's professional staff to do the assigned task competently.[43]

The international civil service has come to sacrifice imaginative initiatives to the imperatives of national interest bargaining and institutional security. The international administration has thus contributed significantly to past failures in co-operation. It must likewise figure predominantly in prescriptions for change.

43. Finger and Mugno, *The Politics of Staffing*, op cit, p. 1

BOOKS

THAILAND BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION

*Roger Kershaw**

MORE than any other state in the ASEAN group Thailand occupies a geographical location which makes it vulnerable to objective external threat, and at a subjective level convinces significant sections of the Thai people (no longer confined to the elite) that this is so. Thus it is impossible to do justice to the dynamics of contemporary Thai politics without keeping the international context constantly in view. Foreign policy either is, or is felt to be, concerned with real issues of national survival, while the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is seen by decision-makers as the local extension of an international secular religion devoted, if not to foreign occupation, then certainly to the destruction of Thailand's social distinctiveness and cultural autonomy (and thus not as the indigenous product of socio-economic change and dislocation—even though they acknowledge the Party's skill in nourishing itself on such dislocation and appealing to national sentiment). Perhaps most significantly for domestic politics, holders of power have developed some skill in persuading the Thai public that counter-insurgency measures and the regulation or limitation of democratic rights are effected in the cause of national independence, because rural insurgency or the institutional 'burrowing' of Marxist students during unrestrained democracy are aimed at the destruction of core Thai values which are as much a component of independence as freedom from foreign occupation (regardless of whether a Thai communist government would align with a particular foreign state or bloc).[1]

From this viewpoint government inputs into the domestic political process take on qualities of an extension of the foreign policy process, just as much as the CPT has operated in a context of international communist solidarity and world revolution. One of the most consistent themes in Thai political dynamics since the demise of royal absolutism in 1932 has been the defensive response to 'revolution in the east'. Not only Field Marshal Sarit's 'development decade' of the 1960s but the reforming efforts of liberal politicians in the mid-1970s (after the overthrow of Field Marshal Thanom's regime by a student uprising) can be understood as defensive or pre-emptive responses, directly or indirectly, to communism in Indochina and China. The military restoration of 1976 was an even more direct response, the 'foreign' danger being projected (in right-wing imagination) into the heart of Bangkok by Thai (and especially second generation Sino-Thai) students who had themselves taken heart from 'red stars in the east'. Ironically, October 1977 yields yet another example, where the military ousted Prime Minister Thanin, the King's nominee, partly on the grounds that his rejection of both democracy and detente was playing into the hands of Thailand's communist enemies! But there is a detectable tendency among Western political

* Roger Kershaw is a Lecturer in Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Kent. On his last visit to Thailand, mid-1977-September 1978, he was affiliated to Chulalongkorn University.

1. On the imposition of alien custom see the interview with defector and former student leader Seksan Prasertkun in *Tawan Mai*, Jan. 19, 1981, translated into English in *Thai Information Bulletin*, May 1981.

scientists to deny these external sources of domestic political dynamics—because the extent of external menace is sometimes demonstrably exaggerated; or because contemporary methodology is shot through with sociological, even Marxist, biases (which latter do in fact allow, even emphasise, 'international capitalism' or American imperialism' as external factors having political relevance); or because in their own roles as 'international political actors' hoping to thwart (or promote) the Thai revolution, Western political scientists must not permit their impact to be compromised by currently unfashionable (or unhelpfully revealing) perspectives.

These strictures are not to be taken as applying in any way to two outstanding new publications from Thailand. They are both the product, in part, of American cultural penetration of Thailand, more precisely of the training of Thai scholars in American universities in the 1960s, and then their acceptance of the desirability of communicating their research findings to an international scholarly audience in English. The documents in the edition[2] were in fact translated and annotated by three scholars: historian Dr Charnwit Kaset-siri ('The Crisis of Royal Authority, 1932-1938'); political scientist Dr Thinaphan Nakhata ('National Consolidation and Nation-Building, 1939-1947'); and political scientist Dr Thak himself ('The Emergence of Military Power Politics, 1947-1957'). This book should be compulsory reading for any Western student of Thailand before he reads any work of description or analysis whatsoever. It may be objected that such translations will give Western scholars an alibi for not learning Thai. But there are many worse economic and institutional pressures than this at work to prevent the proper study of Asian languages. On balance it is probably best that Thai scholars should stimulate foreign interest in Thai studies in this way; a few serious, language-based commitments may follow.

One of the most interesting documents in Dr Thak's section of the book is the play 'The Prowess of Phokhun Ramkamhaeng', of 1954, by the nationalist publicist Luang Wichit Wathakan. 'Its political message', Dr Thak points out, 'is one that traditional political ideas of "father figure" or the *phokhun* is a benevolent concept of leadership acceptable to the public' (p. 744). One will be struck also by the recurrent theme of national defence. This is all highly relevant, and points the way to the published version of a Cornell University thesis—a study of the foundations of modern Thai politics in the person and regime of a latter-day, non-royal *phokhun*, Field Marshal Sarit.[3]

The return to a quasi-traditional Thai paternalism after the ineffective constitutionalism of the later Phibun was termed a *pattiwat* or 'revolution'. Actually, the 'Revolution' of 1932 is rarely so called in Thailand, but it was more progressive than Sarit's *pattiwat*, which put constitutionalism into reverse and brought the monarchy back into the limelight—though without any independent political role as long as Sarit himself lived. The international context played a not inconsiderable part in the decision to seize power in 1958: Proclamation No. 4 of the Revolutionary Council invoked (inter alia) the internal communist menace, the deteriorating situation in Indochina, and the growing animosity of Sihanouk's Cambodia. At the same time, regime legitimacy was to be sought largely through *phatthana*—development—without any salient security rationale. However, as the situation in Laos deteriorated in 1961, Sarit's development plans came to focus increasingly on the north-east, with counter-insurgency considerations—and

2. Thak Chaloemtiarana, ed., *Thai Politics Extracts and Documents, 1932-1957* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978)

3 Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979). In publication the book has lost little of its thesis structure but its methodical development makes it the easiest of the present set to read and absorb; it also has the virtue of being both witty and humane about this larger-than-life dictator.

American advice and money—occupying a dominant position and influence. Out of this nexus between Thai and American goals grew, in turn, one of the serious contradictions of the Sarit regime and its successors which preoccupies analysts of the 1970s more than Dr Thak himself (though see p. 262): the alienation of village people by the novel penetration of a corrupt and arrogant police presence into remote areas. But the contradiction in Sarit's legacy which Dr Thak has most to say about is the rise of the monarchy to a position of political primacy from which it can overshadow or frustrate the pretensions to legitimacy of democratic statesmen and military politicians alike.

Next in order of readability, and thoroughly up-to-date, comes the latest in the new Cornell series, 'Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia', edited by Professor Kahin.[4] The subtitle is misleading inasmuch as this is essentially a book about modern Thai politics only, but it does accurately reflect or betray a certain bias towards sociological and economic explanation of political phenomena (cf. the strategically placed Chapter 2, 'Economic Change—Political and Social Implications'). Once we assume the primacy of forces of social change it becomes reasonable, for instance, to place the chapter on the CPT right at the end (Chapter 7, 'Revolutionary Alternative') with no more than six brief references to the Party in earlier chapters. This is perhaps the best indication of the author's orientation, if not vision, regarding the natural interrelation and sequences of social and political change, and the shape of political things to come. It seems implicit that the social forces which gave rise to the great florescence of participatory politics between 1973-76 are still present, quietly fermenting, even if denied a strong political impact for the time being; the frustration of that impact by reactionary violence can only postpone, not pre-empt, the day of reckoning; indeed it guarantees that the reckoning will be violent when it comes—as every good liberal knows without John Girling's reminder (p. 12). Consistently with this paradigm of the roots of revolution, Chapter 6, 'External Involvement', is concerned predominantly with American involvement, whose motives and guiding perceptions Girling ridicules with generous sprinklings of inverted commas around words or phrases such as 'subversion', 'free world bastion' and 'nation building'. Yet the 'sociologistic' approach also leads the author to document across fifty-three pages of Chapter 4, 'Political Structure', the institutional strength of the traditionally dominant groups and supporting values, leaving only sixteen pages for the new, extra-bureaucratic forces, while in the Conclusion he acknowledges that the assets of the ruling system remain powerful: 'Although the trend is toward decline, it has not yet reached the stage when assets become "liabilities" . . . [the elite] is flexible, not rigid; pragmatic, not doctrinaire' (p. 288).[5]

The book was apparently commissioned as a result of an article which listed

4. John L. S Girling, *Thailand Society and Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), with no less than 650 footnotes, some long and detailed. But this extensive apparatus seems to arise partially from the author's reliance on a great deal of secondary source material rather than a social science research project or projects of his own. One important source is, in fact, the MS of David Morell, Chai-anan Samudvanija, *Political Conflict in Thailand. Reform, Reaction, Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.. Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981)—see below—to which Girling had access

5. Or see Chapter 1, 'Past and Present', pp. 18–19, emphasising elements of continuity from the past, as well as change. (Presumably the significance of these lines is that continuity will persist in times ahead too) Chapter 1 constitutes an immensely painstaking conducted tour through the Western literature on Thai traditional social structure and world-view However, like some of the writers from whom he quotes, Girling is ambiguous about whether 'loose structure' is a structural concept or equivalent to eclecticism in personal behaviour; and if the former, whether that type of structure (connected in some mysterious way with the ancient kingdom of Sukhothai) is the dominant influence on modern politics or a more structured structure (derived somehow from Ayuthaya) or both. An attempt is made to relate both these contradictory models to a theory of Thai Buddhism but in the process Thai Buddhism yields no convincing explanation of anything in particular. On p. 187, regarding 'autonomy and interdependence' at the Provincial level of the bureaucracy, it appears that patron-client relations are both inhibitory to, and the essence of, functional interdependence. Nor did I gain much from the almost Freudian suggestion of p. 43 that the student riots of October 1973 were an eruption of

democratic conservative consensus as one possibility for further development two years after the October 1973 Uprising.[6] I am thus surprised by an admonition to myself (p. 207) for assuming that consensus already existed, in an article which merely (like Girling) treated it as a desirable, though realisable, objective of political institution building.[7] My real fault may be to have attached the principal blame for the non-crystallisation of such a polity or political culture to student Marxism. Girling is singularly unsympathetic—and thus, I feel, unperceptive—towards not only the profound culture shock which the emergence of student Marxism occasioned in conservative circles, but also (despite the concluding nod in the direction of elite 'pragmatism') the capacity of military leaders and bureaucrats to understand the need for democratic conservative consensus and to chart an imaginative course towards it after the initial failure of 1976 (p. 228). Is it only a misprint that places the right-wing violence against students *after* the coup (p. 117), as if the coup aimed to facilitate and condone that violence rather than put an end to it (and see also p. 156)? Marxists did, we are told, take over the National Students' Center of Thailand (NSCT) by 1975, 'yet a distinction could still be drawn between radicals and revolutionaries' (p.200). As for the mock hanging at Thammasat University of a student who even without makeup looks like the more intelligent twin of the Crown Prince—the incident which led quickly to the Thammasat massacre and indirectly to the coup—Chapter 5, 'Political Performance', would have us believe that the student only 'appeared to resemble the Crown Prince', let alone that the resemblance could be said with any certainty to have been intentional (p. 214). A book which sets out to provide an empirical account of politics rather than to theorise (unless it be in a latent, implicit way) perhaps needs to marshal more evidence in relation to any controversial matter than Girling does here, whatever the particular author's conclusion.

Much as Thak's study takes its strength from the ability of a cultural 'insider' to relate Sarit's patrimonial regime to pervasive values of Thai society such as love of 'properness' or good order (*khwam riaproy*), so Dr Chai-anan, as nominal co-author (surely main author?) of *Political Conflict in Thailand*, sets a tone of cultural and philosophical authority for the whole book with Chapter 2, 'The Heritage of Political Values and Symbols', wherein are explained other important Thai concepts such as the derogatory *len kan muang* (to play politics), abhorrent *woon wai* (nuisance, confusion), solidarity-awakening *roon diew kan* (same graduation class), and intangible, mysterious *barami* (inherent grace, charisma). Dr Chai-anan also has the advantage of having been an actor in some of the politics he analyses. In one structural respect, too, the book is superior to Girling's, in concerning itself almost exclusively with the rise and fall of parliamentary democracy in the mid-1970s, rather than going in search of a quintessence of 'Thai politics' which tends to prove elusive, or subject to many exceptions, in times of rapid change.

By aspiration, and to a considerable extent in its achievement, the book is a study of a new democratic system 'in overload', giving a fine sense of the cumulative interplay of all factors. The CPT is introduced where it properly belongs, among 'Challenges to the traditional order' (Chapter 4), following 'Traditional political institutions and modern Thai politics' (Chapter 3), and there is a good section on how the military variously perceives, and explains, insurgency (even if the book as a whole is rather thin on the international dimension). As it was not the CPT but the NSCT that was immediately responsible for the demise of the Thanom regime in 1973, Chapter 6,

---

tensions engendered by pressures for conformity in a culture which exalts individualism. I suspect that it is not so difficult for Thais to be Thai as some Western observers have imagined.

6. J. L. S. Girling, 'Thailand: Conflict or Consensus?', *The World Today*, Feb. 1976.

7. Roger Kershaw, 'The Denial of Pluralist Democracy in Thailand', *Art International*, Jan. 1978. I have more recently returned to the theme of this article in 'Thoughts on the Return of a Thai Son', *Asian Affairs*, Feb. 1982.

entitled 'The student movement, catalyst for the new politics', may seem a little awkwardly placed, coming *after* 'The parliament and the electoral process', Chapter 5. However, Chapter 6 is also concerned with the radicalising effect on some students of participation in the government's Democracy Propagation Programme;[8] and with the subsequent dominance of Marxist leaders and values in the student movement. Both developments were a sequel to initial democratisation, and the student movement neither created nor greatly upheld the democratic institutions but always seemed more apt to challenge them. Chapter 7, 'The Labour Movement and Modern Thai Politics', and Chapter 8, 'Farmers and Modern Thai Politics', continue the examination of new political forces whose vigorous socialist image and mutual alliances added to democracy's crisis of legitimacy on the Right and increased political polarisation (cf. Chapter 9, 'New Rightist organisations: Response to Threat') to the point at which a military coup was viewed as a desirable alternative well beyond the ranks of right-wing activists.[9] Chapter 10, 'Breakdown of the Coalition and Return to Military Rule', covers aspects of military politics and Cabinet government in the same period (1974-76) and, in an admirably balanced way, the increasing alienation of the monarchy from democracy (p. 271).[10]

This is a book that prompts few reservations. Yet it does have a strong and incongruent line of rhetoric which breaks surface now and again in patches of *New York Times* prose coloured (for 'objectivity'?) with the jargon of political science. Take for instance:

> Operating under political dynamics of their own, Buddhism and the revered monarchy had been dragged into the fray, suggesting levels of vulnerability matched in their terrifying implications only by the pervasive fear of communism itself. The lines of political conflict were becoming clearer than ever before as Thailand moved inexorably toward an uncertain but potentially devastating destiny (p. 280).

Or again, in only slightly more optimistic vein, the closing lines of the book, a veritable 'message to the Thai nation':

> We continue to believe that, though replete with vulnerabilities, Thailand's leaders and people have the capacity to combine their inherent strengths of political heritage and royal legitimacy with the necessary measures to accelerate social equity, political participation, and economic development. This optimistic hope is by no means preordained, however. For though they have the capacity, whether they have the political will to make the necessary tough decisions and carry through into an uncertain future remains to be seen (p. 315).

If the authors really fear the worst in repression or social myopia from Thailand's ruling groups, and see the CPT as an indigenous political force flourishing without foreign help, it is understandable that they should have reprinted with little revision an

8. See pp. 151-54 and moreover pp. 287-89: some students were contacted by CPT cadres while 'teaching democracy' to the peasantry. As Dr Chai-anan explains, there were in fact two distinct programmes (not one as in Kershaw 1978, *op cit*); but both operated under government auspices, albeit the first was not administered from the bureaucracy (Kershaw 1982, *op. cit.*, may be in error in identifying both the sponsoring and administering group as the Constitution Drafting Committee; but Dr Chai-anan was both a leading light of the original Democracy Propagation Programme and the principal author of the 1974 Constitution)

9. The omission from Chapter 7, at least, of any suggestion that the assassination of peasant leaders was responsible for the radicalisation of students seems to give implicit confirmation to a hypothesis advanced in Kershaw 1978, *op. cit* , and 1982, *op cit* But it is also made clear that by 1976 the assassinations had effectively removed the Farmers' Federation of Thailand as an active component of any political process: right-wing organisations increasingly held the initiative.

10. In the following section the mock hanging of the 'Crown Prince' is also handled with balance: the resemblance of the student actor to the Prince is described as 'startling' after the makeup was applied.

out-of-date article from *Asian Survey*[11] as Chapter 11—'Changing Revolutionary Capabilities in the Post-Coup Period'—mentioning the return of Seksan Prasertkun only in the last footnote, while failing in the post-1976 section of Chapter 10 to reveal that new elections were held in 1979![12] But it is surprising, conversely, that they deal relatively unsqueamishly with the Marxist, not to say Maoist, trend in student politics between 1974-75, in Chapter 6. Why the great transformation from Morell's original perspectives on 'liberal activism'?[13]

One cannot but speculate whether Morell's emotional wings have been clipped by the more lucid Chai-anan and whether the inconsistencies of analysis or style reflect the moments at which the American author nevertheless succeeded in asserting his point of view. May it not have been better for Dr Chai-anan to write the book un-'aided'? Of course he too wishes a more liberal Thai polity to emerge, not only because it corresponds to a personal ideal but as a defence against communist revolution. But his work may have suffered some distortion from the partnership with the highly 'political' American Professor, star of House of Representatives Hearings on Human Rights.[14]

If, in Morell and Chai-anan, there is only a latent hint of reluctance to give the CPT its due as a dynamic element in the decline of democracy, and no evidence that this could reflect a desire to preserve credibility with a particular audience, a celebrated broadsheet of the post-coup period attracts strong suspicion on both counts.[15] This essay was originally presented to the House Hearings,[16] nor is it published by Ohio University simply as a historical document (which would have undoubted interest) but apparently for purposes of ongoing pressure on American public opinion to demand certain minimum standards of political conduct from Thai governments: for apart from a considerable number of revisions in the wording, there is an Appendix by two of the writers, taking cognisance of the removal of Thanin.[17]

Among the highly 'political' features of this document must be counted the claim (pp. 2-3) that the United States' traditional friendship for Thailand was expressed, even at the height of the Vietnam war, by concern to develop Thailand's economic, social and political institutions.[18] Even odder are the delicate references to an 'insurgency' without once revealing the existence of a Communist Party (the authors must have feared that their American audience was sales-resistant to new exhortations to resist the onward march of Asian communism; yet unlike the NLF of South Vietnam, the Thai Party has never been afraid to call itself Communist). Similarly, and

11. David Morell and Chai-anan Samudvanija, 'Thailand's Revolutionary Insurgency Changes in Leadership Potential', *Asian Survey*, April 1979.

12 And is it merely journalistic artifice that on pp 273 and 281 makes the coup of 1976 seem like a premeditated army strategy, even though the contrary is affirmed on p. 276?

13 David Morell, 'Political Conflict in Thailand', *Asian Affairs*, Jan -Feb 1976—not to be confused with Roger Kershaw, 'Thailand after Vietnam: after Vietnam Thailand?', *Asian Affairs* (UK), Feb. 1976. The arguments in the two articles are more easily distinguishable than the names of the journals.

14 See House of Representatives Sub-Committee on International Relations, *Human Rights in Thailand* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977) However 'asymmetrical' the academic partnership in question, it must be stressed nonetheless that Thai liberal academics had good reason to value the political efforts of American 'patrons' like Morell during the difficult year after the October 1976 coup. This is the side of a symbiotic relationship which corrects any apparent imbalance of advantage.

15. William Bradley, David Morell *et al., Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for U.S Policy* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1978)

16. *Human Rights in Thailand, op cit*, Appendix 2

17 An event not entirely unconnected, indeed, with the Washington Hearings and the appearance of the original draft of *Domino by Default?*, but clearly not reassuring enough to have made the writers start laying down pens and resting on laurels.

18 This may be true, but is not what was said in Morell and Chai-anan, p. 91. The image of a benevolent, ever-giving United States is presumably conjured up to persuade the American public of a tradition—and thus continuing obligation—of concern for Thailand. At the same time consciences are pricked by reminders that the United States in some ways did not reciprocate the good will of its Thai clients in recent times.

with perfect consistency, the belief on the Thai Right in 1976 that student political activities were in any sense, or even in some cases directly, communist, is laughed out of court. It is true that the Ohio version has moderated the authors' stand on the 'hanging of the Crown Prince': they say it has been 'debated ever since' whether the press photo had been retouched (in the House version it was 'clearly' retouched). They are also marginally less confident about the 'Thai' nature of the insurgency: when the insurgent leaders come in from the hills following the predicted collapse of the existing system they will 're-educate the populace along Marxist lines, hopefully with a Siamese tenor' (cf. the House version: 're-educate the populace along Socialist lines, very possibly with a highly Siamese tenor'). But the memorable, highly unsympathetic account of the King's role in October 1976 is unchanged.[19] A rotten tree needs no communist moles to sap the roots!

The political potential of American academic expertise—or hopes, at least, of such a potential—are illustrated most entertainingly by the proposal for expanded recruitment into area studies in order to make American foreign policy more culturally sensitive. On which note may appropriately be introduced a second Ohio volume,[20] in which four American Thailand specialists and a non-specialist (Ben Anderson of Cornell) take a detached, and very serious, look at the 'state of the subject' within their respective disciplines. This is very much a specialists' book. It would be impossible in a short space to do justice to these five versatile people doing justice to the ever expanding diversity of work in Thailand (including, now, sophisticated publications in Thai). One comes away with the depressing sense that the next generation of Western scholars are going to have to devote lengthening periods to the mastery of the Western literature in their own disciplines, let alone the Thai literature and then the broad interdisciplinary exposure which the contributors agree is so urgently required, along with a knowledge of other Southeast Asian societies—vital antidote to the peculiar obsession of Thailand specialists that Thailand is unique.

The anthropologist, Charles Keyes, makes a cogent plea for understanding the impact of political economy, even international factors, on the Thai world-view and social structure—a point which is well taken, even by political scientists if they have fallen under the domination of certain anthropological perspectives, and provided that the 'international context' is allowed to include the expansion of Marxist ideology and communist power. On the other hand, the historian, Constance Wilson, bemoans the pervasive influence of social science and the fashion for model-making; her plea for more Thailand-specific approaches and the collection of facts seems at odds with what underlies Keyes's essay, but ironically draws some of its emotional strength from anger at the effects of (admitted) American cultural and economic penetration of Thai society. The essay by political scientist Anderson, also no great friend, and no denier, of American involvement in Southeast Asia,[21] has already achieved some fame in Thai

19. In 1979, *after* the restoration of limited democracy, a Thai writer made bold to publish a translation of the Ohio version but was cautious enough to leave out the four paragraphs on the monarchy: Ekarong Rangkhaprathib, *Hed kan bog Tula nai thadsana nag wichakan Amerikan* (Bangkok: Samnagphim Lanna, 1979). A far more 'understanding' account of the monarchy in October 1976, invoking a presumed dynastic crisis, is Roger Kershaw, *The Changing Face of Monarchy in Southeast Asia: Three Political Portraits* (London: Contemporary Review Reprint, 1979). However, note that: (a) provision for succession by a female dates from the 1974 Constitution, being merely reiterated in 1978; (b) the marriage of the Crown Prince to his cousin seems more likely to reflect a preference in principle, by the Queen, for that kind of union than the author originally believed, for the Queen's earlier 'overtures to a member of the court for the hand of his daughter' (p. 25) are now understood to have related to another niece.

20. Eliezer B. Ayal, ed., *The Study of Thailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, History and Political Science* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1978).

21. *Cf.*, on Thailand, Ben Anderson, 'Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, July-Sept. 1977.

studies circles for its self-consciously provocative critique of the royalist doctrine that the Chakri dynasty preserved Thailand, or built it up, as a truly independent state, and a modern or stable one. Anderson blames the acceptance of this 'myth' by Western scholars partly on the theme of Thai distinctiveness and 'unchanging essence' in American anthropology. (This seems in consonance with Keyes, albeit, more like Wilson where she stresses Thai uniqueness, Anderson is saying that certain traditional features of the Thai state have indeed been preserved—but precisely by Western intervention.) But the extent to which these characterisations are mythological will surely depend, in part, on one's definitions of 'independence', 'modernity', and 'stability'. From his viewpoint as an economist, David Feeny reveals how difficult it is to achieve specialist consensus about the effects of the rice premium or whether peasant tenancy *is* in fact increasing (news such as this might have a salutary effect on the gloomier type of prognosis about Thailand's political future);[22] while Professor Ayal, in a comment, argues that the economic conservatism of the nineteenth century elite was well calculated to preserve national independence.

It may be regretted that Anderson does not try out the 'disguised colony' thesis on post-Second World War Thailand—his essay seems to raid historians' territory and says nothing about contemporary politics.[23] Still, it is not too difficult to guess what the conclusions would have been in such an event. The left-wing 'paradigm'—to borrow a term from the contemporary radical armoury—is as much a 'paradigm' as anyone else's. It may be comfortable for some to see Thai revolution as the result of Western-inspired ossification and 'reaction', but there is a range of non-revolutionary Thai strategies, from 'reaction' to 'democracy', which would bear alternative analysis as responses to revolution in the East—always subject to the proviso that Thai elites have shown a capacity for monitoring their own performance and changing strategies when the need arose.

22 Feeny's paper was written before another factor for stabilisation came to light: the quite sensational drop in rural fertility rates (*cf* Hugh Leong, 'Letter from Chiangmai', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov 14, 1980).

23. The essay's title: 'Studies of the Thai State: the State of Thai Studies'.

Review of the Foreign Press 1939–1945, Series A, Vols I-IX, Enemy Countries; Axis-Controlled Europe; Series B, Vols I-VI, The European Neutrals and the Near East; Series C, Vols I-III, The Americans, the U.S.S.R. and the Far East; Series D, The European Allies, 1939–1940; Series E, The Dominions, 2 vols; Series N, The U.S.S.R. and Far East, 1943–44; US (Research Memoranda), 2 vols; Latin American Memoranda, Series 1, February 1940-December 1942 and Series 2, January 1943-June 1945, 2 vols; Series F, France and the French Empire, 1943–1945; The Near and Middle East, June 1943–June 1945. Munich: Kraus International Publications for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1980-81. (Distrib. in UK by KTO London.)

*D. C. Watt**

This, at first sight, enormous publication is merely one example of the manner in which a handful of publishers, nearly all American, are turning the most modern printing technology to the large-scale unedited reproduction of archival sources. The cost of the publications are so great that only the larger research libraries are likely to be able to afford them. But the demand, world-wide, is sufficiently great, and the cost of international travel so high that the publishers are clearly performing a great and very necessary contribution to current historical research. At the very least the individual researcher hunting for travel grants in vain may find it easier to persuade sources of funding to buy the sources as reproduced for his institutional library, where others besides himself can consult them, than to sink money into the chances that his visit to the archives—wherever they are located—may produce a set of notes from which he on his own can make some worthwhile contribution to the advancement of learning; or so the argument runs.

The *Review of the Foreign Press* is not the least interesting of these publications to any historian of the Second World War; while its publication is by way of an act of pious ancestor-worship for Chatham House today (and an awesome reminder of what the Chatham House of the 1930s regularly could and did do for its members). It was designed to provide the Foreign Office and its other recipients with a weekly appreciation of the press of most of the countries of the world. It was prepared by the staff of the Information Department of Chatham House who for the duration of the war moved en bloc into attachment to the Foreign Office. Physically, their centre of activity was moved from St James's Square to Balliol College, Oxford, where they remained until 1943 when, having been metamorphised in 1940 into the 'Foreign Research and Press Service (RIIA)', they were united into the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD). From the summer of 1943 until the end of July 1945 their pieces were published from the address: Research Department, Foreign Office, Whitehall. The imminent end of the war in the Far East then separated the Chatham House side of FORD's activities from the rest and returned it to St James's Square and the freedom, as well as the austerity, of Mr Attlee's Britain and peace.

The consumers of their product were in part the Political Intelligence Department, itself stuffed with names familiar to Chatham House members and the history departments of the universities: Llewellyn Woodward, G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, G. E. Hubbard, John Hawgood, R. W. Seton-Watson, M. H. Macartney, among others. In

* D. C. Watt is Professor of International History in the University of London.

1944 the Research Department surfaces in the Foreign Office List (while Political Intelligence disappears into the shadows) and we find, under the headship of Arnold Toynbee himself, the names of Sir Alfred Zimmern, the future Sir Charles Webster, the late Tom Marshall, Britain's most distinguished sociologist, J. D. Mabbott, W. S. Edmonds, Geoffrey Hudson, Robin Humphreys, C. A. Macartney, and F. P. Walters—once of the League of Nations Secretariat and its most distinguished historian.

The product of this enormously distinguished galaxy of historians bears the unmistakeable stamp of the Toynbee-Wheeler Bennett school of writing on current international affairs. Comment is kept to a minimum; a narrative summary of the main themes expressed in the foreign press is brilliantly boiled down to three to four pages per country, at first roneoed, but from the summer of 1940 onwards printed in the same manner as the Foreign Office's own confidential print. As the series extended the academic hand steadily took over from the journalistic—the occasional special supplements, enlarging on a theme the unnamed editors thought required more than three or four paragraphs to develop, increased in number; the regular weekly summaries dwindled down to 'notes on the week' until in July 1943, with the move to Whitehall and the surfacing of the Research Department from the mists of political intelligence, the weekly summaries disappear and series of numbered memoranda appear in their place. In part, of course, this was dictated by the very differing rates at which the newspapers of the world arrived in the hands of those responsible for digesting them. After all, the rates of delivery of the press of occupied central Europe, let alone of Uzbekistan or of Kuomintang China, (flown over the 'Hump' into India by US Air Force transport planes returning empty from aid deliveries) could not easily be made to coincide in time with the regular deliveries of the American or Iberian newspapers.

The quality of the memoranda is never less than workmanlike; though there are times when they are not much more than précis-writing which must have wearied the writer almost as much as it does the reader. They are also, as their title makes clear, reviews of the press and nothing more. No effort has been made to dovetail them with the other sources of similar intelligence: the weekly political reports from the British embassy in Washington, so recently published by Professor H. G. Nicholas, for example, or the reports of the BBC Monitoring Services. Occasionally in the early reports (on France, for example) one will find a quotation from a private letter, but they do not recur.

As such, the series tend in part to reflect the interests or special abilities of the historians, or so it must be inferred. The twenty-six memoranda on the Soviet Union between 1943 and 1945 for example, show the oddest concentration on the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoys no less than four lengthy memoranda, second only to Soviet Central Asia and Islam with six of the twenty memoranda. At a time when the major preoccupation of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office was how far the Soviet Union could be expected to continue co-operation with the West once the common enemy had disappeared, and *War and the Working Class* was watched with careful suspicion to see what light each new issue could throw on the matter, such detachment seems to reflect a lack of co-ordination between the academics and the desk-bound policy-makers which is at first sight surprising.

The brief volume devoted to the press of the Allies, France, Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium (Series D, before they move over to Series A, 'Enemies and Enemy-Occupied Territory') is equally revealing. The summaries deal in detail with the French political press; yet very little appears of the fundamental hostility of the embryo *Vichysois* of the Right, both to the Third Republic and to Britain. In part this was, of course, due to the French censorship; but very few French censors could match the allusive abilities of the French right-wing journalists, and the

press summaries are as blank as every other kind of reporting to Britain from France of the real deterioration of French morale. What these reports do bring out however is the degree to which, even in the winter of 1939–40, wide ranges of French opinion were talking of a postwar federation of Europe and welcoming the increasing integration of French and British war-making capacity and institutions as a first step towards this goal.

Perhaps the biggest gap in the whole coverage of the world press in the years 1939–45 is the absence of any direct coverage of the 'Final Solution'. Recent books by Walter Laqueur and Martin Gilbert have shown that a careful scrutiny of the world press, including that of the neutrals, reveals if not a wealth certainly a sufficiency of press reportage on the subject. Readers of the wartime *New Statesman* will remember reports on the subject, as they will remember Sir Osbert Sitwell's unfortunate attempt to equate these reports with the manufactured atrocity propaganda of the 1914–18 war. There are a great deal of references to German anti-Jewish propaganda and to the measures of deprivation of property, rights and citizenship imposed on Jews in each of the occupied countries of Europe. The courageous stand of the Belgian Catholic hierarchy, especially the Bishop of Liège who made February 28, 1943 a day of prayer for the Jewish people, and the Nazi effort to forge the approval of the Dutch hierarchy for their measures, is covered. A chilling sentence on the disappearance of Jewish medical practitioners in German-occupied Russia in March 1943 and references to the evictions of Jews from the German East towards the Polish *General Gouvernement* can also be found. But the only full-length memorandum, No. 250 of November 14, 1944 to deal with the Jews of a particular country covers the Jews of Bulgaria, depicted as more fortunate than others. The deportation of 10–12,000 Jews from Bulgarian-occupied Macedonia and Thrace in March 1943 is noted with the chilling comment, 'Their subsequent fate is unknown'. Perhaps if the organisation of FORD had been less fragmented into their respective national pigeon-holes, the Foreign Office might have had advance warning of the realities of the Final Solution, they might have had some idea of the head of fear, misery, agony and desperation which underlay the Zionist activity over the next four years.

Among the most interesting, and most detailed memoranda, are those dealing with the United States. These demonstrate both the strength and the weaknesses of the Chatham House approach. For any historian who wishes to study the evolution of American opinion during the Second World War on the major issues of American foreign policy, especially during the period of American neutrality, this review makes almost indispensable reading. The observations are shrewd and well-informed and the coverage is by no means limited to the east coast press. Newspapers covered range from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Atlanta Constitution*, the *Cleveland Plan Dealer*, the *Des Moines Register*, and the *St. Paul's Pioneer Press* to the *Los Angeles Herald-Express*, the *Denver Post*, the *St Louis Post Dispatch*, and the *Wall Street Journal.* The authors of the memoranda have the papers carefully labelled in their own minds politically, and so presumably did their readers. Nowhere among the memoranda however is there any analysis of the American press or of the structure of ownership and political orientation. The reader is even expected to be able to identify which papers belong to Colonel McCormack's chain, apart from the *Chicago Tribune*, and which to the Scripps-Howard press. The reader has to make his own alignment, either by reference to the specialised studies by American historians of the isolationist and interventionist movements (which do not necessarily cover detailed studies of the regional press) or by pencil and paper classification of the newspapers mentioned.

These records are an excellent guide both to the newspapers and press sources mentioned and to the image of events in Europe and the world constructed by what must have been one of the most able and well-informed branches of political intelligence gathering at the disposal of any of the powers engaged in the Second World

War. Where these records need supplementation is in assessing how far their work was incorporated into the policy-making process. The political files of the Foreign Office reveal that the work of the Research Department was used from time to time and valued by the political departments which sometimes solicited special memoranda on specific topics to enlighten, even to overawe, selected ministers or tip the balance against one of the Prime Minister's particular fancies. One member, Sir Charles Webster, was to play an important part in the British side of the drafting of the United Nations Charter. But what became of the regular output remains unclear. The historian who assumes that these careful and illuminating reports in any way reflected the views of the policy-makers, without careful investigation of the files of the political departments, is courting disaster. These are a guide to the perceptions of a section of British opinion, and a guide to the events they portray—an exercise in contemporary historical analysis by some of the giants of the British historical process. As such they are a valuable addition to the sources we already have and shed an indispensable light on the intellectual history of Britain in the years of the Second World War.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary. Vol. 4: Europe 1946–1979. By Rosalyn Higgins. *Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1981. 419 pp. £40·00.*

THIS is the final volume of Professor Higgins's tetralogy of documents and commentary relating to United Nations peacekeeping operations. With the wide acclaim received by the earlier volumes (Volumes 1 and 2 receiving the Certificate of Merit of the American Society of International Law), this final volume has been greatly anticipated.

Sub-titled *Europe*, the volume begins with an analysis of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), which is included due to its establishment in 1947 of observer groups in the frontier areas of Greece. Its inclusion is important, as Professor Higgins suggests, because UNSCOB:

> marked the UN's first tentative steps towards peacekeeping through the establishment of subsidiary organs in the field; it showed an early realization of the limits of 'enforcement action' orthodoxy and the need for the consent of host states; and it illustrated at this early stage the inevitable evolution of an active Assembly role in such operations (p. 5).

This part of the volume also addresses the Balkan Sub-Commission of the Peace Observation Commission, which replaced UNSCOB in 1952 and maintained military observers in the frontier areas of Greece until 1954.

The second part of the volume (which takes up four-fifths of the book) relates to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). While this series of volumes began by being entitled *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967*, those interested in United Nations operations in Cyprus will be pleased to find that the analysis of UNFICYP (including the Force's civilian police unit, UNCIVPOL) begins with its establishment in 1964 and continues through much of 1979. Consequently, full reference is made to the critical events occurring in the mid-1970s (the Greek-instigated coup d'état on July 15, 1974, the subsequent Turkish military intervention on July 20, 1974, and the unilateral declaration of a Federated Turkish State in the Turkish occupied area on February 13, 1975) which have left, what seems at present, an indelible mark on Cyprus. Professor Higgins's analysis of UNFICYP is of particular interest because the Force is the longest running of the major United Nations efforts at peacekeeping, completing its eighteenth year as of March 4, 1982 (this observation is not meant to overlook the record of service of smaller observer groups such as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [UNTSO] which came into existence in 1948, or the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan [UNMOGIP] which came into existence in 1949).

The materials in both parts of this volume are very well organised. All those familiar with the first three volumes of this work will know that the documents and

commentary relating to each peacekeeping operation are divided into twelve analytical categories: introduction; enabling resolutions and voting; functions and mandate; constitutional basis; political control; administrative and military control; composition and size; relations with contributing states; relations with the host state; relations with other states involved; finance; and implementation. As with the earlier volumes, this facilitates comparative analysis with the same facets of different UN operations documented in the several volumes.

Shortly after the withdrawal of the second United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai in 1979, Joseph Sisco (US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 1974-76) evaluated the role of UN peacekeeping by commenting that, 'there is a lot wrong with the United Nations, and this has led to diminished reliance on it, but UN peacekeeping remains a valuable option that should not be diminished . . . In peacekeeping, the UN record remains noteworthy'. For those interested in examining this record, Professor Higgins's excellent work is indispensable. These four volumes provide more than an invaluable collection of primary source materials relating to UN peacekeeping operations; Professor Higgins's lucid commentary shapes these documents into an extremely informative narrative.

RICHARD KENNEDY GUELFF

Europe Under Stress: Convergence and Divergence in the European Community. By Yao-su Hu. *London: Butterworths for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1981. 120 pp. £12·00*

THIS is the second book to flow from a Chatham House project on the political implications of economic divergence in the European Community. Basing his analysis on 'convergence' and 'divergence' as dynamic concepts, implying an intensification of the process in each case, the author focusses on ways in which the members of the EEC appear to be moving towards and away from each other over a period of time. The EEC itself is seen by the author as little more than a 'framework in which sovereign nation-states interact with each other' (p. 9).

This focus on the nation-states takes up most of the first part of the book. What emerges is that the term 'convergence'—now firmly established as part of the Community's jargon—means different things to different people. For example, West Germany is anxious to see a 'convergence' of inflation rates downwards towards its own low levels. On the other hand, the British and the Italians would like to see a 'convergence' of per capita income levels that implies substantial transfers of capital from the richer parts of the Community to the poorer. There is, therefore, considerable divergence of views as to what 'convergence' actually means.

In the second part of the book, the author looks at five policy areas: agriculture; external commercial relations; energy; the European Monetary System; and the Community budget. Despite the very different levels of success achieved in these policy areas, the author is at pains to point out that, even in an apparently cohesive Common Agricultural Policy, national expenditure and national priorities are really paramount and the system of MCA's is little more than an attempt to paper over the cracks in the whole edifice. A similar point is made when he explains that the so-called 'regional ceilings' (in the Common Commercial Policy) are just old-fashioned national quotas.

Although it is not the purpose of the book to proclaim it, the reader cannot help being left with a strong impression of West Germany's hegemony in the European Community—even despite balance of payments difficulties. Not only is the Federal Republic the world's largest exporting country but it accounts for 31 per cent of the

Community's GDP, 37 per cent of its foreign exchange holdings, and 28 per cent of its gold holdings. Through the successful operation of the European Monetary System, West Germany's interests in holding down inflation rates and steadying exchange rate fluctuations are maximised. An implicit condition for greater capital transfers via the redistributive mechanisms of the EEC is stricter financial control in the would-be recipient member countries. To cap it all, West Germany appears to be mopping up large gains from the Common Agricultural Policy—something that used to be considered a French prerogative! In its attitude towards the EEC, an appropriate image for West Germany is that of a gentle giant, almost absentmindedly finding itself prosperous and looking upon the rest of Western Europe as a back garden that has to be tidied up, kept in good trim, and fenced off from predatory neighbours!

The book represents a distinct challenge to those who still fondly harbour optimistic thoughts about future integration in Western Europe. In particular, the author's suggestion that political integration should precede economic integration undermines most of the neofunctionalist assumptions on which the Community is based. Nevertheless the book will be of great value to students of European integration. Its account of the operation of the European Monetary System; its straightforward description of how MCA's work; and its sage comments on Britain's budgetary wrangle with the EEC will all commend themselves to those who seek to find the way ahead. Whether the way ahead lies along the path of a 'two-tier' Europe or a 'variable geometry' Europe is open to question but what is beyond question is that the balance between divergence and convergence in the EEC is the essence of its survival.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis. By Kenneth W. Thompson. *Baton Rouge, La., London: Louisiana State University Press. 1980. 249 pp. $20.00. Pb: $6.95.*

Morality and Foreign Policy. By Kenneth W. Thompson. *Baton Rouge, La., London: Louisiana State University Press. 1980. 197 pp. $16.95.*

KENNETH W. THOMPSON has made a major contribution to what is often called the 'classical' tradition of international relations theory, not only with his voluminous writings but also indirectly through the financial support given to the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics by the Rockefeller Foundation, of which he was Vice-President for many years. Both aspects of his contribution have gone against the dominant trend of behavioural and quantitative analysis in the American study of international relations. The two books under review reflect both his continuing preoccupation with normative theory and his cosmopolitan approach.

Of Thompson's eighteen *Masters of International Thought* five are British, eleven American and two European, although many of the Americans have continental origins, as Thompson makes clear. He has grouped these 'master thinkers' into four sections, each of which has its own introduction: The Search for a Normative Foundation for Politics (Herbert Butterfield, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Courtney Murray, Martin Wight); Power and Politics (E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Nicholas J. Spykman, Arnold Wolfers, John H. Herz, Karl W. Deutsch); Conflict and the Present Crisis (Walter Lippmann, George F. Kennan, Louis J. Halle, Jr., Raymond Aron); World Order Theorists (Quincy Wright, David Mitrany, Charles de Visscher, Arnold J. Toynbee). A chapter is devoted to each writer and follows a fairly standard

format—biographical details, intellectual formation, a brief summary of his major works, an assessment of his influence, and a short bibliography.

Any evaluation of the book must consider these profiles not as definitive studies but as introductions designed to provide background and encourage the reader to delve into the works of the 'master thinkers' themselves. On this basis the book should be warmly received, although some chapters are fuller and more informative than others. The book is a welcome antidote to the increasing fragmentation of the discipline of international relations, reminding us that there is an intellectual core to the subject. The paperback edition would be a useful supplement to the introductory texts usually assigned for new students of international relations.

Thompson's almost hagiographical approach to his chosen writers does, however, sometimes pall. 'Intellectual giants' stride through these pages—for example 'this remarkable theologian' (Niebuhr) and 'one of Britain's immortals in traditional historical writing' (Butterfield) (p. 2). Thompson does not disguise his admiration for many of his thinkers; indeed he freely admits in his preface the subjective side of his undertaking. This is most evident in his treatment of those whom he has always regarded as his intellectual mentors: Niebuhr, Kennan, Morgenthau, and Halle.

The latter also figure prominently in *Morality and Foreign Policy*, which represents a further elaboration of Thompson's own brand of ethical realism. The book is somewhat misleadingly described by the author as a 'treatise' (p. xi), for it is largely a skilfully edited compilation of his most recent journal articles. Despite its wide-ranging content (touching on religion, law, political philosophy and other areas), its basic focus of concern is American foreign policy. One chapter is largely concerned with the ethical basis of such doctrines of American foreign policy as 'no entangling alliances', manifest destiny and Wilsonianism, while another presents 'case studies' on issues which were much debated in the Carter era: human rights, foreign assistance, education and culture, and world poverty. At one point we are treated to a list of those sayings of Reinhold Niebuhr which President Carter is said to have underlined in a biography of the theologian (p. 143).

The overall theme of the book is Butterfield's familiar characterisation of moral choice as 'inescapably tragic' (p. 76). Thompson's basic assumption is that 'the viability of an approach to political morality can be measured by the help it offers for understanding and action when "concrete values collide at any human crossroads" ' (p. 177). The American ethos, Thompson implies, is essentially anti-tragic, for it is unwilling to accept the 'realization of the unbridgeable gulf between human aspirations and attainments' (p. 161). Perfectionist ethics, science and Marxism are all dismissed as attempts to bridge the unbridgeable. What Thompson recommends instead are the well-tested maxims of statecraft (e.g. those embodied in the model of the good and virtuous diplomat) and the counsels of prudence, defined here as 'the wise application of the principles of justice to the contingencies of interest and power in political life' (p. 181).

Although some discussion of philosophical traditions (monism v. pluralism, transcendentalism v. relativism) is provided, there is little awareness of the important contributions which such Anglo-American political and moral philosophers as Thomas Nagel, Michael Walzer, Stuart Hampshire and R. M. Hare have made in the application of moral reasoning to international relations in recent years. In addition, Stanley Hoffmann's *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), which provides a more systematic exposition of the main issues (use of force, human rights, distributive justice), is now available. We should nonetheless be grateful to have the most recent reflections of an acute observer of the international scene brought together in a convenient form.

University College of Wales: Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics. By Stanley Hoffmann. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1981. 252 pp. $18.00. Pb: $9.95.*

THE author himself says of this book that it will be called naïve by the realists and timid by the utopians. 'So be it' he shrugs (p. xii). It is an attempt to reconcile realism with the demands of morality, to incubate the germ of cosmopolitanism in a world of states, and to provide avenues for peaceful coexistence among antagonistic cultures. The book turns out, in the end, to be more realist than utopian, but it is not content merely to repeat stale anti-utopian maxims.

The method of the work is that of 'applied ethics': not, the author says, in the Walzer manner (*Just and Unjust Wars*) of moving from the ought to the is, but in seeking to 'uplift politics', groping from the is towards the ought (p. 2). It is the work of a political scientist, not a philosopher, and Hoffmann's constant reference-point is to ask of any splendid moral theory whether it has any chance of working. Most of the theories he scrutinises fall at this fence. The substance of the argument about the possibility of ethical international politics is organised in three chapters: on the just war, on human rights, and on the problems of distributive justice. The argument is especially impressive on the difficulties confronting a foreign policy of human rights, and on the practical consequences of theories about the causes of the structural inequality of the globe. Hoffmann's talent for combining topicality with historical and theoretical depth is much on view here.

Hoffmann feels the pull of the revolutionists' arguments, and seems to wish sometimes that he could join in their simplicities. Certainly, he is persuaded that neither incrementalism nor moderation will do in reforming the international system: the size of global problems (such as nuclear proliferation and resource scarcity) require social engineering and not mere tinkering. But he is in fact much less impressive in his last chapter on solutions than he is in the brilliant statement of problems both in the first chapter, and in the introduction to each of the substantive chapters mentioned above. He gives a statement of the structural, philosophical and political limits on moral choice in international affairs that is fresh as well as profound. The Frank W. Abrams Lectures at Syracuse University were inaugurated with the essays collected in this volume. It will be a hard act to follow.

University of Keele R. J. VINCENT

Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and its Presidency. Edited by Davidson Nicol. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon for UNITAR. 1981. 401 pp. $42.50.*

THE United Nations may be seen either as a potential world authority or as a mere tool to be used or ignored by states according to their purely national interests, but few dispassionate assessments would come to either of these extreme conclusions. More realistically, it is sometimes claimed that membership and participation in the world organisation can socialise statesmen and officials in ways which can erode their purely national predilections and create a long-term change in their perspectives on world politics. If this can be shown to happen not only in the 'technical' or functional areas of the United Nations activities but also in the 'high politics' of the Security Council itself, then there may be hope for global conceptions of common purpose.

In the collection of essays edited by Davidson Nicol, himself a former President of the Security Council, it is claimed at a number of points that the holding of this office and the gradual development of its practice might provide the basis for an underlying change in attitudes and expectations. As Kurt Waldheim asserts in his Foreword, 'We

need to learn from the rich experience of those who have served as Security Council President in order to understand the nature and the potential of the position in the conduct of multilateral diplomacy and in crisis management' (p. ix). Although the President's post is a fragile and temporary one, rotating every month among the members of the Security Council, it may nonetheless be claimed that it provides a reservoir of experience and shared dilemmas among a growing body of diplomats and politicians. Apart from three brief introductory essays, this volume consists entirely of the reflections of those who have held the Presidency, some of them once only, others (especially the representatives of the Security Council's permanent members) a number of times.

It might be expected that shared concerns and experiences would emerge from such a collection (twenty-five essays), and indeed they do. More than one President has felt the conflicting pressures of national and international loyalties; some have strictly separated the two, whilst others have never forsaken their national ties. Many have noted the growth of informal consultations and the search for consensus, rather than the confrontations induced by formal debates and voting; whilst several see this as a path of virtue, others are conscious of the danger that all public debate may be stifled in the quest for the lowest common denominator. All note the impact of the Council's enlargement during the 1960s and the influence of the non-aligned group. Some (e.g. Lord Caradon in ch. 5) claim to recognise a 'new parliamentary diplomacy' emerging from these processes, whilst others (e.g. Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, ch. 15) stress the multiplicity of ways in which the Presidency can channel views from members and non-members. Yet others (Ivor Richard, ch. 21) see the President as a blend of diplomat and politician, needing to choose with great care which role to emphasise.

Yet although a number of insights emerge from these and other chapters, the collection is patchy in the extreme. It is almost as if the contributors had been provided with headings under which to gather their thoughts, rather than being asked to muster their own 'rich experiences'. Some chapters are extremely short (one or two pages), whilst others lack a clear focus. Only very occasionally do we get a glimpse of the excitement and pressure which must accompany the Presidency (e.g. from Rikhe Jaipal, ch. 13). Even then—and despite the useful information contained in a number of Appendices—one is left asking what it all adds up to. Unfortunately, it doesn't amount to enough for any but the best-endowed libraries to consider this a worthwhile investment.

Coventry (Lanchester) Polytechnic MICHAEL SMITH

The Soviet Union and the Third World. Edited by E. J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 229 pp. £20·00.*

The Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cooperation and Conflict in the 1980s. By Robert L. Rothstein. *Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1981. 271 pp. $27.50. Pb: $12.00.*

AT first glance these two books seemed an interesting pair to compare. Together they would give a global view of the present and future relationships of the super-powers with the countries of the Third World. But they are very dissimilar. Rothstein is writing primarily for foreign policy practitioners and he is concerned with the future. Feuchtwanger's and Nailor's contributors are writing for academics and they are concerned with the past. Rothstein's concern for the future involves forecasting and his approach is normative. *The Soviet Union and the Third World* is descriptive. The most striking difference is between the integrated approach of a single author in *The*

Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy and the loose thematic connection between the contributions to *The Soviet Union and the Third World*.

Feuchtwanger and Nailor divide the essays in their book into General and Regional Aspects. In the general section Otto Pick discusses political and ideological aspects of Soviet-Third World relations, explaining that the correlation of forces theory permits the pursuit of great power policies without the infringement of ideological precepts. Johathan Alford describes the use made of military instruments since 1975, and Bert Pockney analyses Soviet trade with the Third World. Peter Wiles and Alan Smith examine the commercial policies of the Communist Third World. It is striking how small a proportion trade with the Third World constitutes of Soviet trade, and how little change there has been in the commercial policies of the Communist Third World. In the regional section Karen Dawisha looks at Soviet policy in the Middle East; Malcolm Yapp discusses policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, updating the section on Afghanistan in light of Soviet intervention. Michael Leifer describes Soviet policy in South-east Asia; James Mayall analyses Soviet African policy; and Christopher Clapham examines Soviet experience in the Horn of Africa. A strength of the book is that Soviet-Third World relations are seen as bilateral and the contributors enquire into the attitudes and policies of the Third World recipients of Soviet interest and attention. A weakness is that there is no chapter which ties the contributions together. The essays remain disparate, connected only tenuously.

Rothstein's policy-oriented book examines the North-South bargaining relationship to forecast possible future developments in the relationship between the United States and Third World countries. He examines how trends in food, energy, trade and debt will influence the choices of the developing countries, and derives possible policy alternatives for the United States. His prescriptions are in the tradition of 'pragmatic liberalism', defined as an approach which 'while fully desiring to provide as much help as possible to the developing countries . . . is necessarily less normative and more empirical [than pure liberalism]' (p. xv). He concentrates on the possible rather than the ideal. The United States requires a stable policy towards the Third World which will both protect its own interests and prevent an increase in the North-South divide. His book is an interesting contribution to an increasingly intractable problem. But even his 'pragmatic realism' seems rather optimistic.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. By Lawrence Freedman. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 473 pp. £25·00.*

THIS is an account of the ways in which attempts have been made to fit nuclear weapons into national (and, in the West, alliance) patterns of thought about security and war. It deals with issues that call into play rationality and rationalisation, deduction and emotion, fear and hope; and in that sense while it is a history of ideas it is also a catalogue of confusions. Not that it reads like a catalogue: indeed, it is no fault of Dr Freedman's that the book makes, in places, depressing reading or produces a sobering conclusion. Long hours on the Chatham House treadmill clearly have a refining effect, and the book is lucid, and well-written; but it consistently has a substantial content of insight and commentary which lifts it out of the category of first class *reportage*. Dr Freedman's aim, as stated in his Introduction (p. xvi), was to

provide a systematic and reasonably comprehensive treatment of the major themes of nuclear strategy, and he has successfully and enjoyably achieved that objective.

It is difficult to do the book justice in a short review. It is full of interesting and suggestive material, and although Dr Freedman concentrates on the strategic debate in the United States, he weaves into his account the apposite parts of the parallel debates in the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. One would normally pick out a couple of issues or themes, to illustrate, first of all, that the reviewer had actually gone through the book and secondly to demonstrate that one had both an illuminating and, perhaps, a condescending perspective to adorn the author's labours. I really do not think that this would be appropriate in this case. It is a major work, that will not only be very useful to the strategic community (sic) but to students of international affairs generally. One might reasonably, even nowadays, hesitate before recommending a £25·00 blockbuster for purchase, but if there can be an exception, either for personal edification, or for teaching use, this is it.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

New Directions in Strategic Thinking. Edited by Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 318 pp.*

Nato's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense. Edited by David S. Yost. *New York: Pergamon. 1981. 258 pp. $29.00.*

THE soldier-scholar has an honoured place in Academe, and if Major Horner is not yet as well-known in European as in Australian strategic circles, Robert O'Neill made his reputation years ago with his study *The German Army and the Nazi Party* (London 1966). Accordingly, one picked up their jointly edited collection of essays with pleasurable anticipation, noting with approval that, while the first drafts of the essays had been presented to a conference at the Australian National University in summer 1980, the conference was to assist in the shaping of the book, not the book to be a record of conference proceedings. One puts it down with mixed feelings. Its first section dealing with concepts governing super-power policies and world order is splendidly opened by Hedley Bull, well worth skipping Theodore Ropp's preposterous introduction. Bull's steadily maturing thought on force in international relations is well supported by Warner Schilling's deft guidance along the search by the United States for that strategic will o' the wisp 'sufficiently equivalent countervailing parity'. In turn, Schilling is ably buttressed by Geoffrey Jukes on Soviet strategy in general and by Roman Kolcowicz on Soviet approaches to limited war in particular. The next couple of essays are less satisfactory, but T. B. Millar's reflections on cohesion in the super-power alliances provide a sensible conclusion.

The remaining half of the book is devoted to sections on the strategic thinking of China, India and Japan; the developments of concepts governing non-nuclear warfare; and on political problems in the management and application of military force. The least satisfactory is section two, though J. D. Pollock's study in the evolution of Chinese strategic thought repays attention. In section three, Kenneth Hunt's crisp treatment (as always) elucidates, in this instance concepts of conventional warfare. But Richard Ned Lebow is less sure on managing relations with the Soviet Union in section four, and J. Owen Zurhiller—as a professional diplomat—is frankly disappointing on arms control.

Which seems to suggest that collections of politico-strategic essays require a more limited focus, an observation confirmed by *NATO's Strategic Options* as edited by a relatively young scholar, David Yost. The introductory essay by Robert Strausz-Hupé is provocative, possibly rumbustious; it precedes four excellent essays on the content

for defence decisions which cover Soviet and American military doctrine, nuclear politics, and speculation on the lessons of Afghanistan. The next section is opened by Robin Ranger; his contrasting of models of arms control in European security is less clear-cut because less specific than Colonel Keliher on MBFR, an essay which reinforces the reputation of the military for scholarship. Succeeding essays on particular defence options, however, reveal the importance of literary style. Samuel Cohen on the potential contribution of enhanced radiation weapons ought to be compulsory reading for anyone who has addressed himself one way or another to the neutron bomb; Uwe Nerlich on policy alternatives in chemical warfare would perhaps have a point were he to assert that his readers should make the effort to read what he has, after all, written in a foreign language.

Both volumes, then, provide an interesting range of contrasts; in both the editors provide useful contributions. Tyros in NATO studies will accord especial thanks to David Yost for his additional, valuable and detailed essay on sources for research in European security.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Strategy and the Social Sciences: Issues in Defence Policy. Edited by Amos Perlmutter and John Gooch. *London, Totowa, NJ: Cass. 1981. 99 pp. £12·50.*

THE *Journal of Strategic Studies* has joined the *Adelphi Papers* in having material already published between soft covers reissued in book form in order to reach new readers, new markets, and, presumably for the first time, reviewers.

Strategy and the Social Sciences is, then, an issue of the *JSS* in hardback—six papers rather than six chapters, by different authors, each illustrating (except Lawrence Martin's overview) an aspect of how thinkers approach questions of war and peace. Only 'peace research' is unrepresented, but not neglected—it collects a gentlemanly kick on the shins from Martin.

The predelictions of its editors have dictated the balance of the book. Two papers on military history, readable as they are, easily overstate its significance in this context. And the 'military sociological' contribution, from Andreski, in spite of its interesting theme that military dictatorships are relatively peaceable, is uttered in the sort of English we have come to expect from an ineptly programmed computer.

In a contribution bridging military history and strategic theory Aaron Friedburg promotes the idea that the United States has always had two strategic doctrines for its nuclear weapons. One is tacit, or underground, changes only very slowly, and is always well matched to the military capabilities at hand. The other is declaratory, which we all hear about, but which is more apt to lurch from one slogan to another pretty well irrespective of practicability.

Michael Nicholson's quiet and sensible introduction to what 'game theory' and 'simulation' have to say would have been better for more careful proof-reading (p. 80). But no amount of care would have ensured that it was read by strategic thinkers who have decided (perhaps by the spin of a coin) that what quantitative methods have to offer is not worth the mental investment they have to make in brushing up (from below floor level possibly) their schoolroom mathematics.

Whether Lawrence Martin ever contemplated spinning a coin seems rather doubtful, and he comes over so much the man of the middle way that had he done so the coin would probably have landed on its edge. He prefers middle-range theorising to what he sees as methodological top-heaviness; he speaks well of arms control as that middle portion between implausible disarmament and ever growing defence budgets;

and he praises limited war theorising as probably the greatest achievement of postwar strategic thinkers.

One final irony: when Martin does refer to arms control he takes it for granted that it will always be there, and when he wrote his piece, in late 1979, he was even a little unsure as to what kind of work remained for strategic thinkers to do. Obviously he need not have worried. What is now far more worrying is whether, in the English speaking world at any rate, people capable of taking in what strategic thinkers are trying to say are ever again going to reach high office.

University of Lancaster IAN BELLANY

Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. By Richard Ned Lebow. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by CCJ.) 350 pp. £14·75. $30.60.*

THIS book makes important contributions to two bodies of international relations literature: the substantive historical literature relating to the twenty-six crises which Lebow selects for analysis and the theoretical literature on crisis causation and outcome. It is rich in historical detail and extensively footnoted throughout, providing the reader with primary source documentation in French, German and English and excellent bibliographic references for the study of cognitive and motivational influences on decision-making. Certain crises are given more attention than others in this work, with greatest emphasis placed upon Fashoda (1898), the July crisis (1914), Munich (1938), Korea (1950), the Sino-Indian border dispute (1962), and the Cuban missile crisis (1962). The book will be of special interest to students interested in specific aspects of these six crises.

This reader's principal theoretical criticism of Lebow's book concerns the author's typology construction. Lebow categorises his twenty-six historical cases according to three inductively derived types: justification of hostility crises, spin-off crises, and brinkmanship crises. His development of these three ideal types does provide us with some interesting insights about how crises develop and how they are managed by both initiator and respondent. The three types are, nevertheless, vague and not easily compared. Thus, for example, we find the author classifying the 1938 confrontation between Hitler and Chamberlain as a case of brinkmanship but employing it to describe the dynamics of a justification of hostility crisis. This reader also had some difficulty with Lebow's operationalisation of time as a factor in crisis decision-making and with the author's analysis of nuclear weapons as a factor in contemporary international crises.

These criticisms must, however, be placed in the proper perspective. *Between Peace and War* is a well-crafted and thought-provoking analysis of the sources and dynamics of international crisis. Lebow offers valuable conclusions about the sources of international crises (e.g. perceived need is a more important source of aggression than perceived opportunity) and the determinants of effective crisis decision-making (e.g. 'When leaders are committed to a policy, the various techniques advocated by theorists to improve the quality of decision making have little chance of adoption . . . [p. 297]). Lebow's book should be considered for adoption in graduate seminars on crisis or decision-making. It would also be a useful recommended text for a seminar on international relations theory and methodology since the author gives students a good sense of the difficulties involved in any conscientious effort to formulate valid generalisations about complex historical events.

University of Southern California, Munich DOUGLAS T. STUART

Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry. By James Turner Johnson. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1981. 380 pp. £20·00.*

THIS book is a sequel, and a very welcome one, to the same author's *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200–1740.* (Princeton and London 1975). But it does not start where the former work left off, and the author does not hesitate where necessary to cover the same ground again. This time his scope is far broader. He studies the whole idea of 'The Just War', both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, from Augustine to the limited-war concepts of our own time which he rightly sees as a branch of the main tradition; and he studies it *as* a tradition—not as a 'theory'. It is a tradition which, as he points out, has manifested itself in many guises. There is the Christian tradition based on *caritas*, on concern for others, so strongly expressed in our own time by Paul Ramsey, and there is that other, more Thomist tradition based on perceptions of divine law. There is the chivalric tradition originally grounded on the self-interested *mores* of a warrior caste, but still persisting (to an extent Professor Johnson does not explore) in the ethic of professional soldiers. There is the utilitarian tradition of the eighteenth century, when limitations were anyhow set by technical capabilities. There is the legal tradition stretching back to Grotius and Vattel, trying to reduce warfare to a practicable means of settling differences within systems of states. And there is the contemporary concern for limitation in the interests of the sheer survival of the human race. In all of these the question of *jus ad bellum* addresses itself to the three basic issues of right authority, just cause and right intent, and that of *jus in bello* to those of discrimination and proportionality.

Professor Johnson's eclectic approach has presented him with some problems of organisation that he has not entirely solved, but it has resulted in some interesting and unusual emphases. He is interested primarily in the problem of reconciling different cultural perceptions of what is 'just' in war, and he dismisses the usual criteria of 'civilised' or 'humanitarian' behaviour as verging on cultural imperialism. His heroes therefore are those thinkers who were aware of this problem and tried to solve it; particularly the sixteenth century Spaniard Victoria, who pointed out the injustice of trying to foist European Christian ideas of justice on the natives of Mexico and Peru, and to a lesser extent Gratian, who deserves more credit than any other teacher for successfully reconciling Christian restraints with the medieval warrior culture that the Church had to tame. Interesting also is his identification of the American Civil War as the first modern, total war, and of the consequent importance (pointed out also by Geoffrey Best in his *Humanity in Warfare*) of Francis Lieber's codification of the laws of war in his *General Order No 100* for the armies of the Union.

Altogether this is a most distinguished contribution to the literature of this enormous subject: useful and thought-provoking as well as scholarly.

Oriel College, Oxford MICHAEL HOWARD

The Structure of International Conflict. By C. R. Mitchell. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 355 pp. £20·00.*

SCHOLARS of international relations tend to emphasise the uniqueness of events at the interstate level whereas conflict researchers take the pragmatic view that there are no *a priori* limits to how social phenomena may be divided up. Any conceptualisation may prove rewarding and their aim is to explore the hypothesis that conflict at every social level from the inter-individual to the international has enough in common to count as a distinct reality. With this as his starting-point, Dr Mitchell addresses seven main

questions: what basic concepts are needed to analyse conflict? what types of conflict can be discriminated? what causes conflict? how do conflicts develop? what are the effects of conflict on the parties to them and on their environment? what outside factors exacerbate, moderate or resolve conflict? and why and how do conflicts end? His richly documented work gives insight into all of these questions in a carefully constructed terminology that avoids rebarbative jargon.

The book has four Parts. The first, 'The Structure of Conflict', argues that analysis should concentrate on conflict situations resulting from incompatible objectives. The contrary view (associated with Konrad Lorenz) that conflict is a product of instinctual aggression is set aside and much complicated language in the conflict research literature is brought into lucid uniformity. Part Two, 'Conducting Conflict', has two chapters each on attitudes and behaviour. Those on attitudes give precision to, and survey the current state of knowledge about, such ideas as that conflict progressively dehumanises the opponent and that the conflicting parties develop mirror images of one another. 'Conflict Behaviour' provides a wide-ranging typology of conduct aimed to be an instrument for coercing an opponent, influencing a third party, etc. 'Conflict Behaviour as Communication' emphasises how important and difficult the opponents' (and third parties') *understanding* is in even the harshest conflict. It should be compulsory reading for those who imagine that it can ever be sufficient to say that war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to comply with our will.

Part Three, 'Ending Conflict', reviews the very numerous difficulties of getting a settlement. One emerges from it battered, marvelling that conflicts are ever resolved. Part Four, 'Containing Conflict', distinguishes various types of strategy for conflict 'management' and has a chapter on peacemaking. In an 'Afterword' Dr Mitchell argues that his book reflects the current 'pre-theoretical' state of conflict research, clearing away difficulties as a preliminary to genuine empirical theory-building.

The feasibility of a 'genuine science' of conflict is debatable but this book is valuable regardless. It is attractively written and timely. Summaries, diagrams and excellent jokes help the reader through a necessarily abstract argument. ('What do you mean, "My country right or wrong"? Since when has our country ever been wrong?') Many of the principal works to which Dr Mitchell alludes were written during the Kennedy era, when strategists tried to heed the human factor. A later generation of strategists, obsessed with technology, argues as though conflict research had never existed. This new survey is an admirable challenge to them. One can only hope that Macmillan will issue a paperback at a price students can afford.

King's College, London BARRIE PASKINS

Contemporary Terror: Studies in Sub-State Violence. Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. *London: Macmillan for the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts. 231 pp. £20·00.*

THIS book comprises ten papers presented to the seventh course of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, held in Italy, August 1979. The papers by Yonah Alexander and David Carlton have been previously published in *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Westview 1979), and that of Alessandro Silj on Italian terrorism is a reprint of the introduction to his book *Never Again Without a Rifle!* (Richard Karz, 1978). Of the seven previously unpublished papers none has been updated to take account of developments and fresh research published over the three years since 1978. More damaging still, there appears to have been little or no editorial effort to extract the wheat from the chaff.

Is there anything in this expensive volume which would justify its purchase by

specialist libraries? In the third contribution, Bernard Feld, Professor of Physics at MIT, takes an informed look at the dangers of nuclear violence at non-governmental level; it was also an excellent idea to include Werner Pfeifenberger's paper on 'Chinese and Soviet Attitudes Towards Sub-State Violence in the UN Context'. He is particularly successful in characterising the official attitude of the Chinese regime:

> With regard to the manner of guerrilla warfare Peking has developed its own rules of *ius in bello*. Enemy governments have to heed at least the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Peking stresses this obligation from time to time. Indeed the Chinese argue that such governments are bound by even stricter rules. But the guerrillas need heed no convention at all: they have to fight 'without mercy' . . . As to terrorism, it is a crime committed mainly by governments, not by individuals or groups of insurgents (p. 67).

Despite some lack of detail on the Soviet position, this chapter's value lies in bringing to light the totally opposed philosophies of human rights confronting each other across the world's ideological divides.

There are two contributions to this volume which are of enduring quality. The first is Jillian Becker's case study of the rise of the Rote Armee Fraktion. It is superbly written and is the only piece in the whole volume that provides convincing portraits of the leading terrorists themselves, and shows how their personalities and relationships interplay with political, social and economic factors. She shows vividly how the RAF terrorists tired of the dry determinism, 'programmatic declarations' and 'waffle' of 'proletarian internationalism', and quotes in support of this claim, from *Das Konzept Stadtguerilla*: 'the Red Army Faction speaks of the primacy of praxis. Whether it is right to organise armed resistance now depends on whether it is possible; whether it is possible can only be determined practically.' The RAF are by no means unique among terrorist groups in this ultimately subjective and arbitrary practice of violence. This is why it is so important to try to understand the beliefs, fantasies, ambitions and temperaments of individual terrorists which so often find twisted expression in cruel deeds.

The second gem is a long and profound article by Frank Wright, of Queen's University, Belfast, on 'The Ulster Spectrum'. Despite the many important developments in the Province since it was written, it can still be read with profit by anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict. As befits one of that small group of academics who have made a close study of the ideology and political behaviour of the Loyalist population, Frank Wright has many valuable insights into the constraints posed by Protestant paramilitarism against any attempt to impose either an IRA victory or some form of unification with the Republic. He has also been proved wise in his assessment that:

> Nothing really constructive can emerge from direct rule so long as the integrity of the national conflict preserves the essential ingredient of British mediation. British mediation guarantees that all political pressures are applied to the British mediator and that there is no incentive to the traditional leaderships to seek accommodation with each other (p. 200).

Three years later this still remains the most immediate problem facing the British government in Northern Ireland. Somehow the political vacuum in the Province must be filled. A new framework of government must be constructed in such a way as to protect the political rights and participation of the minority and to provide a means for the moderate parties in both communities to work constructively together, leaving the violent extremists isolated.

University of Aberdeen PAUL WILKINSON

The Three Per Cent Solution and the Future of NATO. *Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 1981. 118 pp. $6.95.*

THE three per cent in the title of this book refers to the commitment made by NATO members in May 1977 to raise their defence budgets by this amount, beyond inflation and over a five-year period to commence in 1979. This sharp little study traces the origins of this commitment in the concerns over weaknesses in the alliance's conventional force posture in the mid-1970s, and demonstrates the connections with the Long-Term Defence Programme, adopted in May 1978, which was supposed to find ways to use existing resources more efficiently.

This is a partisan study. The authors make much of the budgetary shenanigans by which the Carter administration attempted to reconcile the three per cent commitment with a general, initial, disposition to hold down defence spending and the needs of the fight against inflation. They then chart the way in which the deterioration of the international situation, and the consequent conservative shift in American public opinion, led to three per cent coming to be viewed as a floor rather than a ceiling. The partisan tinge is made clear by the fact that the Director of the study, who contributed a preface, was none other than Alexander M. Haig—now American Secretary of State.

However the bias is explicit and does not detract from a well-written analysis that provides a useful case study of the difficulties of alliance diplomacy, especially when it comes to budgets. For Haig, 'the history of the Three Per Cent Solution illuminates the problem of allocating enough for defense in an era of detente, the welfare state, and low growth'. There is little evidence as yet that the administration of which he is a member has discovered any more convincing answers to this problem.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World. By Anthony Verrier. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1981. 172 pp. Pb: £5·95.*

THE history of United Nations peacekeeping forces is the history of a conflict between fervent idealism and brutal practicalities. Dag Hammarskjold's belief in peacekeeping by persuasion has hardly ever over more than twenty years been justified by events. Not surprisingly it has been soldiers, like the Ghanaian General Erskine in the Lebanon, who have, through force of circumstances and to protect their men from death or humiliation, injected the realism necessary for the management of violence. United Nations soldiering, as Anthony Verrier repeatedly shows, is an arduous, thankless task and one not suitable for amateurs.

At the core of the problem has been, and remains, an inherent contradiction between the United Nations precept of using force only in self-defence, and the tasks given to the military component. In the process the question of the extent and limits of United Nations authority in such situations has never been satisfactorily determined. As a result theory has stood in the way of effective practice and there has been continuous scope for public misunderstanding. Major-General H. T. Alexander, British Chief of Defence Staff of the Ghana Army, persuaded *Armée Nationale Congolèse* units in the Congo in 1960 to lay down their arms and was taken to task by Ralph Bunche and other United Nations officials—on the essentially academic grounds that he had no authority to do so.

Anthony Verrier's concise, but by no means skimped, account of successive United Nations operations demonstrates effectively, and depressingly, the continued failure to grasp this nettle. It is one of the strengths of his book that it is timely, not only in the historical sense that twenty-five years have passed since the first United Nations

Norwegian troops arrived in Port Said. For some time now the deployment of a United Nations force in Namibia has been under active consideration. This, as Anthony Verrier rightly asserts, brings us back 'to the point where the study of international peacekeeping began: unless a UN—or any other—international force is both politically neutral and can express its authority, can *enforce* its presence, it is liable to create insecurity, not remove it' (p. 54). South Africa can, and has, already claimed that the impartiality of such a force is in question because the United Nations General Assembly has recognised the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) led by Sam Nujoma as the sole authentic voice of the Namibian people. Others, including Mr Verrier, see the proposed force, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group for Namibia (UNTAG) and the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) on the border as primarily determined by security conditions imposed by South Africa.

UNTAG is the first preplanned United Nations force: it was, at least initially, supposed to do everything from preventing guerrilla infiltration to providing an interim administration. Its military component has been attacked by South Africa first as too large and then as too small and composed from the wrong sources. This time a United Nations or other international military presence will, if it is to have any chance of success, have to have unequivocal backing and a clearly defined role. Britain's original offer of a signals unit for UNTAG is still on the table but it clearly should not be sent to Namibia unless the force as a whole has much more authority than was allowed to the Commonwealth Monitoring Group in Rhodesia.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role. By C. R. Mitchell. *New York: Nichols. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot, Hants.) 169 pp. £11·50.*

IN some kinds of conflict—interpersonal and intra-organisational, for instance—it is possible, and fruitful, to bring the parties together in a neutral setting in the presence of one or more consultants who can help them to see the conflict as a whole as a problem to be solved. John Burton, as he reported in his *Conflict and Communication*, published in 1969, is one of those who have attempted to apply a similar approach to international conflict. Now Chris Mitchell, who has worked with Dr Burton, offers us a rationale, a survey, a pedigree, and a taxonomy of such consultations, and has articulated, and attempted to answer, the objections that might be made to them. The objections are articulated more convincingly than they are answered.

Dr Mitchell's conception of conflict is clear but one-sided. He cogently refutes Marxist and other notions that there are irreducible conflicts of interest, concluding aptly that 'while conflict might be "objective" at a particular point of time, changes in the parties' aims, calculations, preferences and evaluations that occur over a *period* of time render it changeable and hence an intensely subjective phenomenon' (p. 31). Unfortunately, this leads him to a brusque and uncomprehending dismissal of bargaining theory, and even economics in general, on page 32; a neglect of game theory, masked by loose contrasts between 'constant-sum' and 'variable sum' conflicts; and an unsupported claim that 'traditional mediation techniques have aimed only at "satisfactory compromise" as opposed to conflict resolution' (p. 40).

In the language of Anatol Rapoport (whom, amazingly, the book nowhere mentions) international conflicts are 'games' as well as 'fights' and 'debates'. When, in a well-argued chapter (ch. 6), Mitchell explains that parties are often unable to resolve their conflicts without third party aid, because of the strategic disadvantage to whichever side moves unilaterally from 'bargaining' to 'problem-solving', he comes

close, in effect, to conceding this. What is missing—and what an analysis couched in terms of a sequence of prisoner's dilemma games might have supplied—is an explanation of how 'consultation', repeatedly characterised as 'non-committing', 'informal' and 'non-directive', eliminates this consideration.

Mitchell's own explanation of how consultation works is that it induces the participants (who are not usually the decision-makers in a conflict but may have close access to them) to conceive of their conflict as an instance of conflict in general to which conflict theory applies. To that end, he tends to endorse John Burton's view that 'the really crucial element in a successful consultation is the nature of the information injected into discussions by the consultant' (p. 131). (What now becomes of the claim to non-directiveness?) As to the effects of 'consultation', he is well aware that the necessity for informality and secrecy makes them virtually impossible to demonstrate; but when he says (without citing any source) that 'there exists a great deal of qualitative evidence about the impact of consultant exercises upon even international and communal conflicts, and most of it generally supports the claims and contentions put forward by proponents of consultant peacemaking' (p. 152), he is asking for too much to be taken on trust.

It has to be added that, though well-organised, the book is not very lucidly written. It is also badly produced. There is an abundance of misprints, some impairing the sense, and the type is uncomfortably small.

University of Sussex RODERICK OGLEY

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Ethnopolitics. A Conceptual Framework. By Joseph Rothschild. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. 290 pp. $29.50.*

PROFESSOR ROTHSCHILD's study reflects the widening interest in the ramifications of ethnicity which has arisen in American scholarship in recent years. Much detailed research has emerged from this movement and attempts at synthesis are welcome but this contribution aspires to do more than that. In the author's words, 'it is presented as a conceptual framework for further research and analysis'. He is not especially concerned to explore the psychological and cultural elements behind ethnicity, expert knowledge of which he is content to ascribe to others; rather, his essential purpose is to investigate the political mechanisms through which the basic 'markers', race, language, religion, etc., with which we are born may be translated into political assertiveness. There are salutary reminders that such politicised ethnicity is something which has been cultivated for various complex reasons in modern industrial states. Professor Rothschild makes pointed references to Liberal or Marxist academic colleagues who for ideological reasons have preferred to neglect its importance for the postwar world. He is right to do so.

As the author concedes, his approach is heavily taxonomic and this can make for a rather fragmented structure in places, but his writing is lucid and his arguments are clear and uncluttered. His examples reflect his own extensive knowledge of East European affairs and a wide reading in the recent literature on ethnicity and nationalism. These are rarely examined at length as Professor Rothschild prefers to hurry on with his arguments, assuming a considerable degree of knowledge on the reader's part.

The book explains the wide variety of political factors which may serve to trigger an innate but dormant ethnic awareness into a force which may demand, for example,

increased representation in a state structure, the right to secession from such an organisation, or even the reversal of an existing ethnic relationship. While it is a broad-based analysis, it is also a careful one in which the author avoids obvious traps. He eschews value judgments which have been known to cloud analysis; ethnicity may develop Frankenstein characteristics but it can also articulate positive values. He is also aware of the ways in which states can foster their own ethno-nationalism in a search for legitimacy.

This is an important study of a question which is basic to an understanding of the modern world. The concept of ethnicity as the acid test of a state's legitimacy, arising out of the French Revolution, shows no sign of abating and Professor Rothschild's book helps clarify why this is so.

The New University of Ulster, Coleraine T. G. FRASER

Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. By Amartya Sen. *Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press for the International Labour Organization. 1981. 257 pp. £8·95.*

THE question of 'basic needs', or their lack (i.e. poverty), or their extreme lack (i.e. starvation in the chronic case; famine in the acute case), have steadily moved into the centre of development analysis. And if the questions with which Amartya Sen deals in this 'monograph' (as he modestly calls it) are at the heart of development, his analysis in turn goes to the heart of that problem. It was originally written for the World Employment Programme of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In spite of its now almost anachronistic name, this Programme almost from its inception has moved beyond unemployment towards basic needs and poverty. If the Kenya ILO Mission may, perhaps, be described as a landmark on the way and the 1976 ILO World Conference an important stage, Amartya Sen's book may be described as the ultimate consummation.

Almost half of the book (including one of the important technical Appendices) are taken up with case studies of famine in Bengal (India/East Pakistan), Ethiopia, the Sahel and Bangladesh (Chapters 6–9 and Appendix 1). These case studies show that some of the worst famines have taken place without any significant decline in food availability per head. The other half (Chapters 1-5, 10 and Appendices A-C) contains the more general exposition of his 'entitlement system'. Although no doubt the special interest for many readers will be in the actual famine cases, in the limiting framework of a brief review we will concentrate on the general entitlement approach.

Sen's starting-point that famines are not only, and generally not essentially or mainly, a question of lack of production or ultimate supply, but rather of markets, of distribution, buying power, access or entitlement (all terms used by different analysts), has by now become widely recognised and accepted—if not always effectively used as a basis for policy. As Sen puts it with characteristic incisiveness at the beginning of his book: 'Starvation is the characteristic of some people not *having* enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there *being* not enough food to eat.' This reviewer prefers the term 'access' or 'command' to 'entitlement' because (as Sen indicates on p. 2) entitlement implies a concept of 'legitimisation', whereas illegally obtained income or power can provide access to food equally with 'legitimate' means. That, however, is a minor point and Sen is naturally aware of the existence of 'non-entitlement transfers' and corresponding 'limitations of the entitlement approach' (pp. 48-50). An author is entitled to his terminology, and Sen's is one of the best and memorable throughout this book—memorable in the way he builds up, from the definitions of entitlements and their interrelation in the modes of production, a powerful tool for understanding

causes of poverty and famine. The reviewer does not wish to doubt that entitlement failure is the major cause of poverty and famines.

Repeated references to 'the elimination of starvation in socialist economies'—with China in mind—sound strange just now in view of events in Poland—but who could claim *that* much foresight? But is the case of China beyond doubt?

This is a truly seminal book. Even in the short time since publication, this book—and of course the earlier manifestations of its approach in articles dating back to the mid-1970s—have helped to shift the attention of policy-makers and international organisations away from excessive concentration on food production to broader issues of 'food security'. The thirty-three page bibliography is evidence of Sen's deep grounding in the preceding discussions of this basic subject.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex H. W. SINGER

International Production and the Multinational Enterprise. By John H. Dunning. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 439 pp. £20·00. Pb: £8·95.*

Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets. By Alan M. Rugman. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 179 pp. £11·95.*

THESE two books have much more in common than their shared concern with the multinational enterprise. Both authors are economists writing in a common intellectual tradition; Rugman makes reference to the debts he owes to the Reading school of which Dunning is chief. Both are centrally concerned with the creation and exposition of a general theory to account at one and the same time for spatial and institutional characteristics of world production. Both employ the same literary form of theme and variations to organise their recent papers on multinationals. Thus each book has as its second chapter a theoretical essay which acts as the springboard for a series of extended glosses which elaborate, test, predict, and prescribe from the basic theory.

The essence of the eclectic approach pioneered by Dunning in recent years is that the decision about whether to supply a foreign market by exports, by a licensing agreement with an indigenous firm, or by direct foreign investment is explained by analysis of comparative advantages of which some are specific to locations and some to firms. Examples of the former are government policies, input costs, and transport costs; examples of the latter include patents and trade-marks, organisational and research expertise, and economies arising from intra-firm diversification, and integration and scale of production. Firm-specific advantages are further sub-divided into those which may and those which may not be marketed to the satisfaction of the seller. The existence of this last category is vital. Advantages of location explain why particular sorts of production take place where they do, but it is only the fact that there are some firm-specific advantages which cannot be sold without conferring substantial unrecoupable benefits on third parties that explains why so many firms have chosen direct foreign investment rather than licensing arrangements in situations where locational advantages argue firmly for foreign production. The motive to retain or internalise a firm-specific advantage arises most obviously from the public-good characteristics of knowledge, which Rugman identifies as 'the oil which lubricates the engine of the MNE' (p. 41). To sell knowledge is not only to lower the barrier to a single purchasing firm; it is also to surrender control over further sales of that knowledge and so risk complete dispersal of market advantages. In these circumstances substitution of an administrative system for the market may be the simplest way in which the monopoly rents available from technological or organisational innovation can be maximised.

It is the breadth and comprehensiveness of these new explanations of international economic relations rather than passages more specifically concerned with political questions that should commend these books to students of international affairs. Rugman and Dunning, good liberals that they are, both remind their readers that many practices of multinationals to which national governments have taken exception, such as the abuse of intra-firm transfer-pricing, are no more than rational responses to price-structures already distorted by earlier government policies. It follows that 'some of the concerns of host countries towards MNEs could in fact be removed by the rationalisation or harmonisation of certain national economic policies and institutions' (Dunning, p. 197), at which point the economist retires, refusing to be drawn into political analysis of the feasibility of such seemingly innocuous and costless adjustments. Similarly, while Rugman subtitles his book 'the economics of internal markets' he is in fact almost exclusively concerned with explaining how the economics of imperfect markets may lead firms to internalise ownership-specific advantages, hardly at all with analysis of the administrative structures which they substitute for markets, and which he rather misleadingly refers to as internal markets.

Of the two, Dunning is by far the superior analyst. Rugman too often argues by citation or by emphasis; he has taken insufficient care to eliminate repetition and is apt to provide barriers to the non-economist by unnecessary symbolic representation of common-sense analysis (especially pp. 57–60). Dunning, by contrast, writes careful and precise prose in which the line of argument is always clear and generally persuasive. Moreover, in the revision of the 1977 paper which as Chapter 2 forms the theoretical core of the collection under review, Dunning appears to have taken on board more than adequately the importance of the crucial concept of internalisation, supposed neglect of which was a chief pretext for Rugman's book (Rugman, pp. 68–69). In addition the wide experience of Dunning as a consultant on international production with the United Nations and other bodies gives his views a documentary value to the political scientist and contemporary historian which Rugman, through no fault of his own, cannot yet match.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

Energy for Development: An International Challenge. By John Foster et al. *New York: Praeger for North-South Roundtable (SID) and the Overseas Development Council. 1981. 257 pp.*

Rivers of Energy: The Hydropower Potential. By Daniel Deudney. *Washington: Worldwatch Institute. 1981. 55 pp. Pb: $2.00.*

THE energy crises of the past decade have placed extreme pressures on the economies and societies of developing countries. Oil exporters have experienced huge increases in income which have brought grief or chronic anxiety to their rulers. For all but the most dynamic of oil importers, the rising price of commercial energy has sharply reduced chances of eliminating poverty and managing the shift from agrarian to urban economies.

Energy for Development surveys the energy problems confronting developing countries; the often unhappy relations between oil exporters, oil importers, and industrial nations; and the individual and collective actions which might help remedy what appears to be a deteriorating situation. It represents the first phase of a programme initiated by the North-South Energy Roundtable (an offshoot of the Society for International Development), which will be followed by a 'series of in-depth dialogues' and, ultimately, by a document containing a synthesis of discussions and

analyses. The chapters have been written, singly and jointly, by five distinguished energy specialists, and there is a foreword by Maurice Strong.

It is an important and ambitious book. It aims to be comprehensive, covering all available energy forms, the entire Western world, the many aspects of international relations associated with energy supply (finance, pricing, technology, crisis management etc.), and the whole gamut of policy options. While admiring its courage in ranging so widely, I shall value this book chiefly for the attention it draws to specific issues: in particular, the plight of those poorer countries caught in the vice of high oil costs and diminishing fuelwood supplies; the excessive concentration of exploration effort in North America; and the effect that exporters' fears of decline 'after oil' has on extraction, pricing and investment policies. Although the book was published as recently as early 1981, it already feels a little dated, such is the impermanence of our troubled world. The discussion of North-South relations might have been sharper if the Reagan administration's greedy insensitivity to the problems of developing countries had come to the surface before writing.

Despite its obvious worth, the book has some notable defects. Excessive repetition between chapters makes it seem a long read—even the 'Overview Summary' at the beginning seems long-winded. Books with several authors are always difficult to structure, but a stronger editorial hand would have brought dividends. Its coverage is also unduly skewed towards oil and natural gas. Coal is poorly treated. The authors' evident lack of confidence in discussing coal leads them to underestimate its significance.

Most seriously, the book is heavily biased towards the supply side of the energy equation. Its title might lead one to expect a rigorous analysis of the rate and 'quality' of demand growth and the various factors influencing it. Instead, it is assumed uncritically that energy demand will, and should, grow rapidly in the Third World. But how rapidly, and with what variation between countries? With what balance of fuels? These questions receive scant attention, yet they could make all the difference in specific cases between development and disintegration. Especially lacking is consideration of the very real structural choices in transport, farming, industry and urban development. The only option for influencing demand considered here is conservation, which seems of secondary relevance in view of the energy-poverty of the mass of the people, and their lack of capital to spend on even the most rudimentary energy-efficient equipment. The identification of development strategies which minimise vulnerability to rising energy costs is surely a key issue, deserving a place of honour in a book like this.

Deudney's pamphlet on hydropower has lesser significance. Yet it is lively, well produced, and enjoyable to read. His thesis is that there are large hydro reserves, notably in Africa, South America and Asia which could provide substantial amounts of cheap energy and obviate the need to invest in what he considers to be undesirable coal and nuclear stations. He is particularly keen on small-scale hydro installations.

Deudney presents a good case for hydropower, but this reader ended confused. Balancing his fervour for exploiting water's potential energy is an equal fervour for protecting environments and populations from the costs and risks linked to dams and reservoirs. It might have helped if he had tried to develop a more thorough classification of sites and areas according to their various merits and defects. The analysis also lacks a sound assessment of the economics of hydropower. The costs of construction, transmission, operation and repair are not clearly presented; nor is there a fair comparison with the costs of alternative energy supplies.

University of Sussex WILLIAM WALKER

Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Spent Fuel Problem. Edited by Frederick C. Williams and David A. Deese. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon for the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. 1980. 221 pp. $30.00. £15·00.*

Reconciling Energy Needs and Non-Proliferation: Perspectives on Nuclear Technology and International Politics. Edited by Karl Kaiser. *Bonn: Europa Union for Forschungsinstitut der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. 1980. 190 pp.*

THE literature on nuclear non-proliferation has itself undergone a proliferation in recent years. It has also come to be characterised more by the edited proceedings of seminars and conferences than by single-author books, and these two additions are no exceptions. The Kaiser volume is based on an international conference with the same title as the book, organised by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* with the support of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, in May 1979. The Williams and Deese book is the product of the meetings, over the course of a year, of a group of scholars and professionals based at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, with funding provided mainly by the Ford Foundation and the United States Department of State.

Both books are useful additions to the literature, although they will appeal only to specialist readers. An attractive feature of them, and especially of Williams and Deese, is the attention which they give to developing countries' perspectives on nuclear non-proliferation. Williams and Deese also contains a conveniently sized review of the state of nuclear politics in several key regions, including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean Basin, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East and Western Europe.

The aims of the books are somewhat different. Kaiser is concerned with the broad question of how to have nuclear power without spreading the bomb. Williams and Deese focus on one unglamorous but practical aspect of that question, namely, whether, as one step towards non-proliferation, reprocessing might be avoided, or at least delayed, by the introduction of international arrangements for the storage of spent nuclear fuel.

Taking up that second theme, the editors regard it as a strength of international spent fuel storage that it lends itself to incremental implementation. They believe that small steps are the only ones worth attempting in this field. While this is probably true, one cannot help commenting, as a European reader, that there is a slight North American air about the book which may have led them, despite all the difficulties which they foresee, still to underestimate the size of the task. Consider this passage:

> Europe and America can probably agree that international storage meets both their objectives. It is superior to unsupervised storage at reactor sites. If the fuel can eventually be reprocessed, the Europeans will be satisfied; and if it delays the actual occurrence of reprocessing, the Americans will be satisfied . . . Europe, which will not have to start reprocessing until four or five years before scheduled breeder start-up, may see interim international storage as a good way to deflect American pressure (pp. 14–15).

Apart from the possible implication that Europe is seen as a proliferation-threat, the more serious difficulty with this passage is that it overlooks the pressures in Europe for rapid introduction of reprocessing, as instanced by Mr Justice Parker's report on the Windscale Inquiry in which he argued that if reprocessing was in any case needed, it would be better to proceed at once so as to gain working experience rather than launch a, possibly over-hasty, crash programme just in advance of breeder start-up. But despite this reservation, the Williams and Deese volume analyses thoughtfully the

regional politics of international fuel storage, as well as reviewing the technical and economic considerations, political incentives and disincentives, and other matters, and all within the terms of a helpful analytical framework developed by the editors.

The Kaiser volume is less unified and is also more variable in the quality of chapters, some being too brief to be useful. Like Williams and Deese, it has been somewhat overtaken by the publication of the reports of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, but it remains a good survey of current thinking on the subject. Among the questions discussed are nuclear power and development, the debate on reprocessing, safeguarding plutonium, and the proliferation-proofing of reprocessing and enrichment.

Both books, of course, assume that horizontal proliferation *is* a problem. Without entering here the resurgent debate about whether this is true (or, alternatively, whether a little proliferation might increase security), it is worth noting the paradox to which Smart points in the Kaiser volume (pp. 189–90), that whereas the pressures for control of horizontal proliferation ought to come from the non-nuclear weapon states, and those for control of vertical proliferation from the nuclear weapons states (the pressures being supposed to arise from those most affected by the problem), in fact the opposite tends to be the case.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

The Transition To Egalitarian Development: Economic Policies for Structural Change in the Third World. By Keith Griffin and James Jeffrey. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 128 pp. £15·00.*

ALTHOUGH a debate exists about the exact nature and meaning of development, most would accept that it must involve some element of redistribution. The exact nature of the redistributive measures and their effects on economic growth and societal structures is an under-researched area. In *The Transition To Egalitarian Development* Griffin and Jeffrey address the economic problems associated with any transition to egalitarian development whether within a capitalist or a socialist framework. The argument is developed in general terms, but with many references to historical examples and to research which covers a wide range of Third World countries.

The authors' central theme is that a major redistribution of wealth and the flow of income are necessary components of a strategy of egalitarian development and that these measures must be implemented rapidly. It is clear to me that a basic needs or anti-poverty approach requires major structural change. Griffin and Jeffrey show that structural change is necessary because the regulatory mechanisms of the market tend to reduce the effectiveness of once-for-all change. They also argue correctly, that although the market is unable to respond adequately to structural changes a total replacement of the market is inappropriate. Therefore, a mix of strategies incorporating administrative controls and reliance on market indicators is necessary. The concern in this book is with transition in the short-run and responses to accompanying disequilibria. Having argued the case for rapid structural change and shown the limitations of the market in attaining this end the authors proceed to examine alternative forms of redistribution; supply and demand management measures during the transition period; and the adequacy and efficacy of various types of administrative systems and policies. Finally, they look at the experiences of Chile, Cuba and China in attempting the transition of egalitarian development.

A major strength of the book is the careful distinctions made concerning the different groups likely to be affected by redistributive measures and the careful consideration of the different economic effects of various policies. The poor is a

heterogenous group and successful egalitarian measures must take cognisance of this fact. Failure to do so would lead, first, to the failure to reach the relevant target groups and secondly, to a lack of support for the redistributive measures when groups discovered they were losing out. Nine alternative forms of redistribution are analysed and the authors show, first, that each type of measure has varied effects and secondly, that taken singly these measures would be unable to effect the necessary transition. Further, they show that a combination of both supply and demand management measures are necessary.

The major criticism of this interesting book is that although the authors show awareness at several points of the importance of the political dimension this is nevertheless virtually excluded from serious consideration. On the whole this is a clearly written, lucid and stimulating work which fills a much needed vacuum in discussions of egalitarian development. It should be of interest to all concerned with development issues.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

In Search of Democracy in Socialism: History and Party Consciousness. By Svetozar Stojanović. *Buffalo, NY: Prometheus. 1981. 145 pp. $16.95.*

IN this important essay, Svetozar Stojanović pleads for a restoration of 'communist dignity' and for the emancipation of the critical spirit which lies at the heart of Marxism. Emancipation, that is, from the fetters of the collectivist psychology which ruling communist parties have so far espoused. The plea takes the form both of a closely reasoned argument and of a *cri du coeur*. It is important to see it as both of these things, since for Stojanović the dignity of communists is at risk if those who conscientiously object to the policies of a given leadership allow their indignation to be overruled by a *raison du parti*. But to attempt to summarise the author's argument in a few words is to do the essay an injustice, since it forms a closely articulated whole, an excellent counter-point of history and theory.

Behind the essay's theme lies a predicament which is as old as civilisation. It is one which opposes Antigone to Creon, Luther to the Roman Church. But it changes its form at each spin of the merry-go-round. What draws Stojanović's attention more than anything else is the apparently principled way in which dissenters from party orthodoxy in the 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union, and in the early 1950s in Eastern Europe, abdicated from their responsibility. The author's analysis centres, therefore, on what those principles were, and on how they came to be held—and above all on the question of 'historical responsibility'.

The book is highly topical in a number of ways. The emergence of Eurocommunism, together with events in Poland, are part of a questioning of Bolshevik history to which this book makes a major theoretical contribution. Secondly, the writer is a Yugoslav, and so cannot but ponder whether social self-management in that country provides a way out of the dilemma which Bolshevik history poses (in his view it does not; it merely recasts the dilemma in a different mold). Above all, he is a Yugoslav *dissident* who has had to consider his own historical responsibility. Unlike the victims of the Stalinist purges *hier steht er, er kann nicht anders*—but, as he points out, times have changed, and for the moment all that he has lost is his post at Belgrade University's Department of Philosophy.

If the work has a failing, it is that the author expects too much of the ideology of Marxism as a guide to political action, and allows too little for other factors. He blames Mao, for example, for 'absolutising' ascetic communism, whilst admitting that 'such a materially backward society would have no real hope were it not prepared to set

today's bread aside for tomorrow' (p. 74). Yet surely any Marxist leadership in a materially backward society will *necessarily* absolutise whatever it has proved capable of achieving, and will present those achievements, however limited, as the 'gains of socialism', just as it will necessarily tend to 'skip the stages' of the Marxist schema. When the revolutionary turbulence recedes and when economic and cultural development has made some progress, then the options change. Hence the value of Stojanović's essay, with its topical treatment of present problems and present possibilities—a treatment which outshines his theoretical impatience with those who have been caught in the bind of either having to cut their ideology to suit their cloth, or to withdraw from their position of leadership (and nobody climbs willingly into the dustbin of history).

In many places the book is spell-binding in its lucidity. If the ideas which Stojanović puts forward are not always entirely new, he is entitled in some cases to claim them as his own on the basis of the way in which he presents them. Much has been said and written about the party's dictatorship over the proletariat, but it takes a Stojanović to say that 'Bolshevik ideologists . . . established an *a priori and analytical* connection between "dictatorship" and "proletariat", and between "centralism" and "democracy" . . . If the dictatorship was *by definition* democratic, and the centralism *by definition* democratic, it followed that it was senseless to make any demands for the proletarianisation of the dictatorship or for the democratisation of centralism' (p. 67). It is hard to imagine a more economical, perceptive and logically exact way of putting it.

Such lucidity could not come through in the English text without an excellent translator. That translator is Gershon Sher, who deserves the thanks of English readers for transmitting to us this valuable text.

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

Women, Power and Political Systems. Edited by Margherita Rendel. *London: Croom Helm 1981. 262 pp. £12·95.*

THIS book fills two important gaps in the literature on women's issues. First, it is one of the few studies which focusses exclusively on the position of women in power systems. By adopting a very wide definition of 'the political' and seeing power as an aspect of all social relationships the authors are able to approach the study of power and powerlessness (more typically characterising women's position) from a variety of angles. The second valuable feature of this volume lies in the wide spread of socio-political settings in which women's power position is explored. The contributions range from studies of women in the highly developed United States to the economically and socially backward areas of rural Tanzania, from the problems of women engendered by capitalism to those encountered under state socialism, from the relatively liberated women of Finland to the relatively oppressed ones of Brazil.

This wide sweep of the book serves to emphasise the fact of women's universal political oppression, regardless of the degree of development or political ideology of the societies concerned. But it also has the effect of making some of the 'wrongs' of women in the more developed societies appear trivial in comparison with those suffered by their sisters in the underdeveloped societies.

Inevitably in a volume of such breadth of theoretical concerns and substantive problems the quality of the contributions is variable. Some articles merely develop very predictable arguments about the impact on political participation by such factors as access to higher education (Awosika on women in Nigeria), or admission to the higher level professional and civil service occupations (Abadan-Unat on women in Turkey),

or by both (Tabak on Brazilian women). Their redeeming feature is the systematic presentation of data on women's position in these societies which has been hitherto unavailable.

Another group of authors have higher theoretical pretensions but lack the thorough empirical grounding of the above authors and advance their argument more by assertion. Particularly irritating examples are the article by Kickbusch on 'Women and Reproduction', and that by Rothschild on 'Technology and the Social Control of Women'.

Then there are a number of articles which confront more confined, but nevertheless important, research problems on the basis of an empirical study. The article by Sinkkonen and Haavio-Manila on the impact of three waves of the Finnish Women's Movement on the legislative activity of women MPs is both solid and imaginative. The article by Cook on American women judges, exploring their impact on the redefinition of sex roles, is both sociologically sound (although an analysis of actual legal documents rather than of reported attitudes would have been more valuable) and of practical value to the Women's Movement. The article by Wolchik on 'Demography and Women's Issues' in state socialist Czechoslovakia gives the Western reader a valuable introduction to the different political and ideological setting in which the struggle for greater self-determination takes place. The most stimulating contribution by far is the provocative and thought-provoking article by Stiehm, arguing that women will only become equal citizens when they have gained equal rights to bear arms.

Altogether then, the book is a valuable contribution to the understanding of gender relations. The introduction by the editor succeeds well in providing a unifying theoretical perspective and is also interesting in its own right. Although the book contains only few theoretically innovative pieces, it offers a wealth of new empirical data on lesser-known societies and should be of value to future comparative researchers.

University of Aston in Birmingham CHRISTEL LANE

Crisis in International News: Policies and Prospects. Edited by Jim Richstad and Michael H. Anderson. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. 473 pp. $37.05. Pb: $16.25.*

THIS book is about an important subject: the continuing revolt of the relatively underdeveloped, frequently ex-colonial world, against the dominance of the advanced, industrialised and wealthy nations of the West. Most of the nations which have struggled for their political freedom during the last two centuries, have also faced what they see as economic imperialism and are now protesting against the 'imperialism' of information. There can be no doubt that the flow of international news is substantially in the hands of the four large, Western international news agencies: Associated Press and United Press International of the United States, Reuters of the United Kingdom, and Agence France-Presse. Inevitably their selection and presentation of news, however objective they may try to be, is affected by Western values and assumptions. Many in the West have recognised that the protests from about 1970 onwards are not without some justice; hence the concept of the New International Communication Order (NICO). But the task of rectifying the imbalance is not an easy one; there are many different and often conflicting views.

Most of these are neatly summed up in one paragraph in the first chapter (by the two editors):

> those who want government to control media versus those who favour laissez-faire; those who stress freedom versus those who stress responsibility; those who

> perceive communication as a form of power versus those who see it as a human right; those who view news as a means versus those who see it as an end; those who use news as a private commodity versus those who view it as a precious public resource; and those who want to maintain the status quo versus those who want a new communication order (p. 14).

The subject is complex and confusing. The editors, in the best traditions of journalism, have tried to represent every point of view. There are over twenty individual contributions, apart from those of the editors, summaries of reports and six appendices with the statements, resolutions and declarations of a series of conferences held between 1970 and 1978. To add to the appearance of confusion there are two forewords, a preface and an introduction. There is inescapably a great deal of repetition.

Nevertheless the book represents a gallant attempt to examine a complex issue whose importance will increase as the technology of communication continues to develop and advance. Rather more attention could have been given to the problems of translation. There is a useful index.

GEORGE CAMACHO

LAW

International Criminal Law: A Draft International Code. By Cherif M. Bassiouni. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1980. 280 pp.*

PROFESSOR BASSIOUNI of DePaul University and Secretary-General of the International Association of Penal Law, was commissioned by that body to prepare a 'Study Project'. The book under review is the result. With the assistance of a number of experts, listed on pp. xxxiii–xxxv, the Study was completed in the years 1976–79. The work consists of a Draft International Criminal Code (pp. 47–173) supported by valuable prefatory observations in a chapter, 'International Criminal Law; its History, Scope and Content' (pp. 1–57).

The Draft Code, which forms the core of the book, is accompanied by a commentary on each Article and sub-section. The Code itself is divided into four parts: (i) the Special Part, comprising the international crimes; (ii) the Enforcement Part, dealing, *inter alia* with the critical question of extradition; (iii) General Treaty Provisions dealing with formal matters such as Ratification, Reservations and Revision; and (iv) the General Part dealing with the substantive elements inherent in an international crime, definitions, jurisdiction and 'exoneration', among other topics. Under the odd title 'Exoneration' (Article 10) the Draft Code treats of the substantive defences to international crimes (such as self-defence, necessity, coercion, obedience to superior orders, mistake of law or fact, and insanity). The whole of this Article is of great interest and attempts to induce some order into the chaos of the existing law of international criminal responsibility (pp. 163–67). It is a pity that the commentary on such critical provisions of the Code is so brief.

The author makes a bold attempt to condense the history of International Criminal Law into sixteen pages (pp. 2–18). His central thesis is that International Criminal Law is 'a product of the convergence of the international aspects of municipal criminal law and the criminal aspects of international law.' Nevertheless international criminal law is now a discipline in its own right. He makes the further point that although this distinction is historically valid, it is becoming of considerable methodological significance. Both points would seem to be valid. Much of the difficulty in the task

undertaken by the author is to accommodate two very different disciplines, namely, municipal penal law and international law, and all that that means.

Professor Bassiouni has framed his Draft Code on the basis of two alternative assumptions: (i) that it might be used as a comprehensive code by an international criminal court (which does not yet exist); and (ii) that it might be used as a code of substantive international crimes, embodied in an international convention, and afford the Contracting Parties the means to enforce it through their municipal penal law systems. He points out, quite rightly, that 'Each of these assumptions required a different structure and content of the . . . Code' (p. 37). This he has done in fifteen Articles (pp. 143-73). Both, however, require a 'Special Part' which defines the substantive international crimes and mechanisms of enforcement peculiar to international criminal law system. Although there is still a marked lack of consensus international crimes—from aggression to International Traffic in Obscene Publications (pp. 52-106). This Special Part is usefully complemented by a comprehensive list of 'Principal International Instruments relating to International Law' (pp. xix-xxx).

The author has faced an ambitious and difficult task with skill, and a measure of optimism for the future of the discipline and for the eventual realisation of an international criminal law system. Although there is still a marked lack of consensus among states upon many key topics—such as extradition, and the defence of superior orders—we have here a working document which could well serve as a basis for the slow but necessary work of building an international criminal law system which the facts of international interdependence will inevitably demand. For such a guide we are much in the debt of the author.

G. I. A. D. DRA[illegible]

Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations. By Julius Stone. *Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press. 1981. 223 pp. $21.85. £12·25.*

PROFESSOR STONE's extraordinarily high and justified reputation derives in part from his ability to set his legal insights within a wider framework, principally philosophy (his *corpus* of writings on jurisprudence is formidable) and international relations. This book falls into the latter and offers his analysis of the relevant principles of international law governing the conflict in the Middle East. It is a fascinating and provocative study, of considerable value to anyone seriously interested in the subject, but which suffers from scarcely concealed contempt for certain anti-Israel positions.

It is an integral and, with respect, extremely well-argued part of Stone's thesis, that whereas in 1917 the Jewish people represented a coherent group, bound together by common cultural and religious ties, there was no corresponding group of Palestinian people. Palestine only ever existed as a place, and as such, was only part of a much larger area which was to accommodate the respective claims for statehood of Jewish and Arab nationalism. Furthermore, it is argued, the claims of Arab nationalism have been met in full by the establishment of twenty-two sovereign states in Africa and the Middle East, only a miniscule part of the original Ottoman Empire being removed to constitute the territory for the state of Israel and thereby the claims of Jewish nationalism. In the light of this, that new entitly (Stone argues in favour of 1966—the adoption of the Palestine National Charter—as the date of creation), the Palestinian people has neither history nor international social justice on its side.

What then is the relevance of this *political* analysis to the principles of international law? Indeed, before we can address ourselves to this question, we must, logically confront another controversial issue, namely what are the relevant principles of

international law, and—of particular importance in this area—does a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations constitute a source of international law?

Here, Professor Stone wholeheartedly adopts the orthodox position: extreme caution to the point of scepticism as to the legally binding nature of such resolutions. He is sharply critical of a United Nations study entitled *An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question*. His attack is based upon what seem two equally justifiable propositions, first that it is clearly partisan and therefore ought not to have appeared under the auspices of the United Nations and secondly that resolutions passed by a body guilty of double standards, hypocrisy and inconsistency can hardly be an effective base from which to derive principles of law. However, even if it is conceded that the relevant United Nations resolutions were thus tainted, this is hardly conclusive of the question as to whether such resolutions should not, in politically less partisan circumstances, be treated as law. Stone's arguments in favour of the orthodox position are not conclusive. Statements, on which he relies, like that of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht that 'resolutions [of the UN General Assembly] refer to recommendations . . . whose legal effect although not altogether absent . . . appears to be no more than a moral obligation' could well be quoted against him. Furthermore, insofar as his rejection of the opposite view rests on what he calls, 'the complete imbalance arising from the entry of scores of new states into the United Nations . . .', it looks suspiciously like wanting to change the rules because the game is going against you. Finally, there is the proposition that the passage of the resolutions is due to the coercion deriving from the virtual monopoly over oil supplies enjoyed by the Arabs. This is questionable on two grounds. First, can it be established? Secondly, if it can, when does the exercise of power—fundamental in any law-making process—become illegitimate and thus incapable of categorisation as law?

This is but one of the several fascinating issues discussed in this book, which also has a very useful collection of maps and documents. Any interested reader, regardless of his or her present persuasion on the Middle East conflict will also derive great benefit from the forthright expression of Professor Stone's own views and the great clarity and sharpness with which they are presented. He is persuasive and provocative, as we would expect.

King's College, London HARRY RAJAK

International and Legal Problems of the Gulf. By Sayed Hassan Amin. *London: Middle East and North African Studies (MENAS) Press. 1981. 235 pp. £16·50. $41.25.*

Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea: Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian Gulf. By Charles G. MacDonald. *Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1981. 226 pp. £16·50.*

DR AMIN's book analyses the major political and legal problems arising in the Persian/Arabian Gulf (the author considers the joint name the most appropriate) up to the 1980–80 Iran/Iraq war. It gives much factual information concerning the history and divergent policies of the eight Gulf States, but the incoherent style of writing, and numerous grammatical errors make assimilation of this otherwise useful information difficult. More meticulous editing was required.

Political events are recounted with much transitory detail, often repetitious, overwhelming the legal aspects. The incoherent style reflects some confusion of thought: in Chapter 3, on 'The Strait of Hormuz', consensus is said to have been achieved at UNCLOS for unimpeded transit passage, yet the chapter establishes that

Iran and Oman do not fully accept the concept and have disputed the international status of this strait. Dr Amin advocates a regional solution qualifying the UNCLOS regime, with international approval (unlikely to be forthcoming given the prolonged negotiations to achieve the UNCLOS compromise). In Chapter 10 he proposes the North Sea as a regional model without examining its lack of system or co-ordinating organisation.

There are few footnotes; many contentious statements, references to events, treaties and UNCLOS are unsubstantiated; instances are too numerous to mention.

Chapter 4 on the Iran–Iraq conflict would be more comprehensible if the rules laid down in Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention and relevant cases were first described. Discussion is deferred to Chapters 5 and 6 and even then the analysis is not rigorous. Chapters 5 and 6 usefully, but simplistically, outline respectively agreements on the six Gulf offshore boundary delimitations already concluded and the facts of the disputes concerning the eight offshore boundaries that remain unsettled; legal analysis is superficial and misleading—for example, concerning the territorial sea of islets. Although the delimitation problems presented by offshore islands are of especial relevance to Chapters 4 and 5, legal issues are not fully described until Chapter 6 on the United Arab Emirates.

Fisheries and pollution are dealt with cursorily in Chapters 9 and 10 respectively; no real grasp of the development of international law in these fields is shown; the problems presented by the High Seas Convention which codified freedom of fishing are ignored. Dr Amin does not appear to understand the meaning of 'codified'; Chapter 10 opens with the inaccurate statement, 'On a global scale, of all marine pollutants, oil and hydrocarbons are recognised as the most destructive'.

Despite the author's familiarity with the Islamic legal background, the conclusions favouring a regional solution based on the area's status as semi-enclosed sea are very general.

Professor MacDonald's book covers similar ground but is limited to two Gulf States. It is, however, a more useful volume, better written, displaying greater insight and analytical skills. Its purpose is to examine the role of developing states in the changing law of the sea and to evaluate their contribution to international legal development. It takes the roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia in developing the law of the sea in the 'Persian' Gulf as a case study, using the McDougal/Lasswell policy-oriented approach to international law. The author is a political scientist; he emphasises the effect of interactions within the Persian Gulf sub-system, with secondary consideration of the interplay between it and the international system. The trouble with the McDougal/Lasswell system is, however, that it leads to repetition as each issue is ground through the claim/counter-claim mill; to the asking of leading questions; and to conclusions which are largely predetermined, obvious and scarcely illuminating: for example, 'the role of the developing state in international law is not unlike that of advanced states, since it is based upon specific interests as determined by the nature of the context in which they are situated' (p. 205).

Chapter 1 on 'The Persian Gulf Context' analyses participants, situations, objectives, strategies, and identifies the web of actors and interests, including multinationals and non-governmental bodies. We see more clearly the significance of the political events recounted by Dr Amin, aided by better maps and tables, and comprehensive footnotes and bibliography.

Chapter 2, 'Basic Community Interests', identifies the legal principles for the promotion of these interests within the developing law of the sea and emerging threats to 'public order' challenging Gulf security interests and world peace.

In Chapter 3, after surveying jurisdictional claims, MacDonald concludes that though they first based their claims on the 'given' international law, both Saudi Arabia and Oman have now resorted to more refined jurisdictional terminologies

promoting 'community preference'. Chapter 4 examines claims to submarine areas. Boundary agreements and the North Sea Case are analysed but the Anglo-French Channel Case (included by Amin) is omitted.

The chapter on control of pollution is as unsatisfactory as Amin's. It does not take account of existing principles, customs and treaties on *all* aspects of pollution because its McDougal/Lasswell straightjacket forces attention onto 'claims' to regulate access for purposes of pollution control.

The final chapters—9 on 'Claims in Transition' (covering the two states' UNCLOS proposals) and 10 on 'The Roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia'—conclude that the imaginative and pragmatic application of equitable principles to solve delimitation disputes is the most significant contribution of these two states, and that the broad application of equitable principles is more conducive to agreement than the rigidity of equidistance rules; but 'equitable principles', divorced from equidistance and other legal factors, surely lead to destabilising uncertainty: for many states 'pragmatism' is not enough. Professor MacDonald does not consider the influence of Islam (it is not in the index); a serious omission as Dr Amin noted that the name 'Islamic Gulf' has been proposed for the region.

University of Edinburgh PATRICIA BIRNIE

United States Foreign Relations Law: Documents and Sources. Vol. I: **Executive Agreements.** 474 pp; Vol. 2: **Treaties.** 567 pp; Vol. 3: **The War Power.** 389 pp. Edited by Michael J. Glennon and Thomas M. Franck. *New York, London: Oceana. 1980–81. $40.00 per volume.*

THESE volumes provide a collection of documents relating to the scope of the authority of the executive and legislative branches of the United States federal government in the conduct of foreign relations. In the Preface, the editors accurately suggest that 'the courts, for a variety of reasons, venture infrequently into the realm of foreign relations, and the contours of the law are best revealed by the arguments and justifications offered by those vying for power.' Hence, the documents are primarily in the form of memoranda, reports, policy letters, statements, resolutions and transcripts of hearings which present the views of a number of executive and legislative bodies including the White House, the State Department, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Editorial commentary is restricted to very brief, but useful, notes which introduce the different parts of each volume.

Volume 1, *Executive Agreements*, contains documents relating to the criteria for determining what constitutes an international agreement, the Presidential power to enter into executive agreements and the Congressional role in respect of such agreements, the choice of concluding an agreement by treaty or by executive agreement, and recent proposals for Congressional controls over executive agreements. Materials of a general nature (such as a Library of Congress definition of the term 'international agreement') are mixed with those relating to particular foreign policy issues (such as the execution of the Sinai Accords in 1975, and the informal continuation of SALT I after 1977).

Volume 2, *Treaties*, contains documents relating to the role of the Senate in treaty ratification, the legal consequences of conditions attached to ratification, the role of the House of Representatives in the formation of treaties, and the termination of treaties. As in Volume 1, materials of a general nature (such as a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff memorandum on the role of the Senate in treaty ratification) are mixed with those relating to particular foreign policy issues (such as the ratification of

the Panama Canal Treaty in 1978, and the Presidential decision in 1978 to terminate the mutual defence treaty with the Republic of China).

Volume 3, *The War Power*, contains documents relating to the enactment, implementation and interpretation of the War Powers Resolution, and Congressional financial control over the power to wage war. Again, materials of a general nature (such as a statement on the origins of Presidential and Congressional war powers) are mixed with those relating to particular foreign policy issues (such as the Mayaguez incident in 1975, and the Iranian rescue mission in 1980).

The task of attempting to delineate the foreign relations power of competing branches of the United States federal government is a formidable one; as the editors recognise in the Preface, 'the absence of authoritative resolution causes these arguments to recur.' Nevertheless, the editors provide an extremely interesting selection of documents which, in many cases, would not otherwise be generally available to the public; almost all are reproduced in their original form. The first two volumes of this work (published in 1980) received the 1981 Certificate of Merit of the American Society of International Law for a work of high technical craftsmanship and utility.

RICHARD KENNEDY GUELFF

HISTORY

Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918–1939. By R. F. Holland. *London: Macmillan. 1981 248 pp. £20·00.*

THE picture of the Commonwealth given here differs radically from that of traditional historians whose assumptions were based on the existence of a virtuous sequence leading from First World War co-operation through the Balfour Report to establishment of the constitutional framework that survives today. Holland's Anglocentric view instead puts a set of forthright questions: who planned, who organised, who benefitted from the arrangements haphazardly instituted in the interwar years? His plain judgment is that, despite all the liberal window dressing, the whole system was managed from London in the economic and strategic interests of the 'mother country'. He invites—though in such an admirably concise account he can hardly do more than hint at—comparisons with the management not only of other empires but spheres of influence such as that of the United States in Latin America.

The problems that British politicians and bureaucrats met overlapped: it is clear that the Commonwealth was not a fact but an artefact, product not of Balfour's clear vision but of conflict and the shifting needs of Britain and partners who could be both clients and critics ('the wheat crisis paradoxically created intense Canadian resentment of British economic management and at the same time a tendency to look vaguely but expectantly to Britain for a solution' [p. 113]). Holland crisply sketches the practical and political standpoints of Joseph Chamberlain's heirs and the Dominions office, and shows conclusively, through the case of Ireland in the 1930s, how in practice *ties* came to replace constitutional obligations. The core of the book is an admirable account of economic conflicts as well as grand strategy; imperial defence and who, if anyone, would pay for it; of Britain's attempts to outweigh the attractions of the United States market for Canada, for example, or of how the high hopes for protection in 1923 declined to mere horsetrading at Ottawa nine years later. Out of the tensions between nationalism and supra-national interest comes the author's unequivocal conclusion that Britain elevated the concept of Commonwealth and sold it to

Dominion leaders, as part of a process of worldwide crisis management. Substantive short-term success gave way in the end to an equally British-derived understanding that relative decline and external threats from Germany could not be met by keeping afloat that 'fragile and problematic coalition of interests, requiring continuous management'. As Holland puts it 'in the end Britain had a war imposed on her and her Commonwealth just when the latter relationship was ceasing to have any fundamental relevance to the UK's long-term interests' (p. 207). Although, in 1939, the Dominions entered the war, it had by then become impossible to harmonise their interests with conflicting necessities in Europe and the Pacific.

The convention of harmony broke down as early as 1930; the facade barely survived the 1937 Conference; and the Second World War brought suspicion rather than understanding, even if for Britain it added a 'glorious ressurection [of the Commonwealth idea] during the epic dollar shortages after 1945'. But overall, Britain did benefit, shoring up bulwarks against relative decline which were only to be demolished in the late 1940s: and when set against performance after 1939, Holland surely overstates what he calls 'the enormity of the British economic malaise' beforehand.

University of Sussex KEITH MIDDLEMAS

The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propoganda 1919–1939. By Philip M. Taylor. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 363 pp.*

THE question of 'cultural diplomacy', or the extent to which a state can protect its interests by the presenting of its social and economic achievements to the outside world, is currently attracting considerable interest among governments searching for commercial advantage and low-cost prestige. It has, however, taken some time for this low-profile activity–public relations, trade fairs, broadcasting, and subsidies to lecturers travelling abroad—to pick up a head of steam from its early beginnings between the wars. In *The Projection of Britain* Dr Philip Taylor traces the slow evolution of British propaganda (if a spade is to be called a spade) from its perceived successes during the latter part of the Great War.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s the Foreign Office, or parts of it, made half-hearted attempts to improve official reflations with the press, and to boost the image abroad of Britain and her goods, ultimately through such QUANGOs as the Empire Marketing Board (1926) and the Travel Association (1928). In this they were continually frustrated, in a classic demonstration of bureaucratic politics, by the Treasury, 'doing its job' in preventing unnecessary expenditure but also not reticent about savaging the political rationales for propaganda. Only after 1934, with the setting up of the British Council and the BBC's Foreign Language Service (1938), did the National Government begin to acknowledge the potential importance of the images held by foreigners of Britain and its policies. 'Psychological rearmament' was a recognition of the damage being done to Britain by German and Italian abuse.

Dr Taylor's story is well-researched and fills a clear gap in our knowledge. It is not his fault that much of what he has to say is so negative. The British did very little to market themselves in this period, and such successes as they had largely bore fruit in wartime. As a result *The Projection of Britain* is preoccupied with middle-level administration, as it chronicles the efforts of men like Rex Leeper and Sir Stephen Tallents to overcome conservative attitudes towards the power of information. On the other hand some of this makes rather dull reading, high-lighted as it is only by the occasional Cabinet meeting or firework from Sir Robert Vansittart. Dr Taylor might have done better to have followed up further some of the interesting political questions

which his research raises, even at the expense of an inter-departmental committee or two. For example the relationship between the tentative policy on propaganda, and general conceptions of appeasement, might bear examination. Was the assumption that the German people could be persuaded from outside to overthrow Hitler deep-rooted, or was it (and propaganda in general) one of many straws grasped at by a government rapidly losing its grip on foreign policy? Equally, how successful was the Foreign Office in using Fleet Street as a tool in the management of diplomacy, and what were the implications of its influence for the domestic debate on appeasement?

The Projection of Britain says a good deal about the British machinery of government, and virtually all there is to tell about British propaganda between the wars. If it does not delve very far into the efficacy of that propaganda, or its functions in relation to the other instruments of foreign policy, it is still a most valuable piece of work.

London School of Economics CHRISTOPHER HILL

The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police. By George Leggett. *Oxford: Clarendon Press· Oxford University Press. 1981. 514 pp. £22·50.*

GEORGE LEGGETT might well have altered the subtitle of his book from *Lenin's Political Police* to *Executive Arm of Lenin's Government.* We already know (thanks to Harry Rigby's fine study) how the Soviet government extemporised and then refined its central administration during Lenin's lifetime. We now know, from Leggett's sophisticated book, a great deal more about how the Bolsheviks actually implemented their policy.

Initially the Bolshevik regime was extremely reluctant to re-establish a professional police force or army. As symbols of Tsarist repression they were discredited and in Lenin's project for socialism in Russia they were redundant. Their powers were to be assumed by a universal militia. The All Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (the Cheka) was genuinely conceived of as an emergency, strictly temporary institution which would deal with threats to the state until such time as a well-organised militia emerged. Being conceived of as but a transitional, temporary body with small powers and a tiny staff it escaped the jurisdiction of the ministries of state or Commissariats. It was made responsible solely to the Bolshevik-dominated Council of Ministers and Lenin alone assumed responsibility for scrutinising and controlling its activities.

The great merit of Leggett's book is that it shows us the circumstances in which the Cheka became far more than an agency of wholesale coercion. It quickly emerged as the most extensive, efficient and reliable administrative structure available to the Bolsheviks. In stark contrast to many of the Commissariats the Cheka could be relied upon to get things done. It alone seemed to have the energy, expertise and resolve to mobilise men and material resources on a grandiose scale to meet the succession of crises the regime endured in these early years. The more the crises multiplied and the more that disaffection manifested itself the more the Cheka grew, expanded its personnel and its budget and refined the sophistication of its internal structure. Its growth to a state within the state reflected the Bolsheviks' own awareness of the fragility and isolation of their regime.

The fine balance of the book is well sustained in the treatment of 'Iron Felix' Dzerzhinsky who created the Cheka and led it until it became the GPU in 1922. Leggett is quite clear that neither he nor Lenin can be excused for the often excessive and barbarous repression the Cheka carried out. And yet he cannot fail to acknowledge that Dzerzhinsky was an enormously impressive man. He was prodigious in energy

and implacably devoted to the revolutionary cause. There was about him no hint of personal corruption or self-interested abuse of his massive powers.

In view of the vital importance of the Cheka to the very existence of the regime and in view of Dzerzhinsky's manifest abilities it is rather curious that Lenin should have held Dzerzhinsky in rather low regard and Leggett does not take us far in explaining how their relationship worsened in the last years of Lenin's life. It may be that the breach had something to do with the increasingly close links of the Cheka with the Party's Orgburo and, therefore, of Dzerzhinsky with Stalin—a juxtaposition of powers that was to have such fateful consequences for the future.

George Leggett has given us a detailed, well-balanced and thoroughly readable book which opens our eyes to the real mechanics of power in the early years of the Soviet regime.

University College of Swansea NEIL HARDING

Stalin's Secret War. By Nikolai Tolstoy. *London: Cape. 1981. 463 pp. £9·50.*

NIKOLAI TOLSTOY defines his object in writing this book as being 'to interpret Soviet policy, internal and external, during the crucial years 1938–1945', and above all 'to lay bare how Stalin himself saw events and reacted to them' (p. xiii). This is a tough assignment, given the limitations of the evidence about Stalin's thoughts and motives, as the author himself recognises. What he offers is a central thesis to serve as a key to Stalin's policies: fear of the Soviet peoples themselves. The first part of the book describes how the Communist leadership 'lived like an occupying power in a conquered land' (p. 45); how it set up in the camps of GULAG a ferocious system of slavery; and how the party elite enjoyed a life of ostentatious luxury behind a screen of strict segregation and iron security. Over all this Stalin ruled, an absolute tyrant and, in Tolstoy's view, an arrant coward. The 'secret war' of the title is Stalin's constant struggle against the peoples of his own country.

Tolstoy's claim is that this key unlocks the riddles which many observers have found in Soviet policy. To support his argument he deploys archive material (mainly British), published documents, some standard secondary works, and many books by participants in the events of those years. His finds in the Foreign Office papers include a fascinating report by British Intelligence officers who were allowed to interrogate Soviet prisoners of war in Finland during the Winter War.

The book's main importance, however, lies not in its use of new material but in its interpretation of Soviet policy. The crucial period is that immediately before and after the German assault on Russia in June 1941; and the core of Tolstoy's argument is that Stalin devoted to the internal war against his own people vast amounts of resources and manpower which might have been used against the external enemy. In the week before the German attack the Soviet transport system in the western regions was occupied in moving tens of thousands of Poles, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians off to GULAG, with the Germans massing on the border. Immediately after the invasion, fresh NKVD troops were still arriving to guard camps on the White Sea while the Germans were driving headlong into Russia. Tolstoy's estimate is that up to a million troops were guarding, deporting or massacring Soviet citizens instead of fighting the Germans. It is a formidable case, and well documented.

So far, so good. The central thesis of the book is powerfully argued and highly illuminating. The trouble is that the force of this thesis is diminished by faults in both substance and method. In substance, the author claims to deal with the whole period 1938–45, yet the treatment after 1941 is very thin: effectively, one chapter of twenty-four pages is devoted to Soviet policy from 1942 to 1945. At the end of the book,

indeed, his attention is diverted to criticism of Western attitudes to Russia, and to what amounts to an appendix to his earlier book, *Victims of Yalta.* A detailed chapter is devoted to the handing over by the British in 1945 of people who had never been Soviet citizens and who were not covered by the Yalta agreement on repatriation. Whatever the truth about these events—and Tolstoy's case deserves an answer—the treatment is out of proportion to the rest of the book.

In method, the book suffers from mixing polemic with history. The author likes to have things both ways: he asserts at one point that a high proportion of the NKVD were of subnormal intelligence (p. 62), and at another that they recruited 'the more reliable type of Red Army conscript' (p. 248). He is sometimes willing to pile one speculation on another, as for example in his comparisons between Stalin and Hitler. He parades a savage reference to Eden, which rests on an account of words claimed to have been used by an NKVD officer and written down several years later. This approach adds bite to the polemic but detracts from the scholarship of the work, and is likely to cast doubt—quite unnecessarily—on the validity of its main thesis.

University of Liverpool P. M. H. BELL

The Pope and the Duce: The International Impact of the Lateran Agreements. By Peter C. Kent. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 248 pp. £20·00.*

ORIGINALLY an LSE doctoral thesis, this book is a thorough and competent analysis of the impact of the Lateran agreements on Italian foreign policy between 1929-35. The reconciliation of Church and State in modern Italy—almost the only lasting achievement of Fascism—consolidated the already substantial consensus on foreign policy between the two, ushering in a period in which both sought, if for rather different reasons, to alter the balance of diplomatic power established by the postwar international settlement. Naturally, there were disagreements: over Malta, Spain and Yugoslavia, for example. The latter was potentially serious, involving Mussolini's attempt to weaken the Yugoslav monarch by encouraging Croatian separatism, while the Vatican sought a concordat with Belgrade to guarantee the position of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. The dispute even spilled over into the domestic arena, in a conflict over the role of Catholic Action and its loyalty to the Fascist regime, and it was to take the spectre of a revanchist Germany to put this dispute in perspective. Only the threat thereby posed to Catholic *mittelEuropa*—Austria, in particular—concentrated the minds of Pope and Duce, and transferred the focus of Italian foreign policy from the Balkans to the Danube, where the identity of interest was far more marked. Had the Pope succeeded in fixing Mussolini's attentions permanently on this problem, dissuading him from the imprudent confrontation with Britain from 1935 onwards, the role and fate of Italy in the Second World War would have been different indeed. The latter issue is, alas, beyond the scope of Dr Kent's book, which deals with a relatively quiescent period in Italian foreign policy. Partly for this reason the book has a rather low-key, even perhaps dull, air. This might have been avoided had the book fulfilled the promise of its title and given the reader some insight into the personalities of the two chief protagonists, and how they interracted. But of this there is little; the treatment of the conflict over Catholic Action in the Summer of 1931, for example, is a great disappointment on this score. Overall, however, this is a useful addition to the literature, and a valuable aid to our understanding of the constraints on Italian foreign policy during its more prudent interwar phase.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID HINE

The Nazi Question: An Essay on the Interpretations of National Socialism 1922-1975. By Pierre Ayçoberry. Trans. by Robert Hurley. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981. 257 pp. £12·50. (First publ. Editions du Seuil, 1979.)*

DISCUSSIONS about National Socialism have so far been largely conducted by Germans and Anglo-Saxons. Alfred Grosser is almost the only Frenchman to gain a hearing in this country. A newcomer is all the more welcome when he is an anti-Communist from the University of Nanterre who has clearly been influenced by the current French interest in the social, anthropological and even linguistic dimensions of history.

Professor Ayçoberry describes his book as:

> a history of the images of Nazism, constructed at first by itself, its sympathisers and adversaries, then by the practitioners of the different social sciences who found in it a point of application of their methods (p. ix).

He is not concerned with establishing historical facts. He is not even concerned to advance his own views as to why Nazism was as it was. Instead he passes in review the various interpretations which have been placed on it.

Consequently the chief value of the book is that it provides a handy check-list of the main questions which need to be asked about Nazism, with summaries of the main answers which have thus far been advanced. These summaries are often clear and cogent; one sometimes wonders whether the author under discussion saw his position as clearly as Professor Ayçoberry does. The fact that he has no fresh interpretation to propound is perhaps an advantage. For one may doubt whether a subject as multifarious as the Third Reich can ever be completely explained. It provides a good example of the familiar logical difficulty that no generalisation can ever contain exhaustively a number of individual instances. There were after all at any one time some four million convinced Nazis, each presumably differing slightly from his (or her) neighbour in the reasons for faith and in the importance attached to the various aspects of discipleship. Thus the phenomenon may be explained in terms of past history, of individual personality, of mass psychology, of economic and social conflicts, of institutionalised ideas, of organisational analysis. Each of these helps to shed light on the whole. None of them is complete by itself. To fuse them into a single coherent unity is probably beyond the capacity of any human brain.

As the book has been translated in America, it is probably futile to complain that radicals should be described as being 'very minoritarian in the faculties'. But no arguments about shifts in literary taste can excuse putting 'however' at the end of a longish sentence; it is a 'finger-post' word, indicating how a new sentence relates to the preceding one, so that it loses its point if it is not near the beginning. There are several misprints which distort the sense and Stresemann gets his name spelt in three different ways! Finally, it is turning the knife in a sore wound to describe Dr A. J. P. Taylor as 'an Oxford Professor'!

MICHAEL BALFOUR

The Holocaust and the Historians. By Lucy S. Dawidowicz. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1981. 187 pp. £10·50.*

MISS DAWIDOWICZ is best known as the author of one of the most interesting if somewhat uneven recent studies on the Nazi attempt to destroy European Jewry during the Second World War, *The War Against The Jews 1933-1945*. Unfortunately, this short study is as uneven as her major one. Paradoxically, though,

this unevenness serves to underline Miss Dawidowicz's real expertise and strengths—the Jewish side of the Holocaust, and modern Polish-Jewish history here demonstrated in Chapter 5, 'Appropriating the Holocaust: Polish Historical Revisionism'. In other areas of the subject, as previously, Miss Dawidowicz tends to be less sure of herself.

Miss Dawidowicz's subjective approach to this important question of how the Holocaust has been treated by historians is signalled at the outset by her comments that during earlier researches she was 'dismayed to find how inadequately the murder of the Jews had been recorded in the history books', and that consequently she, 'became haunted by the fear that the history of the 6 million murdered Jews would vanish from the earth as they themselves and their civilisation had vanished' (pp. 1-2). Although Miss Dawidowicz speculates as to the reasons for 'this historiographical mystery', one really must take issue with her basic premises and the generalisations that follow.

If one looks hard enough at most general histories of the world and Europe the criticism of so-called 'omission' could be levelled about any number of topics and subjects. But given the vast outpouring of books (not all narrowly specialised, by any means) and articles on *all* aspects of the Nazi-Jewish experience from 1933 to 1945 published in the West since the end of the Second World War, then Miss Dawidowicz's assertions are more than surprising and must be rejected. Indeed, as selective as her claim is the selective nature of her 'historical examination' in the relevant chapters on America and England. Professor Gordon A. Craig's recent history of Germany is, apparently, only to be praised because it includes material on German anti-Semitism and the Nazi destruction of the Jews. Yet the tremendous contribution made by various publications of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich tend to be denigrated for their 'antiseptic quality, sometimes merely cool and detached, but more often lifeless' (pp. 62-63). This really is being unfair—both to the Institute's work and publications, and to others who attempt to write from the point of view of historical accuracy rather than from a position of emotional involvement.

Miss Dawidowicz is, of course, absolutely right to stress that: 'the murder of 6 million Jews stands apart from the deaths of the other millions, not because of any distinctive fate that the individual victims endured, but because of the differentiative intent of the murders and the unique effect of the murders' (p. 14). But she is wrong when trying to argue, for whatever reason, that other people, including some historians, try to deny or deprive the Jews 'of their terrible unique experience as a people marked for annihilation' (p. 16).

Miss Dawidowicz is, however, far better at presenting her case with reference to the Eastern bloc countries, and her chapter on Poland is both valuable and riveting in showing how political considerations determine the fortunes of both history writing and historians. This chapter is, if anything, more interesting than her survey of the situation within Russia since the vicissitudes of postwar Polish historiography and the Jewish question under Nazism were themselves played out against the background of anti-Semitic policies which now leaves around 5,000 Jews in Poland as against 3.3 million before the war (the figure of approximately 240,000 shortly after the war having been reduced to around 30,000 by 1960). As Miss Dawidowicz so aptly puts it, 'to all intents and purposes, the Jewish community and its institutions had been liquidated, the Polish Communists having themselves put the finishing touches to the Final Solution of the Jewish question which the Germans had so efficiently accomplished for them' (p. 124).

One finishes this book, however, with mixed feelings and a certain amount of regret, especially with regard to the selective nature of some of Miss Dawidowicz's argument and evidence. The regret is compounded when one examines the footnotes and sees there the basis for a better-argued, more balanced, and indeed fuller, text.

Nevertheless, for those interested and working in the subject the book is still one to l read.

JOHN P. FOX

Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Nav Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941. By Arthur J. Marder. *Oxford: Clarendon Pre. Oxford University Press. 1981. 533 pp. £19·50.*

ADMIRAL SIR HENRY LEACH's words to Arthur Marder about the sinking of t *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, admirably sum up the naval dimension of t opening stages of Japan's war against Britain:

> The three words, 'folly' in the basic concept of the operation, 'arrogance' presuming it could be implemented against such impossible odds, and 'waste' terms of men and ships, in its inevitable and predictable result, must sum up t saga which you rightly term a disaster.

Strategically and politically the disaster had wider and deeper significance. dramatically demonstrated Britain's inability to defend its Eastern Empire wh fighting for survival in a European war and at the same time showed Churchill's wo failure of judgment as a war leader; his complete lack of understanding of Japan intentions and capabilities and a consequently unrealistic view of the deterrent effect the dispatch of the two ships to the Far East.

The destruction of the ships by land-based aircraft provides the dramatic conclusi to Marder's detailed analyses of the relationships of the two navies, the characteristi of their personnel and equipment and of the domestic and international politic processes which brought them into conflict. A conflict which, although it began successfully, was to end, as some of Japan's naval leaders prophesied, with their ov defeat at the hands of American sea power. The book is published posthumously anc second volume designed to carry on the story to the end of the war, seems unlikely appear. Arthur Marder is unexcelled as a historian of the Royal Navy's performance the First World War and his final evaluation of its contribution to the Pacific campai would have provided a fitting crown to his career.

The particular virtue of what he did accomplish before his death arises from l melding of Japanese, British and American sources on a scale not attempted by a previous historian of this part of the war. The use of a combination of historical a biographical material already published in Japan, the evidence obtained from Japane officers by the United States authorities at the end of the war, and the wide range information derived from his own interviews and correspondence with participant enables him to fill a considerable gap. He provides first hand insight into the thoug processes which led Japan into war, the strategic thinking of her naval leaders, th operational concepts and the strengths and weaknesses of their equipment.

From his earlier work on the Royal Navy Marder was fascinated by the professio and personal qualities of naval officers and this interest features prominently in l character sketches and appraisals of both British and Japanese officers, ranging fro admirals to the men who flew the aircraft and fired the guns.

These two elements which give the book its distinctive value must however approached with some caution. Recollections of events and decisions, especially tho having momentous consequences cannot be always accepted as objective evidence, a evaluations of naval officers made by their contemporaries are notorious for partiali and prejudice.

These important reservations apart, Arthur Marder's long established skill

shaping complex material into readable and illuminating narrative, his intelligent sympathy with the actors in the dramas he so movingly relates, and, above all, his imaginative grasp of the realities of naval warfare, make it all the more regrettable that this is the last book we shall have from his pen.

King's College, London BRYAN RANFT

British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Vol. 2. By F. H. Hinsley. *London: HMSO. 1981. 850 pp. £15·95.*

TO read right through the second volume of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* is to be moved by its clarity and conciseness. Its very anonymity—scarcely a person named—contributes strangely to its dramatic effect producing an impression of huge theatrical scene changes while men and *matériel* are moved across the world stage in relentless pursuit of victory against the enemy and of circumspection towards the ally. Out front, hidden, insistent, stands the prompter, the body of intelligence, correcting, guiding, pushing the production to get better and better as the years go by.

The whole is a marvellous story. It leads the reader through referenced pages from one event to the next, smoothly unfolding each part of the whole. Read the chapters and relevant appendices of the War at Sea, which date from the middle of 1941, and it will not be easy to put the book down until the end of the period comes in the summer of 1943. Follow the land battles in North Africa, on the Eastern Front, in fact any part that appeals. It will become compulsive. There is perhaps over-much emphasis on the Enigma contribution but it is fair to say that due credit is given to all part of the intelligence body, especially the Joint Intelligence Committee which is put in its rightful place at the centre of deliberation.

The empire that stood alone, the fortress of Britain, was remarkably able to adjust to the two most dissimilar allies that appeared on the scene in 1941, one hoped for and planned for, the other unexpected (except to the interpreters of signs and readers of signals). Its flexibility let the intelligence network stretch to take in the new dimensions of allies spread each side of it some few thousand miles. There was no equal partnership with the Russians but a Gilbert-and-Sullivan arrangement by which the British Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley could, by reading the Enigma decyphers, know the dispositions of the German forces on the eastern front. Inversely, the School could produce the German estimates of the allied orders of battle and the decrypted appreciations of the Soviet order of battle made by German air force intelligence. These together provided the necessary knowledge about Soviet forces. Flexibility! But the Russians never did give out any information about their intelligence services, and very sensibly therefore neither eventually did the Western allies give much to them. Understandably, at first, when Russia became an ally, the Prime Minister pushed for Enigma items to be wrapped up and shown to the grisly bear Joe Stalin who played his cards so close to his chest and in human terms needled his allies to try and share their sophisticated knowledge with him. But it soon became apparent there would be no equality and the service to Joe remained circumspect.

When the United States entered the war, the intelligence agencies moved smoothly into gear, thanks to pre-American-entry arrangements made in 1941. It was all a bit over-planned, each variety of bodies suspicious that it might not be receiving what it should in the way of intelligence but in due course it all settled down with folded wings, which were sometimes ruffled, but on the whole the Americans continued to rely heavily on all aspects of the British intelligence organisation. In the summer 1943 the two sections, United States and British, dealing mainly with enemy order of battle joined together into a Military Intelligence Research Section and effected a complete integration.

It is a forlorn but nevertheless valid hope that a who's who of initial holders scattered through the book could be produced for future reference. It would not only be a best seller but it would tell the students of history who were the men and women in all walks of life who contributed so deeply, gallantly and conscientiously to what must be one of the most efficient and successful intelligence machines in modern history.

JOAN ASTLEY

WESTERN EUROPE

The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement. By Loukas Tsoukalis. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 273 pp. £15·00. Pb. £6·95.*

THE European Community is midway through its second round of enlargement. For reasons largely to do with internal politics in the applicant states, Greece was able to jump the gun on its Mediterranean neighbours, Spain and Portugal, and become the tenth member of the Community whilst the Spanish and Portuguese applications are still being considered. Tsoukalis in his timely study takes note of the special circumstances of the Greek accession while demonstrating convincingly that the Community's enlargement to the South can be usefully examined from an overall Mediterranean perspective.

The book appears to have two main objectives. The first is to provide a comprehensive, up-to-date and digestible discussion (from the point of view of specialist students) of the politico-economic issues raised by the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese candidatures. In this objective Tsoukalis undoubtedly succeeds. The author's previous publications have established him as a successful advocate of the political economy approach to European integration. This study provides further confirmation of the productiveness of such an approach. The economic and political background to the three Mediterranean applications are succinctly handled in Part One, followed in Part Two by a useful summary of the negotiating phase and the political reverberations throughout the Community and its member states. Part Three focuses in more detail on two areas—industrial readjustment and agriculture—already seen as sensitive in the current negotiations and undoubtedly posing major problems for the Community of Twelve in the longer term.

The second objective of the book—to contribute to the debate on the consequences of enlargement—doesn't always sit easily with the book's more didactic emphasis. Tsoukalis rightly comments that there has not yet been an adequate *debate* about enlargement. The Community has scarcely any choice but to accept the initial applications, the member states have so far fudged rather than openly confronted the problems involved (with one or two specific exceptions). One of the reasons for the absence of debate can be found in Tsoukalis's own handling of the issues. There really are too many unanswerable questions to make debate satisfactory, certainly at a public level. Tsoukalis makes his position clear—occasionally too clear. His conviction that the Community *must* enlarge, *must* adapt, and *must* not become too loose a grouping in the process contains too many conundrums to be entirely convincing to a sceptical reader. In his own words, this is an interim report; as such it is a sound contribution to a debate which still lacks a sharper, more politically realistic contribution to redress the balance in the literature which has so far appeared.

UMIST, University of Manchester CAROLE WEBB

Harmonisation in the EEC. Edited by Carol Cosgrove Twitchett. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 144 pp. £20·00.*

THIS symposium on harmonisation in the European Community (EC) arose from the work of a study group in 1978 and draws on the expertise of people from various academic disciplines, industry, the civil service, and the Commission of the European Communities. The essays examine the extent of harmonisation in a number of policy areas including non-tariff barriers, fiscal systems, industrial policy and practices, and transport. The impact of harmonisation on the British motor industry is considered in one chapter.

The opening chapter usefully describes the harmonisation process with reference to Treaty provisions and instruments, and defines harmonisation as 'the adoption of legislation by Community institutions . . . designed to bring about changes in the internal legal systems of the Member States' which contributes to the smooth running of the EC (p. 1). This necessarily involves a great many technical matters and relates to questions such as the controversial issue of the mutual recognition of qualifications affecting individuals' ability to take advantage of the Rome Treaty's provisions for the free movement of persons.

Given the *foci* of harmonisation efforts in the EC, it is not surprising that the chapters should deal with rather technical issues. However, this does not make for an impenetrable text. For the most part, contributors have managed to produce lucid and readable short essays without sacrificing too much by way of detail. The essays provide useful introductions to the subject of harmonisation although specialists will probably find the treatment of issues too sketchy and undergraduates unfamiliar with the subject might need a high degree of tenacity to persevere with some of the more legalistic essays.

Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the papers are rather dated, the book will be welcomed by anyone seeking an introduction to what harmonisation really is, the logic behind the process, and the reason why the EC continues to promote harmonisation, not for its own sake, but in order to realise the EC's goal of an ever increasing union.

University of Hull JULIET LODGE

Fascism in Europe. Rev. edn. Edited by S. J. Woolf. *London, New York: Methuen. 1981. 408 pp. £11·50. Pb: £5·95.*

The New Fascists. By Paul Wilkinson. *London: Grant McIntyre. 1981. 179 pp. £7·95.*

THE subject of fascism continues to be of live historical and contemporary interest. Unfortunately, too, it is one of those portmanteau concepts that invites woolly thinking, and the general use of 'fascist' as a mark of disapproval for a variety of regimes and movements we happen not to like destroys the use of the term. That criticism does not apply to *Fascism in Europe*, making a welcome reappearance since its original publication in 1968 under a similar title, dealing with the experience of several European countries during the interwar years and now with an extended coverage. More than anything else, the collection of essays shows that even though we can trace unifying themes in the 'fascist syndrome'—racialism, nationalism, militarism and anti-communism—in fact it is the particular national circumstances that inform us what 'fascism' was really like.

There was, of course, a degree of cross-fertilisation, self-conscious emulation in borrowed trappings, as well as attempts to work out a common ideology. But the essential unity of fascism was imparted by the crises of development facing European society at the time—on a Marxist account set by the desperate manoeuvres of last-

ditch capitalism, less tendentiously as a response to the crisis of modernisation. In that context one would make a plea for the reissue of *The Nature of Fascism*, an excellent theoretical work also edited by Stuart Woolf. Without some such explanatory tool as given by modernisation theory, even though that type of account has come under sharp attack, there is little to make a comparative study worthwhile. After all, there has to be some rationale for putting the British Union of Fascists, the Finnish Lapua movement, the Belgian Rexists and the Roumanian Iron Guard all in, or under, the same bed. As we would expect, the peripheral movements in *Fascism in Europe* attain their significance through their association with the 'great' fascist regimes, German National Socialism and Italian fascism. Their impact gave fascism its indelible colouring, but it is a concept rooted in historical development, not one to use indiscriminately. Woolf is surely right in suggesting that the word 'fascism' should be banned from our current political vocabulary: 'It has been so misused that it has lost its original meaning.'

That verdict is patently not endorsed by Paul Wilkinson in *The New Fascists*. His book traces fascism through its 'golden age', its continuation in the early postwar years through to the 1970s and the present time. He concludes by proposing a number of measures by means of which the fascist threat may be combatted. Despite the qualifications of 'new' as opposed to 'old' fascism, Wilkinson's presentation rests heavily on the continuities of extremist thinking, and that mode of argument weakens the book considerably. We are also treated to a well-informed account of the activities of a host of 'fascist-type' organisations—the Turkish 'Grey Wolves' and a variety of other nefarious groupings. The question is whether, as far as Western Europe is concerned, 'fascism' does represent a definite threat to liberal democracy. Wilkinson concedes that the danger, for the present at least, is not expressed in electoral terms, but rather in the proliferation of clandestine movements, their extensive propaganda and their use of terroristic methods. Yet right-wing extremism in most countries belongs to the epiphenomenon of politics, whilst its social manifestations are arguably more widespread. It is this disjunction that is puzzling, and our analysis is not helped by a blanket labelling of 'fascism'. Not for the first time, political science needs a new word.

London School of Economics GORDON SMITH

The Integration of the European Economy since 1815. By Sidney Pollard. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 109 pp. (Studies in Contemporary Europe, 4.) £6·95. Pb: £2·95.*

PROFESSOR POLLARD has written a book which is at once very useful and fundamentally mistaken. It is useful because it provides an accurate and at times a very perceptive and sympathetic account of late European mercantilism, of the long, ambiguous marriage of nationalism and mechanisation, and of the emergence of European functional international organisations in an elegantly written essay of about 30,000 words. The author is especially perspicacious on the part played by warfare as distinct from economic rationality in establishing the British lead in manufacturing industry after 1815, and on the mixture of revenue, protective, and social stabilisation motives behind nineteenth-century tariff-setting. He has an eye for the illustration which, even in so short a text, can be justified because it drives home a point with clarity and precision. Nineteenth-century economic liberalism, for example, is brought wonderfully to life by mention of the way in which Prussia continued to remit appropriate tax payments to its partners in the Zollverein even when some of these went to war in alliance with Austria against their powerful partner in 1866 (p. 29).

The trouble is that these fine qualities are quite absent in the introduction and the concluding chapters where Professor Pollard gives way to a naïve functionalist determinism redolent of the 1950s. Economic integration is pictured as twin-engined. One wing is kept aloft by a sense of European community and the succession of idealistic calls for unity culminating in postwar federalism. But the real drive is provided by technical and economic progress, 'a natural economic process, not necessarily planned or willed by anyone, but the outcome of untold separate decisions, each arrived at for reasons of self-interest without ulterior political motives' (p. 12). This natural process marks up its greatest achievements on 'practical, purely economic issues' such as the European coal and steel industries (p. 86) or the opium trade (p. 52): the former a prize of war between France and Germany for nigh on a century, the latter a major source of revenue of the British and French empires in the East. The substantial and ineradicable elements of mercantilism present in even the most apparently technical questions to come within the web of international negotiation, convention, and treaty from the closing decades of the nineteenth century through to the current EEC fishery negotiations are lost in euphoria at the way in which 'the logic of . . . the new technology . . . imposed a growing degree of integration on the European economy' (p. 13). It is too late in the twentieth century for such unsupported acceptance of the market as natural, of the distinction between high and low politics, and of a simple analytical distinction between economics and politics. Turning to the bibliography it comes as no surprise to find that the great majority of works listed date from the 1950s and 1960s and only three (out of fifty-seven) from the last five years.

In short, it is the historian's revenge. After all those works by social scientists in which the past is tailored to fit the ideology of the author while the present is treated with a more realistic empiricism, Professor Pollard commits the complementary error. But so many more people (and even some historians) know about the present.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation. By David Reynolds. *London: Europa. 1981. 411 pp. £20·00.*

Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1980: The Special Relationship. By John Baylis. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 281 pp. £20·00.*

RECENT questionings in Britain about the Reagan administration's responses to Soviet misbehaviour, possibly also our now greater sensitivity to West European opinion on the matter, are leading us to think again about our connection with America: the special relationship, or 'close' relationship, as Sir Harold Wilson once called it, perhaps when it began to seem not so special as it had been. How did we, on this side of the Atlantic, get into it? What good has it done us, what harm?

David Reynolds, a Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, in the first of these two books about Anglo-American relations, writes in the best historical manner—there can hardly be an archive, public or private, on the subject which he has not read—concentrating on the birth of the alliance in the late 1930s and ending with Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Two main themes run through the book: 'the gradual creation of a unique alliance between two sovereign states and the rivalry within that embryonic alliance for advantage and increasingly for leadership' (p. 286). But was the alliance created in the late 1930s? In the First World War the United States tipped the scales against the Central Powers and for ever after British politicians knew they could never hope to fight and win another such war without knowing first

what the Americans would do. And was it an alliance? The Americans preferred to call it an 'association'. Was it even an association? On the British side, it was more of a sub-conscious recognition, from 1921, when parity at sea was admitted with America, as with no other Power, that defence of the British Empire henceforward depended on American co-operation; and, on the American side, that their destiny was to step into Britain's shoes as the leader of the democratic world.

Dr Reynolds painstakingly recounts the evolution of the relationship from Roosevelt's Quarantine speech in Chicago in October 1937: the President's fight with isolationist forces, his anxious hopes for Chamberlain's search for a general settlement with Nazi Germany, then, when war came, his struggle to circumvent the Neutrality Acts, ending with the cash-and-carry arrangements to assist Britain with war supplies; America's despair when France collapsed in 1940, followed by the solid bond with Churchill as Prime Minister; then, rising American confidence in Britain's prospects of survival while Churchill strained every nerve to engage America in the war; the hard negotiations over the destroyer-bases deal in September 1940 and finally the Lend-Lease agreement of March 1941, with its involvement of Britain in the American philosophy of economic reconstruction after the war. The giant rises unwillingly from his slumbers to rescue the princess from the dragon, and then devours her.

Dr Reynolds chiefly aspires, like a good historian, to correct popular mythology, represented by a cartoon on the jacket of his book showing the President and the Prime Minister, dressed in sailor suits and dancing a merry jig together to the discomfiture of their enemies. Cultural bonds, ideological fellow-feeling, Hollywood films, American mothers, all played their part, but hard-headed self-interest always was there at rock bottom. British politicians, Churchill no less than the others, had no use for American intervention, either Roosevelt's or Wilson's before him, if it injured the British Empire. Their stomachs churned in shame when, in November 1940, the fate of Britain turned on a vote in America for a new President. On the American side, too, there was never much 'gut' feeling for Britain. George VI and Churchill, too, believed that America would come into the war when bombs fell on London, but she did not. In the bargaining over the destroyer-bases deal and over Lend-Lease (described by Churchill as the 'most unsordid act in history') Reynolds shows how the Americans wanted to see the British prostrate before they would help. As one of them said, Britain must 'scrape the bottom of the barrel' (p. 164). But that is politics. It does not affect the fact that the relationship, in spite of all the meanness and cold self-interest on both sides, somehow enabled the two states to survive, and in doing so made a better world for us all.

John Baylis, a lecturer in International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, begins his study with the outbreak of war in 1939 and ends with a postscript on the British agreement with President Carter in 1980 to buy Trident missiles from America as a replacement for Polaris. He concentrates on the defence field, though it is hard to separate from the politics, and this makes easier the handling of such a long and eventful period. Even so, the actual text fills only some 120 pages, the rest being taken up with documents, useful to have no doubt, but rather wasteful of space. Again, the story is one of the United States inexorably moving towards domination of the alliance during the Second World War, then establishing an easy supremacy over the wider Atlantic bloc after 1945 until its primacy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when Britain was little more than a 'hapless bystander' (p. 75).

Curiously enough, in the most technologically advanced field, that of nuclear weapons, the disparity between the two states has been somewhat less apparent. Beginning with the caustic period of the McMahon Act in 1946, which temporarily shut Britain out of American nuclear know-how, the story has been one of growing mutual confidence. The McMahon Act was amended in the late 1950s and the

Nassau agreement of 1962 positively discriminated in Britain's favour. Through the supply of nuclear materials and technology, Britain now makes a distinct and valuable contribution to the Atlantic nuclear partnership.

But this raises disturbing questions and Mr Baylis asks them. Has the Anglo-American relationship, special or not, lured British governments on to dreams of top-table status, making adjustment to the harsh realities all the harder? Has it, through our over-estimation of the value of the alliance, encouraged us to acquiesce in American policies, many of them perhaps ill-advised, and prevented us from working out our own alternatives? Did it inhibit us, in those early formative years, from joining and then, having joined, from playing a full part in, the European Community? Mr Baylis believes such questions point to serious errors in British foreign policy since 1945, but that the Anglo-American connection is not the sole cause of them. A judicious answer perhaps, but to know when an era has ended is still the hardest of human exercises.

London School of Economics F. S. NORTHEDGE

British Perspectives on Terrorism. Edited by Paul Wilkinson. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 195 pp. £10·95. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS book reprints in permanent form, for a wider readership, the work of the British contributions to *Terrorism: an International Journal*, Vol. V, No. 142, published early in 1981. As one would expect, the Provisional IRA and Northern Ireland dominate the book, though Paul Wilkinson both in his introduction and final chapter, 'Proposals for Government and International Responses to Terrorism', sets that struggle in the wider, international perspective. Specifically on Northern Ireland, Maurice Tugwell discusses the politics and propaganda of the Provisional IRA; E. Moxon-Browne considers public opinion in the Province; and Edgar O'Ballance the problems of leadership within the Provisional organisation. Merlyn Rees, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, contributes also a brief outline of the constraints and implications of the emergency legislation to which the Northern Ireland conflict has given rise. Each contribution will in its way help to clarify the peculiarly intransigent nature of that conflict, not least the way in which an essentially local problem has repercussions on the politics and society of the rest of the United Kingdom and creates problems not only for Britain's relations with the Republic of Ireland, but also with the European partners and the United States.

Britain's experience in combating terrorism, however, is not only much larger but also much more successful than the limited perspectives of the current campaign would suggest. In the rest of the United Kingdom, the 'spillover' from the Northern Irish conflict has to date been very effectively handled by the civilian police. Frank Gregory discusses their role in a useful, wide-ranging article which makes it very clear that their work in guarding against terrorism in the rest of the United Kingdom is not exclusively, nor even perhaps primarily, in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland. Kidnapping, here discussed by Dr Clutterbuck, as a problem in insurance, has fortunately been rare in the United Kingdom, but it is a familiar problem to any large company doing business abroad. Elsewhere in Europe the position is different. Gillian Bechers piece on the Horst Mahler trial and the light it sheds on terrorist motivation in West Germany may appear at first sight to sit uneasily with the rest of the book, but serves to remind us of the lasting influence of the fascist ideas of the Second World War and the fascination with violence which they incorporated. Such a fascination is still strong in many countries and as Clive Aston demonstrates, is a major factor inhibiting

effective co-ordinated inter-governmental responses. It is in short the variety of this useful book that is one of its major lessons.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

Britain in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to the Present. By Peter Lowe. *London: Longman. 1981. 264 pp. £9·95. Pb: £5·75.*

PETER LOWE's deftly constructed narrative account of British policy in the Far East since 1819 is the most comprehensive currently on the market. It will be of particular interest to sixth-formers, university undergraduates and the general reader seeking an introduction to the era of colonialism and imperialism in East and South-East Asia, and will serve as a very useful companion volume to the many studies of these phenomena in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

The eleven chapters are organised in chronologically distinct periods with policy in China and Japan being treated in primary terms and policy in South-east Asia in secondary terms within each period. The first five chapters cover the century to the outbreak of the First World War, the next five chapters cover the four decades up to the end of the Second World War, and the final chapter forms an epilogue 'on the rapid decline of British interests' (p. vii) since 1945

The book summarises an immense amount of monographic literature and doctoral dissertations appearing particularly in the past decade, and it is inevitable that many of the possible issues that could have been included have had to be pruned to the minimum. Well before the Japanese challenge of the 1930s, the British lion had been shown to be made of paper in the encounter with Chinese nationalism in the mid-1920s (pp. 128–34). The unwillingness of policy-makers in Whitehall to back up the China traders and bankers demonstrated all too clearly to the observant Japanese that the bluff had been called, and that not very much was to be expected from Britain as a co-defender of economic interests in China thereafter. The prolonged crisis in China generated a tremendous amount of diplomatic and military radio traffic between London and the Far East which enabled other powers, particularly Germany and Italy, to decipher this traffic throughout the interwar period and pass on some of their findings to the Japanese in the critical 1930s.

Again 'commercial and financial quarters in Britain . . . emphasised the need for a vigorous policy' (p. 151) but protectionist measures, the threat of an oil embargo canvassed in 1934, the Leith-Ross reform of the Chinese currency rescuing Chiang Kai-shek from the jaws of economic collapse, and the refusal to concede parity to the Japanese Navy in the London naval talks combined to alienate every single important element in the decision-making structure of Japanese society against Britain. The author rightly characterises this period from 1933 to 1937 as 'fascinating . . for the exploration of various possibilities in the realm of accommodation with Japan' (p. 146). While one can agree that the ambition and determination of Neville Chamberlain fuelled the 'inner competition' between the Treasury and the Foreign Office in the formulation of policy toward Japan at this juncture, Eden and the permanent officials in the Foreign Office treated Japanese diplomatic representatives with such arrogant disdain that all talk of an accommodation with Japan encountered cold disbelief. (Ambassador Yoshida was described by Vansittart as 'just plainly no good' and by Orde as 'an accomplished blunderer': Public Record Office, minutes of January 1937.)

Dr Lowe finds echoes of similar demands for vigorous countermeasures against Japanese export penetration of the British home market in the 1970s, as well as familiar sounds of a hoped-for expansion of trade with China, but is sadly resigned to

the likelihood that effective competition to Japan is more likely to come from the newly industrialising countries of the Third World than from a deficit-ridden British economy. The political and military trappings of empire in the Far East, with the miniscule exception of the Hong Kong colony, have been reduced to nostalgic history, but Hong Kong is one of the most successful of these newly industrialising countries and the China traders and bankers, along with other British-based transnational corporations, derive a great deal of comfort with every bulk carrier headed for each of the miracle economies that have sprung up along the Pacific rim since the sun set on all the old-style empires.

University of Sussex JOHN W. M. CHAPMAN

Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century. By Richard F. Kuisel. *Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 344 pp. £20·00.*

OVER the last decade Professor Kuisel has become the leading authority on the historical origins of postwar planning in France. In this book he brings together for the first time in one comprehensive argument his earlier ideas. He is concerned to trace the administrative and intellectual history of two noticeable developments in postwar France. The first, is the conversion of government and society to a dynamic, expanding technologically orientated capitalism; and the second, is the part played by state economic management in that process. Beginning in 1900 he traces the evolution of the various strands of thought about the replacement of the liberal order by a more interventionist apparatus. He takes in the productionist, corporatist and syndicalist ideas of the architects of France's remarkable production achievements in the First World War, their defeat in the first postwar reconstruction and the advocates of 'planning' who emerged from every point of the political compass in the 1930s. There follow the two most interesting chapters of the book. The first gives much the best account yet in print of the changes in governmental and administrative machinery wrought by the vigorous and hierarchical interventionism of the assorted corporatists and planners who supported Vichy's 'national revolution'. The second is a very good study of the arguments about reconstruction and planning in resistance circles both inside and outside France. There was often a remarkable similarity of views between Vichy, Algiers and London, not only on the need to 'modernise' the economy but also on the ways in which it might be done. The account of the changes in governmental machinery after 1945 is also well worthwhile, although, sadly, the account of the origins of the 'Monnet Plan' itself falls short of the standard of the rest of the volume. It relies too much on Monnet's highly untrustworthy and boastful memoirs. Furthermore, it sets the plan only in the context of France's domestic economy and that is only half the story, as, indeed, it can only be of all capitalist planning in Western Europe since 1945. But these are small and understandable faults in a most interesting, informative, and useful book.

UMIST, University of Manchester ALAN S. MILWARD

The Atom Besieged: Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany. By Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1981. 235 pp. £10·85.*

IT may be an exaggeration to say that official nuclear-power policies are under siege, but the momentum of anti-nuclear protest shows no sign of faltering in Western

Europe. Partly, its strength lies in the deep concern for our ecological future, although that is only one aspect. The ramifications extend one way to a rejection of nuclear weapons and thence to the contemporary 'peace movement', and in another way they express a hostility towards the traditional party-bureaucratic nexus of decision-making, to an apparent sclerosis in the channels of representation. For all these reasons, extra-parliamentary protest focusing on the question of nuclear power is likely to remain as a disturbing force.

The title of this book is misleading if it conjures up a concentration on showpiece confrontation in the style of Brokdorf. In fact, Nelkin and Pollak present a scholarly analysis, low key and all the more effective in showing the variety of levels at which the politicisation of the nuclear-power issue has to be considered. The authors opted for a close examination of France and Germany, and although their comparative treatment is at times off-putting in the constant switch from one country to the other, they bring out well the contrasts between the two which, as much as to anything, can be traced to their dissimilar political and administrative structures—French centralist traditions and West German decentralisation. The point of the West German system is that it has allowed a determined ecological movement numerous openings to the decision-making structure, and enabled protestors to play off one hierarchy against another. That becomes evident in considering the wide latitude enjoyed by the West German administrative courts, enforcing delays, sometimes for years, in the development of nuclear-power sites on the grounds of public safety. In France, on the other hand, the courts have given little help. More generally, one can say that the protest movement in West Germany is assured of a better platform and has gained a greater coherence than it has in France.

There are differences, too, in the relationship of the anti-nuclear power movement to the traditional parties. The authors show that in Germany the strength of the establishment consensus led to the formation of autonomous organisations, whilst in France it proved easier to work within the opposition parties. However, the most recent developments in both countries reveal a remarkable transformation. The rise of the *Friedensbewegung* in the Federal Republic, particularly affecting the ruling SPD, has had the effect of bringing 'dissent' into the mainstream of party politics. In France, the advent of a left-wing government has curiously altered the stance of anti-nuclear protest; for so long identified with the opposition, it now has to work through the governing parties.

The most difficult questions raised by Nelkin and Pollak relate to the wider social and political significance of this extra-parliamentary protest. Does it point to a new structuring of political cleavage in West European societies? Will its effect be rather to revitalise the division between Left and Right? Or is it just one more 'course corrective', made redundant once governments have absorbed the message? The authors do not really attempt to supply answers, but *The Atom Besieged* is precisely the kind of study we need if they are to be found.

London School of Economics GORDON SMITH

Germany East and West: Conflicts, Collaboration and Confrontation. By Lawrence L. Whetten. *New York, London: New York University Press. 1981. 215 pp. $22.75.*

THERE have been remarkably few books written on the German problem in the past decade. East-West detente and the *Ostverträge* of the early1970s shifted the focus of attention away from Europe. Yet the German problem remains fundamental to any discussion of either East-West relations in general or European security in particular.

After all, East and West did little more than agree to disagree on the future of Germany and of Berlin.

This slim volume sets out to retrace the policies which led eventually to the establishment of formal relations between the two estranged German states. Inevitably, much of the material the author has threaded together will be familiar to students of German politics—from the early disagreements over reunification among Germany's Social Democrats to Romania's diplomatic recognition of West Germany in 1967 and its consequent defection from the East German-sponsored 'rejectionist front' in Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the book does offer a useful summary of the improved contacts and new agreements between the two Germanies since their mutual, if limited, recognition in 1972. The list is impressive. A vindication, perhaps, of the Social Democrats' policy of change through rapprochement? Not yet. As the author rightly points out, the political nervousness of the East German regime has set narrow limits to the new relationship the West Germans had hoped would evolve with their socialist sister-state.

The book may be criticised less for what the author has included than for what he has left out. The opening indictment of SPD 'complicity' with the Communists in attempting to establish a socialist state after the Second World War leaves the reader a little confused. A sharper distinction surely needs to be made between the Social Democrats in the Eastern zone and those in the West. The confusion is deepened by an unfortunate omission or transposition of lines on page 3. Similarly the author introduces us to a 'faction' in the Western SPD in the 1950s in favour of a reconciliation with the East German SED. It would be surprising if the SPD had failed to debate that issue—but the assertion could use some supporting evidence.

The author's concentration on the West German side of the East-West German argument understates the importance of the crisis of confidence which developed in East German-Soviet relations over the German problem. For example, the height of the crisis came in the winter of 1970—just where the author is pointing to a certain 'moderation' of the East German position.

Aside from these details, a more general criticism can be made. The picture of evolving super-power relations is drawn with such a broad brush that at times the real significance of the more finely drawn details of intra-German affairs is lost. As a consequence, events stand out, rather than the shifting political patterns which conspired to produce them. However, the events are important enough in themselves to bear repeat scrutiny.

The Economist EDWINA MORETON

The Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974–1979: A Personal Account. By Samuel D. Eaton. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1981. 169 pp.*

SERVING diplomats normally spend their careers writing for tiny readerships: the restricted list of government insiders who see embassy telegrams or who read ambassadorial despatches. They may then go on to produce memoirs, but these rarely vouchsafe the detailed personal appraisals and political judgments which were the day-to-day business of the writing diplomat. Samuel D. Eaton, who was Minister Counsellor at the United States Embassy in Madrid from 1974 to 1978, somehow manages to bridge the gap between the telegram and the memoir. We hear how Eaton, a long-time Latin Americanist, was sent to Spain after Kissinger decreed that the State Department's Latin-Americanists needed to broaden their experience. We have a fluent account—with plenty of insights gained at the Eatons' own dinner-table—of the

story of Spain's remarkable transformation from dictatorship to democracy. Eaton then goes on to give us his views on how America's foreign service works (with some trenchant criticisms, in particular, of the way recent ambassadors to Spain have been appointed). Finally we have some thoughts on the future.

The result is a highly readable description of the events of those dramatic years, years whose excitement and optimism probably reached their peak on election day, June 15, 1977. The assessments of the major personalities of the time—the King, Franco, Adolfo Suárez, Fraga, Carrillo, and many others—are punctuated by amusing descriptions of the house where Eaton and his Bolivian-born wife Mechi brought government and opposition personalities for regular meals and chats. (Sometimes lunches for men only, causing one chivalrous guest to send flowers to the 'absent Mrs Eaton'). But Eaton's observations of the gradual maturing of the attitudes of Spain's political class, coupled with his firm view that American interests were better served by encouraging democracy than by clinging to the easy simplicities of the vanishing Franco era, make this book a useful account, not only of a crucial period of Western European history, but also of American diplomacy in action.

Since the book was written a number of incidents have occurred—involving incipient military revolts and the eclipse of some of the key political personalities of the transitional period—which may have caused Eaton to revise his judgment. But I suspect not. He wisely rules out Spain's 'living a vision'—the vision of total economic harmony, painless integration into Western institutions, an end to terrorism and a solution to the Basque problem—for a basically democratic future involving some measure of a hankering after authoritarianism and a muddling-through based on a gradual lowering of expectations. Much of Eaton's relative optimism is based on his observations of the high calibre, flexibility and perceptiveness of many of Spain's political leaders, Left and Right. But the pull of Western Europe is for him a decisive factor. Those who engineered the transition to democracy had a strong sense of Spain's isolation from the rest of Western Europe and a countervailing desire for integration and involvement. The 'pull' of foreign examples, Eaton maintains, will continue to exercise favourable influences.

At a time when the debate has shifted to these very matters—Spain's relations with the EEC and NATO—these are perceptive and interesting observations.

Chatham House DAVID STEPHEN

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. *Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Croom Helm.) 291 pp. £15·95.*

WHEN we read Professor Fischer-Galati's book, *Eastern Europe in the 1960s*, published some twenty years ago, we were impressed by the excellence of his analysis, but rather seceptical of his 'pessimistic' conclusions and general prognosis. He was then dealing more with the operation of historical principles of Russian imperialism in Eastern Europe, and it was therefore thought that once the communist régimes stabilised they would become less rigid and would change. However, political development in Eastern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s confirmed his pessimism. Not that the circumstances in Eastern Europe have not changed: Yugoslavia is still very different from the Soviet model; Romania's difference is in external policies; Hungary's internal economic system does not resemble any one's in Eastern Europe; even the stillborn Prague Spring changed Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic

Republic is no longer an identical reflection of its master's shape. However, the greatest change occurred in Poland, but since that crisis has not yet been resolved, we cannot consider this only substantial change as permanent, to inspire optimism. Since the Soviet development itself points increasingly to the militarisation of international and internal political problems there seems to be no joy for the analysts in this field.

The various experts who wrote up the substantive arguments of this volume perceive no real changes either in power structures or in policies. Professor Vucinich's view of major trends in Eastern Europe can be summed up in the celebrated phrase: '*plus ça change, plus c'est la meme chose*'; consequently communist regimes are unable to cope with the accumulation of problems arising out of change, multiplied by historical inheritance. In any case, they are most unwilling to effect fundamental changes, largely because the Soviet Union is jealously guarding its hegemony, and maintaining stability by means of arms. The sad survey of incapabilities is tabulated in Dr Fischer's section on agriculture; Professor Feiwel's on industry; Professor Botsas's on trade; Dr Heath's on education; and Professor Held's on culture. Professor Gilbert's analysis of politics leads to the inevitable conclusion that no change means political stagnation and degeneration, while Professors Remington and Nelson demonstrate the same in the sphere of international relations. The editor's balance sheet rightly takes to task the Western theorists of 'convergence', already rejected, rather more violently, by Soviet and East European rulers. Even with the two great uncertainties of the 1980s, the Polish crisis and Brezhnev's inevitable retirement, Professor Fischer-Galati's prognosis is gloomy for Eastern Europe, and this despite, or perhaps because of the distinct possibility of substantive change in the Soviet Union itself, the party state finally transforming itself into a fully fledged 'stratocracy'.

University of Manchester JOHN BRADLEY

Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe. Edited by Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 302 pp.*

THE rise of the *Solidarity* movement has changed not only politics in Poland but Western study of the politics of socialist states. In the 1950s our major concern was the Communist Party and its *apparat*, in the 1960s interest groups became a focus of political scientists, and in the late 1970s and early 1980s wider social groupings such as intellectuals and workers have come to the fore. There is an implicit assumption that the locus of power in socialist states is no longer to be found in the formal apparatuses of power but in the groups making up the society.

The sixteen essays plus introduction in the volume under review are a significant addition to the literature. Their focus is Eastern Europe rather than the Soviet Union and there are useful case studies of manual workers in Poland (by Kolankiewicz and de Weydenthal), Czechoslovakia (by Valenta), Hungary (by Volgyes), Romania (by Nelson), Yugoslavia (by Denitch). The other articles take a more comparative perspective and seek to generalise about politics and the working class on the basis of East European experience. Viewed as a whole, the book illustrates the lively state of the political sociology of East European studies in the West and the good use to which sociological studies conducted in the East have been put. There is a particularly good and well-researched comparative study of 'Political Attitudes and Activity of Workers in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary', by Alex Pravda, and a most useful account by Laura D'Andrea Tyson of the economic problems and their effects on the working class—particularly in Hungary and Poland.

The book is sound on the ethnographic description of changes in composition and

differentials between strata of the manual working class. A point which is prominent in many of the articles is the growing maturation of the working class. In the early days of socialist industrialisation, the peasant-worker was relatively successfully 'included' politically, socially and economically in the institutional arrangements set up by the Communist power. The present manual working class, however, is now becoming a more traditional working class with its roots in the towns. It is better educated and has higher levels of aspiration and expectation than its forebears of the 1950s. Many of the authors point to the strains and incompatibilities between this 'new' working class and the institutional framework. Politically, workers are becoming more assertive of their interests and seek to influence policy-making (rather than being instruments of policy implementation). Economically, their horizons are higher than the provision of regular work, a daily food ration and a barely furnished room; now they seek the fruits of a consumer society. Socially, they are ambitious for educational advancement for their children as well as for the security provided by full employment and government services. It is argued that the political framework dominated by the single Party cannot accommodate the level of popular demands being put on it. In the economy, the higher costs of fuel and the limitations of labour intensive production call for a rise in labour productivity entailing greater effort. The structure of full employment and work security is called into question—this may ensure the loyalty of the population but it detracts from its efficiency. As the rate of growth of the economy declines, so does the possibility for upward mobility, and internal conflict about relative status and income becomes greater. Political turbulence is likely to increase in the 1980s.

The book is less satisfactory on two counts. First, the theoretical analysis of 'blue-collar workers' is weak. Martin Lipset's essay on 'Industrial Workers in Comparative Perspective' dwells far too much on the changing structure of Western society and he does not come to grips with the dynamics of socialist states. Class boundaries are always fuzzy, but it is not always clear just what group the authors have in mind—is it particular manual occupations, or traditional labour intensive industries? Secondly, the absence of a detailed study of Soviet workers is a gap which is not bridged by the comparative pieces. Poland, for obvious reasons, is a major point of reference for the writers. While the Soviet Union figures in the articles by Bielasiak and Triska, the history and peculiarities of the Russian working class have not only a logic of their own, but also have had an impact on the East European states. The suppression of *Solidarity* in December 1981 makes the point—it also reminds us that political power has a dimension independent of wider social groupings.

University of Birmingham DAVID LANE

Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917–1979. By Hansjakob Stehle. Trans. by Sandra Smith. *Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 1981. 466 pp. £16·20. Pb: £8·00.*

THE theme of this book 'is *not* the history of the Church in communist countries; that is reflected here only to the degree to which it is necessary for the understanding and for background to Vatican policy in Eastern Europe' (p. 9). The book is nonetheless a mine of information about the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe as well as about Vatican diplomacy. 'Like any work of contemporary history, this book must remain fragmentary until all the archives are opened' (p. 9). Yet Stehle includes information which will be new to his readers and will shed further light on, or highlight the shadowy confusion of, the intricate maze of diplomacy which is his subject.

He mentions difficulties in the Vatican's relationship with Russia, even before the Revolution. He describes naïve early missionary strategies; attempts to win Orthodox 'schismatics' back to the Catholic fold through the Uniate Church, or to use famine relief as a foothold for evangelism. He tells of the first Vatican protest note to the Soviet government—about an arrest which had not (yet) happened! Stehle's journalistic talent, and often his own experiences, bring to life the characters behind the official documents—popes, diplomats, clergy. The Second World War and the Nazi threat interrupted the Vatican's expression of growing hostility towards the Soviet government. From the 'cold war' approach of the 1950s the pendulum swung back to extreme tact in an attempt to save the Church from total destruction. Stehle describes the Vatican's response in the different countries of Eastern Europe. He does not gloss over the suffering of older church leaders, appointed to implement an earlier approach and now harshly jettisoned. He describes further developments in Vatican policy, including the election of a Polish Pope, who, he claims, is basically in agreement with the diplomatic course previously pursued by the Vatican.

Some readers will disagree with Stehle's evaluation of certain situations, particularly within Eastern Europe. He suggests that a fully functioning hierarchy ensures healthy Church life, mentioning Hungary as an example. Yet many Hungarian Catholics criticise their bishops for subservience to state authorities and harshness toward their clergy, several of whom have been banished to remote villages for youth work and for expressing disagreement with the hierarchy. Catholics in Lithuania and Czechoslovakia have expressed a desire for more priests rather than more bishops, who will compromise enough to be acceptable to the state authorities. Bishop Vrana of Olomouc is certainly not generally respected, as Stehle implies.

Stehle's claim that John Paul II is basically continuing previous Vatican diplomatic policy is open to doubt. Since his accession members of the Czechoslovakian Catholic hierarchy have become more outspoken. The Pope is known to have encouraged this. He is also known to have shown more interest than his diplomatic corps in problems faced by Czechoslovakian Catholics.

Stehle appears to overestimate the omniscience of the secret police and the impossibility for the Church to survive underground. He implies that all secretly consecrated bishops have been discovered. Several Slovak Catholics, and police interrogators, believe otherwise. He says little about the underground Uniate Churches known to exist in the Ukraine or Romania. Nor does he mention that the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia is flourishing openly after being driven underground for twenty years. He mentions the dissident 'Underground Church' in Czechoslovakia, but not the Underground Roman Catholic Church which remains loyal to Rome, which is highly respected by many Catholics.

The book is further marred by an inept translation, which is unworthy of it and renders it heavy reading. Despite this drawback and some of its author's controversial conclusions, it contains a wealth of fascinating information which will make it a valuable investment for all serious students of the Vatican or of Eastern Europe.

ANNA NICHOLLS

The Soviet Communist Party. By Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 167pp. £10·95. Pb: £4·95.*

THE words 'Hill and Frank' are going to tumble from the lips of any teacher of Soviet politics for as long as the authors are prepared to up-date this handiest of handbooks. The work slips into a gap in the now wide-ranging literature on the Soviet Union, and it fills that gap extremely well. It is concise, crisp, detailed and readable. The text is not

overburdened with names and numbers; it simply provides the essential ones, and sets them in an analytical framework which throws facts and figures into relief. There is a useful bibliography, the references to it being embodied in the text, so that you do not have to hunt for them. Admittedly the job was made feasible by the abundance of information available in Russian on the CPSU, but not all readers of Russian do the leg-work which these authors have done, nor do all specialists on Soviet politics devote as much attention to the self-image of the CPSU as have the authors—particularly Ronald J. Hill in his other works. To conclude this enthusiastic welcome, it is worth pointing out that the text is encased in a good hard plastified cover which will dog-ear in the back pocket scarcely more than a bottle of whiskey.

The work has the business-like style of Caesar's Gallic War about it. It cracks off with an *omnis Gallia*: 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is by far the most important political institution in that country', and this promise of no messing about is sustained throughout the book. There are, however, places where the crisp practical approach forces important theoretical points into a straightjacket. I am not sure that this matters in a work of this kind, but since further editions are likely to be written, it is worth indicating the passages where this particular reader felt that he was being jostled past points which required refinement.

The first is the treatment of the ideology. These Gauls have strange gods, and Hill and Frank are sensitive to the need to explain them in terms which make them understandable to the book's reader (indeed, in one place the portraits of Lenin are likened to Christian images here at home). But the authors see 'the ideology' as something extraneous to the CPSU, to which the Party has to 'relate' itself. This is to a great extent the case; but it diminishes the extent to which, first, elements from outside the Marxist canon feature in the CPSU's ideology, and secondly, the way in which the CPSU itself has generated so much of what has become the ideology of communism (in fact, to be Leninist about it, communism equals Marxism plus Soviet power). On a very particular point, the authors should decide whether 'the CPSU claims that it, and it alone, clearly and correctly understands these truths' (p. 5) or whether 'all this implies an acknowledgment that the party does not always know what is best for society' (p. 14).

More tantalising is a second point. The section on Party-state relations revels (very valuably for the reader) in the difficulties of separating out the Party from the state (in real life, in the Party's self-image, in Western analyses). Under this rug are swept those who like Mary McAuley would 'treat party and state as a single unit for analytical purposes: a neat way of side-stepping the complexities raised by the relationship' (pp. 115–16). But an important element of the scientific method is to seek the simplest description of a complex phenomenon, and McAuleyites (of whom I think I am one) make an uncomfortably large bump in the rug. Structurally Party and state are distinct, but they function as an intermeshed whole—whence the whole school of those who adopt the terminology of the 'communist party-state'. *Podmena* is a problem for CPSU theorists; it need not therefore be a problem for us. The difficulty with this line of thought is that, when the Party's relationship with the mass organisations is brought in, the result is that 'for analytical purposes' the entire Soviet Union has to be seen, in a sense, as one lump. But why not? Is this not precisely what democratic centralism and fractionalism, on their Soviet definitions, are all about? The authors, of course, want to make the other point: that interests and bureaucratic units have a life of their own in the Soviet system. Maybe they are right in choosing this emphasis for the purposes of their book. But in making the point so categorically might they not equally be accused of choosing 'a neat way of side-stepping the complexities'?

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water. By Thane Gustafson. *Cambridge University Press. 1981. 218 pp. £17·50.*

GUSTAFSON'S book is a welcome addition to a small but growing list of studies on Soviet policy towards the environment and its management. It highlights some of the major developments, since the fall of Krushchev, in the sensitive areas of land and water policy planning. There is a further underlying theme to this book which, in the minds of some readers, may have the effect of reducing the potency of its analysis. According to Gustafson, the single contributory factor in the land and water planned usage programme was the significant influence of Brezhnev himself. Yet, at the beginning of the present triumvirate's reign there is evidence to show that Brezhnev was not the sole instigator of changes in land policy.

But there is possibly a much deeper criticism that one can level at this book for it fails to differentiate clearly between policy formulated at the apex of the hierarchy and transmitted through the lower echelons of the executive, and the more commonly established methods of policy changes which arise from the schemes and even wild dreams of the people responsible for formulating strategic and logistical plans for the area of their competence and responsibility.

The text itself explores a large number of sources to provide the raw data for the analysis: there seems to be, however, a great deal of emphasis on Western sources and previously published works and this means that the Soviet sources are limited and highly selective.

The book is in two parts following a general introduction. In the first part the author groups four chapters under the general title of 'Advice and Dissent in the Shaping of Brezhnev's Agricultural and Environmental Programs'. He traces the rise of environmental issues to official legitimacy (ch. 3) and suggests that this was possible only when past Stalinist policies on the price of capital were at least modified and in some cases changed. Technology assessment in general, and in the particular cases for the environmental issues, are explored in Chapter 5 with additional material on the effects of these changes themselves as being promoters and/or retarders for further change in Chapter 6.

In the second part of the book entitled 'Implementation of the Brezhnev Programs', Gustafson developes further the primary issues and suggests (in ch. 10) that one of the major influences in the policy has been the on-going attempt by planners and technologists to change the order of priorities from a waterbased, hydro-technology energy economy, to embrace a greater range of options which themselves included a major programme for the development of newer sciences and technologies. Yet Russia's ability to introduce indigenous technology or to adopt and assimilate foreign technology remains a serious constraint on the long and short term development programmes. At the same time both the management and the work force must be stimulated to respond to needs and short term goals. While this review was being drafted, for example, it was announced from Moscow that the agricultural programme would (once again) be re-examined to overcome product shortfalls due to adverse weather over several years. The inability to maximise crop and stock production at fortuitous times is also a major constraint and any land policy must tie up the reaction times of Soviet land users to make best use of their conditions.

What of the future? Gustafson's own last words are suitable here:

> this book has tried to show that the success of the next generation of Soviet leaders in matching the evolution of their increasingly modern society and economy with modern political instruments will depend less on their ability to launch new programs and reorganizations, incentive schemes and indexes, than on their capacity to rethink the inherited relationships between knowledge and

power, between control and autonomy and between a safe conservatism and progress (p. 161).

University of Birmingham T. J. GRAYSON

The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview. Eng. edn. By Valentin Turchin. Trans. by Guy Daniels. *Oxford: Martin Robertson; New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. 300 pp. £12·50. (First publ. Khronika Press 1977.)*

THE book under review is a socio-philosophical treatise in which its author (a Soviet dissident who came to the United States in 1977) contends that the Soviet Union is a 'steady-state' totalitarianism, unfolds his concept of socialism, and discusses the liberation from totalitarianism.

According to Turchin, Soviet totalitarianism has passed through three stages: that of violence, that of the informationally closed society, and that of consciousness. In the third stage, which dates from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the emphasis is being placed on maintaining the totalitarian mentality of the citizens. And since it is assumed that the altering of citizens' consciousness has been completed, it becomes possible to further reduce the scale of physical force and partially to open up channels of information. Thus, Soviet totalitarianism is going into (p. 5) or is virtually in (p. 229) a steady state, in which it can reproduce itself from generation to generation without substantial changes.

This totalitarianism is perceived by the author as a sort of hybrid between slavery and socialism, because the Communist Party achieves social integration by coercive means in general and by fostering (via the propaganda machine) the kind of thinking that serves the leaders' purposes. In contrast, socialism is defined by him as an ethico-religious doctrine which proclaims humanity's supreme goal to be unlimited social integration, combined with guarantees for, and the development of, the creative freedom of the individual.

The liberation from totalitarianism, Turchin opines, must begin with changes in the way people think, in their social consciousness. However, in the Soviet Union neither of the two pre-conditions to gradual democratisation—pressure from below and a capacity for reform from above—is being met, primarily because of fear, or, more precisely, the inertia of the fear that came into being under Stalin. Despite that, there is a non-revolutionary road to democracy. The path to achieve reform lies in drawing a clear line between the struggle for power and the struggle for ideas, which presupposes at least some trust between the regime and society, and in relinquishing power in favour of ideas. This means giving up demands for a multiparty system in the immediate future, for the period of time it will require for basic individual rights to take root.

Turchin's reasoning reflects his professional training. As a physicist and cybernetician he offers a cybernetic conception of socialism, similar to that of ethical socialism and based on the formula 'social integration plus freedom'. As a scholar he rejects the concept of the transcendental and proclaims science to be the instrument of integration.

Turchin's formula 'social integration plus freedom' is too broad to define socialism, because a combination of integration and freedom characterises every social order, whether socialist or not. Further, in discussing democratisation he overestimates the role of ideas and underestimates the role of power. Moreover, and paradoxically, although he asserts that fear paralyses both society and the authorities and that a capacity for reform from above is absent, his 'rough plan for democratic reforms' (pp.

236-38) consists of measures the implementation of which would have to depend primarily on the willingness of the regime.

Turchin is critical not only of Soviet totalitarianism and his compatriots, but also of the West. He complains that Western countries accept without a murmur the totalitarian rules of the game in cultural, scientific, and other exchanges (p. 246); that all Western radical socialists think in Marxist terms, which makes them potential or actual peddlers of totalitarianism (p. 279); and that their magazines and books, lacking intellectual and spiritual content of their own, closely resemble Soviet publications (p. 281).

St Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel 1947-1954. By Ro'i Yaacov. *New Brunswick, London: Transaction Books for the Russian and East European Research Center, Tel Aviv University. 1980. (Distrib. by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 540 pp. £13·50.*

NOT all successful doctoral dissertations make good books, or at least not immediately. Yaacov Roi's excellent PhD (Jerusalem 1972) is a case in point. To its credit, this tome recounts in impressive detail the shifts in the Soviet Union's attitude towards the establishment and consolidation of the new Israeli state. It also pays special attention to the role of Soviet Jewry in Moscow's policy-making and as a doctoral thesis Ro'i's work is prodigious. As a book, the absence of an introduction or conclusion, the dull style and the numerous type-setting errors render the product in part unsatisfactory.

On more substantive points, the diversity of sources used by the author and the essentially sound historical method will make this book a basic reference on Soviet-Israeli relations for quite some time. Ro'i provides in-depth analyses of the importance of the Soviet Union in creating Israel especially through Moscow's United Nations, immigration and arms sales policies. The early portions of the book stressing the interaction of the Soviet Union's global, regional and domestic policies are clear and well balanced.

Unfortunately, important omissions and hazy analysis emerge in the second part. Those readers taken in by the title's reference to Soviet foreign policy decision-making will be sorely disappointed, and would be far better advised to turn to Karen Dawisha's excellent analysis of a related and comparable material (*Soviet Policy Towards Egypt*, Macmillan 1979). Ro'i's near total absence of any reference to Soviet leadership politics is a glaring case in point (see, for example, p. 170). Furthermore, Ro'i is in part a captive of his extensive reliance on Soviet-Jewish emigré sources. In the latter portion of the book, when explaining the Soviet-Israel break of February 1953, the author launches into a detailed analysis of anti-Semitic campaigns in the Soviet Union as the main cause, while ignoring his previously well laid groundwork in analysing Soviet global and regional reasons for the severance of Moscow-Jerusalem ties. Israel's 'tilting' to the American side in the Cold War, not to mention Dulles's 'Pactomania' in the Arab world, are minimised in Ro'i's study. In place of a lucid and interconnected analysis, the author has an artificially seperated section on Soviet foreign policies (Part 4) following an unnaturally salient section on domestic campaigns (Part 3). The resulting imbalance leaves the reader confused, and therefore provides few insights into why Soviet-Israeli relations have remained essentially at a low point ever since the early 1950's. Ro'i himself acknowledges this crucial question of how the Soviet Union can return to influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict when he accurately says that Moscow 'desired the role of a leading power in the region by virtue of its status with both parties' (p. 491). Alas, despite the author's huge efforts, we are little

closer to understanding why the Soviet Union lacks an 'Israeli card' in the Middle Eastern game.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures. Edited by Robert H. Donaldson. *Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1981. 457 pp. £14·95.*

THIS volume comprises the papers given to a United States Army War College Conference in late 1979, updated to take account of the invasion of Afghanistan. The passage of time has naturally produced important changes and hence prospects for Soviet policies in the Third World; the Iran–Iraq War and the assassination of Anwar Sadat, to name but two. Nevertheless, this is an extremely interesting volume, not least because it was written entirely by American government and academic experts, at a time when Ronald Reagan was being swept into power (in part) by a perception of the need to counter what was felt to be growing Soviet expansionism in the Third World.

The scope of the volume is impressive with the contributions being divided into sections dealing with Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (the one important omission being any rigorous analysis of Soviet relations with Libya); plus a section dealing with more general subjects such as Muslim Policy, the NIEO, and the role of Soviet economic and military assistance in the Third World. In each case, the question of Soviet success or failure is posed directly in the conclusion of each chapter and while most authors fail to provide definite answers, they illustrate the difficulty of rigorously defining Soviet aims and intentions and of interpreting short-term trends in terms of long term gains or losses in highly complex countries and regions.

Freedman's conclusion on Iraq (written before the war with Iran which highlighted the depth of the split between Moscow and Baghdad) illustrate how the West's conventional wisdom, which throughout the 1970s held Iraq to be a Soviet client, can be massively wide of the mark:

> Soviet influence with the elite ruling Iraq has been shown to be very limited indeed. If one measures influence in terms of Soviet ability to modify the behaviour of the ruling elite, the USSR has been singularly ineffective with the Iraqis on matters of significance to Iraq . . . the course of Iraqi–Soviet relations in the 1968–79 period indicates the low level of Soviet influence over a 'client state' that has given relatively little in the way of political obedience in return for a large amount of Soviet economic and military assistance (pp. 186–87).

This volume also has its eye on American policy-makers and the implications for America's foreign policy in the Third World. In this respect, the chapter by Keith A. Dunn on Washington's policy assumptions is particularly interesting. As Dunn points out, the assumptions that the Soviet Union: is primarily responsible for events which are adverse to American interests; has no legitimate 'interests' necessitating its involvement in the Third World; has a major capability to project military force far from its homeland; are all important to the way in which the West views Soviet policy and its own actions and reactions. For example, does the fall of the Shah say more about Soviet foreign policy success or the United States' foreign policy failure, or neither? What lessons about the projection of Soviet military force can we learn from the debacle in Afghanistan?

Furthermore, as Dunn points out, analysts such as Richard Pipes and Paul Nitze (both of whom have since assumed important positions in the Reagan administration),

adhere to the assumption that some grand design lies behind Soviet actions, part of which is the Soviet attempt to put itself in a position where it can deny the developed world access to critical raw materials. Underpinning this view is the assumption that force is the best way to respond to Soviet actions.

Not only do the various chapters in this book point up the simplistic and shortsighted aspects of this view, but it is immensely cheering, particularly in a volume sponsored by the United States military, to read in the preface that:

> the evidence is that Soviet influence in the Third World remains limited, in part by the strong impulses toward autonomy and national self determination of the Third World countries themselves. Many of Moscow's biggest 'victories' have resulted from events over which it had little or no control. Thus U.S. policymakers should not overestimate the appeal of the Soviet Union in the Third World or its prospects for success there. Moreover, the U.S., in its own choice of policy instruments in these regions, should give as much or more careful attention to the promotion of economic development and political institutionalisation as to the military aspects of enhancing security (p. xiv).

If only we could get some of those views understood in Washington DC.

JONATHAN P. STERN

MIDDLE EAST

The Arabs. By Maxine Rodinson. Trans. by Arthur Goldhammer. *London: Croom Helm. 1981 188 pp. £8·50. Pb: £5·50.*

THIS book is an extended essay by a renowned French orientalist. The author presents a multi-faceted analysis of the history, culture and society of the Arabic speaking people from pre-Islamic times to the present. The central theme of the work is the unfurling of a culturally unified people. The book appears at a time when the Arab states are very sharply divided into rival blocs which are in turn divided internally. The book comes as an antidote to these current divisions and provides a concise account of the sources of underlying solidarity and has within its pages comments which elucidate the historic roots of diversity and conflict.

The author begins by asking—who are the Arabs; moves on to analyse the differential growth of 'Arabhood' in the central Arab regions of the Fertile Crescent and North Africa, and then to the emergence of Arab nationalism from this sense of 'Arabhood'. He then goes on to deal critically with both contemporary domestic and inter-Arab society and politics, from the perspective of a sympathetic observer.

The Arabs are defined by their shared self-awareness which has evolved through a complex inter-relationship of language, culture, religion and history. The argument is that the Arab people, or 'ethnos', as Rodinson prefers to describe them, were formed as a people through their use of the Arab language, an awareness of a shared history and culture of which a central component is Islam. Rodinson sketches the process whereby this awareness spread from the pre-Islamic bond of language and culture through a temporary unification under Islam and the assimilation of other peoples through the spread of the language. 'Finally over the last two centuries, new conditions have brought such awareness to many different elites and masses within the confines of a fairly well defined territory, among whom it took the form of a national consciousness, a feeling of belonging to a unified and specific cultural group destined to achieve some form of unity' (p. 46).

Because the book is an interpretive overview and ranges from pre-Islamic times to the present, many of the judgments are controversial. Perhaps at the root of some of these questionable statements is the constant tension in the essay between the cultural unity and political and social diversity of the contemporary Arab world, on the one hand, and between the author's broad interpretive style and historical and political complexity, on the other. The author does take into account regional, class and cultural variations yet writes indiscriminately of 'the Arabs'. For example, 'Arabs looked on the event [the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958] as the laying of a cornerstone of a great Arab union, for which they had long been yearning' (p. 103) is a statement that would set many specialists twitching. This form is probably unavoidable in undertaking such a broad task and probably causes more problems for a writer who has a materialist perspective and is critical of nationalism.

One further characteristic of the book is its tone: that of a Western writer sympathetic to a people who have frequently been ill-served by their rulers and Western commentators. It is nevertheless an excellent introduction to the past and present of the Arabs, marked by a scholarly and informed analysis on a complex topic without sinking into shallowness too frequently. It is an ideal introductory text and will probably prove stimulating for the specialist because of the adventurousness of the many controversial judgments. It will no doubt be reprinted and in this event the publishers might include the mysterious missing noun in the concluding sentence.

University of Manchester DAVID POOL

Not By War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East. By Paul Jabber. *Berkeley, Calif., London: University of California Press. 1981. 212 pp. £11·00. $23.10.*

WITH attention to conventional arms control and notions of restraint in arms transfer policy growing, a book dealing with one of the more intriguing experiments in arms transfer control, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, is of obvious interest. In the Declaration, Britain, the United States and France stated an intention to control the flow of arms to states involved in the Arab–Israeli dispute and gave a somewhat half-hearted commitment to maintain existing territorial arrangements in the area. A Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC) was established in Washington to consider individual arms deals. The Committee lost all effectiveness in September 1955 with the Czech-Egyptian arms deal.

The papers of the NEACC remain sensitive and unavailable. Yet Jabber has managed to unearth much about its activities by interviewing many of the people involved. He develops several notable arguments. He effectively discredits the idea that the Czech-Egyptian deal upset any equality of strength in the area. By 1955 Israel enjoyed considerable military superiority over Egypt and could have defeated a combination of Jordan, Syria and Egypt. This was due to British and later American restrictions on deliveries to Egypt, as part of policies designed to press Egypt into allowing Britain to stay in the Suez base and to join a defence arrangement against the Soviet Union, and to French deliveries to Israel of heavy weapons, including Mystere jets, without the approval of the NEACC.

Jabber's main purpose is to explore the lessons of the Tripartite Declaration for contemporary arms control in the Middle East rather than just to improve our understanding of Middle East history. From analysis of the 1950-55 period, Jabber shows the necessity for arms suppliers seeking to build regional stability to concentrate on just that. They cannot allow other policy considerations to intrude into arms transfer decisions. In terms of strategic stability, the NEACC never seems to have

developed a clear overall idea of what sort of military relationship should exist between Israel and its neighbours, although there was little great power dissatisfaction with the Israeli superiority which emerged from the NEACC's succession of case-by-case decisions. Thus when Jabber considers specific arms control arrangements for the contemporary Middle East in the final chapter, he makes little reference to the 1950–55 experience.

Undoubtedly the book is a valuable contribution to the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict and to the ineffective American diplomacy which led to increased Soviet involvement in the region. It is well-argued and clearly evidenced. It also says some useful things about arms control (although its generalisations in the latter part of the book about offensive and defensive capabilities and the effectiveness of PGM as anti-tank weapons will raise a few eyebrows). Unfortunately the author fails to consider the Tripartite Declaration as a whole—i.e. the territorial guarantee as well as the arms transfer arrangements—as an arms control measure. A case can be made, which he doesn't explore, that using arms transfers to maintain military situations in which neither Arab nor Israeli will be tempted to attack is less important if any side with an advantage feels that the weight of the great powers will fall on it if it tries to use its superiority for territorial gain. Nevertheless, Jabber has written a structured, terse and valuable book.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TREVOR TAYLOR

The Economic Development of the United Arab Emirates. By Ragaei El Mallakh. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 215 pp. £13·95.*

REGAEI EL MALLAKH has continued a more or less systematic course of publications on the oil-exporting states of the Gulf with his latest offering concerned with the seven sheikhdoms that make up the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since the first essay on economic development in the Gulf, *Kuwait* (published by Chicago in 1968), Mallakh has turned increasingly away from analysis of his subjects. His review of the UAE economy is above all factual and descriptive. He abjures even the remotest hint of criticism or incisive debate. The book also lacks any sense of geographical or sociological enquiry. Despite the deep tribal divisions in the area and all that they mean in political terms almost no reference is given to the impact of tribe and kinship on economic events. Variations in the topography, aspect, climate and resource endowments of the various emirates (other than oil) are virtually ignored. While the assumption of relative uniformity has its advantages from a statistical point of view, it is profoundly misleading in all other ways.

The core of the book is devoted to a systematic presentation of materials relating the main sectors of the economy with particular emphasis on the period since 1968 when formal development planning was begun in Abu Dhabi. Professor El Mallakh provides data on the social and economic infrastructure before turning to oil, foreign trade and finance and their role within the scheme of economic development. The formula is sound and the statistical materials are most helpful in an otherwise poorly documented area. A last chapter offers the reader a brief look at the structure of the domestic market in the UAE and legal constraints on business there. But all the important questions concerning the UAE are begged by such an approach. The reader ends without a clear insight of the way in which the economy is manipulated via the oil sector or how the conflicts between the emirates elaborate themselves in economic policies. It is the uneasiness of the relationships between the bedfellows in the UAE and their social, political and economic tensions expressed in personal, tribal and commercial conflicts that explain the patterns of economic development. Yet such

themes are entirely omitted by Professor El Mallakh to an extent that the book appears too bland to be useful except for businessmen or compilers of statistical data. In many ways this current volume must be judged to be a missed opportunity and students of the Gulf area will have to await a first analytical study of the UAE.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

AFRICA

Afrocommunism. By David and Marina Ottaway. *New York, London: Africana (Distrib. in UK by Holmes and Meier.) 1981. 237 pp. $24.50. Pb: $12.50.*

DURING the 1970s several African governments officially proclaimed their adherence to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. A common view of this phenomenon was that the commitment to Marxism-Leninism was largely rhetorical and that the real motive force behind the policies these regimes pursued remained African nationalism. Another interpretation attributed the commitment to Marxism-Leninism to Russian influence and viewed these regimes as basically Soviet satellites. The Ottaways reject both these propositions: hence their description of the phenomenon as 'Afrocommunism' on the analogy of Eurocommunism. They argue: 'Marxism-Leninism is taking hold in Africa and feeding off internal developments more than outside interference' (p. 11).

They contrast the policies of the new Marxist-Leninists with the policies pursued by older radical states which espoused an ideology of African socialism. Indeed, they attribute the rise of Afrocommunism partly to the failures of these states. They examine four of these states individually, encapsulating the bias of each in a telling phrase. For example, Tanzania is characterised as having created 'development without growth' (p. 44); Zambia 'The upper class welfare state' (p. 37). This is a prelude to a detailed examination of three of the new Marxist-Leninist states: Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. The contribution of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice to political organisation in the two former Portuguese territories emerges very clearly from their analysis. However, the reluctance of the military government in Ethiopia to create a vanguard party, notwithstanding pressure to do so from Cuba and the Soviet Union, shows why there is scepticism about the ideological commitment of the new African radicals.

In the economic field their commitment is even harder to judge because of the difficulty of determining precisely what constitutes appropriate Marxist-Leninist policies, given the constraints of underdevelopment that limit what any African government can do. But do they pursue pragmatic policies in practice because they have to or because they want to? If the answer the Ottaways give, that their pragmatism is somewhat akin to that of the Soviet New Economic Policy, is not entirely convincing, it is partly because they present the evidence fairly and bring out the other ideological strands influencing the policies. At the very least, the consequences of following Marxist-Leninist policies in Africa are very different to what has happened elsewhere.

The Ottaways argue that the ideological influence of 'proletarian internationalism' is to be found in the foreign policies of the Marxist-Leninist states. The difficulty here is that in the case of the three countries they examine in detail, support for the Soviet position on most issues is explicable in terms of their immediate interests. In the case of a Marxist-Leninist state with different interests, such as Somalia, it is simply not evident. (A minor criticism is the poor presentation of tables outlining the voting

record of radical African states at the United Nations.) In general, David and Marina Ottaway state their case with admirable clarity and with an absolute minimum of jargon, a remarkable achievement when one considers the subject matter. They wisely do not put forward any prescriptions. The value of their analysis is precisely their objectivity.

Queen's University of Belfast ADRIAN GUELKE

Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West. By Arthur Gavshon. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1981. 320 pp. Pb: £3·95.*

NOVELISTS have an advantage over those who deal with actualities, insofar as the motives or emotions they ascribe to their characters become the given truths on which the reality of their story depends. Mr Gavshon is dealing with the realities of external interference in the affairs of African countries, not only by the super-powers, as his title implies, but also by each other. As a journalist of eminence, he has been in a favoured position at the 'centre of things'; this leads him to depend very heavily on 'unattributable' sources, for whose reliability we have to rely on his judgment.

Such confidence must stand or fall on the way in which Gavshon handles more readily evaluated material. He is manifestly siezed by the drama of the situations with which he deals, so that whole sections and chapters tend to be opened with passages like: 'Egyptian notables and foreign diplomats jostled in the Sudanese embassy, Cairo, for a word with the Sudanese prime Minister, Ismail al-Azhary on 11th May 1955'.

Readers may well feel that the sordid story of Suez is forced into heavy-handed drama, even at the expense of good English syntax. Throughout the book, the way in which palpable historical events are intertwined with subjective judgments may undermine our confidence further, since we have other means by which to evaluate those judgments. Reasonably enough, the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 is taken as the initial formalisation of outside intervention in the affairs of Africa. 'The map makers', it is said, 'arbitrarily rule straight lines on school atlases'. The rhetoric breaks down in the face of the map which the book provides to illustrate the Berlin settlement. It shows very few straight lines—proportionately far fewer than North America or Australasia. Nineteenth-century liberal political theory assumed, in all three continents, that central government would have little direct bearing on the everyday lives of ordinary people, whether in the street or in the bush.

Nineteenth-century European intervention in Africa is categorised as having been 'motivated by greed'. A reading of British Parliamentary debates, or those of the Belgian Legislature would give the lie to such naïve generalisations. Cecil Rhodes's cynical reference to 'Philanthropy plus five per cent' comes closer to objectivity. There is a passing reference to David Livingstone, a man few would dare to accuse of greed. Even he wore the cap of an honorary British consul with some pride.

Mr Gavshon does not mind admitting his dislike for some indigenous régimes, such as Amin's in Uganda. Had he been able to assist in its overthrow, it is easy to imagine that he would have been glad to do so. Yet he appears to accept uncritically that the rule of Obote which preceded it was both entirely legitimate and less oppressive and arbitrary. The pretext for the Tanzanian invasion and occupation of Uganda are given, but there is no mention of the Tanzanian garrison in the Seychelles.

But it would be hard to many of us who have lived and worked in Africa to write about it dispassionately. Those motivated most by altruism and least by greed tended to seek for outcomes which have moved into the centre of political controversy and even armed conflict. When we pick up a book purporting to deal with a 'crisis' and a 'battleground', some of us still dare to hope for guidance based on a belief that

considerable numbers of intelligent, honest and decent human beings find themselves ranged on both sides, together with others made of baser metal. We shall have to go on searching for a while yet.

University of Dundee PHILIP WHITAKER

Conflict in Chad. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. *London: Hurst for the Institute of International Studies, Berkeley. 1981. 180 pp. £7·50.*

TWO experienced American specialists on French-speaking Africa here attempt to provide an account of the background to the current situation in Chad, and thus make a useful addition to the sparse literature in English on this unhappy country. Twenty brief pages set the background to Chad's independence in 1960 and the rest of the book is devoted to the period since then, focussing on the disintegration of the Chadian state in the face of armed revolts against an oppressive central government and multiple foreign interference. The authors rely overwhelmingly on press reports and journalistic accounts appearing in English and French (although the Nigerian press appears not to have been used). They are thus very much at the mercy of the bias of their sources, which themselves have usually had only intermittent and partial access to particular groups and individuals in Chad or, in some cases, derive their information from official non-Chadian agencies. No primary documentation or interviews are cited. The authors stick closely to the facts that they have and, within these limitations, provide a helpful guide to Chad's recent history.

The story itself is one of a bewildering kaleidoscope of individuals and organisations, with frequent changes of alignments. Unfortunately, not enough of these organisations and individuals are adequately identified, and the explanation of motives remains too much at the level of self-seeking individuals allied to and abetted by outside powers which themselves often change clients in pursuit of their own goals (although what these goals are, particularly in the case of the French and the Libyans, remains very obscure). Part of the reason for this lies in the inadequacy of the sources. To understand and explain the situation more fully would require much more information about the social and economic bases of organisations and the individuals forming and leading them. But the authors are inadequate on the economy since independence and fail to relate economic changes to political ones. Also, one suspects that the social status and background of individuals would explain far more about their motives, goals and support than merely locating them in terms of particular occupations or education. And perhaps the problem here is that the focus on the disintegration of the Chadian state conceals the real problem: there never was an integrated Chadian state, and whether or not there will be one is precisely what is at issue.

A. M. BERRETT

The African Development Bank: Problems of International Cooperation. By Kwame Donkoh Fordwor. *New York, London: Pergamon. 1981. 343 pp. $30.00.*

THE subtitle of this work is significant. Dr Fordwor, who was president (or chief executive) of the African Development Bank from 1976 to 1979, does not provide a dispassionate account of its workings and achievements. He says little about the purposes for which and the terms on which the Bank has lent money, and nothing at all about the results thus achieved. His objectives are rather to reveal the political

difficulties of operating a pan-African economic institution and to defend his own record as the man in charge. So judged, his narrative is effective. It could have been advantageously shortened by editing some of the documentation reproduced in it (including a 76-page memorandum from Dr Fordwor to the directors of the Bank) and by omitting the extraneous detail of his interviews with innumerable honourables and excellencies. But at the end of the story one can well believe that unreasonable political demands have been made on the African Development Bank, and that Dr Fordwor in particular had a hard passage. He was finally ousted by a meeting of the governors that spent most of four days trying to decide whether it was quorate.

It would seem that paramount among the aims of members of the Bank has been the securing of jobs for their nationals. Dr Fordwor was, of course, himself among the beneficiaries. 'How could a small country, in dire economic straits, deploy so much in expert and scarce economic resources to secure a job with only marginal direct returns to the country itself for one of its many experts?' (p. 48). How, indeed! But Ghana was not the only government anxious to place its experts. Dr Fordwor's cross was his board of directors, nine men permanently stationed at the Bank's headquarters at Abidjan, with little to do except resent real or imagined slights of their countries by the Bank.

Grander, but not necessarily more important, than the competition for jobs has been the policy question of whether the Bank should be 'opened up' to capital subscriptions by non-African governments. In 1978 the governors accepted the desirability of this innovation, subject to preservation of the African character of the Bank, and much of the central part of Dr Fordwor's narrative concerns his attempt to implement this resolution (many missions were required to establish that by preservation of African character, the members meant that control of the Bank should remain in Africa). Dr Fordwor's displacement in 1979 (seemingly on the ground that he did not get on with his directors) checked this initative, and his successor's attempt to continue it was torpedoed in May 1981 by the unexpected withdrawal of Nigerian support. One would have welcomed more discussion in Dr Fordwor's book of why Algeria and Nigeria at various times have resisted what has appeared an obvious improvement in the Bank's financial basis to its own management, most of its members, and most outsiders.

Perhaps there ought to be more books about international organisations by aggrieved former members of their staffs. Dr Fordwor's story is revealing both intentionally and to some extent unconsciously—as in his patient logging of the prodigious travelling which he and his assistants undertook to lobby for support in meetings of the governors. The outcome of a cost-benefit analysis of the African Development Bank would be highly problematic.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

ASIA

The Japanese Economy. By G. C. Allen. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1981. 226 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·50.*

THE performance of the Japanese economy has over recent years become more and more a phenomenon which cannot be ignored by anyone in this country, and its significance to the British economy is evidenced by the increasing number of individuals and organisations only too willing to pass jealous and hostile judgment on the 'unfair' practices by which Japan has achieved its economic success. Professor

Allen's book should go a long way towards dispelling the ignorance on which such judgments are frequently based by demonstrating in this solid and comprehensive account of the operation of the Japanese economy the multiplicity of factors which have combined to bring about the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy since 1945. His account will be of great value and interest to economists, businessmen and all others with an interest in the Japanese economy; its value is marred only by inconsistent Romanisation and misspelling of Japanese names.

Happily disposing of the myth of Japan Incorporated, that too widely held concept of Japan as a monolithic unit with everything subordinated to economic growth and achievement, the author follows an introductory chapter on Japan's prewar economic development with detailed chapters on various aspects of the economy, including the financial system, agriculture, industrial organisation and industrial relations, trade, structural change and industrial policy. The importance of the interrelationship between the state and the economy, to which a separate chapter is also devoted, pervades the whole survey, but the author emphasises that the degree of government involvement in economic activity in Japan is, in fact, relatively small in comparison with some countries, including the United Kingdom. It is the purpose and nature of such involvement as exists which is significant.

Another widely held belief concerning the nature of the Japanese economy—and, indeed, concerning Japanese society as a whole—is that the real key to Japan's success is the utilisation and functioning of traditional social arrangements and forms of authority. As far as Professor Allen is concerned this too, despite some precedents, is a myth. While institutional factors have indeed played a crucial role in Japan's modern economic development the keynote here, as in the case of purely economic factors, is innovation and adaptation. The West needs to look on Japan as a model of social and institutional innovation, and it is only just beginning to do so.

Professor Allen's account is clearly aimed at the British reader, and the comparisons with the United Kingdom provide a useful yardstick for those who are already familiar with the workings of the British economy. It should be added, however, that the author's opinion of many aspects of British economic performance, is, to put it mildly, not very high. The reader is left with the feeling that Japan, despite its faults, has clearly outdone the advanced capitalist countries of the West at their own game, and that much of the criticism levied at Japan by its less able competitors is little more than sour grapes. This is a view which Professor Allen's account goes far to substantiate, and this volume marks yet another contribution by him to a wider knowledge of the Japanese economy. It is only to be hoped that those who could most benefit from reading it will make the effort to do so.

London School of Economics JANET HUNTER

The USSR and Japan 1945–1980. By Rajendra Kumar Jain. *Brighton: Sussex: Harvester. 1981. 397 pp. £20·00.*

IN the settlement which followed its total surrender in 1945, Japan has been able to pursue its economic strategies peacefully while enjoying the protection of the United States–Japan Security Treaty. For mainly geopolitical reasons, however, Japan remains highly vulnerable. North-east Asia, especially since the open Sino-Soviet split, is one of the world's highest tension areas, second only to Central Europe in terms of military concentration. It forms the focus of a quadrangular relationship, involving China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States. Europe is not directly involved and consequently, perhaps, appears to be little interested.

Rajendra Jain's informative, perceptive and well-documented study analyses the

bilateral relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan within its multilateral framework. There are significant reciprocal economic advantages to be derived from a more collaborative relationship: Russia has the raw materials, Japan the capital and the advanced technology especially useful from Russia's viewpoint in the development of Siberia. Indeed Jain frequently refers to the 'complementarity' of the two economies. From the Japanese perspective the Soviet Union could appear increasingly attractive both as a source of energy—given the vagaries of OPEC—and as a market for their manufactured goods—in view of protectionist tendencies in the European Community and the United States.

The potential, however, is overshadowed by the problems, illustrated by the fact that Japan and Russia have not yet succeeded in signing a peace treaty. The major obstacle lies in the disputed Northern territories, namely the Kurile islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which the Japanese claim are theirs, but the Russians steadfastly cling on to—especially the latter two in view of their strategic importance. The Russians and the Japanese have also been engaged in a long-standing 'salmon war'. Japanese public opinion—a theme Jain occasionally touches but perhaps could have developed in some greater depth—remains generally suspicious of, indeed hostile to, the Soviet Union, while quite strongly pro-Chinese. (China gets a very good press in Japan, a favour accorded neither to the Soviet Union nor the United States.)

And in this quadrangular relationship, it is the China issue which has caused confusion. Japan had sought to maintain a position of equidistance in its relations with the two communist powers, though since the conclusion of its treaty with China in 1978, there is, as Jain puts it, a marked 'tilt' towards Peking. From the Soviet perspective, the rapprochement between Washington, Peking and Tokyo is reminiscent of the Anti-Comintern and Tripartite Pacts. Whether there is any validity in this particular variation on the 'history repeats itself' theme, it is nonetheless certainly incumbent on Europeans that they should seek to develop their own outlook on the Euro-Japanese relation from a narrow concentration on parochial trade issues to a broader appreciation of the 'complementarity' of Europe and Japan's preoccupations and objectives on a global scale.

Jain's book will serve as a useful source for that purpose. It is, however, a matter of great regret that the paper and the binding should be of such abysmal quality; at £20·00 a copy someone must be making a huge profit and I very much doubt whether it is the Indian workers who manufactured it.

University of Stirling JEAN-PIERRE LEHMANN

Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path. By Thomas Hodgkin. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 433 pp. £25·00.*

THE purpose of this book, defined by the author at the outset, is to examine the 'August Revolution' of 1945 'in the context of four thousand years of Vietnamese history', and to establish its importance 'for the general history of liberation movements and for revolutionaty practice'. The author makes no claim to be a specialist on the history of Vietnam for its own sake, although he clearly learned a great deal during a three-month visit to Hanoi in 1974. He is interested in Vietnam for essentially revolutionary reasons; not surprisingly, therefore, the short history he has written is very much in line with Hanoi's own Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the subject. Few readers who are not themselves specialists in Vietnamese history will be familiar with all the facts and interpretations which the book provides, and as a guide to the way the present Vietnamese revolutionary elite sees its own history it

must be acknowledged a competent piece of work. But any reader who is not a Marxist should approach it with caution.

The balance of the book, as one would expect, is heavily towards the twentieth century: approximately half its pages cover the period 1897–1945, whilst the centuries before 1700 are covered in a mere seventy pages. In relation to that early period, the interpretation is largely 'nationalist' and not especially Marxist. We are introduced to the latest opinions on the 'origins' of the Vietnamese, and to attempts by Hanoi historians to reinterpret the early legends of the chronicles by setting them alongside recent archaeological discoveries. The period of Chinese rule—always a complicated topic for the Vietnamese, and even more so since 1975—is dealt with largely in terms of a simple analogy between it and the colonial rule of France, nine centuries later. There is no attempt to get to grips with the real archaeological and historical problems that arise in dealing with an ancient period fundamentally different from our own, and the author makes the whole thing seem much more 'cut and dried' than it can possibly be in the present state of research.

Later on, when he comes to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he follows the Vietnamese Marxists in reinterpreting the Tay-Son rebellion as a 'revolution' in the same sense as the French Revolution (which happened about the same time), and that allows him to treat the Nguyen Dynasty (which unified the country for the first time in 1802) as a 'counter-revolution'. He has little to say on the positive achievements of either this or earlier dynasties in creating a framework of government and social morality; his interest is mostly in conflicts and wars. But it is in its treatment of the twentieth century (down to 1945) that the book becomes most obviously biased towards interpretations which see only events that contributed to Communist success as worthy of attention. Some attempt is made to indicate the evil effects of colonial rule on Vietnamese society, but there is no analysis of the colonial system's own dynamic as a historical phenomenon. There is, of course, a full (and often interesting) account of the Indochinese Communist Party, and of those elements in Vietnamese nationalism which can be claimed as its antecedents. All other manifestations of Vietnamese national consciousness or political ambition are virtually ignored. There is hardly anything, for example, on the role of the southern sects (the Cao-Dai or Hoa-Hao) which were very important for a time in the 1940s; nor any mention of the Buu-Son Ky-Huong revolt of 1913–16, which briefly challenged French control in Saigon. Nor are non-Communist intellectuals of the 1930s and early 1940s allowed any significance. The climax of the book, the account of the August Revolution itself, is heroic rather than analytical; and no attention is paid to the role of the OSS in assisting Ho Chi Minh in the summer of 1945, although it can now be well documented. By looking only at the Communists, moreover, the author fails to get to grips with the most important question of all about Vietnam in the 1940s: namely the weakness of non-Communist nationalism in that country, by contrast with all other parts of South-east Asia. That is one of many things in the modern history of Vietnam which it is too easy to take for granted and which need to be more fully understood—especially by someone seeking to establish the relevance of Vietnam for other 'national liberation movements' in Asia and elsewhere.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London R. B. SMITH

Death in the Ricefields: Thirty Years of War in Indochina. Eng. edn. By Peter Scholl-Latour. Trans. by Faye Carney. *London: Orbis. 1981. 383 pp. £6·95. (First publ. Stuttgart 1979.)*

THIS book consists of a series of condensed reports covering events in Indo-China from the immediate post-Second World War period up to 1979. Since it covers only the

author's immediate visits and experiences, it is necessarily episodic, but this is compensated for by the comprehensive understanding of the Indo-China region that the author has built up during these years. It has the faults and the merits of a piece of journalism of this kind: while it lacks the continuity that a straight political history of the period would have provided, it has the insight and vividness that is rarely present in standard political histories. One of the inevitable consequences of this 'reportage' style is that crucial periods in the development of the Indo-China war, periods when the reporter happened to be absent, are missing: particularly the Diem years, the events surrounding the downfall of Diem and the critical period of the Tet offensive. But these latter periods have been well covered by other eye-witness accounts, and it could conversely be argued that the author has done a particular service in covering other important but less extensively reported periods; notably the period of the spring 1972 north Vietnamese offensive and the twilight period after the cease-fire agreement of 1973. In this sense the book fills a useful gap.

Like many other books of this genre (and there are many such where Indo-China is concerned) its strength lies in its descriptive immediacy and at the same time its tangential insights into political events of the time. For those who are unfamiliar with the subject, it provides a readable picture of what the war was like and what the region is like. This is valuable. On the other hand, it must be said that its bitty and episodic characteristics can make it only of occasional use to those who are closely interested in the region. For example, while the surveys of Laotian and Cambodian political history are necessary for the purposes of the book, they go over ground that has been covered in countless similar books.

A word of criticism should be raised against the use of the term 'Anglo-Saxon' (as, for example, 'the Anglo-Saxon press' on page 162). This term, while it no doubt usefully served the polemical interests of de Gaulle in his time, is one that is used too freely and loosely by European writers, and that has helped to create a dangerously misleading geopolitical image. As such, the term should be denied intellectual respectability. Another criticism is the tendency of the writer to slip into what might be called the 'Indo-China myth'; that is, the inclination to give a romantic gloss to the Franco-Vietminh war in particular, creating out of a sordid and bitter struggle an unrealistic image of Biggles-like camaraderie overlaid with an exotic, and peculiarly French, haze of opium, voluptuousness, cynicism, violence, and betrayal. This romanticising tendency is perhaps a uniquely Vietnamese contribution to the phenomenon of 'orientalism', understandable given the deep and disturbing impression Indo-China has made on European and American visitors, but ultimately distorting and unhelpful.

University of Hull C. J. CHRISTIE

In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. By Selig Harrison. *New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Zed Press.) 228 pp. £15·95. Pb: £5·95.*

THIS is essentially a study of the Baluch people and their tribulations and emergent nationalism. Selig Harrison was a good choice to study this corner of the world, a trouble-spot of more than local significance, for the Carnegie Endowment's 'Programme for Journalists' on current affairs. Much of his information has been gathered by interviewing of leaders or spokesmen, at home or in exile, and it is interesting to have photographs of them as well as to hear their words. A useful set of maps shows patterns of population, natural resources, and ethnic distribution, over the whole area where the Baluch live. Like Kurds and many others, they are divided by

modern frontiers; of their roughly five millions the majority are in Pakistan, under Panjabi domination, while a million or so live in Iran. It was by force that the larger part of their homeland was incorporated in Pakistan when British rule ended, and it has been treated, as Bangladesh was, as a colony. It is controlled by a mostly Panjabi bureaucracy and garrison, settlers have moved in to occupy land; and coal, oil, gas are being extracted for the benefit of outsiders. By the early 1960s there were the makings of a guerrilla resistance; this came to life in 1973 when Bhutto abruptly dismissed the provincial ministry, and four years of bitter fighting followed before most of the insurgents had to draw off into camps in southern Afghanistan.

Harrison introduces us to a bewildering variety of leaders and movements and political viewpoints. The two main alternatives before them have been to press for an equal place within a restructured, federal Pakistan, or to fight for full independence. Older leaders like Bizenjo have been finding themselves caught between Panjabi obduracy on one hand and impatience among their younger generation on the other—students especially who in the fighting days formed a strange amalgam with illiterate tribesmen. A Baluch intelligentsia has been growing, far more than was allowed on the Iranian side. It seems that the Shah pressed Bhutto to resort to violence in 1973, for fear of disaffection spreading across the border. In both countries communists, in line with Soviet thinking, have advocated a united front of progressives of all provinces, instead of breakaways by national minorities. This has won them little favour among the Baluch; and the Soviet occupation of friendly Afghanistan was a shock. Nevertheless, Harrison found a generally sympathetic feeling towards the Soviet Union, largely because its American rival has been so blatantly the patron and arms-supplier of dictatorial regimes in both Islamabad and Teheran. His own conclusions are cautiously modulated. He is convinced that Baluch nationalism has genuine roots and growing strength, and that despite tribal divisions unity has been advanced by the advent lately of 'a broadly accepted high-level Baluch leadership' (p. 71). He has doubts about whether natural resources would be adequate to make a free Baluchistan viable, as sanguine patriots believe; and he stresses another difficulty, that nearly half the Baluch population of Pakistan lives outside its homeland, chiefly in Sind. A federation of these two provinces has many advocates however (p. 179). It might well be the best solution. In his final chapter, on great power interests, Harrison offers sage advice to his countrymen not to act on the assumption that a Soviet intervention in Baluchistan is inevitable, but to work towards a political settlement for the whole region that could pave the way for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

V. G. KIERNAN

NORTH AMERICA

Energy and the National Defense. By Howard Bucknell III. *Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky. 1981. 235 pp. $19.50.*

ALTHOUGH he gives due space to 'international dimensions', Dr Bucknell, a former submarine commander, has written a book for Americans, sketching the American energy scene and its relationship to American national security. He has also, and consciously, written a short, somewhat superficial book, offering a vast topic to a wide readership. He surveys the physical and technical prospects for energy demand and supply in the United States into the twenty-first century, touches more briefly on the associated economics, exposes what he takes to be the military implications, and still has much of his space to devote to the system and process of American energy politics.

Hardly surprisingly, he penetrates none of those subjects to a depth likely to satisfy the specialist. Nor will his chosen and more general audience find all he says as illuminating as it might wish. Chapters on physical and economic factors are overloaded with unorganised numbers, culled uncritically from a multitude of frequently conflicting analyses. That may not be unwelcome; as Dr Bucknell says, 'Americans love scoreboards' (p. 93). But, like other people groping in a fog of statistical dissent, they also love answers. He is at pains, however, to avoid such easy nostrums, preferring to stress the uncertainty afflicting policy-makers in the face of evidential confusion. Unfortunately, his own liberality in quoting previous studies, especially in the absence of economic scepticism, may add to that confusion.

All that said, this is a book with some uncommon merits. The chapter on political reactions, recounting energy legislation and institutionalisation in the United States during the 1970s, leaves no doubt about the ability of the Congress to find one reason or another for thwarting almost any coherent policy initiative. Another chapter on 'Energy Wars' is equally realistic, asserting how vulnerable Western oil supplies are to war but also demonstrating how little American military measures, other than precautionary naval deployment, can do to sustain (or restore) them. A third chapter then underlines the dilemma thus presented to the United States as an alliance leader: 'When we cannot control Middle Eastern oil', asks the author, 'can we truly support the destinies of Western Europe and Japan?' (p. 116).

Above all, there are indications throughout that Dr Bucknell has grasped what may be the central problem of his country's energy policy: not how to control suppliers abroad, but how to influence both consumers and producers at home. He has a proper respect for market forces. But he recognises more clearly than many observers how far American government, in its various forms, has already been drawn into determining or distributing energy costs and benefits—and how strong the domestic and international pressures are becoming to play an even larger role within a country, an alliance and an international economy all of which are divided, rather than united, by energy circumstances. He does not seem to regret the growth of governmental responsibility; 'the juggernaut weight of the unseen hand', he remarks, 'can, in the short term, assume terrifying proportions to the individual as it moves in its awesome and uncaring way across a society' (p. 7). Particularly in the light of events in Washington since his book was completed, he would, however, be the first to recognise the political strength of the opposition to countervailing interference by government in the market place.

IAN SMART

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

The International Civil Service. By Alain Plantey. Trans. by P. Underwood and T. Cork-Radmore. *New York: Masson for Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 1981. 468 pp. $59.50.*

THIS is an updated translation of a book published in 1977 by a distinguished French diplomat. It deals comprehensively, from a legal aspect, with the problems of the international civil service, appointment, terms of service, career structure, remuneration and unionisation. Political questions are included, such as the geographical basis of recruitment and relations with home governments. Designed as a work of reference, it abounds with allusions to laws and cases and has a full bibliography and index. The translation does not read smoothly.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Annual of Power and Conflict 1980–81. *London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1981. 465 pp. £25·00.*

NOW in its tenth edition, this annual attempts to cover political unrest, dissidence and repression throughout the world. For each country concerned a narrative section is followed by a chronology. An introductory chapter by Richard Clutterbuck deals with 'the year of the hostages'; and the book ends with a list of embassy occupations.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Treaties and Alliances of the World. 3rd edn. Edited by Alan Day and Henry W. Degenhardt. *London: Longman. 1981. 409 pp. £27·00.*

THE title of this book, which has been 'substantially revised and re-written' since its last publication in 1974, does not fully indicate its scope. It surveys the progress of international cooperation, first at the global level, arranged by subject area, and then regionally. The texts of a few treaties are given; others are listed and summarised, without bibliographical citations. One of the chief uses of this valuable work is as a reference guide to international organisations and conferences, emphasising aims and achievements rather than structure. A helpful index is included.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Who's Who, European Communities and Other Organizations, 1981–82. 2nd edn. *Brussels: Delta. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 240 pp. £44·00.*

THE second edition of this guide is more compactly produced than the first, published in 1978. Community officials and notables, including representatives of non-member states, are fully covered; the 'other organizations' receive much less attention, but heads of trade and professional bodies are included. Entries are written somewhat randomly in English, French or occasionally German. This work should be of considerable use to anyone concerned with European affairs.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

KRATOCHWIL Friedrich V.: *The Humean Perspective on International Relations.* Princeton, N.J: Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1981. 34 pp. (World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 9.) Pb.

MERRITT, Richard L. and RUSSETT, Bruce M., eds: *From National Development to Global Community:* Essays in Honour of Karl W. Deutsch. London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 480 pp. £18.00. Pb: £7.95.

WETTIG, Gerhard: *Konflict und Kooperation zwischen Ost und West.* Bonn: Osang. 1981. 217 pp. Pb.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

BAKER, David: *The Shape of Wars to Come*. Cambridge: Patrick Stephens. 1981. 177 pp. £8.95.

PURVER, Ronald G.: *Arms Control in the North*. Kingston, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. 1981. 159 pp. (National Security Series No. 5/81.) Pb.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUE: *Nuclear Radiation in Warfare*. London: Taylor and Francis. 1981. 149 pp. £9.50.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

ABERBACH, Joel D., PUTNAM, Robert D. and ROCKMAN, Bert A.: *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1981. 308 pp. £20.65.

AKINYEMI, A. B., COLE, P. D. and OFONAGORO, Walter, eds: *Readings on Federalism*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 1980. 444 pp. Pb.

BUNCE, Valerie: *Do New Leaders Make a Difference?*: Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1981. 296 pp. £15.80. Pb: £4.95.

CHAMBERS, Robert, LONGHURST, Richard and PACEY, Arnold, eds: *Seasonal Dimensions to Rural Poverty*. London: Frances Pinter; Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun. 1981. 259 pp £15.50.

FLAVIN, Christopher: *Wind Power:* A Turning Point. Washington: Worldwatch Institute. 1981. 56 pp. (Worldwatch Paper 45.) Pb. $2.00.

FORSYTH, Murray: *Unions of States*: The Theory and Practice of Confederation. Leicester: Leicester University Press; New York: Holmes and Meier. 1981. 236 pp. £13.00. Pb: £6.00.

KARATNYCKY, Adrian: *Workers' Rights East and West:* A Comparative Study of Trade Union and Workers' Rights in Western Democracies and Eastern Europe. New Brunswick, NJ, London: Transaction. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne) 150 pp Pb: £3.75.

GRIFFITH-JONES, Stephany: *The Role of Finance in the Transition to Socialism*. Totowa, NJ: Allanheld Osmun; London: Frances Pinter. 1981. 194 pp. £12.50.

LEGHORN, Lisa and PARKER, Katherine: *Woman's Worth:* Sexual Economics and the World of Women. London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981. 356 pp. £12.00. Pb: £5.95.

NORDLINGER. Eric A.: *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press for the Centre for International Affairs, Harvard. 1981. 239 pp. £14.00.

SINGER, Hans W. and ANSARI, Javed A.: *Rich and Poor Countries*. 3rd edn. London: Allen and Unwin. 1982. (First publ 1977.) 270 pp. (Studies in Economics: 12.) Pb: £5.95.

TØNNESSEN, J. N. and JOHNSON, A O.: *The History of Modern Whaling* Eng. edn. Trans. by R. I. Christophersen. London: C. Hurst; Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1982. 798 pp. £19.50.

HISTORY

BEEVOR, J. G.: *SOE: Recollections and Reflections 1940-45*. London: Bodley Head. 1981. 269 pp. £8.95.

MARTIN, Bernd, ed.: *Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927-1938:* Militär-Wirtschaft-Aussenpolitik. Düsseldorf: Droste. 1981. 504 pp. DM 56.00.

SHILLONY, Ben-Ami: *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1981. 238 pp. £15.00.

SMITH, Robert J.: *The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Third Republic*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 1981. 201 pp. $39.00. Pb: $12.95.

TUCHMAN, Barbara: *Practicing History:* Selected Essays. London: Macmillan. 1982. 306 pp. £9.95.

WEST, Nigel: *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909-1945*. London: Bodley Head. 1981. 366 pp. £7.95.

WESTERN EUROPE

PENNIMAN, Howard R., ed.: *Greece at the Polls:* The National Elections of 1974 and 1977. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 220 pp.

SAUNDERS, Christopher and MARSDEN, David: *Pay Inequalities in the European Community.* London: Butterworths for the Sussex European Research Centre. 1981. 369 pp. £26.00.

MIDDLE EAST

ADAMS, William C., ed.: *Television Coverage of the Middle East.* Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 1981. 167 pp. $17.50.

United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1980. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies; Abu Dhabi: Center for Research and Documentation. 1981. 167 pp. Pb: $17.50.

AFRICA

HALL, Marjorie and ISMAIL, Bakhita Amin: *Sisters Under the Sun:* The Story of Sudanese Women. London, New York: Longman. 1981. 264 pp. £12.00.

HEYER, Judith, ROBERTS, Pepe and WILLIAMS, Gavin, eds: *Rural Development in Tropical Africa* London: Macmillan. 1981. 375 pp. £25.00.

LEGUM, Margaret *et al: Against all Reason:* Britain and South Africa in the Eighties. London· Fabian Society. 1981. 38 pp. (Fabian Tract 478.) Pb: £0.90.

OYEDIRAN, Oyeleye, ed.: *Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1976–1977.* Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria for the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs 312 pp.

ASIA

CROUCH, Harold, HING, Lee Kam, and ONG, Michael, eds: *Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Election.* Kuala Lumpur, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 330 pp. £15.50

JAIN, R. K., ed.: *China South Asian Relations 1947–1980* Vol. I: India, 599 pp; Vol. 2: Pakistan—Sri Lanka, 690 pp. Brighton: Sussex: Harvester. 1981. £60.00 (the set).

SHIRER, William L.: *Gandhi:* A Memoir. London: ABACUS. 1982. 255 pp. Pb· £1.75. (First publ. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.)

NORTH AMERICA

BELL, Coral: *President Carter and Foreign Policy·* The Costs of Virtue? Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University. 1981. 102 pp. (Canberra Studies in World Affairs, No. 1) Pb.

BRODY, David: *Workers in Industrial America.* Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle. Pb edn. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981. 257 pp. Pb: £2.95. (First publ. 1980.)

CZEMPIEL, Ernst-Otto *et al. United States Interests and Western Europe.* Arms Control, Energy, and Trade. Frankfurt: Campus. 1981. 159 pp. DM 29.00.

LATIN AMERICA

MONTANER, Carlos Alberto: *Secret Report on the Cuban Revolution.* New Brunswick, London: Transaction. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 284 pp. £11.00. Eastbourne.) 284 pp. £11.00.

YOOLL-GRAHAM, Andrew: *The Forgotten Colony:* A History of the English-Speaking Communities in Argentina. London: Hutchinson. 1981. 318 pp. £12.95.

—

BOOKS REVIEWED, SPRING 1982

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 58 SUMMER 1982 No. 3

THE ATLANTIC CRISIS*

*Lawrence Freedman***

IT is easier to describe the character of the malaise that afflicts the Atlantic Alliance than to explain its origins. The disputes over monetary policy, Middle East diplomacy and all aspects of relations with the Soviet Union provide regular and ample fare for the media. However, it remains unclear whether this conjunction of arguments is a temporary phenomenon brought about by the strains of recession or by the incompatibility of the current crop of political leaders, or whether we are witnessing the symptoms of a much deeper crisis that is unsettling the whole set of assumptions that have governed Western policy-making over the past three decades. This is the question that this article seeks to address.

The fact that this question has already occurred to a large number of people is in itself relevant to the answer. The disarray in the Alliance at the start of 1980, caused by the twin crises over the Iranian seizure of American hostages and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, stimulated a surge in seminars, conferences, pronouncements and publications of all shapes and sizes, which has yet to subside, and has indeed recently been given added stimulus by the differences over how to respond to martial law in Poland.

Whatever its faults, therefore, the Alliance cannot be accused of sweeping its problems under the carpet. If anything the reverse is true. The foreign policy communities on both sides of the Atlantic ensure that the resources and the personnel are available for instant comment and speculation. The relationship at times suffers from over-analysis which, in turn, carries the risk of justifying itself by over-dramatising the issues. Signs of disagreement lead to solemn warnings that the Alliance will tear itself asunder; minor ailments are diagnosed as symptoms of a terminal illness.

Much of the comment assumes that the Atlantic Alliance is the most fragile and delicate of international relationships, unable to withstand significant tension. Yet NATO has so far survived a stormy three decades in international affairs and any number of internal arguments. The arguments across the Atlantic are rarely as fraught or as bitter as those that take place within the

* This article was prepared in connection with Chatham House's research project on US-European relations, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of David Watt, William Wallace, Stephen Woolcock, Simon Lunn, Joan Pearce and participants at a study group at the Institute which discussed an early draft

** Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies at King's College, London and was formerly head of Chatham House's Policy Studies Unit

European Communities, yet somehow the European arguments rarely excite the same speculation over imminent fission.

Perhaps this is because the issues at stake in Europe are more tangible. The Alliance has been far less successful in allowing argument to range wide within contained boundaries, because there is not much to argue about but fundamentals. Arguments in NATO are rarely about technicalities or the handling of specific issues. Or at least, even if they start at such a level they soon move on to the first order questions: the nature and thrust of the Soviet challenge and the sharing of the burden in meeting it; the consequences of Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, and its ability or willingness to reduce this dependence. That is, it is very difficult to debate Atlantic relations without debating the underlying structure of contemporary world affairs.

This tendency inevitably induces caution among seasoned observers of NATO affairs. It becomes tempting to dismiss the current fuss as yet another round of a never-ending saga, full of sound and fury but of little relevance to a collection of nations bound together by a compelling and resilient political logic. The arguments are as much a fixture of the international scene as the Alliance itself. The 1973-74 rows connected with Henry Kissinger's launch of the 'Year of Europe', and the responses to the Yom Kippur War and the OPEC price rises were as great as any that have so far occurred in the 1980s, yet all this passed by remarkably quickly. Nevertheless, merely to say 'so what else is new?' when told of another Atlantic crisis is inadequate, for there are elements of the current situation that distinguish it from previous periods.

The changing international context

Some argue that the source of the problem lies in the decline of a sense of Atlantic 'community' that marked the postwar period. 'Atlanticism' reflected a mature idealism or at least an enlightened form of self-interest. This, they fear, is in danger of being lost forever and replaced by an unenlightened nationalism which will undermine any form of alliance or partnership.

The Atlanticism of the generation of policy-makers responsible for the forging of close United States-European ties in the postwar years was based on much more than an appreciation of the distribution of effective world power. It was often an intensely personal commitment—a legacy of the close working relationships developed during the war which was sustained in the years of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the creation of NATO, and nurtured on a certain vision of how close co-operation between the Western democracies could usher in a new era of peace and prosperity.

It is important not to overstate the ideals and cohesion of that generation. The commitment of those 'present at the creation' of the Alliance was to a large extent a function of the political battles waged against others of that generation with alternative views as to the propriety of alliance.[1] In fact,

defenders of NATO still tend to see their antagonists as direct descendants of the first opponents. The fear is of 'isolationism' in the United States or 'neutralism' in Europe. In so far as the arguments against alliance always stress the risk of being drawn into something dangerous or foolish by the partner, then a certain continuity in the forms of opposition is to be expected.

However, opinion polls have not detected any groundswell in anti-NATO feeling in the member states (again the comparison with the European Community is instructive). But the approval is combined with a generally hazy notion as to what NATO actually is. In the United States the lack of media coverage of European affairs has long been noted. This has now been reinforced by a general loss of interest in these matters, as evidenced by the decline in European studies in the universities. The European language most favoured is Spanish rather than French or German, and this reflects preoccupations with Latin America rather than Spain. Europeans often suspect that American uninterest in them is matched by an increasing interest in the Pacific region, as a result of the shift in power and population in the United States from the East to the West coasts and the increase in the proportion of American trade accounted for by Pacific countries. Yet the Japanese claim not to be aware of any surge of interest and knowledge in their affairs. The change may be not so much in a switch of attention from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and so a rival set of attitudes on the international scene, as in a growing preoccupation with domestic affairs and an interest in foreigners—whether they be Mexicans or Arabs or Germans—only to the extent that they impinge on domestic affairs. The Eastern establishment that long provided the guidelines and recruits for American foreign policy has never really recovered from the shock of Vietnam but it has yet to be replaced.

Introspection is not unique to the United States. The same phenomena can be observed throughout Europe with the inclination to blame 'foreigners' for national ills and to concentrate on ways in which the nation can prosper and generally follow its own path, no matter what others may say and do. Moreover, the economic troubles of the past decade have rendered political activity less predictable, though more engrossing. National policy, whether for domestic or external consumption, has become correspondingly less coherent and consistent. This turns into a vicious circle. Introspection and instability at home have a negative effect on foreign policy. With many of the major powers displaying the same tendencies the risk of conflicts of interest, or at least conflicts of perception of interests, grows while any co-operative endeavours falter. The effect of this is to make the domestic problems less tractable and so on. The domestic preoccupations leave politicians with less time and energy to attend to external affairs. In all this the 'European ideal' has suffered as much as the 'Atlantic ideal'.

The problem facing the Atlantic Alliance is therefore nothing so simple as active hostility, led by the twin evils of isolationism and neutralism. Such a view may assume far too much of a positive interest in the actual structure of

international relations. The real risk may be of a drifting apart, fuelled largely by indifference and introspection, rather than some dramatic and decisive break in the Alliance bond.

For our earlier generation of policy-makers 'the Atlantic' provided a natural point of reference for all international issues. Through colonies and spheres of influence, the politics of the rest of the world was an extension of the politics of the United States and the old European powers (including the old outsider, Russia). Relations between the constituent parts of the Atlantic community were not necessarily cordial—for example over Suez—but one way or another they had to work together. Over the past twenty years other powers have intruded into this framework. The end of the empires has meant that the former colonies have had to be dealt with on their own terms and the 'old powers' find themselves competing to gain footholds in each others' ex-colonies; Japan has emerged as a world economic power and other small Asian nations have become industrial trend-setters; the Arab states have been attempting to buy political muscle with oil. Thus, the quality of the Atlantic relationship can no longer be the determinant of a stable world order. Foreign policy has to be wide-ranging. When political power and economic strength are diffused then policy-makers on the two sides of the Atlantic cannot be forever attending to each other's needs, points of view and sensibilities. Moreover, policy-makers now have to cope with a much more complex set of linkages than before. The days when something called 'high politics' could be undertaken as a separate and aloof activity have passed. The economic and political spheres are becoming increasingly merged, which means that the ramifications of all decisions have become correspondingly more complicated.

Thus the strains facing the Alliance reflect fundamental changes in the international system and cannot be eased simply by a reassertion of the Atlantic spirit. An international system that is not working properly is generally unsettling and cannot but affect all relations between states as well as their domestic affairs. Moreover, states are likely to vary in their reactions. An unresponsive international environment can induce a sense of resigned fatalism or of desperate activism. The increased diversity and complexity of the environment creates new interests and preoccupations, cuts across old ties and undermines old assumptions.

In these conditions it is not surprising if the United States and the Europeans develop alternative perspectives on the international system and their positions within it. Apart from anything else, as problems that once might have been quite manageable prove to be intractable, the views taken of each other become less generous. Increasingly behaviour is seen to be unreasonable, unpredictable, and unreliable. Whether or not quite different mind-sets have emerged on each side of the Atlantic is more difficult to say. We talk of the 'European' and 'American' positions as if they were homogeneous and consistent though, of course, they are not. When governments change rapidly, so do policies. It was not long ago that Europeans

were bemoaning the naïve idealism of President Carter. A popular anti-nuclear movement is no longer unique to Europe. If in recent years the United States has tended to take a more hawkish view on challenges than has Europe, the Falklands crisis shows how easily stereotypes can be reversed—with a European country pressing on with a military solution while the United States searches for even-handed mediation. Nevertheless, the Falklands crisis has put extra strains on the Alliance, largely because the United States has not felt able to offer the whole-hearted support that has been expected of the allies when America has faced its own problems, and which Britain, more than most, has tried to provide. This illustrates the basic problem: that in any given trouble-spot it is unlikely that American and European interests will directly coincide.

It also indicates what may be the major divergence of substance: the priority given by the United States to opposing communism as a major foreign policy objective. This is why it was reluctant to come down too hard on Argentina which has supported American policy on Central America. Related to this is Washington's increasing difficulty in accepting the legitimacy of the United States as a major international actor with a role to play in the settlement of disputes. However, apart from this important divergence in view, the key point of this analysis is to stress the features of the contemporary international situation that make it more likely that the members of the Atlantic Alliance will disagree on a variety of issues, rather than the specific content of the disagreement.

The economic malaise

We can take this diagnosis further by examining the economic sphere. In the early days of the Alliance the United States dominated the international economy. The relationship between the United States and Western Europe is now quite balanced. The United States is still the largest economic unit in the world but its GNP is smaller than the combined total for Western Europe. The role of the dollar as a reserve currency has not yet been seriously challenged by the Deutschmark, Swiss Franc, or the ECU of the European Monetary System, which leaves the United States pre-eminent in the international monetary system. However, in trade terms the United States has become more dependent on Western Europe. Its general dependence on trade has grown (to around 12 per cent of GNP), and in its pattern of trade Europe assumes a critical role as the only major region with which it enjoys a consistent surplus, thereby offsetting the deficits with OPEC and the industrially dynamic countries of Asia, and as the area most able to absorb extra exports when American competitiveness increases. In addition, nearly half the earnings from America's direct investment come from Western Europe.

Even measured by extra-Community trade the Europeans are still twice as dependent on trade as the United States. However, for Western Europe the United States is declining as an export market. There has been a shift toward

intra-European trade—in the broadest sense. Trade with the centrally planned economies, although this may now have passed its peak, is nearly as important to Western Europe as that with the United States (this is particularly true for West Germany with the high levels of intra-German trade).

The United States and Europe are in quite different positions when it comes to supplies of raw materials. In neither oil nor non-fuel minerals is the United States as close to self-sufficiency as it once was, but the dependence is still less than that of Western Europe. For example, America's dependence on oil imports was down to 42 per cent in 1980 (a significant decline since the peak of 50 per cent in 1977) while European dependence still hovers at close to 90 per cent. Thus, trouble in the resource-rich areas of the Third World has graver implications for Europe than for the United States. As American dependence remains substantial, serious risk is not absent. So the importance of the differential dependence may be less the actual difference it makes than that which it is widely believed to make.

All this provides good reason for close co-operation in the formulation of economic policies but it also reinforces the impression of a drifting apart, as each of the partners tries to sort out its position in a complicated web of relationships. Furthermore, the continuing sense of economic uncertainty and the bouts of deep recession that have afflicted Western economies since the early 1970s have encouraged calls for more nationalistic economic policies and, in a more general sense, have encouraged the preoccupation with domestic issues which can soon turn into insularity when it comes to considering the interests and sensibilities of foreigners.

In the past, and simplifying somewhat, the United States was in a position of slight dependence on the international economy while exercising substantial influence over its management and behaviour. It was able, in the 1950s and 1960s, to regard the international economy as an extension of the American economy and proceed on the assumption that what was healthy for the latter was healthy for the former. There was some validity in this approach in that the size of the American economy had (and to some extent still has) a major influence on the world economy, and in that all the developed economies enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic prosperity. Since then there have been two related changes: the relative decline of America's economic power; and the slowing-down (or stoppage altogether) of the pace of economic growth. The Europeans now feel that the United States ought to be more willing to co-operate on an equal footing, and that they are no longer obliged to accept whatever economic pressures flow across the Atlantic as some force of nature.

Trans-Atlantic arguments are therefore likely to be frequent and substantial. The particular sources of controversy may vary—high inflation one moment, high interest rates the next. The main point is that significant interdependence without effective forms of co-operation and co-ordination (or one party being in a sufficiently dominant position to impose his will) means that domestic economic policies and trends in the key countries of the Alliance

are rarely mutually supporting. One pursues tight money policies while another dashes for growth; one trusts the market, another is more *dirigiste*. Increasing public frustration in the West at the inability of governments, of whatever complexion, to find an optimum mix of economic policies has led in many countries to regular changes of government and correspondingly regular shifts of policy. France now has succumbed to this trend, and Germany may soon follow.

Need regular argument on economic matters undermine the overall Atlantic relationship? The only comfort to be found is of a negative kind. First, while the two sides may blame each other for a part of their economic woes, they are likely to blame Japan and OPEC even more. International economic problems cannot be properly understood, let alone solved, on a trans-Atlantic basis. However, what can be done on a trans-Atlantic basis may be less difficult than other forms of co-operation. Secondly, the United States put its allies on notice a decade ago that it could no longer sustain the postwar economic arrangements. The 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods system provided a severe jolt to America's allies, and it has complicated life ever since, but it did not lead to a collapse of the Alliance nor, for that matter, to a collapse in the international economy.

So the 1971 experience suggests that a major economic row need not have a direct impact on the Alliance, certainly not in the sense of causing a dramatic rupture. That being said, the indirect effects can be significant and in the long run possibly as damaging. With the generally weak economic performance since 1971, and the more nationalist inclinations this has encouraged, there has been an erosion of shared rules and conventions, in particular in GATT and the OECD, which has in turn made it more likely that specific trade disputes (for example over steel or textiles) will get mixed up with general arguments over the regulation of economic interests. Not only is squabbling over economic relations not going to make it easier to cope with differences over security policy, but it is difficult to confine such erosions in Atlantic understanding to the economic sphere alone.

Factors undermining the strategic alliance

The Atlantic Alliance is essentially about security. Even much of the stimulus to the postwar economic arrangements came from a fear that unless the Western world could be reinvigorated the challenge from the East might prove to be irresistible. If the basic logic of NATO remains valid then the Alliance may hold irrespective of the disagreements between the member countries on economic matters.

However it is impossible to isolate the military side of the Atlantic relationship. The most obvious reason for this is the high cost of defence. The economic troubles of the past decade ended the surge in public expenditure that had marked the 1960s. Now defence spending either has to be made a special

case (with an obvious potential for arguments based on 'guns versus butter') or else, if it too is held back, it is necessary to tolerate a diminution in the overall defence effort (given that spending must rise annually by a few per cent in real terms solely to keep pace with the higher inflation in defence goods and services than that obtaining in the civilian sector). Most likely the relentless pressure on spending priorities will lead to a gradual reduction in national contributions to the collective defence effort. Despite current appearances, the United States cannot be excluded from this prediction, but there is a clear potential for argument if the Europeans' defence effort is being cut while that of the United States (for the time being) is undergoing expansion, and if subsequent American cuts are justified by European failings.

An added twist to this developing debate on burden-sharing illustrates the connection between the erosion of understanding in the economic sphere and the loss of cohesion in the security sphere. The Reagan administration's attempts to combine high defence spending with lower taxes in the absence of high rates of economic growth, has resulted in an interest-rate regime which represents a set-back to European economic hopes (or at least has been described as such in Europe). This in turn makes it unlikely that the Europeans will feel willing or able to respond to calls for increases in defence spending comparable to that planned by the United States.

There is another, and probably more fundamental sense in which the changes in the economic sphere influence those in the security sphere. The diffusion of economic power over the past two decades, largely away from the United States, means that Western Europe is now in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* the United States but has to take account of other important groupings, of which the oil producers and the East European economies are politically important while the newly industrialising countries (NICs) play an increasingly prominent role in trade. The United States can no longer ignore these groupings, but it is still relatively self-sufficient so that it imports proportionately much less of its oil requirements from the Middle East than does Western Europe, and conducts a remarkably small amount of overseas trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. During the 1970s the Middle East and Eastern Europe became politically more sensitive—a shift that explains more than variations in the actual trading relations. Western Europe has much more at stake in its economic relations with both than has the United States and this puts a cloud over all Alliance diplomacy. The Europeans feel that they are being asked to bear the brunt of any high-risk American diplomacy, particularly if it is based on economic sanctions, while the Americans suspect that the weakness in the European stance on many issues reflects their economic dependence.

To appreciate the significance of both these types of arguments we must now turn to the security debate itself. My point is that the logic of the current debates within NATO, and especially of the European position within these debates, is accentuating the importance of the issues of defence spending and

the relative dependence of the United States and Western Europe in the international economy.

It is probable that the NATO arrangements themselves are far more resilient than is often supposed because if the allies want to sort out their problems they have the means to do so. If the Alliance can hold together and put together a serious military capability, even if this capability does not meet the most exacting standards, then it probably can keep the Soviet Union in check. There is probably more freedom of manoeuvre available than is normally admitted in shaping NATO's overall deterrent.

The asymmetrical nature of the relationship ensures continual tension, in that the Europeans will always be nervous about being sold out or subjected to undue risk, and the Americans will grumble about shouldering disproportionate burdens. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any party to a NATO debate will feel that its security position will actually be improved by the break-up of the Alliance.

If it is not quite so easy in practice this is not only because the Soviet military build-up has undermined confidence in NATO's position. The basic problem is that NATO has allowed itself to put at the centre of its strategic doctrine the dubious proposition that an American President would authorise first use of nuclear weapons in response to a Warsaw Pact conventional invasion of Western Europe that looks like succeeding.

West European dependence on this myth has become one of the more unsettling features of United States-European relations. Yet although it is intellectually unconvincing, in that it requires the United States to threaten suicidal action on behalf of its allies, it is politically viable, in that the Soviet Union is unlikely to wish to try to call America's bluff. It is an act of faith for the United States to offer, and the West Europeans to accept, a nuclear guarantee which can be sustained so long as both sides engage in an elaborate process of mutual reassurance. Because of this, Alliance doctrine has acquired a heavy overlay of symbolism. This is one reason why discussions of Atlantic relations soon get down to fundamentals, for every move in the security sphere is immediately treated in symbolic terms.

As this symbolism has had to accommodate changing political and strategic circumstances it has become extremely complicated and is therefore imperfectly understood, even by the NATO establishment. The fierce debate surrounding the introduction of long-range theatre nuclear weapons illustrates what happens when unchallenged presumptions of NATO orthodoxy are submitted simultaneously to public questioning and a new strategic situation. The same confusion can be seen with conventional forces: in the first half of the 1960s Europeans saw America's stress on improving conventional forces as evidence of a willingness to deny Europe the best available means of deterrence; by the end of the decade they had come to see threatened reductions of conventional forces as evidence of a willingness to desert the continent altogether. Now, as noted below, many Europeans are coming round

to the view that, in principle, a greater conventional emphasis may be sensible after all.

It is common to blame the current confusion in NATO strategic doctrine on to the Soviet Union's achievement of parity in nuclear capabilities with the United States. But the prospect of a nuclear stalemate has figured in Alliance calculations since the first Soviet atomic test of 1949, and the state of mutual assured destruction was proclaimed in the mid-1960s. It has certainly become more evident in a strictly numerical sense, but the real change is in the judgment of the consequences of parity.

In the 1960s only the French argued that parity had rendered America's nuclear guarantee worthless. The rest of the allies took the view that it was not necessary for there to be a certainty or even a likelihood that the United States would wage nuclear war on Europe's behalf—only a risk just large enough for no Soviet leader to ignore it. This begged the question of what actually could be done to remedy the situation if deterrence failed, but only because it was felt that there was no pressing need to pose the question. During the 1970s this question became difficult to ignore. This was in part a result of the loss of confidence in detente and a concern that, at least in the Third World, the Soviet Union was willing to take higher risks in its foreign policy.

Also, American strategists, displaying a rather clinical and apolitical approach to their subject, became preoccupied with the question of what happens if deterrence fails. Unless a satisfactory answer can be found, it has been argued, then the whole edifice of deterrence itself will collapse—for the threats upon which it depends will be exposed as worthless. To remedy this position either American superiority must be regained, or NATO's position at the lower levels of the escalation ladder reinforced. Otherwise a gradual but inexorable process of accommodation to Soviet power has to be accepted.

The strategic logic of this line of argument is not matched in political logic, for it could lead to a self-induced crisis of strategic doctrine quite out of proportion to the actual state of East-West relations. Yet once the process had begun, and the sense of strategic crisis was beginning to grip the United States, the Europeans could not avoid the argument. In the first instance this was simply because this approach has been so influential in the United States.

This can be illustrated by reference to the 'European view' on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) because SALT provided the focal point for American critics of strategic parity. Around 1977-78, it was not unreasonable for conservative critics of SALT in the United States to assume that their fears were shared by the allies. The most visible European input into the debate was a series of worried queries on the impact of particular constraints on weapon systems and mooted non-circumvention clauses. What the conservatives failed to realise was that not only did the European governments lack a thoroughgoing critique of SALT, and so could be satisfied on these various queries, but that their concern for the health of detente meant that they had a positive interest in the talks succeeding. When this became apparent in 1979

the conservatives had to insist that the official European voice now being heard was quite different from that of *their* European contacts and so not truly authentic. The suspicion grew that the allies had been 'got at' and so spoke only under duress.

In 1981, the new Reagan administration soon discovered that the allies' view of arms control was more firmly based than it had suspected and that they would not be reassured by American displays of military preparedness. When Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger spoke in February 1981 about the likelihood of the 'neutron bomb' being reinstated he thought this would be welcomed by the Europeans who had been let down so much by President Carter's abrupt change of policy in 1978, and so must have been surprised, if not persuaded, by the European anxiety on this matter.

To the Reagan administration this sort of reaction, and the evident second thoughts in Europe over the advisability of the long-range theatre force modernisation programme, confirmed the impression of an appeasing and neutralist trend. Given the frames of reference of many of the key American policy-makers and strategists, a likely explanation for the European, and particularly the West German, position was that the gradual process of accommodation was underway. The attempts to shore up nuclear deterrence by new programmes and strategies had failed to convince the Europeans who were now in danger of slipping away.

For the West European governments the real problem was that the attempt to solve a crisis in NATO strategic doctrine that had been largely self-induced, by playing around with all sorts of American nuclear options, had turned into a genuine crisis. Articulate sections of European public opinion came to agree with the American view that the real question, to which the state of East-West relations added urgency, was what happens if deterrence fails. The answer was inevitably unappealing, and NATO's large arsenal of theatre nuclear forces made it more so.

West European leaders found themselves accused by Americans of succumbing to Soviet power, because of their inability to accept what is necessary to make deterrence work, and accused by many of their own people of succumbing to American power by accepting, via nuclear weapons, all the risks of a hawkish American foreign policy. To argue back to both that the likelihood of deterrence breaking down in the form of an all-out war in Central Europe is too remote to warrant all this tension within the West and expenditure of so much nervous energy, hardly seemed adequate.

It might be possible to restore some faith in deterrence by calming East-West relations and the associated arms race by effective measures of arms control, but it is difficult to be optimistic on this score. So, despite themselves, European governments are being forced to address the crisis of doctrine. Political circumstances and, it so happens, strategic logic dictate only one response: to raise the nuclear threshold and, by improving conventional forces, rid the Alliance of the burden of having to threaten nuclear first use. This has

in the past generally been considered to be the preferred American approach, and certainly many involved in the current European debates see it as a likely compromise.

The economic logic, unfortunately, is not so compelling. The long-standing European preference for nuclear deterrence has been based on an unwillingness to fund a much more expensive conventional defence. It is not inconceivable that substantial improvements in the quality of conventional defences could be achieved by more efficient use of existing resources, but the resources are becoming more scarce. Unless the economic performance of NATO countries improves markedly, hard choices are going to have to be made between, on the one hand, holding down defence expenditure and so increasing NATO's nuclear bias with all the associated political problems, or, on the other, redressing the bias by raising expenditure with unfortunate consequences for other social and economic objectives with their own associated political problems.

Divergences in global perspectives

Even if the doctrinal issue could be solved there is no reason to suppose that the current disquiet in Europe on American security policies would quickly evaporate. Part of the critique of the anti-nuclear movement, which finds resonance in polls sampling European public opinion, concerns the combative approach of the Reagan administration to its foreign policy problems. Again this is something that might be remedied by a less assertive American diplomacy or possibly by international developments that might convince public opinion of the need for a certain degree of toughness. However it may also be that there is a longer-term generational factor at work. The incitement to the anti-nuclear movements in Europe was undoubtedly the publicity surrounding first the neutron bomb and then cruise missiles, but they were given direction by leaders whose inspiration draws as much from suspicion of the United States as from any coherent theory of the arms race. These leaders gained credibility from American behaviour during 1980 and the election of Mr Reagan with his entourage of zealous hawks. If East-West relations improve then these movements may subside, even if the objects of their protest remain. The long-term implications of these movements is the growing influence of activists who developed their beliefs during the days of student radicalism and anti-Vietnam War protest in the late 1960s and are now moving up the political, academic, media, and bureaucratic hierarchies. The fading away of the generation whose Atlanticism was based on the intimate co-operation of the Second World War and post-war reconstruction has been noted. What may now be the case is the ascendancy of a generation with an in-built suspicion of American foreign policy.

This has clear implications if the centre-piece of American foreign policy over the coming decades is going to be a robust and indiscriminate stance against all manifestations of communism. For the new European activists, the

critique of NATO military doctrine only gains force because of a prior critique of the risks of American foreign policy in the Third World. If deterrence fails, it often appears to be assumed, this will not be because of a political breakdown in Central Europe but because of super-power conflict in the Third World that will then spill over into Europe.

While few West European leaders would endorse the more sinister interpretation, it is the case that they have on occasion been unnerved by elements of American policy. Certainly, the 'Vietnam syndrome' by which one legacy of the sorry Indochina experience was believed to be an unnatural reticence in the conduct of American foreign policy, was always much more of an American than a European diagnosis. By and large the allies have been far more concerned about the Americans rushing in to new foreign escapades than holding back and, while never quite sure about the proper mix of military muscle and diplomacy, are still happier when the error is on the side of soft talk rather than big sticks. Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out, the Falklands crisis reminds us that simply to pose American militarism against European restraint is to caricature both parties. But the crisis has underlined the way in which America's sense of its global role—and in particular its desire to line up anti-communist coalitions—can give it a different set of interests to even its closest ally.

If one looks back over the episodic crises of the past decade there is a recurring theme of an effort by the current generation of European leaders to encourage the United States to keep a sense of perspective about left-wing successes in various parts of the world. They recall how the rise of Eurocommunism and the Portuguese Revolution was going to lead to the collapse of NATO's Southern flank; then Angola and Zimbabwe were going to be the means by which the Soviet Union could control the Cape Route; next the invasion of Afghanistan was the first stage en route to the Gulf; and more recently insurgency in El Salvador was adding to the communist outposts in America's own back-yard.

From an American viewpoint such an impression is hopelessly exaggerated. It is arguable that had not Washington made a fuss there could well have been a complacent drift into a dangerous situation because of the cumulative effects of developments that might each individually appear to be of only marginal importance. The American complaint, voiced with as much if not more vigour during and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War as in the early 1980s, was that Europeans had lost their global vision for regional blinkers and that they were unwilling to see the links between their own security and events outside Europe. This, the Europeans insisted, was unfair. They just had differing perspectives.

The frequency of controversies over developments outside of the Atlantic region (even when broadly interpreted) has been sufficient to make this a distinctive feature of the relationship. Arguably, it is *the* key divergence, for by contrast the security arrangements within Europe still appear to be remarkably

stable, and, as noted above, much of the questioning in Europe of the advisability of such close links with the United States stems from concern over the consequences of what is perceived to be a certain American recklessness in its dealings with the Third World.

The divergence over security challenges in the Third World has three main causes. First, there are so many parties involved and the issues are so complex that the potential for miscalculation is enormous. Second, the differential dependence on key raw materials, notably but not exclusively oil, means that the Europeans are willing to take fewer diplomatic risks. Third, the incentives for low-risk policies are intensified by the decline in the ability of European countries to project significant military power outside the continent, although it is of note that since Vietnam, British and French forces have seen more action outside of Europe than those of the United States.

The point is that the United States, alone among the Western nations, has both the self-sufficiency and military strength for global assertions of power, and a competitive relationship with the Soviet Union that is qualitatively different from relations between any other pair of countries. The United States sees the increased military visibility of the Eastern bloc countries in the Third World over the past decade as a challenge to a previously dominant American position. The Soviet Union as an outsider trying to get in primarily as a promoter of communism is regarded as inherently subversive of the international order and so an unlikely partner in the resolution of regional disputes.

As the Europeans are out of this competition and can do little, as contributors on the Western side, to influence its course, they tend to see the single-minded concern with United States-Soviet relations as a distraction from the complexities of most regional conflicts. From the perspective of neighbours, they tend to view the Soviet Union as an unpleasant fact of life which cannot be excluded from international affairs and whose interests and view must be recognised if there is to be any sort of peaceful co-existence.

The Soviet Union and its allies are getting more involved in the Third World and their involvement does have a heavy military bias, largely because they have so little to offer in the economic sphere. This has led to an attempt to extend deterrence beyond Europe. There has been a debate within NATO as to whether or not it is appropriate to prepare for large-scale military intervention in the Third World in general, and the Gulf in particular, to counter any Soviet adventures; and, if so, how these preparations should be made.

This debate involves Europeans in yet another of the discussions of 'what do we do if deterrence fails?'. Only this time it is in the context of areas of the world where disorder is only too regular and where military intervention by the West is extremely unattractive. The Europeans are faced with the dilemma of wishing to maximise their influence over the use of such intervention forces (because they are worried about hasty and ill-considered use) while minimising

their actual contribution to a level tolerable to the United States (because they doubt that this would be a useful way to use scarce resources). They would prefer to keep out of local controversies and concentrate on what is believed to be the real Western interest of preserving steady markets and raw material supplies by encouraging regional stability and a generally sympathetic attitude towards the industrialised countries.

This may be fine as a general inclination, and can obviously be supported by generous policies on the whole gamut of North-South issues from aid to commodity agreements but it leaves little scope for active diplomacy. It becomes risky to offend key states by talking too loudly about their more dubious internal practices or local external adventures. It may make sense to follow the line of least resistance and accept the dominant regional view on controversial matters or attempt to keep out, and might even be justifiable according to our principles (opposing apartheid in South Africa) or our notion of another's self-interest (warning Israel of the consequences of ignoring the Palestinians).

A cautious arms-length diplomacy has much to commend it for if one cannot meddle effectively it is best not to meddle at all. It may even work in most places for most of the time. Unfortunately, there are always exceptions, as Britain has recently discovered, where key interests are at stake in some local turbulence and the West needs to act. The Europeans are therefore prepared to go along, at least verbally, with American proposals such as those for the Rapid Deployment Force. The hope is that, as with other forms of deterrence, the possibility of a Western response will ensure that the Soviet Union avoids getting into a position that might result in a serious military confrontation.

The result may well be to neutralise the military instrument as a means of solving Third World crises with an East-West dimension. In these circumstances a different, if less dangerous, problem opens up for Europeans. If it is the case that the best approaches to Third World crises involve political and economic means of persuasion then these means are as available to the Europeans as they are to the United States. As the limits to military power are acknowledged then the potential of economic power has to be explored. If international diplomacy is to move in this direction, and the Europeans have to consider greater use of economic sticks and carrots, this higher profile will lead to an expectation of a greater say in determining the overall Western 'line'. A more active European diplomacy inevitably will result in arguments with the United States. Already significant strains are developing over Southern Africa and the Middle East. This suggests that questions of boycotts and sanctions, subsidies, and grants, are going to increase as contentious issues. To this can be added questions relating to economic relations between North and South and the political strings attached to development aid. This politicisation of economic life brings new problems: doubts over the actual efficacy of sanctions and generous aid or credit provisions; resentments resulting from the differential impact—Europeans feel themselves more vulnerable to loss of oil

supplies; in trade with Eastern Europe embargoes on grain hurt American farmers while those on industrial goods hurt the Europeans.

Thus, despite the current preoccupation with improving the means of overseas intervention, few security issues can be resolved on this basis—because except in rare cases applications of military power tend to be too dangerous or inefficient or simply impractical. The price that might have to be paid to avoid excessive militarisation of global diplomacy is an increased politicisation of the global economy. This will mean that disputes which once might have been dealt with by traditional means of diplomacy backed by threats of military force will now be played out in the economic sphere. In each of the recent crises—Iran, Afghanistan, Poland, El Salvador—the lack of credible military options soon led to demands for economic sanctions or, if the recipient was not too large, generous offers of aid. Even with the Falklands crisis, where military options seemed more appropriate, the first instinct of many was to seek economic forms of pressure.

It is arguable that there are as many, if not more, limits to economic intervention as there are to military intervention. Few countries will be willing to make sacrifices for extended periods. At times of recession it seems foolhardy to forgo trade in order to make a political point, or to subsidise credit or improve general aid to gain fairweather friends. As an indirect form of pressure economic sanctions can usually be resisted by a moderately determined country with a relatively self-sufficient or resourceful economy. Even where this pressure can make a difference it will take time to have effect, while the short-term consequences of exercising it can cause great disruption to international trade and finance. Moreover, while economic sanctions are often assumed to be more humane than direct military action, they can result in immense distress to vulnerable sections of the community.

All that having being said, contemporary crisis management seems to require economic sanctions as an obvious first step in signalling displeasure—something between inaction and the horrors of military action. In time it may be felt that regular resort to economic sanctions has led to far greater costs than gains, and that such political intervention should be held back for only the more extreme contingencies. Then the question will have to be asked as to whether there is any other form of pressure that is appropriate to modern conditions that can back up diplomacy. Until then, politicians are likely to find it difficult to resist the temptation of looking to the economic sphere for their sticks and carrots.

International economic policy already involves hard bargaining over divergent interests, is becoming dependent on the decision-making procedures of awkward coalitions such as OPEC or the EEC, and is influenced by the grievances of the South against the North. These issues are now being complicated even more by linking economic concessions to political favours and considering punitive economic measures to signal displeasure or force reversals of transgressions. It is hard to believe that this will do anything other

than render the underlying economic backdrop for defence policies and international diplomacy even worse.

Prospects for the Alliance: rupture or readjustment?

To return to our original question: should we view the current set of trans-Atlantic troubles as just another episode in a continuing story or are there deeper factors that will severely test the durability of the Alliance?

The difficulties in agreeing on a coherent set of Alliance policies reflect the difficulties in establishing a coherent political structure within the Alliance. The pressure of economic circumstances is forcing governments to be more inward-looking. The complexion of individual governments and their policies change regularly. All this is largely a consequence of instabilities and uncertainties in the larger structure of international relations. The Atlantic Alliance remains a crucial feature of the structure, but its relative importance has declined. The challenge for the Alliance therefore is to organise itself so as to be able effectively to influence the factors shaping the rest of the structure. To some extent this has already been recognised in calls for Alliance-wide consultations (including Japan) to co-ordinate responses to crises in the Third World as they arise.

However, the analysis of this article argues that we must move beyond the recognition that the security problem involves more than the Soviet military threat to Central Europe. The economic dimensions to the problem must also be acknowledged. Otherwise there is a risk that attempts to deal with the dissatisfaction in Western Europe (and increasingly in the United States) with the nuclear bias in NATO strategy, or to develop an effective diplomacy towards the Third World will falter through a lack of funds to support them or get caught up in the spillover from arguments on trade or monetary issues.

The issues which currently exercise NATO—on nuclear strategy and arms control, and on burden-sharing—are new variations on old themes and ought in principle to be manageable. This long-standing question of how best to organise the defence of Western Europe is, however, being complicated by outside factors and unless these factors are addressed the original question will get progressively harder to answer. When politicians in the Bundestag doubt whether the close association with the United States is so wise and their counterparts in Congress wonder why the United States continues to spend so much to help wayward allies, their queries have often been prompted by arguments about how to handle crises outside the NATO area. And whether the issues are related to East-West security relations in Europe or to troubles in the Third World, the economic issue is looming larger as a disruptive and complicating factor.

It is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to solve specifically NATO issues on their own terms, while the wider issues cannot be handled readily within an Atlantic framework. Too many other countries and international

groupings and institutions need to be involved. The first requirement for the Atlantic Community is therefore to recognise the linkages between its more immediate problems and these wider issues. In particular the importance of world economic recovery cannot be stressed too much. Nothing is so corrosive of Atlantic relations as the current recession and the accompanying arguments over the allocation of responsibility. The second, and inevitable, requirement is to improve mechanisms of consultation and co-ordination not only on security questions but also on general economic policy, and to extend them to include the relevant outside parties.

These sorts of institutional improvements are difficult enough when the very international conditions which make them so necessary also create an indifference and impatience towards multilateral diplomacy. They are also insufficient unless those involved operate with a clear sense of what is at stake and where they stand. In this sense the current crisis is more troublesome for the Europeans than for the Americans. They are increasingly being forced to question the economic policies and global diplomacy of the United States. They bring to the arguments considerable experience in Third World diplomacy and substantial economic strength, so that in many areas economic levers are as available to them as they are to the Americans.

The risk is that, faced with this challenge, the temptation for the Americans will be to draw the Europeans' attention to their dependence on the United States for their own security. In the sort of conditions that we have been describing, the Europeans are unlikely to be quiescent on contentious economic matters because of security considerations. This will be particularly so if they feel that the United States is over-stressing security and if they feel that the Americans are making dangerous and mistaken calculations in their dealings with the Third World. In such circumstances, it is going to be extremely difficult to protect the special and largely successful security arrangements in Europe.

This logic now takes us full circle for it may be that only if these arrangements are adjusted can the European dialogue with the United States be on equal terms. If NATO can reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons then Europe can reduce but not remove its dependence on the United States. Perhaps only by doing this can the Alliance be turned into a more mature relationship between countries aware that traditional ties and common interests require them to stay close together, but also that differences in perspectives and interests must mean that they bargain and argue as much with each other as they do with everyone else.

PROTECTIONISM AND AUTONOMY: HOW TO PRESERVE FREE TRADE IN EUROPE

*Wolfgang Hager**

THE link between the international trading order and the great issues of war and peace forms part of the practical, working theories of international relations of academic pundits and politicians alike. The central tradition is that developed by both Lenin and Cordell Hull[1] during the First World War, who thought that the fight over world markets led to war. Our postwar order is built on the attractive proposition that an open trading system advances both peace and welfare. Only Marxism offers an equally all-encompassing and consistent solution to the world's problems. In both cases, idealism, the sheer attractiveness of the ultimate goal, leads its advocates to defend a closed intellectual system with vehemence and intolerance, and to accept even large sacrifices on behalf of others as a relatively small price to pay.

This article argues that the mis-application of liberal principles to an illiberal world risks sacrificing the existence of Western Europe as we know it: a group of free enterprise welfare states uniquely open to each other. The prospect is for the region's transformation into a group of economically stagnating, state-directed and neo-mercantilist states; with substantial reverses in the two historic integration efforts by which it responded to the lessons of a hundred years of history: that of the working class into the main stream of bourgeois life, and that of its nation states into a nascent economic and political union.

Before making this point it is useful to put one trade problem into perspective. This problem—the threatened 'trade war' with the United States—for all its drama, does not call into question the Western world as we know it. Exchanges with the United States represent less than 2 per cent of Western Europe's GNP. American exports are, on the whole, carried out within the context of mutually agreed public policies: agricultural products, other raw materials, military equipment and civilian procurement goods like aircraft; or are conducted by multinationals whose competition among subsidiaries and the firms themselves is nothing if not orderly. Intra-industry trade of the most useful kind makes up much of the rest: machine tools which

* Professor Hager has been Professorial Research Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, since 1980. He is also Visiting Professor at the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna

1 See on this Richard N Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 9. Gardner sensibly comments that Hull was confusing cause and effect: bad political relations prevented trade agreements and caused war.

compete on quality rather than price and which speed the diffusion of technological know-how.[2]

European exports to the United States contain a higher percentage of standard consumer goods (e.g. motorcars), which are above all vulnerable to third country competition. This is one explanation for the 16 billion dollar trade deficit of the Community with the United States. That same deficit, however, is Europe's best safeguard against an extension of America's trade protectionism *vis-à-vis* Japan to affect Europe as well. The 'reciprocity' bills which have been tabled by various members of Congress (there is both a general bill and three sectoral bills)[3] which make continued market access conditional on equal treatment on a product-by-product basis, would in practice fashion a flexible tool in the hands of an American administration. It is legislation which acknowledges, as the European Community's search for general access to Japan does not, that the Japenese problem is a structural one as much as a balance-of-payments phenomenon: large purchases of commodities (from the United States) or easier access for whisky (from Europe) does nothing to circumscribe the strategic freedom of Japanese industrial policy-makers to decide what to buy and sell. This freedom is arguably greater, because less constrained by technical or economic factors, than that of an East European central trade ministry.

In Europe, with its pluralistic economic system, this sort of autonomy is now largely limited to the sectors *formally* linked to government—i.e. those where public procurement predominates. Since these are formally or informally 'buy-American' sectors in the United States, the reciprocity approach hardly represents a major threat to United States-European trade.[4] If trade officials and the GATT are worried, it is on the matter of principle: the implied further breach in the non-sectoral approach to trade. But there is a limit to keeping up the pretence that world trade is conducted by independent firms and kept in balance by the workings of the exchange rate.

This is precisely the problem with the more visible aspects of Euro-American trade conflict, such as steel, which entered a new and acute phase when American industry gave up the spurious protection of the Trigger Price System to seek, via the Courts, more solid forms of redress against imports. The quarrel over steel between the United States and the European Community is not, however, the forerunner of a general process—the famous protectionist spiral which keeps haunting us with the ghost of the 1930s. It is a straightforward clash of industrial policies which in the nature of things, sooner

2. Of the 64 billion dollars' worth of American exports to Western Europe, only 7 billion were consumer goods including cars 23 billion were food and raw materials and 9 billion semi manufactures Of Western Europe's total deficit of 20 billion dollars, only 6 billion were accounted for by manufactures (figure rounded from GATT, *International Trade* 80–91, Table A 17)

3 *The Financial Times*, March 8, 1982

4 In military procurement, of course, the shoe is overwhelmingly on the other foot: the 'two-way street' is a one-way highway

or later gives rise to a political dispute.[5] It is quite legitimate that the European Community should lose out in this particular quarrel, as the United States did over naphtha-based petrochemicals two years earlier. When someone rigs a market, and by doing so disturbs the market of the other fellow, he can legitimately be told to behave. The constraint on the importing party, then, is not some iron rule of free trade, but his possible desire to profit from (artificially) cheap supplies. This a government may wish to do in order to help consumers fight inflation, or simply to constrain excessive market power of domestic suppliers. In a world of competing industrial policies, it is a question of degree, not of a technical optimum or some moral absolute.

The real danger for Euro-American trade relations comes from the emotional climate engendered by righteous posturing which ignores the basic political simplicity of the issue. Given the economic indeterminacy of mixed economy conflicts there is no substitute for straight bargaining. Of course, Commissioner Davignon's attempt to run his rationalisation cartel with its painful production limits will be made harder by the closing of America's safety valve. But European exports to the United States amounted to 4 per cent of production in 1980. Just a tiny let up in the battering which European economies are receiving from American interest rates would increase the Community's demand enough to take up the slack.

European-United States trade relations are basically manageable—although a continuously high level of hitherto unaccustomed tough bargaining will be necessary. One reason is the similarity in costs, of which more below. The other is the still relatively limited role of the state in each of these mixed economies, and the habit of seeking tolerable compromises. An early example is, of course, agriculture. In another problem sector, shipbuilding, the United States practises the most complete protectionism without the whisper of a trade conflict. In textiles, the European Community and the United States have resolved their common problems at the expense of outsiders, through the Multifibre Arrangement, with the United States handsomely increasing its exports to Europe. In automobiles, captive multinationals are a convenient tool of trade management, as they are in United States-Canadian relations. There may, in time, be a serious conflict but it will be a low-risk one since present production integration across the Atlantic would be too costly to disentangle. In most high technology sectors (aeroplanes, reactors) there is not so much a fight as a never-ending game, largely played in third markets, with some ground rules, for example, on export credits. Clearly, as the more 'mixed' of the two economies, the Community is likely to be more often in the wrong when measured by GATT standards; but the size of its trade deficit with the United States is a reasonably good protection even against a crusading free market administration.

Much more relevant in both political and economic terms is the threat posed

5 See on this Wolfgang Hager and Jacques Pelkmans, 'Managing Euro-American Trade Conflicts', in Hager and Pelkman, eds., *Managing Trade Problems among Mixed Economies* (de Gruyler, 1982).

by protectionism within the European Community and the greater European free trade area. For each of its states Western Europe represents about two thirds of total export markets. The freedom, or lack of it, in *this* market is a make or break issue for the continent. Not only is this market ten times the size of America's—again seen from the standpoint of the individual European exporter—but it is also the precondition for the continued existence of a sophisticated, highly diversified and technologically advanced industry within a very peculiar socio-political setting which prides itself, in a sense, on being anti-industrial. This view of the matter, which links the maintenance of West European free trade to fundamental goals of socio-economic autonomy, will be elaborated in the discussion that follows.

The threat to the Common Market takes three main forms. The first is the *de facto* abandonment of the common commercial policy as nations and/or national industry federations make separate deals with troublesome third countries or by unilateral acts of protectionism. Secondly, within the Common Market itself, trade is impeded between member states by every conceivable device short of tariffs and quotas.[6] Thirdly, more subtly but ultimately more devastatingly, financial protectionism—the subsidies to industry—undermines the assumptions under which the free trade game is played. The threat of Chancellor Schmidt to stop Community steel imports into Germany if state subsidies were not dropped matches to some extent the logic we encountered in Euro-American trade conflicts.

No doubt, seven years of almost unrelieved deflation, and recurrent balance-of-payments shocks, can to some extent explain the rise in protectionism and recourse to state intervention. The 1970s were marked by a speed-up of adjustment needs on a broad front: real wages rose too fast and profits were squeezed in many countries after the late 1960s; oil changed production costs and the composition of final demand; the realignment of exchange rates after the straightjacket of Bretton Woods proceeded in the most erratic fashion. Economics, as a guide to public policy, became a discredited Tower of Babel from which finally emerged a thin voice which, with escapist simplicity, reduced the myriad new problems of adjustment and uncertainty to a single aggregate—money.

The international trade aspect of the adjustment problem is frequently talked about as if it were analogous to the oil crisis: a once-and-for-all shift of industrial structures to accommodate a handful of new competitors from the Third World. This would simply require the abandonment of some labour intensive and/or technologically mature lines of activity, and a move up-market to more sophisticated lines. This is a dangerous fallacy, itself the sum of many individual fallacies.

6 For an inventory of these see Hager, M Noelke and R. Taylor, *EC Protectionism: Present Practice and Future Trends*, 2 Vols (Brussels: European Research Associates, 1981 and 1982).

Europe's loss of technological monopoly

Trade liberalisation has provided a crucial underpinning to the unique growth performance of the postwar period. This stylised version of history is only too familiar. Let us not quibble over the fact that the fastest growth was achieved by the most protectionist—Japan and the LDCs—but let us look at Western Europe to which, together with North America, the story is largely confined. Until the lifting of exchange restrictions, in 1958, genuine two-way trade liberalisation was largely limited to the OEEC area. With the implementation of the Common Market and the EFTA Treaties and the famous GATT Rounds the 1960s were experienced, subjectively, as the golden age of trade liberalisation. The crucial point to grasp, however, is that Western Europe, in this period, collectively enjoyed an effective monopoly at home, and a strong oligopolistic position (price leader) abroad in all but the most advanced and primitive forms of manufactures.

The United States was increasingly hampered by an over-valued dollar, and its internationally minded companies turned up as investors rather than traders, causing a massive transfer of technology and closing the technology gap almost as soon as it was discovered. Eastern Europe could not deliver acceptable manufactures at any price. Japan, still almost a developing country, concentrated wholly on the American market to which, for strategic reasons, it was given ample if circumscribed access. The Long Term Cotton Arrangement of 1963, by which the United States hoped to get Europe to 'share the burden' of Japanese textile exports, simply discouraged the Japanese from continuing in this activity, while offering Europe ready-made protectionism against their LDC successors. The developing countries, otherwise, seemed permanently caught in the trap of insufficient infrastructure, skills, capital, sub-optimal home markets and so forth.

In these conditions, Western Europe enjoyed protection towards the outside world as effective as the more formal protectionism of Japan. In socio-political as well as industrial terms, these were years of autonomy in which European societies found answers to the problems which had dominated politics for a century and more.

Industrial work was rendered tolerable by shorter hours, improved physical conditions and improved social security. Workers came to enjoy some of the privileges of civil servants. Income distribution became more equal and those aspects of well-being which cannot be met by individual purchases were generously provided by the state: schools and swimming pools, parks and more pleasant urban environments. Coming to terms with the negative externalities of industrial culture involved not only a steep increase in public expenditure, but also laws which limited private enterprise freedoms to dispose of labour, land and other resources in the most efficient way. The new economic culture was anti-industrial, not by accident, but by design.[7]

7. For a sympathetic analysis from an unexpected quarter, see OECD, *Facing the Future*, Report of the Interfutures Project.

Squeezed by high wages, social security and other taxes, and government regulation, business would have fared disastrously had it not been able to recoup costs via increasing prices made possible by near universal oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures. Although in real terms the system was in a dynamic equilibrium (with a bias towards declining dynamism as regards industry), in money terms the strong bargaining power of unions and firms caused an inflationary bias. If monetarism became the anvil for beating that power, new trading competitors became the hammer.

For the old collective monopoly of Western Europe in manufactures had been lost by the early 1980s or was rapidly disappearing. The United States entered the sensitive low and middle range of manufactured exports with a vengeance, after successive devaluations of the dollar re-established the advantages of a—by European standards—docile and flexible labour force, high (if stagnating) productivity, and cheap raw materials. Eastern Europe had decided, in the early 1970s, to modernise both production and product design through Western capital imports and co-operation with multinational corporations and began to be a presence in both semifinished and finished manufactures. Japan became a mature industrial country with a range of supercompetitive exportables which, while still narrow by Western European standards, had widened to encompass key middle-range industries (such as cars) as well as advanced products. Finally the newly industrialising countries (NICs), trailing a comet of quasi-NICs behind them, captured 10 per cent of world export markets in manufactures.

Overnight Europe stood revealed as a high-cost area of production, no less suddenly than in the case of European coal after the discovery of Middle Eastern oil in the 1950s. Public rhetoric and the prescription of trade economists have not really faced up to this fact. Both use words like comparative advantage, a term derived from a neo-classical paradigm, using comparative statics, where adjustment problems are assumed away *ex ante*, and equilibrium is postulated *ex post*, and which is of monumental irrelevance in the new world of man-made dynamic advantages.

In striking contrast to its famous report on the NICs a year earlier,[8] a recent OECD study maintains that 'The ratio of exports to imports . . . in manufactured goods . . . may fall from 4.3 in 1976 to 2.3 in 1986, a minimum level to maintain a measure of balance in employment', and more importantly, '*all* of the 2-digit divisions will face increasing competition from developing countries, if only because of their policies to develop domestic industries'.[9] In other words, the familiar linear adjustment model is wrong. The model suggests that the industrialised countries have to shed a few labour intensive industrial activities, moving up market in terms of both production technology and product. Implicit in this is the notion of 'natural shelters'—dizzy heights of sophistication which brown people (other than

8 *The Impact of Newly Industrialising Countries* (Paris: OECD, 1979).
9. *North/South Technology Transfer: The Adjustment Ahead* (Paris: OECD, 1981).

Japanese) will not be able to reach. This is arrogant racism, and about as accurate as the 1956 prediction that the Egyptians would run down the Suez Canal in a matter of months (it improved). Machine tools, aeroplanes and the most sophisticated consumer products are already being exported by the LDCs. In the above mentioned OECD study, only machinery manufactures, of all Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) two-digit positions, were likely to remain fairly safe from LDC competition in the 1980s.[10] Two further arguments can be used against linear adjustment optimism. One is to point out the stable composition of final consumer demand—the basket of things people actually buy, and for which the rest of industry provides the inputs. The world will need only a limited amount of nuclear power stations, satellites, or ocean mining equipment, even in future; but it will need tennis rackets, bottle openers, carpets, and shoes. There is no doubt that most consumer items can be, or shortly will be, more cheaply produced somewhere else.[11] Some advances in design, like the micro chip in the washing machine, ease low-skill production through the elimination of electro-mechanical control equipment. With numerically controlled machine tools, looms, etc., there is no reason why overnight shifts in fashion, local demand, etc. cannot be transmitted to market-distant production locations, with cost differentials ample to pay for jet freight. The Italian textile, clothing and leather industry, which had successfully adjusted to up-market production, is beginning to feel the impact of these technological possibilities.

The second argument relates to the market and production structure in the advanced categories which are meant to provide the escape ladder, and subsequent shelter, to Europe's workers. With the United States, Japan and Europe working at the same frontiers of technology, prospects of a peaceful period of monopoly rents, typical for earlier periods, look distinctly dim. Rather, the prospect is for premature overcapacity and negative value added. The nuclear power industry, rather than IBM, may be the prototype.

As regards the standard manufactures, the extent of the problem is not adequately measured by the usual statistics on import shares from certain sources. First, for a heavy exporter like the European Community, it is the world market situation that matters. By 1980 Japan and the NICs together accounted for about 20 per cent of world manufactured exports. To this must be added the effect of import substitution (behind high protectionist barriers)—a policy which is now much easier to pursue effectively with the great ease of technology transfers.

Secondly, new competitors, naturally enough, capture markets by price competition, something which goes right against the grain of modern

10. *Ibid*, p. 79.

11 The whole point of Ricardo is, of course, that it is worth trading anyway. For practical purposes in the medium term it is more important to note that new competitors, by virtue of real lower resource cost in the bulk of manufacturing, gain enormous discretion in export oriented industrial policies; something which, for the old industrialists, translates into great uncertainty as to long-term investment decisions. For a more subtle critique see Marc Grjébine, *La Nouvelle Économie Internationale* (Paris: Presse Universitaire Française, 1980).

capitalism. A US Department of Commerce document puts the problem well:

> In any given market, a relatively small percentage of an imported item priced well below the domestic price has a major effect in upsetting the price structure and the normal competitive relationships. Moreover, the amount of imports at any specified time is less important than the potential amount of imports at some later time [for Europe read: of world market shares, W.H.]. Unless later possibilities can be defined, decisions with regard to investment . . . are made more difficult.[12]

The textbook response to such competition is a lowering of production costs—shedding labour and/or investing in higher productivity. The latter option requires capital and hence certainty. Not surprisingly, it is the British textile industry, long exposed to free-trade-like conditions in the Commonwealth, which has failed to adjust. It survived for a time by the simple device of running down existing capital stock. American and German industries on the other hand were able to use protectionist rents for a complete retooling. So much for the debilitating effects of protectionism so often cited in the literature. For another example it is worth comparing the state of health of the British and Italian motorcycle industries.

The standard adjustment prescription fails to take account of the real implications of adjustment among different socio-economic cultures. Reduced to its simplest terms the thesis reads: we have in rather marginal ways sinned against the market. Now there is a state of nature outside against which to measure the extent of your departures from the straight and narrow path: repent and adjust! There may be some temporary stresses and strains but equilibrium is just around the corner.

In reality, we are experiencing the interaction between highly artificial states of nature. A caricature can serve as a first approximation.

Two socio-economic worlds co-exist. One, ours, is characterised by unfree labour markets and still relatively free markets for allocating real capital. The other is a world of free labour markets (kept 'free' by jailing trade unionists, if necessary) and systems of capital allocation by central plans or strategic consensus by a handful of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Two things can be fairly categorically stated about the two worlds in interaction. First, there is no natural equilibrium solution possible even in theory, even less one which maintains full employment in the high cost area. Secondly, in the traditional adjustment model the initiative lies wholly with systems which allocate capital centrally. (In this model, incidentally, multinationals have no will of their own, but simply react to public[13] incentives and disincentives more quickly than arms-length markets for goods, capital and technology would.)

12 US Department of Commerce, Textile Outlook for the Sixties, Government Printing Office, 1969.

13 'Public' understood in a wider sense than industrial policies to encompass the whole sphere of publicly sanctioned contractual relations in a socio-economic system

The caricature is more accurate as regards the 'unfree' parts of the dichotomy—European labour markets and new competitor industrial policies—than as regards the supposedly free counterparts, a point which reinforces the notion of conflicting anti-natures. European postwar economic history cannot be written without reference to voluntarist industrial development,[14] especially in France and Italy. Yet it remains an exception as far as the creation of industries is concerned, and that creation (nuclear energy, aerospace) was largely directed at fulfilling domestic needs first, and exports second. Moreover, until the quite differently motivated status quo interventions of the last decade, industrial creation enlarged total wealth, rather than displacing capacity (which leads to overcapacity as a permanent 'transitional' phenomenon).[15]

The labour market of the Third World is free only in a very aggregate sense. As educational advances proceed,[16] the supply of industrial labour of the Third World will approach, for practical purposes, the infinite. For the group as a whole, the marginal price of labour will remain close to subsistence level, even allowing for a rise in the 'reservation wage' which Adam Smith already identified as a socially, rather than market determined phenomenon.[17] With increasing capital stock, workers in small world-market oriented economies will have to align their productivity wages to the low marginal price of labour, even where trade unions exist. (Japanese trade union behaviour shows how long such a basic attitude can persist.[18]) In most NICs, of course, unions simply receive orders on the right wage for the year, on the East European pattern.[19]

The OECD, citing rapidly rising wages in the NICs, develops what amounts to a theory of convergence. What they fail to point out is the stability of productivity wages, and hence of the cost gap *vis à vis* the old industrial countries. The following, not entirely reliable, figures show that whilst productivity in the textile sector in some NICs is virtually equal to the German level, wages are a fifth or less—often less than the per capital-GNP gap would suggest.

If this is the picture in the textile industry, supposedly dominated by second-hand equipment transferred to the Third World, average productivity in some of the capital-intensive sectors may even be higher than the German level. This is due to the fact that a country starting an industry from scratch, like ship-building in Korea, will only have equipment of the latest vintage incorporating

14 See Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the RIIA 1965) for the period till 1964; and Raymond Vernon, ed , *Big Business and the State* (London, Macmillan, 1973).

15. See on this Susan Strange, 'The management of surplus capacity: or how does theory stand up to protection 1970s style', *International Organization*, Summer 1979, Vol 33 (3), pp. 303-334.

16. Between 1960 and 1978 LDC primary school enrolment increased from 55.6 per cent to 78.1 per cent, secondary schooling from 8.4 per cent to 22.8 per cent. For these and other splendid achievements see UNCTAD's first *Trade and Development Report, 1981*, p. 33 and passim.

17. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (London, 1776).

18. For a typical episode see the wage settlement after 1974 which not only brought down inflation but also increased company profitability dramatically.

19. This is apparently not so in Hong Kong, probably the only economy in the world with both free labour and capital markets.

Table 1
NIC Productivity, Wages and Per Capita GNP as Percentage of the German Level (1980)

	Productivity	Total wage cost	GNP per capita
Singapore	95	13·3	32
Taiwan	90	11·9	n.a.
Hong Kong	90	19·4	31
South Korea	90	9·0	10
Thailand	80	6·3	5

Sources: German textile and garment union, World Bank

the latest advances in productivity, while old industrial countries will phase in such equipment gradually, depressing average levels.

A pliant labour force not only reduces the cost of one factor of production, but—by allowing its more efficient utilisation—the real cost of the other factor, capital. All this would still, in theory, allow some stable patterns of comparative advantage to emerge, were it not for the fact that the initial cost and allocation of industrial capital follows far less liberal criteria than evidenced in the labour markets of LDCs. The fact that private entrepreneurs are a prominent feature of, say, South Korean, Taiwanese, or Brazilian economic life has given rise to a profoundly mistaken image of rugged capitalism. Rather, these capitalists can be conceived of as the most efficient method yet discovered to implement national industrial policies. The state—to present an only slightly exaggerated model—provides everything: cheap capital, control of the work force, protection from outside suppliers, credits for both exports and imports, virtually free land and low cost inputs like electricity, and then hands the package over to a private entrepreneur. The overnight birth of a Korean shipping industry represents a particularly clear case in point.

This is not, in fact, so much of a caricature, even of Japanese industrial development, as Shigeto Tsuru[20] among others has shown. In the writings of trade policy specialists—every issue of *The World Economy* published by the Trade Policy Research Centre carries plenty of examples—a curious double standard emerges. High cost areas are rightly (if not justly) accused of anti-market behaviour, and told to adjust. Low-cost producers are absolved from similar analysis by a simple *ex post* virility test of their competitiveness. Economic theory requires an intellectual robustness (so-called strong assumptions) otherwise only found in people who maintain that the earth is flat.[21] To represent earth as a semi-sphere suggests astigmatism.

20 Shigeto Tsuru, *The Mainsprings of Japanese Growth. A Turning Point?* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977).

21 Cartography successfully employs mathematical techniques which represent the earth as flat. Good theoriests always keep in mind that they distort reality so that they can draw lines on it. The real sin is reification, which in economics of trade leads to the mixed statement that the earth is flat and should be flat.

The real adjustment

To understand the meaning of adjustment in the real world, it is not enough to think in terms of marginal reallocation of factors in response to moderately stable market patterns. Rather, it involves in practice a profound adjustment in the organisation of our economies and societies. This implies more market-like performance of the labour factor and less market-like behaviour of the capital factor. Adjustment—in these organisational terms—is a one-way street for the reasons stated: Europe is a high cost area with decentralised real-capital formation, and hence intrinsically on the defensive. Under free trade conditions, any of the low-cost producers can decide to produce anything for the European market, constrained only by other outside competitors.

More market-like behaviour of the labour factor is more in evidence in the United States than in Europe, but government policy and the behaviour of firms is moving in the same direction: cuts in real wages; reduction of job security; lowering of unemployment benefits, or tougher application of existing policies, to encourage workers to accept alternative employment at lower pay and skill levels; the growth of the black economy (which resembles the white economy in the NICs and most of Japanese industry). A change of working patterns from two to three shifts in the American textile industry was generally hailed as sensible, and contributed to the remarkable turn-around in its fortunes. This is what adjustment really means.

The industrial worker thus becomes an object of market forces in a society, two thirds of which consists of persons receiving contractual payments, enjoying high job security, with pleasant working conditions and schedules. Lawyers and doctors, real estate agents and bankers charge fixed fees or prices for their services, as do railway clerks, and, for that matter, farmers. Spokesmen for the consumer interest suggest that all these worthy nine-to-five gentlemen with their contractual incomes (to which the worker contributes) are entitled, as of right, to a three-shift shirt, so to speak. There is, in this simple adjustment view, a basic refusal to face up to the artificial nature of the pattern of mutual payments in society. Why must the pattern established in the period of Europe's collective autonomy be fundamentally called into question to respond to the rise of new producers?

Three answers are usually given, explicitly or implicitly. The first is international, and refers to fairness tinged with charity. We will return to this point in the conclusion. The second argument stresses alternative opportunities: no white man or woman should make three-shift shirts at low pay, but something sophisticated instead whose value-added allows for high pay. Yet the opportunity question looks fundamentally different when textile ceases to be the exception—in the 1960s it was the only industry competing with new producers—but becomes the rule. In other words, one can bravely contemplate the shift to other occupations of 10 per cent of the industrial labour force, but not of 60 per cent. Paradoxically, shifting out of textiles, in

such a situation, becomes perhaps less attractive, rather than more urgent, since it can no longer be thought to solve 'the problem', which is general.

An economy, we learn from the textbook, arises when people take in each other's washing. The European achievement over the past hundred years was to ensure, progressively, that the participants in this exchange did so at reasonably equal pay, working eight hours a day with a month of paid vacations. As long as alternative occupations exist to allow this pattern of exchange to evolve structurally to ever higher levels of real income, the opportunity (cost) argument points heavily in the direction of an ever greater division of labour.

With unemployment approaching 10 per cent, the full-employment-of-factors assumption of free trade welfare economics looks threadbare. The welfare state adds a twist to the classical story by insisting that the idled factor labour be paid nearly in full, as if it were still producing. The cheap shirt is thus paid for several times: once at the counter, then again in unemployment benefit for the idled workers. Secondary losses involve input industries (although in the short term their exports rise): machinery, fibres, chemicals for dyeing and finishing products.

This brings us to the third argument against our symbolic domestically produced shirt: the earnings generated by the new producers which lead to exports of capital goods and sophisticated intermediate products. This sort of argument is usually bolstered by aggregate figures which lump OPEC, the NICs, and other LDCs together to show that LDCs were and are the mainstay of demand growth since 1974. As far as the NICs are concerned, however, the picture is less rosy. Not only are capital-goods exports almost universally subsidised by supplier credits and even aid, but Europe loses out in this trade to Japan. The European Community deficit in manufacturing trade with four Asian NICs trebled in the last half of the 1970s to three billion dollars. The ratio of European capital-goods exports to manufactured imports was, in 1979, 0·43 for South Korea and 0·25 for Taiwan.[22] For every dollar's worth of textile machinery sold to Hong Kong, the EEC imported 100 dollars' worth of textiles. As local machine tool industries develop, behind protectionist barriers, the balance will worsen even further. Instead of one Japan there will be two: the Asian NICs collectively comprising the second! This will not discourage economists from arguing that this sort of phenomenon cannot happen, because of the benign workings of exchange rates.

Yet the balance of trade argument is not really crucial. Even if trade in manufactures remained in balance, problems would remain. For the exchange would be between imports of consumer goods with steady composition and market shares, allowing long-term production planning and resource allocation, and exports of lumpy and very diverse capital goods without stability either in structure or quantities: a few nuclear power stations or

22. SITC 7 minus transportation/SITC 5–8 imports. From Hager, Noelke and Taylor, eds., *op cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 169.

airbuses one year; a subway or an ethylene cracker in another. In other words, the stability of the international division of labour is assured only for the products Europe specialises out of, so to speak, a stability which rests on market forces and pluralist decisions by consumers. The exports, on the other hand, depend on central purchasing or industrial policy decisions, where repeat business, if not unknown, is certainly rarer and less steady.

Unfortunately, the stability of the loss of activities on the side of European importers is not matched by a stability of gain, for any single producing country, on the export side. For while these countries, collectively, can maintain any market share in consumer goods achieved, they are each of them vulnerable to the industrial policy and wage policy decisions of the others, and the response of the multinationals to such decisions. In such a world, investment must go to the quick-return projects. The overall higher risk premium can be understood as a world economic welfare cost, as can the reverse side of the same coin—misallocated capital rendered idle by unpredictable events. The NICs are as much victim of this instability as the rich countries. The trend runs flatly counter to the increasing need of modern capitalism, with its large investments, large lead times and amortisation periods, for stable (oligopolistic) market conditions.[23]

This is only a small part of the refutation of the argument that the moral imperative—the plight of the Third World—requires an unconditional open-market policy by Western Europe.[24] Another entirely practical argument relates to the fact that such a policy cannot be sustained in the long run anyway. Trying to sustain it in the short run has two results. The first is an unrealistic build-up of export capacities: expensive capital stock rendered idle when panic protectionism in industrial countries leads to overnight changes in market access. The build-up of a Korean colour television industry, entirely for export to the United States, led to a predictable response, leaving that industry working at 20 per cent capacity. The second consequence of letting free trade run its course until panic conditions are created in an industry, is the debilitating effect on such industries, deprived of profits and hence investments long before they are finally forced out of the market. In this situation the choice is between government rescue and closure. In the former case, the NIC supplier still loses his market, but at a high cost to national budgets.

Implied in this is another element of adjustment which is highly undesirable for most West European states: the stateward drift of the mixed economy. This is adjustment by imitating the practices of successful competitors. France, with its Colbertist tradition, would perhaps succeed in trying to run a state-led industrial economy. For the other countries (with the exception of Austria), a further reduction of the scope of pluralist capitalism is likely to be a high cost option in both economic and political (systemic) terms.

23. J. K. Galbraith's analysis in *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1976), esp. chapters 16 and 17.

24. See the sophisticated argument for autonomous development, 'Un développement Autocentré des Régions' in Grjébine, *op. cit.*

An increasing role by the state as banker and co-manager of industry can be translated as 'financial protectionism'. It is, by its nature, a national form of protectionism. This national element is reinforced by the steep increase in non-tariff protectionism by Western European states using every NTB trick in the book: from public procurement to technical standards, customs procedures, etc.

In other words, financial and other forms of protectionism are slowly but surely undermining the one real free-trade experiment in the world today: that of Western Europe. A trading area which accounts for two thirds of each member's exports is being undermined by an insistence—especially by Germany—on practising free trade towards a quasi-state trading environment. (Incidentally, the policy also jeopardises growing economic interdependence between East and West Europe: the Eastern European countries who *do* buy European capital goods cannot pay for them because European import-tolerance limits are exhausted by countries equipped by Japan.) In purely foreign policy terms, the prospect that the economic Balkanisation of Europe will lead to its political Balkanisation should give pause for thought. The OEEC, purely regional, liberalisation effort in the 1950s was permitted with this sort of consideration in mind.

What would an alternative world look like? The slogan—orderly marketing—exists. It implies managing the interface between different socio-economic systems, each with their own systems of resource allocation, price setting, and development objectives, so as to achieve high levels of trade without disrupting these different societies. The spread of European industrial culture since the nineteenth century *has* played havoc with indigenous economies, both in manufacture and agriculture. But at least it was accompanied by the introduction of genuinely new technology. To the extent that better technologies are now developed elsewhere, these can be acquired by means other than trade, or imitated. The classic case for free trade rests on the immobility of factors of production. Yet under modern conditions, the most important factor, technology, is highly mobile. The trick, as development economists have long argued, is to insert new possibilities of production, including cheaper sources of supply, into a given social system. Small developing countries may fail in this—giving rise to repressive regimes rather than more subtle ways of achieving social harmony. Western Europe, which, after bitter experience, has developed arguably the most humane system embedding modern production technology in a framework of social responsibility, should not give up lightly this achievement to adjust to an abstraction, the world market—itself a composite result of conflicting socio-economic arrangements. It is large enough to do so.

For this latter statement to be true in operational terms Western Europe must find its way back to a common commercial policy. At present, with the possible exception of textiles and steel, all really important commercial policy acts are taken by national governments or industrial federations concluding

voluntary restriction deals with troublesome outsiders. This state of affairs will continue as long as the European Community, at German insistence, is the guardian of liberal orthodoxy in matters of foreign trade, leaving national governments with the task of dealing with the real issues. German concurrence towards a more realistic trade policy, however, requires extending the notion of 'Community preference' unequivocally to EFTA. This is not just a matter of practical politics, but follows from the logic of the problem as analysed here: there is no reason why states with similar socio-economic systems should not trade freely.

It might be objected that EFTA already has free access to the Community. The problem is more complicated. If the Community were to practice, or control, modern forms of protectionism, it would enter non-tariff areas of policy inadequately dealt with by the free-trade agreements with EFTA: the creation of a European procurement market, harmonising technical standards, outright industrial policy co-ordination, as in steel (and tomorrow: automobiles?). Even the more traditional kinds of European protectionism—under the Multifibre Arrangement, for example—created new barriers to intra-West European trade through the tough application of rules-of-origin. Germany intervened heavily in Brussels to ease application of these rules, in keeping with its long tradition as champion of the Alpine republics and Scandinavia. The European Community has nearly doubled its membership since the days when the Six had to defend themselves against dilution in an apolitical West European free trade area.[25] It has also acquired a great many tasks, from foreign policy to exchange-rate management, which relieve the common external tariff (in a wider sense) of the burden of representing the Community's 'personality'. But, at the same time, trade remains the core of the Community's business; and it is this core which is threatened by continuing to treat EFTA as a free-riding outsider.

Most people would consider the American question politically more crucial for any scheme which would try to preserve European free trade by shifting neo-protectionism from the national to the regional level. The Multifibre Arrangement is an example of a common commercial policy by the old industrial countries. But in most cases where mixed economy conflicts arise, Europe has a much wider range of instruments available at the regional level—from harmonisation, co-ordination, to joint policies—which only in a second stage must be co-ordinated with the United States which, by law and tradition, uses quite different methods of industrial and trade management.[26]

The trickier question concerns 'managing the interface between different industrial cultures'. In the short term this can mean little more than conducting trade policy with fewer complexes towards countries like Japan; in

25. On the diplomatic history of this period Karl Kaiser, *EWG und Freihandelszone*, (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1963); and Miriam Camps, *Britain and the European Community 1955–1963* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964.)

26. For an extensive discussion of these points see William Diebold, *Industrial Policy as an International Issue* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

short, protectionism. In the somewhat longer term, it means creating (or recreating) a common West European market in the future industries now hampered by national procurement policies. This requires extending 'Community preference' to Western Europe as a whole, with strict 'reciprocity' procedures—rather than the GATT procurement code—applied to outsiders. Here, as elsewhere, the choice is not between protectionism and free trade, but between European and national protectionism. As regards standard manufactures, the Generalised System of Preference should be restricted to genuine developing countries. Towards all new competitors, generous and steady market access should be made conditional on the exercise of price and quantity disciplines—in other words, the sort of understanding already achieved in many instances with Japan and the Eastern European countries (and, in steel, with EFTA countries). Macro-economic policies, such as non-aggressive exchange-rate policies and labour pricing should be similarly rewarded.

These ideas will appear shocking only to those who are not aware that measures of this type are a common currency in the pragmatic part of the international trading system: Asia and the Pacific Basin (including Canada, Japan, the United States, and Australia as well as the NICs). As compared to the proliferation of national measures within Western Europe, and taking account of the amounts of trade involved, the world would become less rather than more messy, even if the elegant simplicity of GATT ideals is compromised. If Europe is to adjust by imitating its competitors, let it do so in ways which do not compromise its essential autonomy as a society and a region.

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS A DECADE AGO: A NEW ASSESSMENT (2)

*Alan Campbell**

This is the second of two articles on Anglo-French relations during the period 1968-72 written largely from the point of view of the British embassy in Paris. The first article appeared in the Spring 1982 issue of *International Affairs*.

THE first phase of the negotiations for British entry to the EEC, which lasted from June 30, 1970 till the spring of 1971, was an agonisingly slow exploration of all the issues. The boring procedures, the colourless setting of the meetings in Brussels and Luxembourg, the extreme caution of the attitude of the Six on all questions, all contributed to a certain sense of frustration in the British delegation. Although Soames at the end of 1970 was reporting from Paris with moderate optimism so far as Anglo-French relations were concerned, the British negotiators in Brussels found it hard to discern much sign of improvement in the French attitude. The same French officials who had so competently carried out the former French policy of keeping Britain out of the EEC were still in place in Brussels and in Paris. The first three or four months of negotiations in 1971 were particularly frustrating since it seemed to the British that on all the major questions—contribution to the budget, New Zealand butter, and Commonwealth sugar—they had put forward proposals which had got nowhere. This was particularly the case for community finance which everybody recognised as the most important of all. The meetings in March were especially barren.

However, this period of depression was shortly to be followed by some interesting and encouraging movement in direct Anglo-French contacts.

Anglo-French contacts in early 1971

The meeting between President Pompidou and Mr Edward Heath, which took place in Paris on May 20 and 21, 1971, was preceded by numerous contacts and consultations involving the British embassy in Paris.

* Sir Alan Campbell is a retired member of HM Diplomatic Service, having ended his career as British ambassador to Italy. He was Counsellor in Paris 1967-69. The articles are derived from a longer study of the period which is based on published material, supplemented by information obtained by the author from British and French ministers and officials.

The British government had foreseen, from at least July the previous year, that it would be necessary to have a meeting at the summit whether of the Seven or Anglo-French, in order to provide the political impetus without which the EEC negotiations would not succeed. The timetable then envisaged by the officials of the Foreign Office was a 'breakthrough' in negotiations in the spring of 1971, completion of the negotiations by the end of the year, and entry of the United Kingdom and other candidates to the Community on January 1, 1973. There were compelling political and parliamentary reasons for keeping to a timetable of this kind. It was especially desirable that the negotiations should have made decisive and visible progress by the time of the British parliamentary recess in the summer of 1971. From the British point of view a summit meeting of seven would have been unsatisfactory since it would very likely have followed the tiresome procedures of the Brussels negotiations. The British preferred the idea of an Anglo-French summit which would permit greater movement and flexibility and would besides recognize the fact that the French were the real masters of the outcome.

On the French side too, it had come to be generally assumed in the latter part of 1970 that at the right time a meeting between Pompidou and Heath would be desirable. When Heath called on Pompidou in Paris after de Gaulle's funeral in November, the President said in the course of their very brief conversation that he hoped they would meet again 'at the appropriate time'. By January 1971 French officials began to speak freely in private of a bilateral summit and in the second half of that month Soames had a long talk on the subject with Michel Jobert, Secretary General at the Elysée. This followed a talk between Soames and Pompidou at which the latter made it clear that this was how he would like to proceed. Soames's contacts with Jobert in early 1971 were to develop in frequency as time went on and this was the channel of communication through which a meeting at the May summit came to be arranged.

Jobert was uniquely placed to act as broker in Anglo-French high-level business. Small, dark, sensitive and witty, he enjoyed the complete confidence of President Pompidou. The embassy in Paris were already on friendly terms with him, having had occasional contact over the last few years, first when he was Chef de Cabinet at the Matignon at the time of Pompidou's Prime Ministership, and later when Pompidou was out of office. Both Soames and Palliser already knew him quite well and from January onwards, following Pompidou's choice of this way of proceeding, Soames handled personally the embassy's contacts with him.

By great good luck Jobert already knew Heath from having stayed in the same hotel when on holiday in Spain in 1964 and they had kept in touch from time to time. Such official meetings as they had were few but there had been a number of private meetings and Jobert's personal knowledge of Heath's views and character was based on close acquaintance. His good opinion of Heath caused the President also to take a favourable attitude towards the British

Prime Minister and this was without question a significant factor in the eventual success of the summit meetings.

Between February and April, Soames and Jobert met very often, usually in Jobert's room on the first floor of the Elysée Palace or sometimes at the Embassy. Soames would be alone while Jobert would bring in one or other of his colleagues at the Elysée. It was considered important to keep these meetings secret until agreement had been reached about the date and agenda of the Summit meeting itself. And in fact nothing leaked out until an official announcement was made on May 8.

Why was it necessary to conduct these preparatory talks in such a conspiratorial manner? There were obvious and also unavowable reasons for this.

Among the obvious reasons there was the consideration that as soon as it became known that confidential bilateral meetings between the French and the British were taking place outside the framework of the EEC negotiations, the latter would inevitably be stalled pending the outcome of the bilateral talks. But it was the unavowable reasons which really mattered more. For the French the essential point was that Pompidou wished to keep the whole affair closely under his own hand. Among his many preoccupations as President, the British candidature was not by any means the most important, but it was one of the most sensitive politically and the one that Pompidou approached most delicately. He might have entrusted the preliminary talks to Schumann, but Schumann was the Foreign Minister negotiating in Brussels and Pompidou thought it desirable to separate the two sets of talks in the early stages. If on the other hand Pompidou used Jobert, his own chief official adviser, he could be sure that the talks would be conducted with the utmost discretion and competence and at the same time in a way which, if things appeared to be going wrong, would allow of their being stopped or diverted without too much difficulty or embarrassment. Until quite a late stage in the preliminary talks Pompidou wanted to remain uncommitted—not only on the subject matter or the date, but even on the principle of a summit meeting. This was the most important consideration on the French side and it resulted in the knowledge of the Soames-Jobert talks being confined to a very restricted circle indeed—in effect only to Pompidou's senior staff at the Elysée. Even Courcel, French ambassador in London, and Schumann himself were not let into the secret until a day before the announcement of the impending meeting.

The British well understood the French attitude in this respect. Heath did not find it necessary to be quite so restrictive in limiting all knowledge of what was afoot. For the British there was however a decidedly embarrassing aspect of this procedure since in the Embassy's normal and frequent contacts with the Quai d'Orsay, from Schumann downwards, they had to preserve secrecy about Soames's contacts with the Elysée.

The Soames-Jobert talks started in a tentative and exploratory way, but in the course of March and April the pace quickened and meetings or telephone

conversations would take place several times a week. They talked about everything, not only about questions being negotiated in Brussels but also those wider questions regarding the future of an enlarged Community which did not figure on the Brussels agenda. Each side spoke on their own authority, it being understood that they could not commit their principals in advance of a summit meeting. Theoretically they were preparing an agenda for a possible bilateral meeting to which neither of their principals was yet committed. In reality the agenda, as it became more and heavily annotated, constituted a large area of agreement on the major issues. Soames visited London for consultations about every week during this period. By early April it became clear that a meeting between Pompidou and Heath would in fact take place, probably in late May. However, before an announcement was made it was thought desirable to arrange matters so as not to let it appear that the summit meeting arose from a deadlock or crisis in the Brussels negotiations. It was therefore agreed that both British and French would make a move forward at the mid-May meeting of the EEC negotiating conference. This would be after the announcement of the Pompidou-Heath meeting but before it took place. The chosen moves were for the French a concession bearing on Commonwealth sugar and for the British one conceding Community preference for agricultural products. Once the details of these moves were agreed the dates of the summit meeting could be finalised. In the last days of April the French made a proposal which after further discussion was agreed upon in early May. It was announced on May 8 that President Pompidou had invited Mr Heath to visit him in Paris for talks on May 20 and 21.

The final stage of preparation was the visit to Paris on May 15 by Robert Armstrong, accompanied by Peter Thornton and Douglas Hurd, to discuss the agenda with Jobert and his staff.[1] They went carefully over the whole ground—on which of course the spadework had already been done by Soames and Jobert—and reached full agreement on the forthcoming scenario. This endorsement of the agenda by the principal advisers at the Elysée and No 10 Downing Street respectively was no empty formality. It was a necessary final step preparatory to the talks themselves. It was fortunate for the success of the enterprise that Jobert and Armstrong found themselves very quickly on good personal terms.

Heath-Pompidou meeting

In the long history of relations between France and Britain the meeting between the French President and the British Prime Minister in May 1971 was but a brief episode. But it was important not only because it opened the way to success in the negotiations for British entry into the EEC, but because it

1. Sir Robert Armstrong, KCB: Principal Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, 1970-75; later Secretary to the Cabinet. Sir Peter Thornton, KCB: Deputy Secretary Cabinet Office, 1970-72; later Permanent Secretary, Department of Trade; Rt Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP: Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1970-74; later Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

thereby removed a long-standing obstacle to understanding between the two Governments and laid the foundation for genuine co-operation between them. At the time of this encounter it was by no means certain that it would be wholly successful though Soames himself believed that success was virtually assured.

There was no lack of preparations on both sides. Apart from the Soames-Jobert talks and the final preparatory discussions between Jobert and Armstrong, there were intensive briefing sessions and internal studies at 10 Downing Street and at the Elysée on the topics which were to figure on the agenda. Douglas Hurd has described Mr Heath's method of briefing himself in the garden at Number 10 where

> for hours on end the Prime Minister sat under a tree, dunking biscuits in tea. Experts were produced individually and in groups, experts on cane sugar and New Zealand butter and the sterling balances. They each had their session under the tree while ducks from the park waddled amorously across the lawn and over the wall on the Horse Guards workmen banged together the stands for the Queen's Birthday parade.[2]

At the end of it all Heath had very clearly in his mind the essence of the arguments on each of the topics which might come up when he met Pompidou. In mastering these detailed briefs he never lost sight of his own central purpose. This was to convince Pompidou that it was in the interest of France to allow Britain to enter the Community on terms which the British parliament could accept as being reasonable. He also looked beyond the forthcoming meeting to a state of confident relations between Britain and France in which the two countries would work together in genuine co-operation within the framework of the European Community.

For Pompidou the briefing was in one sense simpler and in another more complicated. For him it was hardly necessary to do more than bring himself up to date on the items ot the agenda. He knew the files pretty well already and there was no difficulty for a man of his intellectual calibre in mastering those written and oral briefs which Jobert and his staff prepared for him. In any case it was not he who would have to act the part of advocate. It was the British—as the French never tired of saying—who were the '*demandeurs*' and who had to make their case. All that he had to do was to listen and to make up his mind whether what he heard represented an acceptable proposition. But this was where for him the complication arose. Unlike Heath he was sceptical, even unsure, about his own objective. He was no enthusiast for Europe in any sense that would have been approved by the founding fathers of the Community. He was, of course, well aware of the advantages to France of the EEC as it had evolved and he realised that these advantages would be put at risk to some extent if France did not in the end acquiesce in Britain's entry as desired by the

2. Douglas Hurd, *An End to Promises* (London: Collins, 1979).

other Five. From this point of view the right course seemed to be to make just enough concessions on the key questions to provide a tolerable deal for Britain without giving away any significant advantage for France. But Pompidou remained doubtful among other things about the question of sterling. He believed that the most important area in which Europe could co-operate in a constructive way was in contributing to international monetary stability, and he feared that sterling—and in particular the existence of the diminishing but still substantial sterling balances—might be a source of grave European weakness once Britain was inside the Community. Or alternatively would not sterling be a disruptive influence because it gave one member an unfair advantage? Even more important was his doubt about the dependability of Britain as a partner. He had not had much direct experience of the British and he was not prejudiced against them in principle. Indeed his prejudice was on the whole in their favour since he, like they, was above all a political pragmatist. Unfortunately such experience as he had had of the British had been somewhat unfavourable. During his official visit to London as Prime Minister in 1966 he had formed the view that the then British ministers were unable to grasp or cope with their economic problems and he had been unfavourably impressed by Mr Wilson. Later in 1969 he had been disagreeably struck by the way in which the British government had handled the Soames affair. Was Britain reliable? If not, might it not be wise for France once again to block Britain's entry in spite of pressures from its partners? However the British government had now changed and Jobert assured him that Heath was a dependable man. While not altogether ruling out the possibility of keeping Britain out his increasingly strong inclination was to let it in.

There was one other important difference in the way the two sides looked at the forthcoming meeting. For Heath the meeting with Pompidou would be the supreme test of his success on the international scene. His intention was to bring Pompidou to welcome Britain into Europe as a capable and worthy partner. If he failed in this—even though the failure might be glossed over intially it would soon emerge in its true colours—it would be a major setback, indeed a personal catastrophe. For Pompidou on the other hand far less was at stake. If he were to conclude that British entry would be so much against French interests that it must be blocked then he would, it is true, have to face a good deal of trouble. The other five would be most annoyed; the British would react sharply. In the short run the French would suffer the consequences of isolation in the EEC and would no doubt pay penalties in other sectors. But this would only have been the case if France had acted trenchantly to impose a third veto. An alternative and less dangerous tactic would have been to string Britain along for just a long enough period to upset its political timetable, deliberately obscuring the question of whether Britain had been asked too high a price or whether, on the other hand, it had decided after all that it could not afford to join. This was a possible French tactic that some of the negotiators on the British side still did not altogether exclude, and until the Heath-Pompidou

meeting was over it would still have been feasible for the French delegation in Brussels, if so instructed, to shape events in this way.

When Heath arrived in Paris on the evening of May 19 all was therefore still to play for.

The talks between President Pompidou and Mr Heath took place in the President's room at the Elysée Palace in the morning and afternoon of May 20 and 21. The two leaders were accompanied by their interpreters only—Prince Andronikov, the brilliant Elysée interpreter of White Russian origin who had so often acted in this capacity for General de Gaulle; and Michael Palliser, minister at the embassy, reverting temporarily to the role he had performed so well on a number of occasions including the meeting between de Gaulle and Wilson in 1967 in that same room. Altogether the talks occupied some eleven hours including the working luncheon on the first day. Essentially it was a long dialogue between the two leaders but the programme agreed upon in advance involved some participation by other French ministers also. Thus the Prime Minister was greeted at the airport and accompanied to the embassy by Chaban-Delmas who, with Schumann and Soames, was present at luncheon on the following day. In the evening of that day the President and Madame Pompidou gave a magnificent dinner at the Elysée at which the President's speech and general attitude were observed to be of considerable warmth and friendliness.

Later in the evening in Jobert's room upstairs at the Elysée Palace, Armstrong, Thornton and Hurd conferred with Jobert and his colleagues about the upshot of the day's conversations and the prospects for the next day. Douglas Hurd recalls the dismay of the British officials when they found how little had so far actually been decided. 'It emerges that the great men have got through the agenda in high good humour without settling anything of importance', he wrote in his diary at the time.[3] Thus at close of play on May 20, although the omens were good, it could not yet be assumed that the meeting had proved a complete success.

The following day, says Douglas Hurd, was grey and wet but in the course of it 'the pieces fell into pattern'. Pompidou made the gesture to Heath and Soames of accepting an invitation to luncheon at the British embassy, a very exceptional departure from protocol by the President which was given its due significance by both the French and the English sides. This had been suggested in advance by Pompidou and was intended to convey his confidence in the outcome of the talks. It had been during that morning that Heath realised that he had succeeded. Encountering Peter Thornton in the embassy garden just before lunch he told him that all was well. In the afternoon the two leaders resumed and concluded their talks at the Elysée and by then it was clear that success was assured. In the early evening they appeared together at a press conference in the great Salle des Fêtes to make their joint declaration of

3. *Ibid.*

agreement. It was the same room in which the General had twice expressed his opposition to British entry.

The scene at the Elysée that evening was deliberately designed to be dramatic and those present on the British side, not all of whom were fully up to date on the degree of agreement attained by the two leaders, certainly found it so. Sceptics among them had foreseen that both French and British would want to represent the occasion as a success but they thought that this would not necessarily be complete and unequivocal and might still be followed by disappointment when the scene was transferred back to Brussels and Luxembourg. But even the most sceptical and cynical had their doubts swept away by the courageous and forthright terms in which Pompidou declared his position. After explaining 'the essence of our conversations was on the general conception of Europe, on its organization, on how it would work, on its prospects—all this in the framework of all the great problems which exist between European countries and the others and within European countries themselves—' Pompidou continued:

> Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European and that she only wanted to enter the Community in order to destroy it or to divert its purposes. Many people also believed that France was ready to use any pretext to place finally another veto on the entry of Great Britain.
>
> Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you this evening two men who are convinced that neither of these things is true.

After this it was assumed by everybody present that, barring some totally unforeseen accident, Britain's accession to the European Community was assured.

Content of Anglo-French agreement

But what was in fact the content of the agreements reached between the two leaders? Although at the time of the Elysée press conference the talks were seen mainly as a part of the negotiation of British entry to the EEC the Heath-Pompidou meeting contained broader and longer-term implications. Both British and French governments had accepted this from the beginning of the Soames-Jobert talks. Heath's account, given in the House of Commons a few days later on May 24, laid great stress on the identity of view between the French and British governments about the future role which an enlarged Community could play in the world and expressed confidence that the divisions and suspicions which had so hampered relations between Britain and France in recent years had been removed. He continued:

> We discussed the development of the European Community and the working of its institutions. We agreed in particular that the identity of national states should be maintained in the framework of the developing

> Community. This means of course that though the European Commission has made and will continue to make a valuable contribution the Council of Ministers should continue to be the forum in which important decisions are taken, and that the processes of harmonising action should not override essential national interests. We were in agreement that the maintenance and strengthening of the fabric of co-operation in such a Community requires that decisions should in practice be taken by unanimous agreement when vital national interests of any one or more members are at stake.

For Heath the meeting in Paris had been an outstanding success, described by Douglas Hurd as 'the greatest single feat of Heath's premiership'. For Pompidou too the success was gratifying. Jobert records that just before the talks took place Pompidou had asked him what sort of person Heath really was. Jobert replied: 'You will find him loyal and tenacious, even unshakably so, perfectly calm. And if you are right he will acknowledge it without hesitation'. After the talks were over Pompidou told Jobert that he had found Heath exactly as he had described him. Four weeks later on June 24 Pompidou gave a radio interview in which, after making many of the same points as Heath had made in the House of Commons, he ended by reaffirming his faith in the future of an enlarged Community. 'I have confidence', he said, 'in the England of Mr Heath and I am convinced that—not just with him but with all the others too—all of us together can do something great and give back to Europe her place in the world'. Writing five years later about this phase of Anglo-French relations Jobert affirmed that the character of the British Prime Minister won the confidence and friendship of the French President to a degree which was rare among statesmen and it was this which really mattered in the last resort.[4]

There was one other thing discussed in Paris between the two leaders which was of considerable psychological importance. This was the question of the French language. Pompidou attached great value to the use of French as a vehicle of thought and an illustration of an attitude of mind. Heath had been fully briefed by Soames on this point and at Soames's suggestion he told Pompidou of his intention to ensure that British officials dealing with EEC affairs should be able to work in French as well as English. He also promised to inaugurate and finance better cultural contacts between the two countries. It was salutary for Anglo-French understanding that this possible irritant of language should have been removed or at any rate soothed and clearly Pompidou was pleased with what Heath had been able to say on the subject. Speaking to an audience of French officials in Belgium a few days after Heath's visit to Paris he said that he had explained to the British Prime Minister that he wanted French to keep its place in the enlarged Community as a working language on the same footing as English and that Heath had readily agreed to this. He went on to say that there was no question in his mind of linguistic

4. Michel Jobert, *L'Autre Regard* (Paris: Grasset, 1976).

imperialism but 'language reflects a way of thinking, a way of seeing the world'. On that occasion he remarked, with somewhat exaggerated politeness to British linguistic skill, that 'if it were only the English they would be able to manage in French' but one must not forget the Scandinavians and the Irish!

Breakthrough in EEC negotiations

The first evidence that things had changed was at the extra Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on June 7 which was to deal among other things with sterling. This was the most important question outside the negotiations proper which the French had earlier seemed to regard as a test of British goodwill and intention essential to the success of their candidature. But to the astonishment of the Five the French Finance Minister expressed himself at this meeting fully satisfied with the vague assurances on the subject offered by Geoffrey Rippon.[5] It was clear to everybody that the British and French had fixed this up between themselves and had agreed the appropriate stage management in Luxembourg.

The real breakthrough in the EEC negotiations came later in the month. At the Ministerial meetings on June 22 and 23 agreement was at length reached on the two major outstanding questions—the British initial budget contribution and New Zealand butter. By 5 am on June 24 Ministers and officials emerging wearily from the last session were convinced that Britain would join the EEC. After that session interest in the question of the British Candidature shifted to the proceedings in the British Parliament.

At the embassy in Paris the second half of 1971 was felt, from the point of view of British entry to the EEC, as something of an anti-climax. The negotiations were not quite concluded and several occasions arose when the embassy was instructed to seek French co-operation over one point or another. But this was now very different from the exciting days of the secret Soames-Jobert or Armstrong-Jobert talks in the spring and early summer. When something had to be discussed in Paris it was now with the Quai d'Orsay—if necessary by the ambassador with Maurice Schumann himself—rather than with the Elysée, though there was one occasion when the Armstrong-Jobert line had to be reopened over a fisheries question. This was a serious affair which blew up in Brussels at a Ministerial meeting at the end of November and escalated dangerously. The French attitude was such as even to raise doubts in London as to whether the French government were not having second thoughts about the British joining the Community. Armstrong and Thornton came over to Paris and, after discussions with Jobert and Jean-René Bernard at the Elysée,[6] the situation looked less grim. Soames then weighed in and after consultation in London returned to Paris with instructions to try to fix up a new formula with the French. He succeeded in doing this and the formula was agreed in Brussels on December 11.

5. Rt Hon. Geoffrey Rippon, MP, QC, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1970-72. Leader of delegation negotiating entry to EEC.

6. M. Jean-René Bernard, chairman of interdepartmental committee at the Elysée

Other developments in Anglo-French relations

Meanwhile on the international scene the continuing EEC negotiations loomed less large than other problems—Vietnam, China at the United Nations, Rhodesia and international economic and monetary affairs. For Pompidou, well informed and perceptive on financial questions, the immediate and longer term implications of Nixon's action to staunch the dollar haemorrhage were a source of special anxiety. Against this international background Soames's embassy could play but a modest role, though Christopher Ewart-Biggs,[7] who had succeeded Michael Palliser as Minister at the end of September, found his job intensely busy, partly because a great deal was going on in the world requiring Anglo-French consultation and partly because at first he was feeling his way in finding the best method of working with Soames. On taking over the job he found that relations between the British and French governments were good enough to permit them to find a common view on many, if not most, questions of foreign policy. But even apart from residual EEC difficulties such as animal health or fisheries there were several occasions when misunderstandings or conflicts of interest had to be resolved. For example, for reasons of prestige Heath, Pompidou—and to a lesser extent also Brandt—wanted to be seen to be Nixon's principal interlocutor over the international monetary question which was to be the subject of bilateral meetings at the highest level. Ewart-Biggs wrote in his diary on November 23: 'Much useless and petty activity at high level over who announces what first in the fragmented Summit in which, as in an Iris Murdoch novel, each character must couple with every other. In the game of "moi d'abord" Pompidou comes out on top.'

Soames for his part decided that, apart from remaining EEC questions such as fisheries, he should concentrate his interest primarily on those elements of Anglo-French relations that might have a lasting beneficial effect. For the rest he was content, once he had assured himself of Ewart-Biggs's ability, to leave him to do what his predecessor had done, to run the embassy generally and to do all those things which need to be done at a responsible level other than what an ambassador has to do personally. Ewart-Biggs quickly found how best to fit in with Soames's way of working. Like most of Soames's intimate collaborators he was susceptible to his charm while often exasperated by his disorderly methods. He sometimes referred to him as 'the Elephant', alluding not only to his size but to some extent to his style. 'The Elephant shows that he can put his feet down gently' he wrote in his diary on one occasion when Soames had been successful in an effort of persuasion or reconciliation. At the very end of their association in the embassy, after Soames's departure, he elaborated on the metaphor, describing 'the Elephant' as 'winning support and affection everywhere with tremendous trumpetings, brushing aside opposition with a genial sweep of the trunk or an occasional savage prod of the tusk'.

7. Mr Christopher Ewart-Biggs, CMG, subsequently ambassador to the Irish Republic. Lady Ewart-Biggs has kindly given the author access to his diary for the period 1971-72

The initiative regarding Anglo-French relations taken in 1971 which was to have the most spectacular outcome was the suggestion that a State visit by the Queen to France in 1972 would be a timely and suitable endorsement of the renewed political amity between Britain and France. This suggestion was made by Soames immediately after the developments of May and June but some time was required in order to consider its feasibility and it was several months before it could be publicly announced. Other initiatives for improving Anglo-French relations included cultural and academic exchanges and, perhaps most important, contacts between the respective Civil Services. It was Heath, after his conversations with Pompidou in May, who gave the essential impetus and top-level backing to these projects though most of them had originated with the embassy. A timely visit by Schumann to England in November 1971 gave them a useful boost.

Soames's last year in Paris

By the end of 1971 the EEC negotiation was in sight of the end and final agreement was to be reached in the following month. Soames embarked on his last year in Paris resolved to build on the progress made during these last two years. Plans for expanding the work of the British Council in France, for instituting a new British cultural centre, for greatly increasing exchanges of training courses for British and French civil servants and for establishing a new body to be known later as the Franco-British Council were to be carried forward by a further meeting between Heath and Pompidou in March 1972 and to be given the appropriate accolade during the State Visit in May.

State Visits are, as the French sometimes put it, 'condemned to succeed'. The Queen's visit to France was well-timed, imaginatively organised and carried out with graciousness and aplomb by the two Heads of State. Pompidou's speech at the State Banquet at Versailles was an eloquent, as well as elegant, exposition of his view of the prospects before the two countries. The visit as a whole was no more than an exercise in Franco-British public relations at the highest level. But it was a brilliantly successful one which fully repaid the efforts made by Soames and by the many British and French officials and others who worked out the details.

After the State Visit Soames's work in France was virtually done. But there was one further event before he left. This was the first meeting of nine Heads of Government of the enlarged Community which took place in Paris on October 19 and 20. The long and detailed statement issued at the end of the second day was a bold and as it turned out over-ambitious attempt to chart the future development of the Community, affirming the intention of its leaders to transform the whole complex of their relations into a European Union by the end of the decade. Both Heath and Pompidou were pleased with the outcome which was satisfactory to them as well as to the other partners even if there had been vigorous and sometimes bruising argument at official level on the way to

agreement. Nobody at that time could foresee that world economic prospects only a year later would make the objectives set out in the statement unattainable except in greatly diminished form. In the immediate aftermath of the Summit there was general satisfaction at the way in which the addition of Britain and the other two new members had resulted in a new and on the whole well-balanced relationship between the biggest members and the rest. Neither Soames nor the Foreign Office doubted the likelihood of conflicts of interest, as time went on, between French and British but the experience of this first meeting was reassuring about the prospect that such conflicts could be resolved given the necessary confidence and goodwill. Soames for his part recognised that French welcome for British entry to the Community was tinged with apprehension.

The Soameses were to depart on November 8. On the morning before they left the staff of the embassy said good-bye to them in the front hall of the Chancery. Ewart-Biggs's speech, the notes for which are included in his diary, was—as he described it—a mixture of humour and sentiment.

> This [he said] is the Ambassador's last day in the office, so we are here to say good-bye to him and to Lady Soames. He has said all his official farewells, he has made all the speeches. He has shaken the hands of all the many people who are called Monsieur le President, including the real one along the road, who said some very nice things about him and Lady Soames. The President said one very striking thing that has not appeared in the press. He said 'You have won.' That I think really sums it up. You have wound up your very successful mission here and are moving on to another no less important for the future of Europe. But this is a different kind of moment. This is the scene in the courtyard at Fontainebleau. This is where the Emperor takes leave of his Old Guard. And we, like the Old Guard, remain behind dutiful but bereft. The Paris Conference was a very fitting end to your mission here. We have been up to the Summit. Our man Mr Heath stuck his ice axe in up there with the best of them. It was a considerable achievement. But one doesn't reach the Summit without a base camp. The base camp was this Embassy. And under your leadership, Sir, it was a very good base camp indeed. We shall remember other things. Your extraordinary habit of never seeming to have time to read the telegrams yet always having read the only one we have not. Your equally extraordinary habit of swooping instinctively on the essential point while the rest of us are still labouring towards it by the time-honoured processes of logic or trial and error. And those wonderful office meetings—the cloud of cigar smoke, the sparks of wit, the rumblings of menace for those who had not done their homework—something rather like communing with a volcano. We shall miss all that now that you are leaving us.

On the following day they left. As Ewart-Biggs put it: 'The Soameses

depart. With two doves in a cage on the back seat of the Bentley and Churchillian tears. Today there is a deafening silence in the Embassy'.

Some lessons

Anglo-French relations during the last half of Soames's embassy took such a remarkable turn for the better that it is tempting to draw conclusions and point to lessons. This is a risky business because so much depended on the circumstances of the time. Yet some general observations may be ventured.

The first point is that in business between France and the United Kingdom the personalities of the President of the French Republic and of the British Prime Minister are of special importance. This is not quite so obvious as it appears. The difficulty of the relationship between the two arises mainly from their respective constitutional positions and powers. The French President is a Head of State and cannot afford to forget it. It is consequently risky to treat him as if he were just a fellow politician. As the great Lord Salisbury said of another Head of State: 'It is not safe to handle the Shah with the same truth and freedom which is permissible and salutary in the case of Mr Gladstone'. When the British government handled so roughly the overture made by de Gaulle to Soames in February 1969 they were taking a risk. If later it had been Wilson instead of Heath who as Prime Minister had been responsible for British negotiations for entry to the EEC the episode would have been held against him by the French government and might even have been a fatal obstacle to the restoration of confidence between the two governments. Heath for his part was always careful to observe the constitutional proprieties but even he in French eyes sometimes tended to assume that British informality would be easily acceptable on all occasions. In order to surmount these protocol difficulties the essential lubricant is a certain compatibility of temperament and outlook and above all mutual trust.

But this is by no means the only constitutional difference which gives rise to problems between the British and French governments. Others are the respective powers and standing of the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and of the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. In the French governments of the Fifth Republic successive Prime Ministers have had considerable powers and an important bureaucratic apparatus at the Matignon, an administrative machine much larger and more comprehensive than that of 10 Downing Street. This position cannot be compared with that of British Prime Ministers because the powers of the President are overriding. Yet a British Prime Minister may sometimes tend to underrate the real standing and responsibilities of a French Prime Minister and the degree to which he is left a fairly free hand in domestic policy. As for the Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville set the pattern during his decade of service under de Gaulle and there has been no modification of practice since then; the tradition is one of loyal and skilful execution of the President's policy. This is not at all the same as the

position of the British Foreign Secretary whose primacy in the formulation as well as the execution of policy has been challenged only on very rare occasions in recent history, usually with unfortunate consequences. Owing to these significant differences Anglo-French bilateral meetings sometimes result in awkwardness or misunderstanding since a British Foreign Secretary may attribute more power of decision to the minister he believes to be his opposite number than the latter actually possesses.

A further cause of political misunderstanding affecting governmental relations is the fundamental difference between the power and influence of the two parliaments. Everything—or almost everything—is different about the two bodies but perhaps the most pervasive difference, so far as the conduct of public affairs is concerned, is the degree to which parliament impinges on the attitude of the government. British parliamentarians are apt to assume that parliaments abroad are poor things compared with their own. This is a mistaken view so far as the French parliament is concerned especially in regard to the level of debate and the quality of the legislation. But it is true that the powers and demands of the British parliament impose much greater constraints and burdens on British ministers than are borne by their French counterparts. This induces considerable caution in their public utterances since they will be expected to defend their position in the parliamentary setting; whereas French ministers can on the whole get away with comments or commitments which they would find difficult to sustain before an informed audience. The British parliamentary timetable too is a hazard to business between governments in a way that it is hard for foreigners to understand. Thus in 1966 when Pompidou as Prime Minister paid his visit to London Wilson was obliged, by a vote of censure debate in the House of Commons, to absent himself from the dinner given by Pompidou at the French embassy. In spite of every effort made by Wilson and other British Ministers and officials to explain and excuse this unintentional discourtesy the French never really understood how such a situation could have been allowed to arise and were left with a sense of mystification and grievance.

Then it must be noted that good and bad luck played its part in the four-year period, both at the low point in 1969 and the high point of 1972. Bad luck and bad timing contributed to the sorry outcome of the Soames affair but good luck attended every stage of the subsequent upward climb. In addition to the favourable factors in the international situation and in France Heath's government had been given a valuable legacy by the outgoing Labour administration in that a steady increase of monetary reserves and corresponding reduction of debt in 1970 made Britain appear to the French and other EEC Governments to be a desirable economic partner rather than a liability.

But above all it was the fortunate interplay of personalities in key positions in France and the United Kingdom which, combined with the other factors, restored confidence between the two governments. This was especially the case

at the very top level where Pompidou and Heath found at once in May 1971 that they 'hit it off'. So for that matter did Jobert and Armstrong. The fact that Jobert and Heath happened to have met each other on holiday in Spain some years before was a piece of luck which enabled Jobert to play the part of intermediary even more effectively than he would have done in any case. The degree to which Pompidou and Heath won each other's trust was indeed remarkable. In the sadly short period during which they were both in office they worked together constructively and confidently.

Cultural relations

Professor Douglas Johnson has observed that: 'When Churchill broadcast that Germany had surrendered and that the war in Europe was over he concluded with the words "Forward Britannia! Long live liberty! God save the King!" This was quite exceptional in English. But few French statesmen would make a speech of any significance without saying "Vive la France!" '[8]

This is only one example of the contrasting cultural traditions of England and France. The fears sometimes expressed by French leaders that the French people may lose their national cultural identity under the impact of the spread of the English language appear to the outsider somewhat exaggerated. In their own way the French are just as insular as the British in every sphere of activity—without, as Mr Roy Jenkins has remarked, having the excuse of living in an island. Nevertheless French leaders have genuinely had this fear of being swamped by the Anglo-Saxons, especially those like Pompidou—or for that matter de Gaulle himself—who were steeped in the traditions of French language and literature. Among the most valuable products of the Soames-Jobert conversations of early 1971 was Soames's understanding of Pompidou's attitude in this respect and it was his advice in the light of this which led directly to the way in which Heath handled the question of Anglo-French cultural relations. The arrangements thereupon initiated by him and Pompidou—the programme for training of civil servants, the establishment of a greatly improved British cultural centre in France, the increase in all kinds of cultural exchanges and contacts—were sustained by their successors. If the effect has been only partly to meet Pompidou's real preoccupation it must be acknowledged that the resultant arrangements have made a major contribution to Anglo-French understanding. Perhaps the most evident cultural failure still persisting is seen in the very large number of boys and girls in England and France who have 'done' each other's languages at school without acquiring even moderate ability to speak or read the language in question. Even at the level of those who have attained to a reasonably adequate working knowledge of the language it is sad to observe what a tiny minority of Englishmen can read a book in French for pleasure; and it is doubtful whether the French do any better. It may be that with time the insular prejudices so deeply rooted in the

8. Douglas Johnson, *France* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969).

two countries will dwindle. It may be too that as the present younger generation travels more frequently to neighbouring countries the bad habit of both English and French of neglecting the study of each other's language will be broken. If this, or some of this, were to happen, the political class which seems in both countries to be the most insular of all will presumably conform to the change.

British embassies to France

Finally there is perhaps a lesson concerning the role of the British ambassador to France. Among all the British ambassadors who had a part in assisting the negotiation for British entry by exercising influence on the governments of the Six Soames was pre-eminent. It is not going too far to say—and indeed this was said at the time by several of those in a good position to judge—that the part he played was indispensable to the success of the negotiation. But he could play this part only because his own government, from Heath, Home and Rippon down through the senior officials at the Foreign Office and in the negotiating delegation, were willing to give him ready access, to keep him fully informed, to seek his advice on particular difficulties and to trust him to put across British policies in the most effective way at the most suitable level. It was very fortunate that by the time it really mattered he was well established in Paris, known and respected by nearly all the leading figures of the government and the Establishment, occupying with assurance a prominent place in the political and social world and widely known to the public in the provinces as well as in Paris.

It has sometimes been argued that British ambassadors to France should often be, like Soames, political figures. This proposition has merit in principle but the practical difficulties of finding political candidates for the post are often insurmountable. It is not easy to find in politics a first-rate man willing to give up his career for four or five years or perhaps for good. Nor do many politicians speak even passable French. Nor does every political candidate, otherwise well qualified and willing, possess the adaptability or flexibility required in a job so different from that of a government minister. Nor finally does a politician's wife necessarily have the qualities demanded of an ambassadress in Paris, let alone the desire to go and live abroad for some years. For all these reasons it must be the exception rather than the normal rule for a politician to occupy this important diplomatic post.

In offering the embassy to Soames in 1968, however, Wilson and Brown undoubtedly made an inspired choice. They may have based their decision on a rather superficial view of what was required of an ambassador in Paris. Their first idea of sending Soames to Paris at the earliest possible moment was not very sensible. Brown's successor did not make any special use of Soames as he might usefully have done at various times in 1969 and 1970; and nor did Wilson himself. But nothing must be allowed to detract from the excellence of

their choice of ambassador. Soames was not by training or by temperament an ideal ambassador for all seasons. At various other periods of Anglo-French relations he might have made a less brilliant or effective showing even if his and Mary's style would always have made a certain mark. As things in fact turned out he was without question the right horse for this particular course. His embassy to France was both distinguished and successful.

BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE COLD WAR IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1949-1950

Ritchie Ovendale *

AT the beginning of 1949 the Labour government in Britain was preoccupied with the containment of Russia. Weakened by the Second World War Britain could not do this on its own. Only the United States possessed the necessary power. This was emphasised by the newly formed Permanent Under Secretary's Committee under William Strang, which operated in a similar way to George Kennan's Policy Planning Committee in the United States. Strang's committee considered the Anglo-American special relationship as the pivot of British foreign policy: British interests were best likely to be ensured by its maintenance and consolidation. There was, however, an inequality inherent in the association, and Britain thought that the alliance would be least effective in Asia and the Far East. Strang, while visiting this area early in 1949, concluded that with the 'Heartland' of Europe and Asia already largely under Russian control, the periphery of Asia at least should be denied to communism.[1] Here, however, American naïvety and selfishness were particularly evident. The United States seemed unwilling to contemplate any major effort in South Asia, and so Western resistance to the spread of Russian influence in the region depended largely on Britain.[2] During 1949 and 1950, with the expansion of the cold war into South-east Asia, one of the major concerns of the Labour government was to alert the United States to the dangers of communism in the area, and, if possible, to secure an American commitment to a region considered to be in the British and French sphere of interest.[3]

Britain's initiative and the American response

For Britain the cold war in South-east Asia started with the communist insurgency in Malaya, and the subsequent declaration of the Emergency on June 18, 1948.[4] Mao Tse Tung's successes in China led the Foreign Office to

* **Ritchie Ovendale** is a lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. He is author of *'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1975).

1. William Strang, *Home and Abroad* (London: 1956), pp. 240-41.

2. *FO 371*, 76386, E5573/3/500G, Makins to Bevin, Nov. 9, 1949: Foreign Office Minute, Nov. 23, 1949; PUSC 51 (Final) Second Revise, 'Anglo-American Relations: Present and Future' (Top Secret); PUSC 22 (Final), 'A Third Power or Western Consolidation?' (Top Secret).

3 *Ibid.*, PUSC 51 (Final) Second Revise, 'Anglo-American Relations: Present and Future' (Top Secret).

4. D. C. Watt, 'Britain and the Cold War in the Far East, 1945-58', in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York, 1977), pp. 89-122 at p. 89; J. E. Williams, 'The

conclude, late in 1948, that communist movements would be stimulated throughout Asia; the agitation was likely to be serious in Indochina, Siam, and Burma. Indochina, where the communists worked in alliance with the nationalists, was of particular concern: the Foreign Office felt that the strengthening of the communist position there would have repercussions on South-east Asia generally. The United States was not prepared to accept any responsibility for South-east Asia. It therefore fell to the powers geographically situated in the region to meet the communist menace by their own measures. Britain felt that the countries concerned should alert their police and intelligence services, and ensure that the legal powers were adequate to deal with any growth of communist activity. The Foreign Office decided to try to elicit support for these measures from France, the Commonwealth, the Netherlands, Burma, and Siam, and even to approach the United States.[5] Political differences prevented a conference on the containment of communism in South-east Asia.[6] Burma would find it difficult to associate with French Indochina and Dutch Indonesia. Those colonial powers would reciprocate the feeling. The Commonwealth countries principally concerned—Australia, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan—would be unwilling to do anything that could support the French and Dutch governments in the area. Britain was, probably, in the best position to act as co-ordinator.[7]

France responded warmly to the British initiative, and suggested that the small Asiatic countries would be encouraged to take positive action against communism if the United States showed an interest. But, as Peter Scarlett of the Far Eastern desk observed, there were signs that the State Department was already 'shying at just this thought'. J. O. Lloyd offered the assessment of the South-east Asia department. There was the seed of a wide regional organisation for South-east Asia: Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, had held a conference of nineteen countries in New Delhi which had endorsed the idea of a regional organisation within the framework of the United Nations for joint consultation on common problems. One of those was likely to be the spread of communism, but any participation of Western countries presupposed a satisfactory settlement in Indonesia and Indochina.[8]

In contrast to Paris, Washington was cautious. On February 23 H. A. Graves, the Counsellor to the British embassy, discussed the issue with State Department officials. Basing his case on a memorandum provided by M. Esler Dening of the Foreign Office, Graves tried to allay the fears of W. Walton

Colombo Conference and Communist Insurgency in South and South-East Asia', *International Relations*, 4 (1972-74), pp. 94-107 at p. 94.

5. *FO 371*, 75735, F424/1015/10G, 'Memorandum on the Possible Effects of the War in China on the General Situation in the Far East and South East Asia', Dec 29, 1948

6. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as '*FRUS*'), 1949(7), p. 1115, 890 00B/1-449: Circular Airgram, Lovett to Certain American Missions, Confidential, Jan. 4, 1949; for the assessment of Britain sent to the United States of the effects in South East Asia of the Spread of Communism see *FRUS*, 1949(9), pp. 6-11, 893 00/1-549, British Embassy to Department of State, Jan. 10, 1949

7. *Ibid.*, 1949(9), pp. 821-22, 893.00/1-549, British Embassy to Department of State, Jan. 10, 1949.

8 *FO 371*, 75740, F2277/1015/10, Viscount Hood (Paris) to Dening, 102/10/6/49 (Secret), Feb. 10, 1949; Minutes by P. W. S. Y Scarlett, Feb 15, 1949; J. O. Lloyd, Feb. 16, 1949; R. H. Scott, Feb 16, 1949.

Butterworth, the director of the Far Eastern division, that the 'financial appetites' of the South-east Asian countries might be 'whetted' for increased assistance from Britain, and especially from the United States. Graves offered the assurance that Britain did not envisage an anti-communist movement in terms of American dollars. Instead he hoped that the United States would offer moral support for the British thesis that 'the Asiatic countries must set their houses in order and must evolve a policy of their own in the struggle against communism'. Butterworth was interested, but in his survey did not mention the continental territories in Asia in the line of the communist march. The drive was southwards, according to Graves, and so particular attention needed to be given to South-east Asia. Butterworth, however, appeared lukewarm to any suggestion of the communist danger in the region: the United States was apparently not prepared to accept any responsibility for the area, or to take any action to maintain the position of friendly powers there.

Charles S. Reed, the head of the South-east Asia division, was more co-operative. After Butterworth had left he suggested that Britain and the United States tackle jointly at least the Indochina problem, and that the United States should consider 'remedial measures'. But that evening Butterworth telephoned Graves and told him to forget that any such proposal had even been hinted at. Graves consequently advised the Foreign Office that the American approach to the area was likely to be cautious. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, was preoccupied with the Atlantic Pact.[9]

With the communist expansion, British and American officials in Asia offered a joint solution. J. Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador in China, urged a 'new approach' directed primarily at the 'mind and heart': Britain, France and the Netherlands should be asked to join with the United States in forming a federation to assist in the restoration of complete independence to the peoples of Eastern and South-eastern Asia, and through this to protect them from the highly organised minorities of their own people linked to international communism.[10] This was later modified by a scheme drafted by the Indian ambassador to China in consultation with his British, Australian, and American counterparts. In the short term a permanent Consultative Council of the States of the area was necessary to work out common policies, and to provide for an integrated economy capable of resisting communist economic doctrines. Before this could be established, however, Indochina and Indonesia needed 'political freedom' and Malaya the constitutional power to enable it to participate in the economic activities. The Western powers could assist by providing a specialist advisory committee.[11]

Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner General in South-east

9. *FO 371*, 75743, F3288/1015/10, Graves to Scarlett, G47/14/49, Feb. 25, 1949; *FRUS*, 1949(7), pp. 1118-19, 890.00B/2-2349, Memorandum by Reed (Secret), Feb 23, 1949

10 *FRUS* 1949(7), pp. 1117-18, 890.00B/2-1549: Telegram, Stuart to Acheson, Feb. 15, 1949.

11. *FO 371*, 75745, F3790/1015/10, Stevenson to Bevin, No. 141 (Confidential), March 4, 1949 received March 12, 1949; *FRUS*, 1949(7), pp. 1119-23, 890.00B/3-849, Stuart to Acheson, No. 59 (Secret), March 8, 1949 received March 29, 1949, and Enclosure (Secret), Undated.

Asia, offered a diagnosis at the end of March 1949 similar to the one that had emanated earlier in the month from the ambassadors in China. He insisted that South-east Asia should be regarded as a whole: the communists saw the region that way and planned their campaign on a theatre-wide basis. Frustration in the West had probably forced the planners of international communist strategy to give more attention to the East. MacDonald saw the area in terms of what later became known as the domino theory: unless the West's counteraction were firm it would quickly lose important areas like Burma and Indonesia; and that could be a prelude to the loss of a large part of the rest of South-east Asia, and hence the power of the Western democracies to avoid defeat in a war against the communists would be 'gravely imperilled'. Taking the analogy of Western Europe, MacDonald suggested an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. Though differing from the arrangements in Europe the scheme should offer the Asian governments and peoples economic, political, and if necessary, military aid to resist communism. The governments involved in the region could devise it with the help of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. American assistance was crucial: without it no adequate economic or military plan would be possible. Indeed American reluctance to participate could mean that, in the very near future, such a scheme would not be realistic. MacDonald therefore suggested a preliminary conference of Commonwealth countries interested in the region.[12]

In Washington, George F. Kennan, the director of the Policy Planning Staff, noted similarities between a paper drawn up by his department at the end of March and the ideas offered by the ambassadors in China.[13] The paper advocated that the United States should adopt 'multilateral collaboration', primarily with certain Commonwealth countries and the Philippines, and approach South-east Asia as a whole. That region, however, was to be seen as an integral part of the great crescent formed by the Indian peninsula, Australia and Japan. The objective was to contain and reduce Russian influence in the area. Any urging of an area organisation was to be avoided at the outset. Instead the initial effort should be directed towards 'collaboration on joint or parallel action and then, only as a pragmatic and desirable basis for more intimate association appears, should we encourage the area to move step by step toward formal organisation'.[14]

The Policy Planning Staff paper was, however, only projected policy. It formed the basis of a report finally issued as National Security Council Paper 48/1 of December 23, 1949.[15] Indeed, as R. C. Blackham of the Foreign Office observed, the United States would be unlikely to support any proposal which offered effective Anglo-American military assistance to the French in

12. *FO 371*, 76033, F4545/1073/61G, MacDonald to Bevin, No 16 (Top Secret), March 23, 1949 received March 28, 1949.

13. *FRUS*, 1949(7), p. 1123

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 1128-33, Policy Planning Staff Files Lot 64D563, 'United States Policy toward Southeast Asia', PPS 51 (Secret), March 29, 1949.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.

Indochina. Such a scheme could only be put to the Americans in the context of a general attempt to combat communist penetration in South-east Asia, and there was no sign that the United States was prepared to do anything about that.[16]

The Foreign Office assessment

The Foreign Office became increasingly aware of the need to secure an American commitment to South-east Asia.[17] During his visit to Washington in April 1949, to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, hoped to discuss the matter with Acheson. Dening accordingly prepared a brief. A year previously Dening had sounded the Americans about the possibility of secret talks on the Far East. Washington had indicated that it could not treat the other members of the Commonwealth in the same way as it did Britain and Canada. That also made any talks on the Far East impossible. But the Foreign Office was concerned about 'disquieting' indications: not only was the United States without a clear policy for the Far East and South-east Asia, but also the Americans were inclined to decrease rather than to extend their commitments in the area. Earlier British attempts to alert the United States to the dangers inherent in the situation[18] had only resulted in desultory interchanges. The least Britain hoped for was that in the event of the Asiatic countries showing a disposition to form a united front against Russian expansion, the United States would offer material help.

The Foreign Office saw the primary Russian threat being against Europe, and then the Middle East. In the Far East, China would fall to communist domination; in Korea the resistance of Rhee's South to the communist North was uncertain, though the United Nations had a continuing obligation to sustain the position there; but there did not seem to be any immediate Russian threat to the Pacific. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office saw a distinct danger in South-east Asia. As measures developed for the security of Europe and the Middle East, it was felt that Russian pressure on the area would increase, although the threat, for some time, was unlikely to be military. The conditions in South-east Asia, however, were favourable for the spread of communism. If the impression prevailed in the area that the Western powers were unwilling and unable to resist Russian pressure, the psychological effect could be the weakening of local resistance. With that, the governments in the region could be undermined to the extent that eventually the whole of South-east Asia would fall to the communist advance, and come under Russian domination without any military effort on the part of Moscow. It was therefore necessary, simultaneously with the efforts to strengthen the defensive position of Europe

16 *FO 371*, 75961, F3519/1015/86, Memorandum by Blackham, Undated, received in registry March 9, 1949.

17. *Ibid.*, 75744, F3729/1015/109, Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners, Telegram Y No. 69 (Secret), March 2, 1949; F2180/39, Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners, Telegram Y No. 25, (Secret), Undated.

18. *Vide supra.*

Asia, offered a diagnosis at the end of March 1949 similar to the one that had emanated earlier in the month from the ambassadors in China. He insisted that South-east Asia should be regarded as a whole: the communists saw the region that way and planned their campaign on a theatre-wide basis. Frustration in the West had probably forced the planners of international communist strategy to give more attention to the East. MacDonald saw the area in terms of what later became known as the domino theory: unless the West's counteraction were firm it would quickly lose important areas like Burma and Indonesia; and that could be a prelude to the loss of a large part of the rest of South-east Asia, and hence the power of the Western democracies to avoid defeat in a war against the communists would be 'gravely imperilled'. Taking the analogy of Western Europe, MacDonald suggested an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. Though differing from the arrangements in Europe the scheme should offer the Asian governments and peoples economic, political, and if necessary, military aid to resist communism. The governments involved in the region could devise it with the help of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. American assistance was crucial: without it no adequate economic or military plan would be possible. Indeed American reluctance to participate could mean that, in the very near future, such a scheme would not be realistic. MacDonald therefore suggested a preliminary conference of Commonwealth countries interested in the region.[12]

In Washington, George F. Kennan, the director of the Policy Planning Staff, noted similarities between a paper drawn up by his department at the end of March and the ideas offered by the ambassadors in China.[13] The paper advocated that the United States should adopt 'multilateral collaboration', primarily with certain Commonwealth countries and the Philippines, and approach South-east Asia as a whole. That region, however, was to be seen as an integral part of the great crescent formed by the Indian peninsula, Australia and Japan. The objective was to contain and reduce Russian influence in the area. Any urging of an area organisation was to be avoided at the outset. Instead the initial effort should be directed towards 'collaboration on joint or parallel action and then, only as a pragmatic and desirable basis for more intimate association appears, should we encourage the area to move step by step toward formal organisation'.[14]

The Policy Planning Staff paper was, however, only projected policy. It formed the basis of a report finally issued as National Security Council Paper 48/1 of December 23, 1949.[15] Indeed, as R. C. Blackham of the Foreign Office observed, the United States would be unlikely to support any proposal which offered effective Anglo-American military assistance to the French in

12. *FO 371*, 76033, F4545/1073/61G, MacDonald to Bevin, No. 16 (Top Secret), March 23, 1949 received March 28, 1949.

13. *FRUS*, 1949(7), p. 1123

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 1128-33, Policy Planning Staff Files Lot 64D563, 'United States Policy toward Southeast Asia', PPS 51 (Secret), March 29, 1949.

15. *Ibid*, pp 128-29

Indochina. Such a scheme could only be put to the Americans in the context of a general attempt to combat communist penetration in South-east Asia, and there was no sign that the United States was prepared to do anything about that.[16]

The Foreign Office assessment

The Foreign Office became increasingly aware of the need to secure an American commitment to South-east Asia.[17] During his visit to Washington in April 1949, to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, hoped to discuss the matter with Acheson. Dening accordingly prepared a brief. A year previously Dening had sounded the Americans about the possibility of secret talks on the Far East. Washington had indicated that it could not treat the other members of the Commonwealth in the same way as it did Britain and Canada. That also made any talks on the Far East impossible. But the Foreign Office was concerned about 'disquieting' indications: not only was the United States without a clear policy for the Far East and South-east Asia, but also the Americans were inclined to decrease rather than to extend their commitments in the area. Earlier British attempts to alert the United States to the dangers inherent in the situation[18] had only resulted in desultory interchanges. The least Britain hoped for was that in the event of the Asiatic countries showing a disposition to form a united front against Russian expansion, the United States would offer material help.

The Foreign Office saw the primary Russian threat being against Europe, and then the Middle East. In the Far East, China would fall to communist domination; in Korea the resistance of Rhee's South to the communist North was uncertain, though the United Nations had a continuing obligation to sustain the position there; but there did not seem to be any immediate Russian threat to the Pacific. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office saw a distinct danger in South-east Asia. As measures developed for the security of Europe and the Middle East, it was felt that Russian pressure on the area would increase, although the threat, for some time, was unlikely to be military. The conditions in South-east Asia, however, were favourable for the spread of communism. If the impression prevailed in the area that the Western powers were unwilling and unable to resist Russian pressure, the psychological effect could be the weakening of local resistance. With that, the governments in the region could be undermined to the extent that eventually the whole of South-east Asia would fall to the communist advance, and come under Russian domination without any military effort on the part of Moscow. It was therefore necessary, simultaneously with the efforts to strengthen the defensive position of Europe

16. *FO 371*, 75961, F3519/1015/86, Memorandum by Blackham, Undated, received in registry March 9, 1949.

17 *Ibid.*, 75744, F3729/1015/109, Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners, Telegram Y No. 69 (Secret), March 2, 1949; F2180/39, Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners, Telegram Y No. 25, (Secret), Undated.

18 *Vide supra*

and the Middle East, to stiffen the South-east Asian territories' 'will to resist'. This need not involve vast resources: in the initial stages the question would be one of 'political and economic effort rather than of large scale outright aid'. A purely Western approach was unlikely to succeed—the Asian governments needed to build up the resistance themselves and to assume the principal burden. Provided this was done the Western powers, including the United States, could contribute through technical assistance and advice, capital goods, and the small scale provision of armaments. Before there could be a common front against Russian expansion there were major difficulties to be overcome in the area: there was the friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the North West Frontier Province; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; the conflict between the Burmese government and the Karens; the uneasy political situation in Siam; the conflict with the Vietminh in Indochina; the communist attacks in Malaya; and the situation in Indonesia. A realisation of the significance of the communist menace could, however, encourage the settlement of local disputes. Britain had a special relationship with the area through its Commonwealth connections, the treaty with Burma, close links with Siam, contacts with the French and Dutch, and the British presence in Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong. The post-1945 surge of nationalism, however, meant that these Asiatic countries were suspicious of anything savouring of imperialism, or of either dictation or domination by the West. Furthermore, the states of South-east Asia were not likely to be attracted by the possibility that a closer relationship with the West would involve them in hostilities with Russia on a European issue. The territories of South-east Asia would only unite in a common front against Russia if they saw it as being in their own interests. Indeed self-interest should provide the inspiration for the unity necessary to resist Russian pressure. This could create a pan-Asiatic union hostile to the West. But so long as the countries of South-east Asia realised that co-operation with the West was on a basis of equality and self-interest that danger should not arise. Although it was essential that the sovereign states of South-east Asia took the initiative themselves, Britain and the United States could hope to prompt it. Provided that a common front could be built up from Afghanistan to Indochina, it should be possible to contain the Russian advance southwards, to rehabilitate and stabilise the area, and to preserve Western communications across the middle of the world. A stable South-east Asia could also possibly influence the situation in China, and make it possible to redress the position there. Although the strategic necessities of Europe and the Middle East should still have priority, the requirements of South-east Asia were of vital importance.[19]

The British Chiefs of Staff, when consulted about the situation, advised that the spread of communism into southern China would mean unrest, and

19. *FO 371*, 76023, F4486/1023/61G, Dening to Sir Cecil Syers (Commonwealth Relations Office), March 18, 1949; Dening to J. J. Paskin (Colonial Office), March 18, 1949; Draft Brief on South East Asia and the Far East (Top Secret), Undated.

consequently an increased security commitment throughout South-east Asia. If the Russians established bases in southern China, the threat to South-east Asia and to British sea communications could become serious. And if communism spread successfully into the Indian subcontinent the whole position in South-east Asia would become untenable. Until all the countries interested had agreed on a policy for the area, the only effective military co-operation was likely to be the exchange of intelligence and police information on communist activities.[20]

The Foreign Office brief was left with Acheson.[21] The Americans were told, however, that this represented only the personal views of Bevin and had not been discussed by the Cabinet. The issue would involve Britain in talks not only with the United States but also with the Commonwealth.[22] On April 2, Bevin expounded to the Secretary of State his concept of world geographical-political factors and how South-east Asia fitted into this. Bevin envisaged a Western Europe that would develop a multilateral system. In the Middle East there were 100,000,000 Moslems, potentially one of the biggest forces in the world, and Britain was the 'best window' towards this area. Rather than forming joint military pacts in this area, Bevin thought that Britain and the United States should adopt 'a common line' for the development of the great potential resources, particularly oil, needed for their defence. The Foreign Secretary then developed his Moslem theme for South-east Asia: there 60 per cent of the population were Moslems. Russia had an obvious opening. Britain could exercise influence through Pakistan, but hoped for American help. He wanted a conference arrangement set up for South-east Asia in which Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand could co-operate for economic and political purposes, as distinct from a military pact or understanding. Britain intended to stand in Hong Kong and, if necessary, make it a 'Berlin of the East'.

But despite Bevin's exhortations the American participants ignored his suggestions about South-east Asia.[23] Indeed what little official American policy there was for the area was outlined in a reply to the earlier British memorandum on the Far East. At the end of April Mr Hibbert of the Foreign Office observed that this contributed little to the thinking about South-east Asia, 'but the fact that its contribution is so little has an important significance'. If the United States chose to stand back from the attempt to create a cordon against communism in South-east Asia, it would be difficult for other nations to press forward.[24] As Graves observed, it would be a difficult

20 *Ibid* 75743, F3507/1015/10G, Scarlett to Sir Oliver Franks (Washington) for attention of Bevin (Secret), March 23, 1949

21 *Ibid*. 76023, F5743/1023/61G, Graves to Dening, G47/37/49 (Top Secret), April 16, 1949; *FRUS*, 1949(7), pp 1135–7, 890.00/4-2249, Bevin to Acheson (Top Secret), April 2, 1949.

22. *FO 371*, 76023, F4486/1023/61G, Dening to Graves (Top Secret), March 25, 1949.

23. *FRUS*, 1949(7), pp. 1138–41, 890 00/4-449, Memorandum by Beam (Top Secret), April 4, 1949.

24. *FO 371*, 75747, F4595/1015/10, Franks to Bevin, No. 224, March 22, 1949, received March 26, 1949; Minutes by Hibbert, April 27, 1949; Lloyd, April 28, 1949; Scott, April 29. 1949; Scarlett, April 30, 1949

task to bring in the Americans: 'they have burnt their fingers so badly in China that they are at present in a very cautious mood'.[25]

For Britain, however, the threat of communist encroachment into South-east Asia seemed so real that it was prepared to modify the nature of the Commonwealth in the hope that India would remain within that body.[26] With the rapid advance of the communists in China, the British Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Far East suggested the urgent need for diplomatic, economic and military action 'to form a containing ring against further Communist penetration', including India, Burma, Siam, Indochina and the Dutch East Indies.[27] On May 24 the Commissioner General for South-east Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, and Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, met Foreign and Colonial Office officials to discuss the issue. Dening explained that India was the key to regional co-operation in South-east Asia. MacDonald, however, directed his comments to the communist menace represented by China and enunciated a 'domino theory'. He urged the formulation of an overall policy that could be discussed with the United States, the Commonwealth, and later with the foreign countries in South-east Asia. But Dening warned that the Americans were 'holding aloof' from the problems of South-east Asia. Britain would have to take the lead discreetly. Nye foresaw difficulties: the Indian leaders thought that the Chinese communists would be Chinese first and communists second. India might only agree to some economic scheme.[28] For Britain the first test was Hong Kong. Attlee told the Cabinet on May 26 that the whole common front against communism would crumble in the Far East and South-east Asia unless those peoples were convinced of the British determination and ability to resist the threat to Hong Kong.[29]

The Far Eastern committee advised that positive steps should be taken to counter communism in the Far East and South-east Asia.[30] In June, a preliminary report by the working party on economic and social development in the area outlined the objectives of any British assistance as being the establishment of healthy economic and social conditions enabling South-east Asia to resist the spread of communism.[31]

But, as MacDonald warned from Singapore early in September, the time factor pressed with increasing urgency. The Commissioner General advised that unless Britain and the United States showed a constructive interest in South-east Asia, Indochina and Siam would fall to the communists. Britain was

25. *Ibid.*, 76023, F5743/1023/61G, Graves to Dening, G47/37/49 (Top Secret), April 16, 1949

26 *Cab 128*, 15, ff 61-62, Cab 17(49)2 (Secret), March 3, 1949

27 *Ibid*, ff. 127-28, Cab 33(49)2 (Secret), May 9, 1949; *FO 371*, 76034, F6670/1075/61G, British Defence Coordination Committee to Chiefs of Staff, Telegram No. SEACOS 900 (Top Secret), May 5, 1949

28 *FO 371*, 76034, F8338/1075/61G, Record of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office on May 24, 1949

29 *Cab 128*, 15, f. 248, Cab 38(49)3 (Secret), May 26, 1949.

30 *FO 371*, 76041, F7438/1103/61, Memorandum of the First Meeting of the Far Eastern (Official) Committee Working Party (Secret), May 19, 1949

31 *FO 371*, 76041, F8883/1103/61, Memorandum by Lloyd of the Preliminary Report by Working Party on Economic and Social Development in the Far East and South East Asia, received in registry June 20, 1949.

not amiss; rather the problem was to persuade the Americans. If this were not done reasonably soon the communists would take over in Burma and the front line would then be the borders of Malaya. Lloyd, however, minuted that MacDonald's desires for the United States were unlikely to be realised: conditions for private investment by American capital in South-east Asia were unsound, and American government loans would be opposed in Congress.[32]

Lloyd's fears were confirmed with the Anglo-American conversations in Washington in September. On the question of South-east Asia the State Department warned that Congress was unlikely to vote fresh funds for aid anywhere. The Americans thought that the Asians should get together on their own initiative.[33] In any case the Americans believed that Britain was reluctant to 'have a rival to the Empire' in that part of the world, and considered 'the Empire' the 'proper instrument of pressure'.[34]

The long-term policy of the Permanent Under Secretary's Committee

Britain certainly did see for itself a special role in South-east Asia. This was evident in the papers drawn up on long-term policy by the Permanent Under Secretary's Committee, to serve as general guidance on the policy to be adopted. Bevin approved the general approach before leaving for the September talks in Washington.[35] Attlee commented that the difficulties presented by South Africa's attitude to non-European races should be stressed: South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth tended to involve Britain in accusations of colonialism.[36] The Cabinet endorsed the policy in November.[37]

Strang's committee argued that there was a real danger that the whole of Asia would become the servant of the Kremlin unless Britain exploited its special position in Asia to bring about a close collaboration between East and West. Britain was dependent on the area for rubber, tea and jute. Earnings from Malaya helped the sterling area's dollar pool. A combination of Western technology and Eastern manpower could be welded into a formidable partnership—but Asian nationalism was sensitive to anything which savoured of domination by the West. Dictation by Russia, however, had little meaning or reality to Asians, and this was to Moscow's advantage. Political immaturity and economic distress made their countries particularly susceptible to communist tactics. Although communist China was unlikely to extend control over the area, the existence of large Chinese communities within the countries

32 *Ibid.*, 76023, F13136/1024/61, MacDonald to Dening, Telegram No. 665 (Particular Secrecy), Sept. 2, 1949; Minute by Lloyd, Sept 10, 1949.

33. *Ibid.*, F14149/1024/61, Dening to Strang, G33/3/49 (Secret), Sept. 15, 1949; F15735/1024/61, Dening to Bevin, Sept. 12, 1949; F15775/1024/61, Dening to Bevin, Sept 12, 1949

34. *FRUS*, 1949(7), pp. 1204-8, 890.00/9-1349, Report by Yost of Discussions of Far Eastern Affairs in Preparation for Conversations with Bevin on Sept. 13, 1949 (Top Secret), Sept. 16, 1949.

35. *FO 371* 76385, W4639/3/500G, Strang to Bevin, Aug. 10, 1949; Minute by Bevin, Undated.

36. *FO 371*, 76385, W5016/3/500G, Attlee to Strang (Top Secret), Undated.

37 *Ibid*, 76030, F17397/1055/61G, Minute by W. G. Hayter, Nov. 3, 1949. Circulated to Cabinet as CP(49)207. All reference to this document has been deleted from the Cabinet papers. It is evident, however, from cross referencing that the Cabinet endorsed the document.

of South-east Asia heightened the possibility of internal disruption. It was possible, however, that the unpopularity of the Chinese settlers with the local inhabitants could encourage resistance to the spread of communist doctrines propagated from China. Alternatively, India could try to dominate the area, but India was unpopular and its expansionist aims were feared, so the countries of South-east Asia were unlikely to accept its lead. From the Persian Gulf to the China Sea no single power could dominate the region. Nor could any combination of powers resist Russian expansion. And no Asian power could bring about unity and co-operation. As Britain had come to terms with the new nationalist spirit in Asia it could use its political and economic influence to weld the area into some degree of regional co-operation. Most of Britain's former territories in the area were friendly independent members of the Commonwealth, and had been built upon a British foundation. Britain also had a peculiarly close relationship with those countries in South-east Asia within the sterling area. The United States did not enjoy the same degree of prestige as did Britain, partly because it lacked the historical connections, partly because of the failure of its policy in China, and partly because of its reluctance to play a leading part in South-east Asia. Laissez faire American economic philosophy had little appeal in Asia where practically all progressive thought was socialist. Asian nationalists tended to see the choice between democratic socialism and communism, in effect between the British and Russian ways of life. Full development of the area, however, was only possible through American assistance, and the United States was reluctant to risk further losses after its experience in China.

Britain's commitments and interests in Asia were possibly in excess of its postwar strength, but the economic ties could not be severed without serious consequences. Britain, however, could not make any military commitment which would offer resistance against a full scale attack in war. The most it could do in peace was to maintain internal security within its own territories, encourage 'confidence in the adolescent nations of the region, and local efforts to form sound defence establishments'. With proper guidance the Asian nations could resist Russian aggression, particularly as Moscow's major commitments would probably be in the West and Middle East. Britain still had to cope with Asian suspicions that it was trying to re-establish its domination, and the memory of Britain's ignominious defeat by the Japanese lingered. The original draft of the paper drawn up by Strang's committee suggested that the absence of hostility towards Britain was partly because Britain was 'no longer regarded as a force to be reckoned with'.

The Permanent Under Secretary's Committee thought that Britain was in the best position to build up a regional association in South-east Asia in partnership with the West. Not only could Britain interest the United States, but it had the means of influencing and co-ordinating the policies of the Asian dominions, and Australia and New Zealand. The immediate intention was to prevent the spread of communism and to resist Russian expansion. The long-

term objective was to create a friendly system of partnership between East and West, and to improve economic and social conditions in South-east Asia and the Far East.[38] Working on the premise that the Far East comprised principally Japan, Korea and China—the first two being primarily an American commitment and the third a potentially hostile power—it was in South-east Asia that Britain had to start promoting greater regional collaboration. Only later could the Far East be attached to any system that might emerge. Strang's committee argued that there were advantages in using a Commonwealth rather than just a British approach to achieve these aims, though the racial policies followed by South Africa, and the resentment Asian countries felt over the 'White Australia' policy might endanger this. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to expect democracy to develop on the British pattern in the area: corruption and inefficiency would not vanish overnight. The masses of the peoples of Asia for many years would have little voice in government; universal suffrage was only likely to be exploited by the governing classes. The paper suggested that Britain should attempt to establish the nucleus of strategic co-operation between itself, Australia, New Zealand, and the Commonwealth countries of Asia. This was essential before any wider regional defence system could be contemplated. And then the co-operation could only be in the field of planning and exchange of views. Britain would have to supply the arms, and other commitments made any increase impossible. As so little could be done in the military field the most profitable line seemed to be the economic one. A draft of the paper, amended at the request of the Colonial Office, referred to the problem of how to 'reconcile the insatiable appetite of India and the Colonial Empire' for economic assistance with Britain's slender resources and the need to develop South East Asia as a whole. Indeed, economic collaboration seemed to be 'the only form of greater unity' the countries of the area were likely to accept. It was hoped that this could lead to greater political and military cohesion. American participation was, however, essential and Britain's main objective should be to secure this.[39]

The Russians presumably received a copy of these documents. It was decided to send them as a Foreign Office despatch to Nanking. That was passed to Guy Burgess of the Far Eastern Department. The despatch went missing. G. A. Carey Foster of the Security Department noted that several top secret papers had gone astray. Burgess, after trying a suggestion that the paper might have become attached to another document, insisted that he had returned it to the South-east Asia department. There Blackham, on an impending transfer to La Paz, thought that it might have been consigned to confidential waste, though Lloyd could not remember the act of tearing up. Security accepted that

38. *FO 371*, 76386, W5572/3/500G, PUSC(32) Final, 'The United Kingdom in South East Asia and the Far East' (Top Secret).

39. *Ibid.*, W5572/3/500G, PUSC(53) Final, 'Regional Cooperation in South East Asia and the Far East' (Top Secret); Strang to Bevin (Top Secret), Oct. 16, 1949; Minute by Bevin, Undated; PUSC(72), Amendments to Committee Papers on South East Asia and the Far East in the Light of Comments Received (Top Secret), Oct 11, 1949.

explanation. It is probable that Burgess passed on the information, if not the documents, to his Russian masters.[40]

The policy outlined by Strang's committee was endorsed by the Cabinet on October 27. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps, was hesitant about Britain continuing its existing level of aid to South-east Asia, and his colleagues hoped for American participation on the basis of Britain providing the experience and the United States the finance.[41] These reservations were passed on to the conference of His Majesty's Representatives in the Far East and South-east Asia which met at Bukit Serene, Johere Bahru, between November 2 and 4 in preparation for the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference at Colombo.[42] At Bukit Serene the representatives warned that the danger from communism in South-east Asia was so great that energetic short-term action was required irrespective of any steps to secure the long-term objective. Although the Chinese communists were unlikely to fight beyond their frontiers, they would stimulate conspiracy and subversion through the strong communist elements among the Chinese and other populations in Indochina, Siam and Buma. Domination of these great rice growing countries could give the communists a stranglehold on the whole of Asia. South-east Asia should be regarded as an area where an emergency existed. The conference endorsed the long-term aim of a regional pact including the North Atlantic Treaty countries, Australia and New Zealand, but as this was unlikely in the near future an initial approach should be made to stimulate economic co-operation in the region.[43]

Following the conference at Bukit Serene, Dening sounded Australian and New Zealand opinion. On November 11, at a meeting in Canberra, Dr Burton of Australia pointed to his country's dilemma: on the one hand there was the view that Australia had a vital interest in what happened in Asia and should play an increasingly active role there; on the other hand there was the feeling, stimulated by the recent awareness of the internal menace of communism, that Australia should recede from Asian affairs and attend to its own security. Mr McIntosh of New Zealand pointed out that his country was leaning more and more towards a policy of complete isolationism from the area: New Zealanders regarded themselves as belonging to Western Europe. Dening suggested that perhaps, in an increasingly smaller world, the Pacific dominions would not have a choice, and would find themselves involved in Asia whether they liked

40 *Ibid.*, 76030, F17397/1055/61G, Green Division to Tucker, Jan 27, 1950, Minutes by W. C Tucker, Jan. 27, 1950; R Molland, Jan 30, 1950; G A. Carey Foster, Jan. 31, 1950; J. E Puleston, Feb 1, 1950; G. Burgess, Feb. 1, 1950; J O. Lloyd, Feb 4, 1950; G A Carey Foster, Feb. 8 and 10, 1950; W. C Tucker, Feb 8, 1950.

41 *Cab 128*, 16, f. 85, Cab 62(49)8 (Secret), Oct. 27, 1949

42. *FO 371*, 76022, F6056/1022/61G, Scrivener to Dening, March 3, 1949; Strang to MacDonald, Telegram No. 429 (Particular Secrecy), March 26, 1949; 76010, F16233/10110/61, Bevin to Rees Williams and Dening, Telegram No. 1431 (Particular Secrecy), Oct. 31, 1949

43. *Cab 129*, 37 Pt 3, ff. 381-4, Memorandum by Bevin on Conference at Bukit Serene (Secret), Circulated Dec. 1, 1949; *FO 371*, 76010, F16631/10110/61, MacDonald to Bevin, Telegram No. 928 (Particular Secrecy), Nov 6, 1949

it or not.[44] It was thought that New Zealand hoped that Australia and the United States would assume sufficient defence responsibilities in the Pacific to enable New Zealand, in the event of another war, to send troops further afield where they would be of maximum assistance to Britain. New Zealand remained the 'Peter Pan' dominion: it did not want to grow up; it did not want to be strengthened by large scale immigration. New Zealand wanted Britain to be as strong as possible, and enjoyed its sense of dependence on Britain. It hated to think of Britain being dependent on the United States and concealed its own dependence on the United States. New Zealand was irritated when other members of the Commonwealth took steps which it regarded as weakening the bonds of the empire. The British High Commissioner in Wellington warned: 'closer alliance with Western Europe will bring us some undoubted gains, but if it leaves New Zealand with a belief that we have forsaken her it will also bring undoubted and by no means insignificant losses'.[45]

The American commitment

Although the attitude of the Pacific dominions appeared rather negative, by December 1949 that of the United States was moving closer to Britain.[46] In November the Foreign Office and the American Policy Planning Staff exchanged information on South-east Asia. J. O. Lloyd found Kennan's paper of March, endorsed by Truman, 'very stimulating'. Kennan and his staff were allowed to read an edited version of the British papers drawn up by Strang's committee—the editing removing unfavourable references to the United States—and they commented that there was ' a remarkable similarity of view' in the British and American studies. The Americans felt that there was no reason why the envisaged multilateral collaboration, preceded by joint Anglo-American action, should not be successful. R. H. Scott of the Foreign Office minuted that the British and American papers were complementary rather than conflicting; though reached by different routes the conclusions were much the same. The American approach, however, was ideological whereas the British one was 'severely practical'. He was worried that the Americans glossed over 'the fissiparous trends' in South-east Asia.[47] In the middle of December Acheson dined with the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, and explained that the world across the Pacific would be the principal preoccupation of the State Department in 1950. The Secretary of State and his advisers had changed their minds: the communists in China were

44. *FO 371*, 76010, F17568/10110/61, Minutes by Dening of Meeting in Canberra on Nov. 11, 1949, Nov. 12, 1949.

45. *Ibid.*, 76386, W5772/3/5008, A. W Snelling to Sir Percival Liesching, Oct. 12, 1949.

46. *Ibid.*, 76983, F19106/1055/86, MacDonald to Bevin, Telegram No. 1098 (Particular Secrecy), Dec. 19, 1949 received Dec. 20, 1949

47. *Ibid.*, 76025, F17668/10345/61G, Hoyer-Millar to Sir Roger Makins (Top Secret and Personal), Nov. 16, 1949; Minutes by Lloyd, Nov 24, 1949; Scott, Nov. 24, 1949; 76386, W5665/3/500G, Minute by R. M Hadow (Top Secret), Oct. 18, 1949; Makins to Hoyer-Millar (Top Secret and Personal), Oct 19, 1949

likely to expand beyond their borders, 'early', to the south and east. This would be especially dangerous in the areas with considerable Chinese settlements. With this in mind Acheson had 'scratched together about 75 million dollars to use in Indonesia, Indochina, and possibly Siam to help bolster the regimes in those countries. He interpolated a 'paeon of praise' about French achievements in Indochina: the American view had changed, and he was anxious to recognise and help Indochina. The Colombo conference now appeared as a 'most important event'. Acheson was thinking in terms of 'some rough geographical division of responsibilities': the United States would look after Indonesia, the Philippines, Indochina and spare a little for Siam; the Commonwealth could help the countries in the Indian Ocean and particularly Burma. Franks, to the subsequent relief of the Foreign Office, hastily discouraged thoughts about any sharp divisions or functions.[48] As H. B. C. Keeble minuted, the Americans seemed prepared to 'take a fairly helpful line' in South-east Asia.[49]

Indeed, the final Policy Planning Staff paper, NSC 48/2, endorsed by Truman on December 30, 1949, reflected many of the ideas of the papers drawn up by Strang's committee. The basic security objective was the gradual reduction and the eventual elimination of the preponderant power and influence of Russia in Asia. Non-communist regional associations were to be encouraged, but the United States was not to take an obvious lead. The United States was, however, on its own initiative to

> scrutinize closely the development of threats from Communist aggression, direct or indirect, and be prepared to help within our means to meet such threats by providing political, economic, and military assistance and advice where clearly needed to supplement the resistance of the other governments in and out of the area which are more directly concerned.

The Commonwealth was to be induced, in collaboration with the United States, to play a more active role in Asia. As a matter of urgency 75 million dollars was to be 'programmed' for the area.[50]

Bevin explained British policy to the Commonwealth ministers in Colombo in January 1950. Thwarted in the West, Russia was turning east where special circumstances made the equivalent of an Atlantic pact inappropriate. Like minded countries with interests in the east should be ready to help one another resist any attempt to hinder peaceful development on democratic lines. There could be financial help without domination. With remarkable unanimity the representatives viewed communism as a menace, and agreed on the need to

48. *Ibid*, F18982/10345/61, Franks to Bevin, Telegram No 5855 (Particular Secrecy), Dec. 17, 1949 received Dec 18, 1949. Minute by R H. Scott, Dec 22, 1949.

49 *Ibid.*, 75983, F19106/1055/86, MacDonald to Bevin, Telegram No 1098 (Particular Secrecy), Dec 19, 1949 received Dec. 20, 1949; Minute by H. B C. Keeble, Undated

50 *FRUS*, 1949(7), pp. 1215-20, Executive Secretariat Files, Souers to National Security Council (Top Secret), Dec 30, 1949; NSC 48/2, 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia' (Top Secret), Dec 30, 1949; *United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 8, pp 225-64, NSC 48/1, 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia' (Top Secret), Dec. 23, 1949

improve the standard of life and the social welfare of the peoples of South and South-east Asia to combat this. The conference examined the practical economic steps that could be taken to help the threatened areas of Asia resist communist encroachments.[51]

Foreign Office officials, however, remained aware of the need to secure American encouragement and support for this. They were warned by Franks that although there was a genuine acceptance by the American people of the position of the United States as a world power and a willingness to shoulder the responsibility that accompanied that position, there was a budget deficit of five billion dollars and the American people associated that with the money spent by their government.[52]

At the end of January 1950 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that if the communist penetration of South-east Asia continued allied military requirements would increase, and these would have to be underwritten, if not directly furnished, by the United States.[53] Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup, after a fact finding tour of fourteen nations in Asia, including a talk with MacDonald at Bukit Serene, advised that South-east Asia was vitally important to the United States. Jessup agreed with the British representatives he had consulted that all measures should be taken to prevent communist expansion there. Indochina was the key to the situation and the fate of South-east Asia was in the balance.[54]

When British, American and French officials met for talks on the area in May, the Foreign Office observed that there was 'a close identity of outlook' between the British and American administrations.[55] The American delegate explained that although Britain and France had a primary responsibility in the area, the United States wanted to continue its practice of assistance in stemming further communist advances.[56] The United States felt that a regional pact in the Pacific would only succeed if it arose spontaneously and was not forced on Asia by the West. The emphasis should be on cultural and economic matters. This coincided with the British view: it was hoped that fuller economic co-operation would arise out of the Sydney conference following up the suggestions made at Colombo.[57] The Commonwealth economic

51. *Cab 129*, 38, ff 66–70, CP(50)18, Memorandum by Bevin on the Colombo Conference (Secret), Feb. 22, 1950

52 *FO 371*, 84528, FZ10345/3, Note of a Discussion with Sir O. Franks held in Strang's room on Feb. 8, 1950.

53. *FRUS* 1950(6), pp 5–8, 793.56/2-150, Johnson to Acheson (Top Secret), Feb. 1, 1950; Memorandum by Joint Chiefs of Staff to Johnson (Top Secret), Jan. 20, 1950.

54 *Ibid*, pp. 11–18, 611 97/2-450, Memorandum by Jessup of Conversation with MacDonald (Secret), Feb. 6, 1950; pp 29-30, 700.001/2-2750: Telegram, Stanton to Acheson (Top Secret), Feb. 27, 1950; pp 68–76, 611-90/4-350, Memorandum by Ogburn of Oral Report by Jessup upon his return from the East (Top Secret), April 3, 1950.

55. *FO 371*, 84517, FZ1025/1, British Brief for London Conference in May 1950, South East Asia General (Secret), April 29, 1950

56. *Ibid.*, FZ1025/3G, British Record of a Meeting of a Tripartite Official Subcommittee held in the Foreign Office on May 1, 1950 (Top Secret).

57. *Ibid.*, FZ1025/6G, British Record of a Meeting of a Tripartite Subcommittee in the Foreign Office on May 2, 1950 (Top Secret); *FRUS*, 1950(3), pp. 935–48; pp. 1082–85, Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 20, Agreed Tripartite Minutes on South East Asia (Top Secret), May 22, 1950.

programme was orchestrated by the new Australian Prime Minister, Percy C. Spender: Bevin had arranged this as he thought it best that the proposal came from a country other than Britain.[58] The United States sent a mission under Robert Allen Griffin to develop a programme of economic assistance on an emergency basis to remove impediments to economic development in South-east Asia. Its recommendations were accepted and implemented.[59] As John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, observed: 'what is going on in Asia is little more than a recrudescence in a new guise of the aggressive ambitions of the Czars'.[60]

For Britain, United States participation remained essential. As Bevin told the Cabinet on May 8, 1950, Western Europe, even with the support of the Commonwealth, was not strong enough to contend with the military dangers confronting it from the east:

> To withstand the great concentration of power now stretching from China to the Oder, the UK and Western Europe must be able to rely on the full support of the English speaking democracies of the Western Hemisphere; and for the original conception of Western Union we must now begin to substitute the wider conception of the Atlantic Community.[61]

With this in mind the British government became alarmed by the effects of American policy on Asian opinion during the early stages of the Korean war. Bevin acknowledged that from 1945 the United States had regarded South and South-east Asia as primarily a British interest. It was only with the communist threat late in 1949 that the United States took a closer interest in the developments of South-east Asia to the extent of giving military and economic aid to certain countries. But the United States still expected Britain to take the lead, and showed a 'welcome disposition' to consult before taking any action; this was 'satisfactory and should be encouraged'. The American declaration neutralising the straits of Formosa, however, had alarmed Asian countries, and aroused suspicions, particularly in India, of American imperialism. It was feared that unless American policy towards China, Japan and Korea took more account of Asian opinion and Asian susceptibilities, Asia would be alienated from the West to the benefit of Russia.[62] But the American administration was also conscious that much of Asia was unconvinced of its devotion to peace, its lack of imperialist ambition, and its interest in Asian freedom and progress.[63]

58 *FRUS* 1950(6), p 146, 880 00/9-2650, Memorandum by Battle of Conversation between Bevin and Acheson (Secret), Sept. 26, 1950.

59 *Ibid*, pp 87-92, 890.00/5-1150, Record of Interdepartmental Meeting on Far East on May 11, 1950 (Confidential); pp 93-94, 851G.00TA/5-1550. Telegram, Acting Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon (Secret), May 15, 1950

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29, 790.00/8-750, Dulles to Acheson (Confidential), Aug. 7, 1950; Memorandum by Dulles (Confidential), Aug. 4, 1950.

61. *Cab 128*, 17, ff. 94-96, Cab 29(50)3 (Secret), May 8, 1950.

62. *Cab 129*, 39, ff. 242-3, Memorandum by Bevin of a Review of the International Situation in Asia in the Light of the Korean Conflict (Secret), Aug. 30, 1950.

63. *FRUS*, 1950(6), pp. 136-39, 611 90/8-3050, McGhee to Matthews (Top Secret), Aug 30, 1950, Policy Paper 'A New Approach in Asia' by McGhee (Top Secret), Aug. 30, 1950

The Foreign Office brief for the ministerial talks between France, Britain and the United States, held in New York between September 12 and 14, pointed out that although communist aggression in Korea had produced a certain hardening of opinion against communism amongst the free Asian peoples, it was essential for the Western powers to show that they were strong enough to contain China and its communist proteges in Indochina and Malaya, and that the free countries of Asia would receive help from the West in making themselves strong and independent. Indochina was singled out as the principal problem. There an American military mission was already arranging the urgent delivery of considerable supplies to the forces of France and the Associated States. The British Chiefs of Staff warned that if the French, even with American aid, could not contain the Vietminh, there would be the gravest repercussions on the British position in South-east Asia.[64] The preliminary talks between the three countries' representatives on September 1 pointed to Indochina as the principal problem. On September 15 Acheson told his British and French colleagues that the United States government attached the greatest importance to the development of military power in Indochina: military aid to Indochina had been given the highest priority and the amount of American help would be increased. He hoped for talks in the Far East on a high military level.[65] On October 9 Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, suggested that the United States form a closer relationship with Australia and New Zealand of a military and political character. This was seen as implementing NSC 48/2.[66] It marked the beginning of the assumption by the United States of Britain's traditional role in the area.

For Britain the cold war became a reality in South-east Asia with the communist insurgency in Malaya in 1948. At the beginning of 1949 the United States appeared uninterested and was not prepared to accept any responsibility for halting the communist advance there. The United States regarded the area as being primarily a British interest. The American experience in China made the administration wary of considering even economic support for the region. But Britain realised that, even with Commonwealth assistance, it could do nothing to counter communist moves without American participation. In the same way as it had prepared Western Europe for the American commitment[67] the British government did its best to

64 *FO 371*, 84536, FZ1073/1/G, Foreign Office Memorandum for Tripartite Ministerial Talks in New York. Briefs on South East Asia and Indochina (Secret); 'Current Developments in Indochina' (Secret); Secretary of Chiefs of Staff Committee to J. D. Murray, Aug. 24, 1950; *FRUS*, 1950(3), pp. 1146–53, CFM Files: Lot M-88: Box 152: Pre Mins 1-5, United States Delegation Minutes, Preliminary Conversations on Communist Threat to South East Asia and Developments in Indochina (Top Secret), Aug. 30, 1950; pp. 1172-75, CFM Files: Lot M-88: Box 152: Documents 1-40, Paper prepared by Tripartite Drafting Group on South East Asia (Top Secret), Sept. 1, 1950.

65. *FO 371*, 84536, FZ1073/2/G, Document on South East Asia prepared in preliminary Tripartite Talks (Secret), submitted to Ministers Sept 1, 1950; British Delegation United Nations to Jebb, Telegram No. 1017 (Particular Secrecy), Sept 15, 1950.

66. *FRUS*, 1950(6), pp. 147-8, Rusk to Matthews (Top Secret), Oct. 9, 1950.

67 See Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the U.S.A. and the European Cold War, 1945-8', *History* (June 1982).

organise the countries of South-east Asia. At first the British task seemed almost impossible, but by the end of 1949 there was a considerable amount of congruence between the British plan drawn up by Strang's committee and that developed by Kennan's staff. Conversations, and the exchange of views between British and American officials, helped. In the end the key American document, NSC 48/2, reflected many of the ideas propounded by Strang's committee. It took less than a year to convince the Americans of the need to make a firm commitment to South-east Asia. That took the immediate form of military aid to the French in Indochina. With the outbreak of the Korean war, however, the American commitment evolved rapidly. With the moves towards the formation of a defence agreement with Australia and New Zealand the United States was increasingly assuming Britain's responsibilities and role in South-east Asia.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ARMED CONFLICT, 1946-64

*Sydney D. Bailey**

ALTHOUGH the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, wars do in fact occur; and when this happens, it is the responsibility of the Security Council, acting on behalf of all members of the United Nations, to endeavour to restore international peace and security. It is surprising that there is so little published material in any language on the variety of means available to the international community when it seeks to halt the fighting, especially when one considers the vast resources devoted to the deterrence or winning of war. In the course of my own research, I encountered only half a dozen publications on the subject in English, the one substantial work having been published more than sixty years ago and today only of historical interest. It is noteworthy that all of the six items were by authors whose countries were or had recently been at war when they wrote, and this fact no doubt coloured some of the writing.

Before reviewing this meagre literature, let me mention a book which is not strictly about war termination but which deals incidentally with intra-war deterrence. This is *Every War Must End*, by Fred Iklé, an American strategic analyst.[1] Iklé wrote during the Vietnam war but deliberately refrained from trying to be contemporary. He notes *en passant* that the subject of war termination has been neglected, and he calls for historical studies to fill out the abstract reasoning of strategic analysis. Iklé is especially concerned with the way in which decisions about the conduct of military operations may affect the process of war termination.

I should also mention the important studies of Lewis Coser on conflict in general. In 1961, he published a paper on the termination of conflict,[2] later included in his book *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*.[3] Coser was writing of conflict in general rather than international armed conflict, but he stresses that conflicts do not normally end with outright victory and defeat, but from the 'reciprocal activity' of the parties. Indeed, 'the final decision to end [a]

* Sydney D. Bailey's publications include *Prohibition and Restraints in War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1972); *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975); and *How Wars End*, 2 Vols, to be published by the Clarendon Press in July 1982. This article is based on a lecture sponsored by the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI).

1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
2. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1961), pp. 347-53.
3. New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 40-51.

war remains with the potential loser.' The wise leader does not chase 'the mirage of victory' but seeks for a negotiated compromise.

Review of the literature

Of the six studies which are specifically concerned with armed conflict and its termination, the first chronologically was *Termination of War and Treaties of Peace* by Coleman Phillipson, a British international lawyer, published during the First World War.[4] Phillipson examined a number of cases of war termination by surrender or conquest and then, at greater length, war termination by treaties of peace, based on twenty-six such documents: 'The reader is conducted from the field of battle, where the first pourparlers are exchanged . . . to the less sinister methods of negotiation and diplomacy'. This legal work from before the League of Nations and the United Nations has little relevance to the present era but is of historical interest.

The next book came from the United States during the Second World War: *What Makes a War End?* by Lt Cdr H. A. Callahan.[5] The title is in some ways misleading: although the author reviewed the ending of nine wars since 1781, his main focus was on the prevention of war in the future. This was to be achieved by keeping aggressive nations permanently disarmed and by striking at any nation which should threaten world peace 'early, hard, and without warning'. Callahan begged for courage 'to start small wars that we may prevent great ones'—which was perhaps more intelligible in pre-nuclear times than it would be today.

We next come to three articles by American scholars written during the Vietnam war. First to appear was an article by Berenice A. Carroll of the University of Illinois on 'How Wars End: an Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses'.[6] This was an interesting if speculative excursion into the ending of wars. Carroll even attempted an illustrative formula about war termination—though admitting that the collection of sufficient data to apply her formula to even one war would be 'a staggering task'.

Carroll also contributed an article to a special issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* the following year.[7] In it she referred in telling terms to the prevalence of the notion that 'once war breaks out, its end is inherent in its beginning—simply a mindless, inescapable playing out of forces set in motion at the outset'. She also noted that writing on war termination tends to reflect a disposition in favour of the *status quo*. Carroll regarded war termination as a product of 'many interacting factors', and called for more studies of the subject.

Professor William Fox, at that time director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, edited the special issue of the journal

4. London: Fisher Unwin, 1916.
5. New York: Vanguard, 1944.
6. *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), Vol. 6, No. 4 (1969)
7. Vol. 392, Nov. 1970, pp. 1-172 (special edn, William T. R. Fox).

which carried Carroll's second article, and he also contributed an article of his own, 'The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War'. Fox also pointed to the paucity of serious thinking about war termination, and was convinced that future work must be directed at understanding how previous wars have in fact ended.

The last item in this review of the literature is a monograph by Michael Handel, *War Termination—a Critical Survey.*[8] Handel's main contribution was to distinguish between three levels of analysis: the psychology of individual leaders, domestic political pressures, and inter-state politics. In his view the level of individual psychology had been unjustly neglected. He also stressed the role of non-rational factors.

The scholar or practitioner who reads these six items is likely to end up with little more than the hunch that here is an area about which little is known. Indeed, the only point on which all the authors agree is on the need for more studies about how particular wars have ended. It was because this field was so largely untilled that I undertook my own study.[9]

Selection of case studies

According to a consolidated list compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 1968-69, there were eighty-five conflicts in which armed force was used on a significant scale, during the period 1945-64.[10] Some of these conflicts were mainly or wholly internal—terrorist or criminal acts, riots, isolated and sporadic violence. To the man or woman in the street, these did not constitute wars or armed conflicts. Of the wars or armed conflicts *sensu stricto* during this period, most were outside Europe. The ones chosen for detailed study were those which initially came before the UN Security Council and regarding the termination of which a United Nations agency played a major role. There were seven such cases: the Dutch 'police action' in Indonesia in 1947, Kashmir, Palestine, the second Dutch 'police action' in Indonesia (1948-49), Korea, the attacks on Sinai and Suez in 1956, and the flare-up in Cyprus in 1964. In two cases, the question was transferred from the Security Council to the General Assembly: in the first by a decision of the Council to remove the item from the list of items of which it was seized, in the second by resorting to the Uniting for Peace procedure after Anglo-French vetoes. Throughout the period, the Security Council had eleven members, but after the time covered by my study the Council was enlarged to fifteen, and further enlargement is now advocated by some Third World countries.

It is doubtful whether there is such a thing as a typical war, but the seven cases chosen for study included examples of the main types of armed conflict of

8. Jerusalem. Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1978 (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No 24).

9. One other publication has recently appeared, *On the Ending of Wars*, edited by Stuart Albert and Edward C Luck (Port Washington, NY, London: Kennicat Press, 1980).

10. *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-69* (London: Duckworth, 1969), pp 366-71.

the period. The two Dutch 'police actions' in Indonesia were characteristic colonial or liberation wars. Kashmir, Palestine, and Cyprus were legacies of colonial rule and concerned the rights of minorities after the colonial power had left, in all three cases with external intervention. Sinai-Suez was an ordinary inter-state war, even though Britain and France at first purported to be intervening in order to separate the belligerents. How one describes the Korean war depends on the view one takes of the governmental authorities in Seoul and Pyongyang in 1950. If the primary emphasis is on the fact that Korea was one nation, then it could be described as a civil war: if, more plausibly, the stress is on the fact that separate governments had been constituted in Seoul and Pyongyang, then it was an inter-state war, with major external intervention by non-communist United Nations members in the South and by China in the North. It was in every way an exceptional case, beginning with the fact that the Security Council was able to take decisions in June and July 1950 only because of the Soviet boycott of United Nations proceedings as a protest against the Council's failure to expel Nationalist China earlier in the year.

Samuel Johnson told James Boswell that the greatest part of a writer's time is spent in reading: 'a man will turn over half a library to make one book'.[11] Certainly I had to read many hundreds of books and documents in the course of my own study, and I should here pay a warm tribute to the staff of the library at Chatham House and the UN Information Centre in London.

The published material in English is uneven in quantity and quality. Israelis have written copiously about the wars in which they have been involved, Americans similarly about Korea, whereas there is virtually nothing from the Arab side about the Middle East or from the Communists about Korea other than polemics. For some episodes in my first five cases, I have drawn heavily on such official documents as are published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*.

United Nations organs are not short of facts, but it is very difficult in the early stages of debate and diplomacy for third parties to be sure from material in the public domain exactly what the situation is. This is strikingly illustrated in the Kashmir case, which was originally presented to the United Nations as a dispute between India and Pakistan. As a result, the Security Council confirmed that a dispute existed,[12] and this meant that India and Pakistan were not able to vote on proposals for peaceful settlement in Kashmir during their two-year terms on the Security Council.[13] Nowadays it is unheard of for parties to a conflict to claim or admit that a dispute exists, and several convenient synonyms are available.

In the Kashmir case, Sheikh Abdullah was a member of the Indian delegation and was able to address the Security Council,[14] but the

11. April 6, 1775.
12 Resolution 47 (S/726), April 21, 1948.
13. In accordance with Article 27(3) of the Charter.
14. Security Council Official Records, 3rd year, 241 st mtg (Feb. 5, 1948), pp. 16–28.

representative of Azad (Free) Kashmir was unable to get a formal hearing because Azad Kashmir was not thought to be a party to the dispute.[15] Partly because a representative of Azad Kashmir was not heard by the Council, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan admitted that it had consistently underestimated the strength and popularity of the movement.[16]

Some general conclusions

It would, of course, have been nice if the analysis of my chosen case studies had led to one major and outstanding conclusion; simple to understand and easy to apply. Unfortunately, international politics are not like that. But if there is no single remedy, there are some general conclusions, of which four may be of interest. First, the United Nations is not very well equipped to deal with non-state actors. The Charter was drafted on the assumption that disputes arise between states: the only reference in the Charter to non-governmental agencies is in Article 71, which provides that non-governmental organisations may be granted consultative status with the Economic and Social Council: there is no provision in the Charter by which the Security Council or General Assembly may relate to non-state agencies, such as liberation movements, communal minorities, or political parties.

There were non-state actors in several of the cases studied: the Republicans and the Federalists in Indonesia, Azad Kashmir, the Jewish Agency for Palestine before the state of Israel was proclaimed, the Arab Higher Committee and the All-Palestine government, the Turkish-Cypriot community in Cyprus. The problem of non-state actors is still with us, witness the continuing controversy over the status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the South West Africa People's Organisation.

This problem arises at the United Nations over who shall be heard in the debate. In the Indonesian case, the Republicans were heard, but not other Indonesian parties or governmental units. In the Palestine case, the United Nations recognised the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee, and the All-Palestine government authorised the Arab Higher Committee to speak for it. In the Cyprus case, a representative of the Turkish community was heard on only a single occasion in 1964: at all other times, the anxieties of the Turkish Community in Cyprus were presented to the Security Council by Turkey.

But the greatest difficulty in my seven cases arose over the Azad Kashmir, which controlled that part of Kashmir adjoining Pakistan. As noted above, Azad Kashmir sent a senior representative to New York in 1948. He made a favourable impression on Western delegations,[17] but he was not able to get a formal hearing. The Security Council sent a Commission to the sub-continent

15. *Ibid.*, Supplement for November, Annex 20 to S/1100, p. 121, para. 10.

16. *Ibid*, S/1100, p. 52, para. 125; 4th year, Special Supplement No. 7, S/1430, p. 46, para. 225.

17. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. V, Part 1, p. 295, and private communication from a diplomat who was in New York at the time.

to exercise a mediatory influence, but because the Kashmir question had been first presented to the United Nations as a dispute between India and Pakistan, the Commission did not establish formal relations with Azad Kashmir, though informal contact was undoubtedly made. It seems, in retrospect, that the Council was initially at a disadvantage in the Kashmir case because it had not heard from Azad Kashmir directly, but only indirectly through Pakistan. My own speculation would be that the Security Council's first three resolutions on Kashmir in the early months of 1948, before the intervention of regular Pakistani military forces in May, would have been different if the Council had had a better appreciation of what the actual situation was on the ground.

The second main conclusion must be expressed more tentatively, but if its correctness should be confirmed by later studies, it will be of some importance. It is notoriously difficult to devise a satisfactory taxonomy of the causes of armed conflict, but I would suggest as a crude generalisation that most wars until recent times were due to one or other of two main causes: the dynastic interests of rulers or the desire to control or acquire territory which either contained economic assets or was strategically important. In the last thirty-five years, by contrast, the constant theme has been the allegation that human rights are being denied. In more than half of the conflicts in the SIPRI list, and in all of the cases studied, this allegation was an important or even the sole factor in causing war. In spite of Professor Bruce Russett's warning that international confrontation stemming from economic causes will be critical in coming years,[18] I would expect human rights issues in the Third World to continue to be a cause of armed conflict, so that work to protect basic human rights should be an essential part of any multiple strategy for the prevention of war.

My third conclusion relates to the means available to United Nations organs for supervising a cessation of hostilities. If there is confidence between the parties, joint patrolling is the most reliable method. This was advocated for both Kashmir and Palestine by the State Department in 1948, because Washington had been receiving too many requests for American military personnel to monitor other people's cease-fires all around the globe. 'We have found by experience . . . that when we comply with what seems to be a simple request . . . it is a facade behind which a hundred other demands are made. . . .'[19] Count Bernadotte wrote in his memoirs that America's suggestion for joint patrolling in the Middle East caused a good deal of hilarity in Jerusalem.[20] There was, however, a short period the following year when Israeli and Arab Legion forces operated joint patrols around the Government House demilitarised zone in Jerusalem.[21]

18. 'Security and the Resources Scramble', *International Affairs*, Vol 58, No 1 (Winter 1981-82), pp 42-58

19. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. V, Part 1, pp 369-70; Vol. V, Part 2, pp 1251-52, Vol. VI, pp. 1687-88.

20. Folke Bernadotte, *To Jerusalem*, Trans. by Joan Bulman, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 194.

21. Pablo de Azcárate, *Mission in Palestine 1948-1952*, Trans by Teener Hall (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1966), pp. 127-28.

Four other systems of supervision were used in the seven cases: by a so-called Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, by consular representatives in Indonesia and Palestine, by military observers individually recruited and serving in an integrated organization in Palestine and Kashmir, and by peacekeeping forces composed of national contingents from countries not directly involved, in Sinai-Suez and Cyprus.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, which has now existed for twenty-nine years, was created on the basis of parity between the belligerents, Switzerland and Sweden being designated by the Unified Command, Czechoslovakia and Poland by North Korea and China. It is well known that any body composed equally of representatives of two opposing parties is likely to be impotent if decisions are to be taken by majority vote. So it has proved in Korea. The governments of Sweden and Switzerland have always acted with discretion and restraint, but retired military officers from the two countries have spoken candidly of the ineffectual nature of the supervisory system in Korea. Perhaps it was the best that could be devised in 1953, but it is hardly a model to be emulated in other situations.

In Indonesia in 1947, the supervisory task was entrusted to military officers loaned by local consular offices. Ostensibly this was because other methods of supervision could not be deployed quickly enough, but in reality the intention was to have a supervisory system without Communist participation. The consular observers in Indonesia were from Australia, Belgium, the United States (all members of the United Nations Good Offices Commission for Indonesia), Britain, France, and (until May 1949) Nationalist China. In Palestine there was a truce commission composed of consular staff from Belgium, France and the United States: Syria had a consular representative in Jerusalem but refused to serve.

There was much discussion in 1947 about whether national military officers who had no special loyalty to the United Nations but were seconded for United Nations duties could effectively serve on behalf of an international organisation or whether their primary loyalty was to their own government. In the event, all orders from United Nations bodies to the military observers in Indonesia were transmitted through the local consul-general. This question of loyalty was to arise in United Nations peacekeeping operations, but difficulties have been minimised through a formula devised by Dag Hammarskjold.

The Soviet Union always objected to the consular commission in Indonesia and a similar consular commission in Palestine, wanting an organ composed of all members of the Security Council and responsible to it. It would now be inconceivable to act towards the Soviet Union as was normal Western practice at the height of the cold war, but in fact the observers in Indonesia did a perfectly adequate job.

The Consular Truce Commission in Jerusalem lapsed at the end of 1948, some of its functions being transferred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which exists to this day. Count Bernadotte recruited military

observers to supervise the cessation of hostilities, drawing on the three members of the Truce Commission (Belgium, France, the United States), plus Swedish officers recruited directly by him and United Nations guards from headquarters recruited by Trygve Lie. The observers were formed into a single, integrated organisation, for which the Security Council had given Bernadotte express authority just before the first cease-fire went into effect. Bernadotte, in addition and on his own initiative, entrusted the observers with supervision of the embargo on the entry of arms and forces into the region, taking it for granted that this was an essential part of the cease-fire. When the four armistice agreements were concluded in 1949, the observers were given further tasks, such as the chairing of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions and the investigation of alleged violations. A similar integrated observer mission was established for Kashmir.

United Nations observers operate from fixed posts, usually on or near the *de facto* line between the parties. If there are demilitarised zones, as there were in Palestine and Kashmir, the observers check that prohibited military personnel and weapons do not enter the zones, and sometimes conduct mobile patrols as well. They record any unauthorised crossing of the line, including over-flights, but do not physically prevent incursions. In the event of minor violation, they seek to restore the cease-fire through negotiation with the military commanders of the two sides. Major violations are reported to the Security Council. Because observers are appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General or the head of the observer mission, there is a theoretical possibility that they might be withdrawn capriciously, and this theoretical possibility has motivated Israel's opposition to reliance on United Nations observers for supervising the line of separation between Egypt and Israel in Sinai, so that an *ad hoc* multilateral force has been created.

After the Sinai-Suez affair in 1956, a peacekeeping force was established, the first such United Nations force. This was the most important diplomatic invention since 1945, credit for which should go to two remarkable visionaries, Lester Pearson of Canada and Dag Hammarskjold of Sweden. Pearson, in particular, saw that the only way of persuading Britain and France to withdraw was to substitute an international non-fighting force acceptable to Egypt for the two unwelcome European armies: once Britain and France had left the scene, efforts could be concentrated on persuading the Israeli forces to return to their own side of the frontier. The character of the first United Nations Emergency Force was largely determined by factors peculiar to the Suez-Sinai situation, especially two: that states supplying military contingents were unwilling that their forces should engage in actual combat, and President Nasser's insistence that the United Nations troops were on Egyptian soil as guests and not as invaders. The main principles established in 1956 were applied eight years later in Cyprus, though the situation was in some ways different because of the concentrations of population and the intermingling of the two Cypriot communities.

Peacekeeping forces of the United Nations do not use arms except in self-defence or to ensure the viability of the operation. If infiltrators are apprehended, they are handed over to the *de facto* authorities. Provocative installations have sometimes been dismantled by peacekeeping personnel.[22] The peacekeeping units are deployed along the lines of separation but, unlike military observers, they are mobile and have often performed an important interposition role. Their security does not lie in arms but in armbands, the symbol of the authority and concern of the United Nations.

One unsatisfactory element in peacekeeping concerns the procedure for termination. The plan envisaged by Hammarskjold in 1956-57 was that any proposal for termination should go first to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) Advisory Committee, which would if necessary draw the attention of the General Assembly or Security Council to the matter.[23] This was not how it worked in 1967, when President Nasser withdrew his consent for the continued presence of UNEF on Egyptian soil. The fact is that no United Nations force can do its job if the host government is determined to obstruct. When U Thant told the UNEF Advisory Committee in May 1967 of Egypt's request for withdrawal, not a single member formally proposed the convening of the General Assembly or the Security Council.[24] Probably Thant's best course in 1967 would have been to have convened the Security Council himself under Article 99 of the Charter, which grants this discretion to the Secretary-General when, in his opinion, world peace is threatened. This procedure would at least have gained time, but even so, it would probably not have been possible to have avoided the Six Day War. Israel could, of course, have invited Thant to deploy UNEF on Israel's side of the frontier, and this would have helped, though it would not have covered the situation at Sharm El-Sheikh and access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

One warning about United Nations supervision is needed. All methods of supervision are intended to tranquillise the situation: if supervision succeeds in this, it may have the unintended effect of perpetuating conflict. Of my seven cases, the quarrel between Indonesia and the Netherlands was largely settled in 1949, but the other five remain contentious to this day, and the supervisory machinery of the United Nations is still in existence: military observers in Kashmir and the Middle East, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and Cyprus.

On the basis of my seven case studies, I would be hesitant to entrust the supervision of a cease-fire to a commission formed on the basis of parity by the belligerents or even to military observers supplied by states which happen to have consular or diplomatic staff conveniently near. Supervision by observers

22. Security Council Official Records, 19th year, Supplement for April to June 1964, p. 92, Para. 3(a) of Annex 1 to S/5671.

23. General Assembly Official Records, 11th session, Annexes, Agenda item 66, p. 71, Annex to A/3563.

24. *Ibid.*, 5th emergency session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 12, para. 23 of A/6730; U Thant, *View From the UN* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1978), pp. 224-25.

forming an integrated organisation can be relied on when local conditions are relatively tranquil, but at times of tension, and particularly when there is a risk of unauthorised incursions, a peacekeeping operation by mobile military contingents is the preferred mechanism.

The fourth conclusion of my case studies is striking and relates to the dysfunctional character of war in the contemporary world. With one partial exception to which I refer below, not a single one of the parties which initiated the use of force in the period studied attatined the main objective for which it was supposed to be fighting. Admittedly, it is not always easy to know precisely why countries go to war. Samuel Pepys was responsible for naval supplies during one of the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century. He was an intensely inquisitive person, interested in everything, from the construction of warships to the efficacy of praying for victory, but the one aspect of the war which finds no place in his diary is why it was being fought. For Pepys, war was a catastrophe like the Fire of London or the Plague, something to be endured with fortitude because it could not be prevented.

We now live in a more ideological age, but I have been struck by the confusion of purpose of those taking to the assize of arms in the period studied. Probably different elements in each belligerent had different goals: the armed forces to try out new weapons and strategies, politicians to reinforce reputations at the expense of rivals, arms manufacturers to increase sales of military hardware, and so on. Moreover, war aims change during the course of the fighting, especially on the losing side.

All the same, if one is to assess the utility of war, one has to take the formal and declared aim of the initiator of force as representing what the war was about. Consider, then, my seven cases. Two of them may charitably be regarded as accidental wars: Kashmir 1947 and Cyprus 1964. Of course, no wars are wholly accidental, but these arose as a result of previous mistakes and policies of drift rather than well-considered decisions to go to war.

But what of the other five cases? The Netherlands undertook two 'police actions' in Indonesia to eliminate the Republicans—colonial rebels, as they were thought of in the Hague; but the consequence was to consolidate Republican authority and make more certain the early ending of Dutch rule. The Arabs went to war in Palestine in 1947-48 to defeat the United Nations partition plan and prevent a Jewish state from coming into existence, but the consequence was that Israel emerged in a larger area than the United Nations had envisaged, and the creation of an independent Arab state in the rest of Palestine has still not been achieved. North Korea invaded the South in 1950 to eliminate what they thought of as an oppressive régime and to unite Korea, but Korea remains divided and the dissidents in South Korea claim that the régime is still oppressive. Britain and France attacked Egypt in 1956 in order to topple Nasser: France hoped thereby to stop Egyptian help to Algerian nationalists, and Britain wanted to ensure free access through the Suez Canal. None of these aims was realised: Nasser emerged as a hero in the Arab world,

the Algerian nationalists continued their struggle and were soon successful, and the Suez Canal was blocked as a result of the fighting.

There was, it is true, one successful belligerent, for a time anyway. Israel in 1956 had two aims: to end Arab guerrilla attacks from the Gaza Strip and to ensure freedom for Israeli cargoes to pass through the Strait of Tiran *en route* for Eilat; and these two objectives were assured, at least for a decade.

The truth is that it is relatively easy to resort to armed force but difficult in the contemporary world to achieve political objectives by that means, because domestic opinion or the outside world tries to bring hostilities to an end before the side initiating force has attained its goals. Outside intervention is not necessarily for humanitarian or other altruistic reasons: the fact is that wars tend to escalate vertically in the scale of fighting and to spread horizontally to other areas.

The predicament for the Security Council when war breaks out is that the instinct of the uninvolved is to want to stop the fighting as soon as possible, whereas one or both of the parties are likely to wish to link a cease-fire to political goals, or at least to a mechanism for dealing with political demands. The more threatening the situation, the more disinclined is the Security Council to deal with political factors. This leads to allegations that the United Nations uses double standards, a complaint often made nowadays in Israel and South Africa.

The United Nations, of its nature, usually enters the picture at the eleventh hour, when the situation is already critical, and this creates an illusion of failure. I would like to see the Security Council engaging more effectively in prophylactic diplomacy, but it is a great achievement of the United Nations system that so few of the 150 wars since 1945 have spread.

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG: A HONG KONG 'BELONGER'S' VIEW

*Joseph Y. S. Cheng**

IN the past few years, there has been a great deal of discussion about the future of Hong Kong and the lease of the New Territories.[1] There are two reasons for this: first, 1997, the expiry date of the New Territories lease, is no longer far away. Many large-scale investment and construction projects, such as a new airport and perhaps a nuclear power plant, could not be completed by then; unless China and Britain can soon come to an agreement regarding the New Territories lease, many of these projects will probably be shelved. Second, since the fall of the Gang of Four and the shift in emphasis to the Four Modernisations, the Chinese leadership has begun to appreciate the importance of foreign trade and the introduction of advanced technology and capital from the West; Hong Kong's contribution to China's economic development has accordingly become more significant. In addition, the present Chinese leaders are less dogmatic than their predecessors, and seem likely to adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards the question of Hong Kong. The possibility of China and Britain coming to a negotiated settlement over this historical legacy is correspondingly higher.

Owing to the increasing urgency of the problem and the apparent optimism of the citizens of Hong Kong over the future of the Colony, the local mass media and the stock market indices have become very sensitive, occasionally over-sensitive, to high-level contacts involving Britain, China and Hong Kong, as well as to official and semi-official statements concerning Hong Kong's future.

Up to now, there has been nothing to suggest that negotiations between China and Britain have begun. On October 7, 1979, Hua Kuo-feng, the then Chinese Premier, held a press conference for Western correspondents before his visit to Europe. When asked if he could guarantee the maintenance of the

* J. Y. S. Cheng is Lecturer in Government at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Chairman of the Hong Kong Observers, a pressure group aimed at making the colonial government in Hong Kong more responsive and responsible to the Hong Kong community

The term 'a Hong Kong Belonger' is a colloquial term used by officials to denote a person born in Hong Kong and possessing a passport issued there.

1 Britain's colony of Hong Kong was acquired from China, under the terms of cession, in two stages: the island, by the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, and British Kowloon and Stonecutters Island in 1860. The 1898 Convention of Peking leased to Britain for ninety-nine years that part of Guangdong province now known as the New Territories. It purported to add to the colony of Hong Kong a land area of over 350 square miles, including numerous islands, and a large body of sea. If the leased territory is to revert to China upon expiry of the convention in 1997, Hong Kong as a British colony cannot be expected to survive. See Peter Wesley-Smith, *Unequal Treaty, 1898-1997* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980).

status quo in Hong Kong after the year 2000, he replied that the position of the Chinese government was already 'very clear'. He said, 'At present, our relationship with both the United Kingdom and the British authority in Hong Kong is quite good. We think that, through negotiations, a satisfactory way can be sought to settle the question of Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories. But I can say, no matter how the question is resolved, we would take into consideration the interest of the investors there.'[2]

This position is not basically in conflict with earlier Chinese formulations, though obviously the focus is quite different. The most authoritative statement of the position previously held by the Chinese government is contained in a letter sent by Huang Hua, the then Chinese permanent representative at the United Nations, to the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism on March 10, 1972:

> The questions of Hong Kong and Macau belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macau are part of Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China's sovereign right and do not at ali fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories. Consequently they should not be included in the list of colonial territories covered by the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people. With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese government has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way when conditions are ripe . . .[3]

Hua Kuo-feng's statement at the October 1979 press conference suggests that three significant changes had taken place in the Chinese government's attitude towards Hong Kong. First, his comment that 'through negotiations, a satisfactory way can be sought' showed that China no longer insisted, as in the past, on its sovereign right over Hong Kong. Second, the pledge to take account of the 'interest of the investors' in Hong Kong indicated that, apart from China's own interests, the interests of other concerned parties would be considered in any settlement. And, third, the legality of the British authority in Hong Kong was recognised; this recognition also took concrete shape in the exchange of official notes and visits.

Though Hua mentioned negotiations, the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, denied in October 1980 that Huang Hua had discussed with Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, the question of Hong Kong's future during Huang's visit to Britain. Sir Murray held that 'no one

2 See 'Premier Hua Guo-feng Holds Press Conference', *Beijing Review*, Vol 22, No 41, Oct. 12, 1979, p. 11.

3. For the text of the quotation as well as an analysis of the document, see N. J. Miners, *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp 15-17.

knows what the future of Hong Kong will be'. In his annual policy speech to the Legislative Council in the same month, he simply stated:

> There is nothing in this rapidly evolving situation which we have to fear. But naturally it involves new problems as well as new benefits. It is therefore important that we should keep in close touch with the Provincial Government of Guangdong and find ways by which any new problems can be solved by mutual co-operation. This we are doing.

Both the British and the Hong Kong governments appreciate that the iniatiave lies with the Chinese government. The Chinese leaders, on the other hand, realise that, in any discussions about Hong Kong, they cannot ignore the New Territories lease, which was part of the unequal treaties imposed upon the Manchu government by the British imperialists. To recognise the lease, not to say extend it, would be contrary to the Chinese government's declared goal to terminate all unequal treaties, an important aim of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Chinese Communists believe that the future of the whole Chinese nation depends on this, and it is difficult to imagine that any Chinese leader would sacrifice a principle of such importance for the sake of economic advantages.[4]

From the British government's point of view, the New Territories lease is based on the second Anglo-Manchu Convention of Peking, concluded in 1898, which, together with the first Anglo-Manchu Convention of Peking in 1860 (ceding the Kowloon Peninsula) and the Anglo-Manchu Treaty of Nanking in 1842 (ceding the Hong Kong Island), provides the legitimacy for British rule over Hong Kong. The British government cannot therefore ignore the New Territories lease, or any of the clauses of the Treaty of Nanking and the First and Second Conventions of Peking. Theoretically, it can choose to return to China only the New Territories and continue its rule over Hong Kong and Kowloon after June 30, 1997, when the lease expires; in practice, however, according to the development plans of the Hong Kong government, over half the total population and a large portion of the industrial plants will be in the New Territories by 1997. It is simply impossible to move the Hong Kong–Guangdong border southward to Boundary Street in Kowloon.

This contradiction has been the main obstacle to a negotiated settlement between China and Britain. In the past two or three years, a number of academics and legal experts have suggested ways whereby a settlement could be negotiated but since China and Britain have apparently not yet started

4 The main economic advantages which China derives from Hong Kong are these: first is the huge surplus it enjoys in its trade with Hong Kong, which amounted to HK$15,804 million in 1979, HK$23,553 million in 1980, and HK$32,434 million in 1981 (US$1 equals roughly HK$5.83). Second, it earns foreign exchange by using Hong Kong's facilities as a free port to send exports to third countries. And, third, it is provided with a very convenient centre for trade contacts, financial negotiations, the gathering of commercial intelligence about Western technology, etc. See 'Focus: Hong Kong '81', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 3, No. 12, March 13, 1981, pp. 35–40, 44–56; for the trade statistics, see *1981 Economic Background* (Hong Kong: The Government Printer, Jan. 1982), pp. 12 and 18.

negotiations, these proposals have not been formally considered by the two governments.

The main reason for the current uncertain state of affairs is that the initiative lies in the hands of the Chinese government, which at present sees no need to begin negotiations. Since it does not have any intention of recognising the New Territories lease, and since—as things stand—there exists no settlement acceptable to both parties, it is only natural for the Chinese government to choose to maintain the status quo, while retaining the initiative and keeping all options open. Moreover, as already touched upon, there are two subsidiary reasons for postponing a decision. First, the settlement of the future of Hong Kong involves the principle of how to deal not only with the New Territories lease, but with all other unequal treaties; under present circumstances, any Chinese leader, including Deng Xiao-ping, who tries to adopt a more pragmatic stand or to make any major concessions will attract serious criticism, both inside and outside the country. Second, the Chinese leadership's main concern at present is the Four Modernisations,[5] and therefore it is hardly likely to put the future of Hong Kong on its immediate agenda.

Furthermore, the guarantees made by the present Chinese leaders—such as the reassurance given to Hong Kong investors by Deng Xiao-ping and brought back by the Governor after his visit to China in March/April 1979—have already served a certain stabilising function. Although these guarantees are not binding by international law, Hong Kong's economy continues to prosper. Economic exchanges and co-operation between China and Hong Kong keep on growing, and the Conservative government in Britain still wants to maintain the status quo. In other words, there exists no tangible or intangible pressure on the Chinese government to make a definite decision about Hong Kong's future. The only exception would be if the Conservative Party lost the next election, and the Labour Party were to form a government, with its left wing urging withdrawal from Hong Kong. This appears to be the only situation in the near future that could lead the Chinese government to demand a quick settlement. The probability of this eventuality, however, is not high; the greater the influence of the left wing in the Labour Party, the lower will be its chance of winning the next general election.

With the initiative largely in the hands of the Chinese, the best strategy for the British government is to remain silent and wait for further changes. On one hand, it makes full use of Hong Kong to reap the greatest possible benefit; and, on the other, it has already been preparing for the worst—i.e. the return of Hong Kong to China—and is beginning to minimise its responsibility and commitment towards the Colony. To maximise benefits, it hopes to construct a

5 The Four Modernisations are the modernisations of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. It is the grand concept for the development of the Chinese economy advocated by the late Premier Chou on the instructions of Chairman Mao at the Third and Fourth National People's Congress held in 1964-65 and 1975 respectively. The concept was emphatically reaffirmed at the Fifth National People's Congress in February-March 1978 and it was depicted as the main task of the country.

China-Hong Kong-Britain joint co-operation model in which Hong Kong will serve as a link between China and Britain. For example, China Light and Power of Hong Kong has bought a power plant from Britain to supply electricity to Guangdong in exchange for coal from China, and the British government guarantees the $600 million loan for the purchase of the plant. The new British Nationality Act (which comes into force on January 1, 1983) is a good example of the minimisation of British responsibility towards Hong Kong. Under the Act, Hong Kong's 2.6 million Chinese who are registered as British subjects will no longer be thus designated and will instead become 'citizens of the British dependent territory of Hong Kong'. This means that when Hong Kong ceases to become a British dependent territory, these people will become stateless.

The Act is clearly of profound significance; besides affecting the nationality and status of Hong Kong's citizens, it reflects the British government's attitude towards the Colony's political future. The total population of all British colonies amounts to 5.4 million, of which five million reside in Hong Kong, with 2.6 million of them holding British passports issued by the Hong Kong government and being categorised as 'citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies'. It therefore almost looks as if the British Nationality Act was drafted with the future of Hong Kong primarily in mind.

Present uncertainties

Under the present circumstances, the interests and rights of Hong Kong's citizens are obviously not well protected. As the Chinese government has never stated its position definitely, the people of Hong Kong generally feel very uncertain about their future, although they have become more optimistic since the fall of the Gang of Four. The middle class, however, would still prefer to emigrate, given the opportunity. At least they would like their children to study and settle abroad, so that the next generation will not be affected by the current uncertainties. Many have also begun to invest in real estate in Canada and the United States. There are no statistics available yet; but, to judge by the pages and pages of overseas real estate advertisements in the local newspapers, such investments have become highly popular. Even a small country like the Dominican Republic has recently set up an office in Hong Kong to sell property, and it automatically grants any real estate owner the right of permanent residence. This person can even become a citizen after staying in the country for half a year; further, he can concurrently hold the Dominican passport and another, issued, say, by the British government. Such terms seem to suggest that the buyers are concerned more with the right of permanent residence in a foreign country than with real estate investment.

Those Hong Kong citizens who have travelled abroad appreciate that living standards in Hong Kong compare very favourably with those of advanced countries (though housing and transport continue to be problems); moreover,

Hong Kong is famous for fashion and entertainment, and at reasonable prices too. Most of those who have migrated overseas are professionals and technicians, and their occupational options after emigration are limited; nor can they take much part in the politics and public affairs of their countries of residence. Their mental and psychological satisfaction is often lower than before. Furthermore, the cost of migration is very high, and this is common knowledge. Indeed, the main reason for so many middle-class people migrating overseas is simply lack of confidence in the future of Hong Kong.

Owing to this lack of confidence, most citizens do not take much interest in public affairs. They suspect that both the British Government and the British authority in Hong Kong have already been preparing for the worst, and meanwhile are merely making use of Hong Kong and will not commit themselves with regard to the future. In this state of mind, it is natural that people cannot develop a sense of belonging, and do not feel part of a community that enjoys citizens' rights and responsibilities.

Even if negotiations between China and Britain finally materialise, they will be conducted in top secrecy and the citizens of Hong Kong will not be informed until an agreement has been reached. The people will simply have to accept this. If the negotiations were made public, the complicated process would merely arouse unnecessary speculation and worry in the community. Negotiations, then, must be conducted in secrecy. Since Hong Kong does not have any elections (except the unimportant Urban Council elections and the future District Board elections), Hong Kong's citizens cannot choose representatives to articulate and safeguard their interests in the negotiations. Even if they were to elect representatives, it seems unlikely at present that China and Britain would accept their legal status and allow them to participate. Hence, though China and Britain may come to a settlement through a process of negotiation, the people of Hong Kong will be informed only when all details have been finalised, and it is hard to have full confidence that the two countries will keep the people's interests at heart.

Options for an eventual settlement

Theoretically, there are five possible ways in which the future of Hong Kong can be settled: (1) Hong Kong becomes an independent state; (2) the Chinese government takes it back before or after 1997, and it becomes part of China; (3) the status quo is maintained permanently, the New Territories lease simply being forgotten or extended indefinitely; (4) the British give it up, China is forced to take it back, and it again becomes part of China; and (5) it becomes a special economic zone inside China, and may be managed by the British authority in Hong Kong on a temporary basis.

The possibility of Hong Kong's gaining independence is next to zero, since this is contrary to the Chinese government's basic stand. The Chinese government has consistently maintained that Hong Kong is part of China, and

that this historical legacy should be resolved when conditions are ripe (later this is modified to read 'through negotiations, a good way to solve the problem can be found'). Any formula that is found must uphold this basic premise, namely that Hong Kong is part of China, and Hong Kong citizens fully understand the Chinese government's attitude. In fact, a large part of the population has never thought of independence, let alone of organising an independence movement.

Since the Chinese government insists that Hong Kong is part of China, any form of plebiscite or referendum, or any proposal for Hong Kong to become a territory under the trusteeship of the United Nations (or other similar arrangements), would not be acceptable to the Chinese leaders. Such proposals not only go against the premise that Hong Kong is part of China, but would establish a precedent, and might encourage people in Taiwan and Tibet to raise similar demands. Furthermore, an independent Hong Kong could easily fall prey to hostile foreign influences, and thus constitute a danger on China's very doorstep.

As for the second possibility, at present the people of Hong Kong do not wish to see Hong Kong returned to China in or before 1997. Theoretically, since the Chinese government does not recognise the New Territories lease and other unequal treaties, the year 1997 is meaningless. The main reason why it does not intend to take back the New Territories or the whole of Hong Kong for the time being is that the present status of Hong Kong is economically valuable. Even during the extreme turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, the Chinese government clearly indicated that it did not support the local leftists' riots,[6] and condemned their action. And now, when the Chinese leaders have given the Four Modernisations top priority, the economic advantages obtained from Hong Kong are valued much more highly than previously.

The emphasis on the Four Modernisations is something that the people of Hong Kong welcome. For one thing, it leads to a greater value being attached to the economic advantages that their island can offer; for another, most people in Hong Kong still regard themselves as Chinese, and they sincerely hope to see a rich and strong China emerging. However, if China continues to adopt an open-door policy *vis-à-vis* foreign countries, Hong Kong's special position and its economic contributions towards China will be affected in the long run.

The Chinese government has already established three special economic zones in the Guangdong province, namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou, and it is expected that similar ones will soon be established in Fujien. Not only do these special economic zones cater for the development of manufacturing industries, tourism, transportation, real estate, and so on, but the Chinese government further intends to develop them into commercial and financial

6 These riots were initiated by local pro-China groups including trade unions, business groups, student organisations, etc. in response to, and in imitation of, what was happening in China during the peak of the Cultural Revolution. The rioters demonstrated against the Hong Kong government and created a crisis at that time.

centres. Major foreign enterprises and banks have begun to set up offices in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, which in turn have begun to develop sea and air communications with the important commercial and financial centres overseas. These trends indicate that in approximately ten years' time, major cities in China like Beijing and Shanghai, as well as the special economic zones, will possess facilities for international trade, finance, telecommunications, transportation and tourism which are on a par with those possessed by Hong Kong in the 1960s. In other words, in ten years' time, China may develop ten or more special economic zones which are about thirty years behind Hong Kong. Economic exchanges and co-operation between China and the West will be on a solid foundation, and the reliance on Hong Kong as a link will decrease correspondingly. Thus, in the eyes of the Chinese government, Hong Kong will be no more than its most advanced and prosperous special economic zone. As for the administration of the special economic zones, the Chinese government will by then have acquired ample experience, so that it may have the confidence to take Hong Kong back and avoid any significant economic setbacks in the process. This is probably what is meant by the ripe conditions for settling Hong Kong's historical legacy.

According to this reasoning, China will take back Hong Kong: (1) when the Chinese government is confident enough to take it back without incurring serious economic losses; (2) when the commercial and other facilities which are now available at Hong Kong because of its special position may be largely or wholly replaced by the gradual development of comparable facilities in China's major cities and special economic zones; and (3) when China's Four Modernisations gradually succeed; when economic development, exploitation of resources, foreign exchange reserves and economic exchange and co-operation with Western countries in China have all had a firm foundation, so that Hong Kong is no longer unique and takes a place not much ahead of the most advanced special economic zone in China. It is difficult to estimate the span of time needed to realise this scenario, but it will probably not be before 1997. It is therefore impossible for the Chinese government to ignore the New Territories lease. On May 7, 1979, in answering an inquiry from a delegation of French journalists on the lease, a Chinese assistant foreign minister, Song Zhi-guang, who was also former ambassador to Britain, reaffirmed that 'Hong Kong is part of China', and he further indicated that 'when the lease expires, an appropriate attitude would be adopted in settling the question'.

It is this writer's view that the Chinese government will take back Hong Kong at an appropriate time, and that this will be after 1997. The Chinese leaders would not compromise on the principles of abolishing all unequal treaties, of sweeping away all insult and disgrace forced upon China by the imperialists during the weakness of the Ching Dynasty, and of regaining all territories formerly belonging to China.[7] The possibility of maintaining the

7. The 'common programme' of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949 provided that previous treaties between the Nationalist government and foreign governments would be examined and,

status quo indefinitely, and of extending the New Territories lease indefinitely (our third scenario), is therefore very low and does not merit further discussion.

Although the fourth possibility—of Britain abandoning Hong Kong and China being forced to take the Colony back—is unlikely, it has to be considered. In 1974, when the Portuguese overthrew the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano and the leftists came to power, the Portuguese government was prepared to return Macau to China. Although the economic benefits derived by Britain from Hong Kong are much more substantial than those derived by Portugal from Macau, one cannot discount the eventuality that the left wing of the Labour Party will succeed in gaining control of the party, and will proceed to win a general election. In this case, the British government might give up Hong Kong.

It is conceivable that the next few years could see a left-wing Labour government come to power in Britain with a commitment to end the colonial status of Hong Kong altogether. If a future British government indicates that it intends to give up Hong Kong before conditions are ripe for China, Hong Kong's political stability and economic prosperity would be seriously affected. Under such circumstances, there would be only two options for the Chinese government: to take back Hong Kong before it was ready to do so, or to negotiate with the British government and attempt to present a proposal that was acceptable to Britain. The former would be a great loss to both China and Hong Kong. As for the latter, since, according to this scenario, the British government would be voluntarily giving up the substantial economic benefits offered by Hong Kong, the Chinese government would be deprived of the most obvious means of getting Britain to change its mind; the only convincing argument left would perhaps be that Britain has to consider the interests of the people in Hong Kong.

Two further points deserve consideration here. One is that the economic benefits derived by Britain from Hong Kong are not equally distributed among the British. They go mainly to the major British enterprises with substantial business interests in the Far East. Thus British public opinion would not pay much attention to the economic issue, and most British would probably approach the question from an ideological or moral perspective, and conclude that Britain should give up all colonies including Hong Kong. The second point is that if a left-wing Labour Party were to form a government, the

---

according to their contents, recognised abrogated, revised, or renegotiated This was later extended to embrace all pre-Communist Chinese treaties Since 1949 some prior treaties have been recognised and affirmed, and some bilateral treaties have been cancelled after the friendly negotiation of substitutes Others have been unilaterally repudiated, although no pre-existing treaty affecting territory has been unequivocally abrogated without the agreement of the other party, and the government of the People's Republic of China has consistently recognised the territorial status quo established by unequal treaties pending negotiations for a fair and just settlement of the issue. Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chin, two experts in the attitudes of the People's Republic of China towards international law and treaties, suggest that past boundary agreements are considered by the People's Republic of China to retain their validity until renegotiation.

Colony's future would still be in doubt; the new government might not formally declare the abandonment of Hong Kong.

The final possible development is that Hong Kong becomes a special economic zone of China, with its administration temporarily entrusted to the British authority in Hong Kong. This speculation is based on the premises that China would not give up its sovereignty over Hong Kong, and that it cannot choose to ignore the New Territories lease. From the point of view of the Chinese government, this arrangement has the following advantages: (1) assuming that China and Britain come to such an agreement before July 1, 1997, China does not then have to deal with the New Territories lease and thus avoids having to compromise on its principle concerning unequal treaties; (2) China's sovereignty over Hong Kong can be firmly established through negotiations between the two governments; (3) the period of the trusteeship does not need to be specified, and the arrangement may be continued indefinitely until either side informs the other of its intention to terminate it by giving one year's notice (or any reasonable period of time); and (4) through negotiations, the Chinese government may secure the right to send a representative to Hong Kong, or even *ex officio* members participating in its administration.

From the British point of view, this arrangement would certainly not be as satisfactory as its present position in Hong Kong. (In the late 1960s and early 1970s, British officials stated that they would never accept the kind of situation forced upon the Portuguese authority in Macau after the 1967 riots.) Nevertheless, it does hold out some attractions in that: (1) the British role in Hong Kong is at present based on a series of unequal treaties, and its legitimacy is therefore questionable and could easily lead to criticism both within and outside Britain. According to the New Territories lease, the British government has to return the New Territories to China on June 30, 1997, after which its rule over Hong Kong, as well as the advantages derived from it, can no longer be maintained, whereas the above arrangement could extend its rule over Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories. (2) An arrangement of this kind leaves enough room for the British government largely to retain its present position in Hong Kong through negotiations. (3) Since the Chinese leaders have given the Four Modernisations top priority and have adopted an open-door policy in economic development, the increasing attractions of the China market will correspondingly enhance the significance of Hong Kong. The British government's interest in continuing its rule of Hong Kong will thus be strengthened, and it will be more inclined to consider making concessions in the negotiations, such as allowing the Chinese government to send a representative to the special economic zone. (4) From a political and humanitarian point of view, this arrangement would enable the British government to be more accountable to the people of Hong Kong, the British authority in Hong Kong and the active British enterprises in the Far East.

Since an arrangement along these lines manages to look after both parties'

interests, the probability of its being realised is quite high. The initiative of settling the question of Hong Kong's future, however, lies in the hands of the Chinese government, and no arrangement can be negotiated until the Chinese leaders place the Hong Kong question on their agenda.

Wishes of the 'Belongers' themselves

And what do the people themselves want? In view of the uncertainty about their rights, the people of Hong Kong do not, at least as yet, demand independence, and most of them accept China's stand on Hong Kong: that it is part of China and will return to China at an appropriate time. Many of them may hope that the status quo could be maintained for ever, and that the New Territories lease will be forgotten or extended indefinitely, but the probability of this happening is small. Naturally, Hong Kong's citizens hope that the British government will not give up Hong Kong suddenly. This seems unlikely at the moment; in any case, there is little they can do to influence events.

Given that the people of Hong Kong accept that Hong Kong will return to China at an appropriate time (assuming this to be a few decades away), and that in the transitional period it would become a special economic zone of China, temporarily administered by the British authority, then what rights should the people of Hong Kong demand in order to protect their interests?

Since negotiations on the future of Hong Kong would be conducted in secrecy between the Chinese and British governments, it is, as noted, highly unlikely that the people of Hong Kong would be able to send a representative. They can, however, call upon the Chinese and British governments to consider their interests fully, and to provide concrete assurances to this effect before any settlement is made. Public opinion in Hong Kong has to be mobilised now.

As far as the Chinese government is concerned, the people of Hong Kong have always been treated as compatriots, including those holding British passports issued by the Hong Kong government. When the latter travel to China, their British passports are not accepted as valid travelling documents. In the past thirty years or more, most people in Hong Kong have never engaged in anti-China activities; they have tried their best to develop Hong Kong and indirectly they also contribute to China's economic well-being. The Chinese government has offered very generous terms to the Nationalist government in Taiwan and the Taiwan people. On January 9, 1979, Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping, while receiving a delegation of the United States Senate Military Affairs Committee, stated explicitly that after China's reunification Taiwan could retain a completely autonomous status; the Taiwan authority could possess the same administrative powers as before; the security forces of Taiwan could be maintained; the existing economic and social system could be preserved; and the position of Taiwan after its return to China would resemble that of Hong Kong and of Macau.

The people of Hong Kong certainly have the right to ask the Chinese leaders to give the same guarantee that they have offered to the Taiwanese, especially with regard to preserving the existing economic and social system and avoiding a sharp decline in living standards. It was reassuring when, during an interview at the end of 1980, a senior official of the Chinese State Council stated, in his personal capacity, that after the return of Hong Kong to China the living standards of Hong Kong citizens would not necessarily fall to the level of those in the mainland. The five million people of Hong Kong have the right to ask the Chinese leaders to give a more definite guarantee concerning their interests. It is to be hoped that the Chinese government will take into account the interests not only of the investors in Hong Kong, but also of the population at large, most of whom are non-investors.

From the British government, too, the people of Hong Kong have the right to demand that top priority should be given to the interests of the local population in any negotiations with the Chinese government. This kind of guarantee should be made before negotiations begin.

As a result of rising educational standards, the people of Hong Kong have become increasingly aware of their rights and obligations, and their demands to participate in the policy-making process and supervision of the administration have been growing. The colonial government's answer has always been that China does not want to see a political reform in Hong Kong. On August 9, 1980, the student unions in Hong Kong jointly sent an open letter to the deputies attending the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, and indicated their hope that the Chinese government would adopt a more positive attitude towards local mass movements. The letter said:

> Because of the internal changes in Hong Kong in recent years, there have emerged a number of mass movements to fight for the local people's rights. The basic goals of these spontaneous mass movements are reasonable wages, improvement in social welfare and living environment, and participation in and supervision of the government. Reforms along these lines would not change the status of Hong Kong, nor would they affect the interests of the one billion Chinese in China. The Chinese government should understand the needs and demands of the people of Hong Kong and adopt a positive attitude towards such mass movements.

In conclusion, the appropriate time for the return of Hong Kong is probably a few decades away. Within this period, the people of Hong Kong would continue to develop Hong Kong, and to contribute directly and indirectly to China's economic development. Gradual political reform, which will give the people of Hong Kong more opportunities to participate in the decision-making process of the government and to supervise the administration, is certainly an important part of the work of development.

We in Hong Kong hope that the return of Hong Kong to China will be a gradual and smooth process, and that the difficulties of adapting to the political,

economic and social systems of the mainland will be minimised. A guarantee of this kind from the Chinese government would do much to develop a sense of belonging to China among Hong Kong's citizens. We would then no longer need to consider real estate investment overseas or emigration. If overseas real estate investment can be transferred to China, it would be an asset to China's economic development.

Whatever its significance may be, 1997 is a mere fifteen years away, and it is high time for the people of Hong Kong to articulate and safeguard their interests. This is also the critical moment to mobilise the Hong Kong community and international public opinion to exert pressure on the Chinese and British governments to respect such interests in their plans for Hong Kong's future. More important still, satisfaction of the demands of Hong Kong's citizens, as argued above, need not involve the sacrifice of Chinese and British interests, so long as the parties concerned have the political will to negotiate and compromise.

BOOKS

LESSONS FROM THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE FOR WESTERN ECONOMIC POLICY

*Christopher Colclough**

THIS article reviews a number of recent books which focus upon the international economy, and which examine the question whether the fortunes of individual nations stem primarily from their domestic circumstances or from their economic relations with other states. The books selected represent authors from each of the main theoretical traditions—neoclassical, structuralist and neo-Marxist—and most focus upon the problems of growth and development facing the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The aim of the article is to examine the range of the debate in development economics and to argue that the issues raised have far more importance for the formulation of economic policy in industrialised countries than is conventionally assumed.

The economic policy debate which is now being conducted in the Western market economies essentially derives from different views of the ability of the freely working capitalist economy to deliver full employment (or close to it), together with steady economic growth under tolerable levels of inflation. Major elements of this discussion are not new: the neoclassical orthodoxy in economics, which had its roots in the latter half of the nineteenth century, met its first serious challenge in the 1930s. The conventional wisdom at that time had it that underutilised capacity coexisting with endemic unemployment was impossible—that competition in the labour market would reduce wages, and increase the incentives for owners of capital to take on more labour until full capacity production was achieved. It was left to Keynes to explain how such automatic movement towards full employment need not be delivered by the market mechanism—how one could have an equilibrium level of income, where total demand in the economy matched total supply and from which there was not necessarily any natural tendency to move, even in circumstances of significant unemployment of labour and underutilisation of available capital. What was needed in such circumstances was some 'autonomous' increase in the total demand for goods and services in the economy. Only by providing such a boost, and therefore by slightly increasing prices and profits would some upward movement in output, incomes and employment be achieved. Hence the Keynesian system elevated the role and importance of government in achieving full employment and output growth. Whilst he remained pessimistic about the possibilities for long-run expansion, he believed that demand management by the government should be able to achieve steady levels of production at full employment over the long-run.

Thus, in one sense, Keynes preserved the explanatory power of neoclassical economics. Provided the government took an active role by adjusting total demand via fiscal and monetary policy, the market mechanism would retain its benign role in

*Christopher Colclough is a fellow of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. The author is grateful for comments on an earlier draft from Manfred Bienefeld, Ricardo Carciofi, Philip Daniel, David Evans, Martin Godfrey, and Dudley Seers.

providing full employment of all available resources. Fundamental to this system was the view that in circumstances of underutilised capacity, increases in the level of demand would have only a small and temporary effect on the level of prices—that its main stimulus would be to increase the total production of goods and services in the economy. The implications for economic policy—of deficit financing in times of recession, and credit restraint when the economy appeared overheated—were followed, and were seen to work, for two decades after the Second World War. This was a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity for Western economies, and it seemed as though the most important macro economic questions had been solved.

Since the late 1960s, however, government action has not served to protect Western economies from growing levels of unemployment, and a new phenomenon, the coexistence of high unemployment and accelerating inflation, has emerged. This has presented a challenge to the Keynesian orthodoxy as profoundly as had the circumstances of the 1930s to the neoclassical theorists. The current state of confusion in policy, and indeed amongst academic theorists, stems from sharp disagreement over the real causes of such phenomena, and the ways in which they can be best addressed.

The contention of this article is that the state of theoretical debate in the United Kingdom over the causes of the current crisis is too limited to the internal dynamics of economic change. Although there are significant exceptions, many exponents of both monetarist and neo-Keynesian positions give primacy to internal/domestic factors. They contend that either inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon, and controlling the aggregate national money supply will reduce inflation to tolerable levels and an initially negative effect upon employment will be reversed in the longer run; or that an incomes policy plus changes in the structure of government expenditure will be sufficient to achieve the stable full-employment-without-inflation position of earlier years. In fact, however, in circumstances where British productivity levels have dropped well behind competitors, stimulus to the level of domestic demand, as the Cambridge school implicitly argues, is more likely to result in increased imports—with attendant inflationary pressures via the exchange rate—than to higher domestic production. Under such circumstances it begins to look doubtful whether either monetarist or Keynesian approaches could result in enhanced growth without stopping such balance-of-payments leakages using some form of import control (which in turn would imply a need for labour market reform if costs were to be contained) or without first allowing domestic employment and real incomes to fall to intolerably low levels. This is particularly so under the present circumstances of international recession where the growth in demand for British exports is slowing down for income-induced, as well as price-induced reasons.

This debate therefore has tended to see the choices for economic policy, and the causes of economic problems, in essentially national terms. The monetarist view leads to removing barriers to competition in the context of national monetary restraint; the neo-Keynesian to controlling cost-inflation by keeping down wages and using government intervention to manipulate total domestic demand. If, however, the major causes of inflation and unemployment are not wholly, or even primarily national, a different perspective on policy has to be allowed. Such a perspective would have to take an analysis of the existing relationships between countries in the international economy as being of central importance to the design of effective national policies for restoring growth without inflation. Here, the current debate embraces, if anything, an even wider ideological spectrum than that which informs the national policy discussion. At the same time, it is more helpful, since it identifies realities in the world economy which tend to be omitted from domestic policy analysis, yet which are crucial to the fortunes of individual countries within it. What, then, are the main elements of this debate?

Main elements of the current debate

The classical and neoclassical orthodoxy in economics has it that—just as at the level of the national economy—the freely working international market will encourage production decisions through trade which are to the benefit of all partners: even if one country produces all goods at lower cost than its trading partner, it will still be to the advantage of each to specialise in products where its cost advantage is relatively greater and to trade these goods for those where its cost advantage is relatively less. Both countries will thereby have access to products or resources which it can obtain, through trade, either more cheaply or at the same cost as if it did not engage in trade. Increasing trade between rich and poor countries would thus be expected to induce international specialisation in accordance with the comparative advantage and factor endowments of the trading partners. In poor countries with large labour supplies and a shortage of capital this will tend to result in a specialisation in the production of labour-intensive products, whilst in the richer countries it will result in the production of capital-intensive products. Incomes to labour and capital would tend towards equality in the two groups of countries as a result of this process, and a dynamic path of fuller utilisation of factors in the context of economic growth would thereby be promoted.

The theory is, of course, silent about how long it is likely to take for full employment to be achieved—the fact that we observe such massive underutilisation of both capital and labour in the world today is not in itself a refutation of the theory. Provided that the general movement is towards growth and fuller employment in the international economy as a whole, the predictions remain intact. We observe, however, that unemployment over the past ten years or so has become worse amongst many trading partners in the world economy; prices of manufactured goods have been rising faster than many raw materials (particularly minerals) causing the terms of trade for many primary products to deteriorate; only in a few economies of the Third World is there any major tendency to specialise in labour-intensive manufactured or semi-manufactured goods. The debate with which we are concerned mainly relates to the ways in which orthodox trade theory retains any explanatory power in such circumstances, and thus, to alternative theoretical formulations of the real dynamic in the international economy which lead to different policy prescriptions.

Peter Bauer remains the high priest of the old religious orthodoxy. In his latest collection of essays[1] he is concerned to restate and strengthen his his earlier arguments about the foolishness and waste inherent in Western governments providing overseas aid, and to attack the view that the industrialised countries can be held responsible for poverty in the Third World.

With regard to the latter, he argues that the West could not have caused such poverty, because before Western involvement these countries were even poorer than they are today. Those without any Western influence remain amongst the poorest countries in the world. It is tempting to note that those examples which Bauer cites—Afghanistan, Chad, Bhutan, Nepal, Burundi—have few natural resources and are climatically in extremely inauspicious environments; this surely provides the main explanation for a lack of Western involvement. Of course, as Bauer observes, profit remittances are partial returns on investment, and do not, by themselves, imply that there is no local benefit. This nevertheless begs the question as to whether such returns were greater than could reasonably have been expected by Western capital, and whether the patterns of remittances were such as to minimise domestic progress. Even this is denied by Bauer. He argues that Western contacts have not obstructed or retarded progress in the Third World, and claims that 'whenever local conditions have permitted it, commercial contacts with the West and generally established by the

1. P. T. Bauer, *Equality, the Third World and Economic Delusion* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981).

West, have eliminated the worst diseases, reduced or eliminated famine, extended life expectation and improved living standards' (p. 73). Again, it is worth noting that by far the greatest progress in extending education and health facilities to rural areas of the developing world has been made during the last twenty years, and since the end of the colonial period. What progress was made during the period of metropolitan control was *not* due usually to colonial governments—still less to Western capital in a more direct sense—but to a mixture of missionary society involvement and local endeavour. Bauer's observations here, as elsewhere, make the mistake of assuming that the correlation between Western involvement and local advance necessarily implies a causal relationship. It is equally plausible to argue that Western capital only involved itself in the Third World where it perceived supra-normal profit oportunities, and that much of the apparent benefits of Western involvement—at least in some countries—stems from the growth of local entrepreneurs who followed the Western example but who created much greater local linkages and benefits than those deriving directly from foreign involvement in the domestic economy.

The theoretical model underlying Bauer's position is that of a network of international economic relationships which is entirely benign. Just as in the idealised marketplace of the orthodox model, buyers and sellers in Bauer's international market are making free decisions in a situation of equality with respect to knowledge, techniques, and market power. Even with this set of assumptions it is odd how he refuses to acknowledge the existence (or even the potential) of monopolistic behaviour by transnational corporations, the possibility that prices for primary products have been deteriorating, or that the structural characteristics of trading systems or the countries that participate in them are not closely approximated by the assumptions of the competitive model. This leads him to view balance-of-payments deficits as being always and everywhere symptomatic of irresponsible government, and to ignore the logic for protection even when used as a means to secure economies of scale since, he argues, cheaper imports increase consumer welfare and lead to expansion of other activities. For large numbers of countries in the Third World one is left wondering what other activities, in the absence of protection, Bauer has in mind.

It is for these reasons that his arguments can be described as 'religious'. They stem from a theoretical model which is consistent in its own terms, but which is based upon assumptions which seem not to be relevant in the real world. Much of Bauer's argument against aid can be found lacking for the same reasons. Of course he is right that there has been, and is, much waste in the use of aid resources. Nevertheless, his case is not based upon the contingent grounds that aid has often been used unproductively, but on the more fundamental argument that its use will necessarily lead to a slower growth of output—both at the world level and in developing countries themselves—than would prevail in its absence.

Bauer believes that the maximum benefit of aid to the recipient is the avoided cost of borrowing. Thus since aid funds are not subject to rigid financial criteria of allocation in the same way that commercial funds are, they will tend to be used for projects that are not commercially viable. This leads him to the view that aid will be unproductive 'when its declared objective is redistribution, relief of porvery, or some other purpose unrelated [sic] to development' (p. 101). This position stems from a confusion between financial and economic returns. Using Bauer's approach, there would have been no investment in primary schools, hospitals and most physical infrastructure by governments of poor (or, indeed, rich) countries even though the economic returns from such investments have been typically high, and their very provision has enabled higher financial returns to other directly productive projects. Equally, his analysis assumes that governments have the alternative of borrowing on the international capital market. It is well known, however, that in circumstances where governments face an acute balance-of-payments constraint, the only commercial funds they are

likely to be able to obtain will be for projects in the export sector. As Chenery and others have shown,[2] if such projects are not available, growth will be impossible without aid. Contrary to Bauer, therefore, in circumstances where growth is completely blocked because of a foreign exchange constraint, the maximum potential benefits of aid become infinitely large, particularly when viewed over the medium or long term.

If aid is as ineffective as Bauer believes, and if the benefits of trade are so great it seems reasonable to ask why, after so many decades of trade between rich and poor countries, does the gap in income between the different country groups remain so large? The explanation, we are told, is not to be found in the market mechanism, nor in the existence of material insufficiencies per se; rather it is due to personal, social, cultural, and political differences between rich and poor states. The poorest people do not, on this view, have the aptitudes and motivations for economic advance in the way more prosperous people do; they are materially unambitious. Equally,

> because the personal attributes, social institutions and economic policies which promote economic advance are much more prevalent in most donor countries, international wealth transfers reallocate resources from those who can use them more productively to those who use them less so (p. 119).

Thus, aid transfers are pointless under such circumstances, and world income is reduced below what it would otherwise be.

Similar points are made by Brian May, who, far less rigorously and more tendentiously than Bauer, argues that the so-called cultural 'constraint' is capable of explaining the slow progress made with development in the Third World.[3] Essentially, his position is that the dominant culture, attitudes and values of non-European societies are inimical to economic growth and innovation. He attempts to show this using case-studies from India, Nigeria and Iran, in which he argues that political and economic corruption is endemic, that attempts to industrialise create such social stress that they remain superficial and eventually fail, and that Third World societies will therefore continue to stagnate. He believes that progress can be made in understanding the plight of such societies by studying genetically determined characteristics of different racial groups which may give rise to the cultural 'constraints' on economic development. Neither the method he uses nor the logic of his argument succeeds. His conclusions are based upon inadequate analysis, and many people will find them not merely incorrect, but offensive.

To link the unsubtle stance of May with that of Bauer is perhaps unfair to the latter. But in many ways the arguments in May's book provide the reductio for important elements of Bauer's position. Underlying Bauer's analysis is not only a refusal to accept that the causes of income differences between societies are strongly related to their history, to differences in resources or economic structure or to exploitation of one society by another; implicit in his analysis is also a strongly deterministic view of human nature. It is a short step from his position to saying that people are poor because they do not wish to work. How, then, does he explain the phenomenal growth performance of Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan over the last fifteen years? His essay on Hong Kong implies that their success is due, as elsewhere, mainly to the attributes and motivation of their people. If this is true, the fact that their economic growth is so recent must be due to a fundamental *change* in the attributes of these whole populations over the past two or three decades. Even if this were so, to believe

2. See, for example, H. B. Chenery and A. M. Strout, 'Foreign Assistance and Economic Development', *American Economic Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Sept. 1966, pp. 679–733; and R. McKinnon, 'Foreign Exchange Constraints in Economic Development and Efficient Aid Allocation', *Economic Journal*, No. 74, June 1964, pp. 388–409.
3. Brian May, *Third World Calamity* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).

that such changes occur autonomously, rather than in response to some change in material opportunities seems naive. To put the opposite point: the fact that most of the male labour force migrates from Lesotho to work for poor wages in the highly unpleasant conditions of the South African mines, suggests that the explanation for the extreme poverty of Lesotho cannot be that it has a materially unambitious population. The work practices of the Basotho demonstrate quite the reverse. In order to explain such phenomena, we have to look beyond socio-psychological explanations, to the economic opportunities presented by the international market and the material and institutional constraints which prevent the great majority of countries from properly exploiting them to their advantage.

For Singer and Ansari, the main reason why trade has not functioned as an engine of growth and development is that, in important respects, the international system does not operate in the ways which are required by the assumptions of the competitive model.[4] In order for the gains from trade to be distributed in the way predicted by the orthodox theory outlined earlier, it is necessary that the prices of factors and products traded in the international market reflect their true scarcity, that trade is unencumbered by tariffs and quotas, and that technology is free, and equally available to all trading partners. The authors argue that none of these assumptions hold in the real world, and that the circumstances of the international market work to the disadvantage of the poorer countries and to the advantage of the richer ones over time.

The structuralist critique of orthodox trade theory is well known. As world income grows, the demand for exports from the developed countries (typically manufactured goods) increases faster than the demand for exports from the developing countries (typically foodstuffs and other primary products); similarly, for given proportional increases in output under given demand conditions, the prices of primary products fall more sharply than those of manufactured goods; in addition, productivity increases in developed countries tend to be passed on in higher wages, rather than lower prices, whereas the reverse is the case for exports from the developing countries. Thirty years ago, Prebisch and Singer separately argued that for these and other reasons, systematic forces at work in world markets tend to reduce the gains to poor countries involved in international trade.[5]

Under such circumstances, further investment in the traditional food and raw material export industries of poor countries began to be questioned. It seemed likely that the benefits of such a strategy would mainly be captured by the industrialised world and that growth in the periphery would remain slow. A different strategy—that of protected import-substituting industrialisation—seemed the only viable alternative. By producing domestically selected manufactured imports, developing countries could save foreign exchange, increase domestic production and employment, and, when the industries were sufficiently established to reap the benefits of scale economies, their products could perhaps compete with those of the industrialised countries for export markets. This strategy has been widely followed—in Latin America, where it was first advocated, and elsewhere—but with only limited success. Whilst it has often created a useful diversification of the production structure and provided the basis, in some countries, for export-led growth, in others it has contributed to a stagnation of export revenues, increased the domestic costs of production and consumption by turning the internal terms of trade against agriculture, and often has not significantly saved foreign exchange since the products selected for domestic production often themselves required high imports of intermediate goods.

Whilst a good deal of space in their present volume is devoted to arguments against

4. Hans Singer and Javed Ansari, *Rich and Poor Countries*, 3rd edn. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).

5. See R. W. Prebisch, *Economic Development of Latin America and the Principal Problems* (New York: UNECLA, 1950); and H. W. Singer, 'The Gains from Trade', *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 1950.

the protectionist policies of the rich countries, Singer and Ansari are less concerned with the weaknesses in the assumptions made by orthodox theory about prices and terms of trade than with its assumptions about technology. They are concerned to show that the primary reason why industrialisation strategies in the Third World have not worked is that the technology used to promote industrial development has not reflected the real factor endowments of developing countries. On the contrary it has been developed by Western firms and corporations and imported to the Third World without modification. Production processes have been located in developing countries either to jump over tariff barriers, or to profit from cheap labour. But control of technology has remained in the hands of Western interests, and its development has reflected the relative factor availabilities of the industrialised countries. Thus, they argue that unemployment of labour in poor countries, and extreme shortage of capital outside the small modern sector are natural outcomes of this situation.

The solution, as Singer and Ansari see it, is not to abandon protected industrialisation since they remain pessimistic about the wisdom of a fundamental switch back to primary commodity exports. Rather, they argue that the products selected for protection should change—away from light consumer goods industries where the potential for technological innovation is limited, towards investment goods industries which will allow innovation in a more dynamic fashion. Whilst the authors are undoubtedly right that the incentives for innovation need restructuring, it is not so clear that this would be an automatic correlate of changing the product mix. To the extent that backward integration has been prevented by the small domestic market the demand constraint facing the profitable production of investment goods is even more acute than that facing most consumption products. More generally, with or without some shift in product choice, there remains a real question as to whether technologies for producing goods which are competitive with those manufactured in industrialised countries are conceivable which could also absorb the vast labour supplies available in the Third World at wage levels that provide significantly more than subsistence incomes. In other words, can the promotion of exports to industrialised countries provide a viable solution to the problems of employment and growth for more than a handful of developing countries? Or is there a need to seek other solutions?

The analysis of what was wrong with the praxis of import-substitution has been a preoccupation of development economists over the past decade. Leaving aside for a moment the neoclassical critique, most of the economic analysis of the reasons for failure has been in the structuralist tradition. At the risk of oversimplification, the following are the basic tenets of the structuralist argument: import-substituting policies have exacerbated balance-of-payments problems in part because industrialisation was heavily financed by foreign investment which was followed later by excessive repatriation of profits, and in part because the strategies were themselves import-intensive; industries were monopolistic and their inefficiency was protected by tariffs; they formed an enclave which paid high wages, which in turn led to a deterioration of income distribution, and did not absorb enough labour to produce the demand effects which would be needed if the process of industrialisation were to become self-sustaining; thus industrialisation tended to be focused upon products consumed by the rich, rather than those consumed by the masses; protection together with an absence of domestic innovation gave no incentive to shift to more labour-using technologies; thus the modern sector formed the basis for a distribution of power, property and income which was concentrated and exclusive; its workers had more in common with those in metropolitan countries, than with the rest of the population—the working poor, who remained excluded from formal employment. Implicit in the above diagnosis is the view that development is not necessarily completely blocked by structural constraints: 'better'—in some sense of the word—policies can lead to more beneficial and self-sustaining growth and

development. The distinguishing characteristic of the structuralist school, however, is that such changes will not be brought about by the freely working market mechanism. Again at risk of over-simplification, many analysts advocate an approach to policy reform affecting one or more of the following: the prices and distribution of ownership of capital and land; incomes and employment policies; education, health and the provision of other public services; regulation of commodity markets and technological transfer and change. National and international intervention in these areas of policy, it is argued, is capable of overcoming the structural constraints which have impeded most erstwhile attempts to accelerate industrial growth and employment creation.[6]

Another group of writers—often referred to as the 'dependency school'—whilst usually accepting the structuralist analysis of the reasons for past failures of industrialisation, takes a less optimistic view of the possibility of achieving policy change. This group emphasises the degree to which a country's incorporation into the international economy—particularly in terms of exports, imports and investment—necessarily constrains internal economic and political developments. Such patterns of economic and political dependence are, it is argued, inevitably nourished by the attempt to accelerate economic growth, and become the very reasons for the inability to achieve significant structural change. Two recent books discuss important aspects of the work of writers in this 'dependency school'.[7] The major weakness of both is that they imply that the structuralist economic analysis discussed above is a distinguishing characteristic of the dependency school. Whilst it *is* true that some of the early structuralist writers became prominent members of the dependency school (Prebisch, for example), there are many others who remained outside it. The importance of this is not so much to distinguish the type of economic analysis undertaken by both groups, as to be clear about the rather different conclusions that each tends to draw.

In terms of economic analysis, dependency theory has in fact added little to the structuralist analysis of the problems of development. Its main contribution has been to demonstrate the need for an inter-disciplinary (particularly political and historical as well as economic) analysis of the reasons why further capitalist development becomes difficult or impossible (depending upon the perspective of the writer). But at the same time, its political analysis has also been deeply controversial—particularly in the context of the Marxist debate, as Palma's paper[8] in the Seers volume ably shows. Here, the stage has been shared by those (Frank, Wallerstein and others) who argue that the development of 'core' economies necessarily requires the 'underdevelopment' of those in the periphery, and those (typified by Cardoso) who believe that capitalism is possible in the periphery, even if in a constrained, or dependent form. In Frank's early writings, the integration of peripheral states into the international system was seen as involving the automatic drain of surplus from the periphery to the centre. Since under this interpretation both economic and political power rests primarily with metropolitan states, and since they need to keep the periphery as 'satellites' to maintain their own sustenance, there can be no possibility of sustained development for the periphery within the system. The only option is to break the link with the centre, and to proceed to socialism without undertaking the intervening progressive capitalist phases thought to be required by more orthodox

6. Although the theoretical literature on these topics is vast, a document which synthesises both the theoretical approach and its policy implications is the ILO Employment report for Kenya: *Employment Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*, ILO, Geneva, 1973. The Brandt Report, *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, London, 1980, is a more recent example which concentrates upon the implications of this approach for international policy.

7. V. Kubalkova and A. A Cruickshank, *International Inequality* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Dudley Seers, ed., *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment* (London: Francis Pinter, 1981)

8 Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency and Development: A Critical Overview' in Seers, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–78

Marxist writers. As Palma points out, this debate is sterile—to deny that capitalist development is taking place in some countries of Latin America and Asia is absurd.

Perhaps because he recognises this, Frank's latest contribution to the discussion takes rather a different stance.[9] Although he retains the mechanistic world view which characterised his earlier work, his major theme is that the overproduction of capital during the past two decades, and the consequent competition in both product and factor markets, will lead to widespread 'super-exploitation' (by which he means paying wages which are less than subsistence costs) of workers in the Third World, and increased political repression by their governments to facilitate this process. Although not clearly stated, his view seems to be that the growth of peripheral capitalism will be matched always and everywhere with an increase of political and economic repression. He is unclear as to whether this will lead to revolution, and a breakdown in the world capitalist system or not. From the point of view of analytical rigour, this book reaches a new low. Universal statements are constantly made without supporting evidence of any kind, and where evidence is provided, this is often culled from somewhat dubious journalistic sources. Although he no longer engages in the dependency debate, analytic lessons from earlier criticisms of his work seem not to have been learned. This is a pity, since it tends to reflect badly on more careful scholars working in the same intellectual tradition. The discussion of dependency theory in Kubalkova and Cruickshank is the core of a wider attempt to analyse the ways in which the issues of equality and inequality are perceived in state systems other than the Western liberal democracies. To this end, they analyse the rationale for the policies of the Soviet Union and China towards the rest of the world, and attempt to explain the 'world views' emanating from those countries in terms of both the current ideologies of those states and their common Marxist-Leninist roots. The authors also, however, identify dependency theory with the 'world view' of Third World states. Here they are on difficult ground: it is not really possible to characterise *the* ideology of the Third World in the way in which that may be possible for the Soviet Union or China. Equally, whilst dependency theory is certainly a product of mainly Third World writers, it has not as yet had as much theoretical or political impact in Africa and Asia as it has in Latin America. Thus the authors fall into the trap of being too deterministic: whilst the South have common interests in negotiating with the North for a better deal, it is far from true that they share common theoretical explanations for their plight. For example the demands for a new international order, and for concessions on trade, aid and commodity prices can be justified in terms of structuralist, neo-Marxist or dependency approaches. Their existence as part of a common voice should not be taken to imply agreement over the causes of inequality, as the authors of this book suppose. The explanation of inequality between nations is as centrally important to the vast literature on development economics written since the early 1950s—much of it in the structuralist tradition—as it is to dependency theory. This mistake leads the authors to overlook, or ignore, much of the complexity of the development debate.

Negotiations between North and South over items on the agenda for a new international economic order will continue, but at present there appears to be little hope of making much progress. Northern governments view such measures as concessions, rather than as promoting mutual interests. Moreover, as we have seen, the competing theoretical paradigms would not generate an agreed position on all of these policies. However one item on the agenda—the proposal to increase the amount of regional co-operation amongst developing countries—does seem to be clearly in the interests of all groups. Economists from both neoclassical and structuralist schools would see this as a means of increasing market size and of increasing the likelihood of realising scale benefits (although the former would be uncomfortable about the erection of trade barriers against the rest of the world); dependency theorists would

9. Andre Gunder Frank, *Crisis: In the Third World* (London: Heinemann, 1981).

generally view it as a means of reducing metropolitan links, or at least of diversifying existing patterns of dependence. Only those who advocate semi-autarchic solutions (which are generally impracticable) would retain doubts. Equally, in terms of practical politics, this is hardly a move which the North can be seen to oppose. A recent UN publication sets out the arguments in favour of promoting increased regional co-operation, together with an analysis of the problems and historical lessons of such attempts.[10] Whilst the pamphlet does not sufficiently investigate the problems and benefits of different types of regionalism—there is no discussion for example of the choice between formal common markets, which everywhere have proved problematic, or more informal production and marketing agreements—it does provide a useful review of the arguments for regional economic co-operation. It is perhaps a pity that it does not include a discussion of the future of such arrangements amongst industrialised states, since regionalism may prove to be the only viable alternative to defensive nationalist protection in the 1980s—for rich and poor alike.[11]

Lessons for Western governments

Returning now to questions posed at the beginning of this article, it is interesting to ask what lessons, if any, the debates we have discussed may have for the economic choices facing Western governments. We have seen that just as in the national economic policy debate, there are sharp disagreements between structuralist and dependency theorists on the one hand, and neoclassical economists on the other, concerning the extent to which removing barriers to trade and investment, and 'getting the prices right' are sufficient conditions for promoting growth and development in the Third World. Neoclassical theorists tend to argue that Third World economies are capable of achieving such growth via the market, and that national and international policies to secure structural change and greater resource transfers are not required. But even if the case of the newly industrialising countries of Asia (the favourite examples cited by such writers[12]) could be universalised—which is doubtful since their growth has been based upon penetration of existing markets in the context of declining productivity in Europe and the United States, rather than representing a significant net addition to world production—the balance of evidence suggests that their growth has been based upon highly interventionist government policies. As the paper by Bienefeld in the volume edited by Seers shows, state intervention in these countries has involved extensive protection of infant industries using tariff and subsidy policies, government investment to establish and support major production projects, massive state borrowing abroad to help shield the private sector from risk, continued involvement in the labour market to minimise wages and labour costs, and state encouragement of the growth of domestic technological capacity. The balance of policies followed differs between these countries, but it is clearly incorrect to attribute their growth record to freely working market forces in such circumstances.

It can be argued, then, that the experience of the newly industrialising countries provides a vindication of the structuralist, although not necessarily of the dependency, position. Major questions can be raised about the social and political effects of the particular policies which some of these countries have pursued. It remains an open but important question as to whether such policies are necessary correlates. Meanwhile,

10. Ervin Laszlo, with Joel Kurtzman and A. K. Bhattacharya, *Regional Cooperation among Developing Countries: the New Imperative of Development in the 1980s*, UNITAR and Pergamon, New York, 1981.

11. On this theme, see Dudley Seers 'Inflation: A Sketch for a Theory of World Inflation', *IDS Discussion Paper* 169, Sussex, November 1981

12 See, for example, I. M. D. Little, 'The Experience and Causes of Rapid Labour-Intensive Development in Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore: And the Possibilities of Evaluation' (Geneva; ILO-ARTEP, WP II-1, Working Paper). Also Bauer, *op. cit.*

however, they appear to suggest a number of general lessons if economic growth is to be led by the manufacturing sector in current international economic conditions: first, subsidies and other measures will continue to be required in order to benefit from economies of scale and to promote conditions for the generation of external economies; second, carefully monitored protection will be needed in order to ensure that international competition promotes greater efficiency rather than destroys industrial capacity; third, state action to secure effective transfer of technology and build up domestic technological capacity is required; fourth, whilst maintenance of the level of domestic investment is crucial, strong state intervention is needed in order to regulate the terms of entry of foreign capital, if future instability is to be avoided.

It is not suggested that the above measures could provide a panacea for all countries: in any case, manufacturing-based export strategies will be impossible for many whose population size, skill structure, location or resource base impose significant competitive disadvantages. Many others, including those rich in minerals, will continue to base their strategy upon primary commodity exports. The major point for our purposes, however, is that those whose export (or import-substituting) strategy is based upon manufacturing will find these lessons important. Furthermore, there is no *a priori* reason why this is less true of the mature industrialised economies whose competitive advantage in established manufactures has been undermined in recent years, or where structural change away from old product lines towards new ones is now necessary as a result of international competition and the introduction of new technologies. In circumstances where interdependence amongst the European economies is increasing, where domestic markets are being increasingly penetrated by imports, where balance-of-payments crises, inflation and unemployment are endemic, and where domestic productivity continues to fall, the structuralist argument should be of more than passing interest.

If inflation in part stems from structural rigidities in the world economy, as we would argue, it is not clear that monetarist policies as presently practised will do more than preside over the export of domestic financial capital, a fall in real incomes, and, in view of monopolistic labour markets, a redistribution of income from those displaced from work to those remaining in it. These results would be consistent with only a marginal fall in the domestic rate of inflation. Moreover, the Keynesian approach depends crucially upon restoring domestic productivity using incomes policy and other instruments, whilst securing growth through an expansion of domestic demand. This, however, does little to change the pattern of demand in ways in which the structuralist would take to be necessary, nor does it tackle the technology problem which may have even greater impact upon productivity and competitiveness. The counterpart of supply, of course, is demand. Whilst state intervention may initially be needed to restore competitiveness, exports can continue to expand only in the context of growing world income. Otherwise one becomes involved in a competitive vicious circle which successively reduces labour incomes in order to preserve the existing national share of a static world market. Restoration of growth in the OECD economies is clearly fundamental to this process. In addition, however, domestic policies need to be supplemented by an acceptance of the structural constraints preventing sustained growth of peripheral economies which were discussed earlier. This implies some recognition of the fact that real resource transfers—via both aid and trade policies—to the Third World are required, to increase their production and incomes, and thus to sustain their demand for the products which the industrialised world (both old and new) needs to produce, and which it has the capacity to supply.

Economists in the West have been facing a theoretical crisis for some years. The intellectual divisions in their ranks have probably never been deeper. There is substantial disagreement not only about how economics should be taught, but also about *what* economics should be taught in the universities. The crisis arises primarily

from the increasing inability of orthodox theory to explain and predict the underlying movement of Western market economies. This theoretical inadequacy is reflected in the political arena where the fundamentally different economic strategies with which the electorate is confronted are probably more polarised than at any other time in the last thirty years.

Under such circumstances it might appear unhelpful to argue that the range of debate should be further extended. Yet it seems increasingly clear that orthodox economists are mistaken in regarding development economics as a branch of theory having little relevance to the problems of industrialised economies. The crucial issue for economists working on both industrialised and developing countries is the same: to what extent the free market can be the ally and main vehicle for achieving continued growth and development. The conventional wisdom in development economics has been, for many years, that the freely working national and international market will not succeed in achieving these goals for poor countries. In such circumstances, the challenge for economic policy is to provide mechanisms to help and support the market—and in some areas of policy, to replace it. Whilst in principle this is no different from the Keynesian position, in practice, Keynesians, structuralists and dependency theorists would provide different approaches to the nature of the 'help' required, and the policy prescriptions implied by their respective analytic frameworks would also differ substantially. Whilst this perhaps runs the risk of adding to present confusion, it would make the debate richer and—more important—more realistic.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

Law and International Resource Conflicts. By J. E. S. Fawcett and Audrey Parry. *Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press) for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1981. 254 pp. £20·00.*

THE 1973–74 oil crisis meant that the international economic order was never to be the same again. The comfortable situation whereby the developed economies enjoyed the benefits of cheap raw materials from their poorer relations was over. Now the power of the producer countries could be used to extract political and economic concessions from the Northern states. The realisation of this power, and a willingness to use it, brought into question the prevailing economic order and the legal system that helped to preserve it. Out of this the idea of the New International Economic Order was developed; something more radical was required than minor changes to the status quo. Such changes could be achieved by force, economic or political pressure, international law, or a combination of all these. Obviously if an ordered change was desired then the role of international law would be of paramount importance, and this is the subject matter of Fawcett and Parry.

Previous works produced under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs have identified the areas of conflict likely to arise. The present work attempts to see how these can be contained or prevented and the legal reaction to them. The study is divided into three parts: the Handling of Resource Conflicts; The Prevention and Resolution of Particular Resource Conflicts; and the Conclusions. In addition the annexes contain a number of tables on subjects such as foreign investment, the classification of countries into developed and developing, and world energy consumption. A number of documents are also included such as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties and the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Although these documents are useful when going through the text, their inclusion might be thought rather indulgent in view of high publication costs.

The authors draw a number of preliminary conclusions in the section of the book on The Handling of Resource Conflicts and these are illustrated and tested when dealing with particular resource conflicts. Here the applicability of rules and standards to specific resource conflicts are considered. One area of particular interest is the reaction of the international community to foreign investment, an area of great concern to the developed countries who stand to lose valuable overseas assets. It is pointed out in the survey how there has been a marked shift away from the traditional approach of international law, which tended to protect overseas investment, to one centred on national law and bilateral agreements. This is indicative of the lack of confidence in the traditional rules of international law which now play a less important role. Also considered is the role of law in the Management of the Commodity Trade, scarce resources (where the authors point to two legal principles in operation: the equitable sharing of resources and the liability for damage and its prevention), oil, nuclear material and outer space.

In their Conclusions the authors point out that in certain areas voluntary

agreements, such as the codes of conduct for linear agreements, are effective. But they then stress that in areas such as the control of export quotas, the contractual element of a legal agreement is necessary. They also note the importance of international law in the codification and declaration of principles such as the law of the sea and outer space. It is also in these areas that international regimes similar to that in Antarctica are utilised. Finally the authors refer to the linear relationship between law and policy and consider that 'law has a magnitude too whether its use is regulatory, constraining or merely tactical'.

The book is of the high quality that is expected of two such eminent lawyers. It is a thoughtful, well-informed study of an extremely serious problem facing the international community. Although international law does not have the complete answer, it is clear that it does have a significant role to play in international resource conflicts.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN WILLIAMS

The Constitution of Northern Ireland: Problems and Prospects. Edited by David Watt. *London: Heinemann for the NIESR, PSI, and RIIA. 1981. 227 pp. (Joint Studies in Public Policy, 4) 227 pp. Pb: £7·50.*

THIS book is the end-product of a conference, held in London in June 1981, whose purpose was to examine the Northern Ireland problem from a number of perspectives: historical, demographic, economic, political, and so on. The participants in the conference, and the contributors to this volume are, for the most part, academics and journalists with varying degrees of expertise in the topics covered. The book carries its aim of calm detachment almost to the point of superciliousness: Lord Vaizey's sketch of the 'republican mind' and Bruce Arnold's nit-picking scrutiny of Haughey's public statements on Anglo-Irish co-operation, both seem to mock their subjects. The whole tone of this approach is set in the Introduction where David Watt, worrying that we may find the book 'too rational', tells us that 'in order to understand madness, one need not be altogether mad' (p. 3).

Happily, not all the contributors approach their chosen subject with such disdain. Dr A. T. Q. Stewart's analysis of the 'mind of Protestant Ulster', for example, is a warning against any superficial interpretation of the unionist mentality. As Dr Stewart makes clear, there are two 'minds' in Ulster Protestantism: the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterians and it is only their shared aversion to Catholicism that allows their mutual antagonism to be suppressed. Has there been a Protestant siege mentality? Yes, says Dr Stewart, but also periodic justification for it. Was partition the cause of the problem? No, says Dr Stewart, it was the necessary consequence of a problem that had long existed (p. 43). Unfortunately, Dr Stewart's services to the Unionist cause are not reciprocated by Lord Vaizey's attempts to comprehend the 'mind of republicanism'. For one thing, republicanism is not a true alternative to Protestant Ulster since it was 'in the minds of Protestant Ulster that Irish Republicanism was born' (p. 31). For another, Lord Vaizey does not draw nearly enough distinctions between northern Catholics and the inhabitants of the Republic. In fact, one of the most serious defects in this book is the lack of any adequate spokesman for the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. As Professor Murphy says, in a 'comment' on Lord Vaizey's paper, the Provisional IRA may well be sustained by the myths of history, but 'there is nothing mythical about the sea which intermittently enables these terrorist fish to swim' (p. 69). Yet, instead of a serious treatment of the Catholic predicament in Northern Ireland, the reader is exposed to a series of caricatures of the Irish national character.

By way of contrast, Paul Compton's analysis of demographic trends is a good example of the research currently being done in Northern Ireland. He estimates that it will be well into the next century before Catholics become a majority in Northern Ireland and, even then, there is no certainty that they would vote themselves out of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, his suggestion that there was nothing wrong in principle with partition—it was its 'messy execution' that was wrong—ignores the nature of half a century of Stormont rule thereafter. The legacy of partition might have had a chance of success had the Unionists avoided what Mansergh delicately refers to as 'needless affront' (p. 19). This would have pre-empted a feeling in the Catholic community, noted by Dermot McAleese (p. 121), that its only chance of obtaining a fair deal was in the context of a united Ireland. It is this conviction, and not naked irredentism, that explains the chronic nature of the conflict.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. 2nd edn. By James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *New York, London: Harper and Row. 1981. 592pp. Pb: £8·95.*

Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are We to Think? 3rd edn. By Patrick M. Morgan. *New Brunswick, NJ, London: Transaction. (Distributed by Holt-Saunders Ltd, Eastbourne). 1981. 293pp. £19·00. Pb: £7·50.*

THE quest for theory has been one of the characteristic features of the postwar American study of international relations, and it is indicative of the continued vitality of this effort that these two surveys of the literature are now in their second and third editions respectively.

The contrasting styles and approaches of the two books are highlighted by their subtitles. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff's 'Comprehensive Survey' is a dense, eclectic book which contains summaries of many authors and studies; the well-stocked footnotes constitute a useful bibliography of current research. Some chapters deal with general theories of international politics (environmental, power and realist, and systemic theories), but most are devoted to such topics as conflict (five chapters), integration, regionalism, alliances, decision-making, game theory, bargaining, and gaming.

A rather spurious unity is imposed on the survey by a diagram of boxes connected by arrows which precedes the first chapter. Moreover, when the authors venture beyond their task of summarising the research and theories of others, their own dicta do not exactly inspire confidence, for example: 'All Marxist analysis has a "holier-than-thou" quality to it' (p. 239), and 'Rationality is a transcendental notion which cannot be precisely defined' (p. 387).

As Morgan's subtitle suggests, his purpose is 'to encourage [the new student] to think intelligently about international politics' (p. 1). In this undertaking he is largely successful, primarily because he provides more sustained analysis and criticism of the theories and approaches he presents than do Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. His chapter divisions follow a fairly systematic levels-of-analysis pattern: the individual, group, nation-state (three chapters), region, and international system. The final chapter examines how what he calls 'quantitative macroanalysis' has been applied to the question 'What causes war?'.

The author's breezy style (e.g. 'all I can do is try to whet your appetite with what I hope will be a tasty sample' [p. 45]), and his jokey chapter titles (e.g. 'A System, a System, the Kingdom Is a System' [ch. 6]), may be regarded by some as too great a concession to readability. The bibliographical footnotes are helpful but less ample than those of Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. The text is illustrated with a considerable number of tables and figures, some of which are rather too complex.

Both books contain sensible introductory chapters on the possibilities and pitfalls of theorising about international relations. In the final chapter of each there is a nod in the direction of normative theory; this seems regrettably inadequate given the amount of American and British work which has been done lately in this area.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

The Independence of Nations. By David Fromkin. *New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 171 pp. $9.95. Pb: $5.95.*

World Politics: The Menu for Choice. By Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr. *San Francisco, Oxford: Freeman. 1981. 596 pp. £11·95.*

FLYING in the face of the prevailing conventional wisdom that we are living in an interdependent world where domestic and foreign policy are becoming indistinguishable, David Fromkin in a provocative book argues that 'power politics' continues to provide the only acceptable framework for studying international relations. Written in the mould of what Hedley Bull calls the 'classical' approach, the book is littered with references to its exponents: Martin Wight, Hans J. Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, Frederick Schuman, Bull himself, and, almost inevitably, Thucydides. The architects of 'complex interdependence'—Keohane and Nye—are, on the other hand, accused of 'mischievous brilliance' having, by sleight of hand, convinced most of their colleagues of the importance of essentially erroneous ideas.

While acknowledging an important debt to these earlier writers working in the 'classical' tradition, Fromkin asserts that, in general, they have failed to stress sufficiently the unique characteristics of international relations. This is seen as the result of drawing upon concepts formulated in political science which are not only inappropriate but also misleading when extended to the international arena. Plato and Aristotle discussed politics in the context of an imaginary state devoid of external relations and subsequent political scientists, it is asserted, have failed to develop tools which can usefully be employed by the international relations' specialist.

Nevertheless, Fromkin identifies a persistent tendency to think of international politics as an extension of domestic politics. Even Morgenthau is taken to task for suggesting that politics is a struggle for power, thereby establishing a common framework for looking at politics in the domestic and international arenas. Fromkin insists that while international politics does indeed involve a struggle for power, or, as he prefers to express it, independence, domestic politics is concerned with centralised authority and rule governed behaviour, neither of which has any place in relations among states.

The originality of the thesis is overstated. The distinction between domestic and international politics provides the basis for a mandatory examination question on almost any introductory course on international relations. At the same time, the argument is pushed harder and further than would be considered acceptable in an undergraduate's answer. For Fromkin, surprisingly, considering he is an international lawyer, there are no global values and no international rules. This is power politics pulled to its limits.

From Fromkin's perspective each nation operates in dangerous waters and he sees

himself as willing to look over the side at the turbulence below. Too many others, he asserts, fail or fear to confront the reality of our disturbing situation—with unfortunate consequences. He cites the example of the many academics and practitioners who believe that conflict in the international arena can be resolved using domestic instruments and who consequently fail to examine those mechanisms which have in practice proved more important in the resolution of international conflict. The Library of Congress is said to contain over 600 books relating to the settlement of international disputes by courts and tribunals and only two on partition. There is no doubt in Fromkin's mind that partition has often provided a vital solution to conflicts among nations, while international courts have been, at best, of only marginal significance. He provides many other examples of myopic tendencies in the discipline.

Fromkin's stimulating discussion, however, comes to a thoroughly pedestrian end. War, it is stated, has always been the ultimate arbiter in international relations and the paradox in the contemporary world is that nuclear weapons have, in many cases, rendered this option unacceptable. The book concludes that since world government does not represent a feasible goal, national governments have no alternative but to rely on the kind of balance of power diplomacy which maintained peace at the end of the nineteenth century. This is an essentially ahistorical view of international relations; it presumes that nothing of substance has changed since Thucydides. In looking over the side, Fromkin has forgotten to look to the horizon.

Fromkin offers a brilliant and clearly articulated view of international relations; Russett and Starr provide more stolid fare. *World Politics* is yet another American textbook giving an overview of the subject. It covers everything from the multinational corporation and the military industrial complex to the impact of stress on decision-makers and the contribution of sociobiology. It is replete with diagrams, together with two photographs of President Carter, before and after office (a visual display of the effect of stress). As a general textbook *World Politics* has much to recommend it. Not only is it comprehensive, it also embraces a lot of behavioural research in an easy-to-digest form.

These two books ostensibly provide general introductions to international relations. They approach their task, however, from very different perspectives. Russett and Starr wish to display the complex range of activity going on in the discipline. Fromkin wants to provide a general framework which reveals what is important and what is peripheral. From Fromkin there is the danger of over-simplification; from Russett and Starr there is the danger of not being able to see the wood for the trees. Both perspectives are necessary.

University of Lancaster RICHARD LITTLE

Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits. Edited by Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. *Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by George Prior, London). 216 pp. £12·50.*

The Prudent Peace: Law as Foreign Policy. By John A. Perkins. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1981. 246 pp. £19·60.*

THE fundamental question of justice in international relations has yet to receive a fully satisfactory general treatment, although there has been much interesting and valuable work done lately. The two books under review suggest how diverse the various approaches to this issue are.

Brown and Shue's *Boundaries* is a product of the University of Maryland's Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, from which some of the best writing on ethics and international relations has come in recent years. The contributors to this volume

present a genuine debate across disciplinary specialisms on the question: what difference do and should national boundaries make to the way in which individuals, corporations and governments behave towards and judge people?

The book opens with 'The Distribution of Membership', a characteristically trenchant essay by Michael Walzer which elaborates the theory of autonomous political communities implicit in his *Just and Unjust Wars*. The ethical importance of these reflections lies in Walzer's claim that 'the members of a political community have a collective right to shape the resident population', subject to certain limiting factors (p. 23), and a corresponding duty of mutual aid to those 'strangers' who are outside the political community. It is the former which shapes what Walzer calls a nation's 'admissions policies' with regard to immigration, naturalisation and guest workers, each of which receives brief discussion.

The problem of migrant workers is then treated by Elsa M. Chaney in much more factual detail in order to buttress her objection to some of Walzer's 'evaluative judgments'. Judith Lichtenberg follows with a philosophical critique of Walzer's position which makes a moral case for a cosmopolitan view of relations among nations. Her argument centres on the principle of the avoidance of harm to those who are found within 'our world' (a 'world' having been defined as a moral community), and on the assertion that 'our world' is at present coterminous with the planet.

Walzer's brief but useful reply to his two critics marks in effect the halfway point of the book. The remaining three chapters explore the moral arguments against exporting hazardous manufacturing technologies from the United States to Third World countries (Henry Shue), a state's ability to protect its citizens from the depredations of transnational corporations in the modern world economy (Thomas J. Biersteker), and the extent to which it is proper for Western democracies to judge the political systems of developing countries by their own standards (Charles R. Beitz). In short, this is a collection of unusually high quality and coherence; all the essays are published here for the first time, although an earlier version of Shue's has previously appeared in a journal.

While the contributors to *Boundaries* explore relatively uncharted territory, John A. Perkins follows well-worn paths in *The Prudent Peace*. The author, a partner in a Boston law firm which gave him a six-month sabbatical in 1978 to complete the book, has a commitment to his theme which dates back to the closing months of the Second World War, and his book is very much in the tradition of the idealism-realism debate about American foreign policy which took place in the early postwar years. Reversing the usual formula, he examines the ways in which 'right makes might', i.e. how a foreign policy based on international law can also be an effective or prudent foreign policy. His conception of international law is that of a strategy for the resolution of conflict rather than a constraint on states' conduct.

The centrepiece of the book is an exposition of what he calls 'emerging law' in such areas as self-determination, nonintervention, regional security zones, international rights in strategic areas, and international rights of access to resources. In Perkins's view, the concept of emerging law includes 'principles, which, even if not received as binding law, still command the respect of the international community, and which . . . functionally operate as law' (p. 54). This formula in effect justifies a rather questionable reliance on United Nations General Assembly resolutions, a number of which are listed in the appendices.

All this leads up to a proposal for a Voluntary Adjudication Tribunal for resolving disputes in the areas of emerging law, on the grounds that 'it is in our national interest to fashion a realistic process of adjudication that we can accept now' (p. 143). Perkins is candid enough to acknowledge that 'we are not likely to be taken up on the adjudication option very often' (p. 163), which makes one wonder about the potential usefulness of the idea.

The author's focus on United States foreign policy and his plea for adjudication suggest that his book will not find a place beside such comparable studies as Louis Henkin's *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy* and Roger Fisher's *Points of Choice*. There is an unacceptable number of misprints for a book costing over £19·00 from a distinguished university press.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

War and Change in World Politics. By Robert Gilpin. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 272 pp. £12·50.*

ROBERT GILPIN'S world is that of Thucydides with telephones and ICBMS. It is a world characterised by the struggle of nations and states for power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global anarchy:

> Nuclear weapons have not made the resort to force irrelevant; economic interdependence does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy. The fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states, just as it was in the past (p. 230).

Gilpin's thesis is persuasive, and it is a powerful intellectual corrective for any swayed by those theorists of international relations in recent years who have exaggerated the moderating and stabilising influences of economic interdependence and the destructiveness of modern weapons.

Gilpin's aim is to identify 'recurrent patterns, common elements, and general tendencies in the major turning points in international history' (p. 3). In this he has succeeded well, if sometimes at an unhelpfully high level of generalisation. But this was a risk he accepted at the outset, in choosing to treat 'significant matters with imprecision' rather than 'explain trivial matters with exactitude' (p. xiii). In its attempt to grapple with the central issues of the subject, the book is a welcome change from the ephemeral micro-analysis on which so many international relations scholars spend their time, and with which editors subsequently fill their journals. Thucydides would never have made the *International Studies Quarterly*.

In his analysis of the forces which cause change in the international system Gilpin welds history, sociology, and economic theory in a sophisticated fashion. He has a sure touch, if sometimes his careful findings border on the banal. Do we need a footnote to Hedley Bull to be persuaded that the 'more potentially destructive a war seemed to be, the less the probability of its occurring' (p. 216)? If the theory offered in *War and Change in World Politics* is sometimes less than first meets the eye, this remains an impressive book. It is a literate and profound survey of the present state of world politics. Unlike other books purporting to explain the contemporary international system, this one is not constrained either by the narrowness which comes from thinking about world politics as if the activity began only in 1945, or by the belief that the only important trends have been those conventionally regarded as 'political'. So impressive is this book that if Thucydies were to return to earth for a day, and ask 'what's happening?' one could do no better than present him with a copy of Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics*, and leave him to get on with a few hours of stimulating reading.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima. By Michael Mandelbaum. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 283 pp. £17·50. Pb: £5·95.*

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM'S latest book is the final part of a trilogy based on the study of nuclear weapons. In this volume the author sets out to consider, from a number of different perspectives, one of the central questions of international politics: how has nuclear military technology affected the world in which we live? More specifically the focus is placed on how nuclear weapons have affected such things as disarmament, the balance of power, alliances, the arms race, the politics of leadership, and 'the psychology of vulnerability'.

The approach adopted by Professor Mandelbaum is particularly useful and illuminating to those students of strategic studies who are used to dealing with mainly post-Second World War development. The method adopted is both historical and comparative. Drawing liberally on the experiences of such events as the Peloponnesian war, the Napoleonic era and the First World War, the author traces the significant continuities of the present with the past as well as the fundamental changes brought about by the dramatic expansion of the destructive power unleashed in 1946, with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The result is an impressive analysis which helps to sharpen and deepen our understanding of many of the crucial strategic issues facing us today.

If the work has a flaw it is that although the various chapters are intended to stand on their own, the central theme is not always as clear towards the end of the book as it is in the beginning. A final chapter which brought the strands of the various arguments together would have rounded off more effectively an otherwise excellent study.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN BAYLIS

The Great Power Triangle. By Gerald Segal. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 195 pp. £15·00.*

THIS particular study in international geometry seeks to demonstrate 'the value of perceiving the international system as a triangle' (p. 1) and to posit that the triangular relationship among the Americans, Russians and Chinese in the 1960s was *the* great power triangle to be esteemed above all others among the triads spotted by the geopolitical pundits of that and the succeeding decade. The bulk of the monograph (pp. 9–146) is given over to separate case studies of events or factors that illustrate the impact of Chinese policy on the two super-powers between 1961 and 1969: the civil war in Laos, the border war with India, the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, and efforts to control the nuclear arms race after China went nuclear in 1964. Each case is tied to their relevance for the issues of stability, crisis management, and deterrence and the Soviet Union is seen as the pivotal power in the triangular relationship during the decade up to 1968.

Dr Segal's researches into American archival materials, especially those in the Kennedy Library, have yielded a number of important insights into American policy in the early 1960s in particular. The evidence is marshalled to support the contention that the exponents in the 1970s of a tripolar conception of international politics need to challenge accepted views about a basically bipolar character of the politics of the 1960s and to perceive that these are 'better understood in terms of a more complex

triangular pattern of relations' (p. 3). Swords are crossed with some American policy-makers of the time, notably Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, whose thinking is seen as indicative of 'a deep-seated misunderstanding of the great power triangle' (p. 113). Although mention is made of Chinese aspirations as early as 1949 for an independent role in world politics, it is argued that this desire was 'not fulfilled in the 1950s, but it was increasingly satisfied in the 1960s' (p. 1). That there is a certain doubt about the exact origins of this tripolarity in the author's mind is suggested in the subsequent remark that 'the birth of the triangle clearly lay in the 1950s' (p. 7) rather than the 1960s. It is unfortunate that Chinese initiatives of the 1950s in Korea, Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and at Bandung are entirely omitted in the introductory chapter 'because this is too complex an issue to be dealt with in a rapid review' (p. 7), since these are rather intimately related both to the Asian crises of the 1960s and super-power responses to Chinese involvement in them.

These particular crises suggest rather strongly the significance of China as a regional actor which *can* influence the strategic balance at the global level, but perhaps only rather intermittently. Perhaps the strongest case for tripolarity is made in connection with China's emergence as a nuclear power after 1964, but this appears to have been a temporary phenomenon connected to super-power fears of a potentially disastrous connection between the domestic political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution and the use of nuclear weapons to further the goals of one domestic faction or another. Since then, the ringing revolutionary rhetoric of the Maoist era has faded amid the lamentations of past admirers about the drift along the capitalist road, and even the applause of appreciative foreign capitalists has been distinctly muted as overambitious plans for the economy have faltered once more. The case for tripolarity, already hedged about with many a wise and modest caveat in the introduction, is equally muted and couched in rather half-hearted terms in the book's conclusion that 'the notion of a tripolar great power configuration did not cease to have relevance for the more recent years' (p. 147). While the study of triads is indisputably of no small interest to an understanding of relationships, the overestimation of China's wider international role is a snare with many precedents. The apparent attempt by President Carter to play the China card in evident attempts at the encirclement of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s was rather quickly outmanoeuvred by the counterthrust toward the Middle East. In this connection, Saudi Arabia's decisions on oil price levels did not cease to have global relevance after 1973, but it would strain credibility somewhat to examine the triadic relationships with the super-powers, the other two leading producers of oil in the world, and seek to erect any very substantial model about emerging tripolarity in the international system on these. The China factor cannot be ignored or neglected, as Chinese exchanges with Reagan and Brezhnev in the spring of 1982 suggested, but it takes more than triangular pegs to fill round holes.

University of Sussex J. W. M. CHAPMAN

International Arms Procurement: New Directions. Edited by Martin Edmonds. *New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 227 pp. $24.00.*

Estimating Foreign Military Power. Edited by Philip Towle. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 210 pp. £13·95.*

THE plethora of mediocre collections of readings and edited conference proceedings that flow from publishers lowers one's expectations of such products. It is rare to find an edited volume that contains contributions of a consistently high standard. It is even rarer to find contributions from different authors that dovetail together to make a

coherent whole. The eleven well-documented chapters of *International Arms Procurement* are calculated to dispel such negative thoughts. An excellent opening chapter by Martin Edmonds sets both the parameters of the debate and the standard of the volume. The book then moves by careful stages to examine the political and economic problems of international, military equipment partnerships, continues with three case studies, and concludes by examining the international organisational aspects of the question.

Two early chapters by Stephen Chaffer and Cindy Cannizzo examine the problems and progress within NATO, the organisation that—to the perhaps surprising exclusion of Japan—provides the major focus of the whole volume. Both chapters highlight the political nature of arms procurement, and the problem of co-operation between sovereign states belonging to an alliance that may not endure indefinitely. Carl Groth (Chapter 4) examines both macro- and micro-economic consequences in the course of analysing production alternatives, but emphasises that coproduction is not always beneficial to either the alliance as a whole or to the partners involved. Keith Hartley (Chapter 6) skilfully takes up the task of destroying many of the myths surrounding procurement. But even his careful economic arguments have to face the fact that although, 'Economic models show the potential cost savings from standardisation . . . actual decisions occur in the political marketplace' (p. 111).

It is in this context of the acceptance of 'hard nosed' political decisions that David Greenwood's suggestions that collaborative collaboration should proceed *'a la carte'* seems out of place. After a trenchant analysis of the weakness of the present techniques and aspirations Greenwood's own prescriptions require complete information on equipment, missions, numbers, budgets etc. to be available, and for this information to be subject to 'independent and authoritative analysis' (p. 91). That the world of procurement is not populated by the statesmen needed by Greenwood is evident from the three case studies on the Roland missile (Richard Fast), the Main Battle Tank (Mark Metcalf and Martin Edmonds) and Tornado (Rae Angus). In this world of realpolitik, narrow domestic pressure groups *do* affect decisions, exchange rates *are* 'rigged', mutual suspicions *do* stifle the complete exchange of information and only the United Kingdom divulges the secrets of Chobham Armour in a manner 'entirely compatible with NATO RSI principles, even if not in the best commercial interests of the UK' (p. 151).

The industrial management of international procurement projects receives least attention. Bernard Udis draws attention to the problem in his informative chapter on European ventures in aerospace and Rae Angus gives considerable details of the Panavia organisation, but no single chapter is devoted to this most vexed of problems. This is a pity for, as William Bajusz suggests, it has probably contributed substantially to the early failure of some projects.

In all, this is an excellent volume that must become an early candidate for the title 'A seminal work'.

By contrast with the tautness of the Edmonds volume, that edited by Philip Towle is rambling and diverse. After a promising thirty-page Introduction discussing the nature of power, the volume launches into three chapters on Russia and the Soviet Union, forming Part One of the volume. Of these three chapters that by R. Huisken on Soviet military expenditure is the most useful for contemporary analysis. C. D. Bellamy, examining British views on Russia and vice versa, manages to move in fourteen lines from the Mongols via Clausewitz and the seventeenth century Russian Army to the Russo-Finnish war, hovercraft and helicopters (p. 53). Geoffrey Jukes's attack (ch. 3) on intelligence systems and their shortcomings is well written and hard hitting.

The next five chapters, grouped inexplicably together in Part Two as 'The Power of the New States', include two chapters estimating Japanese power—British estimates

1900–1914 and Australian estimates 1905–1941; one chapter on British naval perceptions between the wars; one arrogantly written and self-congratulatory chapter by R. Rikhye on 'Recent Indian Experience'; and an attempt to assess the Arab-Israeli balance. Africa and Latin America appear to be geographical areas devoid of military power. The book concludes with a short essay by Michael Howard on the forgotten dimensions of strategy, which forms the whole of the third part of the volume.

Each contribution may, alone, be instructive (though one doubts even that in the case of Rikhye's chapter) but there is a total lack of framework in which to place the parts. Only Geoffrey Till (ch. 6) makes any real attempt to discuss the methodology of assessing foreign military power, and to analyse the deficiencies of estimation in his particular period in such a way as to make the chapter anything other than 'interesting reading'.

The book as a whole lacks direction and purpose—though there *is* a need for a book about the subject of the title. In contrast to the Edmonds volume this is not a book to buy when funds are short.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

The Internal Fabric of Western Security. Edited by Gregory Flynn. *Totowa, NJ: Allenheld Osmun; London: Croom Helm for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs. 1981. 249 pp. £15·95.*

PRODUCT of an extended exercise by the Paris-based Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, this volume comprises a review of the domestic problems facing the defence authorities of the four largest members of the Alliance, sandwiched between introductory and final sections in which the editor sets the scene and draws conclusions. If Gregory Flynn's opening chapter emphasises the continuities underlying the West's security situation, his second concentrates more on the challenges that make for new problems in the 1980s—a case of *plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change?* While the treatment here tends to the abstract and schematic the views expressed are sensible and balanced. In particular, Flynn brings out the economic difficulties that are a potential influence for disintegration in NATO quite as much as any of those more commonly identified.

In the country studies that follow, Yves Laulan had the disadvantage of writing prior to the change of regime in France, but his chapter establishes clearly enough the framework within which President Mitterand too will be bound to operate; so that, even if style may change, substance is unlikely to do so in any marked degree. True, internal political tensions, together with economic constraints and a continued lessening of Gaullist orthodoxy, may well modify the contradictions which Laulan regards as inherent in the position of 'independence within alliance'. Yet, as he says, 'it must be recognised that [this] would leave unresolved the fundamental French problem, of a dispersal of objectives *and* the inadequacy of equipment and means' (p. 126).

Professor Martin's account of British postwar defence policy evinces much of the cogency of his Reith lectures. He is less concerned over any serious questioning in Britain of the central importance of NATO than he is at the practical effects of economic decline. Despite, however, the growth of nuclear pacifism—which has only increased since his paper was written—and the doubt he casts on some of the argument for preserving a British deterrent, he does not expect the strategic nuclear programme to be sacrificed, short of politico-economic catastrophe. He also sees the probable impact of defence cuts on rival Service claims as entailing 'an equal spread of misery', rather than any straight choice between BAOR and the Royal Navy.

In 'The Italian Paradox' Stefano Silvestri contrasts the familiar weaknesses of his country's state and society with the effective consensus that has somehow managed to insulate foreign and security policy from the *conjoncture* of events, as well as from the efforts of those who want, or profess to want, to bring about radical change. He lists a number of unsolved problems in the security field, but notes that the:

> general belatedness of the debate, [which] corresponds directly to the conviction that Italy is relatively marginal to the West's defensive system, could have alarming consequences should changes in the international picture require Italy to play a more active role. Accustomed to draw stability from the system, she could be unprepared to supply it (p. 151).

Lastly, as important as any, is the article by Josef Joffe (of Hamburg's *Die Zeit*), pointing to tendencies that could upset the steadiness hitherto maintained by Germany in defence matters: notably an incipient nationalism *vis-à-vis* the United States; and the implications, political and economic, of its evolving relations with Eastern Europe. In the main however his analysis is a reasonably confident one, not least in scouting the possibility of any 'new Rapallo'. 'Barring cataclysmic upheavals, West Germany security choices in the 1980s are not likely to transcend the framework laid down by past generations' (p. 94).

In summing up, Gregory Flynn seeks to get to grips with prospective threats to the health of the Alliance, which he makes no attempt to play down. The ingredients in his argument may not be very new—they could perhaps hardly be—but he pulls the threads together in convincing fashion; and ends with an appeal for leadership, and shared concepts, in the political as much as the military field. He concedes that the result of the book is 'inevitably pessimistic in tone, for the focus is on those factors that bode ill', but he takes encouragement from the fact that, up to now, 'the will to overcome difficulties has always asserted itself', as 'evidence of the enduring partnership between Europe and the United States' (p. 239).

The book represents a worthwhile effort into which a lot of thought has gone; covering the ground, as it does, concisely but thoroughly. It is also an example of the useful work now being sponsored by the Atlantic Institute, after its inauspicious beginnings twenty years ago.

MICHAEL CULLIS

The East-West Strategic Balance. By T. B. Millar. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1981. 199 pp. £12·95. Pb: £5·95.*

British Nuclear Weapons: For and Against. By Jeff McMahan. *London: Junction Books. 1981. 165 pp. £9·95. Pb: £3·95.*

The Nuclear Destruction of Britain. By Magnus Clarke. *London: Croom Helm. 1982. 291 pp. £11·95.*

TIME was, and that not so long ago, when academics writing on contemporary defence issues fell into two groups: those who prefaced their work with quotations from Lewis Carroll's *Alice* and those who did not. The authors under review fall into the second category, but that is their only common feature. Professor Millar is concerned with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and the groups of states associated with them by military agreements. Defining national strategy as the deployment of the nation's physical and psychological resources towards the achievement of assumed national objectives, he renounces detailing and evaluating all such resources in the two groups of states and the consideration of their domestic imperatives. What he does do is to attempt to assess those political, economic and military policies and capacities able or designed to change significantly the

international status or to prevent such change. This remains a tall order for a couple of hundred pages, and description rather than assessment would best summarise his achievement. This is not to disparage; we are given a succinct and bone-dry description of the essentials of the East-West relationship at the beginning of the 1980s which not only ought to be read by the young but deserves to be read by those of us who have grown grey in the postwar world. With news coming at us daily we need to know why much of it is discomfiting.

Whereas Millar eschews evaluation, Jeff McMahan embraces it, focuses on one particular aspect of one particular country's military policy and makes sure that the reader realises how strongly he feels about it. He begins forcefully: 'most people who have studied the problem are agreed that the danger of nuclear war is now greater than it has been in any previous period' (p. 1). This slightly hectoring tone runs through his summary of arguments for and against the retention by Britain of its nuclear weapons, being replaced by a certain weariness when he admits that his treatment of the moral arguments against is cursory in the extreme. While permitting his distaste for much of American policy to show through, he accepts the reality of the Russian threat; he concludes that Britain ought unilaterally and at once to renounce nuclear weapons while welcoming the American nuclear umbrella as a deterrent against Soviet nuclear blackmail. This is clearly a tenable position; having advanced it he asserts (p. 150) that it is possible to be glad that the United States has a retaliatory capacity *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and at the same time be critical of virtually every aspect of America's current nuclear policy. At this point, one begins to wonder whether Mr McMahan might not have rushed us through his arguments with a little too much speed; there is something to be said for some aspects of America's nuclear policy, and in his prosaic way Professor Millar says it.

The personal *basso profundo* is quite absent from Magnus Clarke's attempt to define what will or may happen to Britain in the event of overt conflict with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, his opening chapter is marked by the convention accepted by sociologists that one ought to describe the views of as many of one's fellow scholars as possible before modestly displaying one's own reflections. In his study of the possible causes, nature and consequences of a Soviet nuclear attack on Britain, Dr Clarke goes into great detail and takes his illustrations from incidents as varied as the collapse of the Inca Empire in the two years 1532 and 1533 to the bombing raids of the Second World War. In contradiction to Jeff McMahan he does not consider a nuclear war likely; he stoutly asserts were a nuclear attack to be made on Britain 'there is little historical evidence to show that, at least beyond the outer limits of fire zones riot and/or flight are certain to result, in direct contradiction to the now much shown film by Peter Watkins, *The War Game* (p. 211). But his conclusions are chilling; were an attack to take place, the immediate casulaties in a population of 55 million would number 6–8 million; three months later this would reach 20 million and approach 40 million after a year. After ten years he postulates a population of 10 million in an essentially feudal Britain.

One could cavil at some of Dr Clarke's assumptions concerning the most likely Soviet attack pattern and in regard to British options for reaction to the threat or the reality of Soviet attack. Indeed, one might not accept one of his conclusions, that 'British governments have long accepted the potential destruction represented by thermonuclear weapons but too great an emphasis has been placed on their deterrent powers and too little on the possibility of their actual use' (p. 260). But one puts the book down more affected by his painstaking analysis than by McMahan's heavy advocacy. As the recently formed Council for Arms Control observes, the issue of unilateral disarmament threatens to polarise British society; it pleads for protagonists and antagonists to realise that they have a common interest in disarmament and it calls for concentration of political, academic, and general effort to obtain it. Dr Clarke's

study is a valuable stimulus to this end—even if one has to acknowledge a twinge of envy as one reads at the end of his postscript that he lives only a few hours from what is reputedly the safest place in the world in the event of global nuclear war: the centre of Tasmania.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

The Future of Strategic Deterrence. Edited by Christoph Bertram. *London: Macmillan for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1981. 108 pp. £15·00.*

THE twelve papers included in this volume were prepared originally for the 21st Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies held in Villars, Switzerland, in 1979. The theme of the Conference was an examination of the contemporary nature of strategic deterrence in the light of the many changes (particularly technological) which have occurred in the 1960s and 70s. As such the debates which took place at the Conference and the chapters included in the book foreshadowed many of the issues contained in the wider public discussions about nuclear weapons which have taken place in the early 1980s with the resurgence of the CND movement.

This book, which is well edited by Christoph Bertram (with a useful opening introduction), provides a major contribution which all serious students of the subject would do well to read. The various chapters consider the historical development of strategic deterrence through the debate about Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Counter-force options (Bundy and Martin), and an examination of the future of the concept is made from a number of different perspectives (Treverton, Freedman, Lambeth, and Dror).

The most impressive aspect of the book is the balanced approach adopted by most of the authors. Contrary to the impression often given by many critics of strategic studies, the contributors to this volume recognise the weaknesses and paradoxes of nuclear deterrence as well as its utility in helping to maintain peace. In the best of the chapters, Hedley Bull argues that the opportunities for making ourselves less dependent on nuclear weapons in the future are not great. He warns, however, against 'the fetish of deterrence' and points out that in the long run it does not provide a sound basis for peace and security (p. 17). As Professor Bull argues, an understanding of the difficulties of strategic deterrence is important because, although 'such an awareness may not cause us to abandon our policies . . . it will prevent us from being fully reconciled to them and will alert us to seize whatever opportunities may arise for improvements at the margin'. As such it is to be hoped that government officials as well as members of the CND will read the book carefully.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN BAYLIS

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Communism Since World War II. By Adam Westoby. *Brighton, Sussex: Harvester. 1981. 514 pp. £35·00.*

Marxist Governments: A World Survey. 3 Vols. Edited by Bogdan Szajkowski. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 821 pp. £20·00 (per vol.); £50·00 (the set).*

THESE two publications under review should probably be put into the category of reference works although the three volume study of 'Marxist Governments' does not

take anything like the same approach as Westoby's book. *Communism Since World War II* forms a continuous narrative within a coherent framework with all the strengths and weaknesses that the work by one individual has, whilst *Marxist Governments* brings together over twenty different authors with expertise in specialised (often highly concentrated) areas of study. It would not be unfair to say that the first of these books gains in personality and individual view but loses on detailed knowledge, over what is a vast area, whereas the second is information brought together from diverse sources within the looser format of research contributions on different Marxist states.

It is an enormously difficult task to cover world communism within one volume and with only one author; few people have the knowledge over such a range which would enable a complete review. (The temptation is to concentrate on those areas where interests overlap and that may be unfair.) *Communism Since World War II* is divided into a historical section (up to p. 274) and a section dealing with the theories about what modern communism is.

The historical section of Westoby's study brings the study of world communism from the war through to the invasion of Afghanistan. This narrative falls loosely into the tradition of revisionist histories of the cold war but the early pages which discuss the origins of East-West rivalry do not entirely convince. The argument appears to be the standard one that both the capitalist regimes of the West and the 'Stalinist' bureaucrats have worked (not necessarily together) to dampen the potential for working-class revolution. Moreover the problem of a postwar return to American isolationism is probably underestimated and the difficulty of dealing with the Russians, especially in the West, is not really tackled. On this last point the interpretation of the 1947 strikes in Italy and France stresses their spontaneity—beginning in Marseilles and spreading outwards orchestrated by the communists. Moreover at the Yalta agreement and later, the Western allies did not seem to envisage an Eastern bloc completely under the Soviet Union's domination in the way that developed during the cold war.

There is a tendency to slip the multinationals—the current stage villains—into the narrative with no real supporting evidence, but this historical section is solid and well written so students will no doubt be referred to Westoby's as an introduction to world communism. The second section tackles the problems which are familiar to Marxist discourse on these societies. How can societies without private property be analysed within a framework which promises utopia on the abolition of that institution? The standard answers are reviewed and the author's own preference for the use of the notion of bureaucratic power is evident although as a 'Marxist' explanation this, oddly, would seem to locate power outside of class. There is, of course, an endless discussion of these points elsewhere, in literature on communism.

Szajkowski's three volumes, *Marxist Governments*, are a formidable achievement and will be used as a handbook for the study of these regimes by many people. In the study of comparative politics Marxist regimes which claim a common inspiration present an interesting but neglected series of problems and these volumes will serve to aid these studies. For the student of communism these volumes are comprehensive and run from Albania through Mongolia to Yugoslavia. Some of the governments to which chapters have been devoted are not written-up elsewhere, so that these volumes provide invaluable source material (as in the case of Kampuchea) and others (such as Mozambique and Angola) are placed in valuable and up-to-date context. The book suffers from the rapid changes in the communist world which now make the piece on Poland out of date, but no doubt this will be remedied in subsequent editions.

Both of these publications cope well with the span of languages which they necessarily cover, but suffer from excessive pricing.

University of Leeds D. S. BELL

The New Communist Third World: An Essay in Political Economy. Edited by Peter Wiles. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 392 pp. £15·95.*

THIS is in fact a collection of essays by different contributors. To list them would seriously erode the allocation of words for this review. A straightforward 'book' tends to promulgate a 'message', whether *a priori* or *a posteriori.* In the present case, it is inevitably the arbitary choice of theme which determines what is included, and to a considerable extent who is invited to contribute. This is brought out by Peter Wiles and Alan Smith in the first page of their text:

> The New Communist Third World (NCTW) . . . consists of those developing countries that have recently proclaimed a Marxist-Leninist form of government (Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the PDR Yemen) plus a periphery of doubtful cases . . . The countries of the NCTW are substantially independent, especially in economic matters. They really can trade with whom they like, and their tempo of, say, agricultural collectivisation is their own decision. They, or rather their governments, are volunteers, quite unlike Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (p. 13).

The 'irrevocability' of the move into communist organisation is one of the editor's main preoccupations. It is easy to become involved, but almost impossible to escape. Barry Lynch's study of the Somali Democratic Republic as 'The One That Got Away' is thus of particular interest.

As the Preface acknowledges, the book emerged from an SSRC project on 'The Commercial Policies of the Communist Third World'. The emphasis is on just that. Copious tables provide a wide range of detailed information on the topic, though it has to be constantly emphasised that communist statistics have characteristics all their own. The political 'hows, whys and wherefores' are in general not so well dealt with. It is assumed that élites or minorities seize power and opt to use it to establish Marxist-Leninist systems. No attention is paid to the factors to which writers like Barrington Moore or Lijphart address themselves in their different ways: why has some form of representative democracy or fascist alternative not emerged? Reference is sometimes made to coups or the threat of them; but how is sufficient loyalty achieved to maintain a particular regime? How effectively are its decisions enforced at the 'grass roots'? How many (or how few) of the details of life can they hope to cover? How is 'political socialisation' effected? How much coercion is involved? How is it that Islam has been virtually eliminated in Albania but not in Somalia or Yemen?

Abbreviations are rife (such as 'NCTW' cited above); ninety-six of them are listed in a glossary at the beginning of the book, but even this is incomplete (e.g. 'LDC' on p. 320). There are simply too many for a lot of readers to carry in their heads and, if for this reason alone, an understanding of the book calls for dedicated attention. Is it desirable to adopt this device to save a page or two?

Your reviewer will keep this book close at hand as a work of reference to the numerous specific topics covered rather than for cursive reading. It is unfortunate for this purpose that the Index contains fewer than 140 headings. Much less than justice is done, thereby, to the 'meatiness' of the book.

University of Dundee PHILIP WHITAKER

The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century. (Report prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State.) *London: Allen Lane; Harmondsworth, Mx: Penguin. 1982. 766 pp. Pb: £7·95.*

THIS book presents the results of a study, commissioned by the United States

government, intended to provide an overview of likely changes in the world's population, natural resources, and environment during the period to the year 2000. The study draws together the various forecasts of American governmental bodies to provide a synthesis to be used for long-term planning. Though long and indigestible, the study achieves one of its aims—that of bringing greater consistency to the models used by these governmental agencies for arriving at an understanding of the future. The study pulls together the forecasting tools used by distant parts of the administration to arrive at a coherent set of outcomes.

As we have come to expect, the outcomes are almost uniformly nasty. But such forecasts have lost the power to shock: *Global 2000* implicitly recognises this by bludgeoning us with 750 pages of analysis rather than seeking to excite attention with a shorter, crisper book. Social forecasters face a dilemma. They can extrapolate existing trends and field criticism of their naivete, or they can project alternative futures and be pilloried for the arrogant baselessness of their assumptions. *Global 2000* looks, at the first sight, as though it falls into the first of these traps. Much of it does seem to consist of simple regressions and *ceteris paribus* extrapolations.

This impression is erroneous, for the greater consistency that the authors of the report have applied has brought dividends in the form of hugely improved interaction among the critical variables. (Most importantly, the study allows the balancing of supply and demand through price changes.) This step is an important one, for it allows movement away from the mechanistic analysis of trends. While strong assumptions still remain—for example, that no substantive changes in policy will occur—*Global 2000* represents an advance toward realism.

Nevertheless, the study disappoints: it is unfocused and diffuse; it contains elements of rural romanticism; and its style seems repetitive. But the real failure of this book lies in a reluctance to identify the prime inflexibilities in the world economy. It is not obvious that, in a world of almost limitless technological possibilities, vulnerability to unpleasant constraints will multiply over the next few years. The study should have delved far more deeply into elasticities of substitution.

To have made the report useful, as President Carter wanted it to be, would have required much greater emphasis on identifying which are the binding constraints on growth and development. Instead, the reader is left with a feeling of unease at what appears to be increasing environmental decay, but no sense of the priority or relative intractability of the various problems. In particular, the report does not separate those concerns which will tend to be rectified by the free market, such as grain production and minerals use, from those which will not, such as over-fishing, the growth of deserts, and possibly deforestation.

This book should have answered more questions than it does. Why does it not discuss the size of the response of agricultural production to price changes? Or the trade-offs between labour and energy use? The impact of different scenarios for energy prices on economic growth? Or the scope for creating new technologies which avoid the use of scarce resources rather than being designed around them?

Global 2000 takes a few slow steps in the right direction. But every study which repeats with unsophisticated urgency the litany of environmental and social decay diminishes our surprise and concern at the seriousness of the difficulties. We have to hope that our forecasting techniques improve faster than the world's economic problems grow.

McKinsey and Company CHRIS GOODALL

Building a Sustainable Society. By Lester R. Brown. *New York, London: Norton for the Worldwatch Institute. 1981. 433 pp. Pb: £9·95. $18.50.*

THIS book forms part of the Worldwatch Institute's continuing research programme which, it is claimed, has familiarised a large domestic audience with the concept of the sustainable society. The author begins by identifying three major threats to civilisation, the erosion of soil, the deterioration of biological systems, (forests, grasslands and oceanic fisheries), and the rapid depletion of oil reserves. These developments which all adversely affect food prospects together infringe on every facet of human existence—'diet, employment, leisure values, politics, and habits' (p. 8). The resulting economic and social stresses are identified in the first part of the book, entitled 'Converging Demands'.

The second part, 'The Path to Sustainability', examines the prospects of finding solutions to problems which have 'their roots in environmental deterioration and resource scarcities' (p. 140). Population policies in various countries are considered, with those of China and Indonesia receiving favourable mention. An analysis of initiatives required in land-use planning follows with the growing encroachment of urban needs on farmland summed up in the phrase 'asphalt is the land's last crop' (p. 30). The prospects for afforestation in different conditions are examined and various fast growing species recommended to augment or replace indigenous trees. The Throwaway Society is castigated and its supports, planned obsolescence and annual fashion changes, condemned. A further chapter deals with alternative sources of energy including energy crops. This part of the book provides a valuable compendium of information on the nature of environmental degradation.

In the final chapter, 'Changing Values and Shifting Priorities', the author turns to priorities and programmes and the changes in attitudes and values that must go with them. The concept of 'voluntary simplicity' is developed as an alternative to the materialism of the market economy and marxism. The introduction of 'conspicuous frugality' has political as well as economic implications of which two examples are given. The first, from California, shows Jerry Brown rejecting the Governor's limousine, a ploy that is not always accepted at its face value. The other, from the Third World, is of President Nyerere and his colleagues virtuously pedalling to a Cabinet meeting. While agreeing that these and other forms of conservation will be slow to take effect, the author concludes that 'collectively, millions of small initiatives will bring forth a society that can endure' (p. 371). Given his belief in the efficacy of 'voluntary simplicity' it is possible to accept this conclusion. It is equally possible to survey the same ground and conclude that the self destroying tendencies in the present composition of society will inevitably prevail.

RICHARD BAILEY

Food Politics: The Regional Conflict. Edited by David N. Balaam and Michael J. Carey. *Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun; London: Croom Helm. 1981. 246 pp. £16·95.*

THIS book is based on an interesting and novel idea: to bring together a more political approach to food and to relate this to a regional setting. Accordingly, this book deals more with food policy than analysis, and the core of the book comprises seven regional chapters dealing respectively with North Ameria, the EEC, the COMECON area, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Tropical Africa. This is then supplemented by an introduction, a chapter on international organisations, and a conclusion.

The trouble with this plan is that it is not really systematically carried out. After all, the main political focus of food strategy is national rather than regional. So the idea of

dealing with food politics rather than analysis or description is somewhat at odds with the regional approach. Even the chapter on international organisations has very little on the relation between global and regional institutions, but deals mainly with the difficulties of global policies in a nationalistic setting. Also the basic idea is not systematically carried through: one would have expected much more about the national politics within regions.

Within such limitations, the book is a useful addition to the literature. The two editors, jointly and separately, account for about half the book. All the contributors are academics from American universities, which accounts for some lack of direct background in the regional chapters. The quality of the chapters ranges from weak (e.g. Tropical Africa) to competent (e.g. North America, and International Organisations).

The regional approach is admittedly least plausible in the case of Asia, and the Asian chapter accordingly is much more written on a country and sub-regional basis than the others. The North American chapter includes not only the United States and Canada, but also Mexico; one feels that Mexico might have been better dealt with in the Latin American chapter—the sub-title of 'The Bread Basket' hardly fits the Mexican case.

The African chapter, although weak, is certainly on the right track in placing much of the blame for malnutrition on government policies and pro-urban biases. The point could have been made even more strongly. In some of the countries concerned, the parastatal marketing boards are so costly and ineffective that in fact not only the producers suffer from lower prices and inability to dispose of their products, but even the urban consumer pays more than would be the case in the absence of government intervention. In such circumstances, it is even difficult to speak of an 'urban bias'. The chapter seems wrong in dismissing the seasonality problem lightly: recent work by Chambers and Longhurst has shown that it is a profoundly serious problem in Africa and elsewhere.

The conclusions are not particularly clear or definite. Take for instance the following paragraph from the conclusion:

> First of all, there is definitely such a thing as food power. Nevertheless the extent to which food alone is a factor that can condition outcomes favorable to the West or the United States is debatable. Food is one political tool among many that, as part of a broader strategy, is most effectively used in a diplomatic or political payoff fashion. This is not to say that some day conditions could not be arranged in such a way that food would prove to be an effective weapon. But to extend the role of food—from an instrument of foreign policy to a weapon that in and of itself can change behavior—may not be possible and may have greater consequences for those who would attempt to use it than for those whom it is intended to hurt (p. 225).

It is difficult to determine from such a statement whether there is such a thing as food power or not.

All in all, a good idea and a book with interesting elements, but not living up to its original promise.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex H. W. SINGER

Regionalism and the New International Economic Order. Edited by Davidson Nicol, Luis Echevarria and Aurelio Pecci. *New York: Pergamon for UNITAR. 1981. 387 pp. £22·50. Pb: £8·50.*

Diplomats' Views on the United Nations System: An Attitude Survey. By

Thomas M. Franck. *New York: UNITAR. 38 pp. (UNITAR Policy and Efficacy Studies, No. 7.) Pb.*

THE classic claim that fortifications and weaponry are out-dated before they can be made and used seems to apply to at least one of humanity's latest nostrums. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) devised by the delegations of the Third World at the United Nations, is being overtaken by events. It has already been threatened with going out of fashion, and the EEC is said to be seeking to persuade Third World countries to ease their pressure for a new economic order—if only because of their increasing dependence on those very agencies of the existing order that they chiefly attack: the IMF, the World Bank Group, and GATT. On the other hand, Shridath Ramphal recently defended 'the myth of NIEO' as an eminently desirable aspiration, goal, and practicable programme of action.

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has published several studies of the NIEO, and this one (arising from a conference of interested institutions) concentrates on its regional implications. In his foreword Dr Waldheim comments on the lack of progress so far made by the so-called North/South Dialogue and the urgent need to break the impasse, and Dr Nicol introduces the book's various contributions by commenting on their direct relevance to negotiations going on about the world economy, and on the building of self-reliance in the developing countries (which at present account for 70 per cent of the world's population). Luis Echeverria, former president of Mexico, warns that if these countries do not work in mutual solidarity their voice will not be heard as it should be. And Aurelio Pecci, founder and president of the Club of Rome, spells out the daunting variety of problems on the global horizon, concluding that mankind must decide whether this decade will set the seal on its decline or see the dawn of a human renaissance.

In the commentaries that follow, regionalism is examined from every angle: in terms of co-operation in the Third World generally, and in areas such as Latin America, ASEAN, Africa and Europe; and on the need for it in the Indian Ocean region; of its place in the concept of NIEO; and on much else. The UNITAR staff supplied appendices on monetary, statistical, and organisational matters.

The United Nations itself gave a firm place to regionalism from the start, setting up regional economic and social commissions in the various continental areas. These have given devolutional impetus to collaboration among neighbours and helped to implement projects of the global agencies. They have proved their worth and the possibilities of regionalism, whether or not they can serve the needs of the hoped-for NIEO.

The slim brochure of Diplomats' Views of the United Nations System fulfils its subtitle: it is an attitude survey. And the attitude, being that of 185 delegates who were politically and emotionally involved in affairs at United Nations Headquarters, largely in the context of the UNGA and of ECOSOC, was appreciative, in a curate's egg fashion. Their opinions were sought on the value of United Nations organs and agencies; the North/South dialogue; priorities among the issues before the United Nations; budget items; peacekeeping; coverage given by the media; the Secretariat; and so on. It is a handy guide to generalisers about the Organisation and its works.

BRIAN MEREDITH

The Political Economy of New and Old Industrial Countries. Edited by Christopher Saunders. *London: Butterworths. 1981. 325 pp. £16·50.*
The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal. By Carmelo Mesa-Lago. *Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1981. 235 pp. $17.50. Pb: $9.95.*

THE first of the two books reviewed here is the published version of the proceedings of an international conference which was held in January 1980 under the auspices of the Sussex European Research Centre at the University of Sussex to discuss the growth and export performance of the New Industrial Countries (NICs), a group of developing countries which to many people represents the success story of development written large. The emergence of these countries as modern industrial nations offers much hope and encouragement to the vast majority of developing countries which are struggling to change their economic structure and to break into world markets. More importantly, it raises many problems for the older industrial countries, which is really what this book is about.

Specifically, it analyses the development strategies which have contributed to the rapid industrialisation and transformation of the NICs. These are discussed in the first part of the book (Chapters 1-4) in the context of the 'diffusionist' and the 'dependency' theories of development with the main controversy centred around the role of import substituting industrialisation and export promotion. Although the individual contributors handle their brief competently and well, the debate remains inconclusive, probably due as much to the nature of the controversy itself as to the diversity of the NICs. The experiences of South Korea and Taiwan for example, are clearly different to those of Brazil or Mexico.

Part 2 discusses the place of the NICs in the world economy and their relations with the older industrial countries. Helen Hughes views the prospects for the 1980s in terms of two alternative scenarios, one symbolised as the 2 per cent future and the other as a 4 per cent plus future, while Geoffrey Shepherd examines the strategies which the old industrial countries have adopted to counter increased competition in textiles and clothing and motor cars, two sectors of crucial importance to the NICs. These range from defensive (essentially protectionist) to offensive or positive responses, for example, up-market specialisation and liberalisation of import regime.

This is followed in Part 3 by individual case studies of South Korea, India, and Brazil. Although one may quibble over the choice of countries, the contrast in their experience with import substitution and export promotion is both interesting and informative. They seem, nevertheless, to instil a peculiar note of pessimism which, along with Helen Hughes's pessimistic scenario, does not augur well for the NICs, nor for that matter, those developing countries which are striving to emulate them.

The responses of Western Europe, North America, and Japan to the emergence of the NICs are covered in three separate chapters in Part 4. The message here is loud and clear, namely, there is no single or concerted response which, though not a particularly profound insight is worth underlining, since there are a great many people who believe otherwise. A final chapter (Part 5) by Wolfgang Hager outlines the strains on the present international system, and asks can it work? He does not actually answer the question himself. Instead he gives a wide ranging review of issues and possible strategies. His proposal for a managed system is not totally convincing, though it appears to have generated a lot of debate. All in all this book makes a valuable and original contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the NICs.

The Economy of Socialist Cuba has a rather different purpose. In it the author offers an overall appraisal of Cuba's economic performance in the first two decades of the Revolution. He begins by outlining the basic features of the Cuban economy before the revolution and then proceeds to trace the frequent changes of policies and development

models which were tried and discarded as Cuba shifted from a market to a socialist economy. His analysis focusses on five main socioeconomic goals: sustained economic growth, diversification of production, external economic independence, full employment, and more equal distribution of income and social services.

As any economist knows all of these goals cannot be achieved at the same time, and one inevitably has to make compromises and trade-offs. Apparently the Cuban leaders had to learn this basic fact of economic life as they struggled first to dismantle the trappings of a capitalist system and establish a socialist state in its place, and later to reintroduce limited forms of market allocation. The author pursues his analysis methodically and painstakingly, perhaps a bit too much so in places. He stresses the successes and failures though it is the latter which come through more forcefully. The dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union is a recurring theme, and the ominous problems which will arise if the latter calls in its debts which are due for repayment starting in 1986 cannot be ignored.

This book is unlikely to bridge the ideological gap between those who have uncritical admiration for the Revolution and all that it has done for Cuba, and those who see the exodus of 1 per cent of the population in 1980 as clear evidence of its failure. Being written by a former partisan of the Revolution is unlikely to win many converts. For all that though it is worth reading.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

Restrictive Business Practices, Transnational Corporations, and Development: A Survey. By Frank Long. *The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1981. 166 pp. Fl 42.50.*

THIS book sets out to be 'an exploratory survey aimed at locating the restrictive trade practices of transnational corporations in a wider framework of analysis of development'. This is a difficult task and not surprisingly the aim is only superficially achieved. The survey is weak on the current theoretical work on the transnational enterprise and does not successfully integrate restrictive trade practices into the development literature. No consistent division between restrictive trade practices and the more general impact of transnational corporations is made. The lack of an integrating theoretical perspective leads to jumping from the static industrial economics analysis of imperfect markets to dynamic considerations of development and descriptions of legislation without due consideration to their interrelationship (or lack of it). This is a pity, because the book tackles issues of great importance and of current policy interest, as the proliferation of (largely ineffective) codes of conduct demonstrate.

Perhaps the root of the difficulty is in attempting to cover such a wide field without presenting a set of core concepts to provide starting points of integration. Analysis of the nature of final markets, the command of intermediate internal markets within transnational corporations, the nature of technology transfer to developing countries, the existence of barriers to entry to industries and the dynamic problems of development are not tackled head on and consequently the discussion is too often diffuse. In Chapter 2, which states the problem of restrictive trade practices, Long leads us through a variety of models of imperfect markets with nods in the direction of Schumpeter and Galbraith but with little attention to the key concepts of industry barriers to entry or the dynamics of competitive behaviour. The chapter trots equally briskly through the literature on development, beginning with Adam Smith. Chapter 3 examines legislation on restrictive business practices in selected developed countries before suggesting that the paucity of such legislation in developing countries is a major

policy gap. Long describes, and seems to endorse, UNCTAD's attempt to draw up a 'model law', although one has to doubt its general applicability to the widely diverse developing nations. He hesitates to develop this further by examining the alternatives to transnational enterprises in developing countries, which is surely a vital influence on the efficacy of control. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between transnational corporations and developing countries but the mass of evidence is presented in an unstructured fashion, leaving the impression that restrictive business practices are 'a bad thing' but analytically difficult to pin down. It is at this stage that a clear model or set of models is vital in getting down to the real issues of power and control.

Chapter 5, on the empirical evidence, provides typologies of restrictive business practices but a lack of distinction between types of market, industries and host countries fails to distil this mass of information in a more meaningful way. Chapter 6 attempts to draw out the development implications of restrictive practices and a two-sector model of the world economy with developing countries representing a 'restrictive business practice intensive sector' (p. 101) is suggested, but regrettably not pursued. Thus a possible device for illustrating and illuminating the dynamic implications of restrictive business practices is lost. Chapter 7 examines the so far ineffective attempts to formulate policy on restrictive business practices, largely through UNCTAD. The two-page Conclusion is too brief to examine the impact of legislative control on the operations of transnational corporations. As Long concludes, much more rigorous empirical research is necessary, particularly on the technology transfer implications of restrictive business practices.

University of Bradford P. J. BUCKLEY

HISTORY

The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy 1847-1942. By John Gooch. *London, Totowa, NJ: Cass. 1981. 163 pp. £11·00.*

THIS collection of essays has already been published elsewhere in learned journals, but it is useful to have them more readily accessible and available to a wider audience than heretofore. The theme behind them is the transition of British military policy and strategy from concern with Imperial problems in the early 1900s to preoccupation with the threat posed by Germany to Britain from 1908 to 1942. Inevitably my attitude towards this work is coloured by the fact that many of Dr Gooch's views coincide with my own. Thus I can only applaud his conclusion that the transition to an anti-German stance on the part of Britain's civilian and military policy-makers before 1914 was a gradual one and not a sudden switch in 1905 or 1906, and also his assumption that 'the military agreements reached . . . with France' in the 1906-1914 period did not represent 'a de facto alliance with France and a moral obligation to fight at her side . . .' (pp. vii-viii).

Essay 1, 'The Bolt from the Blue', deals with the periodic invasion scares from France in the nineteenth century and from Germany in the twentieth, and with the rivalry between the army and the navy as to which was to secure the lion's share of the resources necessary to deal with the danger. This conflict was won by the navy in 1889. Dr Gooch re-emphasises that most of these scares were fantasies of the imagination except, of course, in 1940 and 1941. Essay 2, based on a survey of pre-1914 British non-fiction literature, analyses late Victorian and Edwardian attitudes to war. The third essay shows how British strategists before 1914 found that the defence of Canada from a United States' invasion was well-nigh impossible, and provides further evidence to explain why British politicians ruled out the possibility of war

with the United States from their calculations during the twentieth century. This is followed by a short discussion of Sir George Clarke's tenure of the secretaryship of the Committee of Imperial Defence from 1904 to 1907, and explains why he spent such a relatively short time in the post: his abrasive, opinionated, socially prejudiced and right-wing personality soon brought him into violent controversy with the Admiralty and with many influential politicians.

Essay 5 deals with the foreign policy and military aspects of Haldane's expeditionary force, demonstrating convincingly that it was intended as a 'general purpose army' and 'never intended to fight simply and solely against Germany on the continent of Europe' (p. 111). In Essay 6, the Curragh incident is re-told, based on new evidence contained in Adjutant General Sir Spencer Ewart's diary, with the meddlesome Director of Military Operations, Sir Henry Wilson, emerging as the chief instigator of the ensuing fuss. Essay 7 deals with 'Soldiers, Strategy and War Aims in Britain, 1914-1918', and attempts to further the argument, not entirely convincingly in my view, that the soldiers were more realistic in their attitude towards the future place of Germany on the European stage than the politicians.

When Dr Gooch deals with postwar issues his study becomes more simplistic. Reparations were not imposed on Germany, even partly, 'to achieve the destruction of German militarism' (p. 142), nor is it clear how reparations could have been expected to achieve this. A final essay sheds some interesting light on the Maurice affair.

The book is marred by a number of errors—the Agadir Crisis occurred in 1911, not in 1905-6 (pp. vii and 46), there is no 'h' in Sir Arthur Nicolson's name (p. 135), and there was no *new* German Naval Law in 1908, it was an amendment (or *novelle*) to the 1900 Navy Law. None the less this collection of essays contains excellent reflections on, and broad insights into, civil and military relations in the period.

King's College, London M. L. DOCKRILL

The German Army 1933-45. By Albert Seaton. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1982. 310pp. £16·50.*

THE author, a former British officer now living in Canada, has already produced several books concerned with Germany in the Second World War, notably *The Russo-German War, 1941-45.* In this study, 'the result of ten years' extensive research', he covers the well-trodden ground of Hitler's rise to power, destruction of the traditions and authority of the *Wehrmacht* and gradual usurpation of the actual command of operations in his megalomaniac waging of total war. Colonel Seaton's account of the pre-1939 period does not add substantially to earlier studies such as R. J. O'Neill's *The German Army And The Nazi Party*, but does bring out in detail the problems created by breakneck expansion. He is also good here, and throughout the book, in his critical pen portraits of prominent officers. Guderian, for example, often accepted in Britain on his own high estimation in *Panzer Leader*, is described as a narrow tactical specialist; while Beck, whose vision of total war was perceptive, was pathetically naïve about Nazi politics. Indeed very few senior officers—List and von Leeb are notable exceptions—emerge from this account with their professional efficiency and honour unblemished.

Until early in 1938 Hitler interfered little with the command and staff structure of the army; between 1939 and 1942 he steadily undermined the service chiefs and took over their functions through lackeys such as Jodl, and in the final years of defeat he exercised an increasingly hollow authority in person. This development is well known in outline, but Colonel Seaton shows in impressive detail what it entailed in terms of an incredibly complicated command system and bitter personal relationships among the

generals. To take a critical example, Hitler's indecision and failure to appoint an overall commander on the Eastern Front forfeited a good opportunity to capture Moscow in the late summer of 1941. After the initiative was finally lost at Kursk, Hitler chopped and changed commanders in a bewildering game of musical chairs, the end result being that only fanatics or sycophants (often combined in the same person) such as Model, Schörner, and Rendulic could survive. The military hierarchy lost what little respect and cohesion it still possessed in the purges following the plot of July 20, 1944. The purge was carried out with indiscriminate vindictiveness, not simply to crush any vestige of opposition, but also any remaining independence and initiative on the part of military commanders.

Colonel Seaton's book will be particularly valuable to British readers for its extensive use of German archival sources and publications. It is not written with any literary distinction, and the author has over-indulged his apparently insatiable appetite for orders of battle, composition of formations and units, production and casualty figures and statistics of all kinds. Relevant though most of these are—for example, in showing that expansion of divisions was not matched by production of weapons and equipment—many could have been relegated to footnotes and appendices. These, however, are minor drawbacks in comparison with the wealth of information provided in a concise study.

The outstanding impressions left by this important book are the magnitude of Germany's war effort on land and the extent to which it was misused and sacrificed by an irrational dictator and a subservient high command. The latter paid dearly for its misguided loyalty and obedience: 22 generals were condemned to death by German courts, 110 committed suicide and 963 died or simply disappeared.

King's College, London BRIAN BOND

Churchill and De Gaulle. By François Kersaudy. *London: Collins. 1981. 476 pp. £12·95.*

THE relationship between Churchill and de Gaulle was stormy and dramatic, and provides a story rich in human interest, which François Kersaudy has treated at length. He opens with comments on Churchill's long-standing affection for France and particularly for the French army, and on de Gaulle's inbred distrust of British motives. He then takes his narrative through the war years, from his protagonists' first meeting in 1940 to de Gaulle's triumphant return to France in 1944-45. He ends with a charming epilogue on their last years, revealing that de Gaulle wrote to the widowed Lady Churchill every year on the anniversary of her husband's death. For most of the war years, however, their relations were by no means so smooth or gentlemanly. It is true that during the first difficult months of the Free French movement, and especially after the disaster at Dakar in September 1940, Churchill's unwavering support for de Gaulle was crucial for his survival. But after they first came into conflict over Syria in 1941, little went right between them. The Levant figured prominently in their disputes, and is equally prominent in this book. *'Vers l'Orient compliqué, je volais avec des idées simples'*, de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs; and Dr Kersaudy is inclined to think that his ideas about Syria were *too* simple, in his refusal to grasp the realities of local nationalism and his obsession about British ill-will. (The controversial figure of General Spears plays less part in all this than might have been expected.) In other parts of the narrative President Roosevelt rightly appears as the stormy petrel of the relationship, fixed in his dislike for de Gaulle and repeatedly pressing Churchill to break with him. Eden, on the other hand, appears as the go-between, working patiently to improve relations between these two great but difficult men.

The story is well told; though the author has a habit of presenting his reader with large chunks reproduced textually, sometimes from archive sources (which can be useful), but sometimes from well known memoirs. The approach is occasionally uncritical or lacking in context. For example, the author appears to accept at face value de Gaulle's own account of the engagements of the 4th Armoured Division at Laon and Abbeville in 1940, which should be compared with the more sceptical discussion in Guy Chapman's *Why France Collapsed*. The chapter on the Darlan affair of 1942 needs to take note of the accounts by Arthur Funk (*The Politics of 'Torch'*) and R. T. Thomas (*Britain and Vichy*), which show that the Darlan deal was by no means wholly an improvisation, putting Churchill's later words and actions in a different light.

The author remarks that there has been no previous book specifically on the relations between the two men. This is true; but readers of this journal should be aware that the substance of the book is less original than this claim might imply. The gist of the story may be found in Elisabeth Barker's *Churchill and Eden at War*, to which Dr Kersaudy's work adds much in detail and colour, but little in essentials.

University of Liverpool P. M. H. BELL

Washington Despatches 1941–1945: Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy. Edited by H. G. Nicholas. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1981. 700 pp. £20·00.*

THIS excellent collection of 'raw' data from the public records domain—one example of hiving off to private enterprise which any student of the period should welcome—constitutes a most valuable and original contribution to our knowledge of developments in almost every sphere of politics and society within the United States between Pearl Harbor and VJ Day. The volume consists of some half of the total contents of the weekly summaries sent to London from Washington, based primarily upon the drafts written by the British embassy's small Reports Section. In their compilation, the dominant influence upon the despatches was Isaiah Berlin, and one of their recipients at the time was the editor, Professor Nicholas. Together, in introduction and foreword, the two men outline with commendable clarity and great eloquence, the origins, scope and function of the despatches.

The quite enormous range of content makes it impossible in a short review to undertake a detailed critique of the subject-matter. Nor is generalisation simple. The despatches do not concern themselves with the minutiae of major issues, such as Lend-Lease or Anglo-American strategy, but nor are they mere background material. It does them less than justice to describe the despatches as a lucid synthesis of each week of the war as seen from Washington. Thus, in part, they record the chronology of America's war, but through an unusual focus. First, as the major issues were seen by officials and journalists, Congressmen and other opinion-makers and decision-takers acting on the American stage. Their image was but the starting-point for a further conversion of the picture, through the process of selection and analysis by the British embassy and this provided, in turn, the backdrop against which the American dimension intruded into decision-making in London.

The point of the above is to argue the irrelevance of whether these extensive summaries gave, or could give, a 'true' picture of events, attitudes and decisions in the United States. There are instances where both published and yet-unpublished studies offer minor or major amendments to the detail of the despatches. Conversely, there is much in the despatches, particularly on the 1942 and 1944 elections, and the general activities of Henry Wallace and Wendell Willkie, which either provides entirely fresh information, or supplements or corrects the arguments presented by other works. In

the final analysis, the despatches were 'true' at the time, and affected behaviour accordingly.

The despatches also emphasise that United States developments were subjected to an alien eye. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, London was enjoined to 'always base ourselves on the assumption that Americans are foreign to us, and we to them'. Given this dimension, the despatches perform the much-needed function of denting, if not cracking, the cultural monopoly of American historiography in the analysis of this vital period. And in doing this, they push to the forefront the sheer provincialism of the American perspective, its total insulation from the immediate fear, ravages and dislocation of war, which determined the 'aberrant' behaviour of most of Europe and Asia. The impression of practical remoteness remains, in spite of the rhetorical thunder of the extensively reported theoretical debate, which resulted in the triumph of 'Internationalism' over 'Isolationism'. This judgment is offered on the basis of what is implicit in the despatches. So much of American wartime political, economic and social life continued to run on a business-as-usual basis, that 64 per cent of Americans asked by Gallup in early 1945: 'Have you had to make any real sacrifices for the War?' could respond negatively. Perhaps this was just a little too much normalcy to underpin the policies of an unscathed giant, 'now the most powerful nation in the world', when it was forced into the role of 'stabilising' the most abnormal postwar world, which existed elsewhere.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record, 1944-1945. Edited by Bradley F. Smith. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 259 pp. $24.95.*

THIS volume is essentially complementary to the same author's *The Road to Nuremberg*. That earlier work provided a narrative and analytical account of the evolution of American policy towards the punishment of major German war criminals, and Professor Smith has now proceeded to assemble in print most of the chief primary source materials relevant to this theme. The overwhelming majority of the fifty-nine documents presented here originated in Washington, but it is convenient to have from the British camp the full text of Lord Chancellor Simon's two very revealing memoranda dating from September 1944 and April 1945. The chronological core of the collection extends from August 1944 to early June 1945, symmetrically topped and tailed by two particularly well-known items, the Moscow Declaration of November 1943 and the London Agreement of August 1945. The really intriguing lacuna continues to stretch across the two months or so prior to that final inter-allied compact on the establishment of the International Military Tribunal, and Professor Smith is right to direct scholars towards some further investigation of the detailed course of the London Conference. The whole compilation has been deftly and unfussily edited, and readers who require some analysis more substantial than that supplied through the spare commentary and annotation supplied in this volume can be confident of finding plenty of extra meat in Professor Smith's preceding book.

University of Reading MICHAEL D. BIDDISS

Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947. By Robert M. Hathaway. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. 410 pp. $32.50.*

THE release by the British and American authorities of many of the documents relating to the early years of the cold war has encouraged scholars to move away from the political polemics of the orthodox versus revisionist debate, and to concentrate on trying to find out what happened. Hathaway's book, though hardly a pioneer study, is a useful contribution in that it brings together in a lively and readable work much of the recent research.

According to Hathaway this was the time when Britain ceased to be a great power. But, as a Foreign Office official realised, Americans would 'long continue to see many crucial things through the British window' (p. 2). London, therefore, tried to ensure that Washington implemented what Britain saw as crucial foreign policy objectives. The pax Americana had to replace the pax Britannica, as Britain no longer had the means to sustain its world role. What might have appeared as American wishes imposed on Europe was, in reality, 'British desires . . . translated into United States foreign policy' (p. 2). Hathaway quotes as indicative of the British attitude a tale told of a young man preparing for the Foreign Office saying that the most important things in the world were love and Anglo-American relations. The actual origin of this story is a memorandum written in 1938 by F. Ashton-Gwatkin who had heard these lines on a London stage.

There is a careful examination of the difficulties experienced in the Anglo-American relationship towards the end of the Second World War: British 'obstructionism and intransigence' in the Middle East and South East Asia; London's refusal to countenance a postwar international economy based on multilateralism; Churchill's insistence that the Atlantic Charter would not apply to the British Empire; and conflict over Greece and Turkey. In Hathaway's view Britain had become a 'harassed and waning' power, and in recognising this shift of power in the partnership American officials were 'simply acknowledging reality, a feat Whitehall appeared incapable of duplicating' (p. 228).

In the immediate postwar years, however, Britain would not concede defeat and fought to remain a great power. As American security had become closely entwined with that of Britain, officials in London had reason for expecting that the United States would continue traditional British policies. And that was, in effect, what happened when Washington participated in observing the Greek elections in 1946, and helped Iran, traditionally in the British sphere of influence, to resist Russian pressure. With the decision to aid the Greeks and Turks in February 1947 'Washington officials quite consciously saw themselves as inheritors of Britain's imperial responsibilities'. To a large extent 'the Truman administration had come to embrace London's perspective in international relations' (p. 306).

Hathaway has used extensive collections of British and American private papers as well as the official records. Perhaps his choice, however, of the British *FO 371* files is a little selective, and he has not consulted the Colonial Office records on the Middle East. But he has read much of the recently published literature in the field and helped to focus the scholarly debate.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

WESTERN EUROPE

Industrial Policies in the European Community. By Victoria Curzon Price. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Centre. 1981. 141 pp. £15·00.*

The Common Agricultural Policy: Prospects for Change. By Joan Pearce. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1981. 122 pp. (Chatham House Papers, 13.) Pb: £3·95.*

THE European Community and GATT have achieved tariff-free or freer trade, and now seek a new role. Should this take the form of 'negative integration' like tariff cutting or of 'positive integration' *à la* CAP? This means positive and negative in the sense used by John Pinder and others. Market economists may beg to differ: to them, measures taken by national or international agencies are positive if they encourage structural change and negative if they delay such change. Ms Curzon Price writes as such an economist and deals with long-term industrial problems. She approves of only limited intervention even in recession, and views the future from a perspective akin to that of the schools of H. G. Johnson and F. A. von Hayek. Her approach seems intentionally argumentative. By contrast, Ms Pearce's concise survey of the CAP tries to show where we are and to eschew controversy. Long-run supply problems are mentioned but assume *ceteris paribus*, so that changes in world population or the terms of trade are beyond the scope of her study. Now, in manufactures, the case for intervention is often strongest in the short period and weakest in the long. In agriculture, the opposite often applies. Consequently, this study of agricultural policy in the short or medium run falls almost as much into market-economics oriented literature as the industrial study with its longer time scale.

Both authors have a gift for the apt phrase. Ms Pearce starts with, 'Among the many surpluses generated by the CAP, there is a surplus of proposals for changing it' (p. 1). Have no fear; this study does not add to the surpluses but helps understanding of the CAP. Ms Curzon Price writes, 'Trade liberalisation with adjustment assistance is a typical example of West European capacity for moving forwards while looking backwards' (p. 27). Well put, though the comment could equally apply to the United States where this combination was invented. Her special *bêtes noires* are the Davignon plans for steel and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Her strictures belong to the literature on effective protection, or rather, negative effective protection. Steel quotas may delay job losses in steel production and boost profitability there through higher prices. Given the geographic concentration of the industry, this may also relieve governments of regional headaches. To steel users, however, this is costly and undermines *their* profitability or even their competitiveness at home or abroad. Then look at intervention in textiles, where fibres and yarns were protected as well as clothing. Fibres and yarns were helped in their home markets, as intended. But for clothing the greater security of the home market was bought at the expense of higher input costs, so that the net effect was uncertain. All such aids are seen as having misfired or even backfired. The latter comment applies also to redundancy pay: intended to enhance job security, it made employers more reluctant to employ more labour. The author suggests that aids should not be given to firms *per se*, while firms should be relieved of the burden of providing this form of social security. Instead, redundancy pay should be nationalised or Europeanised, so as to give victims of change adequate compensation without distortion of the labour and product markets. The money for such payments would come from the saving of aids currently given to the inefficient.

Of all the aids given in Europe, those to agriculture loom largest. The main object of the CAP (the subject of Ms Pearce's study) is to support farm incomes, while the chief means is price support. This may have worked in the 1960s, but over the whole of the

twenty years of the CAP's life to date, the means have not always fitted the end. Some unexpected results have ensued. Low cost farmers, for example, benefited more than high cost ones. This may satisfy an efficiency criterion but not the aim of keeping small farmers on the land. In the course of the 1970s, all Community countries, except Italy, became more self-sufficient in CAP products. So there was excessive protection if the aim was not only farm support but also the creation of a common market. Within this market, France lost comparative advantage. These and other points emerge in *The Common Agricultural Policy*, though the main aim of the book is not so much to comment as to explain. Target and intervention prices, Monetary Compensation Amounts and much else become comprehensible, so that this volume should be invaluable for politicians, students and others concerned with European affairs.

In different ways, both books suggest that negative intervention can lead to a positive response from the economy and vice versa, so that both should contribute to an even wider debate.

University of Exeter FREDERICK VICTOR MEYER

Economic Power in Anglo-South African Diplomacy: Simonstown, Sharpeville and After. By Geoff Berridge. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 225 pp. £20·00.*

THIS meticulously researched and closely argued book focusses on an almost wholly neglected aspect of Anglo-South African relations: the contribution South African gold made to the support of sterling between 1950 and 1970. A subsidiary theme is the importance to Britain of South African uranium sales in the mid-1950s. Drawing on Klaus Knorr's work on the politics of international economic relations, Berridge argues that gold and to a lesser extent uranium provided the South African government with leverage over Britain which it used to extract political concessions from successive British governments.

In his view, this leverage accounts for the favourable terms on which South Africa acquired the Simonstown naval base, though in this case Berridge first has to demolish the conventional wisdom that the Simonstown Agreement favoured Britain. He argues that it also explains Macmillan's efforts to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth. Finally, he sees it as the reason why the Labour government came to regret its imposition of an arms embargo against South Africa, though in the end George Brown and other senior ministers just failed to overturn the policy during 1967. The evidence Berridge presents to show both that South Africa was in a position to use the gold weapon at each of these junctures and that it did so or threatened to do so is impressive, if largely circumstantial.

Berridge rejects what he calls the 'establishment explanation' of British policy towards South Africa during this period. This emphasised the strategic value of the Cape, Britain's responsibility for the High Commission Territories, economic interests, and ties of kith and kin as the reasons for Britain's reluctance to offend South Africa. He also criticises the 'radical explanation' that the relationship was an example of economic imperialism or that a pro-South African lobby operating within business circles accounted for the bias of British policy. However, Berridge is mistaken if he believes that in showing weaknesses in these views and by contrast highlighting the importance of the monetary role of South African gold, he has provided anything like a complete explanation of the intimate relationship between the two countries. For example, Macmillan's anti-apartheid rhetoric may have been exaggerated and as he argues, have had very little practical significance, but in treating it in these terms Berridge understates its psychological impact. Nonetheless, South Africa's use of gold as an instrument of diplomacy is a fascinating story which he tells very well in a way

that is easy to follow, with the technical details set out in a series of statistical appendixes. Indeed, the pity is that he stops at 1970 and makes no attempt to sketch in subsequent developments or to characterise the present relationship.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

Le Gouvernement de la France sous la Vᵉ République. By Jean-Louis Quermonne. *Paris: Editions Dalloz. 1980. 682 pp.*

THE Fifth Republic has passed its third major trial, perhaps the most important after twenty-three years of existence. Having proved its capacity to resist the student-worker challenge of May-June 1968, having survived the abrupt departure (1969) of its founder and father-figure, Charles de Gaulle, the regime has seen the Left Opposition come to power. The Fifth Republic's legitimacy can no longer be contested.

The Fifth Republic was designed to remedy its predecessors' defects: assembly domination and executive instability, party fragmentation, and policy incoherence. The now powerful President formulates policy above the party fracas and beyond the reach of Parliament, which, restrained by multiple constitutional curbs, can no longer impede government action. The single-member constituency, two-round ballot system ensures the election of presidential supporters in the Assembly. In sum, the Fifth Republic's major innovations, a reinforced executive and a 'rationalised' Parliament, produced stability.

Jean-Louis Quermonne's new interdisciplinary manual examines these institutions in historical context through the Giscard years. Quermonne voluntarily neglects socio-cultural factors ('American' concerns) and limits his study to an analysis of French constitutional principles, electoral mechanics, the national institutions and administration, and the parties. Here Quermonne is thorough, orderly, informative, and interesting.

The book loses its incisive quality when grappling with the nature of the regime. Quermonne rejects the 'semi-presidentialist' model and stresses the notion of *pouvoir d'Etat*: the President's regal authority buttressed by his command of the administration, the army, and the courts. He cites the 1962 political crisis as proof: confronted by hostility in both parliamentary chambers, de Gaulle went directly to the people with a referendum, mobilising popular support for the *pouvoir d'Etat* (and institutionalising presidential supremacy by the direct election).

Analysing the Fifth Republic, however, is somewhat analogous to the blind man and the elephant, although interpretation depends less on where one touches it than when. The example of de Gaulle does not allow us to sort out the weight of personal charisma and that of the *pouvoir d'Etat*. Quermonne's analysis of the autonomous President is not borne out by Giscard d'Estaing's experience: witness his 1978 avowal (ploy?) that he would be unable to prevent a Left parliamentary majority from implementing its programme. Giscard's failure to bring the Gaullists into line hindered the achievement of his cherished reforms and finally destroyed his presidency.

Quermonne underestimates the role of the party system in providing executive stability. The struggle for the presidency has polarised the parties into two tenuous coalitions, each with a senior and a junior partner—not quite a clear majority-opposition axis, but a division which leaves no party in between. In order to govern, the President must become a partisan manager of his coalition and, in the words of Vincent Wright, 'increasingly intervenes to marshal party and parliamentary support.' French voters now perceive the parties in terms of presidential supporters or

the Opposition. The Socialists' overwhelming victory in the June 1981 elections makes the point unmistakably: the Fifth Republic's institutional stability requires coincidence of presidential and parliamentary majorities.

American College in Paris PAUL J. GODT

The Left in France. By Neill Nugent and David Lowe. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 275 pp. £15·00.*

AS the Mitterand government pushes ahead with its programme of change, this is an appropriate moment to produce a comprehensive work in English on the French Left. Solidly researched and clearly written, this volume provides an informative analysis of the development of the Left in France. If it does not advance any novel interpretations, then its detailed explanations and judicious conclusions equip readers very well for making their own analysis of what is happening across the Channel. The work begins with a useful summary of the problems involved in defining what 'Left' really means, then after acquitting itself honourably of that well-nigh impossible task, prudently confines its analysis to the main political forces of the modern Left—socialists (PS) and communists (PCF), while not forgetting Radicalism and the bewildering richness of the 'alternative Left', on which there is a chapter with original material and some dry, shrewd analysis. The parties' development is analysed separately in considerable historical detail, followed by a consideration of their structures and ideologies. They are then assessed in terms of their conflictual relationship, and an attempt is made to measure their influence in areas lying outside the mainstream of national politics (and often neglected in this sort of book), notably the fields of trade unions and local government. A brief epilogue then updates the analysis to the spring of 1981 and the socialist victory.

The main sections show various strengths. The one on the PCF deals especially clearly with the mechanisms whereby the apparatus maintains its ascendancy over the grassroots and is shrewd in its evaluation of the quality and extent of recent dissidence inside the party. Some readers might find the concluding comparison between the PCF and Gaullism (p. 162), on grounds of the hostility to European integration and economic nationalism of both forces, a little misleading; for the Socialist Party (PS) has never hesitated to make such nationalist noises, albeit in a more subtle way, when it has thought it convenient to do so. As regards this latter party, the authors show up well the monarchical way in which it has been run, despite the very sincere aspirations of its members towards more participation. There is perhaps a slight tendency at times to take both the ideology and the actions of the PS somewhat at face value: an instance of the former would be the European positions of the party, especially reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (p. 84ff.), and for the latter one could wish that the party's behaviour in the municipal elections of 1977 had been analysed less kindly (p. 204). Similarly perhaps, the relationship of the PS and the CFDT trade-union is perhaps more complex than suggested here. To be fair, however, this is a labyrinthine subject which would require a book of its own. On the whole one agrees with the authors' general conclusion about the future relationship of the unions and the party/government: that the unions will doubtless have to play some enhanced rôle in economic policy making, but that given the unions' historic weakness this will not be anything like the 'corporate bias' which authors like Middlemas see at work in other developed industrial states.

Minor infelicities apart, there are very few blemishes in this work, which reads very easily and whose natural appeal goes beyond the specialised reader to anyone with a

:neral interest in contemporary affairs. If it is to fulfil its deserved vocation, then the ublishers would be well advised to produce a paperback version as soon as possible.

'niversity of Reading DAVID HANLEY

'he Strategy of the Italian Communist Party: From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise. By Donald Sassoon. *London: Francis Pinter. 1981. 259 pp. £15·00.*

'ONALD SASSOON has written a book for believers. Its theme is the relationship :tween the 'general perspective' of political parties committed to socialism, and their rategic behaviour in 'concrete historical circumstances'. The reader who doubts hether the concept of the 'general perspective' has much meaning may find himself ıt of sympathy with the book's approach, for Sassoon makes no secret of his illingness to share the categories of thought and analysis of the PCI. Thus when riting of the difficulty of eradicating from the party the pre-Gramscian notion that ›cialism or elements of it cannot be introduced under bourgeois democracy, he rites:

> It seems to me, however, that in the present phase of the crisis of the 'enlarged state', of the 'Welfare State', this sort of mentality rather reflects the subordinate role to which, historically, the working class has been relegated. It is only in formulating a clearly political project of transition . . . that the working class can reach that role of being a 'national' class that Gramsci was thinking of when, from the depths of his prison cell, he meditated on the historical defeat of the working class (p. 244).

ll good orthodox stuff that would take pride of place in the pages of *Rinascita*!

Even the unbeliever may find something of value, however, if he suspends his sbelief. The PCI since the Second World War has been responsible for an outpouring theoretical elaboration unparalleled in Western Europe. Having enjoyed a near ıonopoly of support in progressive academia, and having been largely free of the 'sponsibilities of government, the party has had little to distract it from an extended :ogramme of strategic navel contemplation. In the last ten years it has even managed hold some fascination for the British Left, and if Gramsci has not yet made his debut *London Labour Briefing* he soon will do. What Italian communists have to say ıould not go unnoticed therefore, and Sassoon's book is as good a place as any to udy the origins of Italian Eurocommunism. The first section charts the development the concept of the new 'mass party', and the difficulties such a concept encountered ıring the most tense period of the cold war. The second passes to the period running om 1956–64, and examines the various dimensions of Togliatti's 'polycentrism' as emerged in the last eight years of his life. Where the book is least satisfactory is in its tempt (imposed by the exigencies of marketability, perhaps) to bring what is ;sentially an historical study right up to date. The last three chapters take the reader ı a whirlwind tour through events since 1964, and attempt to draw conclusions ›out a period the book would have done better to leave alone.

'niversity of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID HINE

tatürk: Founder of a Modern State. Edited by Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun. *London: C. Hurst. 1981, 243 pp. £8·50.*

an-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism. By Jacob M. Landau. *London: C. Hurst. 1981. 219 pp. £11·50.*

TIME has not diminished the stature of Mustafa Kemal, aptly known as Atatürk, 'Father of the Turks', nor the significance of his achievement—the creation of the Republic of Turkey. But now that a resurgent Islam and a variety of revolutionary creeds are competing for the allegiance of much of the developing world, how valid still is his programme of the 'six arrows': secularism, reformism, nationalism, *étatism*, republicanism, and populism? This is the question to which the ten distinguished contributors, seven of them Turkish, address themselves in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. Their aim, as the editors point out, is not to prescribe Kemalism as a universal model but rather, through studying it, to stimulate debate and contribute to a better understanding of current development and modernisation processes.

The many helpful insights offered in this symposium cannot be adequately described here, but some call for special notice. Professor Dankwart Rustow gives a perceptive assessment of 'Atatürk as an institution-builder', and notes that his achievements were rounded off by 'that rarest of feats for a one-party personalist system—a smooth and undisputed succession on the founder's death' (p. 62). Nor was continuity ensured (as now in post-Tito Yugoslavia) by a single party stepping into the autocratic ruler's shoes or maintaining an indefinite monopoly of power (as Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party has maintained for more than half a century). The Kemalist regime, as Professor Özbudun points out, 'offers one of the very few cases of a peaceful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic policy' (p. 79). On three occasions since Atatürk's death the parliamentary process has, it is true, been interrupted by military intervention, each time on the plea that the founder's ideals were being betrayed. Whether, for the third time, contending political parties will be permitted to return to the National Assembly remains to be seen.

Kemalism then, despite its undoubted achievements, has so far left unsolved many of Turkey's grave political and economic problems. Islamic and Third World critics claim that it was bound to fail since it represented an attempt to impose an alien and secular Westernisation on an Islamic society rightly reluctant to renounce its cultural heritage. In his interesting essay on Religion and Secularism, Professor Mardin examines why Atatürk attached such importance to the secularisation of state institutions whilst (unlike his Soviet contemporaries) refraining from trying to curb the expression of private religious belief. But the former cannot easily remain unaffected by the latter, or by the influence of ideological trends in neighbouring countries, and Kemalism now faces the challenge of a revived Islamic fundamentalism as well as that of its rival, Marxism.

The Islamic challenge has overtones of the phenomenon examined in Professor Landau's important and fascinating study of Turkish irredentism. To Kemal's realistic goal of establishing *Vatan*—a vigorous though geographically restricted nation-state—and the Pan-Islamists' tendency to regard all territory inhabited by Moslems as their 'homeland', the Pan-Turks opposed the concept of *Turan*—'an undefined Shangri-La-like area in the steppes of Central Asia' (p. 1), allegedly the cradle of their race—and dreamed of rapprochement and eventual union with all peoples of proven or assumed Turkish stock. Professor Landau draws attention to a Turkish document of 1832 in which *Turan* is variously identified with Turkistan, Tataristan, Uzbekistan and Moghulistan. *Turan* was alleged to cover the territory lying between China, Tibet, India, and Iran, and to extend into Europe to include the Hungarians, Finns and Estonians. Pan-Turkism, largely in origin a response to the Pan-Slavism sponsored by Tsarist Russia, was a rather less grandiose chimera than Pan-Turanism. It appealed as a feasible policy to the Young Turks who took their country into the First World War, and led Enver Pasha, the most dynamic figure in the Committee of Union and Progress, to die fighting against the Russians for the establishment of a Turkic state in Russian Central Asia.

During the first two decades of the Kemalist regime, Pan-Turkish sympathies lay

largely dormant but were fed by the propaganda carried on by 'Outside Turks', emigrés from the Soviet Union, South-east Europe and the Middle East. In the Soviet Union itself, the spread of industrialisation, urbanisation and education fostered a growing national consciousness amongst the non-Russian peoples, especially the Tatars. Backed by the Germans as a tool for disrupting the Soviet State, Pan-Turkism was given fresh stimulus during the Second World War, and many volunteers of Turkic stock joined the Germans in fighting the Russians. Pan-Turk supporters in Turkey took fresh heart but were curbed by a government fearful of provoking the victorious Russians. It was only after capturing a medium-sized conservative party, which they renamed the Nationalist Action Party, in the mid-1960s, that the Pan-Turks openly entered the political arena under the leadership of the strongly anti-communist Alparslan Türkeş. With the suspension of all party political activity following the military take-over of September 1980, Pan-Turkism has been silenced as effectively in Turkey as it has been under communism. Professor Landau's valuable study should help readers to understand its roots and past manifestations and assess its chances of revival.

STEPHEN CLISSOLD

The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey. By William Hale. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 279 pp. £13·50.*

THIS is an extremely useful précis of the development of the modern Turkish economy which, no doubt, will become an indispensable tool of reference for anyone interested in modern Turkish history. Dr Hale's survey starts in 1923 and takes us up to 1980, with the political framework of Turkish economic development providing the necessary background for the economic history of a country where economics cannot be separated from politics. Indeed the founders of the Turkish Republic visualised the development of Turkey as a sustained, undifferentiated thrust which would bring Turkey to the same level of power as the countries of the West.

The amount of information provided by the author becomes richer in his coverage of the economy since 1950 but, despite the difficulty of access to sources, there are also considerable data on the 1920s and 1930s. No doubt the availability of many recent monographs on specific areas of the Turkish economy, as well as more general works, have made Dr Hale's task easier than was the case for pioneers in the field. Nevertheless, this study is of particular value not only because of the framework it adopts but also because of Dr Hale's attempt to see the Turkish economy from the viewpoint of its architects. The author's ability to recapture these moods and motivations constitutes an original contribution to a much debated subject. What emerges from this treatment—although the author does not make this point specifically—is the 'cavalier' attitude towards economic development which characterised both the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic and their putative opposites of the 1950s, the Demokrats. ('Cavalier' is my own, inadequate but I hope suggestive, translation of 'komiteci'.) In Turkish the expression is used for the activist Balkan and Middle Eastern political leader who placed his life in the balance to achieve his aims. This style of politics was introduced in Russia in the nineteenth century and became a model for the Ottoman politics of minorities (and majorities when they attained hegemonic control) after 1908. Its repercussions continue in the Middle East today.

Most works on Turkish economics have stressed the dissimilarities between early Republican policies and those of the Demokrats. From this perspective the generation of Atatürk appeared as 'planners' and 'etatists' whereas the winners of the elections of 1950, the Demokrats, were characterised as 'liberals' willing to encourage

agriculture, peasant enterprise and private enterprise at the expense of state enterprise. Dr Hale reminds us that a number of Turkish economists have challenged this interpretation, stating that they share 'capitalistic' features. What seems to emerge from his own account, however, is that both periods in the development of the Turkish economy appear to have been marked by a *style* of tackling economic issues: that of small groups of 'insiders' taking upon themselves to carry out policies which they saw as favourable for Turkey against all international obsctacles, come what may. It is easy from this angle to see how Menderes could be accused by his detractors of heading a 'gang' of malefactors. It is only with the 1960s that we begin to have something like the prevalence of expert opinion in economics. Dr Hale gives us an example in the report of the State Planning Organisation dated 1963 which, judging the Demokrat era in retrospect, begins: 'It is hard to pass overall judgment on the eight year lifespan [i.e. 1950–58] of a policy of deficit-financing, inflation and physical controls' (p. 111). So much for the ability of critical thought to surface. A number of Turks who have studied the development of the Turkish economy since 1960 would claim that the new weight of economic expertise has not ruled out the development of important 'dependency' structures in their country. While such a thesis has always seemed somewhat too close to a conspiracy theory of history to the present reviewer, it would, nevertheless, be interesting to see where the flaw of this type of politico-economic logic lies. Mr Hale, a true empiricist, does not address himself to these questions of 'structure', but for Turks who feel some responsibility for the conduct of public affairs, they need to be explicated.

Boğaziçi University SERIF MARDIN

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union Since 1917. By Martin McCauley. *London: Longman. 1981 290 pp. £13·95. Pb: £6·95.*

A History of the Soviet Union 1917–1953. Vol. I: Lenin: Revolution and Power; Vol. 2: Stalin: Order Through Terror. By Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. Trans. by Valence Ionescu. *London: Longman. 1981. Vol. I: 279 pp. Pb: £4·95. Vol. 2. 269 pp Pb: £4·95. (First publ. Paris: Flammarion, 1979.)*

ALL histories of Soviet Russia must of necessity dwell in the shadow of E. H. Carr's definitive fourteen volumes. Yet, more manageable texts have been available for some time: J. N. Westwood's *Russia 1917-1964* (now revised under the title *Russia since 1917*), J. P. Nettl's *The Soviet Achievement* and the histories of Soviet Russia by Georg von Rauch and, more recently, by Adam B. Ulam. Longman have now provided us with two additional alternatives to Carr: Martin McCauley's forms the final volume, chronologically speaking, of an ambitious series of seven, designed to deal with the history of Russia from Kievan times to the present day; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's history appeared for the first time in French in 1979.

The Soviet Union since 1917 serves two interrelated purposes. It provides the non-specialist reader with a general introduction to the main lines of Soviet history; at the same time it serves a valuable purpose as a work of reference. The two apparently irreconcilable functions can be combined satisfactorily because the volume is very clearly 'signposted', both in the table of contents and in the text itself. It also contains a useful glossary of terms and several maps and tables. The main drawback involved in such a layout is most noticeable when reading the text over a longer distance. McCauley's subject is broad, however one chooses to approach it. McCauley sets himself the task of tracing all major developments in the history of Russia from the

February Revolution of 1917 right down to Soviet activities in Angola and Afghanistan in the mid to late 1970s. Furthermore, the editors of the series have chosen to emphasise foreign as well as domestic affairs. It would therefore be unkind to criticise the author for fragmentary or superficial treatment of his subject: indeed it is to his credit that fragmentation is the greater problem in this case: just as the reader becomes engrossed in a particular section he is apt to find that his attention is being turned all too soon in some other direction. The final chapter, entitled 'The Brezhnev Era', is a case in point. It contains sections dealing with Soviet policy towards the United States and China, Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, Southern, South Eastern and Eastern Asia, Australasia, Africa, and Latin America; it also deals, in other separate sections, with social and economic policy and religious and cultural affairs, and ends with some reflections on the nature of the new ruling class in Soviet society and the role of *nomenklatura* in Soviet life. Yet it should be pointed out that two features of the work make it more satisfying both to use and to read: first of all, political, social, economic and diplomatic elements are all skilfully and sensibly balanced throughout; and secondly, the author has tried hard to produce a readable as well as a lucid and useful text: anecdotal insertions help the reader along, and, although McCauley's fondness for the exclamation mark might irritate some, it shows evidence of a positive attempt to enliven and entertain as well as to inform.

Though the two volumes of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's history of the Soviet Union from 1917–53 owe their titles respectively to Lenin and Stalin her concern is by no means biographical; it is rather with the two revolutions, social, cultural and economic, as well as political, which the two men brought about. The formation and nature of political systems, rather than of personalities, is the author's concern, though the indivisibility of the men and the systems they created is in the case of both Lenin and Stalin, of course, beyond doubt. At the end of the Stalin volume Professor d'Encausse points out that 'one of the paradoxes of the USSR is that of the decisive role played in its history by individuals, although the ideology of that country has proclaimed for more than sixty years that history is above all the product of the collective wills and the movements of the masses' (p. 222). In fact, the work as a whole focusses mainly on the history of the Communist Party and on the part played by its most prominent individuals, not just by the *Vozhd'* himself. As such it is a straightforward political history of Soviet Russia, useful particularly for the non-specialist, with some emphasis being placed *en route* on social problems, like that of official attitudes to the family, and on the nationalities issue, on which Professor d'Encausse has written illuminatingly elsewhere.

Unfortunately, the publishers' claim that this work is 'exceptionally lucid and readable' can only be applied to its original French edition. The proverbial ability of the French academic to match clarity of thought with *le mot juste* is not reflected at all well in this translation. Indeed, if translation is the concealment of translation then this one must be judged conspicuously unsuccessful. The English reader finds himself wrong-footed time and again by the unidiomatic use of the definite article, by the unusual and sometimes misleading vocabulary and by word order. In the Lenin volume we read about 'the "New Economic Policy" (NEP), which the Marxist Riazonov [*sic*] . . . called the "Brest-Litovsk peasant" ' (p. 124). Less entertaining and egregious examples of infelicitous translation litter virtually every page, and obscurities in the translation are so frequently compounded by errors of transliteration and punctuation that one is forced to conclude that the editors are also partly to blame for the unprofessional presentation of this valuable contribution to the non-specialist literature on the Soviet Union.

University of Hull M. C. CHAPMAN

Decision Making in Soviet Politics. By John Löwenhardt. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 238 pp. £15·00.*

THE study of policy-making has been one of the growth areas in Western analyses of Soviet politics in recent years. Many central issues, however, still remain obscure and contentious. To what extent, for instance, can political actors in the Soviet Union usefully be conceptualised as 'groups', comparable perhaps with those that exist in Western polities? How can we demonstrate the influence that they exert over outcomes, given the secrecy that surrounds decision-making at the highest levels in the Soviet Union? And to what extent does such influence vary depending upon the period of time, the area of policy that is concerned, and other factors? John Löwenhardt's study is an attempt to take these matters one step further; rather than examine a particular policy-area in detail he has surveyed the findings of Western scholars in ten different cases, and his study is essentially an attempt to synthesise and generalise from these cases rather than to break new ground in any one of them.

The ten issues that Löwenhardt selects for reanalysis all date from the 1950s and 1960s. They range from economic policy (for instance the reclamation of the Virgin Lands in the early 1950s) and social policy (for instance family law reform) to education, the environment, and the attempt of Soviet Jews to secure the right to emigrate at the end of the 1960s. In addition Löwenhardt presents a rather fuller case study, based in part upon his own research, of the reform of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the early 1960s. These are accurate and helpful summaries of a variety of different studies but more interest, perhaps, will attach to the author's attempt to draw conclusions of a rather more general character from them. He argues, for instance, that it is more useful to speak of 'policy coalitions' rather than of group actors in the Soviet policy-making process, and he surveys the means by which such coalitions can bring their influence to bear: through professional conferences, for instance, or through the standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet. Löwenhardt does not believe that all discussions of this kind are necessarily manipulated by the Communist Party, which itself may be divided upon the issue in question.

This, then, is a very useful contribution to an important area of study. It breaks little new ground empirically, but its summary and review of the case studies of others helps to clarify the central issues and to produce some worthwhile generalisations about them. Löwenhardt is modest about what he claims to have achieved, and fully accepts that the conclusions he advances may have only limited applicability to other policy areas or to the 1970s and 1980s. His helpful study should nonetheless prove a valuable starting-point when other studies of this kind come to be written.

University of Glasgow STEPHEN WHITE

God's Playground: A History of Poland. By Norman Davies. Vol. 1: The Origins to 1795. 605 pp; Vol. 2: 1795 to the Present. 725 pp. *Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press); New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. Indexes. £27·50 (per volume).*

RECENT events in Poland have aroused in this country great interest in Polish affairs. Certainly there was, even before the crisis of 1980 and after, a good case for the exploration of Polish history in depth and Dr Davies's work, stretching from prehistoric times to the present day, is a response to an urgent need. The title of this work—curiously described in the preface as a subtitle—is on the author's admission likely to 'raise some eyebrows'. The author's translation of the Polish word *igrzysko* as 'playground', is questionable. The phrase *Boże Igrzysko*, which was evidently first used in Poland in the 1580s, could equally be translated as 'The Sport of the Gods',

and even 'The Laughing-stock of the Gods'. Certainly there is nothing happy in the history of Poland in the last three or four hundred years. The fact that Poland today owes to Western European and American banks 27 billion dollars, invites the reader to look for insight into the practical problems which creditors must understand. The author throughout this work establishes most clearly the climate of opinion in Poland as it prevailed in the past and exists in the present. The Polish phrase, *Sprawa Polska*, is normally translated as 'The Polish Question', but for Poles it carries the meaning of 'The Polish Cause'. The author supplements this historic fact with extensive quotations from literary works, some of them amusing, which seem to indicate an impressionistic approach to problems. Overall the work does not give detailed attention to international affairs, and more attention could have been given, in the second volume, to the Tehran conference of 1943, as well as to the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. In dealing with the Poland which emerged in 1944–45 within new frontiers the author states: 'The manpower of the Polish state had receded to the position of 1918. Over-all density had also fallen from 89·8 to 76·4 inhabitants per km. In other words, Poland had lost still more people than land' (p. 489). The author cannot have it both ways. Elsewhere he states that 'the national minorities had almost disappeared', and that 'the People's Republic was to be the first truly national state in Polish history' (p. 491). He gives due attention to the high birthrate leading to a rise in the population from 23·9 million in 1946 to an estimated 35·1 million in 1979. This in itself was a problem. The Polish state since the Second World War has had to wrestle with the problem of capital investment in industry to provide jobs for a growing population. The regime of Edward Gierek over-reached itself in contracting vast loans to speed that process. Another problem, to which the author does not appear to give adequate attention, is agricultural. The agrarian reforms of 1944–45 have led to a situation in which there are now over three million peasant farmers, of whom some 57 per cent hold 5 hectares or less. An explanation of the effect of small-scale farming on the economy as a whole would have been welcome. Obviously, if consumer goods are in short supply in the shops, small farmers with a cow and a calf, and a pig or two will not be disposed to market their livestock which they can themselves consume at home. The complexity of economic problems in Poland is complicated by this factor. The author seems to think that agricultural production is to some extent complicated by the slow rate of mechanisation in the private sector, due to some extent to the reluctance of the state to provide small tractors. Perhaps in fact it is due to structural faults caused by the small size of holdings.

In one respect we can offer the author our sympathy. In what is virtually an appendix to the second volume, and appearing after the index, is a chapter entitled 'Solidarity, 1980–81'. Events clearly overtook the production of this book and the imposition of martial law in December 1981 overtook this postscript. It is unfair to review these volumes simply in the light of present problems, because they cover a wide period, but readers will ask questions of a worrying situation at the present time. It is hoped that, in the next edition of his work, Dr Davies will be able to revise the terminal chapters of his book and offer an explanation of the present crisis. He has tried to write a readable book with a wider appeal than that of the dry-as-dust historical works concerned more with analysis than capturing the spirit of events. On occasions he exhibits a somewhat flashy style, which is irritating to purists, but, on the whole, this work conveys a great deal of information. There can be no doubt that Poland will continue to occupy our thoughts in the next months and even years. This book will provide the general reader with a guide to the background of current events.

Queen Mary College, London R. F. LESLIE

The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution. By Neal Ascherson. *Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin. 1981. 316 pp. Pb: £2·50.*

Independent Social Movements in Poland. By Peter Raina. *London: London School of Economics. 1981 (Distrib. by Orbis.) 632 pp. £15·00.*

THE daunting task of providing the first stepping-stones through the enormous quagmire of material surrounding the sixteen months of Solidarity's existence has been successfully accomplished by Neal Ascherson's book. His brand of analytical and scholarly writing is scarcely journalism any longer and undergraduate course reading-lists will use his book for some time to come.

Ascherson's historical preamble is clearly written, providing the reader with reference points against which the significance of August 1980, and more depressingly, that of December 13, 1981, may be judged and to that extent it is selective. For example the defence of Gomulka's 'October' by the security forces in the face of Soviet pressure (p. 73) can be juxtaposed to the 'auto invasion' by the heirs of these security forces in December 1981. Inevitably the chronicling of events immediately preceding the Baltic agreements and their direct aftermath may be open to contention on points of detail. Nevertheless Ascherson's analysis of the concatenation of historical, political, socio-economic, and moral forces is truly masterly. Yet questions must remain and Ascherson to his credit prefers to leave some of them unanswered. A case in point is why for instance was not the dissident movement of which KSS-KOR was the prime example not quashed piror to 1980 (p. 116)? Alternatively, when the working class appeared to be well on the road to achieving 'class-power', why did it choose to confine itself within the bounds of what Staniszkis has termed the 'self-limiting revolution' (p. 263). Paradoxically the declaration of martial law provided answers to some of the questions posed by Ascherson. Thus there is now more evidence for the existence of a 'bureaucratic class' (or caste?) which whilst not necessarily concerned with translating party-state office into material privilege is nevertheless concerned with maintaining power—over both the allocation of goods and persons in society (pp. 253–56). Solidarity and its 'horizontal' outgrowth within the Party itself threatened to break the mould of hegemony by introducing observability, accountability, and elements of genuine representative democracy into the exercise of power. Unfortunately the book fails to draw out the effect of Solidarity upon such institutions as the judiciary, the legislature, and higher education.

Faced by the obstacle course of provocations (p. 264), increasingly meaningless negotiations, an antagonistic mass media, and borne down by the relentless pressure of an economy sliding to disaster, Solidarity found itself forced into making ever expanding demands to fill the political and economic vacuum left by official paralysis and duplicity. By the end of May 1981, with the death of Cardinal Wyszynski and the publication of the infamous declaration of the 'hardline' Party Katowice Forum, Ascherson graphically and presciently notes that the crowds attending the Polish Primate's funeral 'felt bitterly alone in a country where the enemy within was growing stronger' (p. 269).

Ascherson correctly identifies 'incompleteness' as the curse of postwar Poland. Mild Stalinism 'bequeathed a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus which had never been terrorised into obedience' (p. 274). Economic reform, designed by some of the most gifted economists in the Soviet bloc, was stifled, agricultural collectivisation of any kind never had a chance. One could add to this, the incomplete renewal of the Polish Party, which stopped at democratic elections and statutory changes, leaving largely untouched the structure and practises of bureaucratic centralism. There was no 'renewal' in the military or security forces, a fact which they now claim gives them a purity 'unbesmirched' by collaboration with Solidarity. Whether Jaruzelski has any

more success with frightening, cajoling or even terrorising the bureaucracy to adopt a style of thought and action it is unprepared for remains to be seen.

For Ascherson the most serious incompleteness was that of protest, always stunted and slowed up. One can conjecture that Solidarity was the last chance for channelling protest which emerges out of Poland's very 'geographical situation' (p. 275). Peter Raina's book contains a mine of key translations tracing the origins of the independent 'social movements' of protest which coalesced in August 1980. The tragedy is that many of them such as the civil rights movement ROPCIO, the Young Poland movement, the KPN (the Confederation of Independent Poland) as well as KSS-KOR will be presented as labels of vilification attached to those who will probably stand trial before military courts. Raina's book will act as a counterweight to those interested in the truth.

University of Essex GEORGE KOLANKIEWICZ

The Soviet Regime in Czechoslovakia. By Zdenek Krystufek. *Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs. 1981. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press, New York.) 340 pp. £27·30.*

THE political development of Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1968 is so well covered in the academic literature that to be worthwhile any new study must at the least offer new information or fresh insight. This book provides neither. Zdenek Krystufek takes us chronologically from the communist take-over to post-invasion normalisation. The journey is rapid, uneven and rather staccato-like since chapters are numerous and very short (averaging eight pages). Most issues are treated superficially, some omitted altogether. There is a slightly greater emphasis on legal and judicial developments than one might expect to find in a general survey, but this is as near as the study gets to having a focus, let alone a framework of analysis. And even in these sections the author draws on fairly well known texts adding nothing to previous interpretations. There are twenty-four statistical appendices of which little or no use is made in the text. Together appendices and footnotes bulk almost as large (133 pp.) as the written text (197 pp.) and they often make the more interesting reading.

University of Reading ALEX PRAVDA

MIDDLE EAST

Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry. By Bassam Tibi. Trans. by M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 286 pp. £20·00.*

Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939. Edited by Marwan R. Buheiry. *Beirut: American University of Beirut. 1981. 195 pp. $18.00.*

PROFESSOR TIBI, who occupies the chair of Political Science at Göttingen, starts his book with a discussion of the special characteristics and problems of nationalist movements in the Third World, which is followed by a brief historical account of Arab nationalism. These introductory chapters lead to a fairly elaborate assessment of the 'populist pan-Arab' theories of the Syrian writer and politician Sati al-Husri (1882–1968), including an account of his career and his polemics against the propounders of more regionally based doctrines. What especially marked off his ideas from those of his Arab contemporaries and successors was the influence of German thinkers, with their

emphasis upon cultural and linguistic concepts in defining the nation; but the author shows how these elements in al-Husri's thought were related by him to others deriving from Ibn Khaldun. The book has been translated into clear, readable English, and supplements quite usefully the concise treatment of al-Husri in Albert Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*; but the formidable apparatus of notes and references, often to German sources that will be inaccessible to most readers, seems rather disproportionate.

The thirteen papers that make up *Intellectual Life in the Arab East* were delivered at a seminar at the American University of Beirut in May 1979 by a mixed team drawn from visiting scholars and the university's centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies. Their main concern is, predictably, with nationalists: their ideas and means of expressing them. Seven of the items deal in one way or another with the press and its growing influence in the period covered. Negib Azoury (*Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe*), the pre-1914 Cairo editor Shaykh Ali Yusuf, the Syrian Shakib Arslan and, again, Sati al-Husri are amongst those whose careers and ideas are discussed. It is an unpretentious and useful little book.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Iran. By Nickie Keddie and Richard Yann. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1981. 321 pp. £21·00. Pb: £4·15.*

A STANDARD essay-writing ploy among undergraduates addressing a subject which they find inaccessible is to assert from the outset that it is first necessary to examine something else: and the red herring often survives for much of the essay.

While the strategy of diversion raises the hackles of professional readers of undergraduate essays, it is entirely acceptable as an approach to modern Iran. To understand what happened there in 1979, we must first know a great deal about the character of Islam in general and Shi'ism in particular, and about twentieth century social and political changes in neighbouring states. Mohammed Reza's programme of modernisation closely resembled models adopted elsewhere and so its consequences for religious revival are only to be understood in the peculiar context of Iran in the 1960s. An adequate account of the Iranian revolution, therefore, is bound to be encyclopaedic and the problem of knowing where to start is not necessarily resolved by picking up the story in Zoroastrian days. Nikki Keddie's achievement in this book is to provide a work that is densely documentary but at the same time coheres as a thesis. It has the essentials of an introductory volume—when Persian words are used they are properly explained and there is a supportive index—but at the same time Keddie offers a systematic interpretation to engage the reader who is already informed. The sometimes optimistic publishers' blurb about being all things to all men is in this instance not unjustified.

The historiography is systematically researched, closely informed and patiently written: because scholarly interest in Iran and access to sources were more general before 1979 than since, however, it is not this part of Professor Keddie's book that distinguishes her contribution. Its value lies rather in its survey of intellectual trends in modern Iran and it is with this that issue may be taken. The writer holds the interesting view that the Islamic revival in Iran and elsewhere has consisted not in any increase in popular religiosity but only in the greater penetration of politics and government by Islam. Accordingly, her intellectual history is occupied with acts and actors at the level of state and high culture. In eight pages of photographs we see portraits of President Bani Sadr and the moderate constitutionalist Ayatollah

Shariatmadari alongside an anonymous Kurd, a Shahsevan tribeswoman of Azerbaijan, and a Qashqa'i factory worker; but the relationship between the figures and the symbols is not made clear in the text. Further, the treatment of Pahlavi ideology as secular is hardly plausible in view of Mohammed Reza's conflicts with Mossadeq and the insistence with which he declared his faith in his autobiography.

In the final analysis, Keddie offers a kind of bandwagon model of Islam and notices that various intellectuals choose to express themselves in Islamic terms: religiosity is interpreted as mere strategy and currents of post-revolutionary auticlericalism are noted in support of this thesis. Commentators who are compelled by Marx's view that religion transforms into prayer the revolt of the exploited find themselves reluctant to give Islam credit for the revolution in Iran.

Centre for the Study of Religion and Society, Canterbury ROGER HOMAN

AFRICA

Africa South of the Sahara: The Challenge to Western Security. By L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1981. 114 pp. Pb: $9.95.*

IN the preface to this short book, which is a companion volume to that on the Middle East and North Africa, the authors indicate that 'it does not pretend to be an academic study' (p. xiv) and is aimed at the general reader. It may be the case that Drs Gann and Duignan consider that the objective of their book, which is to elucidate Africa's strategic position and general problems and to offer assessments and recommendations for United States policy-makers, will be promoted more effectively by appealing to a non-specialist audience.

In the early chapters of this volume, the authors offer clear and often highly contentious interpretations of topics like European colonial rule in Africa, the record of independent African governments, the merits of a market-oriented economy and the nature of Soviet involvement on the continent. Broadly they take a strongly positive view of colonialism (e.g. introducing new modes of thought, new skills and technology) a rather negative stance on African rule (e.g. occurrence of wars and coups, corruption, and malnutrition) and argue that a market system confers many economic and political benefits while state-intervention is seldom to the advantage of the people. African governments are advised that the path of virtue is one which promotes a capitalist-type economy, encourages Western trade and investment and eschews external aid.

Because they consider African states possess or can influence the flow of important strategic minerals to the West, and because they believe the Soviet Union is seeking to gain control of these supplies, Drs Gann and Duignan devote a major part of their discussion to these related issues. Writing in 1980, they propose that the United States should support pro-Western regimes in Africa including some with an unimpressive record with respect to government, the economy and human rights. Specifically they argue for Western recognition of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 'government' in Namibia, increased economic and other ties with South Africa, and United States assistance for opponents of the governments of Ethiopia and Angola. The book's comments on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe indicate some bewilderment on the part of the authors that the government led by Robert Mugabe is not 'living up' to their expectations.

In the light of the assumptions and preferences of Drs Gann and Duignan it is not difficult to see how they arrive at their policy recommendations. It is worth noting that

Dr Duignan made a policy contribution to President Reagan's presidential campaign in 1980 and that the attitudes and perspectives of this book are shared by significant members of the present United States administration, including probably the President. Those who differ with these assumptions and attitudes will find it difficult to accept that implied American support for South Africa and for the internal settlement in Namibia would promote Western interests and influence in Africa. Likewise they may doubt the efficacy of reducing the Angolan government's dependence on the Soviet Union by assisting UNITA forces.

University of Keele DAN KEOHANE

Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa. Edited by Thomas H. Henriksen. *Stanford. Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1981. 137 pp. Pb: $11.95.*

BOOKS on the communist presence in Africa are now appearing quite regularly and this to me is a very useful addition. It examines the policies of the Soviet Union (Richard E. Bissell), the East European states (Roger E. Kanet), Cuba (George Volsky) and the People's Republic of China (William E. Ratliff) over the past two decades but concentrates most attention on the period since 1974–75 when the Portuguese revolution and the fall of Haile Selassie opened up great opportunities for Soviet involvement. The book is rounded off with an essay by Thomal H. Henriksen, the editor, which takes up some of the points previously raised. All the essays are competent and up to date.

The Soviet Union is faced with many opportunities, as are other socialist states, in sub-Saharan Africa due to the instability of the continent. Leaders have internal and external enemies and given the fact that nationalist traditions are often underdeveloped, that leadership is often vested in one man or a small clique, and that most African political cultures are non-democratic, skilful behaviour can pay handsome dividends. Soviet experience in modernising its own 'Third World' in Central Asia and elsewhere can also be drawn upon. The Russians now concentrate on providing military hardware, skilled personnel, on establishing joint ventures especially in fishing, transport and resource extraction, and scholarships for civil and military training in the Soviet Union. The Soviet model, based as it is on a ruling ideology which legitimises the running of the country by a small elite, is very attractive to African leaders who are seeking to mobilise apolitical populations for national ends. It is of some interest that the Soviet Union does not involve itself deeply in the economic development of African socialist states. It now prefers trade to aid. Herein lies one of the reasons for the present uncomfortable position of the United States in Africa. The Americans concentrate mainly on economic development and, given recent African experience, the prospects of success are very limited.

There is a fundamental difference in attitudes towards Africa between the Soviet Union and its allies. Whereas the Soviet Union does not need Africa, the East Europeans do—mainly as an increasingly important source of energy and raw materials. This applies particularly to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Cuba, on the other hand, is looking for military-revolutionary experience. China appears to be losing its position, chiefly due to its inability to compete militarily and economically with the Soviet bloc. There is however one important aspect of the situation which is not explored in any of the contributions to this book.

Socialist elites are gradually coming into being under Soviet, East German, and Cuban guidance. The example of Poland has revealed that if the instruments of coercion—the military, civil and political police—remain loyal, even a communist party riven with dissent can survive. Hence the need to bring such instruments of

coercion into existence in the dark continent and here the East Germans are playing the key role. Economic growth may turn out to be a key factor but even economic failure can be contained if the instruments of coercion remain loyal and ruthless. This is the real key to socialist Africa.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London MARTIN MCCAULEY

Redistribution of Population in Africa. Edited by John I. Clarke and Leszek A. Kosiński. *London: Heinemann Educational. 1982. 212 pp. £19·50. Pb: £7·50.*

IT would be understandable if, like ecology and the environment, population and demography were in their turn to suffer from over-exposure and popularisation in the media and international fora. Since the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest and the formulation of a World Population Plan of Action there have been signs that politicians and public alike have a somewhat better grasp of the issues involved than they did of the grossly over-simplified science of the ecosystem or survival threats to the panda. Where the professional ecologist would think twice before risking even *haute vulgarisation* of his findings, lest some Green Party appropriated them for slogans, the professional students of population have arguably a duty to communicate their findings to inform public opinion in spite of such likely misrepresentation. With more Africans than ever before and consequently increasing pressure on *Lebensraum* and resources, governments are less and less able to venture or afford ad hoc decisions based on ignorance of population distribution and movements.

Like *festschrifts*, symposium reports are seldom intended or likely to have wide appeal and many come close to the category of vanity publications. This volume, originating from a conference in Zaria, part-sponsored by the UNFPA and having a singularly uninteresting, if accurate, title, might seem reserved for the specialist reader. This would be a pity, for overall many of the twenty-seven contributions are considerably more readable and edifying than the dull and worthy two volumes (*The Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives*) that came out of Bucharest. Its organisation falls neatly into general and national 'overviews' of population and redistribution, followed by mainly short, well illustrated papers grouped under rural and urban redistribution and resettlement schemes and redistribution policies. The joint editors summarise contemporary trends, patterns and policies, including in their review progress in census taking and design and country-based data on topics such as the changing geography of non-African population, refugees and rural to urban shifts. Their report of government attitudes to population policy, derived from regional consultative meetings convened after Bucharest, warrants some concern. Questioned by the United Nations Secretariat in 1976 on their attitudes to existing patterns of population distribution, 45 of the 56 countries viewed them as extremely or substantially unacceptable; 32 wished to decelerate and 5 to reverse basic trends in internal migration in another question. In an Africa in which, to quote N. O. Addo, 'Pan-Africanism appears everywhere to be on the retreat', and where the eviction of the Ugandan Asians is by no means an isolated case today of 'repatriation', population mobility and migration are clearly likely to increase their importance in shaping government development strategy and, no doubt, in other less publicised calculations behind domestic and foreign policies.

Although the national overviews, covering Libya, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, or the other grouped papers on Gambia, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, Ethiopia, and Sudan, might seem to leave conspicuous gaps in the francophone African coverage and the erstwhile Portuguese

settler colonies, this volume is remarkably comprehensive in its thematic coverage of the deceptively simple issues of how population is distributed and ordered over space and time. With Professor Clarke as an editor the attention to French language sources could scarcely be other than scrupulous, but the failure by contributors to draw on the now prolific German-language research—particularly Tanzania or Ethiopia or the four areas of the great *Afrika-Kartenwerk* project—seems curious and dismissive. For those government officials who will read working copies of this book—and the indirect subsidy by the IDC and UNFPA through advanced purchases is acknowledged—this will provide a valuable situation report for foreign ministries. For more general readers it offers a stimulating review of contemporary conceptual, theoretical and subject preoccupations in the population geography of Africa and, in certain papers, perceptive insights which anticipate or specify the very questions to which policy-makers will soon urgently need to find answers in a continent which, unlike most of the developing world, has experienced virtually no decline in its high levels of fertility and population growth since 1950.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne J. A. HELLEN

South Africa: Time Running Out. (Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa.) *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1981. 517pp. £12·00. $25.00. Pb: £5·25. $9.95.*

IN late 1978 the Rockefeller Foundation established and funded a Study Commission on United States Policy toward Southern Africa. The Chairperson was Franklin A. Thomas, president of the Ford Foundation, and its other ten members were academics, university administrators, senior directors from some major American Corporations (like Xerox and Carnegie), an urban affairs specialist and one senior trade unionist. It was backed up by a professional staff of assistants, researchers, writers, and counsel. The commission spent seventy-five days in various meetings and travels in the United States, Europe and including two-and-a-half weeks in South Africa. This lengthy report was published in August 1981.

The commission's assignment was 'to determine how the United States can best respond to the problems posed by South Africa and its dismaying system of racial separation and discrimination'. The contents of the book under review are not in general new or enlightening, though it is well put together. The bulk of the book covers history; economic, social and political affairs; South Africa's position in Africa; its relations with major trading partners; its strategic position and its strategic minerals; the threat of the 'communist' states in Southern Africa; and, especially, the importance of South Africa to the United States.

The Commission sought to devise a framework of policy for the United States which could, on the one hand, result in the (preferably) peaceful transition to democratic government in South Africa, while on the other ensuring long-term and positive economic and political links between South Africa and the United States. There is no doubt that if South Africa did not occupy such a strategic geographic position at the tip of the continent, and if it did not have such important minerals as chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum, it is unlikely that such massive corporate attention would be given to it. At the same time, the Commission emphasised the importance of moral and philosophical opposition to apartheid and its non-democratic system of government, and urged the sharing of political power amongst all South Africans though saying nothing of economic power. The report argues that the present regime is no buffer against 'communism' at all and could only lead to more regional conflict, which, in turn, would provide the opportunity for the Soviet Union,

Cuba and other communist countries to become more involved through assistance to liberation movements. The loosening of American and Western interests in the region which would inevitably result from such a sequence of events could almost be said to be the Commission's central concern.

What sort of policy objectives, then, do the members of the Commission come up with? First, they urge the American government to make clear its opposition to apartheid and the exclusion of blacks from power. Secondly, the United States should use its influence to promote power sharing 'with a minimum of violence'. Thirdly, it should support organisations *inside* South Africa seeking to promote black welfare and leadership. Fourthly, it should assist in the economic development of neighbouring states in the region so as to reduce their dependence on South Africa. Finally, Washington should take steps to reduce the impact of stoppages of imports of key minerals from South Africa, so that this could be used as a lever and also so that the United States would not suffer unduly if the South Africans refused to supply them.

Limited as it may be, there is always something to be said for this sort of strategy, though it feels more than a decade out of date. But there are two main qualifications to make about its possible bite. First, while short and medium-term gains are to be made by American corporations in their dealings with South Africa, it is unlikely that longer-term considerations will have much effect on their local policies inside South Africa. Secondly, and more significantly, this Commission was conceived under the Carter administration but born under the Reagan star. The policies which the Commission suggests are unlikely to carry much weight with the present administration. Its belief in the forces of the market and the power for good of private enterprise suggest that it will not want to influence corporate activities in South Africa. Moreover its hostility to some regimes in Southern Africa (as demonstrated by its food aid policy in relation to Mozambique) suggests that it is not too keen to help them. In an era when the political Right is in the ascendant in the United States, the proposals of this book seem unrealistic. In any event, the kind of pressure they would actually exert on South Africa appears rather ineffective, dated and cautious.

University of York ADRIAN LEFTWICH

Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation. Edited by Amon J. Nsekela. *London: Rex Collings for the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference. 1981. 274 pp. £14·00.*

Families Divided. The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho. By Colin Murray. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 219 pp. (African Studies Series, No. 29.) £18·50.*

ON April Fool's Day, 1980, the nine independent states of Southern Africa convened the Lusaka Economic Summit, at which they decided to act in concert for the co-ordinated development of a region the size of Europe. This grouping includes an Angola which is seventy-two times the size of Swaziland (the smallest member), six landlocked states, and four which count among the Third World's poorest economies. Five were styled the 'Front Line States' during the years following Rhodesia's UDI in 1965, and the new alignment—aimed at reversing dependence on South Africa—is in quantitative terms dominated by Tanzania's one third share of the sixty million population aggregate and by Zimbabwe's 'modern and cohesive economy'. This is unquestionably a valuable source-book on a movement which can be traced back to the immediate post-colonial period of the early 1960s and the consequent realignments which have so altered spatial relationships in the region. Its value lies not in a recitation of familiar and ineffectual rhetoric about economic liberation, but in a

reasoned account of development objectives and priorities appropriate in a 'programme of action'.

The point of departure is the text of the Lusaka Declaration, prefaced by an elegant and succinct introduction by the late Seretse Khama, a leader well aware of his country's total dependence for transport and communications on neighbouring white-ruled territories and of the regional, as well as national, context in any attempt to break existing dependencies on South Africa for such requirements as transportation, markets, finance or key personnel. The Declaration sought liberation through the reduction of economic dependence, the forging of links to create regional integration, the mobilisation of resources, and concerted action to secure international co-operation, but in the 253 pages of sectoral papers there is clear recognition not only of constraints on eventual co-ordination of development policies and projects but also of the potential conflict of interests and the not unlikely retaliatory actions of South Africa which might threaten its 'hostage' states like Lesotho. A wide range of integrating activities is discussed, with transport systems seen as development priorities alongside water resources, agriculture and the better use of energy and mineral resources. Areas such as employment, training and research, as well as post-independence trade and the harnessing of external regional finance are thoroughly examined, but the authors clearly recognise that the most pressing common problems are the scarcity of skilled and educated manpower and the unavailability of appropriate technology. That the operation of a free market system might lead to polarisation and regional inequalities unless new growth centres and axes are developed is recognised, but this point exposes a particular flaw in the book's presentation and much of its conceptualisation—namely, the absence of maps (an over-reduced frontispiece apart) in a volume dealing with the problem of spatial inequalities, problem regions and the need to adopt regional planning programmes. It is a somewhat ironic comment on how little has been learned since the map of Africa was 'carved up' by the colonial powers at the Berlin Conference nearly a century back.

Migrant labour in Lesotho in many ways encapsulates the extremes of dependency on the Republic of South Africa which concerned the Lusaka signatories. In 1863 described as 'the granary of the Free State and parts of the Cape Colony' and now as an 'impoverished reserve', the subject of its agricultural decline and growth of labour migration deserves continued attention. Dr Murray, an anthropologist, bases his study of a country—in which in 1976 about 200,000 of its 1·25 million population worked outside its frontiers—on five village communities in three different areas over about two years of fieldwork.

Migrant labour as a way of life forms the key topic of the book, whether regarded through the sociology of absenteeism, the demography of household composition in its effect on wage-earning capacity, or the adaptations forced on land management. Subjects like poverty and class formation are discussed at considerable length, and it is demonstrated that although access to land as a productive asset is relatively evenly distributed, successful farming tends to depend on investment from the migrants' incomes. The Basotho operate as part of a larger system of production on the RFA's periphery, no longer peasants or free labour, forced to work abroad in order to establish land rights at home and faced with the prospect of becoming structurally unemployed, without work at home or abroad. The author presents a wealth of information and interpretation of the changing family structure, the operation of bridewealth and the role of women in a society in which 'many men . . . are transient visitors, strangers even, in their own community'. He demonstrates the need for changing perspectives on migrant labour—itself a subject which had been seriously studied by anthropologists like Godfrey Wilson forty years ago—and the impetus given by the new historiography in Southern African studies and radical, if inevitably transient, theories of underdevelopment. His purpose to render an account of life in a Southern

African labour reserve in the 1970s is achieved with persuasive and subtle attention to facts. The Basotho are in the majority members of a rural proletariat 'to be understood primarily in relation to industrial capitalism in South Africa', the conditions of which derive from racial and class oppression in that country. To interpret their traditional social relations today as survivals from the pre-capitalist mode is to succumb to the illusion of dualism when they are integral aspects of the very process of transformation. In what P. W. Botha has envisaged as a 'constellation of Southern African states' Lesotho is faced by pressures from ethnic nationalism, abortive independence and class fragmentation. As Dr Murray perceptively comments on the answers to the larger questions raised by such forces or developments: they will depend upon the developing struggle within South Africa itself.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne J. A. HELLEN

Central Administration in Nigeria 1914–1948: The Problem of Polarity. By Jeremy White. *Dublin: Irish Academic Press; London: Cass. 1981. 369 pp. £17·50.*

FEW nations enjoy perfect constitutions. The devising of Nigeria's independence constitution, the work of nearly a decade of political jockeying and legal in-fighting, was especially complex. Its subsequent incapacity to balance the forces of regionalism had tragic consequences in the shape of a bitter civil war. Jeremy White's well-written and well-researched book examines the history that goes a long way towards explaining Nigeria's particular difficulties. He is a convincing advocate of the view that decisions taken by colonial officials from 1914 onwards not only created the modern state of Nigeria, but also built into that terrain specific fault-lines along which civil society would divide and ultimately fight. There is, of course, no implication of intention here. Nigeria's colonial rulers in the interwar period come across as genuine devotees of the nation-to-be, for the most part concerned, and concerned passionately, about the most advantageous means of developing the huge colony. The success of one policy, that of Lord Lugard's over others, ensured that one version of unifying Nigeria dominated. White demonstrates that although future weaknesses were foreseen, both Lugard and later Sir Arthur Richards were so intent upon preserving the viability of what they correctly saw as successful 'native administration' in both northern and southern Nigeria that they were unprepared to depart from the older bureaucratic structure which had prevailed before amalgamation.

Thus despite the amalgamation the distinctive ways in which north and south were perceived by administrators survived the marriage. Northern and southern Nigeria continued to be regarded as implicitly separate and unsurprisingly, as modern African politics began to challenge the colonial state, the developing political culture reflected the administrative divisions of the country. This set of distinctions was reinforced rather than created by the undoubted cultural and historical divisions that did exist between a predominantly Muslim north and an increasingly Christian and literate south; much the same could be said about the equally important repercussions of uneven economic development between north and south. The essential bi-polarity of Nigerian politics in the colonial era was hardly reversed by Arthur Richards's tri-regional constitution and indeed White argues that this development worsened an already entrenched regional approach to what might otherwise have been national political competition.

The tendency of Nigerian governments after the civil war to recognise the essential problematic by increasing the number of states in the Federation was interestingly prefigured by that remarkable man Sir Charles Temple. It was his argument, that Nigeria

be divided up into a large number of administrative units, that lost out in the face of Lugard's commitment to the administrative status quo. White shows above all that colonial structure is of absolutely central significance in understanding the shape and style of both the anti-colonial movement and of the post-colonial state.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London RICHARD RATHBONE

Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System. By J. 'Bayo Adekson. *Aldershot, Hants: Gower; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1981. 164 pp. £11·50.*

The Nigerian 1979 Elections. Edited by Oyeleye Oyediran. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 182 pp. £15·00.*

IF the 1960s was the decade of decline for Nigeria, then the 1970s must be seen as one of recovery. The contrast is remarkable and fascinating. How has the military managed to restore unity after the civil war? How has it managed to hold peaceful and successful elections in a country where there had been a complete absence of civilian politics for fourteen years, and where the elections prior to that had been occasions for political malpractice and regional-ethnic conflict? How, moreover, has the army managed to combine its military and governmental roles, and shift itself from a wartime to a peacetime footing, without provoking crises within its own ranks?

'Bayo Adekson and Oyeleye Oyediran are Nigerian academics, well placed to give insiders' views on these issues. Adekson claims to provide a 'critical study of the evolution and conduct of military government as well as civil-military relations in Nigeria since 1970'; while Oyediran seeks to follow up his earlier work, *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966–79*, with a discussion of how Nigerians responded to the new opportunity provided by the 1979 elections. Oyediran himself contributes to six out of the ten chapters.

Adekson's concern is to distil—from an examination of press and academic comment, party manifestoes, and the draft and final versions of the 1979 constitution—the nature of 'civil-military thought' as it developed and changed during the decade. He aspires to be systematic and scientific. We are introduced to the 'five "D"s' of civil-military thought (i.e. defence, development, demobilisation, demilitarisation, democratisation), and to a concept of 'M.E.R.' (military extractive ratio). The term 'optimum military size' is defined ('neither too large nor too small') and discussed at length to show that 'such ideals do not lend themselves to precise mathematical calculations' (p. x). This pseudo-scientific approach is pretentious: it leads to unnecessary repetition, and more importantly, it is misleading—giving the impression of coherence and accuracy where none exist. Even the section on the size of military expenditure manages to present the figures and tables in a confused and confusing way.

This is a real pity. Important issues relating to the ethnic balance in the armed forces, and the definition of the army's role under a civilian regime are dealt with, and interesting questions are raised; but the treatment is too shallow and brief to be useful.

Oyediran's work on the election is certainly more meaty, but even here it must be said that the flavour is somewhat bland. The book includes chapters outlining the preparation of the constitution, and the work of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO); the formation of the five registered political parties, and their programmes; the biases of the national newspapers and the patterns of voting; and the political manoeuvres following the elections, concerning both the constitutionality of the Presidential election result, and the subsequent allocation of Ministerial posts.

This study certainly does provide a fuller and broader discussion of the election than others which have appeared so far, and the chapters on the ethnic factor in voting

behaviour (Chapter 5), on the emergence of the political parties (Chapter 3), and on the choosing of the Cabinet (Chapter 9) are particularly illuminating. Nevertheless, the overall impression is still of a brief, preliminary survey, rather than of an in-depth analysis. There are two major omissions. First, there is no examination of the actual conduct of the election campaign, or of the attitudes of the electorate in a particular constituency or state, which would give us an insight into grassroots perceptions, and the flavour of party competition. Secondly, although the problems facing FEDECO, as regards the absence of population data and the possible inflation of the registration figures, are noted, there is no consideration of the FEDECO report to the National Assembly, published in early 1981, at about the time when the essays for the book were being completed. This report makes it clear that the official voting figures, accepted here as the basis for calculations and analysis, are in fact grossly inaccurate and unreliable. It thus calls into question the judgment that 'if there were hitches, the political parties and voters, much more so than the Commission, were to blame' (p. 39).

University of Birmingham DAVID BROWN

ASIA

China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent. By Merle Goldman. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1981. 276 pp. £14·00.*

Re-educating Chinese Anti-Communists. By J. A. Fyfield. *London: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1982. 117 pp. £10·95.*

PROFESSOR GOLDMAN has followed her earlier and extremely influential work on intellectuals in China in the 1940s and 1950s (*Literary Dissent in Communist China*) with a superbly written account of the role of intellectuals in the Chinese political system since 1959, the year of Mao's criticism at Lushan and the retreat from the Great Leap Forward. The argument of the book is that periods of crisis for the communist regime during which the political leadership has become disunited have given intellectuals opportunity both to voice support for one particular faction or trend, and to develop wider criticisms of the regime and its character. Faction patronage has usually been crucial in mobilising the intellectuals but once such mobilisation has occurred the ensuing debates have often proved difficult to control and have ultimately occasioned arbitrary and sometimes harsh restraint. The intellectuals are thus in Professor Goldman's analysis prisoners of the political process who have nevertheless been able to play a vital role in its functioning since they are that group best able to manipulate the esoteric (often historical or literary) materials of a surrogate debate but yet are expendable and may be sacrificed if one faction triumphs or the regime unites as a response to external or internal dangers.

In the early 1960s a group Goldman labels 'the liberal intellectuals' were mobilised by Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen and their allies to criticise the pretensions of Mao and the irrationalities of the Great Leap Forward. Based in the Party's Propaganda Department and in the Beijing Party Committee, and occupying senior positions in the literary and cultural establishment, these men were masters of the historical and literary forms in which this criticism was couched. Mao's response in 1965 was to mobilise a 'radical group' of intellectuals from the philosophy and social science departments of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and from the Shanghai Party Committee. These individuals were deeply committed to Mao's vision of a voluntarist revolution of the mobilised masses, and being younger and more obscure figures of the second rank the motivation for their criticism of their opponents sprang at least partially from personal

rivalry. Their polemics touched off the Cultural Revolution which elevated some of them for a time to prominence in the Cultural Revolution Group. However, their commitment to Mao's goals was apparently stronger than his own, for when they supported the creation of a Shanghai commune and called for the extension of the Cultural Revolution to the military forces hierarchy they were restrained and some of their number purged.

From the ninth Party Congress (1969) to Mao's death these radical intellectuals having gained some access to formal political power were forced to share it with many they considered enemies or temporisers, which led them to launch in their frustration a series of increasingly esoteric campaigns. One of the responses of that faction around Deng Xiaoping which had gathered following his re-emergence in 1973, was to seek support in his struggle with the radicals from the scientific and educational elites whose work had suffered at their hands, and whose research and educational institutions had to be revivified if Chou Enlai's vision of a modernised China was to become a reality. As a consequence this modernisation would also require greater contact with the West, a policy described by Jiang Qing and her radical circle as 'comprador'. Deng's intellectual supporters were sometimes able in this context to redirect the campaigns of the radicals back upon their perpetrators as Goldman shows in her masterful handling of the confused and obscure movement to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius.

With the demise of Mao in 1976 and the final triumph of Deng at the third Party Central Committee plenum of December 1978 the regime came to be committed to a programme of social transformation based not upon mass mobilisation but a return to the economic management principles of the 1950s and the emulation of Western advances in technology. Many of Deng's advisers and supporters, old cadres and scientific intellectuals alike, have thus come into their own, but if his policies are to be pursued consistently the position of the intellectuals in the Chinese political process must change to allow the scientific, technological, and management elite to exercise real power. Professor Goldman points out that the contemporary pre-eminence of these elites is not at present guaranteed by any structural alterations in the character of the regime: so long as it is not a reversion to Maoist fundamentalism is possible (and likely, given the political experience of the coming generation of Party leaders). The most that can be said for the current leadership is that their capacity for intellectual fine-tuning exceeds that of Mao, since they can pull down the shutters on political dissent and excessive cultural experimentation without disrupting (so far) China's scientific and technological efforts.

Professor Goldman has written a remarkable book which will stand as the definitive account. Fyfield's work is in a different class though it does contain some fascinating interview material on the experiences of former anti-communists (all of them previously supporters of the Guomindang or the Japanese) re-educated in the 1950s and 1960s, some in Fushun Prison which was visited by the author and those assisting him in 1979. It is doubtful whether this work could be done again now, a fact which makes the book interesting reading.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

China's Economic Development: Growth and Structural Change. By Chu-yuan Cheng. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1982. 535 pp.*

THE China-watcher of the 1980s would do well to have this book within easy reach when assessing the meaning of annual performance and long-term changes in the Chinese economy. The political scientist will rely on other sources when evaluating

the ideological background of current affairs, but the brief section on Mao's thought and its demise serves well the reader who is chiefly concerned with the country's economic and social landscape. The picture which emerges is one of untidiness, even though the occasional peek through undergrowth and jungle gives cause for a certain amount of satisfaction.

China is undergoing changes fast these days, and only an old China hand like Professor Chu-yuan Cheng can cope with ease. The author has been at it for a quarter of a century, first in Hong Kong and more recently at Ball University (Indiana). He has at his disposal the full tool-kit of his profession, yet he never uses a plane where sandpaper will do. In fourteen sections which are concise and easy to read, he surveys all major aspects of China's economic policies and their results throughout the three decades since the Communists came to power. Extending his analysis by a year beyond the date when the (confidential) report of the World Bank reached the desks of the privileged few, the author presents single-handedly—though at times without the sophistication of the World Bank report—a survey which takes the reader right up to the end of the year 1980, for which, understandably, his data are open to revision, even if the general trend will remain unaffected. The author is at his best when he writes about the rural sector, ranging from the early days of land reform to the creation of the communes and their downgrading. This still goes on at present, though there is no sign of a return of the land—which is owned by 'the people'—to individual cultivators. Another well-presented and highly topical chapter deals with the role of wages, prices and price ratios within the wider context of past and present economic policies.

The author is concerned mainly with China's domestic affairs, but in a brief final chapter he assesses the country's external economic relations, ranging from Soviet foreign aid in the 1950s to trade prospects in the 1980s. In the section on economic growth and its cycles, a wider coverage of Western and Japanese research on China's national accounts would have been welcome. The overall picture which emerges is one of oscillations comparable to, if not in excess of, those experienced by non-communist countries. Prolonged periods of stagnation, if not decay, such as the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, are interspersed with relatively brief periods of recovery and prosperity. Industry has fared better than other sectors, though the over-emphasis on steel and engineering created imbalances and waste of energy, raw materials and human skills, the correction of which will take more than a mere three years (1979-81) of 'readjustment'; this period has already been extended to 1985 or beyond.

In 1980, agriculture still 'loomed very large' (p. 381) in the Chinese economy. Productivity of land, labour, and capital remains low, abysmally so in parts. Yet 75 per cent of the work force and, of course, the whole of China's population depend on its well-being. Its future is far from secure. The recent increases of certain farm-gate prices—which had been unchanged for a dozen years—should help to provide incentives where in the past exhortation was supposed to be all that was needed. However, price ratios are badly out of gear, leaving adjustments to the black economy. Retail prices of basic consumer goods—which have been rationed for three decades—are being kept stable at the expense of the public purse. As in the past, 'the allocative function of prices is mainly subsidiary and subordinate to allocation by administrative order' (p. 224). The aim of price stability is bound to run counter to any form of price differentiation. All in all, Professor Cheng withholds his judgment on the degree of success which current reforms are likely to have.

St Anthony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

The China Factor: Peking and the Superpowers. Edited by Gerald Segal. *London: Croom Helm. 1982. 210 pp. £12·95.*

GERALD SEGAL and his group set out to explore 'a limited, but crucial, aspect of international relations: the way in which the China factor affects the main strategic concerns of the superpowers' (p. 9). They do so by bringing together and evaluating a scattered mass of specialist studies. Five scholars take part, four of them working in this country and the other in the United States, but they share much the same viewpoint, and the collection has been given added unity by the editor contributing, besides his introduction, two of the other six chapters, including the longest, a concluding general assessment. Commendable caution and objectivity are the keynote, along with recognition of greater complexities than some of the decision-makers seem to be alive to. Segal remarks on America's 'youthful zest for a new game in international politics', tripolarity (p. 156), and comments that world affairs are far too intricate to be reduced to any such neat image as a card game (p. 191). Much American thinking, or talking, it appears, revolves round the idea of 'playing the China card' against Russia. How far to go with it has been a subject of intense debate in Washington of late, as Banning Garrett indicates in his study of the American outlook.

More than one writer is moved to express distaste for the style in which China's foreign dealings have been carried on. There have been 'twists and turns' in attitudes to various other countries which to them have seemed 'opportunist at best and inexplicable at worst' (p. 33). Peking's tactics have been 'remarkably flexible and disingenuously self-serving' (p. 114). It may learn from experience that it is useful to have a reputation for some modicum of principle. On the economic plane, things are now strikingly the reverse of what they were in bygone days when the West wanted so much from China, and China nothing from the West. 'The seemingly eternal dreams of a vast China market have proven as illusory in the present as in the past', Segal observes (p. 183).

To Russia the triangle must represent a threat of encirclement. 'The bogey of Japanese money and expertise allied to the Chinese masses' has compelled it to devote a quickly increasing share of its military budget to its Asian defences (pp. 52–53). On Eastern Europe, Edwina Moreton finds no significant repercussions. Western Europe (Britain under its present government may have to be thought of as an exception) has shown little inclination to join Peking and Washington in their strident hostility to Moscow. Lawrence Freedman recalls that the Soviet Union earned respect by its dismissal of China's former wild talk of a war against the West (p. 109). He points out moreover that China has lost the importance it once had as leader of the radical camp in the Third World, and in his view it really only matters now because, to the puzzlement of West Europeans, 'the two superpowers continue to act as if it did matter' (p. 105).

This is a thoughtful book, which deserves to be widely read. Given the present quality of Western 'leadership', it cannot be called a reassuring one. It is anything but cheering to read of piecemeal decisions being taken by the White House, without regard to their relevance to wider issues, and often without consultation with the State Department (p. 97). The thought can hardly be avoided that Washington's card games, or card tricks, may end by costing us all our lives.

V. G. KIERNAN

China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955–75: Three Case Studies. By Hashim S. H. Behbehani. *London: Kegan Paul International. 1981. 426 pp.* £25·00.

THE title and dust-cover promise a useful analysis of an increasingly crucial aspect of China's foreign policy. Regrettably, the book itself is disappointing and above all obscure. Dr Behbehani (a Politics lecturer at Kuwait University) suggests that his book uses three case studies to help understand China's foreign policy in the Arab world. Despite a wealth of detail he has chosen to provide little analysis and some polemic while plodding through his three obscure examples.

Of the three case studies, the first on the Palestine Resistance Movement was potentially the most illuminating. Behbehani clearly has close contacts with certain Palestinian factions and has access to documentation of the Movement otherwise unavailable (several appendices contain particularly useful primary source documentation). But the author's apparent commitment to revolutionary violence becomes immediately obvious in the use of his material, thereby rendering the book more a primary source requiring careful reading between the revolutionary lines. Behbehani often appears to be fighting Palestinian factional politics more than providing an academic study. The author's openly admitted biases also lead the reader to suspect the authenticity and reliability of the detailed information, or to dismiss much of it as irrelevant side-lights (e.g. regular citation of pseudonyms of Palestinian leaders). The useful analysis that remains—for example, on the role of Sino-Soviet relations in China's Palestinian contacts—is not new, and has already been much more judiciously done in the standard text on Sino-Arab relations by Yitzhak Shichor (*The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy*).

The other two case studies stray off into minutiae about China's ties with the liberation movement in Oman and the Kuwait government. Seventy-six pages on Omani politics without reference to China (another thirty-five regarding China and Oman) tells us more about the author's pet interests, but contributes little to case studies of Chinese foreign policy. Sino-Kuwaiti relations might have made fascinating reading as an example of China's growing interest in the Gulf region, but instead there is a mass of obscure detail, excessively long quotations to no apparent purpose (this is a problem throughout the text) and above all little or no analysis. Behbehani's asides on Sino-Iraqi and Sino-Iranian relations show signs of sophisticated analysis, but these are soon cut off. The book's concluding chapter might have been the place to draw the threads of analysis together, but here too there is no attempt to make sense of the details provided. For a primary source book this tendency is a virtue, but for a supposedly analytical text, it is one of several fatal flaws.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security. (Reports of Conference at Pattaya, Thailand, Dec. 12–16, 1979). Edited by Joyce E. Larson. *New York: National Strategy Information Center. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 260 pp.* £18·00.

THE balmy setting of Pattaya provided the setting for a conference on Asian and Pacific security convened under the principal auspices of The National Strategy Information Centre based in Washington. Its addresses, papers and committee reports as well as editorial introductions make up the content of this volume. The scale of the undertaking was vast but organised. Three sets of themes are addressed with corresponding policy proposals presented subsequently. These themes—Political-Military Dimensions of Security in South-East Asia; Political-Military Dimensions of

Security in North-East Asia; and Economic Dimensions of Security in Asia and the Pacific—are addressed by regional political figures, academics and journalists.

The general tone of the volume is established in a foreword by Professor Frank Trager who expounds on the failings of the Nixon Doctrine and bemoans the dismantling of the West's cold war alliance structure. A concluding American view is provided by Douglas Pike who takes up the beguiling thesis that the great enemy of the United States in the 1980s will be the absence of government. He maintains that 'the U.S. cannot cope with anarchy, whether it is induced deliberately (as in Kampuchea) or perpetuated by vested interests (as in Iran)'. In the light of recent American experience in Asia, it could be argued also that the United States has not always been able to cope with the presence of governments, whether approved of or not.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective. By Anthony Arnold. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1981. 142 pp. Pb: $11.95.*

Afghanistan in Crisis. Edited by K. P. Misra. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 150 pp. £10·95.*

WE are here offered an American and an Indian view of the Afghan revolution of 1978 and of the Soviet invasion of December 1979, and very different the two views are. The American view is supplied by Anthony Arnold, a former federal intelligence analyst, whose service included Afghanistan. Much of his short book is concerned with the historical background to the 1978 revolution. Confidence in the author's reliability receives a severe blow right at the beginning where Chapter One is headed by a quotation from a letter from Palmerston to the Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon in 1853, which Arnold contrives to assign to the period of the first Anglo-Afghan war, fifteen years earlier, whilst converting Clarendon into Viceroy (presumably of India). Since the work from which Arnold takes the quotation renders its origins perfectly correctly one must assume that the errors are a gratuitous contribution by the analyst himself. In fairness to him, however, he does improve considerably as he approaches the present day.

Arnold's information about recent events comes from fairly well-known sources. He relies heavily on the official (Hafizullah Amin-inspired) history of the April 1978 revolution, written shortly after that episode. Like Amin's biography the official history places too much emphasis upon the role of that worthy, exaggerates the degree of party control of events and, in consequence, diminishes the role of the military conspirators. In his interpretation of events Arnold leans towards the theory of close Soviet involvement at all stages from the planning of the 1978 coup onwards, with the obvious exception of the Amin period (September–December 1979). Arnold suggests that Amin's downfall was primarily the consequence of his alleged refusal to agree to Soviet demands that the Afghan regime should invite Soviet troops to quell the resistance. Apart from the circumstance that this view rejects the Soviet and Karmalist claims that the Taraki and Amin regimes had repeatedly asked for Soviet military assistance in vain, Arnold does not take account of the abundant evidence that the Soviet Union frequently urged Amin to adopt more conciliatory policies towards the resistance. In particular the author does not deal with the question of land reform, opposition to which was at the heart of the opposition to the Khalqi government in the period before December 1979.

The Indian view consists of a number of essays by members of the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. These essays examine both the Afghan revolution and the reactions of various states to that

revolution. The general approach is much more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The authors reject the theory of Soviet planning as well as all the general motives—search for warm water ports, desire for oil, need for security, fear of Islam, and apprehension of infective nationalisms—alleged to have inspired the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In the opening essay M. S. Agwani goes so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union walked into a trap laid by its international adversaries and that the United States wanted the Soviet Union to be involved in Afghanistan! Such Florentine cunning scarcely accords with most observers' assessment of the thirty-ninth President's qualities but it certainly opens up remarkable new prospects of recent events. Indian attitudes towards the Soviet Union, we are informed, are not like those of others, characterised by suspicion and hostility (which is more than can be said apparently for their attitudes towards the United States), but they reflect the good relations enjoyed by the two countries. There is a strong hint, however, that Indian sympathy and understanding for the Soviet Union may have been carried too far at times, notably in the initial Indian reaction to the Soviet invasion, as expressed at the United Nations in January 1980. 'There is no denying the fact', remarks Bimal Prasad, 'that India has been traditionally extra careful in the choice of words when not agreeing with the Soviet Union' (p. 82). For the fact is that India does not like the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Relations with Pakistan remain India's main foreign policy preoccupation, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, by attracting the hostile attention of the United States, has led to the strengthening of Pakistan's military power. For this reason, rather than for any concern for Afghanistan or worries about Soviet expansion, India would like to see an end to the Soviet intervention.

These two books contain nothing that is new and, such is the progress of events, they already begin to show their age. Nevertheless, their juxtaposition serves to remind us of the constraints upon the policies of the super-powers. To put it mildly, neither the Soviet invasion nor America's response has improved the relations of those states with India and, in some modest measure, India's sturdy pursuit of its own self-interest has acted as a brake on the conduct of both super-powers.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London M. E. YAPP

NORTH AMERICA

American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. By Samuel P. Huntington. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1981. 303 pp. £10·50.*

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON is a sophisticated American conservative. Dismayed by the general assault against authority carried out between 1965 and 1975, he has sought to explain the vagaries of his countrymen by a sweeping selective reinterpretation of American history in this fascinating, provocative and sometimes infuriating book.

The thesis, elaborately worked out with many penetrating asides, can be simply stated. All politically significant Americans believe in a vague liberal democratic ideology which—as in few other countries—defines the national identity. This creed has many inconsistencies but one dominant theme: distrust of power. Government is inevitable but basically evil; American institutions therefore do not match their ideals. They respond to the tension by complacently ignoring the problem, hypocritically denying it, or cynically accepting it. But every sixty years or so, they are seized by a moralising urge to resolve the tension by overthrowing the evil power-holders of the day, suddenly seen as a threat to liberty. Early movements of this kind, the American

Revolution and the Jacksonian reforms, succeeded triumphantly. But this destructive attitude towards power is inappropriate now that the continent is populated, large-scale organisation is dominant, and the world is dangerous. The Progressive reformers were less successful than their predecessors; those of the 1960s and 1970s produced unintended and usually unfortunate results, or changes which soon withered away, leaving a gravely weakened power structure at the centre which may cripple the United States in world affairs. Understated but inescapable, the conclusion is that while all very well in another age, in the twentieth century these reform surges combine irrelevance with misconception and menace. A stylish and often elegant writer, Huntington's distaste shows in the ugly names he bestows on his key concepts. The contradiction between American ideals and institutions is christened 'the IvI gap'; the periodic attempts to bring them into line are called 'creedal passion periods'; the latest of these, the 1960s and 1970s, become 'the S & S years'.

Huntington is often illuminating about the differences between the United States and other countries, both Western and Eastern—or ingenious about unexpected similarities: 'the S & S years' appear as America's Cultural Revolution. When he turns from foreign comparisons to domestic ones, he is selective and even perverse; there is an elaborate if unconvincing explanation for not counting the New Deal, but none for the omission of Lincoln. He is defiant in his defence of the United States' international role. Without pretending that its influence has always favoured democratic liberties, he stoutly maintains that its record has been and will be the best among great powers, and he boldly maintains—for Central America and East Asia as well as Europe—that freedom has flourished and declined in direct relationship with the waxing and waning of American power in the world. To defend freedom at home is to endanger it abroad, he argues, if the defence is to be pursued by weakening the country's instruments of power. Not until the conclusion are these themes developed. But the first nine-tenths of the book form a scintillating and stimulating prelude to the provocative message of the final tenth.

Nuffield College, Oxford P. M. WILLIAMS

American National Security: Policy and Process. By Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor Jr. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by CCJ, London.) 604 pp. £21·00. Pb: £7·75.*

THIS comprehensive text on all aspects of national security as it relates to the United States is timely, given changes in the external environment and the unfavourable domestic economic situation facing a Reagan administration which has sought, since the 1980 elections, to change the direction and emphasis of national security policy. Indeed, the real value of this study is that it provides an excellent conceptual and historical synthesis of analysis and empirical evidence with respect to national security affairs in the United States since the end of the Second World War. This material is presented clearly and concisely, with a nice balance struck between elementary information and sophisticated detail, and each chapter ends with a set of discussion questions and a select bibliography. Thus it is at one and the same time a textbook for student courses and a summary of evidence from which even the specialist can derive some benefit. In a book of this scope and length there are inevitably some minor errors of citation, but the range of bibliographic and other source information is impressive.

Given the military background of the authors, and associates who helped in their research, it is not surprising that great emphasis is placed on military concerns, but they do not simply parley a military view, and their treatment of most subjects is even-handed. The study is divided into five sections. Initially the authors try to define what

national security has come to mean for the United States at the beginning of the 1980s. They go on to discuss the different organisations and institutions of government responsible for making and implementing decisions on national security, and how these have changed over time. The third section considers the major issues of national strategy, including new economic challenges and specific issues such as nuclear proliferation, refugees and terrorism as well as the ongoing problems of conventional and nuclear war capability. This is followed by analysis of major international and regional security issues, beginning with relations with the Soviet Union and perhaps giving less prominence than it should to Central and Latin America. The final section assesses the nature of the national security problems facing the United States in the 1980s.

The overall tenor of the authors' argument is supportive of a realistic, power-oriented policy conducted by a militarily strong United States, and they reject both neo-isolationist and collective security strategies as being inadequate. In their view national priorities should incorporate three principles: a strong posture which concedes no strategic political initiatives to other countries; the restoration of a stable and not unfavourable strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union; but perhaps most importantly the development of a strategy which is backed by a domestic political consensus—even if this means modifications to the ideal or preferred strategies of the 'experts'. The authors are uncertain whether the American public has the will to permit the country to be and to act as a major power, and is prepared to pay the price involved. While the Reagan administration has operated in ways generally consistent with the first two principles, the generation and maintenance of public confidence in national security policy objectives remains a crucial problem.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean. By Jenny Pearce. *London: Latin America Bureau. 1981. 272 pp. Pb: £2·50.*

THE literature on Latin America in English is very unbalanced in some respects. The bulk of it is the work of United States academics and journalists. Their works tend either to be focused on one or another of the larger Latin American countries, or to give an American (though not always friendly) view of the United States-Latin American relations. Only a small proportion of it consists of Latin American works in translation, and these are often literary works chosen for translation for their literary rather than their historical merits. Any book that deals seriously with the Central American region from a non-American perspective, therefore, is a useful addition to the literature.

Under the Eagle is a polemic work, highly critical of the role of the United States in the Caribbean, and in particular of the policies of the Reagan administration towards Nicaragua and El Salvador. As I write, the administration, still ill-informed and ill-coordinated, but noticeably less careful than in its first months in office, is once again sounding the alarm about what it conceives to be a communist conspiracy masterminded through Cuba to take over the Caribbean. Jenny Pearce points out correctly that the evidence originally presented alleging arms supplies to El Salvador not only lacked conviction but appeared to have been tampered with. Her section on El Salvador, which carries the story down to the 1981 Franco-Mexican initiative, comes at the end of a hard-hitting account of United States policy in the Caribbean since 1945, which is in turn prefaced by the briefest of historical introductions. Newspapers, magazines, official publications and the reports of Amnesty International, among

other sources, are cited as the basis of an account which, though sensational in tone and presentation, is factually accurate on the recent period.

The thesis of the book, that there is a consistent pattern of United States policy in the region, and that the Reagan policies are only the latest version of a persistent endeavour to suppress the attempts of those in the region to obtain social justice and self-determination, can be faulted on several counts. The facts are that Central America has never been economically very important to the United States. Strategic considerations spurred the acquisition of the Panama Canal, the securing of possible alternatives (e.g. Nicaragua), and later armed interventions. Their history is exceedingly complex, for regional leaders sought American aid in pursuit of the regional rivalries which go back to the Spanish colonial period. Consequently the United States has supported democracy in the Central American region (e.g. Costa Rica), acted against dictatorial regimes (e.g. Trujillo, Duvalier), or accepted popular revolution (e.g. Panama) or opposed it (e.g. Guatemala), or accepted alliances with dictators eager to secure their own position, as the world strategic balance seemed to indicate. Even more often, it has not intervened at all. In the process its leaders have not hesitated to override narrowly economic interests, whose dominance was achieved much by the absence of serious competition and little by systematic governmental support. In fact, ironically, the chief defect of this book is that it underestimates the importance of indigenous factors and so, in the last analysis, falls into the same trap as the Reagan administration: that of attributing the many evils it rightly detects and denounces to a systematic and co-ordinated plan—masterminded from Washington, however, rather than from Moscow.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies. Vol. 2: 1921-1948 The MacKenzie King Era. By C. P. Stacey. *Toronto, London: Toronto University Press. 1981. 491 pp. £21·00. Pb: £8·75.*

THIS is the second volume of an extended study of the development of Canada's external relations. It covers the years 1921-1948, encompassing Canada's transition from autonomous dominion to sovereign state and the country's shift from the orbit of the United Kingdom to that of the United States. While the book is primarily of interest to students of Canadian history and foreign policy, it has a broader appeal as well, for it traces, albeit from a Canadian perspective, the evolution in Britain's relations with its white dominions from empire to Commonwealth, and the emergence of the United States as a world power.

The book is an extremely competent treatment of the subject. It is well researched, drawing on a very broad spectrum of British, American, and Canadian primary and secondary sources. The style is clear and cogent. Of particular value are Professor Stacey's account of the intricacies of the evolving relationship between the British and Canadian governments, his analysis of the domestic sources of Canada's foreign policy, and his sensitive treatment of the curious blend of respect and resentment, affection and fear that characterised Canadian attitudes towards both the United Kingdom and the United States. The analysis focusses in particular on the personality of MacKenzie King, Canada's prime minister for all but five of the years covered, and stresses his imprint upon Canada's evolution towards sovereignty. Stacey shows how MacKenzie King shared the Canadian ambivalence towards the country's two competing patrons. In emphasising that the prime minister combined a concern to protect and to expand Canada's sphere of independent action in foreign affairs with a deep commitment to maintaining a close and special relationship with the United Kingdom, Stacey lays to rest the myth that MacKenzie King was in essence anti-British.

On a more critical note, Stacey's perspective is clearly a nationalist one. While this is perhaps not a bad thing in itself, it does on occasion affect his analysis in curious ways. For example, in his analysis of troop deployments in the Second World War, he maintains that the division of Canadian forces between the Mediterranean and Northwest European theatres was 'one of the great aberrations of Canadian war policy' (p. 353), because it made the maintenance of national control and the assertion of an independent Canadian presence in the war difficult. Surely the criterion for judging the wisdom of a deployment decision should be its effect on the war effort and not its implications for the national identity of the participants.

Beyond this, as the author moves away from subjects directly related to Canada, his analysis on occasion becomes rather questionable. In his brief treatment of the origins of the cold war, for instance, he maintains that the basic problem preventing a settlement of the German problem was Soviet unwillingness to compromise. Likewise, with respect to Poland, the problem was that the Soviet Union would accept only a 'Communist puppet administration manipulated by herself' (p. 390). This interpretation sweeps under the rug twenty years of debate in Western academic circles on the roots of the postwar order in Europe, ignoring the failures of Western diplomacy at the time, and failing to appreciate the evolving and sometimes faltering character of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, these criticisms detract in no important way from the conclusion that Professor Stacey provides here a useful and eminently readable treatment of an important and difficult subject.

International Institute for Strategic Studies S. NEIL MACFARLANE

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica. By Carl Stone. *New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 262 pp. £12·50.*

THIS book is a most welcome addition to the political sociology of the Commonwealth Caribbean by one of the most energetic practitioners of the art in the region. It makes available a wealth of data on the politics of Jamaica during the two Michael Manley premierships and so considerably advances our understanding of those turbulent years.

The book is essentially in two parts. The first six chapters set the background with a presentation of the inter-play of class and politics in Jamaica derived largely from the interpretation of opinion poll data collected by the author. The most important contribution here is Stone's identification of Jamaica as a 'clientilistic system of democracy . . . understood by the political actors in the system but defying classification by the existing concepts, paradigms and theories governing competitive party politics and electoral democracy' (p. 109). This argument of exceptionalism is a familiar one in comparative politics. In this instance Stone almost carries it off were it not for the fact that the patron-client model he presents is somewhat too perfect to be true. His argument at this point is also open to the criticism that it is not at all clear how much of the model is derived logically and how much from observable reality. This is particularly irritating because Stone is usually most meticulous about sources and method.

The second part consists of five chapters treating with voting behaviour, public opinion, and public policy. The most interesting sections here are those charting the peak and decline of the People's National Party of Manley in the years 1976 to 1978; and the provision of considerable evidence to show how weak political parties and

organised interests are in the formulation of public policy as a whole. Particularly significant here is the finding that foreign policy questions, and not domestic issues, have been the most divisive forces in recent years and the chief cause of bitterness in Jamaican politics. Stone's final appeal to nationalist sentiment in Jamaica as the balm to heal the wounds is thus quite understandable.

This book will be read with considerable profit by all interested in Caribbean politics. It has its weaknesses but as an example of the value of political sociology as a method to understanding the complexities of the region it is a particularly good advertisement.

University of Hull PAUL SUTTON

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Year Book of World Affairs 1982. Vol. 36. *London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. 1982. 277 pp. £16·50.*

STILL edited by George Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger after thirty-six years, the Year Book has fewer pages than ever before, no doubt a sign of the times. All but two of the articles in this issue are devoted to either global or African topics. Contributors include Wayland Young, Richard Falk, and Colin Legum. The introductory 'Trends and Events' section provides a guide to the contents of previous editions.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Index to International Public Opinion 1979–80. *Oxford: Clio for Survey Research Consultants International. 1981. 511 pp. £50·00.*

NOW in its second year of publication, this index assembles a vast amount of very miscellaneous information on peoples' attitudes to political, social and ethical questions, and on their use of their spare time. Much of the material could be of some use to political or social scientists, but it is difficult to guess why the compilers include such information as that on Gabonese preferences in orchestras. Despite their hope that the work 'will make an important contribution to the enhancement of international understanding', for most readers it will be of primarily entertainment value.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

The World of Learning 1981–82. 32nd edn. 2 Vols. *London: Europa. 1981. 2136 pp. £48·00 (the set).*

THE new edition of this directory published annually is a comprehensive up-to-date work of reference providing detailed information about over 24,000 universities, colleges, libraries, museums, art galleries, learned societies and research institutes and the 150,000 people active in them.

Volume 1 covers more than 400 international educational scientific and cultural organisations and a country-by-country survey from Afghanistan to Qatar, including a new entry for Belize, while Kampuchea through lack of recent information has been omitted. Volume 2 covers the country surveys from Romania to Zimbabwe.

The consistent lay-out of the entries, the clear print and the excellent binding add to the value of these essential reference volumes.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Encyclopedia of the Third World. Rev. edn. 3 Vols. By George Thomas Kurian. *London: Mansell. 1982 (First publ. 1978.) 2125 pp. £60·00 (the set).*

THIS is the second edition of this reference work which aims at providing a description of the dominant political economic and social systems of 122 countries of the world. The term 'Third World country' is defined by the author as the 'politically non-aligned and economically developing and less industrialized nations of the world'. Following this definition, some communist ruled countries have been included in the survey; China and Taiwan have not. Eight newly independent countries have been added to the list covered by the first edition. They are Dominica, Kiribati, St Lucia, St Vincent, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Banuatu, and Zimbabwe. The majority of the data in this second edition are reasonably current, the cut-off date being January 1, 1981.

The first volume contains a section devoted to International Organisations: concerned with Third World development, and economic or political solidarity, such as the World Bank, the West African Economic Community, and the Organisation of American States. There is also a list of Third World organisations in the political, economic, cultural and educational fields. This is followed by the alphabetical country-by-country survey from Afghanistan to Guinea-Bissau, the second volume covering Guyana to Qatar. The third volume is devoted to the Rwanda to Zimbabwe, survey followed by a forty-six page section of comparative economic and social statistical data in table form.

The country surveys information is arranged, rather than classified, according to a standard pattern which lists basic geographic, demographic, economic and political facts, including a twenty-year chronology of political events and a recent bibliography. There is a detailed map and, when available, the national emblem of each country at the beginning of each section. As a rule, the central government section includes a recent list of the members of the executive body of the country.

The majority of the statistics displayed can no doubt be found elsewhere, in the publications of the United Nations, the *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey* of the IISS, and the *Statesman's Yearbook*, but for the larger library this is a useful if expensive source of otherwise scattered facts and figures.

Chatham House Library N.G.

British Year Book of International Law 1980. *Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 511 pp. £40·00.*

THE publishers state that the Year Book is now a journal rather than a book, but the contents—articles, reviews, digests of court decisions—remain unchanged. The geographically specific studies deal with Morocco, Namibia, and (charmingly) the English/Scottish boundary in the Solway Forth.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

A Collection of International Concessions and Related Instruments: Contemporary Series 1975, Vol. 1. Edited by Peter Fischer. *New York, London: Oceana. 1981. 505 pp. $50.00.*

THIS volume inaugurates a new series, complementing the historical collections published by the same editor. The year 1975 was chosen as marking a turning-point in world economic relations. Texts of the eight agreements included are given in the original languages, usually English; they relate to mining, petroleum and timber investments in Africa, Latin America, and Indonesia.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

The Europa Year Book 1982: A World Survey. 2 Vols. *London: Europa. 1982, 3678 pp. £80·00 (the set).*

THE Europa Year Book is the companion to the *World of Learning* volumes, dealing with political and economic institutions of the world.

A similar pattern is followed: Volume 1 deals with international organisations, the countries of Europe and countries outside Europe arranged alphabetically from Afghanistan to Burundi. Volume 2 covers the rest of the world from Cameroon to Zimbabwe.

This invaluable reference work is a source of reliable political, historical, economic, statistical and bibliographical information which no serious reference library may be without.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Policy Formation in the European Communities: A Bibliographical Guide to Community Documentation 1958–1978. By Michael Hopkins. *London: Mansell. 1981. 339 pp. £24·50.*

THE author provides a detailed survey of the mimeographed but publicly accessible documents of the Commission and its predecessor bodies. After an introductory account of the decision-making process, each chapter covers a particular subject field. It first outlines the development of policy and its bibliographical consequences, and then lists chronologically the more important documents. Their scope and significance are described, and references are made to related Community publications. This book should be of very great value to students of the Communities.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Reports of the European Communities 1952–1977: An Index to Authors and Chairmen. Edited by June Neilson. *London: Mansell. 1981. 561 pp. £27·50.*

THIS valuable work covers published Community material and a few other reports. English or French translations of titles are provided, and a subject index increases the usefulness of the compilation.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

CALVOCORESSI, Peter: *World Politics since 1945*. 4th edn. London: Longman. 1982. 516 pp. Pb: £5·95.

DRAPER, Thomas, ed.: *Human Rights*. New York: Wilson. 1982. 154 pp. (Reference Shelf, Vol. 54, No. 1.)

WORSLEY, Peter and KITROMILIDES, Paschalis, eds: *Small States in the Modern World*. (Papers given at Conference on the Survival of Small Countries, Nicosia, Sept. 1976.) Nicosia: New Cyprus Association. 1979. 261 pp. Pb.

YOST, Charles W.: *National and Collective Responsibility*: The Governance of International Affairs. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. 1981. 23 pp. Pb: $3.00.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

BERTRAM, Christoph, ed.: *Third-World Conflict and International Security*. London: Macmillan for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1982. 121 pp. £15·00.

DOUGLASS, Joseph D. and HOEBER, Amoretta M.: *Conventional War and Escalation*: The Soviet View. New York: Crane Russak for the National Strategy Information Center. 1981. 63 pp. Pb: $5.95.

GOODWIN, Peter: *Nuclear War*: The Facts. London: Macmillan. 1981. 126 pp. Pb: £2·95.

HAAVELSRUD, Magnus, ed.: *Approaching Disarmament Education*. Guildford: Westbury House with the Peace Education Commission. 1981. 280 pp. £14·95.

HARRIS, Robert and PAXMAN, Jeremy: *A Higher Form of Killing*: The Story of Gas and Germ Warfare. London: Chatto and Windus. 1982. 274 pp. £9·95.

MOINEVILLE, Hubert: *La Guerre Navale*: Réflections sur les Affrontements Navals et leur Avenir. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1982. 160 pp. Pb: F 100.00.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

BAUDET, Henri and VAN DER MEULEN, Henk, eds: *Consumer Behaviour and Economic Growth in the Modern Economy*. London: Croom Helm. 1982. 283 pp. £14·95.

CAIRNCROSS, Frances, ed.: *Changing Perceptions of Economic Policy*: Essays in Honour of the Seventieth Birthday of Sir Alec Cairncross. London: Methuen. 1981. 276 pp.

JACOBY, Russell: *Dialectic of Defeat*: Contours of Western Marxism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 202 pp. £15·00.

JAMES, Peter: *The Future of Coal*. London: Macmillan. 1982. 271 pp. £20·00.

LLOYD, Peter: *A Third World Proletariat?* London: Allen and Unwin 1982. 139 pp. £18·50. Pb: £8·95.

NORMAN, Colin: *The God That Limps*: Science and Technology in the Eighties. New York, London: Norton for the Worldwatch Institute. 1981. 224 pp. Pb.

NOVAK, Michael, ed.: *Liberation South, Liberation North*. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 98 pp. Pb.

PACIONE, Michael, ed.: *Problems and Planning in Third World Cities*. London: Croom Helm. 1981. 290 pp. £12·95.

POLLOCK, John C.: *The Politics of Crisis Reporting*: Learning to be a Foreign Correspondent. New York: Praeger. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 221 pp. £20·00.

SLAWSON, W. David: *The New Inflation*: The Collapse of Free Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1981. 424 pp. £11·70.

UNESCO: *Living in Two Cultures*: The Socio-Cultural Situation of Migrant Workers and Their Families. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for UNESCO. 1982. 325 pp. £12·50.

URBAN, Michael E.: *The Ideology of Administration*: American and Soviet Cases. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 1982. 174 pp. $33.50. Pb: $9.95.

HISTORY

BUTLER, R. A.: *The Art of Memory*: Friends in Perspective. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1982. 175 pp. £7·95.

EYCK, Frank: *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*. London: Macmillan. 1982. 498 pp. £8·95.

HUMPHREYS, R. A.: *Latin America and the Second World War. Vol. 1: 1939–1942*. London: Athlone for the Institute of Latin American Studies. 1981. 232 pp. £16·00.

MARSHALL, George C.: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall. Vol. 1: The Soldierly Spirit, Dec. 1880–June 1939. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1981. 742 pp. £21·00.

WESTERN EUROPE

ESSER, Klaus and WIEMANN, Jürgen: *Key Countries in the Third World*: Implications for Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the South. Berlin: German Development Institute. 1981. 204 pp. Pb.

FRASER, John: *Italy*: Society in Crisis/Society in Transformation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981. 307 pp. £10·95.

MINET, G., SIOTIS, J. and TSAKALOYANNIS, P.: *The Mediterranean Challenge VI*: Spain, Greece and Community Politics. Sussex: Sussex European Research Centre. 1982. 161 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 11.) Pb: £4·00.

PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, Michael: *British Political Finance 1830–1980*. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 339 pp. $17.95. Pb: $10.50.

RUSTOW, Dankwort and PENROSE, Trevor: *The Mediterranean Challenge V*: Turkey and the Community. Sussex: Sussex European Research Centre. 1981. 118 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 10.) Pb: £4·00.

SURREY, John and WALKER, William: *Industrial Adjustment and Policy III*: The European Power Plant Industry: Structural Responses to International Market Pressures. Sussex: Sussex European Research Centre. 1981. 90 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 12.) Pb: £4·00.

MIDDLE EAST

BEHBEHANI, Kazem *et al*, eds: *Proceedings of the Symposium on Science and Technology for Development in Kuwait*. London: Longman for the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research. 1982.

KUBURSI, Atif: *The Economic Consequences of the Camp David Agreements*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 1981. 182 pp.

MALLAKH, Ragaei El, ed.: *OPEC*: Twenty Years and Beyond. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1981. 270 pp. £14·95.

MUSHKAT, Mari'on, ed.: *Violence and Peace-Building in the Middle East*. (Proceedings of a Symposium of the Israeli Institute for the Study of International Affairs.) Munich, London: Saur. 1981. 192 pp. Pb.

NOYES, James H.: *The Clouded Lens*: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy. 2nd edn. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 168 pp.

AFRICA

KÖRNER, Peter: *Südafrika zwischen Isolation und Kooperation* Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1981. 204 pp.

MATTHIES, Volker: *Der Eritrea-Konflikt*: Ein 'Vergessener Krieg' am Horn von Afrika. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1981. 181 pp. DM 18.00.

SACHS, Albie: *Island in Chains*: Ten Years on Robben Island as Told by Indres Naidoo to Albie Sachs. Harmondsworth, Ms: Penguin. 1982. 278 pp. Pb: £1·95.

ASIA

BURCHETT, Wilfred: *The China Cambodia Vietnam Triangle*. London: Zed; Chicago: Vanguard. 1981. 235 pp. Pb: £4·95.

NISHI, Toshio: *Unconditional Democracy*: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945–1952. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 367 pp. $19.95.

RICHARDS, Peter and GOONERATNE, Wilbert: *Basic Needs, Poverty and Government Policies in Sri Lanka*. Geneva: International Labour Office. 1981. 176 pp. Sw. frs 17.50.

NORTH AMERICA

GODSON, Roy, ed.: *Covert Action*. New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction for the National Strategy Information Center. 1981. 243 pp. Pb: $7.50.

JACOBSON, Gary C. and KERNELL, Samuel: *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*. New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press. 1982. 111 pp. £10·50.

PENNIMAN, Howard R., eds: *Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980*: A Study of the General Elections. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 426 pp.

SABATO, Larry J.: *The Rise of Political Consultants*: New Ways of Winning Elections. New York: Basic Books. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Harper and Row.) 376 pp. £14·00.

WALKER, William O.: Drug Control in the Americas. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1982. 287 pp. $25.00.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

BIESANZ, Richard, BIESANZ, Karen Zubris and BIESANZ, Mavis H.: *The Costa Ricans*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1982. 246 pp. £11·20.

BECKFORD, George and WITTER, Michael: *Small Garden . . . Bitter Weed*: The Political Economy of Struggle and Change in Jamaica. 2nd edn. London: Zed. 1982. 167 pp. £16·95. Pb: £4·95.

SCHMITZ, Hubert: *Manufacturing in the Backyard*. (Case Studies on Accumulation and Employment in Small-Scale Brazilian Industry.) London: Frances Pinter; Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun. 1982. 232 pp. £12·75.

BOOKS REVIEWED, SUMMER 1982

REFLECTIONS ON A PARTNERSHIP: BRITISH AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY*

Henry A. Kissinger†

MICHAEL HOWARD, in his earlier lecture in this series, confirmed what I had suspected: that the United States deserves some of the credit for Britain's decision to create a Foreign Office in the first place. The Foreign Office was founded only a few months after the battle of Yorktown. The 'politicians' of the time having just mislaid America, the need was evidently felt for some more professional machinery to run Britain's newly expanded sphere of 'foreign' affairs.

Since then, Britain and America have never ceased to play important roles in each other's history. On the whole it has been a productive and creative relationship, perhaps one of the most durable in the history of nations. In the last 200 years, we have approached each other sometimes warily, and dealt with foreign affairs often from different perspectives. Still, on balance the relationship has been of considerable benefit to world peace. This has been true particularly of the period since the Second World War.

All accounts of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War and in the early postwar period draw attention to the significant differences in philosophy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, reflecting our different national histories. America, which had never experienced a foreign threat to its survival, considered wars an historical aberration caused by evil men or institutions; we were preoccupied with victory defined as the unconditional surrender of the Axis. Britain had seen aggression take too many forms to risk so personal a view of history; she had her eyes on the postwar world and sought to gear wartime strategy towards forestalling Soviet domination of Central Europe. Many American leaders condemned Churchill as needlessly obsessed with power politics, too rigidly anti-Soviet, too colonialist in his attitude to what is now called the Third World, and too little interested in building the fundamentally new international order towards which American idealism has always tended. The British undoubtedly saw the Americans as naive, moralistic, and evading responsibility for helping secure

* Dr Kissinger was Secretary of State, United States, 1973-77, and has been University Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, since 1977.

† This article is the text of a lecture given by Dr Kissinger at Chatham House in May 1982 to mark the Bicentenary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His lecture, and three other lectures given to mark the same anniversary, have been published in *The Listener*.

the global equilibrium. The dispute was resolved according to American preferences—in my view, to the detriment of postwar security.

Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid awakening to maturity in the following years. In the 1940s and 1950s our two countries responded together to the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union and took the lead in creating the structures of Western co-operation for the postwar era which brought a generation of security and prosperity. In the process a rather ironic reversal of positions took place. Today it is the United States that is accused of being obsessed with the balance of power, and it is our European allies who are charged by us with moralistic escapism.

I believe, nevertheless, that the extraordinary partnership among the democracies will overcome the occasional squabbles that form the headlines of the day and, even more important, meet the objective new challenges that our countries face.

Philosophies of foreign policy

The disputes between Britain and America during the Second World War and after were, of course, not an accident. British policy drew upon two centuries of experience with the European balance of power, America on two centuries of rejecting it. Whereas America had always imagined itself isolated from world affairs, Britain for centuries was keenly alert to the potential danger that any country's domination of the European continent—whatever its domestic structure or method of dominance—placed British survival at risk. Where Americans have tended to believe that wars were caused by the moral failure of leaders, the British view is that aggression has thrived on opportunity as much as on moral propensity, and must be restrained by some kind of balance of power. Where Americans treated diplomacy as episodic—a series of isolated problems to be solved on their merits—the British have always understood it as an organic historical process requiring constant manipulation to keep it moving in the right direction.

Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this field. Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters Britain has traditionally practiced a convenient form of ethical egoism, believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. This requires a certain historical self-confidence, not to say nerve, to carry it off. But Britain has always practised it with an innate moderation and civilised humaneness such that her presumption was frequently justified. In the nineteenth century, British policy was a—perhaps *the*—principal factor in a European system that kept the peace for 99 years without a major war.

American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradition. The Founding Fathers, to be sure, were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and skilfully manipulated it to win independence.

But for a century and more after that, America, comfortably protected by two oceans—which in turn were secured by the Royal Navy—developed the idiosyncratic notion that a fortunate accident was a natural state of affairs, that our involvement in world politics was purely a matter of choice. Where George Canning viewed the Monroe Doctrine in terms of the world equilibrium, 'call[ing] the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old', Americans imagined the entire Western Hemisphere a special case, safely insulated from the rest of the world. We had created a nation consciously dedicated to 'self-evident' truths, and it was taken for granted in most American public discourse that our participation (or non-participation) in the world could be guided exclusively by moral precepts. That geography gave us this luxury was only evidence of God's blessing upon us; we owed Him that *quid pro quo*. The competitive, sometimes cynical, and always relativistic style of European power politics was viewed in America as an unsavoury example of what to avoid and as further evidence of our moral superiority.

In American discussion of foreign policy, even through much of the twentieth century, the phrase 'balance of power' was hardly ever written or spoken without a pejorative adjective in front of it—the 'outmoded' balance of power, the 'discredited' balance of power. When Woodrow Wilson took America into the First World War, it was in the expectation that under American influence the postwar settlement would be governed by a 'new and more wholesome diplomacy' transcending the wheeling and dealing, secrecy and undemocratic practices that were thought to have produced the Great War.[1] Franklin Roosevelt, on his return from the Crimean Conference in 1945, told the Congress of his hope that the postwar era would 'spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed'.[2] Both Wilson and Roosevelt put their faith in a universal organisation of collective security in which the peace-loving nations would combine to deter, or combat, the aggressors. It was assumed that all nations would come to the same conclusions regarding what constituted aggression and be equally willing to resist it, no matter where it occurred, regardless of how far from their borders, irrespective of the national interest involved.

In the American view, nations were either inherently peaceful or inherently warlike. Hence, after the Second World War the 'peace-loving' United States, Britain and Soviet Union had together to police the world against Germany and Japan, even though the former enemies had been rendered impotent by unconditional surrender. If there were doubts about the peace-loving virtue of our wartime allies, they seemed to many American leaders to apply as much to Britain as to the Soviet Union: Roosevelt toyed with the idea of nonalignment between a balance-of-power-oriented, colonialist Britain and an ideologically

1. Woodrow Wilson, address before the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1916.
2 Franklin D Roosevelt, address to Congress on the Yalta (Crimea) Conference, March 1, 1945.

obstreperous Soviet Union. Even Truman took care not to meet with Churchill in advance of the Potsdam conference; he did not want to appear to be 'lining up' with Britain against Russia. The secret dream of American leaders, if great power conflict proved unavoidable, was to arrogate to themselves the role to which the nonaligned later aspired: that of moral arbiter, hurling condescending judgments down at all those engaged in the dirty game of international diplomacy.

As late as 1949, the Department of State submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a memorandum that strove mightily to distinguish the new North Atlantic Treaty from traditional military alliances and above all from any relationship to the very balance of power it was supposed to establish. The Treaty, the memorandum said, 'is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting "balance of power" but to strengthen the "balance of principle".'[3]

American attitudes until quite literally the last decade have embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended, that problems can be solved permanently, that harmony can be the natural state of mankind. Thus our diplomacy has often stressed the concepts of international law, with its procedures of arbitration and peaceful settlement, as if all political disputes were legal issues, on the premise that reasonable men and women could always find agreement on some equitable basis. Theodore Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize for helping mediate the Russo-Japanese war in 1905; thus Alexander Haig's recent efforts in the Falklands dispute have a long tradition behind them. There is also a perennial American assumption that economic well-being automatically ensures political stability, a belief which has animated American policies from Herbert Hoover's relief efforts after the First World War to the Marshall Plan to the recent Caribbean initiative—never mind that, in many parts of the world, the timeframes for economic progress and the achievement of political stability may be seriously out of phase. In our participation in the two world wars of this century, and afterwards, our bursts of energy were coupled with the conviction that our exertions had a terminal date, after which the natural harmony among nations would be either restored or instituted.

Disillusionment was inevitable. America fluctuated between moral crusading and frustrated isolationism, between overextension and escapism, between extremes of intransigence and conciliation. But history was kind to us. For a long time it spared us from the need to face up to fundamental choices. Not being called upon to help preserve the equilibrium—a service rendered gratis by Great Britain—we could avoid the responsibility of permanent involvement in world politics, of unending exertion with no final answers or ultimate resolution.

Even when the United States finally entered the world stage of permanent

3. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty*, 81st Cong., 1st sess (1949), pt. 1, Appendix, p. 337.

peacetime diplomacy after 1945, it did so under conditions that seemed to confirm our historical expectations. For several decades we had the overwhelming resources to give effect to our prescriptions, and thus conducted foreign policy by analogy to the great formative experiences of the 1930s and 1940s: the New Deal translated into the Marshall Plan; resistance to Nazi aggression translated into the Korean 'police action' and the policy of 'containment'. We tended to attribute our dominance in the Western Alliance to the virtue of our motives rather than to the preponderance of our power. In fact, the United States enjoyed nearly half the world's Gross National Product and a monopoly in the atomic bomb; our NATO allies, given their dependence, conducted themselves less as sovereign nations than as lobbyists in Washington decision-making. It was therefore a rude awakening when in the 1960s and 1970s the United States became conscious of the limits of even *its* resources. Now with a little over a fifth of the world's GNP, America was powerful but no longer dominant. Vietnam was the trauma and the catharisis but the recognition was bound to come in any event. Starting in the 1970s, for the first time, the United States has had to conduct a foreign policy in the sense with which Europeans have always been familiar: as one country among many, unable either to dominate the world or escape from it, with the necessity of accommodation, maneouvre, a sensitivity to marginal shifts in the balance of power, an awareness of continuity and of the interconnections between events.

Our perennial domestic debates reflect the pain, and incompleteness, of that adjustment. The American Right still yearns for ideological victory without geopolitical effort; the American Left still dreams of reforming the world through the exercise of goodwill unsullied by power. We are edging towards a synthesis but it will be a slow, painful, perhaps bitter process.

The nature of the 'special relationship'

That two countries with such divergent traditions could form a durable partnership is remarkable in itself. The periods of the close Anglo-American 'special relationship', the object of such nostalgia today, were also times of occasional mutual exasperation.

For quite a while we stressed different aspects of our histories; in more senses than one, we lived in different time zones. It was only some while after the settlement of the *Alabama* affair just over a century ago that American and British interests began to run parallel. The need for intimacy seemed to be greater on this side of the Atlantic (that is, in Britain), and Britain began to avoid alliances that could entangle her against the United States—including a tantalising offer from Germany around the turn of the century.[4] American memories were longer: the First World War was a temporary exertion, after which we withdrew into isolationism; during the 1920s the US Navy

4. See R. B. Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* (London: 1925), p. 92.

Department still maintained a 'Red Plan' to deal with the contingency of conflict with the British fleet.

It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed permanently. In the immediate postwar period we were held together by strategic circumstances which imposed the same necessities, whatever the different philosophical premises. American resources and organisation and technological genius, and British experience and understanding of the European balance of power, were both needed to resist the sudden threat from the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty, while formally American initiatives, were inconceivable without British advice and British efforts to organise a rapid and effective European response. Ernest Bevin was the indispensable architect of the European response as well as the staunch helmsman of Britain's journey from power to influence.

Even then, Anglo-American difficulties persisted occasionally. The anguished disagreements over immigration into Palestine; the misunderstandings over atomic co-operation; competition over Iranian oil; the abrupt, unilateral ending of Lend-Lease; the race to demobilise; these were only some of the items in a stream of irritants. More serious policy differences were to follow in the 1950s, causing Anthony Eden to reflect on the 'tough reality of Anglo-American relations'.[5] Even when the politics were parallel, the personalities were often divergent. Eden and Dean Acheson were friends as well as colleagues; the same could not be said for Eden and John Foster Dulles. Misunderstandings and conflicts of interest continued through European integration, the rearmament of Germany, and Indochina, right up to the tragic climax of Suez—to which I will return below.

That these irritations never shook the underlying unity was due to statesmanship on both sides. One factor was a brilliant British adjustment to new circumstances. To the outside world it may have seemed that Britain clung far too long to the illusion of Empire; in her relations with Washington, she proved that an old country was beyond self-deception on fundamentals. Bevin, the unlikely originator of this revolution in British diplomacy, shrewdly calculated that Britain was not powerful enough to influence American policy by conventional methods of pressure or balancing of risks. But by discreet advice, the wisdom of experience, and the presupposition of common aims, she could make herself indispensable, so that American leaders no longer thought of consultations with London as a special favour but as an inherent component of their own decision-making. The wartime habit of intimate, informal collaboration thus became a permanent practice, obviously because it was valuable to both sides.

The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder—and no little resentment—to third countries. Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American 'arrangements' and 'understandings', sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal

5. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (Cambridge, Mass.; Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 225.

documents. The stationing of B-29 atomic bombers in Britain in 1948 was agreed between political and service leaders but not committed to writing. Less happily, only general principles were recorded when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed in 1942 to co-operate in producing the atomic bomb. After Roosevelt died, Clement Attlee reflected with admirable restraint: 'We were allies and friends. It didn't seem necessary to tie everything up'.[6]

The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practised between sovereign nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key document. In my White House incarnation then, I kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department—a practice which, with all affection for things British, I would not recommend be made permanent. But it was symptomatic.[7]

For a brief moment in the early 1970s, Britain seemed to decide to put an end to the special relationship in order to prove itself a 'good European' in the year that it entered the European Community. The attempt was short-lived.[8] By 1976, James Callaghan and Anthony Crosland had restored the traditional close relationship—without resurrecting the label—and it was enormously valuable, indeed indispensable, in the Southern Africa negotiations that began in that year. In my negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when I did not fully grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. The practice of collaboration thrives to our day, with occasional ups and downs, but even in the recent Falkland crisis, an inevitable return to the main theme of the relationship.

Britain, America and Europe

Clearly, British membership of the European Community has added a new dimension. But the solution, in my view, is not to sacrifice the special intimacy of the Anglo-American connection on the altar of the European idea, but rather to replicate it on a wider plane of America's relations with *all* its European allies; whether bilaterally or with a politically cohesive European Community is for Europe to decide. The special frankness and trust that may have been originally resorted to as compensation for a disparity of power may now be even more essential in the partnership of equals that must characterise the future relations between America and Europe.

Europe has been a traumatic issue for both Britain and the United States. Americans often forget that Britain, too, has been a reluctant internationalist, at least as far as Europe was concerned. Tradition pulled Britain across distant

6. Clement Attlee and Francis Williams, *Twilight of Empire* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1962), p. 108.
7. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson/Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 274-86.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-43.

oceans. The glory of foreign policy was identified with Empire and Commonwealth, its problems and perils with the continent of Europe. It was Czechoslovakia, in the heart of Europe, which Chamberlain described as a small faraway country of which Britons knew little—after a century and a half of fighting on the borders of India.

In Britain, reluctance to enter Europe was always bipartisan, and somewhat mystical. Eden once said that Britain knew 'in her bones' that she could not join it; and Hugh Gaitskell spoke of the impossibility of throwing off 1,000 years of history. But there were more substantial reasons: worries about sovereignty—which on the Left were combined with concern for the unfettered development of socialist planning; an instinctive disinclination to deal with continentals on an equal footing; trade ties with the Commonwealth; and the special relationship. Even Churchill, despite his intimations of the future, remained as ambivalent in government as he had been prescient in opposition when he had called as early as 1947 for a United States of Europe. In office, he never quite found the balance among his three concentric circles—the Commonwealth, Europe, and the English-speaking peoples.

Only after Suez did the risks of isolation become obvious, as did the opportunity that the emerging Europe offered for exercising in a different but equally effective form Britain's traditional role of guardian of continental equilibrium. If the economic benefits were ambiguous, the political necessities were not: only as one of the leaders of Europe could Britain continue to play a major role on the world scene.

By entering the European Community, Britain did not abandon her instinct for equilibrium. But for the first time in peacetime she threw herself into the scales. As I have already noted, she did so with the fervour of a frustrated convert who had been kept waiting for a decade at the doors of destiny.

If Britain has had a difficult adjustment to make in its relationship to Europe, so has the United States. After the war, American leaders applied a heavy dose of their usual missionary zeal and the full rigour of their 'problem-solving' energy to the task of promoting European integration. Federalism, of course, was a hallowed American principle. Shortly after the Philadelphia Convention, Benjamin Franklin was urging on the French the attractions of a federal Europe. A similar evangelism, in a more practical form, shone through the Marshall Plan. Even Acheson, not usually seen as a moralist, was carried away by the European idea; he recalled listening to Robert Schuman outlining his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community: 'As he talked, we caught his enthusiasm and the breadth of his thought', Acheson wrote, 'the rebirth of Europe, which, as an entity, had been in eclipse since the Reformation'.[9]

Despite the idealism of our commitment, tensions between America and a unified Europe were inherent in the logic of what we were so enthusiastically endorsing. We had grown accustomed to the devastated, temporarily impotent Europe of the postwar period; we forgot the Europe that had launched the

9. Dean Acheson, *Sketches from Life* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), pp. 36-37.

industrial revolution, invented the concept of national sovereignty, and operated a complex balance of power for three centuries. A Europe reasserting its personality was bound to seek to redress the balance of influence with the United States; Charles de Gaulle in this respect differed largely in method from Jean Monnet, who never disguised his hopes for a more powerful and effective European voice.

Thus, later American disillusionments were inherent in our goals. It was naive for Americans to take for granted that a federal Europe would be more like us, that a united Europe would automatically help carry our burdens, and that it would continue to follow American global prescriptions as it had in the early postwar years of European recovery and dependency. That cannot be so.

Yet even if some of our more unhistorical expectations were disappointed, our original judgment was correct: European unity, strength, and self-confidence are essential for the future of the West. It is beyond the psychological resources of the United States—not only the physical—to be the sole or even the principal centre of initiative and responsibility in the non-Communist world. (This is one reason why I always favoured the independent British and French nuclear deterrents.) American support for European unification was therefore an expression of self-interest even if it paraded under the banner of altruism; it was to our advantage even if we paid occasionally in the coin of clashing perspectives—provided we found a way toward creative unity on fundamentals.

Britain, Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union

The central foreign policy problem that Britain, America, and Europe have had to confront together since 1945 is, of course, the Soviet Union. And the need for creative unity among us as we do so has not ended.

One thing that is clear from the historical record is that neither side of the Atlantic has had a monopoly of special insight into this problem. As soon as the war had ended, both Britain and America fell over each other in the rush to demobilise. All American troops were due to leave Europe by 1947. After a visit to Moscow in May 1945, Harry Hopkins told President Truman that he saw no major sources of conflict between America and Russia on the horizon.[10]

After Churchill left office, British policy for a brief period ironically fell prey to some of the same illusions that had bedevilled American leaders. The Labour Government at first hoped that 'Left could speak unto Left'. The brief moment of nostalgia reflected the hope that Britain would stand neither for the unbridled capitalism of the United States nor for Soviet communism. A resolution calling for 'progressive unity' between the British Labour and Communist parties was only narrowly defeated. There is not much doubt, in fact, that once the United States was committed after the Greek-Turkish aid programme in 1947, some in Britain were tempted—as Roosevelt and

10. Attlee and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

Truman a few years earlier—by the idea of enhancing British influence by remaining aloof not just from Europe but from the emerging superpower confrontation, adding to her traditional role as manipulator of the balance in Europe that of intermediary between East and West. This attitude has reappeared in some circles in Europe today.

No amount of revisionist distortion can change the fact that it was the Kremlin which turned Anglo-American hopes into mirages. There is today in some circles a curious assumption of diabolic Soviet cleverness and foresight. Yet in those years, Stalin's conduct of relations with his former allies made him the chief architect of NATO. A few more fleeting smiles on the wooden features of Mr Molotov, and a modicum of self-restraint and diplomatic delicacy, would have done much to prise apart the young and still brittle Atlantic co-operation: and all the boys might have been home, as planned, by 1947.

The Soviets did not manage this degree of subtlety. Instead, Moscow went out of its way to estrange and alienate, where it could have softened through a little courtship, however heavy-handed. The Russians declined Britain's invitation to send a Soviet contingent to a victory parade, and Stalin side-stepped an offer from Attlee to renew the wartime alliance. Every door that Ernest Bevin, mindful of the influential left wing of his party, was careful to keep open was resoundingly slammed and loudly bolted. As was soon to be shown in the persecution of social democrats in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union countenanced only one form of 'socialism' and fought other, democratic versions even more bitterly than capitalists. The outright Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan was an egregious blunder; a mild expression of interest, however disingenuous, could have caused untold disruption and delay in the Western camp. Acceptance would have changed the face of postwar politics.

It was one of those moments when America's activism and idealism brought out the best in her. The 1940s were years of imaginative men and bold measures on both sides of the Atlantic: The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin airlift, the Brussels treaty, and finally NATO, were inspired and creative initiatives. And in the years following, the United States and its allies stood fast against Soviet pressures and blackmail in crises over Korea, Berlin, and missiles in Cuba.

But we in America had only begun to scratch the surface of the long-term problem of US-Soviet relations in the nuclear age, which would soon produce more ambiguous challenges. The problem was, at bottom, conceptual. Americans were uncomfortable with the notion of a cold war. They tended to treat war and peace as two distinct phases of policy. Total victory was the only legitimate goal for war; conciliation the appropriate method for peace. In this sense the postwar period fulfilled neither of America's conceptual expectations. If in wartime we lacked a sense of political strategy, in peacetime we had difficulty forming an understanding of the permanent relation between power

and diplomacy. The policy of containment, and its variant called 'negotiation from strength', were based on the experience with the anti-Hitler coalition. It focused on the build-up of military strength towards some hypothetical day of greater parity; it aimed at eventual negotiation of some kind with the Soviet Union but offered no clue as to either its timing or its content, nor even a clear definition of the nature of the relevant military strength. George Kennan's famous 'X' article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 looked vaguely to the eventual 'mellowing' of the Soviet system; Dean Acheson spoke of building 'situations of strength' which, somewhere down the road, would induce the Kremlin 'to recognize the facts . . .'.[11] But how precisely this negotiation would emerge or to what end it would be conducted was left vague.

The flaw in containment was not only, as the cliché has it today, that it was overly preoccupied with military counter-force, but that it misunderstood that the West in the immediate postwar period was precisely at the apex of its relative strength. Containment thus deferred the moment for a diplomatic encounter with the Soviet Union to a later time by which Soviet power could only have grown. In 1945 the United States had an atomic monopoly and the Soviet Union was devastated by 20 million casualties. Our policy paradoxically gave the Kremlin time to consolidate its conquests and to redress the nuclear imbalance. The West's military and diplomatic position relative to the Soviet Union was never more favourable than at the very *beginning* of the containment policy in the late 1940s. *That* was the time to attempt a serious discussion on the future of Europe and a peaceful world.

As so often, Winston Churchill understood it best. In a much neglected speech at Llandudno in October 1948, out of office, he said:

> The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against using this strange new power against them, what will they do when they themselves have huge quantities of atomic bombs? . . . No one in his senses can believe that we have a limitless period of time before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad for us to turn up. The Western Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too.[12]

11. U.S Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East*, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (1951), p. 2083.
12. Winston Churchill, speech at Llandudno, October 9, 1948, reported in *New York Times*, October 10, 1948.

So the postwar world came into being. A precarious peace was maintained, based on a nuclear equilibrium, with occasional negotiations to ease tensions temporarily, but ultimately dependent on a balance of terror. The problem of maintaining security took on an unprecedented new dimension. Technology was soon to make the United States directly vulnerable to attack; the Atlantic Alliance increasingly based its defence strategy on reliance on weapons of mass destruction that posed risks more and more difficult to reconcile with the objectives being defended.

In the nuclear age, peace became a moral imperative; and it imposed a new dilemma. The desire for peace is the mark of all civilised men and women. Yet the democracies' desire for peace, if divorced from a commitment to defend freedom, could turn into a weapon of blackmail in the hands of the most ruthless; if the desire to avoid nuclear war turns into undifferentiated hysteria, nuclear blackmail may well be encouraged. The problem of the relationship of power to peace, the balance between ends and means, has been evaded for a generation by an abdication to technology. But history tolerates no evasions. To develop a strategy that relates ends to means, to build military forces that avoid the choice between Armageddon and surrender, is a pre-eminent moral as well as political problem for our period. Of at least equal importance is to develop an Allied consensus behind proposals of arms control based on analysis, not panic, and freed of either the quest for confrontation or the tendency towards abdication.

Third World perspectives: what is the limit of inter-allied conflict?

In a period of nuclear stalemate, ironically, conflict became more likely at the level of local, non-nuclear crisis. In an age of decolonisation, many of these clashes were bound to occur in the Third World. This was another area in which, in the immediate postwar period, American and European attitudes diverged sharply.

Americans from Franklin Roosevelt onwards believed that the United States, with its 'revolutionary' heritage, was the natural ally of peoples struggling against colonialism; we could win the allegiance of these new nations by opposing and occasionally undermining our European allies in the areas of their colonial dominance. Churchill, of course, resisted these American pressures, as did the French and some other European powers for a longer period than did Britain.

As Europe decolonised, partly under American pressure, there began a reversal of roles, the march by each side towards the philosophical positions vacated by the other—to an America focused on international security and a Europe affirming general moral precepts of conduct. On Third World issues especially, many in Europe have ended up adopting the attitude embodied in Roosevelt's anticolonialism and Eisenhower's conduct over Suez. Now Europe would seek to identify with Third World aspirations, economic and political,

intensifying its efforts at conciliation the more insistent, peremptory, and radical that Third World demands become. At the same time, the United States, at least in some administrations, has come to a perception closer to Eden's: that appeasement of radical challenges only multiplies radical challenges.

Different perceptions of national interest were involved as well. Thus in the India-Pakistan war of 1971 Britain did not share our sense of concern for the country which had opened the first tenuous links to China; the historic nostalgia for India was too strong. So too in the early stages of the Falkland crisis America hesitated between its Atlantic and its Western Hemisphere vocations. But neither of these disagreements did any lasting damage. In the end we came together; the old friendship prevailed over other considerations.

The lesson I draw is that in the Third World we may occasionally operate from different perspectives. But we must take care not to let these differences reach a point where they undermine the basic self-confidence and sense of mission of the other party, lest we threaten prospects for progress and stability transcending the immediate issue.

In this context the experience of Suez is instructive. Our prolonged and never-reconciled clash had lasting consequences not only for the Middle East and the Third World but also for the long-term evolution of Western policies.

The details of that disaster are not relevant to my immediate purpose. The British-French expedition against the Suez Canal was clearly misconceived. The fact remains that Eden had got hold of what was intellectually the right problem, while the American reaction, among other things, begged some crucial questions: to what extent our 'revolutionary' historical analogy was relevant; to what extent it was wise to humiliate one's closest ally; and what would be the long-term consequence of such a course.

Britain and France, in my view, were acting on a strategic analysis which may have been traditional and even self-serving but was far from frivolous. Nasser was the first Third World leader to accept Soviet arms and to play the radical, pro-Soviet game in an attempt to blackmail the West. Eden's perception was that a dangerous precedent was being set: can there be any dispute of this today? Had Nasser's course been shown a failure, a quite different pattern of international relations would have developed, at least for a decade or more. As it turned out, Nasser's policy was vindicated; revolutions spread in the Middle East in the following years, and he has countless imitators today around the world relying on Soviet arms to increase their influence and to destabilise their neighbours.

Even more important, our humiliation of Britain and France over Suez was a shattering blow to these countries' role as world powers. It accelerated their shedding of international responsibilities, some of the consequences of which we saw in succeeding decades when reality forced *us* to step into their shoes—in the Persian Gulf, to take one notable example.

Suez thus added enormously to America's burdens—and simultaneously

fuelled a European resentment at America's global role which continues to this day.

It is clear that a world of progress and peace requires that more than 100 new and developing nations be made part of the international system; no international order can survive unless they feel a stake in it. It is incontestable that many conflicts in the developing world arise from legitimate social, economic, or political grievances; this, however, does not exclude the possibility that these can be exploited by extremists and turned against the long-term security interests of the West. The democracies, whatever their shifting positions, have failed to relate their philosophical and moral convictions to a coherent analysis of the nature of revolution and an understanding of how best to foster moderation. Above all, disputes among the democracies over this problem should not be permitted to turn into a kind of guerrilla warfare between allies. Whatever the merit of the individual issue, the price will be a weakening of the West's overall psychological readiness to maintain the global balance.

The strategic position or self-confidence of a close ally on a matter it considers of vital concern must not be undermined. It is a principle of no little contemporary relevance. In this sense the Falkland crisis in the end will strengthen Western cohesion.

Suez, by weakening Europe's sense of its own importance as a world power, accelerated the trend of Europe's seeking refuge in the role of 'mediator' between the United States and the Soviet Union. The role that some American leaders naively saw the United States as playing between Churchill and Stalin, in the end too many Europeans seek to adopt between Washington and Moscow.

It is not a new phenomenon. It began, at least where Britain was involved, as wise advice to us that negotiation could be an element of strategy. This is a lesson of which Americans often need to be reminded. It has its antecedents in Atlee's flight to Washington for reassurance when Truman seemed to hint at using nuclear weapons in Korea; in Eden's efforts at various Geneva conferences to sponsor a dialogue in the era of Dulles's moralism; in Macmillan's appearance in an astrikhan hat in Moscow in 1959; in the strenuous Western European importunings of the Nixon administration in 1969 to join Europe in the pursuit of detente. But carried too far, it runs the risk of abdicating any share of responsibility for a cohesive Western strategy toward the Soviet Union, or toward anti-Western radicalism in the Third World.

And thus we see the ironic shift of positions reflected in some of our contemporary debates. The deprecation of the importance of power, the abstract faith in goodwill, the belief in the pacific efficacy of economic relations, the evasion of the necessities of defence and security, the attempt to escape from the sordid details of maintaining the global balance of power, the presumption of superior morality—these features, once characteristic of America, now seem

to be more common in Europe. Where the United States has never quite abandoned its earlier moralism or fully developed a concept of equilibrium as Europe had once maintained, many in Europe paradoxically seem to have adopted some of the illusions that Americans clung to in years of isolation from responsibility.

The unity of the industrial democracies remains crucial to the survival of democratic values and of the global equilibrium. We must at last answer the perennial questions of all alliances: How much unity do we need? How much diversity can we stand? An insistence on unanimity can be a prescription for paralysis. But if every ally acts as it pleases, what is the meaning of alliance? There is no more important task before the Alliance than to deal with these problems concretely, seriously, and above all immediately.

The contemporary debate

I do not claim that the United States is always correct in its perceptions. But Europeans ought to take care not to generate such frustrations in America that either an embittered nationalism, or unilateralism, or a retreat from world affairs could result.

I fully acknowledge that the United States by its actions has sometimes stimulated or intensified the feelings in Europe that Europe had to strive to maintain its own interests, its own policies, its own identity. Indeed, as I said, naive American expectations that a rejuvenated Europe would follow its lead are partly responsible for the sometimes petulant reaction to Europe's assertions of its own role. In recent times the United States may have appeared unintentionally callous towards the danger of nuclear wars or insufficiently alert toward the opportunities for peace. But the United States has nevertheless been more nearly correct than its critics in warning that those who seek peace not backed by strength will sooner or later find the terms of peace dictated to them; that peace to be meaningful must be just; that nations live in history, not utopia, and thus must approach their goals in stages. To ask for perfection as a precondition of action is self-indulgence, and in the end an abdication.

Observers, including myself, have been sounding the alarm for decades about this or that 'crisis' in the Western Alliance. But today's, I am afraid, is more genuinely, objectively, serious than ever. It comes after decades of a relentless Soviet military buildup, when the West, for a decade, is edging in some areas toward a dangerous dependency on economic ties with the East; while in Poland the Soviet Union enforces the unity of its empire, its clients press on to undermine the security interests of the West from South-east Asia to the Middle East to Africa to Central America. Not all our difficulties are caused by the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union has shown little restraint in exploiting them, and their solution—whatever their cause—has been impeded by the lack of a unified Western response.

One of Britain's contributions to the Western Alliance has been to supply a needed global perspective: the knowledge, from centuries of experience in Europe, that peace requires some clear-eyed notion of equilibrium and a willingness to maintain it; the insight, from centuries of world leadership, that Europe's security cannot be isolated from the broader context of the global balance; the awareness, from heroic exertions in this century, that those who cherish the values of Western civilisation must be willing to defend them. In the Falkland crisis, Britain has reminded us all that certain basic principles such as honour, justice and patriotism remain valid and must be sustained by more than words.

The issue before the allies now is not to assess blame but to face our future. An alliance at odds over central issues of East-West diplomacy, economic policy, the Middle East, Central America, Africa, and relations with the Third World is in serious, and obvious, difficulty. Indeed it cannot be called an alliance if it agrees on *no* significant issue. Sooner or later such divisions *must* affect the field of security. For too long, all of us in the community of free nations have put off the uncomfortable questions; our evasions are now coming home to roost.

Thirty-five years ago, after the war, the democracies for a time overestimated the immediate dangers and underestimated their own capabilities; yet in the end they came up with a creative and effective response. Today, too, we may be underrating our own capacities and confusing long- and short-term dangers.

The strange aspect is that the disarray is taking place at the precise moment that the bankruptcy of the system that denies the human spirit seems to become clear beyond doubt. The communist world has fundamental systemic problems and has not shown any ability to solve them except by recurrent brute force, which only delays the day of reckoning. In its sixty-five-year history, the Soviet state has never managed a legitimate, regular succession of its political leadership; the country faces the demographic time-bomb of its growing non-Russian population, soon to be a majority. The system has failed to deal seriously with the desire for political participation of its intellectual and managerial elite. Or else it has sought to pre-empt their political aspirations by turning the ruling group into a careerist 'new class' bound to produce stagnation if not corruption. Its ideology is a discredited failure, without legitimacy, leaving the Communist Party a smug, privileged elite with no function in the society except its own self-perpetuation, struggling to deal with bottlenecks and crises which its own rigidity has caused. It is an historic joke that the ultimate crisis in every communist state, latent if not evident, is over the role of the Communist Party.

Soviet economic performance is a disaster. It seems impossible to run a modern economy by a system of total planning, yet it seems impossible to maintain a communist state *without* a system of total planning. How ironic that the West is tearing itself apart over how best to coordinate Western

financial, technological, and agricultural *aid* to a so-called 'superpower' incapable of sustaining a modern economy.

In short, if Moscow is prevented by a co-ordinated Western policy from deflecting its internal tensions into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side. It is the communist world, not the West, that faces a profound systemic crisis. Ours are problems of coordination and policy, theirs are those of structure. And therefore it is not beyond the realm of hope that a coherent, unified Western policy could at long last bring into view the prospect of a negotiated global settlement that Churchill foresaw at Llandudno.

The solutions to the West's problems are, to a significant degree, in our own hands. One problem is that the democracies have no forum for addressing the future in a concrete way, let alone harmonising disagreements or implementing common policies. As my friend Christopher Soames has recently emphasised, the Atlantic Alliance has no institutional machinery for addressing economic or Third World issues, or any long-term political strategy; the European Community, while eminently successful in its political co-ordination, has no mechanism as yet for formulating a coherent European view on matters of defence. The economic summits of Western and Japanese leaders, begun in the mid-1970s, are an attempt to surmount this procedural impasse, but they can do little more than call key leaders' attention to key problems in an informal, unsystematic way. Procedures do not solve substantive problems. Nevertheless, creating an appropriate forum for broader and deeper consultation would be an important first step.

America has learned much in the postwar period, perhaps most of all from Britain. In the last decade we have also learned something of our limits, and in the new administration we have shaken off the trauma of perhaps excessive preoccupation with our limits. An America that has recovered its vitality and its faith in the future is as much in the interests of the West as a Europe shaping its identity.

Both Britain and America have learned that whatever their histories, their futures are part of the common destiny of freedom. Experience has taught that moral idealism and geopolitical insight are not alternatives but complementary; our civilisation may not survive unless we possess *both* in full measure. Britain and America, which have contributed so much to the free world's unity and strength, have another opportunity now, together with our allies, to show that the democratic nations are the masters of their destiny.

THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN

*Robert G. Wirsing and James M. Roberty**

BY the beginning of 1982, the United States and Pakistan were ready to renew a defence relationship that had been in suspension since 1965. Congressional waiver of the anti-proliferation Symington Amendment lifted the aid ban imposed on Pakistan in April 1979 and cleared the way for President Ronald Reagan's Republican administration to move ahead with the first instalments of a six-year $3·2 billion programme of economic and military assistance. By failing to adopt a concurrent resolution to block the administration, Congress also approved a foreign military sales transaction of $1·1 billion (to be paid for, in part, by Saudi Arabia) for forty high-performance F-16 tactical aircraft, six of which were to be delivered within one year. The programme dwarfs the Carter administration's $400 million aid offer, made in February 1980, an offer which Pakistan's President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq disdainfully dismissed as 'peanuts'. Divided roughly in half between economic aid and military assistance programme credits, the Reagan administration package gives Pakistan access to an array of sophisticated military hardware, including attack helicopters, self-propelled howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, medium tanks, guided missiles and radar equipment.[1] The decision thus to revive America's erstwhile partnership with Pakistan runs parallel to security agreements which the Reagan administration has been attempting to fashion with other friendly regional powers. No less than in these other cases, Washington's courtship of Islamabad has given rise to debate among United States foreign policy observers.

There were several motives for Washington's action—alarm over the chaos in Iran, the shock of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and the belief

*Robert G. Wirsing is at present Visiting Professor, US Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a specialist in South Asian politics,and is a frequent visitor to India and Pakistan. He is editor of *Protection of Ethnic Minorities Comparative Perspectives* (1981) and author of *The Baluchis and Pathans* (1981). James M. Roherty is Professor of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina. He specialises in defence and security affairs of the United States. He is author of *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara. A Study of the Role of Secretary of Defense* (1970) and editor of *Defense Policy Formation Towards Comparative Analysis* (1980).

Research for this article in Pakistan was partially supported by grants from the Institute of International Studies and Research and Productive Scholarship Fund of the University of South Carolina. The authors would like to thank Anthony Wikrent and Nancy Wirsing for their research and editorial assistance

1. As of November 1981, Pakistan had placed orders for 40 F-16s, 100 M-48/A5 medium tanks and 35 M-88/A1 tank recovery vehicles, 64 M-109/A2 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, 40 M-110/A2 eight-inch self-propelled howitzers, 75 M-198 155 mm towed howitzers, 10 AH-1S (Bell) assault helicopters, 1,005 TOW missiles and 24 M-901 TOW vehicles (*Strategy Week* November 30-December 6, 1981, Vol. 7, No. 46). In February 1982, the Pentagon notified Congress of its intention to sell Pakistan an additional 10 assault helicopters. *New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1982, p 7Y

that a militarily strengthened Pakistan would prove an important element in the deterrence of further Soviet expansion in the direction of the West's vulnerable oil lifeline. As Washington policy-makers saw it, Pakistan had come to occupy a frontline position in the containment of Soviet power. As 'an essential anchor of the entire south-west Asian region',[2] it was, therefore, in urgent need of ground and air force modernisation.

Critics of the aid programme were already contending, however, that it would provide little security for either America or Pakistan, that it severely compromised American nuclear non-proliferation policy, that whatever strategic consensus now existed between the two states was likely to break down over chronic weaknesses in Pakistan's internal and external situation, and that the programme, in departing from President Carter's allegedly more even-handed approach to subcontinental politics, encouraged an arms race and thus heightened the risk of war between Pakistan and its arch-rival India.[3]

The Reagan administration granted that it was, indeed, reversing the position of the Carter administration, but it insisted that Pakistan's military modernisation would bolster the entire south and south-west Asian region against Soviet pressures from neighbouring Afghanistan, that the limited arms transfers involved in the agreement would not upset the existing military balance between India and Pakistan, and that Islamabad was more likely to curtail its nuclear weapons programme if the rehabilitation of its conventional forces was undertaken.[4]

Almost none of the aid programme's critics argued for withholding *all* assistance. In fact, most of them appeared to accept the need for at least some upgrading of Pakistan's armed forces, so long as it was tailored to what they considered to be Pakistan's legitimate defence requirements. The controversy arose mainly over the priority Washington gave to arming Pakistan rather than to improving Indo-Pakistani (and Indo-American) relations as a way to meet the threat of Soviet expansion. The controversy reflected a basic division of opinion about Pakistan's suitability for inclusion in an American-sponsored security system that was already evident when the United States signed its first arms agreement with that country in 1954.

Our objective in this essay, now that Congress has formally sanctioned the renewal of America's security link with Pakistan, is to try to anticipate the shape that relationship is going to take over the next few years. At a minimum, we believe that any understanding of the relationship's probable evolution has

2. James L. Buckley, in statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Senate, *US Cooperation with Pakistan*, Nov 12, 1981, reprinted in Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, Current Policy Series No. 347

3. For examples, see Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, *United States Policy in South Asia*, Sept. 23, 1981 (especially statements of Selig S. Harrison, William L. Richter, and Michael H. Posner). See also Selig S Harrison, 'Fanning Flames in South Asia', *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981-82 No. 45, pp. 84-102

4. For the administration point of view, see Under Secretary of State James Buckley's statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, *United States Policy in South Asia*, Sept. 16, 1981, and his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op. cit.

to be sought both in the objectives of the Reagan administration and in the constraints on achieving those objectives arising from Pakistan's domestic and regional political predicament. Hence, we consider not only the role Pakistan seems prepared to play, governed by its foreign policy objectives, resource endowments, and environmental limitations, but the role Washington wishes it to play, swayed by its own design for countering Soviet ambitions in the vicinity of the Gulf. We look first at the Reagan administration's broad strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean and south-west Asian region, at the importance it appears to assign to Pakistan in this larger geopolitical context, and at the specific ways in which it may seek to integrate Pakistan into its regional and global strategy. We turn then to an analysis of Islamabad's approach to the relationship, looking first at the forces shaping its regional security outlook, and second at internal political developments that may affect the ruling regime's stability and longevity.[5]

Washington's outlook

The decision of the Reagan administration to mount a major military and economic assistance programme to Pakistan is more than a reversal of Carter administration policy; it is a datum in a far-reaching American strategic reassessment of its relationship with the Soviet Union and with the Third World. The Reagan reassessment is sweeping and complex, but by the first quarter of 1982 some of the more salient features of the terrain were coming into focus. These include (1) the integration of foreign and defence policy insisted upon by the President; (2) the conscious attempt to support policy with strategy; and (3) the affirmation of the utility of arms. The Reagan administration's *leitmotif*, if there is one, would be something akin to 'the restoration of realism'. Realism as applied to the case of the Soviet Union entails fundamental global competition, a stance which can be expected to produce both 'negotiation' and 'confrontation'. In the current reasoning, to expect only the former or only the latter is imprudent. In so far as Third World countries are concerned they are to be extended the dignity of 'political' entities and, consequently, treated with in terms of political criteria. In the 'spirit of Cancun' economic assistance will not be forsworn, but neither will it be permitted to have a logic all its own. Economic and, needless to say, military assistance will be extended when it is judged to enhance the politico-military interests of the United States.

Two principal *interests* control US *policy* and, in turn, US *strategy* in the region which, for convenience's sake, we call south-west Asia. (As we shall

5. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been explored at length by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982). For additional recent perspectives on their relationship, see Rodney W. Jones, 'Mending Relations with Pakistan', *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1981, pp. 17-29; Leo E. Rose, 'Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia', *Asian Affairs*, Sept-Oct. 1981, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 50-65; and Shahram Chubin, 'U.S Security Interestgs in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s', *Daedalus*, Fall 1980, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 31-65.

see, this term does not adequately describe the relevant region.) Soviet control, direct or indirect, over the 'landbridge to Africa' is unacceptable from the standpoint of global competition. Stability of the oil flow from the Gulf (rather more to Europe and Japan than to North America) is a *sine qua non* in the global competition as well. The two interests are essentially distinct, however much they may tend to converge at the levels of policy and strategy. The particular aspirations of regional regimes enter into this calculus only tangentially. No amount of advocacy, for example, on behalf of a 'South Asia policy' which would have as its object accommodation of what many in Washington consider India's 'pretentions' will avail with the current administration.[6] Nor will any departures from 'even-handedness' in the resolution of Arab-Israeli issues be entertained. The horizon is unabashedly global; the attitudinal stance is determinedly pragmatic. It is a posture open to attack from all points on the ideological compass and may by virtue of this fact alone have some prospect of success.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan no doubt would have been described by Talleyrand not as a 'crime' but as a 'mistake'. It has in any case prompted an extraordinary strategic response in the United States, which is to say current American thinking carries well beyond the articulation of interests to a consideration of specific reinforcement measures.[7] The new policy imperatives, i.e. to secure the landbridge between Eurasia and Africa against Soviet hegemony and to secure the oil output of the Gulf against interruption from whatever source, make the arc of states extending from the subcontinent of Asia through the Horn of Africa a focal point of strategic analysis. But of greater significance is the underlying strategic choice to fashion a response to present exigencies in the region which will grow from immediate, localised measures to increasingly broadened schemas.

The barest outlines of a long-term design are discernible. What they suggest is nothing less than the evolution within the decade of a security regime which takes account not only of the North-west Quadrant but of the entire littoral of the Indian Ocean and, indeed, the eastern Mediterranean. (New nomenclature is required for new regions!) Viewed from Washington, the geostrategic implications are awesome but for all of that not beyond the ken of well-known American propensities. It remains a basic postulate that conflicts must be kept as far removed from 'dear old CONUS' as possible and this, in turn, puts the matter squarely into that realm of logistics, transport ('strategic mobility'), and forward deployment where the United States has demonstrated its capabilities.

6. For an energetic defence of the need to accommodate India, see Harrison, statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *op. cit.* For an analysis of differences in United States and Indian security outlooks, see Raju G. C. Thomas, 'Security Relationships in Southern Asia: Differences in the Indian and American Perspectives', *Asian Survey*, July 1981, Vol. 21, No. 7, pp. 689-709.

7. Among many current examples of discussions of such measures, see James Digby, *The Emerging American Strategy: Application to Southwest Asia*, RAND/N-1700-FF (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1980); Anthony H. Cordesman, 'The Changing Military Balance in the Gulf and Middle East', *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1981, No. 119, pp. 52-60; and Cordesman, 'The U.S. Search for Strategic Stability in the Persian Gulf', *ibid.*, pp. 61-84.

Delineation of the relevant theatre immediately establishes a south-to-north perspective with Australia and South Africa taking on, perhaps, unexpected importance. The great maritime entry-ways to the Indian Ocean are via the Cape and via Australia. Suez–Aden on the north-west and the archipelagian straits on the north-east are secondary in any security scheme. Consequently, continuing American–Australian discussions concerning Western Australia are one aspect of a broad undertaking. In response to the obvious point that Western Australia is itself a considerable distance from the Gulf, the equally obvious point is made that it is not nearly so distant as San Diego or Pearl Harbour. Moreover, the Perth–Fremantle–Cockburn Sound complex, whether appropriate as a 'home port' for a Carrier Battle Group or not, looks very much better to some in Washington than Okinawa for the forward-deployed Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). Repositioning of III MAF would, of course, raise questions about United States military commitments in North-east Asia. Still another aspect of the strategic reassessment is increasingly frank discussions between the United States and Japan on this very subject.

South Africa's strategic significance is increasingly appreciated in Washington today. Without in any way diminishing the importance of tanker traffic in the 'roaring forties' (not the most likely point of interdiction), or the admittedly critical minerals of southern Africa, a third factor looms largest of all. South Africa provides a totally modern infrastructure of manufacturing industry, communications, transport and harbours (not to mention such elementary factors as temperate climate and hospitable terrain) at the West's major gateway to the Indian Ocean and at the midway point between Norfolk, Virginia and Bahrain. Current American initiatives looking to a settlement in Namibia are the centrepiece of a dedicated effort to realign southern Africa with the West. Clearly, there are no illusions about the political difficulties nor is there any early expectation that South Africa will become a main base camp of an evolving security regime. However, incremental progress is expected; South Africa, Washington now anticipates, will be part of any long-term security system.

The American search for facilities in the region (more pointedly, the American effort to expand the definition of the theatre) has been only marginally successful to date. This is due, quite obviously, to regional circumstances of both a political and geographical nature; there is, frankly, a paucity of options. But it is also the case, if not quite so obviously, that the United States has not as yet settled upon the character or extent of the effort to which it will commit itself in the years ahead. For example, it is evident that the 'Bright Star' exercises at the end of 1981, while enhancing the effectiveness of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), also underscored the need to consider some repositioning of American forces now deployed in the Pacific and European theatres. Logistic and facilities requirements for American units which might be stationed in the Indian Ocean theatre differ markedly from the requirements of an RDF that would arrive in the region only in the event of an

emergency. Another related and also unresolved issue is that of an appropriate command structure for American forces in the region. At this point there is only agreement that Florida is not an appropriate site whatever form such a command may take.

It is in the North-west Quadrant, of course, that we find the most immediate and compelling features of the new security architecture. A vast American effort in Saudi Arabia in recent years has gone little noticed—admittedly, there has been no effort to direct attention to these activities! Consequently, the firmness (tenacity, perhaps) with which the Reagan administration has committed itself to forging a 'strategic consensus', principally among 'moderate' Arab states, strikes many as a new departure when only the urgency of the undertaking is new. Manifestly, Saudi Arabia is the keystone of the design; its enormous oil assets as well as its geostrategic position will ensure the Kingdom's priority for decades. The always complex political issues between the House of Saud and Washington do not serve to slow the pace of developments falling within the specifically strategic realm. There is, at least, a *policy* consensus between the two governments sufficient to permit strategic planners to step up their joint activities. It is axiomatic among the latter that any security regime must extend well beyond the peninsula no matter how ill-defined the total concept may be at the present moment. Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya are seen as constituting 'the rear'. Moreover, it is deemed of the greatest importance to shore up relationships with Morocco, Tunisia and, for that matter, Algeria, not the least reason being the security of the air-access route. 'The front' is across the Gulf in Iran beginning at the Zagros mountains. The threat, at least for the present, is sharply defined by the presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the chaos in Iran. In this context Oman at the entrance to the Gulf, Egypt and Turkey in the north and Pakistan in the east occupy especially critical ground. This is the strategic context of a new chapter in United States-Pakistan relations.

There has long been a propensity in Washington to regard the Pakistani military as first-rate, smart and professional, certainly on any comparative standard. Hence, Pakistan represents high strategic-military value at the present juncture, however tangled is the web of political issues. Its military is among the few that can effectively assimilate high-technology weapon systems, if only in relatively limited amounts. Nonetheless, the decision to provide the small but proficient Pakistani Air Force with a force package of forty F-16 tactical aircraft has occasioned a level of controversy, both in India and in the United States, which is not without its curious aspects.

There is insistence in some quarters that 'the underlying policy challenge is how to satisfy Islamabad's legitimate defence requirements without supplying arms that could be used to undermine India's security.'[8] This is plainly not the

8. Andrew J. Pierre, 'Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy', *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981/82, Vol. 60, No. 2, p. 279. For additional commentary on the arms factor in Indo-Pakistan relations, see Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Indian Ocean Littoral: Intra-Regional Conflicts and Weapons Proliferation', in Robert O'Neill, ed., *Insecurity,*

'underlying policy challenge' from Washington's standpoint. The Reagan administration can claim whatever merit attaches to an unambiguous, concise rationale for its actions: the policy challenge is how best to advance the legitimate defence requirements *of the United States* through large scale conventional arms transfers.[9] (Actually the challenge is *strategic* in character.) Plausible lines of Soviet advance into south and south-west Asia are relatively few, constricted, and remarkably subject to interdiction from the air. The F-16 is a superlative platform from which to deliver a sophisticated array of air-to-surface 'hitting weapons'; it is the optimal tactical aircraft against advancing columns. In the present instance this force package—not something other than or less than—in the hands of the Pakistani Air Force provides a distinct measure of credible deterrence. Moreover, the F-16 infrastructure introduced into Pakistan establishes a baseline of interoperability with the United States Air Force should circumstances require direct American augmentation. We do not have here an example of 'arming a proxy' but of establishing a *point d'appui*; discussion of F-5s or F-16/79s (a scaled-down version of the F-16) for the 'air defence of Pakistan' is, given the strategic premises which now obtain, not germane. Neither of these aircraft would provide interoperability, since the United States Air Force does not deploy them in operational squadrons.[10] Finally, the contention that Pakistan's acquisition of forty F-16s 'undermines India's security', with all due allowances, is not credited.

Washington envisages a number of ancillary benefits of its force modernisation programme in Pakistan. One of these—linkage among Pakistani, Saudi, and possibly Egyptian armed forces—will not be seen as salutary in all quarters, but it is a vital if not always underscored theme in Washington's thinking. Movement towards Egypt's integration into a Gulf Air Defence System is an example; Saudi funding of the F-16 sale to Pakistan is another. There were reports that the Desert Kingdom was prepared to finance up to two combat divisions of Pakistani troops to shore up its small (51,000 regular and national guard troops) defence establishment and to provide on-the-ground security for Saudi oilfields.[11] This project may have been curtailed, possibly owing to Saudi reluctance to base such a large foreign force on its soil.

The Spread of Weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), pp. 182–221

9. For expressions of this theme, see Under Secretary of State James Buckley, statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *op cit.*, and his addresses to the Aerospace Industries Association, May 21, 1981, and National Conference of Editorial Writers, Sept. 25, 1981, reprinted in Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, Current Policy Series Nos 279 and 320

10. This is the apparent premise of James L Buckley's statement in regard to the sale of F-16s that 'from a U.S. strategic and operational perspective, there is an obvious advantage in having Pakistan acquire and develop the ability to support an aircraft that will be widely deployed by the U.S Air Force beyond this decade' (statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *op. cit.*).

11. *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1981, p. 4Y. For a recent discussion of Saudi–Pakistani military relations, see Col. William O. Staudenmaier and Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The Saudi-Pakistani Military Relationship and Its Implications for US Strategy in Southwest Asia*, Special Report No. ACN81026 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Oct. 1, 1981). See also Devlet Khalid, 'Pakistan's Relations with Iran and the Arab States', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Spring 1982, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 16–22.

In any event, discussions between Riyadh and Islamabad continue with regard to expanding current Pakistani assistance in such areas as pilot training, manning of high-technology equipment, and development of commando groups. The extent of the Pakistani undertaking is not altogether clear; but it is part and parcel of an American commitment to Pakistani force modernisation, again involving Saudi funding.

The Reagan administration also maintains that its military assistance package of conventional weapons for Pakistan reinforces American nuclear non-proliferation efforts. In making its case, Washington has obviously had very little support from Islamabad, which continues to plunge ahead with a clandestine crash programme aimed almost certainly at bringing Pakistan to the threshold of a nuclear test within a few years.[12] Washington was clearly embarrassed, for example, by Pakistan's covert bid in October 1981 to bypass United States export controls on zirconium, a key metal used in construction of nuclear reactors, before congressional approval of the arms programme had even been obtained.[13] The current leadership appears to be governed by the assumption that while it may not be able to halt Pakistan's preparations for a 'peaceful' demonstration of nuclear capability, such as, for example, India's since unrepeated detonation in 1974, its best hope for delaying a test explosion or for acquiring any leverage at all against subsequent nuclear weapons development in Pakistan lies in a credible display of America's commitment to Pakistan's long-term security. Washington also seems to believe that Islamabad's military linkages with the Arab states of the Gulf may in themselves hold promise of obviating any perceived requirement for either a Pakistani *or* an Islamic bomb. However little influence Washington may have in this regard, it is not the least among American objectives in the region. While having waived the Symington Amendment, Congress continues to remonstrate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on an Islamic version most particularly. It is aware, however, that the very schema the Reagan administration is now in the process of elaborating—a new security regime for a new region—may be a necessary element in any nonproliferation effort.

Any plans that the Reagan administration now has for enlarging the scope of its present relationship with Islamabad have not been announced. President Zia ul-Haq disclosed in April 1982 that he had rejected an American proposal to station troops and arms in Pakistan made at the time the aid package was being negotiated.[14] This proposal may well have been made only informally, with minimal expectations. American officials are certainly aware that Islamabad's approval of ambitious United States military projects in Pakistan would face stiff obstacles. On the other hand, Lawrence Lifschultz reports that

12. A recent CIA report concludes that Pakistan will have the ability (though unlikely to employ it under present circumstances) to explode a nuclear device within three years. *New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1982, p. 6Y.

13 *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1981, p 1Y. For a recent detailed discussion of Pakistan's secret efforts to secure nuclear technology, see the five-part series by David K. Willis, 'On the Trail of the A-Bomb Makers', *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 30–Dec 4, 1981 See also *Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*), Dec. 4, 1981, pp. 21-22.

14. *New York Times*, April 4, 1982, p. 7Y

'a phased programme of close military cooperation and coordination is planned between the two countries' armed forces over the next few years'. Among various American objectives he mentions are acquisition of military base facilities for prepositioning of RDF military equipment and matériel, access to air base facilities for anti-submarine surveillance aircraft, and reopening of electronic surveillance bases shut down in the mid 1960s.[15] Islamabad denies it and Washington refuses to comment; but there can hardly be any question, Egypt's now slain President Sadat having revealed it in an NBC-TV interview in September 1981, that Pakistan is already helping the United States funnel arms to the anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan.[16] Opinion is divided; but there are some in the Washington hierarchy who view closer ties with Islamabad as a way to facilitate 'bleeding' the Soviets in Afghanistan and who expect Islamabad's co-operation at least in this endeavour as a *quid pro quo* for American arms.

Islamabad's regional outlook

With over 84 million people, Pakistan is the most populous Moslem country between India and the Atlantic Ocean. Its influence with the other Moslem states of this region varies considerably and at times, as in the period following the widely resented execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1979, it has suffered severe setbacks. Generally speaking, however, its standing in the Middle East today is substantial, aided perhaps by the shedding of its SEATO (1972) and CENTO (1979) memberships and formal admission to the ranks of the non-aligned, but above all by the backing of Saudi Arabia. Its calculated efforts, greatly intensified since the loss of Bangladesh in 1971, to identify itself with the Islamic Middle East rather than with the Hindu dominated Indian subcontinent have clearly yielded considerable dividends. This became apparent in January 1980 when the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, specially assembled in Islamabad, joined Pakistan in outspoken condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, then (in September 1980) nominated its President to help mediate in the Iran-Iraq war and later (in October 1981) honoured him again with the opportunity to address the General Assembly of the United Nations on behalf of the entire Moslem world.

Of particular importance to Pakistan, especially since the embargo of 1973 sent oil prices spiralling upwards, are its economic links to the Middle East. The area supplies about 25 per cent of Pakistan's imports and absorbs about the same amount of its exports.[17] Economic assistance to Pakistan from Middle Eastern states has increased dramatically in recent years. According to some

15 *FEER*, Dec. 11, 1981, pp. 17-18. For an additional view on the potential for an enlarged relationship, see Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and Alvin J. Cottrell, 'The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean. A Last Chance', *Strategic Review*, Spring 1980, pp 36-38.

16. *The State* Sept. 23, 1981 See also Carl Bernstein, 'Arms for Afghanistan', *The New Republic*, July 18, 1981, pp. 8-10.

17 Export trade with Iran has more than doubled (to $231·8 million in financial year 1980-81) since imposition of the US economic embargo against Teheran. *FEER*, Nov 20, 1981, pp 59-60

reports, Saudi Arabia had alone contributed a total of $7·5 billion by autumn 1980 and was committed for some $5·0 billion more.[18] By late 1981, the number of Pakistani migrant workers employed abroad, most of them in the Gulf area, was officially estimated at 1·4 million.[19] In the financial year 1980-81, this rapidly expanding migrant work force remitted more than $2·1 billion in badly needed foreign exchange, a figure whose importance can best be gauged by comparing it with Pakistan's $2·9 billion export earnings in the same year. Of the roughly 130,000 Pakistanis who now seek jobs abroad every year, most continue to go to the Middle East. In fact, 90 per cent of the total foreign manpower requirement of Saudi Arabia is currently being met from Pakistan.[20]

Equally important are Pakistan's growing military links with the states of the Middle East. According to one report, by 1981 Pakistan had emerged as 'the third world's leading supplier of military manpower after Cuba.'[21] It had military contingents in twenty-two countries, mainly in the Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Syria and Libya. Their missions ranged from troop training to guerrilla warfare.[22] Apart from any political and military benefits gained from this activity, Pakistan's export of military personnel clearly was a major source of foreign exchange for Islamabad.

Pakistan's military rulers have certainly been stimulated to extend the country's ties to the Middle East not only by the imperatives of oil and economic development but by events on its western and north-western borders stemming from the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in Iran in late 1978 and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979. There are now over two million Afghan refugees (*mohajidin*) in Pakistan, perhaps a ninth or more of Afghanistan's population and the largest refugee group anywhere in the world. They had fled a vicious conflict, now in its fifth year, that seems to be growing more lethal and widespread with the passage of time. Early in September 1981, Afghan troops with armoured vehicles allegedly crossed the border into Pakistan's Baluchistan province, the first violation of Pakistan territory by Afghan ground forces and an object lesson, some observed, in Pakistan's weak western defences. In late October of that year, Pakistan reported the 379th air intrusion along its border with Afghanistan since April 1978.[23] There have been increasing reports of strafing and rocket attacks on refugee camps by Afghan helicopter gunships. Pakistan's leaders understand that were the geopolitical nightmare of a Soviet surge to the Gulf to take place, one possible corridor to the sea might be carved from Pakistan's politically restless province of Baluchistan.

18. *The Economist*, Sept 13, 1980, p. 40.
19. *Pakistan Affairs*, Sept. 16, 1981, Vol. 34, No. 18, p. 2.
20 *Pakistan Affairs*, Nov. 16 and Dec 1, 1981, Vol. 34, Nos 22, 23, p. 2
21 *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1981, p. 4Y.
22. Khalid, *op. cit*, p. 20.
23 *The Economist*, Oct. 31, 1981, p 13

Pakistan's involvement in South-west Asia is thus indisputably deep and many-sided. Equally unquestionably, however, its strategic outlook thus far in its history has been influenced less by its Islamic links than by its relationship with Hindu India. One reason for this is that Pakistan has a major unresolved territorial dispute with India over Kashmir, the resolution of which seems even less likely now that Soviet armed forces occupy the eastern strip of Afghanistan (the Wakhan corridor) that once stood as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the northernmost areas of Pakistan. Military occupation of the corridor brings Soviet forces dangerously close to the Sino-Pakistani frontier, China's sole exit to South-west Asia. Pakistan's new Karakorum highway (completed in 1978, a major artery built with China's assistance, adds a surface dimension to the existing air link between Pakistan and its principal Asian ally. The potential that now looms for a Soviet and/or Indian effort to cut this obviously vulnerable link invests Kashmir with extraordinary strategic importance. Two trans-Asiatic alliances and two ancient rivalries meet in this tangle of soaring, but increasingly accessible, mountains. Chinese pressures on its ally to hold the line in Kashmir are certain to be considerable, at least so long as its own protracted border dispute with India remains unresolved.[24] Under the circumstances, Pakistan has very little incentive to risk either alienating Peking or narrowing its own options by rescinding its claim on any part of Kashmir.

A second reason for Pakistan's strategic preoccupation with India is that most of Pakistan's leaders share a deep distrust of Indian intentions. Some of this stems, no doubt, from lingering suspicion that Indian disapproval of partition and, indeed, of the very concept of Pakistan may surface one day as irredentism and result in the dismemberment of the country. Far more widespread, however, is fear of Indian hegemonism and the notion that even if Indians do not harbour territorial ambitions against Pakistan, they do want Pakistan weak or at least subservient to India's regional leadership. It has recently been argued that every South Asian state *except* Pakistan has already been brought within the framework of a regional, Indian-dominated security system.[25] Indian leaders do not mask their desire that Pakistan also bow to the realities of power. In testimony before Congress in September 1981, Ainslee Embree, former Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the American Embassy in New Delhi, emphasised the point that 'India has inherited the ways of thinking of an imperial power whose chief concern was that there be on her borders no genuinely independent power making treaties and alliances with external powers.'[26] Pakistanis, reluctant to accept the implications of an Indian Monroe Doctrine, inevitably react with distrust to Indian professions of friendship.

24. Sino-Indian discussions on the border issue in May 1982 were reportedly inconclusive *New York Times*, May 21, 1982, p. 4Y. For a recent discussion of China's interests in this area, see Gerald Segal, 'China and Afghanistan', *Asian Survey*, November 1981, Vol. 21, No. 11, pp 1158-1174

25. Leo E. Rose and Satish Kumar, 'South Asia', in Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, eds., *Comparative Regional Systems* (New York: Pergamon, 1980), pp 264-267 See also Norman D. Palmer, 'India's Security Concerns in the 1980s', *International Security Review*, Fall 1981, Vol 6, No. 3, pp. 307-332

26. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *op cit.* (statement of Ainslee Embree)

A third reason for Pakistan's preoccupation with India is the obvious fact that India's military capability dwarfs that of Pakistan. In recent years, India has held favourable ratios of 2·5 : 1 in military manpower, over 2 : 1 in medium tanks, 3·5:1 in surface warships, and at least 2·5:1 in combat aircraft. India's ability to maintain or increase its numerical advantage is not in doubt. This is reflected in the announcement that New Delhi has contracted to purchase forty French-made Mirage 2000 aircraft and has taken an option to buy 110 more.[27]

Pakistanis are worried not merely because the Indian military possesses more of practically everything, but also because it has vastly greater resources and more dependable sources of supply to fall back upon. India's recent defence expenditure ($4·4 billion in the financial year 1980–81) has been running at roughly four times Pakistan's. But with a GNP more than five times that of Pakistan's, India can sustain the arms race with less injury to its economy. Moreover, India's own superpower supporter, the Soviet Union, has been not only demonstrably more reliable in recent years than the United States, but considerably more generous as well.[28] The Soviet military supply relationship with India, already worth $3·6 billion by the end of 1977, rose to over $5·2 billion in 1980 with the conclusion of a $1·6 billion weapons deal. Thanks to subsidised pricing, a concessional interest rate of 2·5 per cent., and a seventeen-year repayment schedule, this latter sale was clearly worth much more (according to Pakistan's President, $6–7 billion more[29]) if assessed at prevailing market rates. India's huge industrial-scientific-technical establishment gives it an edge which Pakistan simply cannot match. India was the world's sixth country not only to explode a nuclear device (1974) but (in 1980) to put into orbit a space satellite—one designed and made entirely in India.[30]

A fourth and last reason for India's preponderant influence on Pakistan's strategic outlook is Pakistan's extreme vulnerability to its eastern neighbour. This is the result in part, of course, of Pakistan's long and exposed frontier with India, a border along which lie most of Pakistan's major population and industrial centres, and of its lack of territorial depth, which places virtually all of its defence works and nuclear installations within reach of the Indian air force.[31] But it is at least equally the result of Pakistan's own internal disunity and very weakly developed sense of national identity. India looms large in Pakistan's security in part, then, because Pakistan's leaders recognise that the partition of the subcontinent could come undone as much from the hostility or indifference of Pakistanis as from the belligerence of Indians.

For an illuminating discussion on this subject, see Stephen P. Cohen, 'The Strategic Imagery of Elites', in James M Roherty, ed., *Defense Policy Formation. Towards Comparative Analysis*, (Durham, N.C Carolina Academic Press, 1980), pp. 153–174.

27. *New York Times*, April 18, 1982, p. 6Y.

28. For an excellent elaboration of this point, see Robert H. Donaldson, 'The Soviet Union in South Asia A Friend to Rely On?' *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall/Winter 1980–81, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 235–258.

29. *FEER*, Oct. 16, 1981, p. 44

30 *The Economist*, July 26, 1980, p. 40.

31. See Francis Fukuyama, *The Security of Pakistan. A Trip Report*, RAND/N-1584-RC (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, September 1980), pp. 4–6.

It is for such reasons that Pakistan, in spite of the presence of a large and growing force of Soviet troops across the Afghan border, continues to reckon its security requirements largely in relation to India, its traditional adversary. It is for these reasons that Pakistan stubbornly persists with a foreign policy that denies India's claim to 'natural' regional leadership. It is certainly India, whose intercession on the side of Bangladesh in 1971 cost Pakistan over half of its population, that provides principal motivation for Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. It must be recognised, finally, that India is a strong motivating factor in Islamabad's willingness to renew the defence relationship with Washington.

Pakistan's internal political situation

In July 1982, Pakistan's third martial law regime since independence marked the fifth anniversary of military takeover with no clear threat to its authority apparent anywhere on the horizon. With some justification the regime could claim that it was firmly in control and that there was little immediate danger of an internal upheaval such as claimed the Bhutto regime in July 1977. The appearance of political calm provided at least temporary relief for the Reagan administration, whose aid offer to Pakistan was severely criticised for having made American interests contingent upon the survival of an unstable dictatorship. It was clear, however, that the matter of the regime's stability would continue to trouble the development of the two countries' security relationship.

The present regime appears determined to relinquish power, if indeed it must, strictly on its own terms. Since October 1979, when President Zia ul-Haq reneged for the second time on his pledge to conduct fresh general elections, the military has steadily tightened its grip on government. In May 1980, Zia introduced constitutional amendments that gave virtually unchallengeable powers of arrest and detention to military tribunals; and in March 1981, he promulgated a 'provisional constitutional order' that effectively abrogated Bhutto's 1973 constitution, abolished the national and provincial assemblies, and stripped the judiciary of most of its remaining authority.[32] The government has made a number of attempts to build a civilian base of support. On January 11, 1982, in the most recent of these, Zia convened a 350-member appointive Federal Advisory Council (*Majlis-i-Shura*) to serve as an interim consultative body.[33] But the regime's overriding objective, in spite of these concessions to civilian participation, appeared to remain the military-chaperoned reconstruction of the government tailored to the military's own political requirements rather than to the Western-type parliamentary tradition.

32 *The Economist*, April 25, 1981, pp. 48-49.

33. Political parties are not formally represented in the Council and in February the ban on political activity was extended. *New York Times*, Feb 11, 1982, p 7Y

Thus far, the military has been successful in coping with its civilian political opponents. In this, it has employed a variety of weapons, including the coercive instruments of martial law (banning of political activity, incarceration of political leaders, press censorship, and the denial of judicial redress), appeals for domestic unity against external threats, and efforts to divide, slander and co-opt the opposition. A shrewd tactic has been pre-emption of the Islamic ideological cause, the same cause used successfully by the political opposition to Bhutto in 1977. While the government's programme of official Islamisation may not satisfy the most extreme religious militants, it has to some extent neutralised them. This is the case, for example, with the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), the best organised and best financed of the country's Islamic fundamentalist groups. The JI formally sides with the opposition to Zia in demanding restoration of civilian rule; but in this demand it is, if not disingenuous, clearly ambivalent. Treated at best with contempt during the Bhutto period, the JI and similar groups are prime beneficiaries of Zia's pro-Islam reforms and enjoy the government's protection and patronage.

The present regime is, of course, not fully insulated against the force of religious militancy. Islam is politically volatile in Pakistan (witness the burning of the American Embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 by a mob enraged by reports of American involvement in the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca); and Zia has at times overplayed his 'Islamic card' (inspiring massive protest, on one occasion, by the country's Shi'a minority[34]). One cannot rule out a religious-motivated anti-government conspiracy, drawing support perhaps from elements of the military disenchanted with Zia's definition of Islamic militancy. In general, however, the probability of a Khomeini-like religious convulsion in Pakistan appears relatively slight. Pakistanis are mainly (about 85 per cent) of the Sunni sect of Islam, which lacks the tightly-knit organisation of Iran's Shi'a majority. Sandwiched between both Marxist and Hindu adversaries, Pakistani Moslems seem less inclined than their Iranian co-religionists to shed ties with the 'World Satan'. In common with the rest of the political opposition, none of the major pro-Islam parties has raised serious objection to Islamabad's weapons deal with the United States.

The military regime has been especially resourceful in dealing with the People's Party of Pakistan (PPP), an organisation whose leader Zia sent to the gallows in 1979. Most, though not all, observers believe that were a fair election to be held tomorrow, the PPP would probably win it. But from the beginning, President Zia has understandably made it a central goal of his government to prevent the PPP from recovering power. To this end, the military has sought to divide the several wings of the party, and to discredit or isolate those with any potential for rallying the faithful against Islamabad. Thus far, the military has not succeeded in dislodging the late prime minister's widow, Nusrat Bhutto, or his daughter, Benazir, from their dominant position in the party's central command. At the moment, none of the party's other

34. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Sept. 11, 1981, p. 31070

potential leaders, including Farooq Leghari, Sheikh Rashid, Mustafa Jatoi, and Ghulam Mustafa Khar, has a national following or a significant base of support of his own. The Bhutto women themselves are clearly handicapped by government restrictions on their movement.[35] The military has had a powerful ally in the PPP itself, whose leaders are undisciplined, distrustful of one another's ambitions, and badly divided over strategy.

The rest of the political opposition has thus far been no more able to challenge the military's hold on Islamabad than the PPP. In February 1981, eight of the smaller parties, led by the centrist Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, joined with the PPP in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. That undertaking got off to a miserable start, however, when the government managed to link it in the public mind with the persons responsible for the hijacking of a Kabul-bound Pakistani airliner in March. Most of its leaders were arrested; and it has never since regained its early momentum.[36]

The possibility exists, of course, that there is no realistic alternative (at least no *democratic* alternative) to military rule in Pakistan. The political opposition is badly split; and there are severe ethno-regional and factional divisions within it that have stymied all previous attempts to forge unity. Some thoughtful Pakistanis concede, in private at least, that they prefer the military government, whatever its imperfections, to its most probable civilian successors. They point to the fact that the country's first period of civilian rule (1947-1958) set a rather low standard of responsible political behaviour and that its second (1971-1977) was notorious for its ruthless suppression of political dissent. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the armed forces have been heavily involved in Pakistani politics since at least 1954; and that even in the periods of ostensibly 'civilian' rule the military's influence has often been a critical factor.[37] It may well be, as Gerald Heeger has argued, that the military's influence has been severely 'de-developmental' and bears much of the responsibility for the country's institutional malaise.[38] Nevertheless, the military appears able at the moment to overpower any threat from the organised political opposition.

The government's defenders, on the other hand, have to contend with the obvious fact that Pakistan is a weak political entity, 'a premature, feeble offspring at birth' that 'never gained the strength necessary to combat its inborn ailments.'[39] Of all such ailments, the country's lack of a cohesive national identity is the most conspicuous. This problem has its roots in the

35 Benazir has been under detention since the March 1981 crackdown, and late last year the Zia government again extended her confinement. *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1981, p 5Y

36 *The Economist*, March 21, 1981, p 41; Dec. 12, 1981, pp 31-32

37. Bhutto began his rule as Chief Martial Law Administrator; he employed the military against the country's own citizens in Baluchistan for four years and against the entire political opposition after the fateful election of 1977; and he ended his rule with martial law in the major cities.

38 Gerald A. Heeger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience', *World Politics*, January 1977, Vol. 29, No 2, pp. 242-262

39 Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980), p 249

resentment which Pakistan's Pathan, Sindhi and Baluch ethnic minorities feel towards the politically dominant Punjabi majority.

The Baluch separatist movement, in particular, has been continually highlighted as a prime threat to Pakistan's political stability and, as a consequence, has been a factor in the debate over Washington's force modernisation programme in that country. A constant theme in the arguments critical of Washington's renewed association with Pakistan has been the presumed danger to American interests inherent in supplying arms meant to deter external aggression to a regime which might use them instead to crush political unrest in Baluchistan. To a number of analysts, the danger in Pakistan's situation is especially grave due to the high potential which exists for Soviet involvement on the side of dissident tribesmen. Selig Harrison's recent and highly detailed analysis of the Baluch nationalist movement is of particular importance in this regard.[40] Harrison argues that Baluchistan is, indeed, ripe for Soviet intervention. In contrast to many other analysts, he discounts the likelihood of a direct Soviet military thrust southwards. He suggests, instead, that the Soviets are more likely to play a limited 'Baluch card', for example, by inciting another round of tribal insurgency, and to do that only if provoked by accelerating United States-Pakistani aid to the Afghan guerrillas (*mojahidin*) and a deteriorating military situation in Afghanistan. Since the Baluch problem, in the judgment of Harrison and other analysts, may well put the present regime's stability to its most severe test, it is essential that we take a closer look at it. Just what is the strength of Baluch nationalism? What is the extent of Soviet involvement in it? And does Islamabad have the ability to cope with the situation?

The Baluch are a semi-nomadic tribal people, numbering perhaps five million, whose homeland overlaps parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bulk of them (between 3 and 3·5 million) dwells in Pakistan. Although the province of Baluchistan, Pakistan's largest and least populous, occupies about 42 per cent of the country's total land area, the Baluch themselves account for no more than 4 per cent of the country's population.

Baluch nationalism, which hardly existed prior to Britain's departure from the subcontinent in 1947, has grown fairly swiftly since then. The ambitions of tribal leaders, resentment against the central government's state-building inclinations, and mounting threats to traditional tribal autonomy led to a series of progressively more violent and nationalist-motivated struggles, the first (in 1948) an abortive and localised attempt by the Khan of Kalat to avoid accession to the new state of Pakistan, and the most recent (1973-1977) a massive and bitter guerrilla war in which, according to Harrison, over 5,000 Baluch lost their lives.[41] In this last conflict, the Baluch guerrillas were badly battered by government forces, and in some areas Baluch noncombatants

40. Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981). For a related discussion, see Robert G. Wirsing, *The Baluchis and Pathans*, Report No. 48 (London: Minority Rights Group, March 1981).
41. Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, No. 32, pp. 138-139

endured severe economic hardship. By its end, the reputations of some leaders of the Baluch nationalist movement were tarnished with charges of corruption or of collaborating with the government; divisions among tribal leaders were in some cases deepened and splits that persist today appeared within nationalist organisations. To some extent, however, the Baluch nationalist movement did emerge from this conflict a more powerful force, better funded, better armed, and with a new second-line leadership, a network of combat-seasoned guerrilla organisations, and an expanded base of support.

A rapid sequence of events in the latter 1970s—the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the Marxist coup in Afghanistan followed by Soviet military intervention—catapulted the Baluch problem fully into global cold war politics. Baluchistan's obvious potential as a Soviet corridor to the Arabian Sea, its possession of a natural (though undeveloped) harbour at Gwadar, its vulnerability to penetration and subversion, and its long coastline, stretching from Karachi to Bandar Abbas on the vital Strait of Hormuz, inevitably magnified the strategic importance of its inhabitants. The Baluch were quickly swept up in a torrent of geopolitical speculation linking residual Russian imperial ambitions for a 'warm-water port' with modern Soviet desires to command the maritime passages to the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

For a number of reasons, the probability that Baluchistan would soon become an avenue for Soviet advance southward was in reality a great deal less than many claimed. One reason is that Baluch nationalism has by no means finished the task of drawing all the separate Baluch tribes together into a united whole. The Baluch 'nation' consists of several score tribal groups, fifteen or twenty of them significant politically, led by hereditary chiefs called *sardars*. The authority of the *sardars* has declined dramatically in the twentieth century, and in some tribes (those of the Makran coastal belt, for example) they have very limited influence. In some of the other tribes, however, such as the Mengals, Bugtis, Marris and Zehris, they remain towering figures, demanding and usually getting the compliance of thousands of tribesmen. A marked characteristic of Baluch history has been the failure of the *sardars* to subordinate their particularistic concerns to the wider interests of the Baluch 'nation'. The fortunes of Baluch nationalism in the 1980s depend, in large part, on the ability of a handful of dedicated leaders to win the more faint-hearted to the nationalist banner.

The task will not be easy. Of the three Baluch leaders described as the 'triumvirate' of the nationalist movement by Harrison, two (Khair Bux Marri and Ataullah Mengal) have been in exile abroad since 1980, a situation bound to complicate mobilising support for and retaining control of a movement that has been threatened with disunity from the start. Until his death in a jeep accident in June 1982, Doda Khan Zarakzai ranged his large and well armed tribe (the Zehris) firmly on the side of the government.[42] Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of another large and politically very important tribe (the Bugtis),

42. Doda Khan was one of several Baluch *sardars* appointed to the new *Majlis-i-Shura* in January 1982

broke with his longstanding nationalist allies in a leadership tussle in the early 1970s and has held his tribe aloof ever since. Many other tribal leaders have been won to the government's side with a variety of inducements—payments directly by Islamabad to aid in rehabilitating those who suffered 'dislocation' in the recent fighting, offers of official positions, and judicious allocation of development projects to 'co-operating' tribes. It is probably true that for the first time in Baluch history there is now a sense of common identity among virtually all Baluch, even among many of the partially or wholly assimilated 'ethnic Baluch' of neighboring Sind and Punjab provinces. But neither in Baluchistan nor anywhere else does an unevenly felt sense of common ethnic identity translate into a common political and ideological platform. Nationalist leaders themselves admit that the Baluch tribes in the Punjab and Sind, which account for over half the total Baluch population in Pakistan, do not support separatism.[43] In assessing the extent and depth of Baluch nationalism, one has constantly to bear in mind the youth of the Baluch nationalist movement: as a distinct political phenomenon, it really does not antedate the anti-One Unit agitations of the late 1950s; as an organised movement, drawing recruits from many tribes and integrating them into common political frameworks, it dates from the founding of the Baluch Students Organisation in 1967.

A second reason for questioning the extent of Baluchistan's vulnerability to outside manipulation is that Islamabad has many advantages in the struggle for the tribesmen's loyalties. We have already noted that the Baluch tribes are deeply divided in their attitudes towards Islamabad. A variety of economic aid donors (including the United States) have earmarked substantial funds for use in Baluchistan, a fact which may strengthen the government's cause, at least temporarily. Should the carrot fail, Islamabad is perhaps better positioned today to resort to the stick than it was a decade ago. Regular armed forces have generally been deployed in Baluchistan at a level ranging between one and two infantry divisions, based at Kalat, Sibi, Quetta and Loralai.[44] These forces are augmented by special units of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, whose strength has been substantially increased in recent years with the establishment of new garrisons, spaced at frequent intervals in tribal areas. In both the regular army and the paramilitary forces, Baluch tribesmen, especially those of 'dangerous' tribes, are only sparsely represented.

Islamabad has another rather powerful ally against Baluch nationalism in the changing political demography of the Baluch homeland. By June 1981, there were well over 400,000 Afghan refugees, only an insignificant percentage of them Baluch, settled in some thirty camps in the northern districts of Baluchistan.[45] Their arrival added considerably to the number of Afghan co-

43 Based on interviews by one of the authors in Pakistan in summer 1979 and summer 1981. For additional background on many of these points, see Robert G. Wirsing, 'South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan', in Robert G. Wirsing, ed., *Protection of Ethnic Minorities Comparative Perspectives*, (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 277–312

44. A new corps headquarters has recently been set up at Quetta. *FEER*, Jan. 29, 1982, p. 23.

45. Figures supplied by the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Islamabad.

ethnics (Pathans) already living in the province, a number that is controversial but almost certainly greater than 40 per cent of Baluchistan's population. Their arrival challenges not only the provincial ethnic balance, however, but the Baluch nationalist movement itself. Soviet support of Kabul's efforts to crush rebel resistance in Afghanistan has by no means destroyed Moscow's credibility as a potential ally of Baluch nationalism (there is no basis for Francis Fukuyama's statement that 'the primary concern of most politically active Baluchis now is the freedom of their kinsmen living under Soviet occupation in Afghanistan'[46]). But it has clearly helped to bring into Baluchistan a multitude of Afghan refugees who cannot possibly have much sympathy for Baluch separatism, certainly not if it is Soviet-aided.

It is hazardous to attempt even a rough estimate of Soviet involvement today in the Baluch nationalist movement.[47] The Soviets appear to have offered very little, if any, support to the harassed Baluch guerrilla forces in the 1970s struggle. No one, however, questions the enhanced strategic importance of Baluchistan today to the Soviets, for whom the manipulation of Baluch nationalism holds a number of obvious attractions. An independent Greater Baluchistan client state, carved from the territory of Pakistan and Iran, would satisfy any number of Moscow's conceivable longings; and even the mere threat of establishing a Baluch government-in-exile in Afghanistan may serve to inhibit Islamabad from sponsoring a similar entity among the anti-Soviet Afghan guerrillas operating out of Pakistan. No doubt the Soviets are taking care to prepare the ground should the time arrive to take advantage of Baluch nationalist strivings. Of the 7,500 Baluch tribesmen who Harrison estimates are now attached to combat units of the Baluch People's Liberation Front (BPLF), the organised guerrilla force of the Baluch nationalist movement, over 2,700, he believes, are based in camps in southern Afghanistan, where they are directly accessible to the Soviets.[48] Of considerable significance is the report that the key nationalist leader Khair Bux Marri, whose tribe bore the brunt of fighting in the 1970s and now makes up by far the largest component of the BPLF guerrilla force, has shifted his place of exile from London to Kabul.[49] This step, under the circumstances prevailing in that area, he would not have taken without the calculated connivance of Moscow.

In spite of its obvious attractions, Baluchistan does not seem to be a likely target of a Soviet *military* thrust. As a number of analysts have pointed out, South-west Asia presents Soviet armed forces with severe geographic and technical obstacles, and these are especially formidable in Baluchistan.[50]

46. Fukuyama, *op. cit*., p 12

47 See Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, *op cit*., pp 127–148. See also his paper, 'Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Policy', prepared for a conference on Moslem Central Asia sponsored by Freedom House, New York City, Nov 14–15, 1980; and William E Griffith, 'The USSR and Pakistan', *Problems of Communism*, Jan - Feb. 1982, No 31, pp. 38–44

48 Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, *op. cit*., p. 75.

49. Selig S. Harrison, 'The "X" in the Middle East Equation', *The Nation*, Nov 14, 1981, Vol. 233, No 16, p 506.

50. See, for example, Keith A. Dunn, 'Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis', *Orbis*, Fall 1981, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 607-629; and Thomas L. McNaugher, 'The Soviet Military Threat to

Moreover, the political damage which even clandestine involvement in Baluchistan might do to its relationship with India or to its relations with the non-aligned would seem to dictate at least some restraint. The Baluch today are far better armed than they were a decade ago. But they have few heavy weapons and—since virtually all their weapons pass through the hands of not-always-friendly Pathan/Afghan smugglers to the north, who dominate the region's arms trade—few reliable or permanent sources of arms supply. This situation can be remedied, of course, by a determined external ally. But without *considerable* Soviet assistance, the Baluch are simply no match for Islamabad's armed forces; by and large, this was the lesson of the 1970s insurgency.[51]

It would be a mistake to dismiss the threat of Soviet involvement or to underestimate Soviet ability to exploit Baluch grievances to the discomfort of Islamabad. It should be kept in mind, however, that the situation in Baluchistan lends itself particularly well to exaggerated and alarming scenarios. Baluch nationalism is certainly not the only or even the most important threat to Pakistan's political stability. A more appropriate candidate for that designation, in fact, is the present regime's lack of popularity in *all* the country's provinces.

The original justification for taking power from civilian leadership, widespread public disorder, has worn thin with the passage of time and no longer serves to justify the ban on authentic political participation. Undeniably, Zia's government has meted out harsh treatment to many of its opponents. While almost certainly less culpable in this regard than the Bhutto regime that preceded it, it is not above physical and other forms of intimidation.[52] Its censorship of the press has been at least as flagrant as that under any previous government.[53] Its attempts at Islamic institution-building have been arbitrary and clumsy. Whatever its impact on the masses, Islamisation has clearly not won over to the government's side much of the country's large and articulate political class. After five years of rule, the military leadership seems to have failed entirely to extend its base of support beyond the military itself.

The future for the US–Pakistan relationship

The renewed relationship between the United States and Pakistan is subject to a number of imponderables. First, Pakistan's present military leaders, on whose political survival the relationship at least partly depends, may not retain power. Even if they do, they are likely to take steps to protect their authority against internal threats that will not only embarrass Washington but also

the Gulf: The Operational Dimension', prepared for the Biennial Conference of the Section on Military Studies, International Studies Association, University of New Hampshire, November 5-7, 1981, especially pp 12-13, 29.

51 Essentially the same point is made by Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 38

52. See the recent Amnesty International report, *Pakistan: Human Rights Violations and the Decline of the Rule of Law* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1982).

53. Press censorship was partially lifted in January 1982. *New York Times*, Jan 12, 1982, p. 8Y

interfere with Islamabad's capacity to play a regional security role. Washington has to reckon with the fact that the turbulence which lies just beneath the surface of Pakistan's domestic political situation hardly suits it to sustain a long and difficult confrontational posture on the Afghan frontier. Second, Pakistan's persistent drive to acquire nuclear capability, while it may be slowed, is almost certainly not going to be abandoned. Pakistan is hardly the only or even the worst culprit among nuclear proliferators. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that Pakistan's nuclear ambition works against America's longstanding and basic interest in non-proliferation. A third is that Islamabad's acceptance of the Soviet threat to the Gulf area runs in company with its overriding concern to strengthen itself against India, a fact which undeniably complicates American relations with New Delhi.

On the other hand, these arguments, when viewed in a larger context, fall well short of an indictment of Washington's strategic objectives in regard to Pakistan. The contention that 'India and Pakistan constitute an interdependent geopolitical and strategic whole, especially in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan', or that 'the idea of including Islamabad in a Middle East-Persian Gulf strategic consensus is fundamentally flawed because it ignores the ethnic, cultural, historical, and geopolitical ties that orient Pakistan to South Asia[54],' itself ignores the economic, ideological and strategic imperatives that brought the United States and Pakistan together in the 1950s and that are bringing them together with renewed force once again in the 1980s. Both states have an enormous stake in the stability of the Gulf area and in the security of Gulf oil supplies; and both have a commanding interest, which they share with their mutual friend China, in preventing the Russians from using Afghanistan as a base for further advances toward South or Southwest Asia. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan's interest in a regional balance of power has always converged with America's global cold war interests.[55] Now that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has dramatically intensified Pakistan's dependence on the West, the convergence of the two states' regional and global concerns is greater than ever. From a strictly strategic perspective, there is nothing 'unnatural' about their relationship any more than there is something 'natural' about an Indian-dominated South Asian balance of power.

In moving closer to Islamabad, Washington obviously strains its own relations with India. Clearly, however, it has not traded away all of its potential for influencing New Delhi or for helping to normalise Indo-Pakistani relations. New Delhi apparently reciprocates Pakistan's distrust of Indian intentions; but at the same time Indians share with Pakistanis (and with many in Washington) a very deep anxiety over the wider implications of Moscow's adventure in Afghanistan. This was certainly among the motives for the discussions with

54. Harrison, 'Fanning Flames in South Asia', *op. cit.*, pp 98-99

55. On this point, see S. D. Muni, 'South Asia', in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 38-72.

regard to a non-aggression treaty between India and Pakistan which began early in 1982.[56]

The United States military and economic assistance programme for Pakistan, including the sale of forty F-16s, is certainly consistent with Washington's wider efforts to construct a new security regime for the south-west Asian/Indian Ocean region. In so far as we can judge, the programme meets Pakistan's immediate security needs without necessarily upsetting Indo-Pakistan relations, or driving a permanent wedge between India and the United States, or doing irreparable damage to other (non-security) American interests in the area. Obviously, it is not the final solution to all of Pakistan's problems, of which the disunity of its citizens and the hostility of its neighbours are only two. A strategy towards South-west Asia which pursued only security interests, or security interests that were too narrowly defined, would almost certainly worsen Pakistan's current dilemma. (Employing Pakistan as a base for staging an escalating campaign of violence against the Soviet-backed Afghans might be just such a strategy.) It will be essential, if this relationship is to endure (and to have meaning) beyond the last shipment of F-16s, that Washington display more willingness to confront the heavy political 'baggage' which Pakistan and every other potential member of the emerging security regime inevitably carries along with it. Taking greater account of Pakistan's internal and regional political situation will complicate matters, to be sure; but if nothing else, it will keep expectations modest all around and may suggest lines along which America's relationship with Pakistan and with its neighbours can be encouraged to develop in the future.

56. *New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1982, p. 3Y.

US-EUROPEAN TRADE RELATIONS*

Stephen Woolcock†

THE most striking characteristic of what has been a marked deterioration in transatlantic trade relations in 1982 is the coincidence of a number of serious trade disputes. The issues involved are by no means new. For years East-West trade and credit policy, steel and agricultural trade, as well as international monetary relations, have been issues on which Europe and the United States have exhibited divergent interests. Tensions on all these points at one time, however, have put a major strain on the cohesion of transatlantic trade relations.

The causes for these growing tensions are diverse. A major factor has of course been the unfavourable international economic climate, but policies on either side of the Atlantic have also shown a divergent trend on the relevant issues. The Reagan administration, in particular, has shifted US policy on trade with the Soviet Union towards a more restrictive neo-containment approach. On economic policy President Reagan's firm commitment to less government intervention has also had implications for international trade and monetary relations. On the other hand European governments have persisted with their rather passive, low-key approach to the strategic relevance of East-West economic relations. On balance Europe has probably become more interventionist in its industrial policies, especially in its attempts to solve structural crises as typified by the steel industry, and has vainly, and with growing exasperation, called for US intervention to stabilise international monetary markets.

The effect of all this has been to expose some underlying differences in transatlantic trade relations. Once exposed, differences on such issues are not easily resolved without raising sensitive questions about who takes the lead on any given issue in the Atlantic Alliance.[1] When it comes to tests of strength within the Alliance the existing channels of co-operation or consultation are clearly inadequate, as shown by the West's response to Poland, the Versailles summit and to some extent the steel dispute. With little confidence in the institutional means of resolving disputes there is a risk that disputes will escalate as one side or the other resorts to unilateral measures. If not contained

* This article draws on the current Chatham House research work on American foreign policy and European interests which is financially supported by the Leverhulme Trust.

† Stephen Woolcock is a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs

1. See Lawrence Freedman, 'The Atlantic crisis,' *International Affairs*, Summer 1982, Vol 58, No 3, pp. 395-412

such a trend could indeed have significant effects on transatlantic trade and possibly political relations.

East-West trade

The most obvious tension has been over Western policies on East-West trade and in particular over the increased supply of Soviet natural gas to Western Europe by construction of the Urengoi gas pipeline. On June 18, 1982 President Reagan decided to extend the US embargo on energy equipment and technology first introduced on December 29, 1981 as a response to Soviet connivance in the repression of political renewal in Poland. This decision constituted an attempt to employ US legislation, in the form of the 1979 Export Administration Act, in a final bid to stop or delay the pipeline. Whilst the earlier December embargo only applied to the re-exportation of components produced in the United States, the June decision sought to prevent construction of turbines by European companies under production licences. The embargo affected a number of European companies and European subsidiaries of American companies but the contractors building turbines for use in pumping stations on the pipeline were the most severely affected. The issue assumed crisis proportions because the decision, taken at the highest level, sought to force European companies to comply with the restrictive US policy on trade with the Soviet Union in direct conflict with the policies of their national governments. The 1979 Export Administration Act, on which any US sanctions policy is based, was applied not only extraterritorially but also retrospectively, in that the European companies concerned had acquired production licences from the US General Electric Company years previously. This unilateral attempt to force compliance with US policy was taken with little or no consultation only days after the Versailles summit which had been much concerned with East-West trade policies. Consequently it precipitated an almost unprecedented clash of legal, economic and political interests across the Atlantic.[2]

The crisis could have taken no-one by surprise; it should have been, and indeed was, predicted. At a very early stage the Carter administration expressed reservations about the proposed project, and continued to do so throughout 1980. Under the new Reagan administration American opposition intensified. At the Western economic summit in Ottawa in July 1981, President Reagan justified this opposition on the grounds that increased imports of Soviet natural gas risked making Western Europe subject to political pressure from Moscow. In reality, however, the US opposition, which found expression in increased diplomatic pressure on the Europeans in the autumn of 1981, was based on the still embryonic US policy of economic containment of the Soviet Union. The pipeline was seen as damaging to this policy because it would provide the Soviet Union with a future source of hard currency

2. For a fuller treatment of the crisis see Jonathan Stern, 'The Urengoi gas pipeline and Alliance management; how not to do it', forthcoming in *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1982.

earnings.[3] This hard currency could then be used to purchase the Western, that is mainly European, plant and technology which the Soviet Union needed to stave off what were thought of in some American circles as its progressive economic problems. The fact that the Soviet Union was using much of its hard currency at the time to buy American grain did not go unnoticed in Europe.

Just as the United States had made clear its opposition to the pipeline, there could have been absolutely no doubt that the European companies concerned were determined to proceed and that they had the backing of their governments. In November 1981 German companies concluded agreements on the supply of gas and construction of the pipeline. The main contractors, Mannesmann and Creusot-Loire, also placed orders with French, German, Italian and British sub-contractors. To many in the United States the dangers of attempting to stop the pipeline by unilateral action were only too apparent. A number of studies indeed pointed out that such action could cause a rift in the Alliance that would be more damaging to the West than any embargo would be for the Soviet Union.[4] The US Department of State was particularly aware of this danger and countered strong pressure for unilateral action from the Pentagon. The State Department had also attempted to dissuade President Reagan from fulfilling his campaign pledge to end the partial grain embargo against the Soviet Union because it would send false signals about US policy.

Even after the declaration of martial law in Poland the State Department continued to have a moderating effect on US policy, pointing out that the United States must at all costs avoid giving the Soviet Union the double victory of not only repressing Solidarity, the Polish free trade union, but also achieving a major split in the Atlantic Alliance. The events in Poland nevertheless provided the hard-liners with an opportunity to act against the pipeline. On December 29 President Reagan announced a number of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Of these the one with the most immediate effect was the embargo on the re-export of US parts for the pipeline. American efforts to block the pipeline could henceforth be depicted as a sanction against Soviet complicity in the repression of Solidarity.[5]

The initial damage of the December 1981 sanctions on European contractors was limited, but as time passed and delivery dates approached so did the risk of transatlantic tensions. In the spring of 1982 the US State Department initiated talks with the European allies on a number of East-West trade issues. Central to these talks was the cost and volume of Western credit to the Soviet Union. The State Department believed, rightly, that the prospects for an understanding with the Europeans on credit was better than on trade sanctions. Since the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments to

3 There appears to be some doubt that the potential annual hard currency earnings from the pipeline will be as great as the widely quoted figure of $10 billion. See Stern, *op cit*

4. See for example, Thane Gustafson, 'Selling the Russians the Rope?' in *Soviet Technology Policy and US Export Controls* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1981)

5. For more background on this period see Stephen Woolcock, *Western Policies on East-West Trade*, Chatham House Paper No. 15, May 1982.

the 1974 Trade Act the United States had provided no credit or credit guarantees for trade with the Soviet Union. European governments, however, continued to provide either credit or credit guarantees or both and on terms which the United States considered to be tantamount to subsidising the Soviet economy. If the State Department could reach agreements with the Europeans which increased the cost of credit, or better still reduced the volume of credit by restricting official guarantees, the effect would be similar to depriving the Soviet Union of hard currency earnings from the pipeline. As this would have gone some way towards satisfying the hard line proponents of economic containment, there was scope for at least an implicit trade-off with an easing of the US pipeline embargo.

The negotiations on East-West credit were complicated by the OECD talks on general export credit, the OECD 'consensus' on export credit being another issue on which the interests of the United States and some European governments differed. For some time the United States, supported by some European countries, had been pressing for an increase in minimum interest rates and other measures to reduce the degree of subsidy in export credit financing. Despite early French reservations the European Community countries agreed to the reclassification of the Soviet Union as a relatively rich country for the purposes of the OECD export credit agreements.[6] This meant that when agreement was finally reached within the OECD the minimum rate for the Soviet Union rose from 8·5 per cent to 12·25 per cent for two- to five-year credits. Together with other important changes this meant an increase in the price of credit for the Soviet Union.

An agreement on restricting the volume of credit was, however, more problematic as this would have constituted a major policy change, and no consensus could be reached in the run-up to Versailles. The summit communiqué referred in general terms to the need for 'commercial prudence in limiting export credits,'[7] but subsequent press statements soon established that no real agreement had been reached. The US diplomatic effort therefore fell short of its objective. Although important progress had been made—for example, the Europeans had never previously agreed to wording such as 'limiting credit'—it was not enough to satisfy the more ideological proponents of economic containment back home in the Pentagon and National Security Council. The frustration of yet another US initiative on East-West trade by European inertia was seen by some in Washington as one more example of how Europe was failing to come to terms with the strategic implications of East-West economic relations. Any implicit trade-off between credit and the pipeline was denied and President Reagan decided to extend the embargo. The decision was clearly associated with a decrease in the influence of the State Department and the exit of Secretary of State Haig, both of whom had

6. For an excellent background on the OECD negotiations see Joan Pearce, *Subsidized Export Credit*, Chatham House Paper No. 7, 1980.

7. See London Press Service Verbatim Service 98/82, June 7, 1982 for text.

consistently said that it would result in a direct conflict with Europe. As the decision was made in full knowledge of this it must be seen as a desperate attempt to regain US leadership in the field of East-West trade.

The steel issue

As with East-West trade steel is by no means a recent problem in US-European relations. In 1968 slow growth in US demand, combined with import penetration of more than 15 per cent, resulted in pressure to control imports. This move by the steel industry was an important qualification of the United States' previous firm commitment to free trade, and resulted in the conclusion of voluntary export restraint agreements with European and Japanese producers. Voluntary export restraint lasted until 1973-74 when a boom in demand made them superfluous, but the six-year period of import relief was not used to restructure what was becoming a progressively obsolete American steel industry. Consequently the US industry, as well as much of the European industry, was poorly equipped to deal with the structural problems of surplus capacity caused by an unprecedented fall in demand in 1975 followed by progressive stagnation ever since.

In 1977 major US steel producers began closing plants, and, backed by a 150-strong steel caucus in Congress, pressed for protection when imports again exceeded 15 per cent of the market. The US Steel Corporation backed up this pressure by initiating 19 anti-dumping actions against European and Japanese producers. In response the Carter administration devised a comprehensive programme for the steel industry, the central instrument of which was the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM). In the TPM the administration gave itself powers to accelerate anti-dumping procedures. Its main purpose, however, was to help the steel producers by raising the price of imports whilst at the same time retaining executive control over US trade policy. The alternatives would have been to allow anti-dumping actions to run their course, or to introduce quota controls, which might have involved legislation. As the steel caucus was threatening to block the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) at the time unless something was done to help the steel industry, President Carter wished to avoid involving Congress. On the other hand, to allow the anti-dumping actions to proceed would have damaged trade relations with Europe which was desperately trying to rescue its own steel industry. The loss of part of the US market would have exacerbated Europe's problems. The Carter administration therefore devised the TPM which kept US trade policy temporarily out of the courts and Congress and in the hands of the administration.

Parallel to the anti-crisis measures within the United States and Europe there were also international consultations on what was by that time an international problem. At the end of 1977 the United States, the European Community and Japan agreed on a number of international guidelines designed

to avoid exporting the steel crisis. These covered an agreement that national (or EEC) anti-crisis measures should not disrupt existing trade patterns; that excessively low export prices should be controlled; and that national steel policies should not shift the cost of adjustment on to other countries. This desire to manage the international implications of the steel crisis found more formal expression in the establishment of the OECD steel committee in October 1978.[8]

In subsequent years both the United States and Europe have struggled to restructure their steel industries, but by very different means. In Europe there has been an increase in intervention in all aspects of the steel industry at both European and national levels. The United States continued, however, with an arms-length approach. In 1979-80 there was another dip in steel demand, followed in April 1980 by another set of anti-dumping petitions from the US steel industry. After some delay President Carter again headed off definitive rulings with a revamped TPM, which now institutionalised the 15 per cent target for import penetration. The mutual interest of both American and European authorities in avoiding definitive rulings on dumping can best be explained by a feeling that too much was at stake for the decision to be left to six individuals in the International Trade Commission (ITC) or a few bureaucrats in the Commerce Department.

The latest crisis in the steel industry was again caused by a fall in demand which once more threatened efforts to restructure the industry in Europe and the United States. Europe responded by a further injection of public aid in a number of countries, such aid to be co-ordinated by the ECSC code on state aid for the steel industry. Under a decision taken by the Ten in 1981, aid was to be linked to restructuring and phased out by 1985. This further restructuring was necessary despite radical cuts in a number of countries. For example, employment in the British industry fell by no less than 57 per cent between 1974 and June 1982 compared to a drop of 32 per cent for the European Community as a whole. The degree of restructuring varied from country to country; in Belgium, for example, pressure from Brussels to push through more radical restructuring in early 1982 led to the worst riots the country had seen in twenty years.

The US response to the crisis again took the form of petitions for anti-dumping duties. In January 1982, however, the steel industry also petitioned for countervailing duties in order to protect the US industry from 'unfair' import competition from subsidised European producers. This was the first time a major US industry had asked for a ruling on countervailing duties against European exporters since the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of MTN which included a new code on subsidies and countervailing duties. Compared to the previous occasions the Reagan administration seemed more prepared to allow the legal processes to run their course. There were a number of half-hearted efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the Europeans but no

8 See *OECD Decision of Council Establishing a Steel Committee* (C(78)171 (Final)), October 26, 1978

apparent desire on the part of the administration to head off the anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions. In June 1982 the US Department of Commerce posted preliminary countervailing duties against European steel exports for the first time. In some cases these were at such levels—40 per cent for the British Steel Corporation—as effectively to close the US market if they became definitive. The International Trade Commission (ITC) also made a preliminary ruling that European exports were the cause of material injury to the American industry, a necessary condition for applying countervailing duties.

Definitive rulings will have profound effects on the European industry and steel trade in general. Loss of much of the US market for some European producers will probably lead to further plant closures and redundancies, given the precarious position of a number of companies. Whether or not plants are closed, European governments would probably have to provide even more aid, especially where previous closures have resulted in political unrest. These subsidies would then attract even higher US countervailing duties leading to an escalation which could bring transatlantic trade in steel to a virtual halt.

The Europeans' response to the preliminary countervailing duties was to protest at what they saw as a unilateral and incorrect interpretation of the GATT subsidies code, and to initiate immediate talks in the GATT committee administering the code. In particular, the Europeans protested that the Department of Commerce had failed to distinguish between direct production subsidies and aid linked to industrial restructuring and reconversion. This distinction was seen as important because it constituted a fundamental component in the European steel policy agreed with such difficulty only months earlier. The Europeans, in the form of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also contested what they saw as a false and tendentious interpretation of material injury by the ITC, and protested at the apparent American disregard for the earlier consensus reached in the OECD not to disrupt traditional trade patterns.

As in 1977 and 1980, both sides could be said to have an interest in avoiding definitive legal rulings. For the Europeans, countervailing duties could undermine the whole European steel industry as steel destined for the US seeks other markets. A definitive ruling would also set a dangerous precedent. With more interventionist industrial and adjustment policies, European exports in a number of other industries could face US countervailing duties if US authorities define subsidies in the broad sense they did for steel. For its part the US steel industry, as opposed to the government, could lose face in the increasingly unlikely event that definitive rulings reversed the earlier preliminary decisions. For years the industry has blamed subsidised imports for its difficulties; if this were found not to be the case the industry's influence would be undermined. Furthermore, negotiated voluntary export restraint would limit all European exports. Countervailing duties would reduce or remove import competition from Britain, France, Belgium and Italy; however,

German producers receive only limited subsidies, so that countervailing duties would be no remedy against import competition from this source. With an appreciating dollar it may also be difficult to make anti-dumping duties stick, which was incidentally one of the reasons why the US industry opted for countervailing duties and not anti-dumping duties as in the past.

Compared to the Carter administration in 1977 and 1980, the Reagan administration appeared less inclined to intervene in order to defuse trade frictions and retain full control of trade policy within the executive. This may of course have been a negotiating stance, but it was fully compatible with early policy statements which emphasised a greater determination rigorously to enforce US trade legislation to protect American industries against unfair trade practices and to ensure trading partners' compliance with the spirit and letter of the GATT codes.[9] In 1980 the Carter administration had been more reticent about putting the fledgling GATT codes to the test on such a very sensitive issue concerning a major trading block. The events of 1982 also show a weakening of international consultation as a means of dispute settlement, as evidenced by the scant use of the OECD Steel Committee established in 1978 to cope with what is clearly an enduring international crisis in the steel industry. Regardless of the merits of the case the immediate crisis was precipitated by decisions taken not in multilateral adjudication but by quasi-legal bodies in the United States.

Other sources of tension

It is not possible to cover all the current issues in US–European trade relations in equal depth; however, problems in agricultural trade, export credit subsidies and interest rates have all contributed to the present tensions. These sectors parallel in a number of ways the problems of East–West trade and steel. In none are the US–European differences new. For example agricultural trade has been the focus of repeated American efforts to change European policy in each of the major rounds of trade negotiations, but with only limited success. The GATT code on subsidies and countervailing duties applies to agriculture but there is no ban on export subsidies as there is for manufactured products. Export subsidies for agricultural products should not, however, allow any contracting party to gain more than an equitable share of world exports. Clearly what is an equitable share is open to interpretation and it is here that differences between the US and Europe must be resolved. Indeed the US has already initiated a number of cases in GATT against EEC agricultural policy on wheat flour and sugar and an action against European preferences for Mediterranean citrus fruit.

Surplus capacity in the petrochemical industry has also caused problems, particularly in Europe where producers have asked the European Commission

9. See Embassy of the United States of America (London) International Communication Agency, July 9, 1981, *An Outline of US trade policies:* statement by US Special Trade Representative W. E. Brock before the Senate Finance and Banking Committees.

for a whole string of anti-dumping duties against American exporters. The earlier tensions over imports of American man-made fibre products into Europe were resolved following the appreciation of the dollar which reduced US exports, and President Reagan's announcement on the deregulation of US gas and oil prices.

Another area of tension in US-European economic relations is of course the field of international monetary relations. To a greater or lesser degree all European governments have criticised US monetary policy, or more specifically what they see as the imbalance between US fiscal and monetary policies which has resulted in historically unprecedented real interest rates in the United States. Because of the dominance of the dollar on international money markets European governments have seen themselves compelled to defend their exchange rate and inflation targets. Many European governments therefore claim that Reaganomics are partly responsible for their inability to ease monetary restraint in order to expand their economies and absorb some of the growing numbers of unemployed. There must be some doubt that all those governments who criticise US policy are really so constrained by high US interest rates; in some cases the US may be only a convenient scapegoat. Regardless of the merits of their claim, however, there can be little doubt that a sense of grievance exists in Europe.

Whilst one might question the commitment of some European governments—though certainly not that of France—to expansionary policies, one cannot doubt that Europe has a real interest in greater stability in international money markets. Europe's frustration with the Reagan administration's ideological commitment to non-intervention in money markets has therefore become a source of tension.

For its part the Reagan administration has from the very beginning concentrated on putting its own economic house in order. It replies to international criticism of its economic policies by stressing that the creation of stable non-inflationary growth in the United States is in the best interests of the international economy. There can be little doubt that if attained, such growth would help the world economy; in the meantime, however, such an approach begs the fundamental question of international economic co-operation in an interdependent world economy.

Underlying differences

Most if not all of the current difficulties in transatlantic trade relations reflect deep-seated differences. For example, the United States has always placed far more emphasis on the strategic implications of East-West trade than Western Europe. Throughout the 1960s the United States acted as a brake on any rapid normalisation of trade sought by West European countries for mainly economic reasons. After a brief period of US-Soviet detente between 1969 and 1974 when policies converged, there has been a progressive divergence

between US and European policies on East-West trade. Whilst the United States pursued policies of economic diplomacy or sanctions, Europe, with a greater interest in detente, avoided the use of economic links for political objectives. In their respective responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and Europe also exhibited different perceptions of the Soviet threat.

In addition to these consistent differences in perception of East-West relations and the role of trade in those relations, there are also very important differences of interest arising from the structure of East-West trade. These are best illustrated by the dominance of Western Europe in OECD-COMECON trade. In 1980 Western Europe accounted for no less than 91 per cent of OECD imports from and 77 per cent of OECD exports to European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries. In comparison the respective 3 per cent and 9 per cent shares for the United States provide it with only a limited means of influencing East-West economic relations.

International monetary relations are, in contrast, characterised by the relative weakness of Europe and dominance of the United States. Although the role of the dollar in international monetary relations has declined it still accounted for about 80 per cent of official holdings of foreign currency in 1980, compared to 11 per cent for the Deutsche Mark, 2 per cent for Sterling, 1 per cent for the French and 3 per cent for the Swiss Franc. As progress towards a strengthening of the European Monetary System if and when it comes is unlikely to be rapid, this balance of influence in international monetary relations must be expected to endure and with it the propensity for Europeans to criticise US monetary policies.

The steel trade dispute illustrates some structural differences which, although less apparent, are nevertheless just as enduring a feature of US-European economic relations. In very simple terms most European governments have to some extent interventionist industrial policies when compared to the United States. Even the non-interventionist Germans provided aid to high technology industries or to sectors undergoing rapid structural change. The steel industry is of course a prime example of European interventionism, with the European Community also regulating prices, competition, production and, increasingly, state-aided investment. European governments also intervene in a number of other important industries.

Active industrial policies involving governments in decisions on plant closures have heightened European governments' awareness of the political and social implications of trade policy decisions. This is reflected in a general preference among European governments for negotiated settlements to trade disputes which can take account of political as well as economic and legal questions. In comparison American governments, with no active involvement in industrial policy, rely far more on the legal provisions of US trade legislation or international rule oriented settlement of trade disputes. In the United States pressure from interest groups is dispersed between the legal system, with

producers or workers petitioning for relief from import competition, the Executive and Congress, which retains ultimate control over US trade policy. In addition to an ideological preference for arms-length policies, therefore, there are constitutional factors which tend to disperse decision making on trade policy. The US Executive has less control over trade policy than governments or the European Commission in Europe, and can with some justification claim that it is constrained from concluding the negotiated settlements sought by Europe. Based as it is on constitutional factors, the legalistic nature of US trade policy cannot be expected to change, so that the clash between US legalistic and European political approaches to trade is likely to remain a central feature of transatlantic trade relations.

The underlying differences between the US and Europe in a number of areas are therefore more or less permanent features, and policy formulation must take this fact into account. Any policy which plays on these fundamental differences inevitably invites conflict. As neither side is willing to move on fundamental issues, disputes can rapidly escalate and become a question of Alliance fidelity. On the other hand, past experience shows that such differences of interest can be managed.

The danger of escalation and its implications

The potential damage which can be caused by escalation of disputes has already been only too clearly illustrated by those over the pipeline and, to a lesser degree, steel. As for the pipeline, the immediate cause of tension was a further divergence between US and European policies on East-West trade. The Reagan administration has reverted to a policy similar to the economic containment policies of the 1950s. In the late 1970s America and Europe had effectively agreed to differ on President Carter's policies of trade sanctions, but this was no longer acceptable to a US administration committed to countering what it saw as a growing Soviet threat. Needless to say, an American policy of economic containment could only be viable if supported by Western Europe. For their part the West European governments clearly underestimated US resolve to restrict trade with the Soviet Union. President Reagan's decision to end the partial grain embargo against the Soviet Union was interpreted in Europe as a sign that, as in the past, US policy would vacillate between foreign policy or strategic objectives and US economic interests. Consequently Europe continued, as in the past, to resist US initiatives on East-West trade issues.

In addition to the damage already caused to Atlantic relations, the East-West trade crisis could have further implications if it is not brought under control soon. Whatever happens, European companies will in future think twice before using American parts or technology in any project associated with East-West trade. This will not only affect US-European trade, but will further reduce US economic interests in East-West trade in manufactured products. With the exception of the farmers, American exporters are already thoroughly

disillusioned with the potential of Eastern markets and this has weakened the pro-East-West trade lobby. The US bias towards strategic interests may therefore be further consolidated and with it the divergence between the United States and Western Europe, which will continue to seek a balance between economic and strategic interests.

The 1979 US Export Administration Act provides for penalties against delinquent companies. If the dispute continues European companies may be subject to fines or even blacklisting by the United States. Blacklisting would mean that companies continuing to supply parts for the pipeline would be denied US components or technology even when these are destined for re-export to countries other than the Soviet Union. Such developments would clearly be very damaging for business confidence and could have far-reaching implications for trade within the Western world.

In its pursuit of economic containment policies the Reagan administration has also linked trade and credit with the Soviet ability to sustain its military build-up. Europe denies this link, but a persistence in doing business with the Soviet Union may be interpreted by the hardliners in Washington as in some way contributing to the Soviet military effort. Combined with the reservations of some European governments about the siting of cruise and Pershing II missiles, as well as a reluctance to increase defence spending, this may lead to more widespread support for the view that if Europe is not prepared to make sacrifices it is not worth defending.

The steel trade dispute is less dramatic than the East-West trade issue but if not contained it could have more serious implications for transatlantic trade relations. As noted above economic conditions in the steel industry must be seen as the major cause of the crisis. Nevertheless, despite the long time frame of trade policy some changes in policy shading may have contributed to the problems. Above all, deflationary economic policies have affected steel-consuming industries and thus accentuated the structural crisis in the steel industry worldwide. US steel production fell by 35 per cent in the first half of 1982 compared to 1981. In the United States, President Reagan's policy of less government has, amongst other things, resulted in cuts in trade adjustment assistance for workers and companies affected by import competition. The trade adjustment assistance, introduced in 1962 but used more extensively in recent years, was one of the few instruments of structural policy available to American governments. With this gone, industries in difficulty, and in particular the steel industry, had only the Trade Act, which, as noted above, the Reagan administration is determined to employ rigorously. All this came at a time when European governments were elaborating steel policies based in part on increased public assistance.

There were also signs that Congress and American opinion in general were no longer prepared to make sacrifices in the name of free trade. One example of how American patience with the 'unfair' trade practices of other countries appears to be at a low ebb is the general support for a bilateral, as opposed to a

multilateral, interpretation of reciprocity in trade relations. Bilateral reciprocity would mean a direct link between the treatment of imports on the US market and the access granted to US exports. The Reagan administration has flirted with this concept as a means of opening up difficult markets such as Japan. Of more immediate concern for Europe is the precedent set by countervailing duties on steel imports. Given Europe's interventionist industrial policies, exports to the US market in a number of sectors could be subject to countervailing duties. Already Boeing has claimed that Airbus, its only real non-US competitor on the world aircraft market for many years, has benefited from $5 billion in hidden subsidies.

The interpretation of the GATT code on subsidies and countervailing duties, or more immediately the 1974 US Trade and 1979 Trade Agreements Acts, is therefore of great significance. The steel case is important because it is the first test of the US legislation. The GATT subsidies code on which the US and EEC were the main protagonists in the negotiations, bans export subsidies, as indeed to the general GATT provisions. The code does, however, permit subsidies for industrial restructuring or reconversion, but only where these cause no injury to other trading partners. Everything therefore turns on how subsidies are classified and how one determines material injury.

Some commentators have argued that the US legal interpretation of GATT codes is a welcome development. Supporters of this line would point out that legal remedies are better than voluntary export restraint or other negotiated deals, because the latter undermine the multilateral trading system. After all, so the argument runs, what is the point of having a code if you do not apply it? Negotiated agreements or understandings are also not seen as a sound basis for international trade because the stronger, more powerful, country will always come out on top. In other words, rule-oriented dispute settlement is preferable to power-oriented solutions.[10]

In practice, however, the resolution of the steel dispute by legal means may damage rather than strengthen the relevant GATT code on subsidies and countervailing duties. First, the interpretation of material injury and definition of a subsidy is taking place in American institutions rather than in GATT. Secondly, the time is also particularly unfortunate, coming at a time of generally tense US-European trade relations and before the code is really established. The few minor cases involving the code so far have tended to pose more questions than they have answered. The steel sector is also politically sensitive, so that a more gradual accumulation of 'case law' on less sensitive exports may be a safer way of establishing the confidence in dispute settlement procedures which is absolutely essential if the code is to be effective. Finally, the distinction between rule- and power-oriented settlement of trade disputes seldom corresponds to reality. In practice, the most powerful see to it that the rules are interpreted in line with their interests. As the long negotiations on

10 See for a discussion of these points, H Jackson, 'Government disputes in international trade relations: a proposal in the context of GATT', *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1979, Vol. 13

the code showed, US and European interests diverge. Far from being the end, the code is only the beginning of the search for consensus. A headlong rush into setting legal precedents could fatally damage confidence in the code and result in differing national interpretations of what should be an international rule. As every industrialist or exporter worth his salt can identify at least one 'unfair' subsidy helping his competitor, this would open the flood gates for a round of countervailing duties which could roll back some of the trade liberalisation of the 1960s and 1970s.

The ultimate consequence of a weakening of confidence in the multilateral system and an associated increase in national remedies to disputes on trade or industrial policy issues would be the progressive emergence of separate regional systems. The fundamental differences between the United States and Europe discussed above would make trade within one Atlantic system more and more difficult. The United States would protect its purer form of free enterprise from European state trading. Needless to say, both would continue to find the aggression of the Japanese and the NIC exports a risk to their established socio-economic systems and act accordingly to defend them. If the concept of a European trading bloc has become respectable,[11] the prospect of a more cavalier American view of the world economy cannot be fully discounted, especially given America's greater self-sufficiency in energy and raw materials.

Restoring confidence

It may seem trite to say that a deepening crisis in transatlantic trade relations can only be avoided if there is a will to do so. But recent events, in particular the US pipeline embargo decision, have seriously damaged European confidence in the US desire to avoid direct conflicts of interest. This confidence has to be restored if an escalation of the present tensions is to be controlled.

There seems little doubt that tensions over East-West trade can only be reduced when the United States recognises that European governments have a decisive influence over the shape of Western policies in this field. This implies a weakening of US leadership in the formulation of common Western policies, or alternatively an acceptance that the United States and Europe pursue some separate policies, as under the Carter administration. The partial ceding of US leadership would be made easier if Europe were prepared to assume responsibilities for policy formulation concomitant with its dominant role in East-West economic relations. For too long European governments have merely responded to US initiatives on issues such as the cost of Western credit. Future Alliance tensions on East-West trade could be reduced by more active European initiatives on common policies aimed at preventing the Soviet Union or other CMEA countries playing off one Western supplier or country against the other by holding out the promise of large contracts. In effect, a policy

11. See Wolfgang Hager, 'Protectionism and Autonomy: How to preserve free trade in Europe', *International Affairs*, Summer 1982, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 413-28.

common to all the major European countries is in any case necessary for any effective Western policy.

With regard to transatlantic trade itself one must recognise that trade in steel has never been free and very seldom fair. The United States and Europe should therefore negotiate an agreement on steel exports to contain the dispute over subsidies to the steel sector. Anything else runs the risk of precipitating a wider conflict between the American 'free enterprise' system and the more mixed European economic system. The implementation of the GATT code on subsidies is also too important, and confidence in the dispute settlement procedures too fragile, to use steel as a test for the code.

For its part Europe can also contribute to defusing the tensions. On trade issues it should resist the temptation of retaliation. The EEC has already threatened retaliation in the shape of compensation for US export subsidies in the form of the DISC, Direct International Sales Corporations. In December 1981 the GATT Council ruled that this US system of deferring taxes on export profits was contrary to GATT. The EEC first desisted from seeking compensation estimated at around $2 billion, only to reactivate the issue in response to the US countervailing duties on European steel exports. The DISC case shows incidentally that adherence to international trade law does not by itself preclude the possibility of a trade war. Europe should also resist the temptation to sabotage the November 1982 GATT ministerial meeting. This first ministerial meeting of GATT since the initiation of the Tokyo Round is seen by the US as the first step towards a progressive liberalisation of trade in services. As services account for no less than one third of US exports it is of some interest to Washington. The meeting also represents an opportunity to maintain the momentum of trade liberalisation. In so far as trade talks help governments to resist domestic protectionist pressure, such momentum is important given that the likelihood of countries seeking national remedies to disputes over trade and industrial policy issues is higher than for some time. The Urengoi pipeline project, important as the issues involved are, should not obscure the problems building up on the trade and economic front. High and rising unemployment in the United States and Europe brings with it the danger of some countries adopting national as opposed to multilateral remedies to their immediate and genuine economic problems. If not managed properly such pressures will weaken the Western economic system, and with it Western security, far more than any East-West trade deal possibly could.

THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE: COMPETITION OR CO-OPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA

*Wolf Grabendorff**

LATIN America's new role in the international system of the 1980s calls for a changed definition of the interests of the United States and Western Europe in the region. The increasing global importance of some Latin American actors—Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, to name only the most prominent[1]—has led to two separate but interconnected developments. In the first place, the United States can no longer be seen as the principal link between Latin America and the rest of the world; secondly, both state and non-state actors from outside the Western hemisphere are increasingly involved in not only the economic but also the political life of the region.

In short, the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its usefulness—the Falklands/Malvinas conflict being only the most recent of many cases illustrating this. The fact that Latin American policymakers have become aware of this much earlier than some of their US counterparts can be attributed partly to their interest in reducing the 'shadow' of the power which formerly dominated the region.

There can be no doubt that Latin America has been influenced and moulded by both Europe and the United States throughout its modern period. This dominant influence still plays a part, varying according to economic and geopolitical circumstances, in Latin American societies, where seeking to compare the development of the home country with that of Europe or the United States is an old tradition. Indeed, the importation of political and economic models, as well as of lifestyles and patterns of consumption, has sometimes inhibited the development of Latin American societies in a manner more appropriate to the actual resources and needs of the country in question and its population. This contrast between cherished Western values and traditions and a structural affinity with the rest of the Third World has produced simultaneously a role for Latin America in the international system which is at once ambiguous and specific,[2] and a 'stable

* Wolf Grabendorff is a Senior Staff Member at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Institute for International Affairs, Ebenhausen, West Germany.

1. For the new position of regional actors see Wolf Grabendorff, 'Perspectives y Polos de Desarrollo en América Latina', *Estudios Internacionales*, April-June 1980, Vol. 13, No. 50, pp 252-78.

2. See Manfred Nitsch, 'Latin America in the Third World', in Wolf Grabendorff, ed., *Latin America and the Third World*, Special Issue, *Vierteljahresberichte*, June 1977, No. 68, pp. 91-105 and G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, (New York. 1977).

instability' with regard to the political institutions of the majority of the region's governments.

The importance of internal developments in Latin American states to their foreign policy attitudes can scarcely be exaggerated; future alignments of these states will directly reflect internal power structures and policy developments. In this context the different approaches of the United States and Western Europe in the region can be seen to be of more relevance in the political arena than in the often-cited field of economic competition. The plurality of concepts of political and economic development in Western Europe offers Latin American political actors a choice rather than forcing upon them acceptance of one system. Given the generally stronger ideological stance of Latin American political actors and the more pervasive role of the state in their societies—as compared with the United States—West European models have a certain obvious attraction for those Latin American elites which are still looking for a way out of their bondage to political systems dominated by the military.

It is, therefore, quite evident that competition between Western Europe and the United States in Latin America will increase sharply in the 1980s, primarily in the economic, but also in the political and, to a certain extent, the military field. What, then, are the advantages of each side in this competition, and, more important, what advantages will accrue to Latin American states as a result of that competitive situation?

The traditional North-South domination pattern has been characterised by vertical zones of influence: United States-Latin America, Western Europe-Middle East and Africa, and Japan-South-east Asia. Diagonal relationships, such as West European linkages with Latin America or South-east Asia, tend to be of a different nature. The historical burden is less of a factor and they can be operated in such a way as better to serve the interests of both partners. A certain geographical distance sometimes makes power imbalances easier to accept and interventions of all kinds a little less likely. The lack of common borders or neighbours reduces the amount of potential causes of friction—even though the Falklands/Malvinas conflict has demonstrated how rapidly the existing ones can explode—and differing perceptions of respective regional threats make discussions on security less divisive. In this case, all these elements are overshadowed by the decisive factor that one of Latin America's partners is a superpower and the other a group of diverse states whose historical experience of two world wars has made them rather reluctant to exert too much influence over other countries. Their experience since the Second World War has also contributed in great measure to a willingness to live side by side with ideologically radically different states and to seek to resolve issues with them by compromise rather than confrontation. It is only in the context of these differences that the significance of a comparison between US and West European relationships with Latin America emerges.

The legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: United States-Latin American relations

The United States views its relationship with Latin America mainly from an assumption of steadily declining influence.[3] Administrations have reacted variously to that fact: while the Carter administration seemed—at least at times—resigned to letting the Latin American states develop in their own way and choose their own alliances, the Reagan administration appears to want to stop the tide. Its obvious preoccupation with the global balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has moved Latin America into the forefront of the East-West conflict. On the basis that the United States' global posture will suffer greatly if it does not control political developments in the immediate vicinity considered hostile to national interests, the re-establishment of US influence in Latin America has become a high priority.[4] Latin America today occupies the minds of Washington policymakers far more in geopolitical and security terms than in terms of the region's political, social and economic needs.

What were the reasons for the decline of US influence? Was it really a case of inept policymaking on the part of previous administrations—or of the meddling of Cuban and Soviet interests in Latin American affairs? Both are very unlikely. In a global context, it was the Vietnam War and its aftermath which gave Latin American states the opportunity to enter the international system without the consent of the United States. The effects of detente, too, were an important factor in the diffusion of power in the new global environment. Diminished US preoccupation with the possible effects of regime changes in Latin America on the East-West power balance gave some countries in the region new scope for a more independent line internally as well as externally. The preference of the Carter administration for globalism rather than regionalism placed Latin America as part of the Third World and thus contributed to its stronger identification with the positions of Asian and African states in the North-South conflict.[6]

The acceptance of ideological pluralism in the Western hemisphere and the willingness to deal with North-South issues on a global scale had very pragmatic origins. The limitations of US power seemed to make direct or indirect intervention in Latin America highly unlikely—not least because of the domestic political cost—and preferential treatment on economic issues for

3 See Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'The United States and Latin America. Ending the Hegemonic Presumption', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, Vol 55, No. 1, pp. 195-213 and 'Latin America: A Not-so-special Relationship', *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, No 32, pp 107-26

4. The clearest expression of this policy can be found in the writings of the current US Ambassador at the UN. Jeane Kirkpatrick, 'US Security and Latin America', *Commentary*, January 1981, Vol 71, No. 1, pp 29-40

5. For a discussion of US security interests in the region see Margaret Daly Hayes, 'Security to the South: U.S Interests in Latin America', *International Security*, Summer 1980, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp 130-51; Jorge I. Dominguez, 'The United States and its Regional Security Interests: The Caribbean, Central, and South America', *Daedalus*, Fall 1980, Vol. 109, no. 4, pp. 115-33

6. See Richard R. Fagen, 'The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business as Usual?, *Foreign Affairs*, 1979, Vol. 57, No 3, pp. 652-69 and Abraham F. Lowenthal and Albert Fishlow, 'Latin America's Emergence: Toward a U.S. Response', *Headline Series*, February 1979, No 243

Latin American states became less and less forthcoming. The direct cause of the change in US relations with Latin America was the United States' decline as an economic and political world power.

A similar process has occurred in the field of US moral superiority. The human rights question has not, as intended, strengthened the United States' political influence in Latin America but rather contributed to its weakening. Given the relatively low strategic importance of Latin America—as seen by the Carter administration—logic decreed it to be politically more expedient to attack violations of human rights there than in other parts of the world. The immediate effects of this policy were (internally) a strengthening of the opposition forces in any given Latin American state and (externally) a growing anti-Americanism in the ranks of the traditional elites, which soon resulted in distrust of the United States.[7] Some of the US-trained officers went so far as to doubt the readiness of the Carter administration to defend their regimes against internal subversion. The resulting insecurity on the part of the ruling Latin American elites led to the search for new foreign partners and a general slackening-off in relationships with the United States. This trend is not easily reversed, despite the Reagan administration's demonstration of its great willingness to accommodate the interests of the alienated groups; moreover, any trust in US policies that had been recently restored was profoundly shaken by the posture of the administration during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict; the sense of betrayal at the lack of US support was not restricted to the Argentine military. The traditional anti-Americanism of the Left has now been joined by an anti-Americanism of the Right, the cancelling of military aid arrangements during the Carter administration and the continuous change of military suppliers having also contributed to the decline of US influence in the Latin American military—where, indeed, it used to be strongest.[8]

A further important factor in the weakening of the United States' position in various Latin American states must be taken into account, namely, its economic interdependence with its immediate southern neighbours. It has been very obvious in the last decade that the focus of US interest has been shifting to the Caribbean and Central America, including Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. This reorientation is due only partly to increasing interest in securing energy supplies: much more to the immigration pattern. The participation of about 20 million 'latinos' in the US economy has led to a completely different attitude towards the neighbouring countries in the south.

The long-term effects of the most striking juxtaposition of the First and Third Worlds—the US borders with Mexico and the Caribbean—have barely yet begun to take shape. The consequences within the United States of a possibly politically active minority of such dimensions could have a greater impact on United States-Latin American relations than anything since the

7 See Mariano Grondona, 'South America looks at detente (skeptically)', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1977, No 26, pp 184-203

8. See Gabriel Marcella, 'Las relaciones militares entre los Estados Unidos y América Latina: Crisis e interrogantes futuras', *Estudios Internacionales*, June-Sept. 1980, Vol 13, No. 51, pp 382-400

Cuban revolution. So far, no mechanism has been developed to deal with these 'intermestic' problems in any meaningful and farsighted way. The international and domestic aspects of the proximity of entirely different societies—politically, socially, economically and culturally—in the context of ever-improving communications will make necessary a new network of co-operative agreements between all states involved. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)[9], which was launched by the Reagan administration in co-operation with Mexico, Venezuela, Canada and later Colombia, seems to contain some elements of a new approach to this region on the United States' 'third border'. So far it shows no sign of success owing to lack of funds and the inevitable disagreement among the participating countries over development objectives and priorities. Nevertheless, since some of the United States' neighbours—Cuba, Mexico, Haiti—are showing an increasing tendency to export some of their problems to the United States, the political and social fabric of these countries will be accorded more and more attention not only in Washington but also in the southern states which are immediately affected by these new issues in the United States' relations with Latin America.

The Reagan administration's concept of a reassertion of US influence in the world is based on a strong position in the Western hemisphere. Outside interference in Latin America in general and in the Caribbean Basin in particular is seen as a threat to the United States' global position.[10] This makes highly undesirable not only Cuban and suspected Soviet interest in the region but also, to a much lesser degree, West European influence. The Reagan administration would rather accept 'moderately repressive authoritarian regimes' than risk the possibility of their destabilisation resulting in the future emergence of radical Marxist states hostile to US interests.[11] Developments in Nicaragua are seen as an example of undesirable internal political change aided by external forces. What is overlooked is that attempts to control political change very often have the reverse effect and accelerate the process, thus determining the opposite political result: by trying to impose a certain internal order and 'acceptable' external behaviour, the United States runs the risk of leaving revolutionary regimes no option but to seek close co-operation with the socialist camp.[12]

In Latin America, as in other parts of the world, the United States' fight

9. See President Reagan's address before the OAS on February 24, 1982, 'Caribbean Basin Initiative', *Current Policy*, No. 370, US Deaprtment of State, and 'Democracy and Security in the Caribbean Basin', *Current Policy*, No. 364, US Department of State, February 1982. For a critical discussion of the Caribbean Basin Initiative see the articles by Abraham F. Lowenthal, Peter Johnson, Rafael Hernández-Colón, Baltasar Corroda, Sidney Weintraub, Richard F Feinberg and Richard S. Newfarmer, *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1982, No. 47, pp. 114-138.

10. See especially The Committee of Santa Fe, *A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties*, (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980) and James D Theberge, 'Rediscovering the Caribbean: Toward a US Policy for the 1980s', *Commonsense*, Spring 1980, Vol 3, No. 2, pp. 1-20

11. This was advocated by Jeane J Kirkpatrick, 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', *Commentary*, November 1979, Vol. 68, No. 5, pp. 34-45.

12 For a convincing analysis of how to avoid such developments see Jean-Pierre Cot (French Minister for Co-operation and Development) 'Winning East-West in North-South', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1982, No. 46, pp. 3-18.

against terrorism—a term which is also used to cover guerilla movements—has taken the place of a human rights policy. To avoid violently effected political change has become more important than pressing for more respect for human rights in the region.

Whether these new formulas will contribute to a strengthening of US influence in the region remains an open question. It is probable that the measures taken will have the desired results only on a short-term basis and in the smaller, more dependent Latin American countries. By the end of the 1980s their long-term results are likely to work to the contrary: because of the rapidly crumbling community of interests between Latin America and the United States, and because of US unwillingness to transfer to its southern neighbours large amounts of resources for development, the United States' influence will decline further in the region as a whole, though it might remain strong in certain individual countries. All efforts to revive the Monroe Doctrine are bound to fail since the basis on which the concept rested—the community of interests between the United States and Latin America (and the ability of the United States to keep other powers out of the region)—cannot be re-established.

The politics of attraction: West European-Latin American relations

Until well into the 1970s, Western European politicians considered Latin America a rather unproblematic region. After the missile crisis in 1962 nothing much had happened that was considered of international importance, and since then the continent seemed to have been spared from the superpower rivalries. There was a tacit understanding that the United States would take care of the 'lesser' problems in Latin America, while cultural and economic relations with Western Europe would flourish.

The emergence of states such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina as regional powers in recent years has led to their developing much closer relationships with some countries in Western Europe, from a desire to diversify their foreign and trade relations and so avoid pressures from the United States in situations of conflicting interests. Given the strong economic performance of some West European countries in the 1970s and their greater willingness to translate their economic position into a bolder international role, Western Europe became an attractive partner for Latin America. Offering almost the same possibilities with regard to capital, technology, and access to markets, Western European states neither had the capacity to exert political pressure nor wanted to exercise moral leadership, and were therefore preferred to the United States as business partners by many Latin American states. Especially in very sensitive areas of special significance to Latin American perceptions of sovereignty such as weapons and nuclear technology transfers,[13] the

13. For an overview of Western European arms transfers to Latin America see Simon Barrow, 'Europe, Latin America and the Arms Trade', in Jenny Pearce, ed, *The European Challenge. Europe's New Role in*

'European connection' proved to be more reliable and politically less difficult to manage—until the Falklands/Malvinas conflict—than that with the United States.

Fully aware of the tough competition in a variety of fields between the West European and American business interests, some Latin American countries soon became able to play off these interests against each other. The history of the Brazilian nuclear deal with West Germany is only the most spectacular case of many.[14] The obvious political bonus of the greater West European role in Latin America for the emancipation process of some Latin American states has not yet been fully recognised. From the Latin American viewpoint, European involvement was not an alternative to US influence but rather the option available that offered increased bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States.

From the viewpoint of many West European politicians, the attractiveness of Latin American markets and investment possibilities was overshadowed by the fact that the majority of Latin American political and social systems are not compatible with the democratic consensus of West European societies.[15] Visiting presidents—usually generals—from Latin American military regimes to Great Britain, France, or West Germany were often reminded of that fact. The pluralism of West European societies is also reflected in the varying levels of political relations with Latin America: while the more conservative sectors praise law and order in authoritarian governments as the means of achieving economic growth, the more progressive groups in Western Europe favour social change as the only basis for long-term development in the region. The result of this divergence of interest in Western Europe is that Latin America as a region has acquired more and more the image of an area of experimentation for political, social, and economic development strategies.

It is therefore hardly surprising that over the years the pattern of relations between Western Europe and Latin America has changed considerably from one of interstate relations to one of a great variety of substate relationships. Co-operation between the political parties is probably the best known element, but the trade unions, the churches, a number of pressure groups and scientific institutions have also contributed to a large extent to what is now considered the 'European connection' in Latin America. This growing

---

Latin America (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982) pp. 176-216. For a comparison of Western European and US positions in the field of arms and nuclear technology transfers see Edward A. Kolodziej, 'European Perspectives on Europe's Roles in the World: The Partial Partner', *Working Papers No 17, International Security Studies Program*, (Washington: The Wilson Center, 1980), pp. 45-54.

14. For discussion of the controversial German-Brazilian Nuclear Agreement and its aftermath see Helga Haftendorn, *The Nuclear Triangle: Washington, Bonn and Brasilia* (Washington: Georgetown University, 1978); Edward F. Wonder, 'Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and Brazil 1975', *Orbis*, 1977, Vol 21., No. 2, pp. 277-306; Norman Gall, 'Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for all', *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1976, No. 23, pp. 155-201; and William W. Lowrance, 'Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany, 1975', *International Security*, 1976, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 147-166.

15. For a typical example of the ambivalent relationship see Wolf Grabendorff, 'Brazil and West Germany: A Model for First World-Third World Relations?' in Wayne A. Selcher, ed., *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power* (Boulder: 1981) pp. 181-200.

range of co-operative activities was not so much an effect of West European dissatisfaction with the state of development in Latin America as the attraction which a number of Latin American organisations felt for their European counterparts. The willingness of the latter to transfer human and material resources to support political and/or social interests has made a significant contribution to strengthening the civil elites in many Latin American countries.

These transnational elements of West European-Latin American relations are of increasing importance for both sides. From the Western European perspective such co-operation facilitates the support of counter-elites in those Latin American societies where a change in the political system is to be anticipated.[16] At the same time the development of a democratic perspective is fostered, in that it is hoped that the pluralistic bias of West European political philosophy will be accepted by the different groups who benefit from outside support. From the Latin American perspective this type of co-operation might contribute to the process of finding a way out of the vicious circle between military and civilian governments. Since the 'technocratisation of the military' with the help of the United States has resulted in more military competence and more military governments in the region, some politicians in Western Europe hope the 'technocratisation of the politicians and labour leaders' with the help of their West European counterparts might lead to more civil competence and more civil governments.

The attractions of the West European relationship with Latin America, then, are obvious for both sides: economically Latin America has greater options, and Western Europe has extended possibilities; politically Western Europe can make good use of her cultural, linguistic, and religious affinity in offering a variety of ideological concepts and participatory solutions to social problems, while Latin America is free to choose which—if any—fit her needs and aspirations.[17] A number of institutions and their roles within society correspond in both continents, and it seems much easier for many Latin Americans to identify and communicate with Western Europe than with the United States.[18]

Two recent developments have changed West European perceptions of Latin America considerably. One is the relevance of the turmoil in Central America to the East-West conflict; the other is the conflict between the United

16. The author has discussed this for the case of Central America elsewhere; see Wolf Grabendorff, 'Western European perceptions of the turmoil in Central America' in Richard E. Feinberg, ed., *Central America International Dimensions of the Crisis* (New York: 1982) pp. 201-12.

17 The role of the Christian and Social Democratic parties in that process in Latin America is discussed by Mario Solorzano, 'El papel de la Democracia Cristiana en la actual coyuntura Centro Americana', *Nueva Sociedad*, May-June 1980, No. 48, pp. 22-23; Karl Ludolf Hübener, 'The Socialist International and Latin America: Problems and Possibilities' *Caribbean Review*, Spring 1982, Vol 11, No. 2, pp. 38-41; Tilman Evers, 'European Social Democracy in Latin America: The Case of West Germany' in Jenny Pearce, ed., *The European Challenge: Europe's New Role in Latin America* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982) pp. 80-129

18. For the different levels of co-operation see Wolf Grabendorff, 'Latin America and Western Europe: Towards a New International Subsystem?' in Jenny Pearce, *op. cit*, pp. 41-58 and Riordan Roett, 'Tienen los Estados Unidos algún futuro en América Latina?', *Estudios Internacionales*, Oct.-Dec. 1981, Vol. 14, No. 56, pp. 517-529

Kingdom and Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas. Western Europe liked to see itself in a mediating position in the former case, counselling restraint on the part of the United States in its reaction to revolutionary change in Nicaragua and El Salvador; it had to accept the United States taking a similar role in the latter, the United Kingdom being asked to consider not only its own national interest but also the effect of the conflict on overall US-Latin American relations. For many West European politicians, the time had come to make a choice for or against what were perceived as Latin American interests. What appeared to be at stake in Central America was an acquiescence in the possibility of revolutionary change once other options were exhausted, with the hope that political pluralism and a mixed economy would characterise the newly evolving systems along with a foreign policy of non-alignment.

In the case of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the stakes were much higher and possible damage was closer to home. The United Kingdom was given complete solidarity to prove the European Community's readiness to stand by its members and to help enforce a principle highly cherished in Western Europe—that of non-aggression. A deterioration in relations with a number of Latin American states had to be expected and was an accepted result of the economic sanctions imposed upon Argentina. However, the apparent North-South character of that conflict and its possible long-term political and economic consequences are not to be underestimated. They might well make Western Europe a lot less attractive as a partner for Latin American states in the years to come.

The uneasy partnership: co-operation and competition between the United States and Western Europe in Latin America

The different perceptions of the United States and Western Europe with regard to Latin America and their respective receptions by the Latin Americans have made for the development of an uneasy partnership between the two over recent years. Such a partnership is, nevertheless, based on a set of common goals for the region and its relationship to the Western industrialised nations, which can be summed up in three main points: first, to avoid the adherence of additional Latin American states to the socialist camp; secondly, to avoid the regional or internal instability attendant on interstate or intrastate violence; and thirdly, to guarantee economic co-operation with Latin American states through the support of free market economies in the region. Basically the common ground for the Unites States-West European partnership in Latin America is the interest of both in the preservation of the status quo—a somewhat greater interest on the part of the United States than on that of the West Europeans. This common interest in regional stability tends to lose ground, however, when discussion begins on how such a stability should be achieved, especially in areas of crisis or tension like Central America and the

Caribbean. The US position then tends to centre on short-term solutions, while West Europeans are more likely to argue that short-term instability has to be accepted if long-term stability is to be attained. The best way to bring about social change, for which both sides claim to strive, is heavily disputed within the uneasy partnership, in part reflecting the controversy within Latin American societies themselves about that politically divisive subject.

While the United States' strategic priorities seem to make for a greater willingness to tolerate social injustice as long as the regime in question seems to be able to guarantee stability, the West European politicians are more inclined to press for social change because of their association with some of the political groups who would benefit directly from such change. They are also convinced that some form of democratic development in Latin America cannot take place until the majority of the population gets a chance to participate economically and politically.

The tolerance level with regard to the type of development model evolving in some Latin American states can also differ widely between the United States and Western Europe. While Peru from 1968 to 1975 and Nicaragua since 1979 have been seen as dangerous political models by the United States, both experiments have been praised and aided considerably in Western Europe. A development of autonomous socialist systems that would not serve the interests of the Soviet Union would be viewed with little alarm in Western Europe (which is not to deny that it would cause great displeasure in some quarters), but such a trend would most likely be seen by the United States as a serious threat to its interests in Latin America. While Western Europe seems resigned to accepting a large measure of ideological pluralism in the Third World, it seems that the United States—and especially the Reagan administration—is unwilling to tolerate any such developments in the Western hemisphere, citing Cuba as a case in point of the implicit dangers for US security.[19] Only after a 'winning situation' has been achieved—be it in El Salvador or Nicaragua—and a signal asserting US power has been sent, not only to the radical forces within Central America, but also to the Third World in general and in particular to the Soviet Union, might the Reagan administration consider lessening its preoccupation with security in its own backyard.

The United States is much more sensitive than Western Europe to all security-related issues in Latin America. West Europeans and Latin Americans alike find this attitude on the part of a superpower hard to understand; only the legacy of fear left in the minds of American policymakers by the tremendous shock of the Cuban missile crisis can explain their continuous preoccupation with Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua. Only while detente lasted could the tolerance level be stretched a little and ideological pluralism accepted—as in the case of Nicaragua.

19. For a detailed analysis by the US government see 'Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America', *Special Report*, No. 90, US Department of State, December 14, 1981

The preoccupation with arms transfers from outside the region has been another point of disagreement within the uneasy partnership in Latin America. During the sixties most military hardware for Latin America was supplied by the United States, but over the last decade the situation has changed completely. Now Western Europe plus Israel provide the vast majority of all arms shipments to the region. Various US measures to exert political pressure by limiting arms sales have therefore been rendered ineffectual in a number of Latin America countries. Likewise, the ability to bring pressure to bear in cases of warfare by threatening to withhold spare parts has been diminished considerably, as was demonstrated in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. The United States holds Western Europe responsible for most of these developments. Nevertheless the Reagan administration decided early on to enter the arms market in Latin America again and has started to compete with those West European suppliers who had established themselves in the meantime.

Similar disagreements emerged over nuclear nonproliferation. The Carter administration tried vainly to block all sales of sensitive material to Third World countries to avoid the risk of nuclear disaster associated with the combination of internal political instability and nuclear capacity. Most West European suppliers believed, on the other hand, that a policy of denial would only result in increasing political problems between the status-conscious countries of the Third World and the Western industrialised countries, and only postpone the nuclear development of the former for a couple of years at most. They favoured instead a concept of controlled co-operation by which the new nuclear countries like Brazil and Argentina would be integrated into the control mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was no accident that the disagreements between the United States and Western Europe were never drawn into the open quite as much as in the case of nonproliferation policy in Latin America. Aside from the vast value of the business involved, the underlying question was to what extent could the former hegemonic power—over Western Europe as well as over Latin America—control the process of technological emancipation in her allies?

By far the greatest amount of agreement within the uneasy partnership can be found with regard to economic policies in and towards Latin America. The preservation of the rules of the free enterprise system and the market economy within the economic systems of Latin American states, as well as in their relations with Western Europe and the United States, are top priorities for both. Any major changes in the rules of the game, as advocated or tried by some Latin American states, are to be resisted. Latin American tendencies to support radical Third World demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) are criticised by the United States as well as by Western Europe as being contrary to 'their own best interests'. To avoid further Latin American leadership in the North-South conflict, a joint strategy to co-opt some Latin American states into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) might be evolving. It is in this field that the co-operation between the United States and Western Europe in Latin America is most likely to occur.

While competing for certain markets and access to raw materials in Latin America as a whole, there exists to a certain extent an informal division of economic influence between the partners. The United States concentrates on the Caribbean Basin not only its political and security attention but also its economic interest. The large energy reserves in that area, easy of access and in convenient locations, make it a prime target for US economic activity. European participation is only in demand here with regard to development aid in the context of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

West European interest in contrast has historically tended toward the Southern Cone, including Brazil. In the postwar period the United States was also heavily involved economically in this area, but since the 1960s West European influence has been rising steadily, and indeed, may already have passed its high point. Depending on internal developments in the West European and US economies, it could well be that the West European share of the Latin American market does not increase very much in the near future, even though Western Europe is much more dependent on export earnings and access to raw materials and markets than is the United States. The specific conditions of the European Community and its preferential relations with other parts of the Third World are probably the single most important factor in this limitation, and certain countervailing measures taken in the aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict will probably also contribute to it. West European states as well as the United States will find Latin America in general a much less attractive region for their economic activities—for a variety of reasons—than in the recent past.

The process of emancipation: Latin America's new role in the international system

The United States and Western Europe have specific difficulties in dealing with the increasingly assertive Latin American states in the context of the international system. They have not yet accepted that foreign policy in Latin America has always been a strategy for survival—survival in the sense that modernisation has historically been impossible without foreign capital and foreign technology, and the sense of dependence which came with it. Therefore, the Latin Americans' experience in international affairs has been mainly that of asymmetric relationships. A direct result of such experience has been the constant desire to demonstrate some independence and distance from the very countries on which they depended most.

To realise these desires for independence, it has been necessary to search for new international partners to broaden the base of dependence and open new options and alternatives as a defence against political or economic pressures.

Latin America's belated integration into the international system—which came many generations later than its integration into the world market—has been accompanied by a series of efforts to diversify in its foreign relations. Latin American leaders are fully aware that any emancipation within the family of nations can be found only through the creation of new alliances that offer alternatives to the classic North-South pattern of spheres of influence.

Latin American states have demonstrated a greater capacity to form such alliances than other countries in the Third World. The distinguished role of Latin American leadership in the creation and development of the major organisations of the Third World is well known. Its ability to globalise regional problems has enhanced its bargaining power considerably vis-a-vis the United States. The 'European connection' has probably been no more than one card—but nevertheless a strong one—in that game. Another possibility is the strengthening of South-South relationships in which Latin America—as the most developed part of the Third World—would command an advantageous position. If, indeed, Latin American international relations remain a strategy for survival, the region's attention might soon shift to the Arab countries. Brazil has already taken the lead in reorienting itself to the centres of oil and wealth.[20]

Latin America's new role in the international system will give neither Western Europe nor the United States special preference on the grounds of historical ties or hegemonic presumptions. It will deal with each of them from the basis of the national interest of any of the given Latin American countries. Very probably that interest will differ considerably from West European and US interests. In the context of future disputes about the division of power, influence, and welfare between the industrial countries and the Third World, Latin America will be on the side of the status seekers, while Western Europe and the United States will find themselves on the side of the status defenders.

The future problems of Latin America's position in the international system will not be dominated by her relations with the United States or Western Europe but by her ability to continue to form new alliances to gain or preserve political manouevreability. In that context, Western Europe, with her own experiences in dependency and vulnerability, might turn out to be a more tolerant partner than the United States. Given the increasing international importance of Latin America as a region and of some of her states in particular, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that the United States and Western Europe might have to compete for Latin America's co-operation in the near future.

20. For an overview of Latin America's relations with the Arab countries see *Latin America & The Middle East*, a MEED/LAN Special Report, London: September 1981.

BRITAIN AND THE EEC: THE WITHDRAWAL OPTION

*John Palmer**

POLITICAL debate about Britain and the EEC takes place on two levels simultaneously; but whereas on the surface, the arguments between the pro-marketeers of all parties on the one hand and the anti-marketeers on the other appear to have changed little since the era of entry into the EEC in 1973 and the referendum of 1975, and nothing much has changed at parliamentary front-bench level, the terrain on which the debate is fought out is in fact changing dramatically. Within the political parties—and indeed outside them—there is another debate, as yet not fully articulated, for which there is no parallel in or before the early 1970s.

A re-examination of traditional attitudes is under way not only among anti-marketeers (stimulated by such developments as the spread of de-industrialisation and chronic unemployment throughout Europe and the rise of a European nuclear disarmament movement) but also among the supporters of 'Britain in Europe'. There is undeniable disenchantment with the actual experience of nearly ten years of apparently endless friction and strife between the UK and its partners over the period of British membership.

Thus, in the Conservative party and among other traditional supporters of British membership of the Community there is a new interest in recent ideas about different types of membership of the EEC, including those of a 'special' or 'associate' status, as alternatives to the present model of full integration. These have been aired, for example, in the Monday Club pamphlet *The Conservative Party and the Common Market* and various utterances of members of the European Reform Group. Among the Left, including many long-term supporters of withdrawal, considerable attention is being given to a 'European strategy' which covers the possible transformation of EEC policies and decision-making institutions by a British labour movement working in much closer co-ordination with European labour. Illustrative literature on this side includes a recent article in *New Socialist* by Francis Cripps and Terry Ward, calling among other things for a stronger European Monetary System and a common EEC industrial policy, and even Bob Rowthorne's article in the April issue of the Communist Party magazine *Marxism Today*, condemning withdrawal as an 'unrealistic vision [which] rests on a bizarre combination of imperial nostalgia and revolutionary romanticism'.

This upsurge of new thinking about Britain's place in the European

* John Palmer is European Editor of *The Guardian*, based in Brussels.

Community is reflected in the wider debate among the Ten about the future size and shape of the Community. This debate has been triggered both by the internal crises of the present corpus of member states and by the doubts expressed about the EEC's ability to digest two more newcomers, Portugal and Spain. The French government has already talked about a possible 'special status' for Britain within the EEC. The Italian government has similar ideas for Portugal and Spain while the Greek government is also trying to renegotiate aspects of its own accession. Even the EEC Commission has debated whether a new Messina conference should not be called to review the relevance of the Rome Treaty and the community's decision-making institutions to the problems of the 1980s. No-one is clear what special or associate status for any particular country would amount to in practice. But despite the enormous problems involved in redefining the basics of EEC membership, there is a widespread feeling that the Community simply cannot continue on its present course.

Labour's withdrawal policy—theory and practice

Ironically, very little of this debate is as yet reflected in the British Labour Party's policy statements on withdrawal from the EEC, in which the Community is taken as a given and unchanging entity; there is a timelessness about the Labour Party National Executive Committee (NEC)'s critique of EEC policies and its prescriptions for a future outside the EEC. In practice, however, the commitment to withdraw is undergoing a subtle evolution and is no longer quite as bald now as it was even two years ago. Front-bench Labour spokesmen openly acknowledge the 'considerable complexity' of the issues to be resolved in the negotiations for British withdrawal. While on a visit to Brussels early in 1982, the Labour leader, Mr Michael Foot, indirectly confirmed that withdrawal would take a considerable stretch of time when he said that a future Labour government would 'not delay' the introduction of policies aimed at solving mass unemployment and reversing British de-industrialisation until Britain was outside the EEC. This contrasted with earlier claims by Labour leaders that there was little that a Labour government could do about the central problems of the British economy until the country was freed of the shackles of EEC constraints on national economic policy. It is against this background that Labour's commitment to withdrawal from the EEC has to be examined.

One other political fact has been made clear by the Labour leadership which is of prime importance for the process of disengagement from the European Community: it is an essential part of Labour's case that a future Labour government should negotiate for the United Kingdom an amicable withdrawal and an acceptable alternative relationship with its ex-partners. In the words of Labour's NEC statement, withdrawal from the EEC is to be 'carried out effectively and, above all, amicably'. However, the statement goes on to say

that 'our experience suggests that we will need to have in mind a clear timetable for beginning and ending the negotiations, for introducing the necessary legislation, and for withdrawing from the various institutions and obligations'.

Labour proposes to do certain specific things immediately on being returned to power: to state Britain's intent to leave the European Community; and, secondly, to introduce in Parliament a bill to amend the 1972 European Communities Act, the effect of which will be to abolish 'completely the power of the Community to make and implement law in the UK and abolish the powers of the European Court over British courts'. At the same time the government will make provision for the repeal, possibly by statutory instrument, 'of those sections of Community law which have been imposed on the UK and which we do not find acceptable'. In addition the government will seek power to carry through an already agreed timetable for withdrawal.

It is not clear how long a Labour government is allowing for the process of agreeing a withdrawal timetable. The NEC statement says that preliminary discussions 'at whatever level is thought to be appropriate' with interested parties—presumably including the EEC Commission and the Council of Ministers secretariat—should commence before the general election. Labour wants 'the main negotiations' to begin immediately after the publication of the White Paper which would contain the withdrawal timetable. These negotiations will deal with the central issues involved in the new relationship to be sought with the countries of the EEC as well as the 'transitional arrangements' to be obtained before withdrawal is finalised. This transition period, Labour recognises, will be necessary to phase in new trade and other arrangements for Britain as various negotiations for the renewal of legally binding relations with non-EEC governments come up for renegotiation. These would include EEC contractual commitments to and agreements with the Caribbean, African and Pacific countries associated with the EEC through the 'Lomé Convention', EEC agreements with contracting states in GATT and a host of other agreements. Equally it is recognised that it will take a considerable time to negotiate new trading arrangements—for instance with Britain's traditional pre-accession food suppliers Australia and New Zealand—since these countries will also have to make adjustments if the old trading relationship is to be re-activated. Understandably the NEC statement says 'this could take considerable time, and in some areas therefore the process of transition might extend beyond the time for our final withdrawal from the EEC'. In the 'final stage' Labour would fully repeal the 1972 European Communities Act and would withdraw from all EEC institutions including the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. But Labour is careful to leave intact the country's full participation in those bodies during the period when the withdrawal negotiations are actually taking place.

A timetable for withdrawal

The party is equally undogmatic about how long the total withdrawal process is intended to last from the date of the party's successful return to government. The NEC statement merely says that 'our aim will be to complete it within twelve months' although 'the process of clearing up the various items of legislation could go well beyond this date'. The first thing which must be said about the twelve-month target period for completing the withdrawal negotiations is that it is highly ambitious. If Labour aims at a withdrawal by agreement as well as a new negotiated relationship with the other EEC states it is unlikely to be able to impose such a timetable unilaterally. Indeed there are reasons for believing that negotiations for EEC withdrawal would be at least as cumbersome and time consuming as any concerning accession. If the objective is one of amicable agreement, a British government determined to withdraw will come under immense pressure to accept the basis for such negotiations determined by the majority in the EEC Council of Ministers.

In accession negotiations the first step is for the Commission to be charged with making a preliminary report and then to give its 'opinion' on both the timetable for negotiations and on the main substantive issues. There is every reason to suppose that the other EEC member states would want to pursue the same type of procedure in the event of negotiations for Britain's withdrawal. This would mean that almost immediately after the election which returned it to power the Labour government would have to decide whether to try and impose a timetable unilaterally or to accept that the timetable, along with all the other substantive questions, will form part of the negotiations with the EEC authorities; it would be extremely difficult to try for an amicable agreement on the substance of withdrawal while at the same time refusing to accept that the timetable itself was negotiable. Equally important, the government might well find that it came under immense pressure to accept terms for the new relationship with its former EEC partners which were far from satisfactory in order to honour the pledge to complete the negotiations within twelve months.

There is also the issue of the legality of a British government amending the 1972 European Communities Act before and not after the successful conclusion of the negotiations with the Commission and the Council of Ministers. According to senior Commission experts Britain would remain fully subject to EEC law until withdrawal had been agreed. An amendment of the act before withdrawal would at the least leave open the British government to being challenged not only in the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg but also in British courts by private individuals or companies who judged that their interests had been prejudiced. It is a matter for speculation how British courts would respond given the uncharacteristic co-existence of British law and EEC law of statute in this area.

The government would also have to decide just what it meant by participation in the EEC decision-making institutions during the period of the

withdrawal negotiations. This could make an amicable withdrawal even more difficult if a government bent on leaving the EEC found itself—in the pursuit of 'British interests'—invoking the 'Luxembourg compromise' covering claims to a power of veto where issues of 'national importance' are involved. It could well be that the other EEC states would insist that Britain could not invoke the Luxembourg compromise in these circumstances. This could have particularly far-reaching implications in Council discussions of such key issues as the annual level of farm prices or the EEC budget.

There are other reasons for seriously doubting whether negotiated withdrawal could really take place in the manner or within the timetable suggested by the NEC, which itself concedes that 'it will be necessary to repeal a considerable amount of Community legislation' and that 'it will be necessary to re-enact those pieces of Community legislation which we wish to retain but whose legal force is based on primary legislation which we will be repealing as part of the process of withdrawal'. The NEC claims that it might be possible to accomplish all this in one huge Repeal Bill. This, however, could risk ceding to Whitehall a mass of delegated powers of the type ceded to Brussels after EEC accession and could involve an immense number of bills (or clauses in bills) being needed to replace EEC-inspired legislation. Clearly such a mass of legislation would place a huge timetable burden on Westminster and could result in a Labour government literally not having the parliamentary time to bring forward urgently needed domestic legislation. At the very least the Labour Party would have to indicate before the election what priority the legislation effecting EEC withdrawal would have in relation to Labour's other election manifesto commitments.

The timing of the withdrawal is, as already indicated, also very much in the hands of the other EEC member states. This is not solely because of the intrinsic complexity and political sensitivity of many of the issues involved; it is not generally appreciated in Britain that a new agreement between Britain outside the European Community and its former EEC partners would have to take the form of a new treaty. This would be based on Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome and would, therefore, be subject to ratification by the national parliaments of all other member states. There are already nine other EEC member states and it could be that there would be eleven by the time Labour completed its withdrawal negotiations if Portugal and Spain had by then been admitted as full members. It would only need objections by any one national parliament to delay the final ratification of the treaty; even without such an obstacle it is difficult, on past performance, to see parliamentary ratification finalised in less than a year. Again, to judge by past performance, it might well take twelve months for the Commission to prepare its initial advisory opinion before negotiations even begin with the Council. It is, indeed, difficult to see the negotiations with the Council being completed in less than two years and the process of national parliamentary ratification in all the other member states being completed in less than a further twelve months. At the very least,

therefore, it may well take more than four years from the moment when the new Labour government is returned to the end of the process, bearing in mind some delay between the election and the Council agreeing to charge the Commission with the preparation of its opinion.

New trading relationships

This is by no means the end of the story. A central feature of the Labour case for withdrawal is the necessity of negotiating a new trading relationship not just with the countries of the European Community but also with those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) as well as securing the willing compliance of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the policies which the government intends to pursue outside the EEC. This is not something which could be left until the EEC negotiations are safely completed. The whole object of the exercise, according to the NEC statement, is to give the British government the freedom to pursue a policy of 'planned reflation' within the OECD and the IMF and 'negotiated and planned trade' with EFTA and the GATT. The central assumption is that it would be easier for the government to win the agreement of a wider range of trade and economic partners to the reflation and a degree of import growth controls which lie at the heart of the Labour party's alternative economic strategy (AES) than to secure the same compliance on the part of the EEC. This is a highly questionable assumption, quite apart from the fact that—on foreign trade issues—the EEC has in recent years been criticised for import restrictions introduced on steel, textiles and other products. Indeed, there is now a body of political and academic opinion studying similar policies to those outlined in Labour's AES with a view to having them adopted by the Community as a whole. Given that the major criticism of policies aimed at restricting imports would be the danger of retaliation, Britain might well be less at risk protected by the considerably greater weight of the EEC in total world trade than alone.

It is also difficult to see how rejoining EFTA would be a credible option in the light of Labour's proposed trade policies under the AES. EFTA now has tariff-free trade with the EEC and has also undertaken to avoid any distortion of 'fair competition' which might affect that trade. This means that, for many purposes, countries joining EFTA are effectively bound by the Treaty of Rome restrictions on national state aids and other measures which Labour feels it would have to introduce to counter British de-industrialisation but which would almost certainly be illegal under that Treaty. In the words of a commentary on the NEC statement published by a group of Labour Party members working and living in Brussels, 'In key areas of industrial policy, central to the Alternative Economic Strategy, entering into a free trade agreement with the Community would mean that the rules of competition in

Britain would be very largely fixed by agreements with the Community'. And the British would no longer be in a position (in the EEC Council of Ministers) to help shape those rules. At the very least it would take some protracted and highly technical negotiations between the EEC and EFTA to ensure that Britain secured the required terms of industrial trade with both bodies. And again, any such new EEC-EFTA agreement might require national parliamentary ratification.

The process of securing GATT agreement to Labour's proposed changes in trade policy would be, if anything, an even more time-consuming operation. Even after withdrawal from the EEC, Britain would remain bound by a vast number of intricate trade agreements within GATT, both those signed by Britain prior to EEC entry and those to which Britain, as a member state, has been committed in subsequent agreements. Just how difficult it is to secure changes in trade agreements in GATT can be judged from the difficulties experienced by the European Community as a whole recently in pursuing complaints against Japan and the United States. Moreover, it must be noted that while the general trend in EEC external trade policy has been towards greater *de facto* 'management' of 'unacceptable trade imbalances', the trend within GATT as a whole is for still further liberalisation of trade, including financial and other services. It can be and has been argued that in the whole area of trade policy Britain is in a stronger position than mere formal agreements with bodies like the EEC and GATT would suggest. Certainly with a considerable deficit in manufactured trade with the EEC, there is a sense in which the other Community countries need continued access to the British market more than *vice versa*.

Also, the AES strategy is predicated on the successful reflation of the British economy. This, it is true, would enable the government to hold out the prospect of an actual increase in British imports over a period of years which would, nevertheless, be compatible with a restriction of the rate of increase as a proportion of the growth of GDP. Unfortunately international organisations concerned with trade issues do not normally deal in such broad macroeconomic concepts. Rather, trade restrictions tend to be dealt with on a purely sectoral basis judged on narrow legalistic criteria which do not allow for the 'dynamic effect' of wider economic or social policies. In the case of GATT there are established consultation and conciliation procedures, and 'waivers' from GATT tariff agreements can only be negotiated in precise and limited circumstances. There are also comprehensive GATT codes of conduct covering such matters as subsidies, countervailing duties and technical and other barriers to trade. Merely withdrawing from the EEC would not affect Britain's obligations to observe the array of rules and commitments entered into bilaterally and through membership of the European Community in GATT. Certainly if retaliation by the United Kingdom's former EEC partners in the event of unpopular British import restrictions can be exaggerated, given Britain's deficit in manufactured trade, the same can certainly not be

assumed in the case of trade friction with the much wider membership of GATT.

The simple fact is that a British government determined on erecting a totally new trade relationship with both the EEC and the wider world 'free trade' community in GATT would find the obstacles to getting GATT endorsement daunting. That would—perhaps even in the short run—force a choice between having to accept terms of trade little different to those which obtain now or taking the road towards unilateral, 'fortress Britain' policies which would be seen as a virtual declaration of trade war by many of the other GATT member states. Such an outcome seems all the more likely in the present increasingly hostile international trade environment. Indeed, the signs are that the European Community as a whole could find itself involved in ever more overt trade conflict with the other emerging regional trade blocs—notably that grouped around the United States and Japan.

Even the above list does not exhaust the time constraints on the government's withdrawal timetable. The government will also have to think long and hard about, for example, what domestic agricultural arrangements it wishes to make when replacing the Common Agricultural Policy. I am not here concerned with the merits of the case for abandoning British commitment to the CAP which never has corresponded to the interests of either British consumers or the national exchequer and is most unlikely to do so in the future. Nevertheless, the government will have to decide the future pattern of farm production, the extent to which the UK could or should aim to be self-sufficient in agriculture and the pattern of funding farm incomes.

Very considerable changes have occurred in the pattern of British farming since accession to the EEC. Some of these such as the bias in favour of grain production at the expense of livestock, may clearly be judged to be undesirable and uneconomic. But it will be no easy matter to work out with the farm organisations what the desired new production mix should be and how this is to be brought about—and over what period of time—by a switch from the high common price EEC system back to a system based on national deficiency payments.

Taking all these factors into account, it would not be difficult to imagine the entire process of negotiating withdrawal requiring virtually the full five-year period allotted to one government.

Even this is not taking into account the possibility that during such negotiations, completely new alternatives such as giving Britain some 'special status' within the EEC which would allow it to withdraw from one or more common policies (the CAP for example?) may be proposed by one side or the other.

There are other possibilities. One key Labour demand is the restoration of the sovereignty of the British Parliament in the matter of EEC legislation. Taken at face value this is entirely inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome but, again, it might be possible to envisage changes in British parliamentary

procedures which would restore much more control over Community affairs to MPs, without raising the legal complications of the formal restoration of sovereignty. One such model is that operated by the Danish Parliament (Folketing) which alone among the national assemblies of the European Community member states has the power—through a negative vote of its 'European Community committee'—effectively to mandate Danish ministers on subjects prior to discussion and decision by the Council. Indeed it is not uncommon for Council decisions to be held up pending approval retrospectively by the Folketing committee where the Danish minister has agreed to something in Brussels or Luxembourg outside his formal mandate.

On the assumption that a Labour government is elected in 1983 or 1984, it should be remembered that the negotiations for withdrawal would be taking place amidst considerable internal changes within the EEC itself. The final preparations for the accession of Portugal and Spain will presumably be taking place by then and it is quite possible that the Community itself will be in the throes of a major financial and policy review. It seems probable that by then the European Community budget 'own resources' will have been exhausted with the breaching of the revenue ceiling of one per cent of VAT payments. That will demand far-reaching solutions to issues such as control of CAP spending and the distribution of net contributions to the EEC budget which have so far evaded successive attempts to get agreement on reform. Equally, the imminent accession of Portugal and Spain is bound to force an overhaul not only of Community policy priorities but also of its decision-making mechanisms. It could, then, just be that the government would be negotiating withdrawal when some of the more objectionable aspects of British accession—such as Britain's excessive net budget contribution and the cost of farm spending—were at last about to change.

In practice a future Labour government might well decide to hold fire on a formal request to open negotiations for withdrawal at least until it has seen the outcome of the changes to be expected from both the exhaustion of budget own resources and the prospect of further enlargement. If a looser and more pragmatic European Community emerges at the end of the day—especially one which is ready to make special long term provision for countries whose national circumstances do not easily fit into the mould laid down more than twenty-five years ago in the Treaty of Rome, could it perhaps be that Labour negotiators would settle for something less than withdrawal? The answer is likely to be determined less by changes within the EEC institutions and policies themselves than by the emergence of a consensus within the Labour Party that most of the key issues which it faces, such as chronic mass unemployment and de-industrialisation, defy purely national solutions. Add to this the emergence of a clearly 'European' disarmament movement and the tendency for Europe to adopt an increasingly distinct position between the two world nuclear superpowers, and the elements for a revision of traditional Labour hostility to entanglement with Europe would be present. Indeed, the signs are that

revisionism on Europe is already gaining ground, above all on the Labour left wing.

This is all bound to influence the enthusiasm and determination which Labour accords to the commitment to withdraw. It may explain why even those Labour leaders most closely associated with the case for withdrawal in the past are now according the matter a much lower overall political priority.

THE THEORY AND CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

F. Rubin *

THE concepts and theory of national security prevailing in the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO)—with the possible exception, to some extent, of Romania—are a direct reflection, or at best an adaptation, of Soviet concepts and theory of the national security of the Soviet Union. This relation applies also to the measures taken in practical application of national security; these, however, lie outside the scope of this article, the main object of which is to provide an insight into what the phrase 'national security' means to Russia by analysing and considering the significance of the appropriate literature published in Eastern Europe.

In contrast to the practice in Western political, military and academic circles by which the principles and practice relating to the national security of the countries concerned are subjects for open debate, the Soviet theory of Russia's national security is encapsulated in a set of strict, officially established and endorsed concepts and doctrines. These are formulated and laid down in accordance with the current Marxist-Leninist perspective, in both intellectual and practical terms, on national defence and international relations between military coalitions and countries of—from the Soviet viewpoint—'identical' (socialist) and 'different' (capitalist) socio-political and economic systems. A further factor is the internal situation, in terms of psychological and political climate, of each country belonging to the WTO. The dominant psychological factor in thinking on national security and policy decision-making among Soviet political and military leaders is the dialectical perception of a continuing direct and indirect interrelatedness among social, political, military and economic circumstances in nearly all countries of the world, and the positive or negative influence of these circumstances on the construction of the communist society. At the same time, the political and military leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland are imbued with acceptance of this process of influence. The absorption by the WTO satellite countries of exclusively Soviet concepts of national security and defence can be seen clearly in their corresponding doctrines and how these are taught to the armed forces, as in the following Hungarian example:

* **F. Rubin** is a writer on communist political and military affairs. His publications include 'The Hungarian People's Army', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* (September 1976), 'The Collective Treatment of Defence in the Warsaw Pact States', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* (December 1978) and 'National Defence Reserve Forces: Hungary', *Warsaw Pact Reserve Systems: A White Paper* (1978) with A. L. Egervary.

> Soviet military doctrine emerges out of the fact that the Imperialists are preparing a surprise thermo-nuclear attack against the USSR and the other Socialist states; the essence of the Soviet military doctrine is that the war of the future is going to be the decisive armed collision between the two contrasting or opposing socio-political and economic systems; in our present age the leading social classes [a euphemistic term for the elite groups exercising the ultimate decision-making political power in the WTO countries—Trans.] of the Socialist camp are characterised by the identity of their ideological and political views—which also means that their military and political objectives are, therefore, identical.[1]

This publication also states that 'in consolidating and cementing the national defence capability of the country (Hungary), the social sciences (Philosophy, Economics, Political Science, Law, History, Pedagogy, Military Art, etc.) have also very significant roles and tasks in enhancing the moral and combat strength of the armed forces'.

It should be emphasised at this early stage that the present Soviet political and military leadership sees its practical role in terms of 'governing, managing and leading the socialist country on a scientifically established footing and in accordance with the fundamental principles of the inseparable dialectical unity of theory and practice'. Marxist ideology has produced the guideline of 'inseparable unity' to cement the relationship between theory and practice. According to this guideline, the practice of national security must be firmly based on its theory and the operational feasibility of that theory must be proved in practice. Hence a 'scientifically based' set of measures for ensuring national security must be the direct practical implementation of the theory.

Without arguing whether or not the Soviet leadership's image of its own role in these terms fits the facts, it is necessary to accept their assumptions in dealing with exclusively East European sources on this topic.

In Soviet practice, then, the primary task of the Marxist-Leninist political and military philosophers and ideologues is to establish the fundamental ruling concepts underlying vital issues, including the 'security of the socialist nation and state', which exercise a decisive influence on the policy-making resolutions concerning national security passed on Communist Party Central Committee and the Politburo and implemented by central and local government.

The definitions and interpretations of political and military terms in the officially approved ('concise communist') dictionaries are among the most informative available sources which may be consulted in an investigation into Warsaw Pact security thinking. It is absolutely essential that the Western student of this subject should consult both linguistic and specialist subject dictionaries to establish the meaning of terms in these countries. The specialist works include the *Dictionary of Philosophical Terms*; the *Dictionary of*

1. Dr Colonel L. Moricz, ed., *Tisztek Kezikönyve* (*Officers' Handbook*) (Budapest. Zrinyi Military Publishers of the Hungarian Ministry of National Defence, 1972), ch. 2, part D.

Political Terms; the *Dictionary and Encyclopaedia of Legal Terms*; and the *Dictionary of Military Terms*. The linguistic works are the concise dictionaries of the national languages of each Warsaw Pact country. Their interpretations and explanations of the meanings and usages of words and terms reflect officially approved meanings where appropriate, in particular in the case of words and expressions of political or social significance. The literary liberalism of the Western democracies has no place in WTO countries, where the views of the political leadership colour the various types of dictionaries.

According to current doctrine, the communist concepts and theory of national security are 'dialectically reflected' on both national and collective (i.e. international) levels within the Warsaw Pact. On the national level the concepts and operational theory of national security are incorporated into the constitution, penal code and proceedings and national defence policies, laws and regulations in each WTO country. All are, in effect, modelled on their Soviet equivalents.

On the collective or international level, these concepts are incorporated into the objectives, structures and texts of international treaties such as the Warsaw Pact military coalition and COMECON, the corresponding economic grouping. The Warsaw Pact's theory and practice of its collective security ranges in addition over a much wider area, encompassing the security of the NATO alliance in general, and in doing so goes beyond the bounds of the political and military concepts and affiliations of the NATO states in respect of their national security.

The fundamental tenet of communist national security

The key principle underlying the Warsaw Pact's collective perception and handling of the socialist member nations' national security is the 'inseparable unity of the external and internal security of the state and nation of workers, peasants and intelligentsia'. This concept is a product of Marxist-Leninist dialectic and is currently apparent in both the legal and the military contexts. In the former, it is expressed and explained in publications on criminal law and offences against the state, where there is no discrimination in either principle or practice between 'external' and 'internal' offenders against the state. In the latter it is apparent in the terms used to describe the tasks of the paramilitary and armed forces: to defend the socialist state and nation against both external and internal enemies. One of the most clearly presented examples of this issue can be found in a Hungarian study explaining the purpose of the Criminal Code of the Hungarian People's Republic:

> Internal security depends on the relationship between internal forces which stand behind the State order on the one hand, and those which endeavour to weaken or overthrow this, on the other hand. External security depends on factors outside the state: it can be endangered or threatened by certain acts or actions committed by foreign states or

> foreign organisations. There is absolutely no doubt, however, that a close relationship exists between internal and external security.[2]

This principle is rooted in a Soviet conviction of the existence both past and present of overt and covert threats from outside to Russia's existence as a socialist country. The overt external threat is seen and felt in the present and future military capabilities and intentions of the Western democracies—comprising the industrially developed capitalist states and in particular the United States—while the corresponding covert threat is seen to reside in the intentions and capabilities of the bourgeois 'class-enemy' to disrupt the social stability of the socialist nation through clandestine action, and to create counterrevolutionary climates in the societies of the WTO countries.

Those endemic factors which may of themselves endanger the internal security of the socialist state, such as disaffection and discontent among certain groups, e.g. ethnic minorities, in Russia or the satellite countries, are internal in their origins and development but may yet be aggravated and intensified by both internal and external provocation, and can blow up into the kind of situations seen by communist political and military leaders and their state security advisers as threats to the national security of the state.

Working from the basis of their 'class-war' interpretation of historical and military events following the 1917 Russian Revolution and during the 1941 Nazi invasion of Russia, contemporary communist leaders remain—at least apparently—convinced that the Western democracies, in particular the United States, have not given up hope of destroying the Soviet socialist system and reintroducing private enterprise into the 'liberated' Warsaw Pact states if the opportunity should arise. Soviet leaders in particular are also convinced that the potential threat to their national security will not cease to exist while the United States and the West remain in possession of the means of military attack against the Warsaw Pact countries and continue to provide external bases for anti-communist subversion and sabotage. Both these factors are seen as highly dangerous to the security of the Soviet Union and her satellite belt.

One of the most useful open sources for the study of Soviet ideas of the threats to the national security of Russia is a textbook entitled *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, produced for the political education of the regular and reserve officers of the Warsaw Pact armed forces.[3] The following extracts contain a typical exposition of the collectivised concepts of the external and internal threats to the security of the Soviet bloc.

> The deepening of the general crisis of capitalism in the post-war years and the intensification of its contradictions have made the politics of Imperialism more adventuristic. It now constitutes an even greater danger

2. *Bevezetes a Büntető Törvenykönyvhöz* (*Introduction to the Criminal Code*) (Budapest: Közgazdasagi es Jogi Kiado, 1961).

3. Colonel B. Byely (ed.), *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, Eng. edn. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974)

> to the people, to peace and social progress. [The terms 'peace' and 'social progress' are euphemisms for the domestic and global policy objectives of the Soviet Union—Trans.] The Imperialists are preparing a new world war, and have repeatedly provoked international crises which have pushed mankind to the brink of a thermo-nuclear conflict.
>
> Alongside with the intensification of the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism and with the intensified preparations for war against the USSR and other socialist countries—international, notably US Imperialism steps up its subversive political and ideological activity against the socialist states.[4]

The establishment of a comprehensive intellectual and ideological treatment of the 'national security of the socialist state and nation' which would standardise the relevant concepts and theory also involves the participation of academics. Among these, psychologists, acting as professional advisers and consultants to policy decision-makers at various levels of the hierarchy—reaching in all WTO countries the Central Committee of the Communist Party—have elaborated the concept of 'security consciousness'. In its particularised context this concept is treated as a component of human behaviour which is then brought into relationship with the 'maintenance and strengthening of the security of the socialist state and nation. The elaboration of security consciousness as a behavioural concept involves an approach on three levels: ideological, philosophical and psychological. High-level security consciousness ('communist alertness') is a psychological quality required of all good communists. As the academically qualified experts in the investigation of human behaviour, the psychologists have been commissioned, in their capacity as advisers to the communist parties, and by the Party Central Committees, to extend the scope of applied psychology, and this study of man's security consciousness or security mindedness is a relative newcomer, according to Professor K. M., a major in the reserves of the Hungarian People's Army and a reliable Soviet bloc source active in both academic and military establishments (whose name and position, for obvious reasons, cannot be revealed). This new branch of psychology is to concentrate on human factors in international relations, security and national defence, and how the security consciousness of humans manifests itself in various occupational fields, including the making and implementing of decisions on external and internal security.

4. Equally useful are those publications written by high ranking personnel of the internal state security services For students of Soviet security thinking with particular interest in the internal aspects of security, see General S. K. Tsvigun (KGB Army), *The Secret Front* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1974; in Russian) and the same author's 'Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism', *Communist*, 1980, No. 4 In addition the following Hungarian books are extremely useful:
L. Bokor *(H) Ideghâboru (Cold War—The War of Nerves)* (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and Zrinyi Military Publishers of the Hungarian Ministry of National Defence, 1978). V. Scheich, *Gerillak, Diverzánsok, Szabotörök* (Budapest: Zrinyi Military Publishers of the Hungarian Ministry of National Defence, 1971); P Vajda, *Veszélyes Ellenség (Dangerous Enemy)* (Budapest: Zrinyi Military Publishers of the Hungarian Ministry of National Defence, 1978); J. Balázs, *Célpont Magyarország (Target Hungary)* (Budapest, Zrinyi Military Publishers of the Hungarian Ministry of National Defence, 1978).

Western analysts of WTO political and military affairs tend not to place sufficient emphasis on the significance of basic typical features of communist psychology, which affect in various and subtle ways the means by which national defence policy decisions are made on Party Central Committee and implemented at government level in Warsaw Pact national security practice.

Soviet perception and interpretation of national security

The Russian, German[5] and Hungarian linguistic equivalents of the two-word term 'national security'—'narodnoe bezopaznost'y', 'Nationale Sicherheit', and 'nemzet (i)-biztonság'—are used neither in contemporary colloquial Russian, German and Hungarian, nor in the style and terminology of the official language in which political and military training textbooks and handbooks are written. It should be noted, however, that the word 'security' on its own is given quite an extensive functional and interpretative treatment in the concise dictionaries of the Russian, German and Hungarian languages. This is characteristic of the cultures of the Warsaw Pact countries, which are very much under the influence of the ruling political system, and its significance should not be under-rated. Similar treatment is accorded in these dictionaries to the concept of 'consciousness', a term of great importance in Marxist theory of the human mind and mental activity.[6] Amalgamating these two perhaps over-analysed terms, one arrives at the concept of 'security consciousness', which can be considered as a typical political and psychological product of the highly politicised cultures of the WTO countries. A clear picture emerges of an intense security consciousness—as a prevailing psychological quality—among the political and military leaders of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states, and of the influence exerted by this factor on their attitudes.

Despite, then, the absence of the exact term 'national security' in their contemporary vocabulary, the excessive level of national 'security consciousness' on the part of the leaders of these countries is constantly, if indirectly, apparent. For example it is plain to see in those political and military aspirations which aim at the 'perpetual growth of the global influence of the socialist world system' (i.e. that of the Soviet Union) and in the rapid strengthening of the WTO's military capability.

This national security consciousness on the part of the Soviet political and military leadership has a decisive influence on its perception of what the security of the socialist state and nation means, as a set of conditions or a state of affairs measured by the relative military strengths of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Students of the standard phrases and slogans of Warsaw Pact propaganda

5. In this context, 'German' and 'Germany' refer to the German Democratic Republic only.

6 The following publications have been used as information sources: *Slovar'y Sovremennego Russkogo (The Concise Dictionary of Russian)*, (Moscow, Leningrad: Literaturnogo Yazika Akademiya USSR, 1951); *New English-Russian Dictionary* (Moscow, Soviet Encyclopaedia Publishing House, 1972); *Wörterbuch der Deutschen Gegenwartsprache, 2nd edn* (Berlin. Akademie Verlag, 1977); *A Magyar Nyelv Ertelmező Szótára (The Concise Dictionary of the Hungarian Language* (Budapest: Akademia Kiado, 1968).

frequently come across the following sentiment: 'the USSR and the other socialist countries do not aim, either at the present or in the future, for the WTO's strategic superiority over NATO, but want only to remain in the state of parity in strategic strength with the Western Alliance'. Another typical phrase, 'the Soviet Union does not have strategic or military superiority over the United States', also occurs quite frequently in statements made by Soviet political and military leaders, and is very often repeated in Soviet and satellite newspapers and periodicals. Its most likely purpose is the creation of a favourable public image in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences: the question is, whether or not this image is spread with intent to misinform.

If, however, one carefully examines Soviet military doctrine as reflected in the political and military training publications of the WTO countries, it soon becomes obvious that the 'state of parity in strategic strength' between the WTO and NATO is definitely not a state in which Soviet leaders would feel that their country's national security were safeguarded. The official conviction, to be seen at work in current states and future developments in international affairs, is that 'emerging socialism's unchallenged and therefore total superiority over the declining and disappearing socio-political and economic order of capitalism' is the condition in which the Soviet leadership could feel that Russia's national security were assured. Soviet desires to achieve strategic superiority or supremacy are expressed in the current Marxist-Leninist doctrines on the present state of the international class struggle and world affairs, and quite frequently cited specifically in WTO political and military training publications, for example:

> The correlation of forces, or the balance of power, has already tilted towards the side of socialism; the forces of socialism are on the constant increase; the main theme of our era is the transition from capitalism to socialism; the fundamental contradiction of our era is the decline of capitalism and emergence of socialism; although the forces and influence of the socialist world system are increasing rapidly, the socialist world system is not yet able to achieve its ultimate global objective in a relatively short time: that being total victory over the capitalist world system.[7]

The Soviet political leadership as a collective entity also identifies itself and its feeling of its own personal and collective security with the security of the socialist state and nation. The psychological process of identification and projection involved in this exerts, according to the laws of psychological dynamics, a significant influence on the development and establishment of various concepts, including those related to communist national security.

In the context of Soviet ideology and political philosophy, national security is treated on the one hand as a certain condition valid in the case of potentially hostile countries, and on the other as a completely different condition valid exclusively for the Soviet Union. The discrepancy between the two is in

7. See Colonel B Byely, *op. cit.*; J. Balázs, *op cit.*

accordance with Soviet views on the dynamics of international events, involving the struggle between the two politically and ideologically hostile military and economic coalitions of NATO/EEC and WTO/COMECON. Given the Soviet desire and intent that 'capitalism should and therefore must decline and finally disappear' and that 'socialism should and therefore must emerge and thus the socialist world system will finally triumph on the globe' it is self-evidently obvious that a state of parity in strategic strength between the WTO countries and the NATO countries is incompatible with the national security of the Soviet Union and its satellites, which, on the contrary, is ensured only by Soviet strategic superiority.

In confirmation of this principle, it is useful to examine the interpretations of the word 'security' as they appear in the concise dictionaries of the East European languages. An amalgamation of interpretations yields the following definition:

1. Security: without any risks whatsoever; only with the slightest risk involved; a state or condition in which all risks are eliminated or minimised; a condition or situation or state of affairs without any dangers, or just with the slightest amount of danger; the harmlessness of human factors.

2. Security: the state of protectedness from danger; the security of the state and the security of the socialist socio-political and economic order; a condition in which the administering authorities can perform their tasks undisturbed.

3. Security: the particular order of things, circumstances of life or living, a condition in which there is no or just the slightest possibility of unexpected or unpleasant surprise, disturbance, trouble, disorder or confusion; a condition in which it is not necessary to fear these. The condition in which no fundamental changes in the existing socio-political and economic order are to be feared.

It is most likely that the collectivised concepts and theory of the national security of the Soviet Union, as perceived by its political and military leaders, are derived directly from the principle of the necessity of socialism's overall superiority over capitalism (in which may be read: Russian superiority over the United States) in the field of international relations. The strategic superiority of the WTO, and not parity with the West, although the latter is accorded lip-service as the condition necessary for international security in Soviet propaganda, is in fact the state in which the national security of the Soviet Union is assured.

The sum total of measures taken and arrangements made to preserve social stability and maintain internal security in each Warsaw Pact country, and then within the WTO as a military coalition, is a reflection of the universal security-mindedness of the Soviet political and military leadership. The mentality is most apparent when one compares certain arrangements and conditions as they exist in the Western democracies with the corresponding circumstances in the WTO countries—for example, the existing differences in the freedoms of speech, communication and movement. The superiority of the police state over those social elements which constitute a potential or actual challenge or threat

to the state from within is mirrored in the corresponding attitude to protection against those factors which might threaten the communist state from outside the WTO.

The concepts, theory and practical measures deployed in the preservation and continuous strengthening of the security of the communist state and nation are formulated in the closest possible relation to the Marxist-Leninist view on the development of world affairs, and always in the context of the ongoing 'world revolutionary process'. This term, and 'with the participation of the international communist and working class movement' are in frequent use in Soviet and satellite publications on international relations and current affairs. One of the most revealing books on the theme of Soviet ambitions in political and military contexts is *Socialism: Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*, by Sh. P. Sanakoyev and N. I. Kapchenko.[8]

In the course of this process, otherwise seen as the 'inevitable decline of capitalism and the inevitable emergence and ultimate global victory of socialism', the Soviet Union, as one of the most powerful and 'superior' socialist nations, must gain ever-increasing influence over global affairs, and in doing so affect nearly all countries of the world.

Conclusions

Russian national security, in both internal and external terms, in effect depends on three desired or existing circumstances. In the first place, theatre and strategic superiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact armed forces is necessary not simply as a deterrent but in order to win both conventional and nuclear wars with the objective of fully destroying the 'capitalist aggressor' which is the external threat to the security of Russia and her allies. WTO training publications discussing the peace- and wartime tasks of the coalition's armed forces always stress the need for such capabilities, which would ensure the full destruction of the enemy, i.e. the 'capitalist aggressor'. The prediction implied in this is that such a conflict would spell the end of the capitalist socio-political and economic system.

Secondly, the 'inevitable historical process' towards Soviet supremacy requires the subversion of stability and internal security in the societies and political systems of the developed capitalist countries, i.e. the Western democracies, by assisting and supporting, by all available means, the social class struggle in these countries. Simultaneously, stability and security within the Warsaw Pact member societies and systems must be reinforced.

The Marxist-Leninist claim that socialism's ultimate global victory is inevitable as an 'objective historical process and development' is an article of faith in the communist creed. At the same time it is used to rationalise Russian expansion and efforts towards strategic superiority over, in particular, the United States. The 'inevitable' and 'objective' expansion of the socialist world

8 Sh P. Sanakoyev and N. I. Kapchenko, *Socialism: Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*. Eng. edn. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976).

system depends on such military capability, i.e. on the strategic superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO.

Thirdly, it is necessary to secure the availability of all necessary economic and other resources, both within and from outside the WTO countries. This should take place under conditions of detente benefiting the socialist and communist countries by means of trade agreements and co-operation in industrial enterprise between the Western democracies and the WTO states—and using credit facilities provided by the West.

Official literature in the Warsaw Pact states on detente and peaceful co-existence between socialist and capitalist countries invariably stresses the 'mutual advantage' of this situation and gives, in the view of the present writer, the false impression of a desire to create this particular kind of status quo between East and West. It should be noted that this so-called 'mutual advantage' situation is no more the Russians' real objective in economic terms that it is in the strategic context. Cultivating and preserving a state of parity is not conducive, in terms of Soviet theory, to the security of the socialist state and nation. This type of static situation, in which the West fully retains its economic and military capabilities, can at any given time challenge and endanger socialism and pose a serious threat to the national security of the Soviet Union. As such it is incompatible with the Soviet concept of peaceful co-existence between the socialist and capitalist systems, which is essentially one of a highly dynamic process in which the 'forces of socialism', i.e. Warsaw Pact military might and the exercise of Soviet influence on global affairs, prevail.

Deterrence is not the sole purpose of Soviet military capability. It is the present author's belief that a situation in which strategic parity is preserved between NATO and the WTO is not one in which the Soviet leadership would feel that the national security of Russia as a communist country surrounded by a protective belt of satellite states could be regarded as safe. The arms race must, therefore, continue relentlessly on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain, despite the intense Soviet propaganda proclaiming commitment to 'genuine' disarmament and to a state of strategic parity with, not superiority over, the West. To encapsulate in a verbal equation the actual conditions under which Russia could feel sure of its national security: 'Soviet (communist) strategic superiority in parallel with Western (capitalist) strategic inferiority = national security of the Soviet Union'.

RACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*R. J. Vincent**

LIKE sex in Victorian England, it has been said, race is a taboo subject in contemporary polite society. Conflicts or attitudes that to the simple-minded might appear to be self-evidently racial are explained away as class-based, or as difficulties attending immigration, or as responses to special local circumstances. Certainly, race relations are not an area in which political reputations are easily made, and outspokenness on the subject seems to be the preserve of those who have little to lose, their having either departed the scene or not yet arrived at it.

Yet beneath this wish to talk about something else, and perhaps in part explaining it, lurk the largest of claims for the factor of race in politics, and the direst of forebodings about the future of race relations. As early as 1903 W. E. B. Du Bois was already expressing the problem of the twentieth century as the problem of 'the colour-line', and this has been a theme of pan-African congresses to the present day. A recent British prime minister, not noted for his proneness to exaggerate, is reported as having said 'I believe the greatest danger ahead of us is that the world might be divided on racial lines. I see no danger, not even the nuclear bomb, which could be so catastrophic as that.'[1] These instincts of politicians are fortified by academic analysis. John Rex, one of the most prominent writers in Britain on race relations, has gone so far as to predict that 'for the next few centuries the problems which will preoccupy men politically more than any other will be problems which they subjectively define as problems of race'.[2] Hugh Tinker, in one of the very few works on race in international politics, concludes that 'Today, transcending everything (including even the nuclear threat) there is the confrontation between the races'.[3]

No doubt the rioting that took place in Britain in the summer of 1981 is taken by writers of this persuasion to be bitter evidence in support of their view of the place of race in society. This paper is confined to an assessment of the place of race in international relations, in so far as it is possible to distinguish, in this regard, domestic from international politics. In any event, it may be argued that it is to the history of international relations, during the imperial

* R. J. Vincent is Lecturer in International Relations, University of Keele. The author is grateful to Dan Keohane for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.

1. Quoted in Lord Caradon, 'Race, Poverty and Population: (An Internationalist's View)' in Sir F. Vallatt *et al.*, *An Introduction to the Study of Human Rights* (London: Europa,), p. 54.
2. John Rex, *Race Relations in Sociological Theory* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p 161.
3. Hugh Tinker, *Race, Conflict, and the International Order* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 135

expansion of Europe over at least the last two centuries, that one needs to refer to understand the contemporary significance of race in both domestic and international society. This is a task that is attended to in the second part of this article, after an attempt to clear the problem of definition out of the way. The third part of the article is concerned with the possibility of explanation rather than that of definition, and it seeks to measure race against class and nation as forces in international politics. The conclusion, with the benefit of the discussion of explanation, aims to describe and to assess the impact of the factor of race in international politics.

The definition of 'race'

In both domestic and international politics, race is now thought above all to be about colour. Race relations in modern Britain are taken to concern whites and blacks, not different groups of whites. Similarly, in international relations, the most prominent racial issue is that between whites and blacks in Southern Africa. But this is a comparatively recent development. The notion of race was in the nineteenth century used much more generally to depict, it seems, almost any social group. Charles Kingsley, for example, said both that 'there is no more beautiful race in Europe than the wives and daughters of our London shopkeepers', and that the 'valiant peasants between Halifax and Cheshire' were 'the finest race in England'.[4] Kingsley here was departing from a rather narrower sense of race already established, and bearing a closer relation than his own ideas to contemporary usage: namely, race used not merely to describe any group of people, but to set apart people of common descent. European history, told from a racial point of view, might, by making use of this definition, include an account of Frankish aristocrats justifying their rule over a bastard proletariat of Celts and Mediterraneans in France, and of the myth of a Norman yoke in English historiography which depicted anything fine about England as derivative from an Anglo-Saxon past.[5] The same racial mythology was available in the relations among European nations: 'this island race', 'the unspeakable Turk', 'the Hun is at the gate!'. Usage in this arena was, in turn, a preface to the racialisation of the world.[6]

This racialisation came about, it may be argued, because the expansion of Europe coincided with the elaboration of the idea of racial inequality. In nineteenth-century Europe, what is now called, pejoratively, racialism, was widely thought to have a scientific basis rather than being the instict of blimps and fanatics. The idea of discrete racial types took firm root, and became the dominant explanation both of the variety of cultures and of the hierarchy among them. It was possible on physiological grounds alone, said the French writer and diplomat Gobineau, to distinguish three great and clearly marked types, the black, the yellow, and the white, and to arrange them in a scale with

4 Quoted in Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (London: Tavistock, 1977) pp. 76-79

5. *Ibid*, pp. 15-22

6. *Ibid.*, Chap 3.

the lowest, the negro, being hardly more than a mere brute, the yellow race committing none of the strange excesses so common among negroes but tending to mediocrity in everything, and at the top the white race gifted with energetic intelligence, perseverance, an instinct for order and a love of liberty.[7]

Less repellent to the modern reader and more sophisticated were the later nineteenth-century ideas of social evolution influenced by Herbert Spencer's analogy between societies and organisms, and Darwin's account of the survival of the fittest in the animal world. Benjamin Kidd wrote that the road along which man had come was strewn with the wreckage of nations, races and civilisations. Social systems, like individuals, were organic growths seeming to be governed by laws of health and development. They flourished until displaced by more efficient systems. Weaker races gave way to the stronger through the effects of mere contact.[8] 'The gradual extinction of inferior races', wrote Sir Charles Dilke, 'is not only a law of nature, but a blessing to mankind.'[9]

Dilke's law of nature would now be interpreted as a piece of imperial conceit that misled a civilisation ahead in some areas of human endeavour into visions of manifest destiny to rule the world. Biology, in the twentieth century, has eschewed not merely the idea of a hierarchy among the races, but also that of race itself. It has dealt instead with statistics about populations. 'There are no races', we are told, 'but only clines—gradients of change in measurable genetic characteristics.'[10] The conventional wisdom as now distilled by UNESCO has as much diversity within the so-called races as between them; no coincidence between races and blood-groups; factors grouped together and said to be transmitted *en bloc* in fact passed on independently and in varying degrees of association; and cultural advance as a more profound factor in human evolution than genetic inheritance.[11]

Race, according to this view, is a scientifically obsolete concept, and cannot be commandeered in the service of this or that vision of society. Like much conventional wisdom, the consensus this commands is not complete. Writers such as Professors Eysenck and Jensen arouse controversy by finding that there are differences between racial groups measurable by their performance in intelligence tests.[12] But in regard to the question of definition, neither the conventional wisdom dismissive of race, nor the objection to it which seems to accept the old categories without question, is very helpful. The difficulty with the rejection of the concept of race is that it would afford us no purchase on the popular notion of race as part of everyday belief and experience, and therefore a piece of political data whether we like it or not. The difficulty with the

7 Arthur de Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races*, trans Adrian Collins, (London: Heinemann, 1915), pp. 205–07

8 Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, 3rd edn (London: Macmillan, 1902), pp 31, 43 and 47.

9 Sir Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1870), p. 88.

10 Frank B. Livingstone, quoted in M Banton and J Harwood, *The Race Concept* (London: David & Charles, 1975), pp. 56–57

11 From UNESCO's Moscow Declaration on Race, cited in Rex, *op cit* pp 2–4

12. .See Ralph Pettman, *Biopolitics and International Values* (New York: Pergamon, 1981), Chap 3

acceptance of the old categories, racial types such as Caucasoid, Mongoloid and Negroid, because they seem plainly to capture the reality of physical difference among the peoples of the world, is the danger of making too much of these obvious but superficial differences, so that description masquerades as explanation. To observe, when black rioters confront white police, that the conflict is racial, is crudely to describe one aspect of it. Class, to refer back to the beginning of this discussion, may indeed be a better explanation, or the pressures of living in an inner city, or problems associated with immigration, and so on. The racial label has added little to our comprehension, explaining everything and nothing. For this reason, although she goes too far, one understands Ruth Benedict when she writes: 'In order to understand race persecution we do not need to investigate race; we need to investigate *persecution* . . . To understand race conflict . . . we need fundamentally to understand *conflict* and not *race*'.[13]

Ruth Benedict does go too far. It is race conflict as a sub-group of all conflict that we need to understand, and to mark off from other kinds of conflict. Otherwise we should merely be making something else explain everything and nothing. Race is at the same time a biological and a sociological notion. Races are not pure types, but populations differing from each other in the relative commonness of certain hereditary traits,[14] and thinking of themselves as socially distinct. The subjective element is crucial. 'The White Man's Burden' was a racial attitude struck from above looking down. Negritude and Black Power were expressions coined in the attempt to get out from under. An examination of this process illuminates the place of race in contemporary international politics.

European expansion and the emergence of racialism

The ascendancy of the peoples of Europe over those of Asia has been taken, in an important book, to be one of the marks of Western dominance in Asia from 1498 to 1945.[15] This dominance, which came to be rationalised in a doctrine of racial superiority, can be said to have applied generally in the relations between the European and the non-European world in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. The Japanese were widely dismissed as dishonest, getting along quite happily without religion and thus at best semi-civilised.[16] One writer has said that the general image of China during the same period was one of a 'depraved race governed by a despotic and corrupt ruling class'.[17] Despising the natives was the orthodox attitude of the British in India during

13 Ruth Benedict, *Race and Racism* (London: Routledge, 1942), pp. 147 and 151.

14. See L C Dunn, 'Race and Biology' in Leo Kuper (ed.) *Race, Science and Society* (UNESCO, 1975), p 41

15. K. M Pannikar, *Asia and Western Dominance* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p 12 The pattern of the argument here is taken from my 'Racial Equality and the Expansion of International Society' forthcoming in H. N. Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*

16. V. G. Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), p 180.

17. Jerome Ch'en, *China and the West* (London: Hutchinson, 1979).

the nineteenth century so that it was eccentric if not bizarre to adopt any other attitude.[18] And Africans, coming conventionally at the bottom of the European racialist scale, became a standard of barbarism: Lord Salisbury once declared the Irish to be as unfit for self-government as Hottentots.[19]

Along with the confidence in white superiority went a fear that the higher civilisation was under threat from the lower in the tradition of Goths, Vandals, and Tatars.[20] The 'yellow peril', composed of Chinese and Japanese, was such a threat. It had a military and a socio-economic aspect. Militarily, there was the fear in the West from Kaiser Wilhelm II through to the allied leaders during the Second World War and beyond that the next great conflagration would take place between the white and the yellow races. Economically and socially, there was the fear that the cheaper race would starve out the dearer.[21] The Chinese could outwork white men. In this respect they were superior. The result was in the United States the series of Exclusion Acts, and in Australia the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act, seeking to avoid the swamping of the white race by denying access to competitors.

Nor was it just the yellow peril against which this redoubt was to be fortified. The white race was 'in danger of social sterilization and final replacement or absorption by the teeming coloured races'.[22] If the problem of the twentieth century was to be the problem of the colour-line, then demographic trends suggested its settlement in favour of the 'rising tide of colour'.

In view of the racial rhetoric of this kind that accompanied the age of European ascendancy, it is not perhaps surprising that the emergence from colonial domination should have had a racial flavour. The colour-consciousness of Africans or Asians, it has been argued, stems from the dominance of Europeans who were conscious of their whiteness. 'The Negro', writes Fanon, 'never so much a Negro since he has been dominated by the Whites, when he decides to prove that he has a culture and to behave like a cultured person, comes to realize that history points out a well-defined path to him: he must demonstrate that a negro culture exists.'[23] In the same way, K. M. Pannikar writes of 'European-ness' leading to 'Asian-ness'.[24] And in his controversial *Orientalism*, Edward Said speaks of a Western habit of making a 'binomial opposition' between ours and theirs, occidental and oriental, white and non-white in which the former terms were related to the latter as subject to object: we created them, white men designated the non-whites.[25]

It may be said that the practical effect of this racial discrimination on

18 Kiernan, *op cit*., pp. 42-45.
19 Quoted in *ibid*., p. 27
20. Ch'en, *op cit* p. 58
21. Dilke, *op. cit* p. 192.
22 Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Colour: Against White World Supremacy* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1922), p. 298.
23. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), pp. 170-71
24. Pannikar, *op cit*., p. 494.
25. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 227-31

international politics was small. The self-consciousness about ethnicity involved in the shedding of colonial nomenclature in Mali, or Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka, or Zimbabwe might be a one-shot affair, celebrated in independence before the assumption of routine diplomacy. Viewed from underneath, or from the position of object in Said's binomial opposition, however, the matter seems to go deeper. Toussaint Louverture, the celebrated negro leader who, before his betrayal, brought St. Domingue to the verge of independence from France, is supposed to have said: 'It is not a fortuitous concession of liberty, made to us alone, that we want, but a recognition of the principle that whether a man be red, black or white, he cannot be the property of any other man . . . the First Consul maintains slavery in Martinique, which means that he will make us slaves when he feels he is strong enough to do so'.[26] More than a century later, the Jamaican founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), Marcus Garvey, had similarly global objectives: to restore negro self-respect and to speak for negroes as one of the great constituencies of mankind.[27] His allowing himself to be elected 'Provisional President of Africa' at a UNIA meeting in New York in 1920 was thought to be an allowable hyperbole given the importance of finding a spiritual home for the black diaspora.[28] And Nkrumah, actually on the continent of Africa, making the case for independence in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, referred to an historical Ghanaian Empire that had been a centre of civilisation long before the expansion of Europe:[29] the home was actual as well as spiritual.

The insistence on racial equality that lay behind these claims was the concern of the Japanese at the Paris Peace Conference. They wanted the clause of the League of Nations Covenant providing for religious equality broadened to cover racial equality, and so to legitimise their arrival as fully-fledged members of international society. At that time the great powers were not ready, mainly for domestic reasons, to accept the claim. At the end of the Second World War, a war in which a noxious racial doctrine had been worked out within the Western world, the United Nations Charter proclaimed the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. One writer has interpreted the Charter not as a minimalist arrangement for peace and security, but as nothing less than 'a global Bill of Rights' which, by its enthronement of the principle of self-determination, required an end to racialism.[30] The interpretation of this doctrine and the examination of the extent to which practice can be said to have followed it, is a question for the concluding part of this paper. Meanwhile, there is the measurement of race as a force in international politics against other forces such as class and nation.

26. Quoted in Ralph Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint* (London: Gollancz, 1945), pp. 147–48.
27. Richard Hart, 'From Garvey to Black Liberation', *The Black Liberator*, July-September 1973, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 24.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Kwame Nkrumah, *Autobiography* (London: Nelson, 1957), pp. 201 and 185.
30. Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), ch. 8.

The relative importance of race in international politics

From an anthropological point of view, it might be said that the function of racialist doctrine during the period of European dominance was to legitimise it, and to order society in recognition of a racial hierarchy. A God-given mandate to rule meant that the Europeans were to appear God-like themselves in the eyes of the natives;[31] and if not quite God-like, then at least in the relationship of masters to servants, or, a common theme, parents to children. By reference to racialism, both parents and children were confirmed in their roles: Europeans sustained the will to govern; non-Europeans remained deferential. By the same token, the function of the doctrine of racial equality in the emergence from empire might be said to have been that of signalling that 'we are as good as you'. The children had grown up, and should now live on land of their own, enjoying the same right to self-determination as their erstwhile masters.

This anthropological view interprets race as a symbol of something else, such as universal structural patterns of dominance and dependence. But what of race as a reason for action rather than a rationalisation of it, as a motivating force in politics, domestic and international, rather than as a symbol manipulated on behalf of another thing? How does race as a social bond compare to the rival adhesives of class and nation?

Writing on 'the principle of racial sovereignty', Ali Mazrui distinguishes at least five concepts of self-government involved in the politics of anti-colonialism: absence of colonial rule, sovereign independence, internal management of internal affairs, the consent of the governed, and government 'by rulers manifestly belonging to the same race as the ruled'.[32] But the greatest of these, says Mazrui, is the last, for it is ethnicity as a basis for legitimation that determines the interpretation of each of the other senses of self-government. Alongside the old European notion of the sovereign territorial state, there had to be placed the African and Asian notion of 'peoples' recognisable in a racial sense as having a right to sovereignty. This is racial sovereignty. And it was on the assumption of 'the inherent sovereignty' of each race, Mazrui says, that many leaders in the Afro-Asian world based their welcome of India's annexation of Goa at the expense of a colonial power of different racial stock.

The implications of this doctrine for international politics will be examined in the concluding section of this paper. It belongs here as an example of the force of ethnicity in contemporary politics. And it has a domestic aspect as well as an international one. It may be that the rise of ethnicity, and of the ethnic group in the United States is an internal echo of the international movement towards decolonisation. Certainly, some writers have seized on the concept of ethnicity to account for the forces they interpret as being dynamic ones in contemporary society.[33]

31 Kiernan, *op cit*, p 50

32 Mazrui, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

33. See N. Glazer and D. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).

The expression 'ethnicity' is itself an interesting one, and one might be forgiven for interpreting the phrase 'ethnic group' as the de-odourised form of 'racial group'. Generalised to apply to any group with a distinct cultural tradition, the vitality of ethnicity has been detected in the proliferation of ethnic conflicts from that between English and French speakers in Canada to tribal conflict in Nigeria, and including Northern Ireland, Belgium, Pakistan, Malaysia, Cyprus and the Soviet Union.[34] The salience of ethnicity, as compared to class, is explained partly strategically, partly in terms of what Americans call 'affective ties', and partly very much more boldly in terms of some kind of sea-change in world society.

The strategic explanation has an ethnic group as a better bet than a class in a contest to extract a deal from the state. From the point of view of the participants in the group, their membership is relatively small and visible, while the class is rambling and conjectural. From the state's point of view, 'doing something for the Scots' is more obvious than doing something for the workers.[35] The second explanation has class as a cold category, ethnic affiliation as a warm one. Class is defined in terms of common interests, or of a common predicament, and has lost its revolutionary bite. Ethnicity defines interests in the terms of a group united by ties of language, culture and tradition.[36]

There is thirdly the grandiose notion that the old treatment of ethnic conflict as class conflict in disguise should be turned on its head. The argument here derives from Ralf Dahrendorf's treatment of social stratification in a well-known article on the origin of inequality.[37] Of the conventional explanations for social stratification, that of the institution of property seems particularly inappropriate in such countries as Israel, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where private property has been 'reduced to virtual insignificance'.[38] Perhaps ethnicity is a better explanation of inequality in these societies, something that is more fundamental than class and having to do with some primordial attachment to tribe.[39]

Whatever the doubts about this rather inflated notion, there is a plausible distinction between ethnic group and class as social forces. Race (for I am supposing it to be another word for ethnicity) and nation are more difficult to disentangle. For they are both 'warm', both derive from a notion of something one is born into and stuck with, and each is frequently defined in terms of the other. A definition of 'nation' found in a 1910 dictionary illustrates both the confusion and a way out of it:

> An extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other

34. Glazer and Moynihan, 'Introduction' in *ibid.*, pp. 5-6
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.
36. Daniel Bell, 'Ethnicity and Social Change', in *ibid.*, pp. 165-170.
37. Ralf Dahrendorf, 'On the Origin of Inequality Among Men', in Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).
38. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
39. Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.

> by common descent, language or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory.
>
> In early examples the racial idea is usually stronger than the political; in recent use the notion of political unity and independence is more prominent.[40]

Nation has become attached to state. We live in a world composed officially of nation-states. And this is seized upon by the champions of ethnicity. The very success of the idea of nation has enmeshed it in the global bureaucracy. If all states are nation-states then a focus for protest and change must be found elsewhere, and the ethnic group inherits the progressive connotation that the idea of nation enjoyed in the nineteenth century. The task now is to discover if this is true of race in contemporary international politics.

The impact of race in the international arena

There is, in the language to which we are all becoming accustomed, a horizontal and a vertical dimension to the question of race in contemporary international politics. The horizontal dimension involves the relations of states in the ordinary everyday business of diplomacy. The vertical, sometimes called structuralist, dimension involves not merely the surface relations of notional equals, but the hierarchical arrangement of world society in which rich white states are said to exploit poor non-white ones, or, beyond the state, a white bourgeoisie is said to exploit a black proletariat.

We have noted above the inclination of some new states to announce a new name, on or before arrival in international society, that makes a point of their ethnic grouping. This, it was observed too, might make little difference from day two onwards. Indeed, it might be observed, it is the states that continue to make a point of their ethnic grouping after day two that constitute the exception rather than the rule—Haiti's absorption with its status as a negro republic in the Western hemisphere,[41] for example, or Liberia's position as the first independent black state in Africa. And yet, uniting many new states is the memory of what is taken to be racial oppression. It was, after all, well into this century, and not at the height of Victorian imperial enthusiasm, that Franklin Roosevelt put forward his schemes for the inter-breeding of European and Asian stock to produce a less delinquent Asian race, and Churchill thought in terms of 'baboos', 'chinks' and 'Hottentots'.[42] And if Churchill himself is counted in this regard as a Victorian,[43] then it is reasonable to suppose that the resentment felt by those who were the object of the kind of scorn he expressed might last at least as long.

40. *A New English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1910).

41 See Roy Prieswerk, 'Race and Colour in International Relations', *Year Book of World Affairs* 1970, Vol 24, p. 58.

42 Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), pp. 5 and 8.

43. Lord Moran, quoted in *ibid*., pp. 5-6.

Nor has the scorn that leads to the resentment disappeared. The presumption of Western superiority that led to the under-rating of the skill of the Japanese military during the Second World War[44] featured still in the American attitude to the opposition during the Vietnam war. 'The belief that one Marine was better than ten slopes saw Marine squads fed in against known NVA platoons, platoons against companies, and on and on, until whole battalions found themselves pinned down and cut off. That belief was undying . . .'[45] In the same way, the tendency persists, when the opposition is clearly formidable, to associate its strength with European support. Russian assistance to the Egyptians and to the Vietnamese is supposed to have provided the same stiffening as the Germans supplied for the Japanese during the Second World War.

This persistence of the idea of white superiority is matched by the continuation of the old fear that the poorer races will drive out the richer. Immigration laws in the predominantly white rich world might be said to be the expression of this fear. It is true that the blatant racialism of old immigration legislation such as that of Australia in the first decade of federation and of the United States in the 1920s has now moderated, and that more recent law in the receiving countries has been more liberal. For instance, the notion in the United States that immigration law should be framed so as to exclude immigrants of 'inferior racial stock' has now given place to the doctrine of the 'plural mix' as the goal of legislation in this area.[46] But despite this recent liberalisation, it remains the function of immigration laws broadly to preserve the characteristics of established populations. In the plural mix some are more plural than others.

It is not then merely the memory of past oppression, but also the observation that the conviction of white superiority persists, that prompts the non-white world to continue to insist on the principle of racial equality. It is in this regard that we observed earlier the interpretation of the United Nations Charter as a global Bill of Rights proclaiming the self-determination of peoples. According to this view, the mistake of the Western powers in taking peace and security to be the master purposes of the United Nations, is to fail to look beyond those values to 'the dignity and worth of the human person' from which they derive their importance. Following this logic, it may be argued that the test for membership of the United Nations should not be the superficial requirement that a state be peace-loving, but the more fundamental demand that it be respectful of human dignity. On this ground, apartheid in South Africa is, for example, a 'more flagrant failure of the test than territorial aggrandizement by the Chinese'.[47]

The interpretation of the principle of self-determination which would justify,

44. *Ibid.*, p. 4

45. Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (London: Pan, 1978), p. 86.

46. Michael S. Teitelbaum, 'Right versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 59, No. 1 Fall 1980, p. 32.

47. Mazrui, *op. cit.*, p 137

indeed require, the ending of apartheid is the doctrine of pigmentational self-determination that was discussed above—the idea that rulers and ruled should be of broadly similar racial stock. Africa for the Africans is a racial slogan. In its name much has been made at the United Nations of the demand for reform or revolution in South Africa. The spiritual home that Garvey saw to be necessary for negro dignity must now become a physical home that spans the continent.

Nor is this racial mode of thought the particular preoccupation of black Africans with their eyes turned to the imperial debris littering the south of their continent. When the Afro-Asian countries met for their first conference at Bandung, President Sukarno pronounced it the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind, and this racial self-consciousness has been carried into the General Assembly of the United Nations. It has even been said to have introduced an 'additional dimension to the doctrine of non-intervention'.[48] Saudi and Egyptian 'intervention' in Yemen would be a domestic affair according to racial sovereignty, but an external violation of state sovereignty. Soviet or American intervention would be doubly illegitimate, offending against racial as well as state sovereignty.

The difficulty with this doctrine is that the frontiers of racial sovereignty are a good deal fuzzier even than those of state sovereignty, and the overlapping legitimacies produced by such a doctrine might lead to chaos. Ethnic groups within states can already affect international relations by bringing pressure to bear on their governments, or by providing a target for outside intervention, as for example in the relationship between American Jews and Israel, and French Canadians and France. And if ethnic solidarity across state frontiers were to be endowed with the same legitimacy as interstate alliances, so that some association for the advancement of coloured peoples took its place alongside the Warsaw Pact, the implications for the maintenance of world order would be profound.

Yet it is only by thinking in terms of ethnic solidarity across state frontiers, some writers argue, that we can appreciate the place of race in world society. Their view is that the interstate level of analysis distorts the real place of race in world politics, and they require a global or at least a continental framework for its evaluation. There is first the doctrine of the indivisibility of black freedom and dignity: the idea that continued oppression of non-whites anywhere is an offence to their dignity everywhere. An example of this, we have seen, is the connection between the liberty of the American negro and African independence in what became a rich theme in pan-Africanist thought. And on the continent of Africa Tom Mboya said 'As long as any part of Africa remains under European rule, we do not feel that Africans will be regarded in the right way'.[49]

The idea of a global coincidence of interests among the coloured races

48 *Ibid*., pp. 38-39.
49 Quoted in Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations* (London: Heinemann, 1977), p 216

connects, in another strand of racial thought, to a class analysis of world politics. 'In the colonies,' wrote Fanon, 'the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.'[50] More recently, Stokeley Carmichael joined class with colour in a structuralist account which asserted the existence of a Third World proletariat (of which the black American proletariat was part) ranged against a bourgeoisie of whites.[51]

In a third strand of thought about race in world society, the world political system has solidified, from the relative fluidity of class, into the rigidity of caste. Not merely, in this view, does it happen to be the case that the rich world is predominantly white, and the poor world predominantly coloured, but since the gap is widening between them it can be argued that world society displays the features of a caste-system: separation, division of labour and hierarchy.[52] Separation is not hermetic, but universally immigration laws maintain the characteristics of established populations. Where contact does take place White Brahmins oversee the Third World, black Harijans fulfil menial functions in the First World. The division of labour is the familiar one between white manufacturers and coloured primary producers. And hierarchy exists in virtue of the inequality of reward in this division, surplus value accruing to the manufacturers who then reinforce their position of superiority.

How is all this to be judged? Race, it has been suggested, in the horizontal relations of states, has had some part in the liberation from colonialism, continues to be part of the persona of some states, and has even added a new notion of ethnic self-determination to that of national self-determination as part of the theory of international society. This theory is the more persuasive as notions of white superiority linger on, and are not part merely of the memory of past oppression. In multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations and elsewhere, the call for racial equality is often heard, and it is directed particularly at pariah states like South Africa. In the vertical relations among classes in world politics, the notion of ethnic self-determination is given added point by the dramatic demonstration of the position of the non-white races at the foot of a global hierarchy.

There is, by virtue of this list, some reason to pay more attention to the place of race in world politics than is normally given in the textbooks. In particular, it may be said that textbooks tend to be written by those near the top rather than the bottom of the world hierarchy, and that they are for that reason less sensitive to the factor of race than if they were written from underneath looking up. Nevertheless, it may be that some of the claims for the importance of race in international politics are exaggerated. The doctrine of pigmentational self-determination is an African one, hardly applicable to, say, Latin America, and brittle in its application even to African politics. Just as the doctrine of

50. Fanon, *op. cit.* p. 31.

51. Stokeley Carmichael, 'Black Power and the Third World', in Tariq Ali (ed.), *New Revolutionaries* (London: Peter Owen, 1969), pp. 98-101.

52. Mazrui, *op. cit.*, ch. 1

national self-determination has had a clear run only in delegitimising colonial rule, so that of ethnic self-determination seems unambiguously to apply only to white minority rule in South Africa. Such general headway as racial doctrine has been able to make in international society seems limited to the protests made against white racism characteristic of the United Nations General Assembly. The idea of a global caste-system is a striking metaphor, but its strength is sapped by observation, among other things, of the cosmopolitanism of the global diplomatic elite—something more susceptible of class than caste analysis. If it is objected that this elite is tiny and unrepresentative, this is precisely the point: one would not expect, on a caste analysis, to find Harijans among the Brahmins.

To measure the pronouncements about the prominence of race in international relations with which this paper began, one might apply the litmus test used by Bruce Miller some twenty-five years ago.[53] Sceptical of the view then (still) widespread that the next war would be a race war between coloured and white people, he pointed out that, to be correct, it would need to assume that race relations were either more important than national interests or had become the principal factor in them; that peoples would be prepared to go to war against discrimination against others; that racial discrimination constituted a form of aggression; that states founded in an atmosphere of release from racial oppression would continue to find race a crucial factor; and that race relations had enough drive behind them to set the machinery of war in motion. Like Professor Miller, I doubt that race has transcended everything.

And yet it is broadly true to say that the affluent and the hungry worlds stand on either side of a colour line, that the chances are that if you are white you are rich, and if non-white, poor.[54] This does not make of race, any more than it does of poverty, the stuff of international politics. But it does mean that the argument for change, for justice in international relations (in other words that the stuff of international politics ought to be different from what it now is), is likely to be presented as a claim for racial as well as for economic equality. The realist who calls the stuff of international politics today's response to yesterday's demand for justice, should have an eye for tomorrow.

53. J. D. B. Miller, 'Racial Equality', unpublished paper delivered at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London University, 1956.

54. See Trevor Huddleston, 'Race Relations', a lecture given in Canterbury Cathedral, November 12, 1969, p. 4.

BOOK REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Explorations in Ethics and International Relations. Edited by Nicholas A. Sims. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 210 pp. Index. £10·95.*
Human Rights and State Sovereignty. By Richard Falk. *New York, London: Holmes & Meier for Centre of International Studies. 1981. 251 pp. Index.*

IT is difficult to imagine a reader, apart, presumably, from Sydney Bailey himself, in whose honour the first book was written, who will find the subject matter of all nine of its chapters *equally* interesting. They range from Chinese foreign policy to Geneva-based NGO activities, from the theology of compromise to the study of Commonwealth. The contributors' approaches are also very divergent, including politics, law, moral philosophy and theology. Their styles, too, are markedly different, ranging from the very scholarly to the practitioner's personal impressions. Despite this, there is a sense of unity in this book and there are some excellent individual chapters.

The unity, apart from the contributors' association with Bailey, is found in the seriousness and sincerity which underpin all the essays, which are, in the broadest sense, normative, and internationalist.

Among various contributions, I was most fascinated by Habgood's piece which shows that there are elements within the Christian tradition which give a positive value to 'compromise'. Paskins' very lucid chapter on the duties of the defence scientist is also thought-provoking. For those who are more interested in the behaviour of states, there is a first-class analysis by Mendl of the extent to which China's policy, especially in the UN, accords with the ideology and moral principles it professes. Higgins' study of European human rights law is highly informative, and Sims's chapter on the Commonwealth and the United Nations is a valuable attempt at making a potentially dry subject appealing to many.

The nine chapters are sandwiched between a Foreword by Bishop Kunst, and Appreciations of Bailey's work and Bibliography. The editor ought to be congratulated on the seven years' work which it took him to bring the essays together for publication, although not all of them are quite as outstanding as some of the above-mentioned pieces.

The second book is a collection of essays by an eminent professor of international law who has gone beyond, and may even have abandoned, legal scholarship as it is usually understood.

Falk's tentative theoretical basis is a natural law assumption that 'the ordinary person' has certain self-evident convictions about right and wrong requiring 'neither proof nor assent to be authoritative' (p. 158), and he considers it important to stress, in the present stage of human history, the notion that 'certain rights inhere in human nature and should be respected by all organized societies' (p. 42).

However, the reality of the world today, as he points out in Essay IV, tends toward extreme hostility to the fulfilment of human rights. This hostility to human rights, according to Falk, is not inherent in the state. Faced with the choice between socialism and capitalism, which Falk regards as the fundamental alternatives available to states, he considers socialism to be structurally better suited than capitalism for the

realisation of human rights, especially in the Third World; this despite his awaren
the denial of human rights which socialist states have in practice shown, and
cost in terms of human rights infringements incurred by transition to socialism.

Therefore, it appears, Falk's ideal world is one of socialist states. However, th
to be underpinned by global 'community sentiments' promoted by 'a growing nu
of influential individuals and groups who will think, feel and act like planetary cit
as well as fulfil traditional roles as loyal participants in local and national comm
processes' (p. 103).

Falk's global populism leads him even to suggest in the final three Essay
positive international law made by governments is bound to be unsatisfactory
means of realising cosmopolitical justice, and in pursuit of this goal, he looks fo
to more active participation in the articulation of the universal normative standa
non-governmental organisations.

A number of objections to Falk's book are conceivable. First, his love of pe
intensified by his dislike of existing governments, may not be reciprocated by pe
love of human rights as opposed to their respective interests. Second, there
platitudinous circularity in the assertions that to realise human rights there is a n
stress the human rights ideology, and that to overcome statism there is a ne
emphasise cosmopolitanism. Third, nowhere in his book does he atten
philosophical justification of his normative orientation. Despite these reserva
those who wish to know Falk's vision will find this book useful, and those wh
dissatisfied with a more conservative view of the states system (e.g., as articulat
Hedley Bull) will read it with sympathy.

University of Keele HIDEMI SUGA

The North Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. By J
Critchley. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 210 pp. £15·00.*

THE note on the dustjacket of this book describes Julian Critchley as Conservativ
for Aldershot and 'a frequent and lively contributor to the British press on a vari
topics'. Those who read his articles will recognise the man in his book; true b
little irreverent and inclined to season his prose with incantations on the Chr
values of the West and such startling phrases as 'the poltroonery of politic
They will also, one feels, prefer the press contributor to the author, for the book
unsatisfactory amalgam of generalisation and detail. Part one, 'Basic Issues',
with an invitation to consider some illusions to be dispelled with regard to bot
Alliance and the Soviet Union; part two briskly reveals the strategy of the Comm
Party prior to detailing the military organisation of the Soviet Union. The next
on the Atlantic Alliance, opens with an essay on the problem of unity in div
before describing nuclear arms and policies and the minutiae of the various N
commands. The book concludes with one chapter on aspects of the defence
United Kingdom.

The dissatisfaction, then, is provoked by the shallowness of the generalisation
the heterogeneity of the detail; those with £15 and an interest in the Atlantic All
and the Soviet Union would do better to buy from the IISS the current issues o
Military Balance and *Strategic Survey*; and they would still have £4.50 left to
read and enjoy Critchley's occasional pieces in the daily press.

University of Salford COLIN GO

The Practical Negotiator. By William I. Zartman and Maureen R. Berman. *Ne Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 250 pp. Index. £14·00.*

THIS work is a contribution both to the theoretical literature of international relatio and to the literature of peace research. With regard to the latter the tone is firm prescriptive. The authors are concerned primarily with the continuing effort, in tl words of Alvin C. Eurich, introducing the book, 'to improve mankind's ability resolve major differences'. The aim is unexceptionable: what of the result?

It is the authors' belief that diplomatic negotiation is not an arcane art to monopolised by an elite mysteriously endowed with a gift for it but a practical job th can be taught and learned. Negotiators, the authors insist, are made, not born. This a sensible axiom, although it remains the fact that negotiators vary in the quality their work, and it seems probable that such variation depends in part on innate facto of personality, as well as on political tradition and sheer circumstance.

The whole complex process of diplomatic negotiation is worked out in the course the book. There is a chapter on the diagnosis of issues, and another on the defining solutions. However, having been taught by Bertrand de Jouvenel that there are solutions to political problems ('politics is not mathematics') only *settlements* more less tolerable to the parties concerned, one wishes that the authors had avoided tl concept of 'solutions'. There is a chapter on the actual working out of agreemen and one on the problem of 'structuring' negotiations.

The approach is certainly practical, as the book's title suggests, and the whole wo contains a large amount of commonsense, dressed up—perhaps in places ove dressed—in the language of behaviourism.

The basic trouble with the book seems to be that while it identifies real probler and makes highly pertinent suggestions about them, it really tells the intelligent a reasonably well-informed reader what he is likely already to know. It is doubtless usel to have the characteristics of diplomatic negotiation brought together and compact set out. It is interesting to gain an insight, based on the authors' interviews wi various eminent persons, into what practitioners think that they are doing. It instructive to follow the discussion of those cultural diversities and conceptu divergencies (such as surround, for example, the notion of justice) which so greatly a sometimes critically influence the style of negotiations. Yet still one wonders wheth the work as a whole, thorough as it is, really amounts to very much more than comprehensive and authoritative statement of the obvious. One's grandmother h surely learned how to suck eggs by now. *The Practical Negotiator*, worthy as it is intention and masterly in execution, remains a little reminiscent of the Pope's addre to the General Assembly of the United Nations; sincere and impressive but making real difference to anything—certainly not to the conduct of international relations. another critic shrewdly observed of this book, there seems, after all, to be less he than meets the eye.

University College of Wales ROBERT PURNE

Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. By Andr Linklater. *London: Macmillan for the London School of Economics. 19 232 pp. Index. £15·00.*

SCHOLARLY concern with the theory of international relations may involve two ve different kinds of enterprise. The first seeks to develop methods of analysis, oft requiring measurement, of the interacting components of behaviour, with the ultim object of predicting outcomes, or of understanding causation in sufficient degree to

able to influence or control outcomes. Many scholars view this enterprise with deep suspicion. The second enterprise sees international relations through the eyes of the political philosopher, and attempts to identify principles of right conduct and the institutional forms appropriate for their implementation. Andrew Linklater's book is of the latter kind. It is an exceedingly good example of its type.

The apposition of men and citizens in the title is intended to call attention to an age-old problem of political theory, and one of particular importance in the political theory of international relations—the rights and duties of men as members of mankind, and their rights and duties as members of a society or state. The author's purpose is to develop a political theory of international relations which will accommodate both.

The central core of the book consists of three components. First Dr Linklater gives a clear and succinct exposition of the classical rationalist views of Pufendorf, Vattel and Kant. He explains Pufendorf's justification of a civil society uniting part of humanity within a common moral framework, Vattel's notion of a natural society of nations in which sovereign entities are constrained by their awareness of moral obligations, and Kant's holistic conception of a universal kingdom of ends requiring for its realisation a cosmopolitan confederation of republics. He then shows how the basis of rationalism was destroyed by historical studies of the development of mankind in separate tribal groupings, with widely varying social structures and moral codes, from which was derived the extreme relativist view that there is no basis for universal moral principles, but morality can be described only in terms of the rules of each separate society. This in turn is then criticised through Hegel and Marx, who identified the uniqueness of man in his capacity to set his own ends, who saw reason itself as not original and innate but developing through the course of human history, and who thus were able to place societies on a scale of ascending types according to the degree to which they facilitated the development of man's latent powers.

It is through this insight that Dr Linklater evolves for international relations theory his reconciliation of man's obligations as man and as citizen. He postulates a hierarchy of forms of relationships, the lowest being that of largely separate tribal entities with a low level of development of reason; the intermediate consisting of relationships among societies at varying levels of development of reason and moral principles, or among societies with developed moral principles towards 'insiders' (within societies) but not towards outsiders; and the highest where 'the whole of organized humanity, not merely the interests of those who are associated together, [is taken] as the central ethical reference group' (p. 197).

It is not possible in a brief review such as this to convey the full measure of the argument that sustains the thesis outlined above. The argument is of course a theoretical one, and not either a historical account or a programme for action. It does, however, by implication suggest a whole range of criteria by which action may be judged, and it deserves to be read for this reason as well as for the significant contribution it makes to international political theory.

University of Lancaster P. A. REYNOLDS

The Global Community: A Brief Introduction to International Relations. 2nd edn. By James A. Stegenga and W. Andrew Axline. *New York, London: Harper & Row. 1982. 190 pp. Pb.: £6·95.*

THIRTY years ago most introductory textbooks on international relations were weighty and authoritative tomes intent on correcting what was thought to be a deep-seated Anglo-American disposition to think about foreign affairs in moralistic, legalistic terms. Their focus was on the realities of power, naked or in disguise, on relations

between the superpowers—or at least the major powers—and on the permutations of successive balance-of-power systems. Despite this narrow focus, they offered rich intellectual fare and performed, and still do perform, a valuable service. Their successors, however, tend more to neat, tidy and mercifully brief analyses of the sources of international tension, embracing not only East-West relations, but also relations with and within the so-called Third World and, as in this case, the 'global ecological crisis'.

This particular introduction is well written, sensibly organised and should serve as a useful framework within which sixth-formers and first-year undergraduates could progress to more specialist studies. In places the authors' attempt to elucidate the main features of the international system within the compass of 20 pages and to 'see the world' through the eyes of 'enemies' as well as 'friends' leads them to some rather odd historical judgements. But the main weakness is that, perhaps inevitably in 200 pages, there is little historical or analytical depth and the authors tend to skate over really controversial issues. Despite its real merits, whether this study will leave the more intelligent young reader with a sense of intellectual excitement must be doubted.

London School of Economics G. L. GOODWIN

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1930. By Maurice Pearton. *London: Burnett. 1982. (Distrib. by Hutchinson, London.) 287 pp. Index. £12·95*

THIS is an interesting and very useful book. It traces the impact of evolving military technology on the national security problem from 1830 to the present. This subject sets into context the current debate about arms racing and the military-industrial complex, and the author argues convincingly that the impact of military technology on the state has been so great as to call into question much of the traditional distinction between war and peace. It is in this theme that the justification for the rather arcane title of the book lies. The argument is that state power has come to depend on command of technical and scientific knowledge. The main weight of the book is devoted to illustrating how this dependency came about. The conclusion is that the pursuit of knowledge-based military power has led us to our current position in which the requirements for maintaining such power now penetrate and condition the entire state and social structure.

These are important themes, and the author has much that is worthwhile to say about them. His historical approach adds needed depth and perspective to many contemporary discussions of the arms problem, and his good sense of historical and economic factors avoids both the narrow military and technical emphasis and the moralistic futility which too often afflict work on this subject. That said, however, there remains a fair bit to complain about. The obscure title will not help the right audience to locate the book, and if they do, many of them will be frustrated by the organisation and approach they find. Superficially, the presentation appears to be historical, taking us in five stages from 1830 to the present. But this history is highly selective. The author adopts the technique of choosing the best episode to illustrate his theme. This works well for the purpose at hand, but it does not provide a continuous or a complete history, and it requires that the reader be well versed in the subject if he or she is not to take away a distorted view. Many of the European episodes are very well done, but there is little on the United States before 1945, and the very light referencing will not appeal to historians.

The nature of the themes would seem to have called for an approach in the style of political science, with the categories and the themes used systematically from the start. As it is, the reader may find himself near the end before the purpose of the journey has become fully clear. The author's concerns point his book strongly in the direction of those interested in the arms trade and industry, arms racing, and the military-industrial complex, but he makes little attempt to link his work to theirs. The term 'military-industrial complex' does not even appear in the index, and is not mentioned in the text until the last pages. This failure to connect to other literatures is made more surprising by the fact that the author has himself contributed to work on the arms trade.

The book is well written, and an entertaining read. It is supplied with a useful index and a select bibliography, but is marred by a level of proofreading errors of which the advent of word processors should long since have relieved us. With these caveats, I recommend this book as an illuminating and incisive inquiry into a phenomenon of unquestioned importance.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

The Crisis in Western Security. Edited by Lawrence S. Hagen. *London: Croom Helm. 1982. 247 pp. Index. £13·95.*

European Security, Nuclear Weapons and Public Confidence. Edited by William Gutteridge. *London: Macmillan 1982. 236 pp. £20·00.*

BOTH of these editions are collections of conference papers from the late 1970s and 1980, and the contents reflect the neuroses and perspectives prevalent at the time, and in many instances still manifest today. In the Hagen edition some of the papers have been updated for publication, but it instructive to note that while details and narrative may have moved beyond 1980, the themes and conclusions have been little changed. Concern, chagrin and anxiety over the disappointments of detente and arms control, and the threats posed by burgeoning Soviet military power permeate both books, but especially *The Crisis of Western Security*. The papers for this book are drawn from a conference held in London in 1980 in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of SALT II from the Senate ratification process by the Carter administration. Obviously the contributions illustrate the mood of the time and that was one of pessimism and foreboding. Philip Windsor and Lawrence Freedman in two excellent chapters address the question of whether or not arms control is up to bearing the political expectations with which it is invariably encumbered. Windsor argues eloquently that arms control should be primarily a political instrument and judged as such while Freedman adds that the political climate must be conducive to arms control agreements, but that the process is not up to the political burden heaped upon it in the recent past. Richard Burt argues that there is little future for the arms control process as we have known it so long as the superpowers pursue deeply-rooted asymmetrical views of what constitutes strategic stability. Colin Gray, not surprisingly, addresses this issue in a most challenging and thought-provoking manner. He writes of the United States and Soviet 'strategic cultures' being so different as to provide 'insufficient conceptual basis for fruitful co-operation' (p. 100). Indeed, the incompatibility of Western and Soviet views of stability in both the political and military fields is a strong theme running through most of the articles, conveying an almost overwhelming sense of hopelessness. The attention drawn by Hassner and Sonnenfeldt to asymmetrical perceptions of strategic objectives and requirements within the Atlantic Alliance, and the image advanced of chaotic intra-Alliance relations, do nothing to alleviate the gloom. Other concomitant

themes addressed include the complexity of devising arms control arrangements which successfully incorporate the expanding sophisticated' technology of modern armaments, and the pessimism in the West about the growth and potential of all facets of Soviet military power. Many of the contributors are eminent in the world of international security studies in the West, and as an indication of how the experts see the prospects for Western security in the 1980s this is a worthwhile collection. Some of the chapters are short, but pithy and thoughtful, while others are much longer and contain not only interesting argument but considerable technical detail, e.g. Ball's piece on the superpower strategic nuclear intercontinental balance. Often books of conference papers are of variable quality, but in this instance the standard is high throughout. The topics addressed are central to contemporary East-West relations, and it looks as if it will be some time before *The Crisis of Western Security* acquires that dated look.

In contrast, *European Security, Nuclear Weapons and Public Confidence*, a collection of contributions from three Pugwash conferences in 1977, 1978 and 1979 already has a somewhat dated appearance, and suffers from extreme variation in the quality of the chapters. Some of the papers have been updated, but many have been published as they stood. This may convey the mood of the time, for example the intensity of some feelings over the prospect of the deployment of the neutron bomb, but makes little contribution to current concerns. A simultaneous strength and weakness is that the contributors come not only from the West, but from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One should always welcome a broad spread and variety of arguments but the ideological polemicism of some of the Eastern contributions, whilst not surprising, is depressing and of questionable value. Mainstream strategic-military matters are discussed, as are other peripheral but none the less important low-profile aspects of international security. The collection is divided into five parts, ranging from appreciations of the course of detente, to the security implications of competition for Arctic resources, to the impact of Southern Africa on European security, to European co-operation in the field of electric power. If nothing else, this rather loose collection demonstrates the wide ambit of studies apposite to any contemporary appreciation of international security.

University of Aberdeen JAMES WYLLIE

The Two-Edged Sword: Armed Forces in the Modern World. (The Reith Lectures 1981). By Laurence Martin. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 108 pp. £5·95.*

As Professor Martin's Preface acknowledges, to deal with armed forces in the modern world in six half-hour lectures is a formidable task. The resulting six chapters are closely argued, skilled works of art. Each has, perforce, to be an entity in itself, yet contributes to a whole that is more than simply the sum of the parts.

The unity of the volume is provided by the Great Power competition and the centrality of thermo-nuclear deterrence to this competition. Around this core—distinct from it, yet inseparable from it—Professor Martin examines, successively, the nature of nuclear weapons; the position of Western Europe; the Third World, including the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation; and arms control. The final, and perhaps least successful chapter, is devoted to Britain's position in this 'Endless Search for Safety'. It is in this final chapter—where a plea for an extra-NATO capability has an added topicality in the aftermath of the Falklands War—that the quest for economy of argument is, perhaps, taken too far. The reader is asked to accept assertions and judgements that are not always fully supported by the text.

Professor Martin carefully treads the path between the Scylla of the left and the Charibdis of the right: unilateralism is roundly condemned and there is equal condemnation for the 'victory is possible' school, with only slightly more comfort for the proponents of tactical nuclear warfare. This does not imply vacillation. Professor Martin writes with clarity and a sense of purpose (and also a sense of humour). The Soviet Union is perceived as posing the major threat to Western institutions and values, and Professor Martin is very positive that active preparations must be made to defend against such threats. His stand is not a populist one. At a time when vociferous groups, both inside and outside government, shout their opposition to aspects of defence policy as simple slogans, Professor Martin's slim volume is a welcome voice urging reason and debate, and also sets a standard and style for that debate. There is no attempt to hide the complexity of the issues, even though such complexity makes simple prescription impossible. Indeed, it is by exhibiting the process of observation and analysis of these complexities that *The Two-Edged Sword* indicates the very considerable and very relevant contribution that the community of scholars of international relations can make to the well-being—even the continued being—of our society.

Despite the care obviously taken to present arguments consistently, the volume is not without its contradictions—for example, de Gaulle is condemned for going off 'to play Massive Retaliation by himself' (p. 36) yet the arguments for the deployment of Trident by the United Kingdom have a fundamentally Gaullist basis (p. 86). Professor Martin is not beyond making appeals—for example, for a European Defence Community (p. 42)—nor does he hesitate to overthrow some popularly held notions, such as the rarely queried view, propounded by many peace researchers, that there is an active and malevolent arms race between the Great Powers (p. 10).

The volume will make stimulating introductory reading for all students of strategic thinking, and should be compulsory reading for all those, of no matter what persuasion, who imagine that matters of nuclear strategy can be resolved by marching with banners or by sitting outside military bases.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

The Science Race: Training and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers, US and USSR. By Catherine P. Ailes and Francis W. Rushing. *New York: Crane Russak for SRI International, Arlington, Virginia. 1982. 254 pp. Index. $22.50.*

THERE are many dimensions to the economic and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union ('the two world systems' as Mr Brezhnev, quoted in this volume, somewhat inaccurately describes them). One important such dimension centres on the quantity and competence of the qualified scientists and engineers (QSEs) and technically trained personnel produced by the two countries, and another concerns their use in production. Four of the substantive chapters of this book deal with the first of these issues and the other four with the second. The book was produced under the auspices of the Strategic Studies Centre of SRI, one of the United States' independent non-profit-making contract research organisations. The volume's most fundamental conclusion is that the United States has far more difficulty in coping with a diffuse challenge than with a clear-cut one. Thus the impact of sputnik in 1957 was as traumatic in its way as that of Pearl Harbour in 1941, and both events produced decisive responses, yet the United States has found it substantially more difficult to buckle down to the more gradual and long-term challenges mounted by both Japan and the Soviet Union.

The book contains both quantitiative conclusions and qualitative judgements.

Among the more important of the former are that there is more exposure to science and mathematics in the Soviet secondary school curriculum than in the American; that in 1978 the Soviet Union graduated almost six times as many engineers as did the United States; that 70 per cent of Soviet graduate enrolment is in science and engineering compared with 20 per cent in the United States; that by 1974 Russia had over twice as many scientists and engineers as the United States, which had a 3:2 advantage in scientists but a 3:1 disadvantage in engineers; and that by 1976 Russia had up to 2·3 times as many scientists and engineers engaged in R & D. But, as the authors acknowledge, it is when one turns to quality that the problems begin. Thus some 40 per cent of Soviet enrolments in higher education are part-time and probably somewhat inferior, and Soviet specialisation may also be excessive. Beyond this again are factors such as the misuse of qualified people and the rigidity of the economy as this bears on the mobility of technically trained professionals. Finally there are still wider considerations, such as bureaucratisation and the military-civil imbalance. The overall conclusion would seem to be that the situation will bear continued watching, especially given the Soviet commitment to build on its strength in technology, but that the United States system is still distinctly ahead on points. One wonders whether American QSEs are not also, on the whole, a good deal happier.

University of Manchester ROGER WILLIAMS

NATO's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense. Edited by David S. Yost. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1981. 258 pp. Index. $29.50.*

The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and NATO. *Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger for the Atlantic Council, Washington and Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Harper & Row, London.) 232 pp. Index. £13·95.*

THE first of these books is a collection of essays which examines issues in the evolution of NATO policy and the development of NATO strategy. It opens with a collection of four pieces on 'The Context for Defence Decisions'. Joseph Douglass looks at the Soviet threat to NATO, Peter Vigor assesses lessons for NATO from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, John P. Rose deals with the rather erratic development of United States army doctrine in the face of the development of nuclear weapons and Richard Burt writes about 'The Hidden Nuclear Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance'. They are all substantial and robust pieces; and, as David Yost points out in his introduction, the way in which the sets of arguments are produced offers an insight into the different style with which analysts on either side of the Atlantic imbue their conclusions as well as the different perspectives from which threats and the interpretation of events are viewed. However, they have this in common: none of them is comforting, and I suppose that the general argument of this section of the book might be summed up in Richard Burt's phrase that 'the basic problem confronting the alliance is that Western governments no longer possess a common view of the security predicament confronting NATO' (p. 46). (Incidentally there is a rather amusing proofreading error on page 51; as printed the phrase comes out as 'cruise millies'. One wonders whether these have the same function as the Wilis in *Giselle*.)

The second section of the book contains three contributions about arms control. Robin Ranger makes distinctions about the difference between political and technical arms control which raise interesting, though not unfamiliar, questions about both policy and purpose. John Keliher asks succinctly whether MBFR has a future and suggests that, if many of the existing preconceptions are changed, it might. David Yost has a paper on 'SALT and European Security'. This too concludes on a gloomy note:

'Indeed, SALT's symbolic value in Western Europe is such that any new approach to SALT by the United States will have to be pursued with great care if alliance cohesion is to be maintained'. (p. 137).

The third section is about specific defence options with Samuel T. Cohen on the neutron bomb and William R. Graham on reducing the vulnerability of retaliatory forces and command, control and communications. Thomas A. Callaghan argues that 'Nuclear parity requires conventional parity' and Uwe Nerlich analyses chemical warfare policy alternatives. These are all substantial papers in their own right and, although they start from different perspectives, have considerable value in explaining the frequent dominance of technical issues in national and alliance policy evaluation.

Finally Seymour Weiss and Kenneth Adelman argue in the last section of the book that 'Quick fixes are not enough' for healing NATO. And David Yost contributes an interesting and thorough note about sources for research on European security, in which he makes, as far as I can see, only one mistake—to identify D. C. Watt as the Director of Chatham House.

As a collection of essays, this book has a great deal to commend it, and it is prefaced with a typically astringent foreword by Ambassador Strausz-Hupe.

The second book is also a collection of essays and papers, developed under the leadership of the Joint Working Group on the common security interests of Japan, the United States and NATO. It is introduced with a note by Ambassador Kenneth Rush and Dr Masamichi Inoki of the Japanese Research Institute for Peace and Security and is the first-fruit of a joint policy project by the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Research Institute. It has a greater thematic coherence than David Yost's collection in so far as the body of scholars and commentators brought together by the institutes have discussed and reviewed all the contributions at some length; and the overall conclusions of the exercise are introduced in a chapter which also includes some recommendations. There is nothing surprisingly novel about any of the conclusions but the arguments which support them are worked out in the course of the book with a good deal of thoughtfulness and occasionally some new material (e.g. a very interesting and suggestive paper by Mineo Nakajima on 'An Outlook on China in the 1980s; a political turnabout at home and improvement of relations with the USSR'). I have to say, however, that the title of the book is misleading to the extent that, in the text and in the argument, there is not a great deal about what NATO's collective interests are. In the light of the evidence we have from David Yost's collection that the entity that we know as NATO is not all at one over all issues, it seems slightly surprising that such a book should have offered generalities about NATO that are rather simplistic. It is better viewed as a good book about United States-Japanese security relationships.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The Discipline of Politics. By Jean Blondel. *London: Butterworth. 1981. 222 pp. Index. £12·00. Pb.: £5·95.*

ONE must admire Professor Blondel's boldness. He sets out—in just over 200 pages—to survey and assess the progress of the study of politics since 1945. Whatever doubts one may have about the wisdom of the enterprise, one certainly gets a vivid impression of the variety and vigour with which the discipline has developed. There are chapters on survey and voting research, bureaucracy and policy-making, the model building craze of the 1960s and the politics of development, the problem of

quantification, the place of political theory, and comparative politics. The style is partly narrative—picking out and briefly discussing the landmarks in the literature—and partly theoretical—trying to explain the difficulties raised by new departures and attempts made to overcome them. The pieces of the jigsaw are made to fit together very neatly and one cannot fail to be impressed by the very wide range of material with which Blondel is familiar.

Breadth of coverage, however, is necessarily at the expense of depth and there is, perhaps inevitably, a fair amount of skating. In the narrative sections Blondel too frequently does enough to suggest that he understands the works he is discussing, but not enough to communicate that understanding to the reader. For example, I cannot imagine a novice getting much enlightenment from the account of Herbert Simon's work in chapter 3, and the treatment of Oakeshott and Strauss in chapter 6 is perfunctory.

But the theoretical—or perhaps one should say methodological—parts of the book are both more interesting and more frustrating. Frustrating because too frequently problems are tackled in a way which seems slightly out of focus or off target: interesting because Blondel is tackling what remain very much live issues. As the book proceeds it becomes increasingly concerned with questions of method, accurately reflecting the basic uncertainty in many academic students of politics about the status of their discipline. What is Blondel's own position? Of course he regards himself as a political scientist and, though he avoids any direct discussion of 'science', for most of the book one might be forgiven for thinking that he takes this in a fairly simplistic way. Thus he says much of the importance of generalisation and the inadequacy of single-country institutional studies; he is enthusiastic about quantification and mathematical techniques; he attacks 'traditionalists' concerned with maintaining 'the "museum" of the political theory of the past.' But then, in the penultimate chapter, easily—I think—the best in the book, he expresses clearly and sanely a much more pragmatic view: we are not ready to construct grand models or broad generalisations; rather, we must concentrate on the collection of more facts, largely it seems after all by conventional institutional studies aided by new techniques; though we shall also of course want to make modest 'middle-range' comparisons between political systems. Perhaps Blondel's position can be best explained by using a phrase which he himself uses in his discussion of mathematical methods. The researcher using mathematical techniques cannot expect to be sure in advance that these techniques are going to be successful; what is needed is an initial 'act of faith'. For Blondel, political science seems itself to be an act of faith—be confident that it will be possible and get on with the research; don't waste time fretting about the theoretical difficulties. This may be an admirable position for the practical researcher and for one like Professor Blondel who has done much to encourage and help the research efforts of others; whether it is the best standpoint from which to write a book largely concerned with the methodological problems of the discipline of politics, I am less sure.

University of Lancaster GORDON HAND

Consensus and Beyond. By Alan Warde. *Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1982. 243 pp. £19·50.*

THE literature on the Labour Party is already so substantial that any further book must face the challenge—has it anything fresh to say? Alan Warde is concerned with ideas and attitudes rather than events or personal rivalries. He sets out the bases for conflicting beliefs and maintains a high level of analytical commentary. The theme of the book is best set out in the author's own words:

> My contention is that inter-party conflict can best be understood in terms of competing strategies, where strategy is more than ideology and where segments, as bearers of strategy, are not reducible simply to organised groups with boundaries identifiable through the conscious appropriation of a group identity. To understand the cleavages and the trajectory of the Party its members must be seen as collective bearers of social interests within a complex social system which is a severe constraint on both consciousness and action.

Each chapter deals with a separate school of thought in a specific period. They cover the postwar settlement, Social Reformism, Fundamentalism, Technological Collectivism, the social contract and the contribution of the Tribune Group. It is inevitable that there is a certain amount of repetition with references to events; however, some repetition is unnecessary. Crossman's summary of the achievements and limitations of the Attlee Government comes at the beginning of chapter 2 and occurs again at the start of chapter 3. Nor does the use of a rather sociological style of English increase the impact of the work. Another limitation is that little is said about the more extreme views that are to be found within the Labour Party. The period covered is 1945–79 and the author may well have felt that within this time-span the ideas of the Militant Tendency were not a major influence within the Party, yet *Consensus and Beyond* does not seem to prepare us for the great divide and the rancour which split the Labour Party in 1981.

Wilson's technocratic approach to politics in 1964 proved in practice to be a total failure. Alan Warde notes that the most lasting achievements of this period were libertarian type reforms. These reforms were obtained through private members' legislation and had little to do with the party's 1964 manifesto. However, they did reflect the social mood that helped to produce the election results of 1964 and 1966. It follows that what actually happens may have little to do with government intentions, even when ministers have a firm parliamentary majority. That is a lesson which all politicians would do well to ponder.

University of Southampton PETER G. RICHARDS

Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies. Edited by Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonske. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1982. 340 pp. Index. No price mentioned.*

ONE of the disadvantages of essays presented at conferences which are later edited (how stringently?) and published in volume form is that they invariably relate only tenuously to a common theme or treatment. Another is that the standard of the contributions is extremely variable. Both comments apply to *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats*, despite the prestigious list of contributors and the thirty-six participants whose collective scholarly expertise helped, one must assume, to improve the papers.

In attempting to give some coherence to so eclectic a range of contributions, Dr Kolkowicz in his introduction has provided an almost classic case for heterogeneity: claiming to be delving in the 'penumbral area' outside Kuhn's sphere of 'normal science', the volume's focus, he states, is concerned with new approaches within the field of civil and military institutions and the dynamics of their interactions. This was meant to entail breaking from traditional methods, 'characterised by a set of historically idiosyncratic circumstances and by a certain parochialism', by scrutinising the dominant approaches to civil-military relations in developed, developing and

socialist societies, and by focusing with new insight on the role of the military as a modernising force.

Little would be gained by considering in this limited space the thirteen separate contributions, collectively divided into three parts: civil-military relations in the Middle East; those in socialist societies; and the role of the military and systemic change. Certainly there is little among them that falls outside 'normal science' and which could be classed as being encompassed in the penumbra of unorthodoxy. Nevertheless, the final part contains much that could go some way to justify the editors' bold claim that the volume marked an important single step in our understanding of civil-military relations.

Professor Finer's 'Morphology of Military Regimes', however, deserves special mention, as does, perhaps, Kolkowicz's scathing riposte to William Odom's parochial and narrow view of Soviet civil-military relations. Although his paper was not presented at the conference, Finer has brought to the book the same combination of penetrating incisiveness, ingenuity, and revealing diagnosis for which his earlier *Man on Horseback* was justly acclaimed. Indeed, his chapter makes a valuable continuation of that book, and his taxonomy—in terms of art, not science—of military regimes offers a useful classification system. His return to the field is most welcome.

For students of civil-military relations in general, there is a fair case for recommending the volume; for regional specialists on the Middle East or socialist societies, the incentive has to be marginal, at best. Its claim to be the first to break down disciplinary boundaries in the study of the military is both exaggerated and extravagant.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations. Edited by Peter Willetts. *London: Pinter. 1982. 225 pp. Index. £14·50. Pb. £5·95.*

THIS book is to some degree a pioneer work. The idea grew out of a discussion at a British International Studies Association (BISA) conference in 1979, and the contributors were enabled to meet to co-ordinate their drafts by a grant from the Barrow and Geraldine Cadbury Trust. The existing literature on multinational corporations and on international governmental institutions is not yet matched by studies of issue-oriented pressure groups, and this work is one of a Global Politics Series issued by the publisher comprising studies of the external relations of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in different countries and their effects on both national and international politics.

There are contributions, all but one by leading activists, on the Anti-Apartheid Movement by Abdul Minty, on the PLO by David Gilmour, on Amnesty International by Martin Ennals, on Oxfam by Elizabeth Stamp, on Friends of the Earth by Tom Burke, and on international linkages in the women's rights movement by Georgina Ashworth, together with case studies on the Swedish governmental response to pressure groups by Olle Dahlén, and on the participation of NGOs in the activities of the UN High Commission for Refugees by Gilbert Jaeger. Peter Willetts has written an important introduction on pressure groups as transnational actors and a concluding chapter on their impact on global politics. There are appendices on consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and an index of NGOs.

As might be expected, consultation notwithstanding, the styles and scopes of the contributors vary widely. Nevertheless the work will be of value in affording a ready source of concise but authoritative accounts of the histories, structures and objectives

of the six NGOs described. In most cases ample bibliographic references are provided. Every reader will doubtless wish that other institutions had been included—I regret the absence of the Pugwash movement on science and world affairs—but neither the political importance nor the variety of the six can be denied. Their theoretical significance is very briefly discussed by Peter Willetts, who distinguishes groups that act to protect the sectional interests of members from promoticnal groups that seek to support causes arising from specific sets of attitudes.

The significance of this collection of essays resides not in the rather slender analysis offered so much as in the empirical information they contain. The book may raise slightly greater expectations among adherents of the global politics paradigm than it can satisfy; but it probably affords more factual material of interest to Realists, Marxists and Functionalists than they or Dr Willetts may be inclined to suspect. One certainly hopes so. This book provides a point of departure for exploration across a relatively uncharted field.

University of Surrey A. V. S. DE REUCK

The Political Economy of Food Aid. By John Cathie. *London. Gower: 1982. 190 pp. Index. £14·50.*

FEW subjects are more fraught with pitfalls for the unwary than food aid. To the uninformed but well-intentioned onlooker the news that developed countries can produce more food than they need seems the most hopeful means by which the problems of hunger and malnutrition which afflict so many people in poorer countries can be relieved. Those who suggest otherwise seem to be defying common sense as well as demonstrating hardness of heart.

Understandably this 'practical' view is accepted with some enthusiasm by the food producers of the Western developed countries. In place of the need to trim costs and reduce the rate of growth of output in response to the logic of an oversupplied market there is the apparently infinite need which grows with the rising population of the world's poorer countries. Not only does this avoid unpleasantness at home, it also provides a moral basis for further expansion.

To those who share this perception John Cathie's book will provide important new insight. It gives a careful analysis of experience in the provision and utilisation of food aid since the 1960s and affords a scholarly synthesis of the views of academics, bureaucrats and those who 'benefit' from food aid. The book's perspective is objective and although its conclusions will not please all who read it, they cannot be lightly dismissed. In essence these are that food aid provided to cover emergency 'famine' situations can be effective and is superior to financial aid. As an instrument of general development policy it suffers from some serious drawbacks and limitations.

The title of this book stresses the 'political economy' of food aid. The emphasis is right. Food aid, whether from the United States or the EEC, has arisen as a result of economic accidents associated with political decisions. Surpluses have been the basis of providing cheap food for poor countries. These surpluses have to be removed from normal domestic markets in order to sustain prices. Thus their constitution and volume is not the result of planning to use rich countries' resources to benefit the poor, but of the priorities of domestic agricultural policy. As Cathie shows, when more effective means of cutting surplus cereal production evolved in the United States, via the 'set aside' programme, the volume of food provided on concessional terms was sharply reduced.

Again this volume stresses the important political dimension of aid for world trade and for recipient countries. The search for a system less liable to lead to food being

used as a political lever, forcing poor countries to adopt attitudes agreeable to the donor, is of long standing. One particularly valuable chapter traces the trials and tribulations of those seeking to create and operate multilateral food agencies since 1943. The history helps to put current issues in perspective. The performance suggests that despite considerable good will and substantial resources, there exists neither the political will nor the economic insight to ensure the success of food aid projects on a multilateral basis.

This review is able to give only an indication of the many useful, thought-provoking points raised by Cathie's book. There are some blemishes. For example, it is not satisfactory in a book published in 1982 to have some tables and comments based on data no more recent than 1973. Again some issues are oversimplified. The role of the CAP in the Community and the total cost of EEC support for agriculture are both more complex than is suggested. However, this is a good, useful book. For students an excellent bibliography increases its attraction. For all who share its concern, it provides a well written, carefully balanced and penetratingly observed approach to the potentials and perils of food aid.

University of Aberdeen JOHN S. MARSH

The Recalcitrant Rich: A Comparative Analysis of the Northern Responses to the Demands for a New International Economic Order. Edited by Helge O. Bergesen *et al. London: Pinter. 1982. 265 pp. Index. £13·75.*

The Contradictions of Foreign Aid. By Desmond McNeill. *London: Croom Helm. 1981. 114 pp. Index. £10·95.*

THE recalcitrant rich discussed in this excellent book are the European states, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The real rich, who have exported their capital to 'runaway factories' where cheap labour and new energy-saving equipment have made much Western industry obsolescent, are not discussed. *The Recalcitrant Rich* does once mention the fact that in this depression Third World exports in manufactured goods now rank equally with primary products, but only to submerge this long-term trend with the correct observation that developing countries still play only a marginal role in the imports of manufactures into developed countries. Nevertheless, the subject matter of this book is important. The more noticeable effect of the depression has been that the response of the powerful West to the demands for a new order has been to protect their interests under the old order. The outcome of the debate has shown that the response of a few states has been more influential than the demands brought together under the rubric of the 'New International Economic Order'.

This subject is also suited to a workshop of the European Consortium for Political Research. Scandinavian countries have been unusually prominent in the diplomacy of NIEO. Both their disinterested contributions and the special interests of Norway, Denmark and Sweden are here fairly described in telling detail. The central chapters on Britain, Germany and France are mines of information. If I may single out the contribution of Marie-Claude Smouts on France, its breadth of view and literary quality are themselves a reflection of the special seriousness with which the French have treated NIEO. For those interested in UN affairs the chapter on Austria is good value. Students of the European Community are similarly well served by Udo Steffens' account of its role in the commodity negotiations although its concentration on the topic is disappointingly narrow. There is surprisingly no reference to the extent to which the European balance of payments depends on the surplus derived from trade with the Third World. As might be expected, the United States and the Soviet Union are less well served. Perhaps in keeping with its theme, the chapter on America

displays an astonishing dogmatic realism. And the chapter on the Soviet Union, Hungary and Yugoslavia contains much matter but lacks sensitivity to the diplomatic implications of NIEO for the Soviet Union. (An article by T. T. Gati on this subject appeared after the workshop met in March 1980.)

Great credit for the usefulness of this book must go to the editors, H. O. Bergesen, H. H. Holm and R. D. McKinlay. Their opening and concluding chapters on the substance, the diplomacy and the outcome of NIEO are now essential reading. They have succeeded in disciplining their contributors to mould their accounts and explanations of a colourfully representative group of states on an identical pattern. Discussants have been encouraged to improve the quality of the contributions. Occasional recourse to heavy humour is to be expected from an international gathering of political scientists.

Desmond McNeill's book is much slighter, concentrating on the aid process on the basis of British practical experience. Modestly and with great clarity he sets out the motives and methods of the two bureaucracies generally involved, the aid-giving and the aid-receiving agency. His theme is that the primary responsibility for the present difficulty in using well even the small sums available lies with the donor. He argues that donors may be better advised to discharge this responsibility by granting greater freedom to recipient 'partners' than to accept the specious case for more controls, investigations and consultants.

University of Keele C. J. BREWIN

International Financial Co-operation: A Framework for Change. By Frances Stewart and Arjun Sengupta. *London: Pinter; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 204 pp. Index. £13·00.*

THIS stimulating book argues persuasively that modifications are needed in the way in which the international financial system operates. Published at a time when progress towards a New International Economic Order is flagging, it shows various ways in which significant benefits might be conferred on poor countries without necessitating a fundamental redrafting of the existing order. An important component of these reforms is exclusive action by countries of the South.

Frances Stewart and Arjun Sengupta argue that the international economic environment has changed markedly since the beginning of the 1970s. The Bretton Woods system has collapsed, the price of oil has risen dramatically, inflation has accelerated and unemployment has risen. Following 1973–74 huge balance of payments disequilibria were created with surpluses in OPEC countries and deficits in oil-less developing countries, and for a time in industrial countries as well. A large part of the book deals with the recycling problem to which this has given rise. The authors examine various ways in which both the efficiency and equity of the recycling mechanism may be improved in the future. They recognise that many of these reforms, though worthwhile, will be of primary benefit to middle income countries. They argue that the problems faced by the low income and least developed countries are more intractable and that a substantial redirection of aid to these countries is required. They go on to suggest that aid should be 'stretched' by the use of subsidies and by aid blending. The finance for subsidies could come from further sales of gold by the IMF.

Turning more specifically to the IMF, Stewart and Sengupta feel that while IMF conditionality, as operated, may not be appropriate to the needs of developing countries, the attitude of the Third World has been too negative: rejecting IMF conditions without positively seeking alternatives. They propose that a body should be

established to identify alternative packages and to advise countries in payments difficulties. As far as international currency reform is concerned the authors feel that the interests of developing countries would be best served by a move towards an SDR based system. Two other broad policy suggestions arise from the experiences of the 1970s. The first is that the South should investigate options, such as the Third World Agency, export credits, a payments union, and perhaps even a Southern IMF, that do not rely on support from the North. The second is that a World Development Council should be set up to give advice on world economic management and to avoid the sort of global macro-economic mismanagement which it is argued followed the initial rise in the price of oil.

As this brief summary shows, Stewart and Sengupta have written a book bulging with ideas. Given their space constraint it is only to be expected that many of these are not always fully developed or analysed, though in certain cases they have been elsewhere. The book is that much more enjoyable and interesting for arguing a specific case. Apart from a number of minor criticisms the major worries about it are first, the central focus placed on OPEC: there is legitimate debate over just how durable the OPEC surplus is. In any case the degree of solidarity between OPEC and other developing countries that is assumed may not actually exist. South-South divisions may be as much a barrier to reform as North-South ones. Second, the idea of a World Development Council, though appealing, is surely as pie in the sky as many of the ideas the book itself attacks for being unrealistic.

University of Surrey GRAHAM BIRD

From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations 1955-1980. By Angela Stent. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for Soviet and East European Studies. 1981. 328 pp. £22·50.*

THIS volume is a comprehensive and yet very readable analysis of West German-Soviet relations over the past twenty-five years. It follows the intricacies of the Federal Republic of Germany's policy from a time when it was dominated by the cold war, through the evolution of *Ostpolitik*, to the present day when West Germany plays a central role in the West's policies towards the Soviet Union, at least in terms of East-West economic relations.

The book is, however, more than a study of German *Ostpolitik*. It also has a contribution to make to the current debate on East-West economic relations. Differences between the American and European approaches to East-West trade are often put down to Europe's special political and economic interests in maintaining stable economic relations with the East. As German interests in economic links with the Soviet Union are of particular importance, such a study is indeed very timely. Its analytical framework also provides some useful insights into the links between East-West trade and political relations in general, by discussing German experience in this field. In so doing the book provides some striking parallels with the current debate within the Western Alliance. Not only is there a 1962 equivalent of the Urengoi pipeline, but then as now transatlantic cooperation was complicated by American insistence that American grain exports to the Soviet Union were not of strategic importance whilst European exports of energy equipment were.

Since the early months of 1982 the debate within the NATO Alliance has shifted from the Urengoi gas pipeline to credits, and more precisely, to whether the West should grant credits to the Soviet Union and, if so, under what conditions. Here also Angela Stent provides some invaluable historical background, and some very relevant policy analysis.

Based on German experience of linkage in its relations with the Soviet Union the book concludes that using economic relations as a lever will not force the Soviet Union to make any significant political concessions in foreign policy. Linkage may be effective when secondary issues of prestige or influence are at stake, but only when the economic gains are commensurate with the political gains. The book also warns that trade cannot serve as a guarantee for political stability and detente.

Chatham House STEPHEN WOOLCOCK

Political Capacity in Developing Societies. By A. H. Somjee. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 124 pp. Index. £15·00.*

MOST of the existing literature on political development, particularly with regard to developing societies, deals with political systems *per se*, their emergence, structure, growth, performance and related characteristics, but says very little about the political capacity of individuals, i.e. the way people develop and respond to political systems, their ability to manipulate and change them, or simply to make those who govern them accountable for their actions. This book is an attempt to fill this gap in our knowledge and understanding of the political process in developing countries.

It starts off by offering a critique of some of the concepts of political development. This is rather superficially done; the author does not stamp his authority on the book or set out clearly and consistently the principal issues and forms of analysis which he intends to adopt and how these differ from or build on the existing corpus of information. This is followed in chapter 2 by a discussion of the factors and forces which have constrained the development of political capacity in India, a country which he has studied in some detail. He is obviously on firmer ground here though he does not provide any new insights or adequate footnotes and cross-references to existing work in the field.

Four additional case studies—Japan, Yugoslavia, Mexico and Nigeria—are presented in chapter 3, mainly for the purpose of presenting a comparative perspective on the impediments to the development of political capacity. The author argues that in the case of Japan, the principal factors inhibiting the development of political capacity have been the traditional structure of social influence and the deeply ingrained norms of communal harmony. In Yugoslavia, political ideology and the peculiar role assigned to the party and bureaucracy are seen as the main impediments to the development of political capacity. Mexico is given as a case of unextended participation in which a section of the elite manipulates the political system to the almost total exclusion of the vast majority of the population; while in Nigeria, it is the inability of party organisations to build secular collectivities across the ethnic divide which is responsible.

These case studies are interestingly presented and the arguments well made, though there is some imbalance between the treatment given to India as against the others. One also feels the comparative perspective could have been more fully developed. Each case study more or less stands on its own, and consequently it is difficult to establish the main conclusions or forms of analysis for further work. His final chapter, 'Rethinking and Reformulation of the Problem of Political Development' reads like an introduction rather than a conclusion. While, therefore, the subject matter is largely unexplored, one feels the author tried to pack too much into a small volume, probably doing himself an injustice in the process.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

European Environmental Policy: East and West. By Josef Füllenbach. Trans. by F. Carter and J. Manton. *London: Butterworth. 1982. 255 pp. Index. £20·00.*

ENVIRONMENTAL damage has become a major problem in Europe, an area of high population density, heavy industrialisation and a longstanding dedication to materialist values. Traditionally, controls over issues such as pollution, the use of the physical environment and the responsibility to provide clean water or waste disposal services have lain with national governments and one function of this book is to describe the relevant legislation existing in East Germany, Russia, Czechslovakia and Poland. In the main, these countries have been relative late-comers to the field and it is suggested that this is due to several reasons, ranging from more recent industrialisation, to the desire to show a rapid rate of growth and so to catch up with the West, to a reluctance to accept that socialist societies do not automatically work to the good of the total community and the individuals within it.

Dr Füllenbach also argues that both liberal and Marxist economics have been inadequate intellectual disciplines for the assessment of environmental costs and their dismissive attitude has encouraged the general neglect of the environment. However, in practice, both sides of the political divide are becoming increasingly concerned with the ecological limits on growth.

Some of today's issues are self-evidently international in scope. Examples include the joint use and misuse of rivers and seas, air pollution and transnational concentrations of industry. Growing international interdependence through trade sharpens the appreciation of the possible effects on international competition if national standards are not harmonised. Thus there is scope for international co-operation.

It is perhaps not surprising that the most advanced form of international regulation is to be found in organisations whose membership expresses a relatively high degree of political consensus. Thus the EEC has begun the establishment of its own environmental policy. On the other hand, attempts at action through the Economic Commission for Europe, or those resulting from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have had more limited success. However, in these cases, there can genuinely be a wider range of state interests to accommodate and varying levels of economic development which affect the willingness to spend money on environmental improvement; difficulties are not always the result of political mistrust. The case study of bilateral co-operation between East and West Germany is thus one of the more interesting, for a number of such factors are present. Whilst, in general, the East seems to drag its feet more often it is as well to bear in mind that the author considers that the recession has led to a loss of interest in the West in environmental matters.

The study sees some cause for optimism in recent developments, itemising the Baltic Convention of 1974, various agreements over the Danube and the European Conference on the Environment (ECE) of 1979. It must be said, however, that it is the pitifully slow progress that is made, especially in the author's preferred forum of the ECE, that comes over most strongly. The analysis suggests that fairly precise conditions need to be met before international control succeeds and these are not often present. The study contains a wealth of detail but the general issues are sometimes in danger of submerging in it.

University of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

LAW

Law and Power in International Relations. By James Fawcett. *London: Faber. 1982. 140 pp. £9·50.*

INTERNATIONAL law and power are all too frequently seen as separate, self-contained entities, with the result that the significance of international law is often badly misunderstood. The strength of this book lies in its emphatic denial of such a separation. Both law and power, Professor Fawcett points out, are essential for the organisation and functioning of a community. And although he thinks that the international scene has not yet developed into a full community, he is nevertheless clear about the importance in international relations of the legal element. Sometimes, he says, it has a symbolic or tactical role. More substantively, it provides a necessary basis for regularity of behaviour, for some predictability, for the observance of minimum standards, and for the organisation of international regimes. There is, the author argues, a common interest in these matters. Accordingly, there is a common interest in the maintenance of international law—not as some esoteric conceptual scheme but as something which is intertwined with the interests and policies of states.

The elaboration of this general theme, however, cannot be accounted a success. At the beginning it is announced that the book will not deal with theories or models, but what follows is a fairly lengthy chapter which discusses in a very general way how international law and power are related. A matrix is constructed, consisting of authority, national interests, influence and coercion, and common objectives. Here, surely, is a kind of theory. But when the author goes on to examine certain specific issues in the context of his general propositions, the latter are not pursued in a systematic way. Instead we have some largely descriptive and lawyerly accounts, in chapters of varying lengths, of power frontiers, economic issues, human rights, and non-intervention. The UN's 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is given in an annex, but there is no index. Provocative remarks are sometimes made—for example, that instruments 'such as' (p. 28) the Briand-Kellogg Pact should be denied legal status—but are not followed up. Thus the book whets the appetite but fails to satisfy it. That, at least, is what this reviewer regretfully concludes.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

Antarctic Law and Politics. By F. M. Auburn. *London: Hurst. 1982. 361 pp. Index. £17·50.*

PROFESSOR Auburn, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Western Australia and a leading authority on the legal regime of Antarctica, could hardly have written a more timely study, for recent events in the Falklands will have implications for Antarctica and *vice versa.* The immediate occasion for the volume, however, is the increased attention being given to Antarctica as a consequence of resource regimes that have emerged since the early 1970s and the sundry strains the negotiation of these regimes have placed upon the original Antarctic Treaty system.

The volume considers essentially two broad aspects of Antarctica. The first covers the legal regime from the standpoint of claims to sovereignty and the myriad notions of discovery, annexation, effective occupation, sectors or acts that states and publicists have advanced over the centuries; a succinct account of national interests in Antarctica, especially those of the United States and the Soviet Union; the Treaty framework; the Treaty system in operation; problems with jurisdiction over crime, civil matters, and family relations. Attention then shifts to particular resources (krill,

oil, gas) and the environmental implications of developing them. Reproduced as appendices are the Antarctic Treaty, the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, and extracts from materials of the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. There are four maps and an excellent twenty-page bibliography.

Professor Auburn is sceptical about the genuineness of governments' interests in basic scientific research and in environmental protection. Much Antarctic activity, he implies, has been motivated rather by the desire to stake territorial claims or to forestall others in doing so, and, more recently, the desire of present Antarctic powers to secure the exclusiveness of their 'club'. As the number of Antarctic powers grows, the Treaty framework, he suggests, will prove to be more unwieldy, yet schemes for internationalisation of the regime enjoy no evident support among the 'club'. On the other hand, the wider issues of global politics penetrate but rarely into Antarctica, although active resource exploitation could change that pattern. The author is concerned about the plurality of treaty regimes emerging to regulate the Antarctic.

Many issues treated by the author transcend the region itself. Some, such as the legal status of ice, or the use of icebergs, affect polar regions in general. Others are relevant to larger considerations of multipartite regulation of regional concerns and decision-making within international regimes on the Antarctic model, particularly mechanisms for dispute settlement. The author has used to excellent effect both the legal materials and more general scientific literature on his subject; the only consequential gap—and it exists for the Antarctic literature generally—is Soviet doctrine and practice. None of the twenty to twenty-five Soviet legal works on the subject, including the essay in the *Atlas Antarktiki*, have been consulted; doubtless V. V. Golitsyn's monograph on Antarctica, expected to appear in 1983, will shed further light.

University College, London W. E. BUTLER

HISTORY

The Other Ultra: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan. By Ronald Lewin. *London: Hutchinson. 1982. 322 pp. Index. £10·95.*

THE adjective 'other' in the title to this excellent book has a double meaning which will not be lost upon historians of the Second World War. It refers not only to the Pacific as opposed to the European theatre, but also to the fact that this is a sister-volume to Ronald Lewin's very successful *Ultra Goes to the War*. In the Pacific campaign, too, it now appears that older histories will have to be re-written in the light of the fact that one side knew, much of the time, what the other side was up to. American cryptographers could feed their chiefs the intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code ('Magic') and, even more significantly, of the Japanese naval and military codes ('Ultra').

This advantage was, it must be added, neither assured nor continuous. There were frequent periods when the Japanese codes could not be cracked; at other times, there was simply too much material to decypher before military actions broke out. The surprise which Japan achieved in its strike at Pearl Harbour is a salutary reminder that a mass of decyphered 'raw' information is of little strategic value by itself unless it is subjected to intelligent and imaginative assessment. Nor is correct judgement alone sufficient if the country concerned lacks the arms and the men to take advantage of its superior knowledge.

The great merit of Ronald Lewin's book is, therefore, that he eschews the sensationalist, journalistic claim that Ultra was the wonder-weapon which 'won' the Pacific war; and that, instead, he soberly and clearly shows where and how it fitted into the American campaigns. It was thus no coincidence that the United States carriers were correctly positioned for the battle of Midway; that Admiral Yamamoto's plane was intercepted by enemy fighters; and that American submarines had the apparently uncanny knack of encountering Japanese merchantmen. Given the immense economic strength and armaments productivity of the United States by the end of 1942, it is hardly likely that Japan would have been able to hold on to its territorial gains in the Pacific in any case. What 'Magic' and 'Ultra' did was to make its task even more difficult.

The Other Ultra is, then, not merely a new book bearing fresh information from the Washington archives; it is also an excellent synthesis of the overall war against Japan (though there is nothing substantial here on the Burma campaign), and one of the most important works in this field. Written with Lewin's usual clarity, and attractively priced, it ought to appeal to the general reader as well as the specialist.

University of East Anglia PAUL KENNEDY

Mussolini. By Denis Mack Smith. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 429 pp. Index. £12·95.*

Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941. By MacGregor Knox. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 385 pp. Index. £22·50.*

DENIS MACK SMITH'S biography of Mussolini is likely to remain the standard life in English for a long time to come. It is lucid, lively and scholarly and is based on an unrivalled knowledge of the multifarious recent research in Italian so that it is more complete than any of its predecessors in English. It deals in a balanced way with the many legends created by Mussolini himself, some of which survived his death.

The limitations of the book are the limitations of any biographical approach. 'The focus,' Mack Smith states at the outset, 'is on the public life of one man, with only enough of the wider context and general background to make his career intelligible' (p. xiii). The result is that while we are given a vivid, convincing and sometimes very funny picture of Mussolini's character and career, we are still left wondering why this mountebank should have succeeded in imposing himself on the Italian people. Mack Smith rightly sees that one can only explain Mussolini's character if one sees him 'as an actor, a dissimulator, an exhibitionist who changed his role from hour to hour to suit the occasion' (pp. 112-13). He was indeed like an old-fashioned actor-manager ready to take on any part and relying on the very outrageousness of his hamming to make the public believe in his successive impersonations. In this he was helped by the other Fascist leaders who, as Mack Smith, says, 'all—even when jealous or rebellious—realised that their own future depended on his' (p. 123), and who accordingly contributed to the construction of the legend of the Duce who was always right and who could do anything. Mr Mack Smith shows that at the end of his life, in the isolation of Gargagno on Lake Garda, he 'was occasionally ready to recognise that he must have been deluded by flatterers into an excessive conceit; every day for years he had heard himself called a genius whose views on politics and economics—even on science and art—were infallible' (p. 311). Mostly, however, he was as convinced of his historical importance as ever and still saw himself as a superman who had been let down by the Italians—a judgement shared by Hitler—and who kept a file labelled 'immaturity and blameworthiness of the Italian people' (p. 283).

The Italians were not the only people taken in by Mussolini. Many foreigners too mistook him for a real statesman, perhaps to a greater extent than Mr Mack Smith allows. Both Austen Chamberlain and the British Foreign Office in the 1920s were convinced, in Chamberlain's words, 'that the Italian Prime Minister was inclining more and more to a League of Nations policy, and to a general attitude similar to that of Great Britain.' (*Documents on British Foreign Policy* Series Ia, Vol. I, No. 166, p. 292, footnote 2.) Hitler, while amused at Mussolini's posturing, nevertheless took him seriously and seems to have been almost the only person who actually *liked* Mussolini. The Mussolini depicted by Denis Mack Smith is an extremely repulsive man—cruel, vindictive, lying, boastful—even if his wickedness, unlike that of Hitler, remains on a human scale. Mr Mack Smith also brings out well the extent to which, like Hitler, Mussolini towards the end of his life increasingly lost his power of decision because of chronic ill-health, partly the result of earlier illnesses, including syphilis, but partly the result of his own dieting fads. This is a convincing portrait of a particularly nasty man; but we are still not entirely clear how he succeeded for so long in presenting himself to the Italians and others as a great and original political leader.

Professor MacGregor Knox has written an interesting detailed account of Mussolini's politics and strategy from the coming of the First World War until the end of 1941, when Italian defeats in Greece and North Africa led to Italy's subordination to Germany and what MacGregor Knox calls Italy's end as a Great Power. It is based on much new documentary material in the Italian archives and tells us much that is new about the actual workings of the Fascist political and military machine and adds to the standard accounts such as that in F. W. Deakin's *The Brutal Friendship*. On the whole MacGregor Knox's findings reinforce Mack Smith's broader picture of Mussolini's personality and methods. He was constantly pressing his timid and reluctant generals to undertake offensives without the necessary logistic preparation, simply because, as he put it, 'the army has need of glory'. What was important was 'that the country and the world should know that we are advancing' (p. 199). The result was that, as Ciano wrote shortly before his execution on the orders of his father-in-law Mussolini, 'One man alone, Mussolini, through unscrupulous personal ambitions, out of thirst for military glory . . . has deliberately led the nation into the bottomless pit' (p. 286). Professor MacGregor Knox has provided an excellent description and narrative of one crucial stage of this ride to the abyss.

JAMES JOLL

The United States and the Soviet Union: The Decision to Recognise. By John Richman. *Raleigh, NC: Camberleigh & Hall. 1981. 287 pp. Index. $21 95.*

WHEN first formulated in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine recommended that the United States should recognise *de facto* governments in Europe. As far as Russia was concerned, this basic principle was first applied and then infringed nearly a century later; in March 1917, the provisional government that was formed after the overthrow of the tsar gained recognition from the United States in a few days, but the Bolshevik government set up in November after the overthrow of Kerensky had to wait several years.

The reasons for the delay have been investigated by a number of scholars, most recently perhaps by Edward M. Bennett (*Recognition of Russia: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma*, 1970); John Richman's book, although by no means without a number of monographic forerunners, gives what is probably nevertheless the closest attention so far to the final event itself. It amply demonstrates how the State Department's experts, notably Robert F. Kelley, Chief of the Eastern Europe division,

were sticking to their view that recognition should not be accorded when the r
inaugurated Franklin D. Roosevelt moved towards acknowledgement of the fact ‹
Soviet government early in 1933. The President had little regard for the
Department officials, dismissively suggesting at one point that they were more wc
about the spelling of the word 'commissar' than about the real issue confronting t
namely the unnecessary inconvenience of having no direct official contact betwee
United States and the Soviet Union. True, once the decision was made in prin
there remained potential stumbling blocks, especially Stalin's reluctance to pay
incurred by Kerensky and Roosevelt's anxieties concerning Soviet restrictions o
free exercise of religious observance. To clinch the deal, an American emissar
sent to Moscow: none other than William Bullitt, who had worked with enthu
on behalf of Woodrow Wilson for acceptance at Versailles of Lenin's governmen
was now, albeit with some reluctance, acting on behalf of the FDR for recogniti
Stalin's. After a dinner at the Kremlin, Bullitt was sufficiently able to contai
astonishment at being kissed on the cheek by the Soviet leader to kiss him back.

However, if recognition were now—November, 1933—consummated, there
not to be much of a honeymoon, and disputes soon arose over financial and
problems. Mutual suspicion engendered at the time of the Bolshevik Revolutio
the American intervention could not be overcome, and distrust between the Pres
and the area specialists of the State Department also persisted. The experts conti
to submit warnings about Soviet intentions and Roosevelt conducted his own fo
policy in the pragmatic tradition of the Monroe Doctrine.

University of Aberdeen PAUL D

The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain, Sweden and the Iron Ore Question, 1
1940. By Thomas Munch-Peterson. *Stockholm. Militärhistoriska För*
1981. 296 pp. Index. Pb.

THE path of a neutral nation in a major war is a stony one. For Sweden, despe
trying to balance between Germany and Britain in 1939 and 1940, with the S
Union as a further potential threat to the east, the task was particularly irks
To make matters worse, restless elements in Britain and France, anxious for a
energetic prosecution of the war, pressed for military action, not on the We
Front, where a repetition of 1914-18 was a dreadful prospect to be avoided at all
but in Scandinavia, where the outbreak of the Winter War in 1939 between Fi
and the Soviet Union offered a suitable theatre for Allied operations. Entente mi
action here would, it was hoped, satisfy outraged Allied public opinion that some
positive was being done to counter Soviet aggression, enmesh the Soviet Uni
Finland and thus distract her from meddling in the Balkans and Asia and preven
future Soviet move against Northern Norway. Somehow Allied intervention had
achieved without involving the United Kingdom in a full-scale war with the S
Union, but with at least passive Norwegian and Swedish support, support v
neither country was prepared to extend. The real motive for intervention w
course, not assistance to the Finns, but the opportunity it would give the Enter
occupy Sweden's northern iron ore fields since, as Churchill put it, 'if Germany c
cut off from all Swedish ore supplies . . . till the end of 1940 a blow will have
struck at her war-making capacity equal to a first-class victory in the field' (p. 7
Germany intervened, so much the better, since the Entente might be able to inf
crushing defeat on her while, at the very least, the diversion of German reso
would prevent her from invading the West. The British were fixated with the da
which a severance of Swedish ore exports would inflict on the German econom

might, Chamberlain thought, even bring down the Hitler regime—and various schemes were contemplated, ranging from sabotage in the iron ore fields and ports of exportation, the mining of Norwegian territorial waters and the Allied seizure of Narvik to Allied landings at Petsamo, followed by an advance to the Lapland iron ore fields. After the Treaty of Moscow of March 13, 1940 ended the Soviet-Finnish hostilities, the Finland plan naturally collapsed, but alternative schemes, such as the occupation of Narvik and other Western Norwegian ports, continued to be adumbrated until these were forestalled by the German invasion of Norway on April 9, 1940. The rest of the story is well known.

This is an excellent analysis of the complex issues involved in the Scandinavian imbroglio. It is based on careful research in the Swedish and British archives and, in the British case, brings out the volatile and inconsistent nature of the reactions to intervention by the leading British personalities. It was probably, and fortunately, this very inconsistency which inhabited positive British action. Realism kept breaking through and the doubts and hesitations display occasional awareness of the awesome risks and dangers involved in the undertaking.

King's College, London M. L. DOCKRILL

WESTERN EUROPE

Direct Elections to the European Parliament: A Community Perspective. By Juliet Lodge and Valentine Herman. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 322 pp. Index. £20·00.*

THE title here may be misleading. This book is not just another speculative essay on the longer-term implications of the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament. Nor is it an attempt to assess the political consequences of the results of the first direct election held in 1979, which would probably have been a task undertaken prematurely. Part one of the book describes the organisation of information campaigns run by the Commission and the European Parliament for the 1979 election. It also discusses technical and political problems met by those campaigns in the German Federal Republic, Great Britain and the Netherlands. In these respects the book lends support to the impression that both the Commission and the Parliament were primarily concerned to ensure a high turnout of voters and saw the election above all as a major step towards European integration. Part two deals with the role of the European organisations representing Christian Democrat, Liberal and Socialist parties and, in particular, with their part in the election. Most of the subject-matter of this part has already been dealt with more fully elsewhere. Part three considers the role of the European Broadcasting Union and offers a brief analysis of the election results. There are also short introductory and concluding chapters, dealing respectively with the background to the election, mainly in terms of public opinion, and with possible lessons to be drawn for the organisation of information campaigns in future elections to the European Parliament.

Much statistical information is reported in the book, derived mostly from official Community publications and from the Eurobarometer surveys. The style of writing gives every sign of hurried preparation, no doubt with the object of realising as much benefit as possible from publication before the campaign begins for the next election in 1984. But the lack of finish to the style makes the book very hard to read, not least because the authors have taken to what must be an intolerable extreme the modern tendency to use abbreviations. It would probably have been more rewarding to wait and to write a more polished, comprehensive account of the consequences of the first

direct election to the European Parliament, than to devote a book to subject-matter that is mainly fragmentary and tangential.

National Institute for Higher Education, Limerick DAVID COOMBES

The Other European Community: Integration and Co-operation in Nordic Europe. By Barry Turner and Gunilla Nordquist. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 307pp. Index. £12·95. Pb.: £7·95.*

THE title of this book might lead one to expect, essentially, an account of postwar efforts to institutionalise Nordic unity, in comparison with or contrast to the EEC. A good deal of information on that theme is certainly to be found here, but embedded in a more general narrative which traces developments in each of the countries concerned, and within a framework that is indicated by the opening statement (p. 25) that 'the history of 20th century Norden is the advance of social democracy', and by the concluding one (p. 297) that 'at the beginning of the eighties the best guess is that Norden will long retain its reputation as the social laboratory of the Western world'. Whatever that may mean, it puts matters on a rather different level of interest.

This is a pity, for there is need for a systematic study of the reasons why the undoubted cultural and ideological homogeneity of these five countries has not proved to be translatable into effective political or economic unity: and those reasons could in turn have wider implications, not least for the European Community itself. Will economic union lead to political union, without a definite act of political will? Can in fact economic union itself be achieved without a high degree of political unity? In the Nordic case, such factors as competing economies, geographical distance and sparseness of population, Atlantic versus Baltic orientation, the military (and emotional) consequences of the last war, the still comparatively recent enjoyment of nationhood by some of the countries concerned—these and perhaps other considerations have in practice served to block initiatives towards structural unity in the North (as illustrated by the limitations of both the parliamentary and the ministerial Councils, as well as by the failure of *Nordek*), which have thus had to be confined to lesser measures of administrative harmonisation. Indeed, the continuing pull of Scandinavian solidarity, with Denmark at present acting as bridge between the two Communities, may yet come to operate in reverse by inducing fresh moves by Norway and/or Sweden to join the EEC, for all the shifts of posture this will entail for them. (One recalls the *mot* current around 1970, that 'the Common Market was offered attractive terms for joining Sweden' . . .)

Apart from the wish that the authors had written a somewhat different book, concentrating less on the region's middle-of-the-road, egalitarian destiny, and more on an analysis of its attempted politico-economic integration, this one may be commended for the readable and informative survey it offers. The treatment of Sweden is particularly good; likewise that of Finland—despite the suggestion (p. 52) that the Soviet invasion of 1939 was aimed only at the territorial changes originally demanded, instead of (in fact) at total reabsorption of this former Tsarist duchy, under the terms of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. On Norway, there is some apparent contradiction between the statement on p. 159 that the anti-marketeers 'scraped home' in the referendum result and the description of this, 20 pages later, as a 'clear rejection of Europe': but the traumatic effect of that decision is given its rightful emphasis.

'Norden' has indeed yet to define its lasting place in the European scheme of things.

MICHAEL CULLIS

Contemporary French Political Parties. Edited by David S. Bell. *London: Croom Helm. 1982. 199 pp. Index. £13·95.*

Problems of Contemporary French Politics. By Dorothy Pickles. *London: Methuen. 1982. 160 pp. Index. £8·95. Pb.: £3·95.*

OVERALL, these two books complement each other and can be recommended to students despite a few 'warts'. Dorothy Pickles's book is not so much a schematic study as a commentary on party politics, foreign affairs and the presidential system. It is weakest on the first of these three, but this is where David Bell's symposium comes into play, without, however, producing a 'winning team' in all respects. Symposia are, of course, an awkward genre: they are bound to be uneven—as indeed this one is—and yet they can be very useful in a subject like politics, where up-to-date research and commentary is so important for students and teachers alike.

Mrs Pickles is at her best in analysing foreign and defence policy. She has a thorough grasp of the material in this area, writing with subtle nuance and real perception. Her main theme is that French foreign policy is dominated by history and self-interest. Of course, these two factors predominate in the foreign policy of all states, but Mrs Pickles argues convincingly that they are peculiarly dominating in the case of France. The history of French foreign relations over the last century or so has been dominated by Germany, and the most important theme in foreign policy throughout this period has been French determination to control and contain Germany. The policies and governmental structures, Mrs Pickles argues, have changed, but not the underlying themes. What distinguished Gaullist foreign policy from that which preceded and followed it was not so much content as style; de Gaulle was as much an accomplished con-man as a distinguished international statesman. Since de Gaulle's departure French foreign policy has become even more self-interested and less coherent. Mrs Pickles maintains, for example, that France has *no* European policy, only a *French* policy within Europe; and that France's policy of exporting arms indiscriminately to volatile countries is highly dangerous for world stability—moreover, this policy is unlikely to change under Mitterrand owing to the large number of arms workers employed on export contracts (perhaps as many as 100,000 jobs being dependent on these contracts).

There are times when Mrs Pickles' criticisms are a little too sharp and sneering, for example with reference to progress towards European integration during the very difficult decade of the 1970s. Journalists regularly ignore Spinoza's famous advice: 'Do not laugh, do not weep, try to understand'. Political scientists should not forget the third of these commands. On the whole Mrs Pickles does not forget Spinoza's words in this perceptive and useful book, but at times she comes near to doing so. It is a pity, however, that this book does not have even a short bibliography, because it will be used mainly by students. Moreover, it contains far too many careless mistakes: there was no Chaban-Delmas government in 1968 (p. 55); there were no Poujadist MPs in 1952 (we are told there were 50—p. 67); de Gaulle did not make a speech about presidential power in 1974 (p. 128)—he died in 1970!; and the Communist Party was not in government in 1974 (p. 136).

David Bell is rapidly emerging as the leading entrepreneurial scholar in the field of French politics. He not only organises conferences on France, but does his best to get the conference papers published: this is not so easy, given publishers' reluctance to take on collective books. The present symposium arose out of a conference held before the French elections of 1981, but the authors of the nine essays have (where relevant) updated their essays to take account of these important elections. In a short review one cannot possibly comment on all nine essays: three on the Left, three on the Right, and three special cases. I thought that all the contributions on the Left were of a very high standard. Nugent discusses the strategies of the Socialists and Communists between

the Left's defeat in 1978 and victory in 1981. Howorth examines the PCF's attempts to adapt itself to the important sociological mutations which have been part and parcel of the modernisation of France: he concludes that the Communist leadership cannot make up its mind about France's 4-5 million 'intellectual workers'—it undoubtedly needs their votes, as its traditional bastion, the industrial proletariat, declines, but it fears that it will destroy its (mythical) 'revolutionary' image if it takes them on board. This is an excellent essay, clearly written, perceptive and based on thorough research. The same is true of the Fisera-Jenkins article on the PSU.

Cerny's essay on Gaullism is suggestive rather than conclusive. His view is that Gaullism was essentially the vehicle through which France modernised itself into an 'advanced capitalist society' (a rather fuzzy concept, as Cerny himself admits). But it could equally well be argued that economic and bureaucratic modernisation occurred before the Gaullists came to power, i.e. in the Fourth Republic. Actually, despite his unproven thesis, most of Cerny's article amounts to an orthodox and reliable history and analysis of Gaullism. Ella Searls' analysis of the Giscardians is also useful, but the standard of English and proofreading in this chapter is almost unbelievably bad.

Finally, of the special cases, the most scholarly are those by Hanley on CERES at the departmental level, and Graham on the SFIO just before and after World War II. This last essay is certainly interesting but is rather a maverick one in a book about *contemporary* French politics. Generally then, two useful books, but not without their blemishes.

University of Edinburgh R. E. M. Irving

Party Government and Political Culture in Western Germany. Edited by Herbert Döring and Gordon Smith. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 227 pp. £20·00.*
The West German Model: Perspectives on a Stable State. Edited by William E Paterson and Gordon Smith. *London: Cass. 1981. 176 pp. £13·50. Pb.: £8·50*

West Germany has come to be seen in recent years as the model of a well-functioning and prosperous liberal democracy, a large-scale version of Scandinavia or Switzerland. In Britain various features of the West German system have been singled out as the efficient secret of its success and held up as examples to be followed: an effective electoral system, producing and legitimating stable governments of the centre, sensible trade unions and industrial relations, sound economic management and a meritocratic society without entrenched class divisions. In France, too, in the days of Giscard, the German success, particularly in the economic sphere, provoked attempts at imitation. It was a strange reversal of the long and widely held belief in German deficiencies, amounting almost to original sin, which had culminated in the catastrophe of Nazism. The depth of earlier German failures also left nagging doubts about the permanence of current success: perhaps the Federal Republic was, after all, only a fair-weather democracy, which would succumb, like its predecessor, once the economic miracle turned sour.

The West German model—the reasons for its success as well as its possible weaknesses—is the theme of both these volumes. Inevitably there is a good deal of overlap between them and several authors contribute to both. The Döring-Smith volume, the product of a series of lectures held in London under the auspices of the Goethe Institute to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Federal Republic, is somewhat larger, more expensive and concerned more with longer-term trends; the Paterson-Smith volume deals more, though not exclusively, with the problems of the moment. A common thread in many of the contributions is the development of responsible party government in West Germany. This is the subject of

Peter Pulzer's wide-ranging article in the Macmillan volume; it also bulks large in most of the other contributions in this book, for example those by Gordon Smith, Kenneth Dyson, William Paterson, Geoffrey Pridham and Nevil Johnson and again in the contributions by all these authors except the last to *The West German Model*. It is a development which the Founding Fathers of the Federal Republic did not anticipate. One of their main preoccupations was to avoid the mistakes of Weimar, which arose in a context of legislative-executive conflict and a multi-party system. Thus some parts of the Bonn Basic Law—for example Article 67, providing for a constructive vote of no confidence, which forces the Bundestag to elect a new Chancellor by a majority of members before the incumbent can be dismissed—have, for the time being, become virtually redundant. This is a consequence of the rise of 'catch-all parties' or *Volksparteien*—first of the CDU/CSU and then gradually, facilitated by the Godesberg programme of 1959, of the SPD. One could see this, with Otto Kirchheimer, as part of a movement throughout Europe towards classless consumer societies leading to the death of ideology. Gordon Smith and others point out that West Germany exhibits the rise of catch-all parties more clearly than other major European countries like France and Italy. The reason may well be, not the end of class and ideology, but the exceptional degree of discredit into which the extremes of Right and Left have fallen in Germany. Another German paradox is, as Kenneth Dyson points out in his contribution to the Macmillan volume, that parties, which in the past were treated with disdain as manifestations of divisiveness, now have a central role in legitimating the state. To a far greater degree than in Britain the parties permeate the state apparatus and many public offices are held by party nominees. Thus there is a new synthesis between the old 'high' view of the state and the postwar acceptance of party, but also new dangers. Complaints about *Verfilzung*, something not far short of corruption, are common and Roger Tilford, in a perceptive contribution to *The West German Model*, points out the danger to the German universities of the continued high degree of state control and the party proportionality that goes with it.

How permanent is German stability? No doubt much depends on the state of the economy and there are two contributions in *The West German Model* on the German style of economic management by Kenneth Dyson and Jonathan Story, which link up with Roger Morgan's and Helga Michalsky's essays on West Germany in the international and intra-German context. Rainer Lepsius in his article in the Macmillan volume has some interesting pages on industrial relations and trade unions, rightly regarded as an area crucial to the German success. Lepsius shows the high degree of interest aggregation in German wage bargaining, the way in which co-determination separates wage bargaining from other industrial relations issues and the effect of the legalistic German political style in the field of industrial relations. The durability of the stable German system depends, however, not only on economic success Nevil Johnson and others describe the growing tensions between leadership and activists, particularly in the SPD; it might will be that those who have graduated from the student movements of 1960s to be the party activists of the 1970s and 1980s could, by disintegrating the *Volksparteien* that have developed since 1945, bring renewed instability to Germany. These two volumes contain much material of high quality to help the student of German affairs to understand the underlying problems of a country that remains crucial to the future of Europe and of the world.

University of Southampton E. J. FEUCHTWANGER

Histoire Intérieure du Parti Communiste 1945–1972. Vol. 2: De Libération à l'avenement de Georges Marchais. *Paris: Fayard. 1981. 735 pp. Index. Pb.*

THIS is an exasperating book: it contains enough that is interesting to make it impossible to ignore; it has much in it that is inessential or repetitive; and it is badly organised, so that it is difficult to use.

The author's themes—such as they are—are buried in a mass of not always well chosen and often dispensable detail. The book is organised in the French way, by subject headings, and the author seems to have exhausted his file on each subject before moving on to the next. It is not always clear why material has been included, or why some subjects are treated at length. M. Robrieux quotes at length the turgid prose of *l'Humanité* and other party organs, speeches at party conferences etc., when short pithy summaries would have made his point better. Moreover, there is no index or bibliography, indispensable for a book which pretends to be a standard work of reference, and on such a controversial subject and period. They are promised for the last volume, which means that the unwary reader will have to buy the last volume before he can really make use of or pass a scholarly judgment on the first two tomes. That example of publishing sharp practice ought not to escape censure.

M. Robrieux, then, disappoints for want of an effective conceptual framework and principle of selection; what we have is a collection of card files, not a history. That is a pity, because he has shown himself, in other works, to have the necessary discrimination. His biography of Thorez (on which he draws heavily) was better organised, and his memoirs of his own passage through the party (*Notre génération communiste*) was a perceptive, revealing and informative work. Moreover, there are important bits in the present volume: there are, for instance, membership figures taken from the archives of August Lecoeur, once secretary for organisation. That is not the only source which has been opened to the author by former high-ranking members of the party; he has also kept his own files, to which he often refers without further clarification. One can hardly blame him for drawing on his own experience as a *permanent*; but the references to his own papers or private sources—although sometimes no doubt necessary to preserve the privacy of witnesses or participants in events—do not suffice to confirm, for example, his suggestion that Jacques Duclos was the NKVD's man in the French politburo. The annexes are not well chosen either, apart from the *bio*, the questionnaire filled out at various stages by militants and party functionnaries.

In short, one will have to wait for the third and last volume of this massive work before passing a definitive judgment. But it is already clear that this extended exercise in the difficult art of contemporary history is a deeply flawed work.

Lincoln College, Oxford D. B. GOLDEY

The Modernization of Turkey: from Atatürk to the Present Day. By Walter F. Weiker. *New York and London: Holmes and Meier. 1981. No price listed.*

PROFESSOR Weiker's book is a useful summary of studies of Turkish society and history which have appeared in the last three decades. Beginning with a historical overview spanning the first half of this century, Dr Weiker goes on to the 'modernization of Turkish leaders' and 'the modernization of Turkish followers'. Other items which figure in this survey are 'Groups and Forces', 'Political Parties', 'Socialization and Integration', 'Economic Development' and 'Government Institutions and Organization'. The wide range of statistical tables enhances the value of the book and augurs a bright future for its use in courses on modern Turkey at

university level. Most of the book is concerned with developments in Turkey since 1950. The author's summary 'Turkey Today and Tomorrow' will no doubt be read with special care by would-be carpet-baggers, diplomatic greenhorns and information specialists.

Alerted to the low status that the concept of 'modernisation' has recently acquired, Professor Weiker hastens to disculpate himself from association with 'modernisation' studies, thereby committing himself to a middle-of-the-road viewpoint which gives equal weight to 'traditionality' and 'modernity', each of them having its particular contribution to make to modernity. (Both 'modernity' and 'traditionality' are used with inverted commas in the book.) However, sailing between Scylla and Charybdis is no way to solve arduous theoretical issues. A whiff of evolutionism of the type found in studies of of 'industrial man' and a view of integration of Parsonian vintage still remain very much in evidence in the book. The reason for which this failing is underlined is that today one expects a theoretical framework to soar beyond the latent evolutionism which one finds in almost all studies of modern Turkey, whether written by professors of political science or by lesser mortals. The most striking reminder to the reader that Professor Weiker is sailing an outdated craft is the static view of modern Turkey which he presents. Things happen and structures change, and while the sequence of change is no doubt told with painstaking detail, the dynamics of change are not explicated. It might not be legitimate to ask *why* Turkish society changed as it did, but it is certainly legitimate to ask what were the mechanisms involved in change, and that is left unanswered. Even though the scholarly framework of Professor Weiker's researches cannot be faulted, his efforts at impartiality sometimes shade into flatness; for example, witness the following judgement about the Turkish press: '. . . the great influence of the major dailies gives their publisher an opportunity to support causes for the good of the nation and to set much of the tone of Turkish public life' (p. 168). One also wonders whether, in this instance, Professor Weiker's judgement was not somewhat premature. Nevertheless, one does fully appreciate the subtle pressures which have always exerted leverage with scholars who want to continue to write about Turks and still expect to be welcome in Turkey. Finally, if one 'brackets' Professor Weiker's thesis about modernisation, even though it is clearly a substantive part of the book, *The Modernization of Turkey* still emerges as a most useful work of reference.

Boğaziçi University, Turkey ŞERIF MARDIN

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century. By William B. Rosenberg and Marylin B. Young. *New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982. 397pp. Index. $19.95. £13·00. Pb.: £4·95.*

THIS is a stimulating comparative study of the Russian and Chinese revolutions and their impact on the subsequent development of the two countries. Professor Rosenberg, an expert on Russian liberalism, devotes two chapters to the preconditions and the revolution itself, which he perceives as an 'ongoing process'; Professor Young does the same to China, in addition stressing the effects of the Russian revolution on China. The revolutionary struggles with economic and social backwardness are discussed, as are the great patriotic wars, which in the former case means the Russo-German war 1941-45 and in the latter the war with Japan. It is made clear that in both cases 'local' patriotism rather than 'ideological' communism had quite a lot to do with the successful national struggles in these wars. After the war Soviet Russia lapsed

into Stalinism which seems to have suited that country and under this power arrangement, with only a few modifications after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union continues its progress today. China had to look for different ways 'to achieve progress and development'. Its Stalinist 'great leap forward' led to disappointments, as did the cultural revolution. While Soviet Russia opted for neo-Stalinism as its way forward, China has been experimenting and does not seem to have found its own way. Nevertheless, in both countries the revolutionary process seems to have come to its end; each is a one-party state without any opposition or alternative. With international security achieved they both look towards stability and continued improvements in living standards which are supposed to be brought about by the omnipotent party-state; the latter having taken over the role of the former ruling class based on landed property. Since 1964 Soviet Russia has created the so-called 'second economy', comparable to the capitalist free market, and China is well on the road to emulating this unrevolutionary innovation. Still, nothing is certain about these and other developments in the two countries: Mao's concept of 'uninterrupted revolution' was revised after his death, but after the capitalist failure to invest in 'revisionist' China a return to modified Soviet communism may be effected in the future. As it is the two party-states lack revolutionary dynamism to develop further and with stabilisation they have developed their own oppression, often worse than that of the *anciens regimes*. An exhaustive bibliography and detailed index signify that the book is intended as a university textbook.

University of Manchester JOHN F. N. BRADLEY

On a Field of Red: The Communist International and the Coming of World War II. By Anthony Cave Brown and Charles B. MacDonald. *New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Robert Hale, London.) 718 pp. Index. £16·95.*

IT is commonplace to consider Soviet diplomacy as Janus-like, looking simultaneously in the apparently opposite directions of conventional diplomacy and unconventional subversion. Less has been written about the activities of the Comintern than about Soviet foreign policy itself, if only because diplomatic observers and historians share a problem with astronomers studying the moon: one side of the subject is constantly presented and the other always turned away.

On a Field of Red seeks to explore the dark side of the moon by means of a considerable array of documentary apparatus, including recently declassified files from the US Army's Military Intelligence Division, the FBI, the CIA and its forebear the OSS, as well as a variety of secondary materials: memoirs, diaries, biographies and histories. The result of these investigations forms a canvas vast in size and scope: its time span stretches from 1917 to 1951; its range encompasses the activities of the Comintern in the United States, Britain and Germany but also extends to outposts of Empire; and personalities involved include the most famous protagonists of twentieth century history as well as less well-known individuals, who make up an extensive rogues' gallery of sleuths, assassins, spies, smugglers and *agents provocateurs*.

The authors do not claim to have written a formal history of the Comintern; nor have they, for two reasons. First of all, the intrigues they so vividly describe are by no means confined to the communist side: the schemings of Bruce Lockhart, Sidney George Reilly and Clare Sheridan mingle with the machinations of Zinoviev, Ludwig Martens and Donald Maclean. Secondly, the need to set these underground events in some kind of political context gives rise to a broader, yet equally readable, historical account, resulting in a compendious work of nearly 650 pages of text and over 73

chapters—an encyclopedia, in all but name and form, of international intrigue from the Russian Revolution to the beginning of the 1950s.

Clearly a book of this kind is likely to carry considerable lay appeal (and its high price is therefore to be regretted). The authors bring to bear their in many ways complementary skills of experienced journalist and distinguished military historian. Both have an eye for a compelling narrative and cannot resist telling their tale vividly, concisely and straightforwardly in a manner which allows little room for academic doubt and discussion. Furthermore, they presume very little historical knowledge in their reader, feeling the need, for example, to explain that the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo ('in Bosnia') was 'the event that had set off the Great War' (p. 64). The primacy of narrative in the book's conception and purpose is nowhere more clearly evident than in a conclusion conspicuous by its absence. Instead, the authors state their main thesis at the outset: that the cold war began not in the postwar years, 'not with the victory over the Fascist powers but that night in Petrograd during the October Revolution of 1917 when Communism emerged triumphant out of the Commencement Hall of the Smolny Institute for Young Ladies of the Nobility' (p. 8).

University of Hull M. C. CHAPMAN

Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact. By Chistopher D. Jones. *New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne) 322 pp. Index. £25·50. Pb.: £9·00.*

THIS is a curiously mixed book, with some parts reading like an inadequately supervised PhD thesis and others making a genuine contribution to the subject. As far as the former is concerned, the book mentions, for example, 'the battle that erupted in the Polish party between Muscovites and reformers after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU' and claims that in the midst of it, Adam Wasyk (*sic*) published his 'Poem for Adults'. I would have altogether more confidence in this work if its author had been able to spell Ważyk's name correctly and if he had known that the 'Poem for Adults' was published well before the Twentieth Congress, in 1955. The text contains other such errors of fact. An even more serious complaint is that large chunks of this book simply rehearse the various postwar crises of Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968). This is quite superfluous. The literature on these events is extensive and Jones adds nothing to it.

Yet there is a positive side to this work. This lies in the extensive detail that the author has amassed on the Warsaw Pact and the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as mediated through the Pact. Given the readiness of the Soviet Union to use force to maintain its alliance system and, indeed, to do so on its own terms of insisting that an ally must share the Soviet Union's ideology and adopt the Soviet political system, this is a topic of considerable significance.

The core of the book, therefore, consists of four chapters of description of the military-administrative structure of the Warsaw Pact, the Directorate for Military Doctrine, the Political Directorate and the Directorate for Educational Exchanges. Each of these is a thorough account, indispensable to anyone looking for information on the subject. The last of these, the chapter on military education, is of particular importance, not least because it is concerned with the longer-term perspectives of the Soviet-East European alliance. The book argues that all senior military posts in the four East European states fully loyal to the Soviet Union (i.e. not Romania) are monopolised by graduates of the important mid-career military academies in the Soviet Union, such as the Voroshilov.

Military education is vital in building up a pro-Warsaw Pact *esprit de corps* in Eastern Europe and it can be regarded as a variant of the *nomenklatura* system, by which the Soviet Union exercises control over appointments policy in Eastern Europe. The Romanians have remained outside this network of control. The effectiveness of the system was demonstrated by events which took place after the book was completed—the military putsch in Poland.

One final complaint: the author is quite inconsistent in the spelling of East European names, sometimes transliterating them from the Cyrillic, sometimes using the correct form. This is an added hazard (or challenge) in using the book.

London School of Economics; GEORGE SCHÖPFLIN
School of Slavonic and East European Studies

A History of the Romanian Communist Party. By Robert R. King. *Stanford. Hoover Institution Press. 1980 190 pp. Pb.: $8.95.*

DR ROBERT R. KING, who as a White House Fellow has served on the United States National Security Council staff, and was senior analyst for Romania at the Radio Free Europe, has written a lucid and praiseworthy book disentangling the complex history of the Romanian Communist Party in all its metamorphoses.

That history began in March 1893 when a group of 54 intellectuals inspired by Marxist ideology and led by Constantine Dobrogeanu-Gherea, an educated Jew who had been forced to leave Tsarist Russia, founded the Social Democratic Workers' Party in Romania (*Partidul Social-Democrat al Muncitorilor din România*) which, however, disappeared within seven years. Dr King explains that some of its members changed the PSDMR to the National Democratic Party while others joined the Liberal Party. But Dobrogeanu-Gherea, helped by Christian Rakovski, a Bulgarian from Dobruja, and Gheorghe Cristescu, revived the socialist movement by founding in 1900 the Social-Democratic Party in Romania (*Partidul Social-Democrat din România*).

As a result of the First World War the age-long dream of Romanian national unity was fulfilled. In May 1921, in Bucharest, a Socialist-Communist Party in Romania (*Partidul Socialist-Communist din România*) was created by a congress which decided by 428 votes to 111 to affiliate the new association with the Comintern. On May 12, however, a government's commissary, accompanied by an army detachment, closed the congress and arrested many of those who had voted for affiliation. The Second Congress of the PSCR, meeting in October 1921 at Ploieşti, dropped the adjective 'socialist' from the party's name on the Comintern's order and elected Cristescu Secretary-General of the *Partidul Comunist din România.* On February 5, 1924, the PCR was banned, went underground, and its three following congresses were held abroad: in Vienna, Kharkov, and Moscow respectively. The elections to the Politburo as well as that of the Secretary-General were always under the control of the Comintern's Executive Committee. In 1924 a Hungarian, Elek Köblös, became the party leader. In 1928 he was succeeded by an Ukrainian, Vitali Holostenko, and in 1931 a Polish Jew, Aleksander Horn, was elected Secretary-General. 'From the Soviet point of view' comments Dr King 'the primary concern was not the strength of the PCR but the role of Romania in terms of Soviet foreign policy considerations'.

On August 23, 1944, Romania liberated itself from German alliance and occupation. The coup d'État was the work of King Michael I helped by the army and the national conspiracy of four political parties represented by Iuliu Maniu (National Peasant Party), Dinu Bratianu (Liberal Party), Constantine Titel Petrescu (Social Democratic Party), and Lucreţiu Patraşcanu (Communist Party). Acting with his typical skill and falsehood, Stalin first used the Romanian army against the Germans,

then decorated King Michael with the Order of Victory, and finally, in December 1947, forced him to abdicate.

In February 1948 the Sixth Congress of the PCR was held in Bucharest under Soviet occupation. It proclaimed the merger of the PCR with the left wing of the Social Democrats, resulting in the creation of the Romanian Workers' Party (*Partidul Muncitoresc Român*) with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as Secretary-General.

As long as the Soviet army and the Soviet political and economic 'experts' were in total control of the country Gheorghiu-Dej collaborated with occupiers and behaved cautiously. In 1952 he felt strong enough to purge the Politburo of its non-ethnic members. A black page in his biography is the execution in 1954 of Patrascanu whom the Kremlin never trusted. In 1958 Dej obtained from Nikola Khrushchev the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania.

Gheorghiu-Dej died on March 19, 1965, and Nicolae Ceauşescu assumed the party's leadership. The Eighth Congress ratified in July yet another change in the party's name—it became again *Partidul Comunist Român*—but adopted a new constitution describing Romania as 'the socialist, sovereign and unitary state'. In February 1968 a law revised the country's administrative organisation: instead of the previous 16 regions Romania was divided into 39 districts and the municipality of Bucharest, while the Mureş Magyar Autonomous Region, created in 1952, disappeared. In a speech delivered in May 1966, on the 45th anniversary of the PCR, Ceauşescu not only criticised the Soviet Union for meddling in Romanian party affairs in past years, but also challenged a basic tenet of the 'proletarian internationalism', that is, Soviet leadership of the socialist camp.

Concluding his excellent analysis Dr King states: 'The PCR has evolved from a minor political movement serving external interests and having few indigenous roots to the dominant political institution in Romania. This evolution is unique among the East European communist states.'

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party. By April Carter. *London: Pinter. 1982. 285 pp. Index. £13·50. Pb.: £6·50.*

THERE is a tendency for Western observers of the European communist scene to divide party leaders into two neatly defined camps. Every communist leader, like the children in W. S. Gilbert's song, 'Is either a little liberal, Or else a little conservative'. Such an oversimplification of the complex interactions of personality, ambition, local loyalties, ideological conviction and sheer opportunist pragmatism, which determine how the comrades react to specific situations, is particularly wide of the mark when one considers the Yugoslav communist establishment. For example, as with every other issue in Yugoslav life, the 'nationality question' is a major element in the formation of political attitudes. However, as Ceauşescu and Hoxha demonstrate, to be a nationalist is not necessarily to be a liberal. The Croat communists who played the popular national ticket in 1971 may have objected to Serbian centralist tendencies, but there is some suspicion that, had they succeeded, they would have manipulated the levers of power in as illiberal a way as the Serbs whom they criticised.

April Carter's book deals with developments within the League of Communists during the period 1964-72, when the 'liberals' achieved ascendancy. During this period Aleksander Ranković, the Serbian *apparatchik* who controlled the state security machine, was removed from office. Amongst the charges against him was the allegation that he was plotting to succeed Tito. At the Brioni Plenum of 1966 Tito sided with the 'liberals' to remove Ranković, but in 1971-72 Tito denounced 'rotten liberalism' and supported a purge of many of those who had opposed Ranković. In fact

he identified the source of the trouble as being the 1952 Congress, which he said was conducted in a 'euphoria of liberalism'. Was Tito a 'liberal' in 1966 and a 'conservative' in 1971?

Miss Carter does not provide direct answers, but she does offer a wealth of material from which her readers can make their own assessments. She has explored in great detail, mainly from published sources, the changing attitudes of Yugoslav communists during the reform period of the late 1960s. She examines the role of the League of Communists in the organs of self-management, its attitude to such Western liberal concerns as the freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary and the position of parliament in a one-party political system.

Her sources are primarily the reports of congresses and conferences and of discussions in the Yugoslav press, supplemented by scholarly literature of both Yugoslav and Western origin. The Yugoslav worker at the base of the pyramid—ostensibly the manager of Yugoslav society—does not get much of a look in.

After the troubles in 1971 the time came to tighten central control and to reassert the old Leninist values of democratic centralism. After a purge of 'liberals' and 'nationalists' a new constitution was introduced which, in Tito's words, made a determined break 'with all the remnants of so-called representative democracy which suits the bourgeois class'.

Miss Carter, writing from a background of Western liberal values, sees these events as a setback in the development of Yugoslavia's socialist democracy. She is optimistic, however, in stating that the road remains open that may lead Yugoslavia in the next generation towards becoming 'a socialist Switzerland—enjoying national independence, federalism and participatory democracy'. There are too many contradictory cross-currents in contemporary Yugoslav society to enable one to make such a prediction, but one need not share this view to welcome Miss Carter's book as a valuable contribution to Western scholarly writing on Yugoslavia.

University of Bradford F. B. SINGLETON

Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour: A theoretical and empirical analysis. By Hannes Adomeit. *London: George Allen & Unwin. 1982. 377 pp. Index. £27·50.*

STUDENTS of Soviet foreign policy have had little to treasure by way of new contributions to the literature in the last few years. Hannes Adomeit's *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour* provides a welcome addition. It is an important contribution to the subject and should be carefully studied not only by students of Soviet foreign policy, but also by international relations students in general, strategists (especially ostensible exponents of the 'science' of crisis management) and, last but not least, officials in Western foreign ministries.

A brief review cannot do justice to the depth of analysis, density of argument, and breadth of research in this book. A reviewer must therefore leave the substance aside, and simply chart, with enthusiasm, the ground which Adomeit covers.

Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour is divided into three parts. The first, 'Theory', defines and examines the concept of risk, and includes a discussion of the 'wisdoms and conventional wisdoms' about Soviet risk-taking and crisis behaviour in Western literature. This is then followed by two 'Case Studies', which form the bulk of the book, and which consist of detailed analyses of Soviet behaviour during the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961, when the Soviet Union dangerously attempted to strengthen its grip on central Europe. Each crisis is approached through a common organisational structure—an approach which risks becoming laboured, but which in

the end enormously assists the process of comparison. Together, the case studies show that a great deal can be known about Soviet attitudes.

Part Three, 'Comparisons and Conclusions', draws together the findings on the two Berlin crises, and relates them to Soviet crisis behaviour in other areas at other times. Of particular interest are Adomeit's discussion of the 'operational principles' of Soviet crisis behaviour and the 'factors of Soviet risk-taking'. The latter includes a brief discussion of the role of ideology, in which Adomeit says more in a few pages than some other writers have said in complete chapters.

It has been evident for a long time that the study of Soviet foreign policy has been cut off from the mainstream of Western thinking about foreign and defence policy. As a result, the standard Sovietology of a generation ago still flourishes in many official and academic minds. Against this, Adomeit's book underlines the reasons why the mainstream should hurry to integrate the best of recent Soviet studies. This can be illustrated with reference to Western literature on crisis management, which has been so shaped and dominated by American policy during the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, for some after 1962 strategy *became* crisis management. Unfortunately, the ideas largely developed from the single case of 1962, and its related ethnocentric literature, have been imposed on our thinking about Soviet behaviour. However, Adomeit shows that Soviet behaviour in 1962 not only failed to conform to *Western* assumptions, but it also turns out to have been a major exception to established patterns of *Soviet* risk-taking. Crisis management, as both a subject of academic enquiry and a policy-science, will remain in an adolescent stage until it successfully integrates what can be known about the crisis behaviour of the Soviet Union, China, and other states. This has not yet been achieved.

As a result of the work of Western academic strategists over the past twenty-five years, it is sometimes said that 'We are all Clausewitzians now.' It is well beyond the point at which we should also be able to say, to the best of our abilities, that 'We are now also Sovietologists.' Adomeit's book should convince any doubters why this should be so

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise? By Allen S. Whiting. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1981. 276 pp. Index. $22.50*

THIS book fills an important gap in the geopolitical landscape of East Asia. East Asian Siberia is not simply a potential storehouse of minerals—about which much less is known than the western and southern areas of the frozen land-mass—it also stands at a strategic crossroads where Soviet, Chinese and Japanese interests all intersect. Having outlined the resource potential and the prospects for exploitation in a domestic and international setting, the book looks at the strategic implications of Siberian development from the Japanese, Chinese and Soviet viewpoints. The final chapter is devoted to American policy interests in the region.

The chapter on the internal setting is appropriately subtitled 'Quagmire or Bonanza?' At every step, the vastness of the investment and the enormity of the hardships and difficulties call into question the economic viability of the whole effort. However, it is worth remembering that when the Soviet Union took the decision to open up Western Siberia in the 1960s, it was criticised in the West for investing absurd sums of money in the frozen wilderness when oil and gas were cheaply available on world markets; hindsight has shown the wisdom of Soviet policy.

The centrepiece of East Siberian development in the 1980s is the Baikal-Amur Railway (BAM). It has been suggested that the BAM will give the Soviet Union added

strategic advantages in being able to move troops and military hardware in the event of conflict in the East, specifically with China. However, Whiting points out that the BAM, although 310 miles from the Chinese border, is still extremely vulnerable: '. . . the 1,965 miles of single track between Ust-Kut and Komsomolsk offers numerous potential choke points . . . 3,700 bridges and culverts (more than 140 of which exceed 300 feet in length) . . . offer attractive targets for air attack. Less vulnerable, but more disabling if damaged, are the BAM tunnels, which total 15 miles . . .' (p. 102). The conclusion is that while BAM enhances the Soviet capability to prepare for war, once war begins, the liabilities of the railway may outweigh its assets.

There is, of course, much foreign interest in the development of Siberian resources. The Japanese are already involved in oil, gas, coal and timber projects. However, this process could go forward much faster and on a much larger scale if the outstanding dispute between the countries could be settled. Furthermore, any change in the territorial status quo with Japan would open up similar issues with China. However, Whiting points out that a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China could have potentially positive implications for both countries and this is worth remembering if the fuel and resource position of both countries worsens.

The chapter on Soviet decision-making, in respect of Siberia, reminds the reader of the difficulty of focusing the mind of central government officialdom on a geographically distant region, requiring a huge investment commitment. However, this leads to the perhaps unwarranted conclusion that '. . . unless action is taken in the near future to remove obstacles to the extension of US Export-Import Bank credit and the transfer of technology, the opening up of East Asian Siberia's natural resources will not occur this decade, and may not be achieved this century' (p. 236). Past experience suggests that we tend to overstate the importance of Western investment and technology in the overall context of Soviet resource development. With the exception of projects specifically targeted at export contracts, e.g. Yakutia gas, Siberian development will depend on Soviet domestic requirements and capabilities, and those of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a whole.

Despite the differences in interpretation, this book is a landmark work in the political and strategic study of a region which promises to become increasingly important in both these aspects and global resource development. For students of these subjects it is essential reading.

JONATHAN P. STERN

Great October and Today's World. Eng. edn. By N. I. Lebedev. Trans. by Y. S. Shirokov and Y. S. Sviridou. *Oxford: Pergamon. 1981. 378 pp. Index. £20·00. (Russian edn publ. 1978.)*

THIS volume on the Soviet Union's foreign relations has been written by the rector of that country's prestigious Institute of International Relations (IMO) which trains some but not all who enter the Soviet diplomatic service. It is therefore not without interest as an indicator of official thinking. It summarises the Party line on 'The Struggle of the USSR for Peace' and not unexpectedly side-steps awkward issues. The contradiction between the pursuit of peace and 'assisting . . . class comrades abroad' (p. 69) is merely denied, despite the evident fact that support for liberation movements overseas undoubtedly antagonises the capitalist world and thereby raises international tension. The reference to the Nazi-Soviet pact, however, is remarkably honest. It is described as 'an example of skilful exploitation of capitalist contradictions' and a demonstration of 'the Soviet Union's flexibility in pursuing its high-principled foreign policy line' (p. 98)—which adds up to saying: our foreign policy is highly principled

except when it is not. It recalls Stalin's comment to Western diplomats towards the end of the Second World War: the Soviet Union always keeps its word . . . except in extreme emergencies. In truth it is little different from any other power in this respect.

The book is a translation of *Velikii Oktyabr' i Perestroika Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii* (Moscow, 1978), with 'certain amendments suggested by the rapid course of political developments in the modern world (p. v). These amendments are intriguing. On the one hand the following two statements have been omitted from the English version (p. 93) evidently to tone down what might upset capitalist readers: 'The policy of peace carried out by the Soviet Union is not a policy of capitulation in the face of the class enemy. It does not force the USSR to close its eyes to actual reality, to refrain from defending the achievements of the revolution' (*Velikii*, p. 111). On the other hand, the references to detente as having become 'an important, increasingly strong tendency in international life' and to detente as having 'improved the political climate' (*ibid.*, p. 288) have also been excised and do not appear on pp. 238–39 of the English edition. This undoubtedly reflects not only the 'cooling' of the international climate referred to later in the English edition (p. 320) but also doubts in Moscow as to whether the earlier period of detente was an unqualified blessing.

As long as the reader is looking for a relatively sophisticated, clear and concise exposition of the Soviet official view, this work can be recommended—though the Soviet propaganda machine distributes this sort of thing much more cheaply; it should certainly be read by those who want to glimpse into the ideological background to Soviet diplomacy.

University of Birmingham JONATHAN HASLAM

MIDDLE EAST

The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict. By Barry Rubin. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1981. 298 pp. Index. $22.00. Pb.: $10.95.*

BARRY RUBIN'S book is a useful contribution to a strangely neglected topic: the policies adopted by various Arab political parties, factions and governments towards the Palestine conflict from the late 1920s to the early 1950s. The author has made skilful use of an impressive range of British and American primary materials, and presented a coherent picture of a confused and confusing episode. One of the main points to emerge from his analysis is that, far from being a ploy to which Arab politicians resorted to distract attention from domestic problems, the Palestine question often played precisely the contrary role; in other words, politicians, notably in Iraq and Egypt, were frequently forced, against their personal inclinations and even their better judgement, to adopt particular strategies or positions on Palestine in response to pressures from their own supporters or opponents (p. xvi). Again, particularly in chapters 5–7, the way in which the British authorities actually sought the involvement of the various Arab governments in the Palestine question is convincingly documented.

Rubin's frame of reference is wide, and it is only possible to give a few examples of the range of his work. For instance, his discussion of 'Abdullah ibn Husain is particularly illuminating. Although 'Abdullah's policies have earned his memory almost universal execration in the Arab world, they emerge with at least two positive features, consistency and realism: 'not only did 'Abdullah court the Zionists, he never underestimated their power. His analysis of the conflict and its probable outcome was quite different from that of other Arab leaders, who maintained confidence in an easy

victory over the Jews right down to those fatal days of 1948' (p. 47). Like Nuri al-Sa'id, 'Abdullah 'realised that the surest way to make peace was to discover a formula which might win Jewish approval' (p. 99), though of course he eventually alienated all his potential allies by the extent of the accommodation he was prepared to make. By 1947, he was the only Arab leader left 'conducting serious talks with either the Zionists or the British . . . As early as August 1946 he told [representatives of the Jewish Agency] that Palestine would eventually be partitioned and that Transjordan would annex the Arab part' (p. 155).

Rubin is also informative on the last bitter months of the mandate (chapters 10-12), which were characterised by rivalries between the various Arab states, the appalling incoherence of the Palestinian leadership, already profoundly discredited by its association with the Nazis, and the apparent unpreparedness of the Arab world for the United Nations General Assembly's vote for partition. It is interesting to learn that in spite of their generally negative assessments of the military capacities of the Arab armies in 1947, 'Most British and American military experts . . . believed that the Arabs would win in Palestine' (p. 176).

'. . . the 1967 War', writes Edward Said, 'was a momentous event. Not only did it discredit the conventional Arab approach to Israel; it also made clear to most Palestinians that their quarrel with Zionism could not be resolved on their behalf by proxy armies and states.' (*The Question of Palestine*, London, 1980, p. 133.) In *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict* Barry Rubin has provided a detailed historical study of the 'conventional Arab approach', and the catalogue of disasters to which it has led.

Durham University PETER SLUGLETT

State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia. Edited by Tim Niblock. *London: Croom Helm for Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter. 1981. 314 pp. Index. £13·95.*

A symposium on Saudi Arabia sponsored by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter in 1980 attracted many of the world's leading experts on the Kingdom, covered a broad range of political, social and economic subjects and generated an unusually wide spectrum of viewpoints. This book is a selection of thirteen out of over thirty papers presented at the symposium, along with an introductory essay by the editor, Tim Niblock.

The selection, according to the Editor, was made to illuminate four themes: (1) the nature of the Saudi State; (2) the position of Saudi Arabia within the international economic and political environment; (3) the relationship of the Kingdom to its immediate Gulf state neighbours; and (4) the nature of the Kingdom's economic developments. No attempt was made to integrate the papers or to seek consistency; rather, the objective was to indicate the differing perspectives from which developments in Saudi Arabia can be viewed. In general, the papers are 'good' symposium papers aimed at stimulating discussion. Many also reflect substantial research efforts and several warrant specific comments.

Derek Hopwood's essay on 'The Ideological Basis of Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Muslim Revivalism' is an interesting analysis of the developments of the Unitarian or Wahhabist movement in Saudi Arabia in the context of Islamic revival movements in general, and the psychology of revivalist leadership in all religious movements of this nature. Hopwood's paper is also useful in tracing the influence of Hanbal, and his later interpreters, Qudama and Ibn Taimiya, on Abdul Wahhab's intellectual development and the evolution of the Unitarian movement.

Rosemary Said Zahlan's paper on the relationship of Abdul Aziz to the Gulf states is a highly competent coverage of a subject that has attracted little attention in the past. The paper is particularly useful in illuminating the arbitary and somewhat tenuous tri-partite political relationships that developed between the Gulf states, Great Britain and Abdul Aziz as he consolidated his position in the Arabian heartland.

Another interesting paper is James Buchan's study of secular and religious opposition in Saudi Arabia. Little has been published on this subject; Buchan's brief yet fascinating survey of 'opposition' in recent decades focuses specific attention on the Mecca Mosque incident and its continuity with past 'opposition' movements. Buchan argues that the House of Saud is aware of the essential lack of interest of the Saudi population as far as constitutional reform is concerned. He points out, however, that the government is extremely sensitive to Islamic or Arab 'national' appeals and perceives such movements as a primary threat to the family and its system of government.

The paper written by Peter and Marian Sluglett covers the critical years between Abdul Aziz's capture of the Hijaz and the formal creation of the contemporary State known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Using secondary sources and the records of the British Foreign Office, the Slugletts break no new ground in terms of facts but they do provide a highly competent review of the complementary nature of British objectives in the area and those of Abdul Aziz.

Paul Stevens's paper on Saudi Arabia's oil policy in the 1970s and Rodney Wilson's on the evolution of the Saudi banking systems are both excellent. The authors are highly knowledgeable on their subjects and leading authorities in their fields.

Two somewhat negative points: Shirley Kay's paper on 'Social Change in Modern Saudi Arabia' appears out of place as it is impressionistic rather than analytical and aimed at a popular rather than scholarly audience; and H. G. Hambleton's paper on the Saudi Petrochemical Programme is more a paeon to Saudi officialdom ('. . . one cannot but be struck by how a seemingly impossible dream of the 1960s is now taking form. King Khalid, Crown Prince Fah'd and a small but dynamic group of technocrats .. are creating a giant new industry on the desert sands') than an objective analysis of the serious issue and problems now facing the industry. Nevertheless, the format of the book is attractive, and the Editor's inclusion of an index enhances the usefulness of the book.

East-West Business Consultants T. R. McHALE

Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal. By Beverley Male. *London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 229 pp. Index. £13·95.*

ADDITIONS to the sparse literature on Afghanistan are generally welcome. A judicious assessment of events in the country since April 1978 would also be valuable at this time. However, Beverley Male's primary aim is to castigate 'the Left' and 'the Right', the media, Moscow and the current leadership in Kabul, for failing accurately to portray the aims of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and of one of its leaders, Hafizullah Amin. At the risk of serious overstatement, Male begins the analysis with the charge: 'Seldom has any revolution been so widely misrepresented as that which began in Afghanistan in April 1978, or any revolutionary leader so viciously slandered as Hafizullah Amin' (p. 14).

In chapters which examine the revolutionary credentials of PDPA leaders, the development of the Party and the factionalism within it, its strategy for reform and the resistance to its programme, Male responds to the regime's critics. However, much of

the author's defence of Amin or of the PDPA reform strategy seems unnecessary or misplaced. For example, Male asserts that Amin's integrity as a socialist and an Afghan have been impugned by the media and others. Certainly, assessments of Amin, given his manner of coming to power and eventual demise, have been confused, hasty and at times contradictory. But few now state that Amin was either a Soviet puppet, or as Babrak Karmal has alleged, about to sell out the revolution for American dollars; rather, the most widespread, if crude, assessment of him is that he was the 'Afghan Tito'.

More fundamentally, Male takes issue with one of the central criticisms that is made of the PDPA programme, that it was implemented too quickly. But apparently, it was not introduced at the pace desired by PDPA leaders. As Male states, the PDPA sought to avoid the pitfalls of the past 'by carefully analysing the situation and defining the problems, identifying its allies and its enemies and then, having united with the former under its leadership, moving with care, precision and determination to demolish the latter' (p. 107). However, as the author also shows, the party did little if any of this. The intra-party feuds, the pressure of events and the inadequacy of the financial and technical base of the reform policies resulted in a serious loss of initiative from the start.

Male's most successful chapter is one which provides a brief but interesting economic and political survey of Afghanistan in the 1970s. From this information, the reader is able to gauge why reform has been on the agenda of Afghan politics for so long, and why such attempts have so often failed. If the argument had taken this focus as a starting point and concentrated less on explaining away Amin's errors, the book would have had a more lasting impact.

University of Sussex ROSEMARY FOOT

The Arab Economy: Past Performance and Future Prospects. By Yusif A. Sayigh.
Oxford University Press for the Arab Bank. 1982. 175 pp. £7·50.

Arab Industrial Integration: A Strategy for Development. By Elias T. Ghantus
London: Croom Helm. 1982. 239 pp. Index. £16·95

DR SAYIGH'S book, a study prepared for the Arab Bank on the occasion of its 50th anniversary, attempts to examine the record of economic development in the Arab region between 1930 and 1980. The author includes in his survey all the 21 member states of the Arab League. One of the main problems in assessing such a record is the paucity of data relating to the earlier half of the period, and the unreliability of a great many data of the latter half. On the whole the author seems to wade his way cautiously through the statistics available to him, describing in the first part of the book developments in agriculture, education, minerals, industry, banking, external economic relations and regional co-operation. Here and there the style gives the impression that the discussions are kept too closely tied to the available figures, rather than aiming at interpreting the underlying changes. Perhaps something of the perspectives of the contemporary economic historian could have livened up the style and better portrayed the economic experiences of two generations of Arab peoples. In the second part of the book the author considers the outlook for the future, mainly in terms of 'the major issues and tasks of Arab development'. Fourteen tasks are listed, dealing with 'inadequacies', 'imbalances', excesses, shortcomings, etc. In most of his prescriptions the author tends to be too general to be disputed, recommending more and better 'goodies' such as comprehensive conceptualisation of development, economic performance, education, training, acquisition of technology, diversification, wider participation in development efforts, regional co-operation, independence of advanced countries, etc. When it comes to specifics and how to achieve all this, the

prescriptions tend to sound arbitrary, unrealistic or even contrary to the experience of the countries concerned. For instance, 'The resources for all R & D functions are estimated to amount to 1·5 per cent of GDP, and the aim should be to raise them to 3 per cent by 1990' (p. 147). Another example relates to the acquistion of technology. The reader is told: 'The socialist countries are particularly appropriate partners for technical co-operation for two reasons: the motive of private profit does not operate in their dealings, and their less complicated civilian technology is both more readily adaptable to the conditions of the Arab economies and easier to adopt... Furthermore the socialist countries are not burdened by the reputation of the exploitative power of the transnational corporations'. The author does not indicate what he thinks is wrong with the private profit motive, nor does he enquire about the kind of motive which operates the dealings of socialist countries, nor refer to the experience of Arab countries which have bought East European technology; Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Syria and Algeria would all tell a different story. But no doubt some readers will find pearls of wisdom in the author's views which also emphasise that 'the objective in question is the emergence of an Arab society which conducts an energetic search for development, justice, freedom, and unity'. (p. 165). High ideals, yet one could not help feeling the air of authoritarianism which permeates the author's approach.

Dr Ghantus's book 'is the result of two decades of personal involvement in regional economic co-operation in the Arab Middle East' (Preface) and was also submitted as a doctoral dissertation. The reader need hardly be reminded that there has been as yet little actual industrial integration in the Arab world. The subtitle indicates that the main concern of the book is an investigation of the possibilities for industrial integration as a development strategy. The author first reviews approaches to economic integration among developing countries, and concludes by favouring the 'package deal' approach by which a group of countries agree to share the location of industries designed to encourage the integration of their economies. This partial approach is preferred to customs unions and common markets because 'it does not require fundamental changes in the economic systems prevailing in the participants' (p. 51), and because 'it provides a direct means for allocating a number of integration industries among the countries concerned, rather than leaving this to the unregulated functioning of the enlarged market' (p. 215). Rather too much is made of the integration potentialities of this approach, and too little is mentioned about the factual basis upon which the countries could objectively agree about the distribution of the package amongst their territories. Even if the participants possess completely reliable information about the development of the costs, benefits and externalities of the industries to be set up (not a small if), they may still fail to find a distribution pattern which uniquely satisfies their expectations. The author then painstakingly reviews Arab efforts with respect to integration: the committees, conferences, resolutions, studies, etc. which altogether yielded next to nothing on the ground. More usefully, the author examines some industries of the Asian Arab countries together with Egypt and the Sudan with a view to finding out the ones which provide an integration potential. These are reckoned to be new industries with significant economies of scale but insignificant locational externalities. In a subsequent review of the fertiliser industry the conclusion is reached that duplication of plant in the producing Arab countries and low capacity utilisation jeopardise profitability and viability, and that the best solution would depend on locating production units on the basis of achieving minimum production costs. Regional integration is presumed to be a second best, without an investigation of how good a second best it might be. Despite all the unanswered questions, this may be a useful book to read for anyone concerned with the subject.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London A. K. SELBY

The Arab World's Legacy: Essays. By Charles Issawi. *Princeton, N.J.: Darwin. 1981. 378 pp. Index. £17·95.*

CHARLES ISSAWI describes this collection of his essays, written over a span of some thirty years, as 'sketches of a vast, sprawling, ancient building drawn by an amateur artist' which, he hopes, 'may give an idea of the size, complexity and basic structure of the edifice' (p. 9). Generally, his portfolio fulfils this function admirably. The 'amateur' in Issawi must be understood in its French meaning: he is an enthusiastic connaisseur, not someone who lacks the skills of a professional. By training Issawi is an economist; but, as he himself points out, 'for economists . . . nothing human is alien' (p. 349). He pays as much attention to the historical and cultural background as to more strictly economic matters such as the level of investment, the play of supply and demand, the role of technology and control over the means of production. He is as much at home in the field of literary criticism (as shown, for example, by his analysis of Mutanabbi's Egyptian poems, including beautifully translated excerpts, or his discussion of the use of European loan words by the novelist Neguib Mahfouz) as in the more arid realm of statistics or econometric analysis. If his essays are sketches rather than architectural drawings, they gain in colour and perspective whatever they lack in terms of precise measurements.

Despite his eclectism, a generally consistent picture of Issawi's 'edifice' emerges from these essays—a picture which gains credibility from the fact that some of them, written in the late 1950s or 1960s, are obviously out of date. The Middle East is an arid region where up until well into this century pastoralism, which corresponded with Islam's principal frontiers, remained an important economic and political factor. The continuing presence of nomads in the marginal areas generally produced governments of alien stock in the metropolitan centres. These rulers, classically represented by the Mamluks and the Ottomans, paid little attention to the needs of economic development and generally inhibited the emergence of autonomous institutions or centres of power under bourgeois control. From the eighteenth century the entrepreneurial function of the bourgeoisie was undertaken by protected foreigners or members of the minority religious communities, who tended to retain the cultural and economic benefits for themselves. The downfall of these groups, after the First World War in Turkey and after the Second in Egypt and the Levant, was accompanied by a populist revulsion against capitalist development as such. The political consequences are still with us: both parliamentary democracy and, later, revolutionary socialism, were imposed from above without an adequate social base—in the latter case, by military rulers who bear a considerable resemblance to their Mamluk predecessors. Issawi's insights owe much to Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) whom he often quotes, and these essays, like those recently published by Ernest Gellner, show that the theories of this great Arab philosopher of history, if intelligently applied, are still relevant. For a more comprehensive view of the Middle East edifice I would have welcomed a discussion about the role of Islamic law: for example, the failure of Islamic societies to produce powerful corporate institutions of the kind which Issawi sees as having been crucial to the economic and social development of Europe from the late Middle Ages, owes not a little to the fact that the Sharia, unlike the Roman Law, did not recognise groups as legal persons. Corporations, though meshed into the fabric of urban society, tended to dissolve under pressure from rulers or external forces, leaving behind the more durable structures of tribe, family or religious community, which were either outside the control of the religious law altogether, or were fully within its purview.

MALISE RUTHVEN

Yemen: The Search for a Modern State. By J. E. Peterson. *London: Croom Helm. 1982. 221 pp. Index. £11·95.*

THIS modest volume is possibly the best book on the political, economic and social issues in the Yemen Arab Republic that has appeared to date. About half of it is devoted to the Imamate and Nasserite occupation (which is a more accurate term than 'civil war'), the rest covering the period from the departure of the UAR to the present, and dealing particularly with attempts at state building. Peterson is on the whole well informed though he skates over dangerous topics like the assassination of President Hamdi. His survey is fairly generally acceptable, though he makes no critical survey of his sources by which he is occasionally slightly misled. It is surprising that Sir Kennedy Travaskis' book does not figure in the bibliography, as he was an important figure in the south until his abrupt dismissal by Harold Wilson's government in 1964; and the very revealing *Naksat al-Thawrah* (Decadence of the Revolution) is apparently unknown to the author. It is also a pity that Attar's very biased, inaccurate and ill-informed book has gained such currency.

It is pleasing that Peterson does not follow the anti-Imamic bias of the Americans Cortoda and Brown. He understands the role of the Zaydi Imams generally and particularly that of Yahya and Ahmad as mediators; however, it is not correct to call the Imamate an institution of the Zaydi sect—many Imams in Islam have been Sunnis.

The emergence of various political forces, he avers, is the key to the final downfall of the Hamid al-Din. The reviewer's assessment differs: it fell because disunited in itself and al-Badr for fear of his uncle al-Hasan allowed dissident elements to flourish, while the evidence is that Nasser was definitely plotting to engineer a revolt against the dynasty. Peterson gives the part of the young Nasser-inspired officers an importance out of proportion to their aims and achievements. Why is 'Abd al-Mughni described as 'martyred'? 'Disloyal' would be more appropriate. Juzaylan is described by those who knew him as mentally unbalanced. Bankrupt of any practical policy the officers had to call in Sallal (not a *muzayyin* but of the town watchman group it seems) who upbraided them, whatever he may have said in public, for the mess their coup had made. The officers' motives were probably to get greater pay and prestige—since 1962 some officers at least have managed to acquire much land. Peterson does not seem to have appreciated that the Cairo Liberals (as Ahmad Nu'man himself told the reviewer) broke with Baydani as completely untrustworthy and an Egyptian 'stooge', nor the extent of the resistance to 'Nasserite colonialism' by the Republicans themselves.

It is a surprise to read of the 'amount of hatred focused on Imam Yahya personally'. Shafi'is complained in the 1940s to the reviewer of the oppressive officials and soldiers of the Imam but did not think badly of the Imam himself—indeed, after Yahya's murder the Aden Shafi'is reacted strongly against the Yemeni Liberals whose star remained eclipsed for some time.

Whatever theories the various Yemeni political groups may proffer for their actions, and it is with the analysis of these that Peterson is concerned and has discussed with much understanding, the power struggle in the Yemen goes on much as before 1962—the main difference being that the economic situation has radically altered.

University of Cambridge R. B. SERJEANT

The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East. By Mahmoud Riad. *London: Quartet. 1981. 363 pp. Index. £11·95.*

MAHMOUD RIAD's distinguished service to his country has given him a ringside seat at the long-running drama which has transformed the 'Palestine Problem' of the

1930s and 1940s into the 'Middle East Crisis' of the 1970s and 1980s. He began his career as a soldier, and was a member of the Egyptian Delegation which negotiated the Armistice Agreement within the infant Israel in 1949. He became successively Head of the Mixed Armistice Commission, Head of the Palestine Department in the Military General Command after the overthrow of the monarchy, Ambassador to Syria during the Suez affair, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1964 to 1971, Special Adviser to President Sadat in 1971-72, and finally Secretary-General of the Arab League from 1972 to 1979. In offering his experiences as an object lesson to 'the younger generation of Arabs' he concludes:

> It is probably high time that we realised that the solution we beg at the doors of the countries of the world is in fact in our own hands, in the development of our own self-power and in the closing of our ranks, and that we ourselves hold the key to the solution; otherwise we will continue to wander in the labyrinth of US-Israeli manoeuvres (p. 340).

The impression that Arab youth is likely to gain from Mr Riad's account of this labyrinth is that Ariadne's thread will more probably lead them eastward than westward. For his account of the numerous meetings between Egyptians and Russians makes clear his opinion that the Soviet attitude throughout was straightforward and consistent. He sums it up after the Moscow meeting in October 1971, when the Cease Fire Agreement after the War of Attrition was about to run out:

> The Soviet position had never been more clear or outright than in this visit. They had advised a continuation of our political efforts; a unity of Arab action without reference to progressive or reactionary governments while US policy resisted all attempts at Arab unity and worked against countries that it considered 'radical' like Egypt and Syria; they counselled us not to make any further concessions; and finally, what was of greatest significance, the assessment of Marshal Grechko of the military situation. At the same time they refrained from sharing in the responsibility of a decision for war which demanded, in their view, that Egypt have the will to fight (p. 218).

Even after Sadat's expulsion of Soviet experts in July 1972, the Russians continued to supply arms to Egypt, both before and after the October War. They made it clear to the Egyptians that they would not be drawn into a war with the Americans, but short of this Egypt could count on their support.

Mr Riad's view of American attitudes is very different. As Foreign Minister he was frequently deceived by American failure to live up to their promises, and he found Kissinger's diplomatic methods distasteful.

Mr Riad did not share the euphoria with which the West greeted President Sadat's visit to Israel. He saw its dangers for the Arabs, and as Secretary General of the Arab League he fought hard to prevent or minimise the fatal division it spawned between the Arab States and Egypt.

This is an important book, and it could have a salutary effect on European thinking. It must therefore be hoped that it may find many readers outside the academic and specialist community.

JOHN RICHMOND

Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future. Edited by Daniel J. Elazar. *Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 222 pp. $10.25. Pb.: $7.25.*

As the editor points out in his introduction to this collection of Israeli views about the West Bank, Israel during the ten years of Labour rule after the war of 1967 established Jewish settlements mainly around Jerusalem and in the unpopulated Jordan Valley. Since the Likud coalition came to power in 1977 new settlements were placed 'in the mountains of Samaria and Judea and in the Gaza Strip' (why not Philistia?) '... in an effort to create "facts" that would eliminate once and for all the possiblity of repartitioning the land west of the Jordan River'. (p. 3). These facts, now a dominant issue in shaping the political future of the area, provide the latent analytical thread linking the diverse treatments brought together in this volume. The papers are arranged in three sections: the land itself and its resources; the economy, government and social services; and planning for the future.

Elisha Efrat, a leading Israeli geographer, begins usefully with a detailed account of settlement patterns on the West Bank before and after Israeli possession in 1967. Although he himself acknowledges that settlements are the product of *political* decision (p. 18), he appears bemused by the conceptual mystique of his discipline to the point of offering a set of possible political options in terms of their effects on 'spatial relations'. M. Drori follows with a sophisticated consideration of the legal aspects of the Jewish settlements within the wider perspective of legal analysis of the status of the West Bank, to conclude with a recommendation that Jewish settlers should come under Israeli law even if the Arabs of the territories come under autonomy based on different principles. This section of the book concludes with a technical analysis of the water resources of the occupied territories.

Part 2 opens with a good historical sketch by Sasson Levi of the development of local government in the territories since 1967. In emphasising the growth of municipal independence under the military regime its thesis has been overtaken by recent trends in a reverse direction. An economic analysis by S. Sandler and H. Frisch follows with the conclusion that the economy of the territories will need to be integrated with either Jordan or Israel regardless of the specific political arrangements that may prevail. This part ends with a review of the social services in the occupied territories.

Part 3, a somewhat disparate group of three papers pinned together under the heading 'planning', is introduced by a defence professional's recommendation that under any form of autonomy Israel should retain main responsibility for internal security on the West Bank. Mordecai Nissan's account of 'Palestinian Features of Jordan' does not do him justice as a political scientist who has made some significant contributions to this field of study. The editor concludes the book with an extraordinarily imprecise essay that falls far short of vintage Elazar.

University of Sheffield NOAH LUCAS

Arab Monetary Integration: Issues and Prerequisities. Edited by Khair El-Din Haseeb and Samir Makdisi. *London: Croom Helm for Centre of Arab Unity Studies. 475 pp. Index. £19·95.*

THERE has been considerable discussion about economic co-operation in the Arab world, but most of this has concentrated on trade issues. Although a unified currency, or even an alignment of exchange rates, is not a necessary prerequisite for the efficient operation of a common market, as the experience of the European Community shows, payments restrictions can be a severe impediment. It is this kind of issue which was

discussed at the seminar on Arab Monetary Integration held in Abu Dhabi in 1980, the edited proceedings of which are published in this volume.

Khair El-Din Haseeb and Samir Makdisi have been diligent in their editing, and the quality of the papers in terms of economic analysis is extremely high. Leading Western contributors include John Williamson and Robert Triffin, while those from the region concerned include such well known Arab economists as Burhan Dajani, Abdul Al-Sagban, Faik Abdul-Rasool and Karim Nashashibi, although the latter works for the International Monetary Fund in Washington. The book is likely to become a standard reference work for all those concerned with Arab exchange rate regimes, and not only those interested in the somewhat narrower issue of Arab monetary integration.

Like so many pan-Arab goals, full monetary integration is probably unattainable, given the political and economic divergencies in the region. Burhan Dajani points out how even when political unity was achieved, as in the Syrian-Egyptian union of 1958–61, monetary union did not necessarily follow. Karim Nashashibi shows that apart from the major oil exporters, balance of payments problems have been acute in the Arab world, and currencies have only been stabilised through stringent foreign exchange restrictions. In Egypt and Syria the public sector dominated the economy and trade, and imports were controlled to meet planning targets. Nashashibi is hopeful about the future, however, as the flow of workers' remittances from the oil-exporting states to the poorer Arab countries has eased their payments position and resulted in a relaxation of foreign exchange controls.

To encourage exchange rate stabilisation and to foster an eventual monetary union, an Arab Monetary Fund was set up in 1977. Abdul Al-Sagban gives a detailed, though uncritical account of this organisation's role. As its capital is only $800 million, it is difficult to see how it can make more than a token contribution to Arab countries needing payments support, but undoubtedly the experience gained both by fund employees and Arab central bankers is proving useful. The book shows there is a new sense of realism amongst those concerned with Arab economic co-operation, with the options discussed with reference to statistical evidence. The contribution by Abdul Al-Sayyed Ali brings together a large amount of data on inter-Arab trade and financial flows for the first time, while Faik Abdul-Rasool provides the only account of the Arab Monetary Fund's activities at present available. It is refreshing to see the participants at a pan-Arab conference dealing with economic facts, rather than being carried away by rhetoric.

University of Durham RODNEY WILSON

AFRICA

Imperialism In East Africa. Vol. 1: Imperialism And Exploitation. By D. Wadada Nabudere. *London: Zed. 1982. 132 pp. £16·95.*

THE integration of the peripheral countries into the global capitalist system is a subject upon which a great deal of theoretical effort has been expended, whilst at the same time there has been a reluctance to apply these theories to specific case studies. Dependency theories and theories of imperialism generally fail to satisfy many critics because they suspect that close examination of the historical evidence will fail to substantiate the theory. Dan Nabudere's *Imperialism In East Africa* is an attempt to examine the concrete forms of imperial expansion and its consequences for Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. *Imperialism and Exploitation* is the first volume of a planned two-volume work and covers both the colonial and post-colonial attempts to integrate these three countries into the world capitalist economy.

The author's central thesis is that European imperialism responding to developments within European capitalism sought control of these three territories and that the subsequent transformation of the three indigenous economies was both exploitative and oppressive. The argument is developed in two sections. Part One, entitled 'Colonial Exploitation and Revolt', discusses the opening up of the region to colonial penetration from the mercantile imperialism of the Portugese in the fifteenth century to the modern imperialism of Britain and Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All events at the periphery, it is argued, can be understood as the result of the new phase of capitalism in Europe—monopoly capitalism. The colonial economy of each of the territories is then discussed in turn with particular attention being given to the manner in which local production structures were developed and modified so that they reflected the interests of the controlling colonial power. In this era of bilateral imperialism we can agree that colonial development was determined by metropolitan interests, but the argument is weakened by the failure to distinguish specific class and sectional interests and the tendency to over-generalise the effects of economic forces. This section concludes with a discussion of the evolution of political consciousness and the response to colonialism. This is an interesting chapter which traces the dialectical unity between political and economic relations. Part Two, entitled 'Neo-Colonialism and Transnational Integration', examines the developments in the post-colonial period within the general context of the developments within the imperialist system itself, most noticeably the change from bilateral to multilateral imperialism under the hegemony of the United States. Governmental economic strategies are discussed from the perspective of the attempt to integrate these countries into the world market, with particular emphasis being given to the activities of transnational corporations and the leading international economic institutions.

This book is an interpretation of existing material recast by Nabudere in the theoretical perspective he developed in his *The Political Economy of Imperialism*. It is sketchy and impressionistic with a very dismissive attitude to conflicting evidence. At 132 pages it is much too short to discuss adequately the complexities of East African history and the attempt to fit the empirical material into a constricting framework ultimately fails.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

Zimbabwe's Inheritance. Edited by Colin Stoneman. *London: Macmillan. 1982. 234 pp. £12·95. Pb.: £4·95.*

The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defence and Class Revolution. By John S. Saul and Stephen Gelb. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 156 pp. £3·00.*

THE first of these books is a collection of essays about the economic, political, and social circumstances which face the new country Zimbabwe. The main attention is on the economy, with an economic overview by Colin Stoneman and Rob Davies, and separate essays on agriculture, manufacturing industries, mining, foreign trade, and taxation. Considering that the essays are written by eight different authors the standard is very even, and the book's main aim, 'to describe key aspects of Zimbabwe's inheritance' (p. 1), is achieved. There is well presented factual information and a clear picture emerges of the old Rhodesia, with its inequalities, its White privileges, and uneven development. From that background it is easy to identify the problems of the new government as it seeks to retain the strengths of the past—especially the broad-based and buoyant economy—while achieving a more even distribution of rewards and opportunities.

The book is less satisfactory in indicating the way in which the Zimbabwe

government might achieve its aims. While at one point Stoneman decries any attempt to prescribe policy, saying: 'it is not the purpose of this book to make recommendations and predictions' (p. 191), inevitably there is prescription. Stoneman himself, in the chapter on agriculture, says that the choice for the Zimbabwe government is whether to continue past policies based on the demands of capitalist profit or to give priority to the satisfaction of human needs, and there is no doubt that it is the latter that Stoneman favours. These, however, are broad attitudes which give no clear guidance on the difficult choices before the Zimbabwe government. Moreover, 'human needs' can be interpreted in many ways, and capitalists would argue that the economic system they have developed best suits these needs because it has been most successful at achieving growth. There is no point, they would argue, in advocating equality if it is to be the equality of shared economic misery.

One option that is not advocated in the book is Gundar Frank's notion of breaking links with the international economy to avoid exploitation. David Wield, in his chapter on manufacturing industry, points out that the UDI period did not illustrate the cogency of Frank's view because sanctions never were effective in isolating Rhodesia entirely, and, in so far as they were effective, they led to a fall in living standards for the majority of the people. Because Zimbabwe cannot afford to cut itself off, the government will have to go on living with the dilemma of seeking to retain the support and confidence of the business and financial sectors both domestically and internationally, while pursuing its admirable aims for greater equality of reward and opportunity and the final elimination of racism.

John Saul's and Stephen Gelb's *The Crisis in South Africa* is a very uneven piece of work. Its strengths are the valuable critical accounts of the South African government's attempts at reform, such as the Riekert Commission on the movement of labour, and the Wiehan Commission on trade unions and the organisation of labour. An example of the telling points made by the authors is the distinction Riekert makes between 'qualified' urban Blacks who it is recommended have extended rights, and the temporary labourers ('the unqualified') who have very few rights. The book also has a useful short chapter on the African National Congress (ANC), outlining its developments, its strengths and weaknesses.

Where the authors are much less successful is in their attempt to provide an analytical framework based on Marxist concepts and assumptions, as an alternative to 'sterile, liberal-minded agonising' (p. 3). The problem with Marxist analyses—and there sometimes seem to be almost as many of them as there are Marxists writing about South Africa—is that they finish up in contortions as the authors try to reconcile concepts and assumptions which were developed for social circumstances different from those prevailing in South Africa. Saul and Gelb are not altogether unaware of the problem, as is indicated in the passage below, which to a non-Marxist reads like a jumble of jargon. 'A similar sensitivity', write Saul and Gelb, 'may be in order regarding the "reserve army", that term itself masking as many difficulties as it illuminates. For if the actors epitomised by the term are in fact being de-peasantized, there is some chance that they are also being *de-proletarianized*. Adequately expressive analytical categories are difficult to come by: "relative surplus population", the "sub-proletariat", the "marginalised" have all some resonance, as does Chris Allen's term the "outcasts" (though the possible use of the label "lumpenproletariat" for some of these might be more controversial)' (p. 97).

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

African Socialism or Socialist Africa? By Abdul Rahman Mohammed Babu. *London: Zed. 1982. 174 pp. Index. Pb.: £4·95.*

ABDUL Rahman Mohamed Babu is an important figure in the history of the African decolonisation era. As a young man he spent several years working in London, preparing himself for the coming struggle against colonialism. Then he returned to Zanzibar to put theory into practice. After the 1963 revolution he became a minister in Sheikh Karume's government, but when Zanzibar joined Tanganyika in 1964, as Tanzania, he moved to the mainland as a member of Nyerere's cabinet. The move inland proved fortunate for him, for when Karume was assassinated in 1974, and he was arrested, held in detention, and eventually sentenced to death by the Zanzibar courts, Nyerere refused to send him back to the island for execution. Ultimately he was released, and has since lived in exile.

Most of *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?*, he tells us, was written while he was in prison in the early 1970s (it includes a short, moving section on the evils of preventive detention). Published a decade later, it now seems rather out of date. The theme of neo-colonialism, which he develops at length, was indeed set out even longer ago, in 1965, by Kwame Nkrumah in his *Neo-Colonialism—The Last Stage of Imperialism*—the lessons of which, as Babu reminds us, Nkrumah himself never managed to put into practice in Ghana. More serious is his virtually ignoring the former Portuguese colonies. It would have been illuminating to have had the comments of this veteran African Marxist on the liberation struggles, and on the present Marxist governments of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, but he barely mentions them. He can even assert that there has been 'no concrete analysis of the concrete situation' in Africa, thus ignoring the work of Amilcar Cabral who, alone among his African contemporaries, analysed concretely what he had seen and studied in Portuguese Africa, and then drew from it his own concrete plan of action, Marxist in design, but fitted to the struggle in Africa.

Nor does Babu mention the Marxist governments of Ethiopia or Benin, nor yet the struggle of the Marxist Eritrean People's Liberation Front against the Ethiopian government. There is not even any reference to Robert Mugabe. By closing his eyes to so much, and by giving only a generalised account of the struggle now going on in Southern Africa (no mention, for instance, of the ANC), he will disappoint any of his readers who awaited from him an analysis of current radical movements in Africa. Instead he merely repeats the messages of classic Marxism, without giving them any very clear relevance to the Africa of the 1980s.

University of Edinburgh CHRISTOPHER FYFE

The Ethiopian Revolution. By Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux. *London: Verso. 1982. 304 pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £5·95.*

THIS book falls into two sections, although it is not organised as such. The first relates Ethiopia to general patterns and theories of revolution and concludes by analysing the prospects of a transition from a state of 'socialist orientation' to socialism. The second and related focus of the work is an assessment of the causes of the overthrow of imperial rule and the process by which the military came to power, its radicalisation and the 'postrevolutionary' order. The authors also examine the relationship of the Eritrean struggle and the opposition nationalities to the change, and the regional and international dimensions.

The authors view the Ethiopian revolution as akin to the classic revolutions. They consider fundamental social and political changes to have taken place. Put simply, the

argument is that Ethiopia has been undergoing a transition from a precapitalist economy and feudal type political structure under the development of capitalism.

The analysis of the revolutionary process focuses on the relationship between the army and the civilian social and political forces. The authors oppose a generally held view that the military seized power from the civilian political groupings and thus 'betrayed' the revolution. Instead, they argue that the military were radicalised, that mass political action was essentially limited and the military 'arose from and to some degree consolidated the achievements of the mass movements' (p. 34). Particular weight is given to the political radicalisation and personal determination of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Chairman of the Derg. The authors stress the supportive international environment. They analyse the decline of United States strategic interests and the process by which the Soviet Union shifted away from Somalia and facilitated the development of the postrevolutionary order.

The book provides a useful account of what took place in Ethiopia between 1974 and the end of the decade in a dispassionate way with little flavour of the bloody turmoil of those years. The arguments are presented in a forthright fashion but at times with an ambiguity which reflects the nature of the events and the authors' criteria. Although sympathetic to the fundamental change which took place, there is a reservation in judging the extent to which the postrevolutionary order has been firmly established. The writers give much emphasis to the preconditions for a transition to socialism and the existent revolutionary qualities, yet also provide much evidence for an alternative development, for example, the absence of a developed social and economic framework for such a transition and the potential for an Egyptian or Nasserist outcome in the sense of autocratic rule, based on the army, reformist and afraid of incorporating the workers and peasants. The reader is left in doubt as to whether the establishment of co-operatives without collectivisation is likely to lead to anything more than the typical pattern of social differentiation among the peasantry. There is some evidence that many of the Peasant Associations are dominated by wealthier elements and since the political party is to be established around such structures the prospects appear less revolutionary. One further question raised by the book concerns the reasons why the merchant community has remained untouched by the changes.

The authors devote a chapter to 'Regional and National Questions'. They argue that the militaristic response of the Ethiopian regime does not contradict its revolutionary credentials, since that is the way of all revolutions, present utilitarian arguments for the unity of the Ethiopian state and blame all and sundry for the continuation of the problem after 1974. These problems are not only linked to the issue of political democracy but to the capacity of the post-1974 order to survive given the underdeveloped state of the economy and social structure. There are also certain errors of interpretation and fact in the Eritrean section. The authors mention the often repeated but unsubstantiated view that the two fronts are controlled by clandestine political parties (p. 181); Herui Bairu did not break from the ELF in 1974 (p. 188); Isais Afeworki is not the son of a small trader but from a prominent Asmara family (p. 183); Eritreans in Ethiopia were not stimulated to oppose the Ethiopian revolution because of class interests (p. 179); the tern *fallul* has the connotation of anarchist rather than rebel; and the parallels with and influence of Arab politics on the Eritrean movements and splits therein are exaggerated, for the divisions and conflicts have an indigenous dynamic.

University of Manchester DAVID POOL

Libya: A Modern History. By John Wright. *London: Croom Helm. 1982. 306 pp. Index. £13·95.*

JOHN WRIGHT'S second major book on Libya is a contemporary history of the country. For the first five chapters he treads well worked ground from the Italian colonial period to the close of the rule of King Idris. In many ways, the author is at his best in this earlier period. The handling of the Italian occupation is extremely well done, demonstrating exceptional knowledge of the sources and a sureness in interpretation. There is much to admire, too, in the analysis of conditions under the monarchy and not least of the relationship between the ageing king and Ibrahim al-Shalhi, controller of the Court and manipulator/servant of Idris. Wright demonstrates the ineffectual role of the king and the immaturity of the structures that were designed to support him at a time of surging Arab and Libyan nationalism. He makes a strong case for the inevitability of the fall of the king and those who surrounded him. In this area, the author is adding new information and innovative interpretations.

Much of the book is concerned with the revolution of 1969 and the political system that emerged, though attention is also given to the economy and society created by the revolutionaries and in particular by Colonel Qadhafi. In contrast to other recent publications, notably J. A. Allan in *Libya: The Experience of Oil* (1981), John Wright suggests that the changes in Libyan political life in 1969 were far more in the style of a coup d'etat than a revolution. He stops short of implying that the revolutionary actions were undertaken ultimately to legitimise the coup, but is clear in stating that all the aims of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were negative, taken from the Nasserite repertoire, and comparatively easily achieved. Initiating a positive set of policies proved difficult for the new regime and it was not until 1973 and the Zavia speech by Qadhafi that the government adopted a unified approach to change inside the country under the guise of the Green revolution. John Wright argues that Qadhafi successfully pushed forward his views in the teeth of dislike by the intellectuals, the religious leaders and even his collegues on the RCC only because he controlled the one effective organ of state—the army. All his victories were to arise from this one factor, against which his abilities as an orator, a world philosopher and man of faith were as nothing. Those who have scoured the Green Book written by Colonel Qadhafi might not entirely disagree with John Wright's conclusions.

The volume's contribution to economic analysis is rather less, possibly, than that in historical and political spheres. The author is rather over-optimistic of Libyan oil resources and deals only in brief with agricultural or industrial problems experienced by Libya in recent years.

This is a short book, but an extremely good one. It provides a different view of Libya as a contemporary state from most other sources. Both indexing and bibliography are carefully and extensively done.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

Multinational Corporations in the Political Economy of Kenya. By Steven W. Langdon. *London: Macmillan. 1981. 229 pp. Index. £20·00.*

Modern Kenya. By Guy Arnold. *London: Longman. 1982. 156 pp. Index. £7·95. Pb.: £3·95.*

HOW should we judge development performance? Kenya is a country that enjoys the confidence of foreign investors: its growth rate is high and it appears to be industrialising rapidly. These are the indicators that appeal to Mr Arnold. On the other hand, it is argued that in Kenya, as in many other Third World countries, these

statistics merely represent the phenomenon which Rene Dumont has recently termed 'maldevelopment'. The benefits of growth are confined to a few whilst the many are positively harmed in so far as this growth is generated by the multinational corporations (MNCs). These firms, it is argued, do not provide goods that meet the basic needs of the people. They provide a few relatively highly paid jobs in the towns to manufacture high-cost products for consumption by an urban elite, thus diverting resources which could cater for the rural and urban poor. Thus they take advantage of and strengthen an existing inequitable income distribution and prevent the poorest and most numerous groups in society from participating in development. Such arguments, of course, refute current thinking in the United States, Britain and elsewhere, that private investment is of equal or greater value to development than government aid. But if the MNCs do so much damage, why do Third World governments welcome them?

Mr Langdon's careful study of the operations of MNCs in Kenya corroborates the theories of the critics. Using case studies of different industries, his empirical evidence shows that the policies of MNC subsidiaries do not encourage improvements in the living standards of the Kenyan poor, nor do they provide as much employment as local firms in the same industry (per unit of production), nor do they promote the establishment of local firms who could profitably exploit backward or forward linkages. Mr Langdon suggests that MNC investment is encouraged because of the interest and involvement of the political classes in their activities. He argues that the foreign firm dispenses favours and benefits to politicians and bureaucrats and can thus exercise considerable leverage in decision-making. Although it is hard to dismiss these arguments within the Kenyan, or even the African context, it would be wrong to assume that they apply throughout the Third World. In countries where the traditions of national entrepreneurship are older and stronger, political forces which countervail MNC power are more likely to have developed.

Mr Arnold's book is written at a more popular level but it is not clear among whom the readership is likely to exist. It often reads like a government publication, although every now and then qualifications modify the general panglossian approach. Nevertheless, the voluminous literature which warns of the dangers to Kenyan society of growing inequality and land hunger seems to have passed the author by.

University of Bath E. HORESH

Namibia: The Last Colony. Edited by Reginald H. Green, Kimmo Kiljunen and Marja-Liisa Kiljunen. *London: Longman. 1981. 310 pp. Index. £5·95.*

THIS book is a collection of essays of varying quality and length. The title is slightly misleading as most of the essays are on different aspects of the political economy of Namibia, as it is now and as it might develop in the future under a SWAPO administration. There is very little on the implications of the territory's international legal status or on its place in the international political system. The authors' sympathy for SWAPO and its war of liberation also seems to rule out any hard-headed analysis of political trends. Although attractively laid out with a number of maps and a substantial statistical appendix, the unremitting emphasis on economic facts and figures in the main text and the repetition of the same basic information by different authors makes the book rather heavy going to read from cover to cover. The result is that the whole is somewhat less than the sum of the parts. Its appeal is likely to be as a work of reference.

The picture painted throughout is one of extreme inequality within the territory and of economic exploitation of the territory by South Africa. The sharp contrast

between the abject poverty of the vast majority of the population and Namibia's abundance of natural resources, particularly minerals, is brought out well. In his chapter on 'South African Capital and Namibia', Duncan Innes analyses the underdevelopment of the territory in straightforward Marxist terms, explaining the differences between South Africa and the western powers over Namibia's future in terms of a conflict of interests between South African capital (excluding the Anglo American Corporation) and international capital which has a preference for a neocolonial solution that would involve SWAPO. A short chapter on transnational corporations by Constantine Vaitsos touches on the controversial involvement of foreign governments in Namibia's uranium industry, but it is sparse on details and rather wild in its allegations. Vaitsos argues that in the case of France 'uranium relations appear to have been tied to the sale of nuclear weapons and delivery systems like Mirage jets and Crotale guided missiles' (p. 225). A chapter on 'Agrarian Change' by Robert Chambers and Reginald Green examines realistically the difficulties that a SWAPO administration would face in reforming the agrarian sector and, in particular, in reorganising ranching to meet a number of different criteria, including equity, employment, and productivity. They draw on the lessons to be learnt from the post-independence experience of a number of African countries. Among the book's other chapters are an interview with the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, and an analysis of the role of the churches in the liberation struggle.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

ASIA

Intervention in the Indian Ocean. By P. K. S. Namboodiri, J. P. Anand and Sreedhar. *New Delhi: ABC Publ. House. 1982. 361 pp. Index. Rs. 96.00.*

THERE may be a consistent or at least irregularly sustained attempt to destabilise governments of small states in the Indian Ocean region, but to describe the attempted Seychelles coup of November 25, 1981 as 'well planned' (p. 1) does seem an exaggeration. It can, however, be attributed to a worthy attempt by the authors of this book to achieve a topical immediacy unusual in academic circles. They are, in fact, all connected with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi and as such are closer to government than to the universities. This probably accounts for those passages which seem like an apologia for India's activities or inaction in the region.

Whatever the structural or other weaknesses of this book, it is full of useful information which is not otherwise available in one place. Unfortunately the statistics are heavily derived from secondary sources, but these at least have the merit of being up to date. Obviously reliable data is, however, interspersed with remarks or tantalising assertions which remain undocumented. This applies, for example, to the reference (p. 175) to alleged use by the United States Navy of South Africa's Simonstown base and to the possible South Alantic Treaty Organisation. On the other hand, the bibliography, especially of Indian sources, is extensive and the annexures consist largely of a useful reprint of a four-part article in The Washington Post by John Fialka on 'The Rapid Deployment Force'.

In general the book concentrates on what it terms 'an unrestrained arms race in the Indian Ocean' and on India's response to this. The evident anxiety about the progressive involvement of foreign powers in the area is in many ways realistic and it serves to alert readers in other parts of the world to the need to enhance security on a regional basis. The Indian Ocean region is, however, not an ideal location for

pioneering in this field. For one thing, it is very diverse and the definition of a coherent set of common interests is thus a near impossibility. It is not just that some countries are richly endowed with natural resources such as oil or minerals, but that there is an enormous, even extreme, range of state size and of population dispersion or concentration.

The aspiration (p. 242) of persuading individual countries round the ocean's littoral to reverse their military commitments is, in the light of the experiences of the Soviet Union in the area, perhaps not wholly unrealistic. The common cause which would act as the stimulus will not, however, be easy to find and even if the Northern powers could be persuaded to abandon their naval activities, indigenous 'big' powers might be perceived as likely to arise. The book is characterised by 'India's genuine desire to minimise the dangers of military intervention' and presumably to establish a 'zone of peace'. It is as such sometimes disarmingly frank and admits (p. 229) that there is something in the view that India used the 'concept in order to camouflage its own naval expansion programme'. The book, though patchy and erratic, is worth reading, partly because of such incidental insights and above all because it originates wholly in the region about which it is written and expresses opinions.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Racism, Struggle for Equality and Indian Nationalism. By Nemai Sadhan Bose. *Calcutta: Firma KLM Private. 1981. 275 pp. Rs. 80.00.*

PROFESSOR BOSE has written a very informative work, primarily based on study of books, pamphlets, and press files from nineteenth-century India. His theme is 'Indian nationalism during its formative era', and his thesis is that the chief force moulding it was resentment at 'glaring manifestations of racial discrimination and arrogance' (p. xvii). Racial intolerance and exclusion of Indians from responsible positions is traced back to two rulers in particular, Cornwallis and Wellesley (the latter is, oddly, confused on page 2 with his brother Wellington). An uncodified mass of legislation and procedure left Europeans 'virtually exempted' from the jurisdiction of the East India Company's courts (p. 29). Indians among whom a political sense was dawning were first roused to protest by a Jury Act of 1826 which gave a preferential place to Christians, Indian Christians included. It was remedied in 1832; and in 1834 Macaulay arrived in India, full of 'enthusiasm and almost missionary zeal' for his aim of bringing Europeans under the control of the courts (p. 44). A step towards this in 1836 provoked the first of a long-drawn-out series of controversies over what white residents called the 'Black Acts'. There was loud applause at one meeting in Calcutta for a proposal to lynch Macaulay. The Criminal Code, whose chief architect he was, and which was submitted to the government in 1837, was not put in force until 1860, a year after his death. Europeans were free by now to settle in India as landowners, and indigo planters in particular were a law unto themselves, petty tyrants over their ill-used peasantry. In 1849-50 European opposition was strong enough to compel even that benevolent despot Dalhousie to drop a measure abolishing exemptions from criminal law. Indian opinion, inarticulate in 1836-38, was still hesitant, but it was this agitation that set it on a definite course, and put an end to reliance on illusions about British justice. Peasant revolt against the planters, coming soon after the Mutiny, brought into being a further stage of political consciousness among the growing new intelligentsia. European misconduct sheltered by legal privilege was the biggest subject of complaint in Indian newspapers, whose number swelled by 1875 to nearly 500. A climax came in 1883 with the 'Ilbert Bill', a modest enough measure to extend the right of Indian magistrates to try European offenders. The campaign of

resistance to it, waged in Britain as well as in India, was 'unprecedented in its virulence and outpouring of venom against Indians' (p. 162); it was fuelled by alarm at the gathering pressure for admission of Indians to higher places in the services. It ended with Ripon, the well-meaning but irresolute Liberal viceroy, allowing the proposals to be watered down. But the impact on Indian feeling proved a lasting one. Bose regards the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 as a consequence of it, and concludes that the definite advent of nationalism must be placed not in the 1890s but in the 1880s.

V. G. KIERNAN

Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy. 2nd edn. By J. A. Stockwin. *London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 333 pp. Index. (First publ. 1975.) £15·50. Pb.: £8·50.*

IN the US Senate Japan is coming under attack in the form of the so-called 'reciprocity' bills. The European Community is seeking consultations with Japan under Article XXIII of the GATT. While Japan is accused of unfair trading practices, especially in terms of the accessibility of the Japanese market, there is an underlying concern that Japan is not integrated into the international economy and that, while benefiting from the system, it not only gives little in return but indeed causes serious problems. Japan, it is alleged, is not a good international citizen. Whatever the merits or demerits of the case, as Professor Stockwin points out, 'it is difficult . . . to characterize Japanese foreign policy except in terms peculiar to Japan's own circumstances' (p. 256).

Of course every nation's foreign policy is a reflection of its own circumstances, but among the industrial nations nowhere perhaps are they as 'peculiar' as they are in Japan. Against Western images of 'Japan, Inc.', of the 'consensus society', of the homogeneity of the Japanese nation begetting a unique degree of harmony, there are, in fact, as the title of this book indicates, deep political divisions beneath the surface which in turn reflect social and ideological tensions. Japan is not without its contradictions, nor do they appear less acute in the early 1980s.

Stockwin stresses that 'in Japanese society and politics consensus and conflict are not mutually incompatible' (p. 25), and that 'the juxtaposition of conflict and consensus, tension and stability, was probably the aspect of Japanese politics and government which was least easy to understand from the outside' (pp. 5–6). Seven years ago, when the first edition of this book appeared, Professor Stockwin set out, successfully, to reveal and clarify these contradictions. In this fully revised edition, the reader is brought up to date on the current state of affairs. I have one minor reservation. While Stockwin concentrates on the mainstream political movements, he eschews the extremes, with very little on the far left and practically nothing on the far right. One would have welcomed an authoritative analysis of the Narita Airport business as one would benefit from some indication of the meaning of what appears to be a recent militant resurgence of the extreme right.

There can be no doubt that Japanese politics have been successful in ensuring a high degree of economic growth, remarkable resilience in the face of recession, and a comparatively enviable state of social stability. Questions remain, however, which for the time being cannot be answered. The divisions have been contained in a situation of high economic growth. In that sense the Japanese political system and indeed democracy itself have not yet been fully tested. One would hope that the Japanese will not have to endure such a test. Nevertheless, while the historian must be careful not to read too much of the past in the present, there are two reasons for expressing some

anxiety. One is that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is a bit too reminiscent—in terms of corruption, factionalism, absence of ideological principles and real popular commitment—of the ultimately ineffectual prewar parties. The second is the lack of sensitivity, based on ignorance, of the Western nations' approach to Japan. It is in that sense, therefore, that one would hope that the many readers Professor Stockwin's study deserves might include individuals (or their advisers) such as Senators Danforth and Heinz and Sir Roy Denman.

University of Stirling JEAN-PIERRE LEHMANN

The Awakening Giant: China's Ascension in World Politics. By Harish Kapur. *The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1981. 314 pp.*

THIS book is a meticulously researched and clearly written study of Chinese foreign policy since 1949. The work is extensively documented, with footnoting in Russian, French, German and English, and original tables on the economic and political relations of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with selected nations. The author also makes frequent references to prerevolutionary Chinese history to provide the background for his analysis of PRC foreign policy initiatives.

The chapters on Chinese relations with, respectively, the Soviet Union, the United States, Europe, Japan and the Third World can be read separately, according to a reader's research interests. These chapters are nevertheless held together by certain recurrent themes such as the author's frequent distinction between party-to-party and state-to-state relations in his discussions of China's foreign policy. The author also places these separate chapters in context with his introductory discussion of 'China's Perception of the World' and his concluding chapter entitled 'Towards a Great Power Status'. In view of the importance of the topic that Professor Kapur addresses in his introduction, this chapter might have been expanded to provide more information on the cognitive underpinnings of PRC foreign policy in general and Chinese theories of conflict and change in particular. The introductory chapter does provide a useful historical preface for the chapter on Sino-Soviet relations, however, and these two chapters together give the reader a very good sense of the sporadic, tenuous, conditional and tactical nature of Sino-Soviet relations since 1917 from the perspectives of both Beijing and Moscow. Professor Kapur also poses a number of important questions about the dependability and durability of the current Beijing-Washington relationship in the conclusion of his chapter on Sino-American relations (pp. 94-96).

Professor Kapur invites debate on certain points of analysis and historical interpretation in his book, including his assertion that Chinese military backwardness is 'not inherent' but is rather the result of a conscious choice in favour of a 'non-professional, people's army' (p. 286). A second point of dispute is his contention that by the mid 1970s 'Europe began to occupy an even more important position in Chinese perception than the United States did' (p. 181). This claim may be considered to be a bit hyperbolic by many students of Sino-American and Sino-European relations. It is nevertheless one of the great strengths of this book that it goes beyond the analysis of the 'great power triangle', and gives considerable attention to Beijing's political, economic and security relations with Europe, Japan and the Third World.

This work should be considered for adoption as a core text for graduate and upper level undergraduate seminars on Chinese politics and foreign policy. It would be particularly valuable as a companion text to a book on the domestic sources of PRC

foreign policy, such as James C. F. Wang's *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1980).

University of Southern California DOUGLAS T. STUART

The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and their Revolution 1895–1980. By Jonathan D. Spence. *London: Faber. 1982. 465 pp. £11·50.*

HAVING produced a trilogy of brilliant books evoking the world of China under the Qing, Jonathan Spence, an Englishman and a Professor at Yale, has turned his attention to the history of that country in the present century. Whereas his subjects in previous books have been either elites or members of the common people he has chosen in this work to focus upon intellectuals, and particularly writers. The central figures are Kang Youwei, Lu Xun and Ding Ling, but the personal experiences and works of a dozen intellectual figures form the major action of the story, with the activities of both elites and masses confined to occasional (sometimes rather breathless) paragraphs which allow the reader to catch up on those events in which the lives of his subjects are enmeshed.

Although an extensive secondary literature exists concerning many of these figures Spence's treatment of them is never less than stimulating, and his exceptional gifts often enable him to combine literary and historical art to convey to the reader a sense of the immediacy of the experience of his subjects which renders this an unusually vivid and occasionally moving work. He devotes all but sixty pages to the period before 1949, though this is perhaps due to the paucity in recent times of literature and of evidence regarding the lives and reflections of his chosen writers; the tone of the book is tragic almost throughout. Thus Ding Ling, having escaped with difficulty from the Guomindang to the newly communist area around Yan'an, was denounced for criticism of the local bureaucracy and rusticated; and having re-emerged as an acceptable and important literary figure in the late 1940s and 1950s she was purged again in 1957, culminating in five years of solitary confinement. But, as Spence is concerned to point out, with her release and the rehabilitation of the persons or the memories of so many others so brutally handled in those terrible years younger protestors and critics were taking their places in those same prisons, Wei Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua among them.

Spence's latest book is an artistic accomplishment as much as it is a work of history, though one could cavil at his chosen title since his subject is not the Chinese people but some notable members of the literary intelligentsia, a group for the most part estranged from the events of Chinese history and too often the victim of those events. Indeed, his attention is focused upon those Chinese who were most influenced in this century by Western ideas, whether philosophical, literary or political, and the reader is led to reflect how little such individuals have had any real impact upon the Chinese revolution, that other component of Spence's title.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

A History of Sri Lanka. By K. M. de Silva. *London: Hurst; Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. 1982. 603 pp. Index. £18·50.*

THIS is an impressive book, a detailed, comprehensive and reliable account of Sri Lanka's history from ancient times to the present. It is written with great clarity to suit the layman, and with great fidelity to the sources and to primary research so that the specialist is also well served.

As the author graciously states, this volume represents an achievement not just of an individual but of a generation or two of Sri Lankan scholars. Thirty years ago, very little in the way of serious scholarly writing on the island's history existed. Historians at the University of Ceylon (as it then was) resolved to fill this vacuum and despatched several of their brightest graduates to the Universities of London and Oxford for a solid grounding in historical study. Each was asked to examine a separate epoch—the ancient period, the Portuguese, Dutch and early British periods, etc. Their spade work and the labours of K. M. de Silva, who did plenty of digging himself while presiding over this collective expedition into the island's past, are distilled here.

It is possible to fault the author on two counts, but it should be stressed that these problems flow inevitably from two of the book's great strengths. De Silva succeeds in presenting an account that is massive in its scope and meticulously balanced in its judgements. But the sheer scale of the tale to be told makes it well nigh impossible for him to develop any grand interpretative theme that might have lent greater unity and sharpness to the story. His admirable desire to be fair to all sides prevents him from developing acutely critical assessments which are sometimes warranted.

Two interpretative themes, which imply such critical assessments, occur to this reviewer. First, it might be argued that more than three centuries of rule by European powers led to serious erosion of indigenous culture among the low-country Sinhalese, the most important group in twentieth century Sri Lanka. This, among other things, gave rise to a social, cultural and political insecurity among the Sinhalese which has been a major element in the communal suspicion and strife that have long afflicted the island.

Secondly, the failure of European (and especially British) rulers to make their influence penetrate down towards the village level as it did in India, and the elitism of the Sinhalese politicians who arose within colonial political structures to succeed the British, have generated a system of elite dominance which has survived half a century of universal suffrage. In the post-independence period, this is most apparent in the grossly overcentralised character of every important political party, and in the deference paid to leading members of famous families, however patent their political incompetence.

This second theme merges with the first in the elite manipulation of Sinhalese insecurities to generate communalist fantasies that have poisoned so many constructive political initiatives in recent years.

However, these reservations must not obscure the fact that K. M. de Silva has given us a splendid study that will surely remain the definitive volume on Sri Lanka's history for many years to come.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

China Trade: Prospects and Perspectives. Edited by David C. Buxbaum, C. E. Joseph and P. Reynolds. *New York: Praeger. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne. 424 pp. Index. £32·00.*

U.S.-Chinese Trade Negotiations. By John W. De Pauw. *New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 231 pp. Index. £14·25.*

BOTH of these books reflect the dreams of generations of Western traders of the potential riches available from the vast Chinese market. It may be that trading prospects in this region are now greater than they have ever been. Certainly, the 'open door' policy pursued by the Chinese government looks like continuing and recent statements have insisted that China's desire to extend contacts and cooperation with

foreign countries and companies will be unaffected by the current campaign against economic crimes. Scientific and technical exchanges, the signing of trade protocols, the promotion of foreign investment, the establishment of 'special economic zones' in border provinces, joint ventures—all attest to a determination to expand foreign economic relations in the search for goods and technology.

It is to those involved in trade with China, rather than to academic scholars, that these two books are directed. *China Trade: Prospects and Perspectives* is a collection of papers designed to provide background information, especially of a practical nature: to provide all that foreign traders need to know about 'China's people, its culture and its way of doing business'. What traders wish, or need, to know is not necessarily the same as what scholars will find interesting or relevant. Nevertheless, one might reasonably have hoped for a less superficial analysis of some of the themes than is provided here.

The book falls into four parts. The first is an overview of China's economic policies and recent political developments, and is followed by brief analyses of selected market sectors (e.g. agriculture, oil, minerals and metal mining, machine tools and transport). Part 3 comprises case studies of the experiences of two countries (Germany and Japan) and individual American corporations in dealing with China. Finally, there is an examination of the legal and financial frameworks within which trade must be conducted.

The contributors to the book are mainly professional and academic lawyers and businessmen. Their knowledge of China is derived to a large extent from their own direct contact with the country, but also based on secondary, mainly Western-language materials (legal and trade journals, business reviews, etc.).

De Pauw's book may seem prescient in the light of recent predictions of a major increase in United States–China trade. Through institutional analysis and the use of case studies, it examines the framework within which Sino-American trade must be pursued and, more particularly, seeks to identify the impediments to successful trade negotiations inherent in that framework. It demonstrates the tortuous and frustrating nature of trade negotiations, resulting from bureaucratic and legal constraints that impair initiative. Source information here is provided by questionnaire responses, personal interviews and trade documentation.

It will be clear that the orientation of both these books is very practical. For traders, they will serve a useful purpose—though one may feel occasional anxiety at the superficial view which they sometimes offer of the Chinese economic and political scene. For scholars concerned with the legal aspects of trade, they may also be of some value; but for those whose aim is to analyse and understand current trade policies and the political debates that underpin them, it must be said that the books will be of, at best, only peripheral interest.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ROBERT ASH

Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 1950–1980. Edited by James C. Hsiung *et al. New York: Praeger. 518 pp. $33.95.*

THIS is a collection of reprints of articles which originally appeared in American journals, together with excerpts from books dealing, like the articles, with developments in Taiwan after the government of the Republic of China took refuge on that island in 1949. The material is arranged in eight sections, each accompanied by a commentary written by an expert in the field. The whole is linked together by a foreword from the general editor, and by a background introduction, 'The Taiwan Model', written by Chalmers Johnson. Section 8, dealing with security and defence,

contains a number of useful documents, including excerpts from treaties and official statements, as well as from the US-Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. There is a seventeen-page bibliography composed almost exclusively of material published in the United States or in Taiwan, but there is no index. Footnotes have been omitted from the text of the re-published material, and the sources of most of the statistical data have also been omitted. Proofreading has been careless. Usually the original meaning can be discerned, (e.g. 'no study should never be undertaken without a thorough knowledge' (p. 95), or 'the Chinese authorities took to resotre sugar-refining capacity . . . at a price linked to changes in rice changes in rice prices' (p. 141) but occasionally the muddled expression defies clarification.

The work should probably be classed as propaganda rather than as a scholarly inquiry. The basic thesis set out in the introduction is that the high-growth economies of East Asia—Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore—all owe their outstanding performance to certain common factors: (i) political stability ensured by a long period of one-party rule or colonial administration, with only token concessions to democracy, and with the actual business of governing carried on by a bureaucratic elite subject to only a limited degree of political control; (ii) 'a heavy and consistent investment in education for all the people', developing in the population the skills and attitudes necessary to provide both the labour force and the managerial and technical skills required by a quickly expanding and industrialising economy; and (iii) a skilful policy of state intervention through heavy investment in infrastructure, indicative planning, and 'market-conforming incentives' to private enterprise to expand output and to develop new ventures, with a consequent increase in the volume of goods and services available for consumer satisfaction.

In Taiwan at least, it is asserted, inequality of incomes has been greatly reduced. Economic injustice has grown steadily less irritating, and in return the population is willing to accept as necessary trade-offs other forms of injustice—the continuance of martial law over thirty years, the disproportionate share in political power accorded to the immigrant mainlanders, the denial of freedom of expression in many cases, the prohibition of strikes, and the excessive powers exercised by the police. This is goulash capitalism, unheroic but acceptable.

'In its selections, concededly, certain harsher critical works have been left out', the general editor admits (p. 3), 'because we do not believe their inclusion would enhance our understanding of the Taiwan experience'. Instead, the choice of selections conveys an almost lyrical enthusiasm for the economic progress of Taiwan, for its social and political structures, and for its ability to preserve its independence, stability and prosperity in the future. The goal of a reconquest of the mainland from Taiwan, still vigorously proclaimed by President Chiang Chung-kuo, is either played down or completely ignored by the contributors to this reader.

Publication of the work was assisted by a grant from the Pacific Cultural Foundation in Taipei.

C. BURCHILL

NORTH AMERICA

Interest Groups in the United States. By Graham K. Wilson. *Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1981. 161 pp. Index. £12·95. Pb.: £4·95.*

Interest Group Politics in America. By Ronald J. Hrebenar and Ruth K. Scott. *Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1982. 275 pp. Index. Pb.: £8·95.*

THESE are both useful textbooks. They cover the same period, and naturally use much

the same evidence and sometimes the same quotations. Their points of view are broadly similar and their judgments do not differ very much. They even show the same minor faults, suggesting hasty editing; for example, a tendency to small errors in proper names (Robert Michels, Townsend Hoopes, Richardson Preyer, Robert Dornan: two each) and to unnecessary repetition of information and quotations. Yet their focus is quite different, so that students will find them complementary rather than competitive.

Dr Wilson is an Englishman whose previous books were on the politics of agriculture (in both the United States and the United Kingdom) and of trade unions (United States only). His approach is naturally comparative and he concentrates on the weakness, relative to their British counterparts, of the traditional economic interests operating in American politics: they organise a far smaller proportion of their potential members, and their influence is dissipated by far deeper divisions and more intense rivalries. He devotes half of his text to describing and analysing the farming, labour and business groups; Professors Hrebenar and Scott, in a text twice his length, devote far less space (15 pages against 69) to the same task.

Coming from universities in the Western United States, these two authors give a passing mention to the same characteristics but have far less interest in comparison or organisational description. Their main focus is on lobbying techniques and strategies in relation to the fragmented American political system, which occupy half of their much longer text: 132 pages to 23 of Wilson's on the same subject. Consequently, they are much the fuller source on the operation and impact of interest groups not just on Congress or the executive departments, but on the judiciary, the regulatory agencies, and state government, sometimes through use of the initiative and referendum. They also give a thorough account of the unsuccessful efforts to regulate lobbying in Congress, and discuss the slightly more vigorous efforts to this end in the states. The tiny difference between the two titles is more significant than it seems.

Neither book goes at all deep into theory, though Wilson in his shorter space makes more effort to do so. Both devote a good deal of attention to the 'public interest groups'—particularly Common Cause, Ralph Nader's consumer lobbies and the environmental groups—which developed during the 1970s. Hrebenar and Scott have more to say about the professional organisations; Wilson does not discuss the National Education Association, arguably the single group which has most increased its power in the last few years. Neither says much about the vastly greater involvement of state and local government associations in Washington activity as the flow of federal money first became a flood and then ran into attempts to dam or divert it. Neither deals in detail with the New Right and the Moral Majority which have attracted so much recent attention: the single-issue groups and the rapid growth of grass-roots lobbying are discussed, the alarms aroused by the 1978 election are noticed, but developments in and after 1980 seem to have been briefly added to texts already completed from earlier material. In short books on broad topics that is hardly a serious reproach (especially since the lessons widely drawn elsewhere from 1980 experiences were generally grotesquely exaggerated). More surprisingly, neither book mentions one of the most spectacular interest-group coups of recent years, when President Carter's proposal to reform a tax code which he had mildly called 'a disgrace to the human race' was turned by massive lobbying in Congress in 1978 into a vehicle for reducing to a still more trivial level the tax paid by the very rich on their capital gains.

Perhaps the most visible difference of outlook between the two books lies in Wilson's healthy scepticism about the interest groups' claims to influence, in particular at election times. The two Americans give plenty of examples of failures by interest-groups, which the attentive reader will notice; but their alarmist quotations and their own treatment may well, in the old muckraking tradition, impress less careful readers with the invincible strength of the monster as well as with his villainy.

(Their account of the regulatory agencies in particular seems outdated, ignoring the recent changes which have made some of them so obnoxious to business.) That impression is unfortunate, for American politicians are a timid crew at the best of times; and as both books agree, the decline of party organisation and identification, the development of campaign and media technology, and the diversion of vast amounts of money into congressional elections have greatly sharpened their sense of individual vulnerability to attack by a hostile pressure-group. Those alarms are in all probability excessive, but that fact does little to limit their political impact. Everyone now agrees, therefore, that the interest-groups, moving into a vacuum, have greatly expanded their activity and their visibility. Few people stop to ask (and apart from occasional asides these two books do not) whether the groups have also really extended their power since the old days when the case studies focused not on campaign funds and congressional committees, but on the private interests which, quietly and unchallenged, profited by dominating some limited but vital area of public policy—the nation's forests or its sugar imports, its western grazing lands or public housing in its eastern cities, its defence procurement or the Indian Bureau.

City University, London P. M. WILLIAMS

LATIN AMERICA

Power and Ideology in Brazil. By Peter McDonough. *Princeton, NJ, London: Princeton University Press for the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 1981. 326 pp. Index. £17·60. Pb.: £5·65.*

THIS book is an evaluation of the Brazilian political process in general and of the durable authoritarianism since 1964 in particular. Dr McDonough employs analytical and theoretical techniques of political science and sociology in his study. It is based on findings from interviews with over 250 leaders in the civil service, industry, church, banking, politics and labour; it was not possible to secure interviews with serving military officers or appointees to the President's personal staff. The introduction defines the layout and parameters of the study. The first section deals with the power structure with chapters on origins, education, class, marriage, kinships and working ties, and the second section considers perceptions regarding ideology, policy preferences and legitimacy. The conclusion discusses Dr McDonough's findings, and an appendix describes the methods used to achieve these findings. There is also an extensive bibliography as well as copious notes and well laid out graphs and tables throughout the text.

Dr McDonough lays emphasis on the diffuse nature of Brazilian political institutions and groupings which spills over into the relationships between them; there can, accordingly, be no repeat of the transition to democracy after the death of General Franco in Spain, where the political elites have a much more clearly defined identity and role. He states that the support of elite groups for military rule in Brazil began to wane after 1973 as they perceived that it imposed increasing limitations on their own power and as economic benefits were reduced, the 1968–73 period of rapid growth coming to an end with the 1973–74 oil price rises. In response to this reduced support and the deterioration in the economy the Geisel administration (1974–79) and the Figueiredo government (1979 to date) have gradually introduced a form of limited pluralism; the main purpose of this has been to ensure that the groupings exercising power could continue to command events behind the scenes. Dr McDonough states that the maintenance of an orderly political scene has been helped by 'the corporatist strain in Brazilian politics . . . which while not the preeminent one . . . is remarkably

resilient' (p. 237) and 'by an authoritarian compromise which is an informal coalition between strong minded and cooptable elites, between the economists and the social reformers' (p. 236). He says that 'popular expectations and demands appear to be comparatively modest' (p. 239), and that 'Brazilian politics are not generally polarized between extremes. Neither does it possess a consensual centre' (p. 344). However, Dr McDonough does not sufficiently stress the fact that the growth of the public sector since 1945 and the work of the Escola Superior de Guerra since 1964 have created a close relationship between the military and civilian technocrats, to an extent unparalleled in Latin America. This relationship has made a major contribution to effective government and political stability. Nevertheless, the study's conclusions would seem to be broadly correct, despite the absence of evidence from military sources; the armed forces have been the arbiters of Brazilian politics since the end of the Empire in 1889.

All in all, the book is an original and penetrating piece of analysis and is a very important addition to the Latin American literature on the social sciences. The presentation is logical and clear and the writing is lucid and succinct. The professional Brazilianist will find it an essential work of reference and the informed general reader a source of absorbing interest.

ROBIN CHAPMAN

The Struggle for Land: a Political Economy of the Pioneer Frontier in Brazil from 1930 to the Present Day. By Joe Foweraker. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. 260 pp. Index. (Cambridge Latin American Studies No. 39.) £20·00.*

THIS book considers the development of frontier regions in Brazil from both the political and economic standpoints; it concentrates on three regions, Western Paraná, Southern Pará and Southern Mato Grosso. Dr Foweraker has researched his subject for at least ten years with several field trips to Brazil between 1970 and 1977; the study was completed in December 1979. The first part considers the expansion of the pioneer frontier and the roles of the peasantry and political violence, the process and stages of land occupation and the evolving relationship of the outlying areas to the national economy. The second part looks at the legal history of land ownership, federal and state bureaucracy and the gradual development of an alliance between the state and private capital. The third part is more general and evaluates the relationship between the frontier regions and the formation of the Brazilian state and analyses the emergence of the state itself. There are also several excellent maps and an extensive bibliography.

The structure of the study presents the reader with something of a curate's egg. The first two parts contain a wealth of most interesting factual material on the colonisation of Paraná, Pará and Mato Grosso, and particularly on the problems arising from *posse* (occupation of land which implies a claim on that land). There are fascinating descriptions of the work of major federal agencies such as the National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and the Superintendency for the Development of Amazônia (SUDAM). A picture emerges of developments in Brazil which bear a striking resemblance to the expansion of western territories in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century, with aggressive large private concerns, state governments acting in collaboration with them, small farmers fighting to keep land and the gradual growth of infrastructure and a national market. One serious factual error must be noted: Dr Foweraker speaks of Southern Mato Grosso, but in 1978 Mato Grosso do Sul was created as a new state by subdivision of the former state of Mato Grosso.

The final chapter on 'The frontier and the formation of the Brazilian State' is the most tightly written section of the book and the author's conclusions seem valid. Dr Foweraker says that recently 'the primary political functions of the state in the process of frontier expansion and accumulation have not changed but simply become more complete, in the same way that the form of state has not changed since the 1930s, but has become more politically consistent' (p. 233); that 'since 1930 . . . the state has had to fill a political void left by the loss of hegemony of the export oligarchy' (p. 223); and that 'since 1964 the political State is bureaucratic by definition and military by chance' (p. 230).

In general terms, this study is well researched and rewarding. However, it fails to strike a satisfactory balance between factual detail and theoretical analysis so that the reader is left slightly confused; perhaps it is best to begin by reading the last chapter first since all the rest follows from it. Despite this, the book is most worthy of the serious attention of all those who wish to learn more of a very important aspect of Brazilian development.

ROBIN CHAPMAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Issues before the 36th General Assembly of the United Nations 1981–1982. Edited by Donald J. Puchala and Frederic Eckhard. *New York: New York University Press. 1981. 150 pp. $22.75.*

THIS publication of the United Nations is in its 34th year. It surveys the issues likely to be discussed at the coming session of the Assembly. These include dispute settlement and decolonisation problems by country involved, with an account of previous UN action taken in each case, as well as wider questions of arms control and disarmament, economics and development, global resource management, human rights and social and legal issues. The final chapter deals with UN administration and budget.

There is an alphabetical glossary which includes UN abbreviations, and an index.

Chatham House Library N.G.

The Current History Encyclopedia of Developing Nations. Edited by Carol L. Thompson, Mary M. Anderberg and Joan B. Antell. *New York: McGraw-Hill. 1982. 395 pp. £29·95.*

THIS encyclopedia undertakes to cover the political, economic and social history of 93 developing nations.

Six regional sections cover Africa, the Middle East, East and South-east Asia and the Pacific, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America. The centrally planned Eastern European countries and the world's industrial nations are specifically excluded. Each section is preceded by a map. The country articles which are arranged in alphabetical order and preceded by a short statistical table are of necessity fairly concise. They sketch the recent main political, ethnic, social, and economic events which are shaping each nation's development. At least two photographs from the United Nations collection are interspersed in the text of each article. There is both a name and a subject index. The data given are available in other easily accessible publications of the World Bank, the US Departments of State and

Commerce and the United Nations, but it will prove convenient to students and the general reader to find them collated in one easily handled volume.

Chatham House Library N.G.

World Bibliography of International Documentation. 2 vols. Edited by Theodore D. Dimitrov. *Pleasantville, NY: UNIFO. 1981. 826 pp. $95.00.*

THIS first volume of this ambitious work covers the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations, with particular attention given to UNESCO. After a general section on secondary material come listings of basic documents and bibliographical guides to them. A final section covers works on libraries and librarianship deemed helpful in this field; the arrangement is not very clear, and there is a good deal of overlap with the previous chapter.

In the second volume bibliographies on international affairs, armaments and peace are followed by lists of intergovernmental periodicals and political serials. A useful annex calendars United Nations and UNESCO conferences, and 'international years' and 'days'. Indices of author, corporate body and subject are provided. All European languages are covered.

Some sections may be of more use than others, but many librarians should find this a work of considerable value.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel. 2 vols. Vol. 1, 14 May/30 September 1948. Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich. *Jerusalem: Government printer for Israel state archives. 1981. 925 pp. $69.50.*

THE main volume contains editorial material in Hebrew, accompanied by texts mainly in English; the companion volume includes the necessary English translations or summaries. Themes covered are the Arab war and the need for economic and arms supplies, relations with the United Nations, the quest for international recognition, and the encouragement of immigration. A preliminary volume dealt with the period immediately prior to the establishment of Israel. Three more will bring the story up to December 1949. An annual issue is also planned, covering a single year.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Erratum

In the Summer 1982 issue of *International Affairs*, p. 509, the publisher of *International Arms Procurement: New Directions* (ed.: Martin Edmonds) was incorrectly given as Praeger. The publisher of this book is in fact Pergamon, of New York and Oxford. We apologise to the publisher and to readers for the error.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

A Conversation with Michael Novak and Richard Schifter: Human Rights and the United Nations. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 25pp.

KUPER, Leo: *International Action against Genocide*. London: Minority Rights Group. 1982. 17pp. (Minority Rights Group Report No. 53.) Pb.: £1.20.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT RESEARCH UNIT: *Arms Control and Disarmament*: Developments in the International Negotiations. No. 1, February 1982. London: Central Office of Information. 1982. 24pp. Pb.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT RESEARCH UNIT: *Peace and Disarmament*: A Short Guide to British Government Policy. London: Central Office of Information for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 1982. 15pp. Pb.

BILGRAMI, Syed Jafar Raza: *Salt-II*: A Balance of Ambivalences. New Delhi: Intellectual Book Corner. 1981. 179pp. Index. Pb. 60.00.

CODEVILLA, Angelo M.: *NATO Today*: Curing Self-Inflicted Wounds. London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. 1982. 20pp. £1·50

DALY, John Charles *et al.*: *National Defense*: How Much Should We Spend? Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 28pp. Pb.: $3.75.

GÜRKAN, Ihsan: *NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank*. New York: National Strategy Information Center. 1980. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 67pp. £3·00.

PEERS, Arthur, ed.: *Seaford House Papers, 1980*. London: Royal College of Defence Studies. 1980. 138pp.

WETTIG, Gerhard: *Umstrittende Sicherheit*: Friedenswahrung und Rüstungsbegrenzung in Europa. Berlin: Berlin Verlag. 1982. 192pp. Index. DM25.00.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

BERTSCH, Gary K.: *Power and Policy in Communist Systems. 2nd edn.* New York, Chichester: Wiley. 1982. 192pp. Index. £8·95.

BLIN, John M., GREENBAUM, Stuart I. and JACOBS, Donald P.: Flexible Exchange Rates and International Business. London, Washington: British-North American Committee. 1982. 99pp.

BROWN, A. J.: *Inflation in the World Economy*. (Keynes Lecture in Economics 1980.) London: British Academy. 1982. 16pp. £2·00.

CAUFIELD, Catherine: *Tropical Moist Forests*: the Resource, the People, the Threat. London: Earthscan. 1982. 67pp. £3·00. $7.00.

CLAPHAM, Christopher, ed.: *Private Patronage and Public Power*: Political Clientilism in the Modern State. London: Pinter. 1982. 222pp. Index. £14·75.

CLARKE, Robin and TIMBERLAKE, Lloyd: *Stockholm Plus Ten—Promises, Promises?* The Decade since the 1982 UN Environment Conference. London: Earthscan. 1982. 76pp. Pb.: £2·50. $6.25.

DALY, John Charles *et al.*: *Money and Housing*. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 31pp. $3.75.

DALY, John Charles *et al.*: *Terrorism: What should be our response?* Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 25pp. $3.75.

DAUDERSTÄDT, Michael: *Commercial Loans to Developing Countries*: Must we Ride the Tiger? Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 1981. 24pp.

KING, James C.: The Biology of Race. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1982. 180pp. Index. £11·25.

McFadzean of Kelvinside, chairman: *Global Strategy for Growth*: A Report on North-South Issues. London: Trade Policy Research Centre. 1981. 100pp. £2·00. $4.00.

Muller, Mike: *The Health of Nations*: A North-South Investigation. London: Faber. 1982. 255pp. Index. £7·95. Pb.: £3·95.

National Strategy Information Center. *Strategic Minerals*: A Resource Crisis. Washington: Council on Economics and National Security for the National Strategy Information Center, New York. 1982. 105pp. Pb.: $5.95.

Needham, Rodney: *Circumstantial Deliveries*. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1982. 119pp. Index. £9·00. $16.20.

The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S. (Based on a symposium organised by the Centre for Political Research and Information/Ministry of Culture.) Athens: Centre for Political Research and Information. 1981. 340pp.

Newland, Kathleen: *Infant Mortality and the Health of Societies*. Washington: Worldwatch Institute. 1981. 56pp. (Worldwatch Paper No. 47.) $2.00.

Oil and Apartheid: Churches' Challenge to Shell and BP. London: Christian Concern for Southern Africa. 1982. 78pp. £1·50.

Peccei, Aurelio: *One Hundred Pages for the Future*: Reflections of the President of the Club of Rome. New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1981. 191pp. £6·50. $12.50.

Robertson, K. G.: *Public Secrets*: A Study in the Development of Government Secrecy. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1982. 216pp. Index. £15·00.

Sassoon, Anne Showstack, ed.: *Approaches to Gramsci*. London: Writers and Readers. 1982. 254pp. £7·95. Pb.: £3·95.

Stephen, Frank H., ed.: *The Performance of Labour-Managed Firms*. London: Macmillan. 1982. 280pp. Index. £20·00.

Stokes, Bruce: *Global Housing Prospects*: The Resource Constraints. Washington: Worldwatch Institute. 1981. 64pp. $20.00.

Tolles, Robert: *The Search for a New Economic Order*. New York: Ford Foundation. 1982. 44pp.

Wassmund, Hans: *Gründzüge der Weltpolitik*. Munich: Beck. 1982. 303pp. Index. DM24.00.

Woolcock, Stephen: *Western Policies on East-West Trade*. London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 87pp. Index. (Chatham House Papers No. 15.) £3·95.

Zamagni, Stefano: *Rawls between Contractualism and Utilitarianism*—An exploration of Certain Consequences of Methodological Individualism. Bologna: Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. 1981. 31pp. (Occasional Paper No. 36.)

LAW

Black, Cyril E. and Falk, Richard: *The Future of the International Legal Order*: Retrospect and Prospect. Princeton: Center of International Studies and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 1982. 71pp. (World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 11.) $7.50.

HISTORY

Clements, Kendrick A., ed.: *James F. Byrnes and the Origins of the Cold War*. Durham, N. Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. 1982. 127pp. Index. $13.95.

Crosland, Susan: *Tony Crosland*. London: Cape. 1982. 422pp. Index. £10·95.

WESTERN EUROPE

Dauderstädt Michael *et al.*: *The Outlook for Community Policy on Cooperation with the Developing Countries in the Light of Changing North-South Relations and the Future Development of the Community*. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 75pp.

DIAMANDOUROS, P. Nikiforos: *The 1974 Transition from Authoritarian to Democratic Rule in Greece*: Background and Interpretation from a Southern European Perspective. Bologna: Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. 1981. 36pp. (Occasional Paper No. 37.)

ESSER, Klaus and WIEMANN, Jürgen: *Key Countries in the Third World*: Implications for Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the South. Berlin: German Development Institute. 198pp. 206pp.

FREEMAN, M.D.A., ed.: *British Nationality Act 1981.* London: Sweet and Maxwell. 1982. 88pp. £5·00.

HALPÉRIN, Jean and LEVITTE, Georges: *Politique et religion*: Actes du XX^e Collogue des intellectuels juifs de langue française. France: Gallimard. 1981. 411pp.

KOHNSTAMM, Max: *Jean Monnet*: The Power of the Imagination. Florence: European University Institute. 1981. 34pp.

MURCHLAND, Bernard: *The Dream of Christian Socialism*: An Essay on its European Origins. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 74pp.

POIDEVIN, Raymond and BARIÉTY, Jacques: *Frankreich und Deutschland*: Die Geschichte ihrer Beziehungen 1815-1975. Munich: Beck. 1982. 498pp. Index. DM58.00.

SHUB, Joyce Lasky, ed.: *French Security Issues*: A Symposium. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 48pp. $3.50.

WOOD, David M.: *Power and Policy in Western European Democracies. 2nd edn* New York, Chichester: Wiley. 1982. 177pp. Index. £8·95.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

DUFFIELD, Daniel M., Jr.: *US Security Interests in Eastern Europe*: The Case of Poland. Washington: National Defense University. 1977. 65pp. Pb.: $3.50.

MCCAULEY, Martin: *Power and Authority in East Germany*: The Socialist Unity Party (SED). London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1981. 28pp. £3·50.

SCHÖPFLIN, George: *Hungary between Prosperity and Crisis.* London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1982. 28pp. £3·50.

US COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES: *Flight to Uncertainty*: Poles outside Poland. New York: American Council for Nationalities Service. 1982. 8pp. Pb.

ASCHAKOW, Alexander, ed.: Polen—Das Ende der Erneuerung? Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Kultur im Wandel. Munich: Beck. 1982. 276pp. Index. DM19.80.

A Conversation with the Exiled West Bank Mayors: A Palestinian Point of View. London, Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 15pp.

MIDDLE EAST

Conversations with Harold H. Saunders: U.S. Policy for the Middle East in the 1980s. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 101pp. $5.25.

COOPER, Roger: *The Bahai's of Iran.* London: Minority Rights Group. 1982. 16pp. (Minority Rights Group Report No. 51.) £1·20.

KAHHALEH, Subhi: *The Water Problem in Israel and its Repercussions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. 1982. 51pp. $2.00.

SALEM, Elie: *Prospects for a new Lebanon.* Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 16pp. $3.75.

AFRICA

Apartheid's Army in Namibia: South Africa's Illegal Military Occupation. London: International Defence & Aid Fund 1982. 74pp. Index. (Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 10.) £0·50.

GOLDSWORTHY, David: *Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget.* Nairobi, London: Heinemann Educational; New York: Africana. 1982. 308pp. Index. £13·00.

JASTER, Robert S.: *Southern Africa in Conflict*: Implications for US Policies in the 1980s. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 48pp. $4.75.

RAUCH, Theodor: *Das nigerianische Industrialisierungsmuster und seine Implikationen für die Entwicklung peripherer Räume*: Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung der Raumstruktur in peripher-kapitalistischen Ökonomien. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1981. 398pp. (Hamburger Beiträge zur Afrika-Kunde Band 24.) DM38.00.

Speaking Out: Secret Interviews with Black Workers in South Africa. London: Christian Concern for Southern Africa. 1982. 82pp. £1·50.

ASIA

ALLAN, Bill and HINCHCLIFFE, Keith: *Planning, Policy Analysis and Public Spending*—Theory and the Papua New Guinea Practice. Aldershot, Hants.: Gower. 1982. 159pp. Index. £14·50.

CHAPMAN, John W. M., ed.: *Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies 1981. Vol. 6, Part I: History and International Relations*. Sheffield: Centre of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield. 1981. 244pp. £6·00.

KUO, Shirley W. Y., RANIS, Gustav and FEI, John C. H.: *The Taiwan Success Story*: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952-1979. Boulder, Colorado: Westview. 1981. 161pp. Index.

MILNER, A. C.: *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press for the Association of Asian Studies. 1982. 178pp. Index. $11.95.

PYE, Lucian W.: Redefining American Policy in Southeast Asia. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 37pp. $3.75.

NORTH AMERICA

Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). Vol. XI: Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, 1959 (made public March 1982). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1982. 900pp.

HARDING, Brian: *American Literature in Context, II: 1830–1865*. London, New York: Methuen. 1982. 247pp. Index. £9·95. Pb.: £4·50.

HUNTINGTON, Samuel: *The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in Foreign Policy*. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 19pp.

JUERGANS, George: *News from the White House*: The Presidential-Press Relationship in the Progressive Era. London, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1982. 338pp. Index. £17·50.

MASSA, Ann: *American Literature in Context, IV: 1900–1930*. London, New York: Methuen. 1982. 205pp. Index. £9.95. Pb.: £4·50.

METCALF, David: *Low Pay, Occupational Mobility, and Minimum-Wage Policy in Britain*. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 82pp. $4.25.

STEWART, Larry R., ed.: *Canadian Defence Policy*: Selected Speeches and Documents 1964-1981. Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. 1982. 336pp. (National Security Series No. 1/82.)

TIERSKY, Ronald: *America: the Dialectic of Primacy and Uncertainty*. Bologna: John Hopkins University Bologna Center. 1982. 27pp. (Occasional Paper No. 38.)

LATIN AMERICA

TIMMERMAN, Jacobo: *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*. Trans. by Tony Talbot. London: Penguin. 1982. 164pp. (First publ. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981.) Pb. £1·25.

BOOKS REVIEWED, AUTUMN 1982